WEBVTT

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All right , good afternoon , ladies and

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gentlemen . You know , we're gonna

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start this panel preparing the forward

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deployed force to meet the high-end

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threats . I'm Bill Hamlet , the editor

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in chief of proceedings at the US Naval

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Institute . It's my pleasure to , uh ,

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to moderate today's panel , to

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introduce the speakers , and then , uh ,

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eventually , uh , moderate your Q and A ,

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um . So first you'll notice the seating

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pattern here . This is blue-green

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integration at its best . We've got

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fleet commanders and we've got we've

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got meth commanders and Navy Marine

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Corps integration from my left ,

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starting off with Lieutenant General

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Mike Cedar Holme , Commanding General

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of First Marine Expeditionary Force ,

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General Cedar Holme assumed command of

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one meth in February 2024 , so just

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about a year ago . Wesleyan University

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graduate , he was commissioned and

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trained as a marine pilot . He's

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commanded units in all three Marine

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expeditionary forces , including VMFA

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212 , MAG 31 , 2nd Marine Aircraft

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Wing , and 1 FF . General Cedar Holme

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has flown all Marine Corps operational

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aircraft , including the F-35B , the

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CH53K , and VH92 , the new presidential

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helicopter . He deployed for operations

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Enduring Freedom . And Iraqi Freedom

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and also led task force , Baltic

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watchtower in response to Russia's

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invasion of Ukraine . To his left , by

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several John Wayne , US Navy commander

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of 3rd Fleet , is a native of Port

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Washington , New York , graduate of the

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US Naval Academy class of 1990 ,

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surface warfare officer . Admiral Wade

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has made multiple deployments for

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Operations Desert Storm , Southern

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Watch , Iraqi Freedom , and Enduring

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Freedom . He commanded a PC . I'm a big

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fan of , you know , command early

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command often . He commanded USS

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Fireball , USS Prebble , destroyer

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Squadron 28 , Carrier Strike Group 12

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on board USS Abraham Lincoln . And he

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assumed command of the 3rd Fleet in

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June of last year . To his left ,

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Lieutenant General Calvert Worth , US

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Marine Corps Commanding General , 2nd

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Marine Expeditionary Force , uh ,

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native of Saint Louis .

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Saint Louis , Missouri , he graduated

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from University of Missouri Columbia in

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1989 , commissioned through the Marine

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Corps Officer Candid course in 1991 .

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He's held a variety of command and

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staff roles , including rifle platoon

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commander , battalion adjutant ,

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Company commander , Battalion XO , and

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commanding officer of First Battalion ,

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6 Marines and 6th Marine regiment . And

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and special purpose Marine Air Ground

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Task Force Crisis Response Africa . He

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also served as commander of Task Force ,

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Southwest 20.1 in Afghanistan ,

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Assistant division commander before

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commanding Second Marine Division from

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2022 to 2024 . In August of 2024 , he

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assumed command of TUMEF . And last up

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is uh Rear Admiral Joe Cahill , US Navy

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Commander , Naval Surface Force

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Atlantic . Native of Vermont , a 1992

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graduate of the University of Maine ,

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maniac . Admiral Cahill is also a

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career surface warfare officer who

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commanded a PC . This is there's a

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trend here . Uh , he commanded USS

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Monsoon , PC-4 , USS Prebble , DDG 88 ,

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and USS Bunker Hill CG 52 , where he

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served as an integrated air and missile

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warfare commander for CSG-9 . He later

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served as commander of Carrier Strike

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Group 15 here in San Diego , and he

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took command of Naval Surface Force

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Atlantic in June of 2023 . So

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now I've got a couple of questions to

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get this warmed up . Um , actually ,

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first I'm going to start and give each

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of them an opportunity for an opening

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statement . Then I've got a couple

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questions while you all think of your

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questions . When it comes time for

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audience Q&A , please line up at one of

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the microphone . Let's stay away from

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politics . So if politics comes into

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any of the comments or questions , I'm

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just going to cut it off quickly . Just

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state your name and get to a question .

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No long soliloquies , just questions

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about war fighting and preparing the

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force for war fighting . So , uh ,

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General Cederholm , over to you , sir .

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Hey Bill , uh , thanks a lot . First of

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all , I'd like to , uh , give thanks to

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ASA and USNI for hosting this great

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forum where we can have an open and

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free dialogue , talk about the current

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opportunities in the future . That lies

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off of our bow . Secondly , Bill , I'd

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like to thank you for trying to , you

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know , rope these goats that are up

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here and speaking of these goats ,

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these are , it's a pleasure and an

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honor to be amongst fellow warriors and

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longtime friends , and I look forward

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to our discussion today . So I have the

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humble privilege of . Serving as the

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commanding general of First Marine

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Expeditionary Force , about

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44,133 as of

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this morning , Marines and sailors and

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about 17,000 family members were

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distributed across four bases Tuma ,

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Miramar , Camp Pendleton , and 29 Palms .

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And at any one time given time we have

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about anywhere from 3000 to 8000

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service members deployed across the

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international date line doing our

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nation's bidding and supporting Indo

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Paycom's campaign plans with various

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OANIs that go year round . So let me

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talk just a little quickly about , you

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know , we've heard a lot about force

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design in the United States Marine

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Corps . I'm here to tell you that I

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take delivery of force design

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capabilities every day . It's my humble

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privilege to integrate those , and the

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good thing about that , and I welcome

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questions along any lines or any

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subject lines , but the good thing

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about that is that Ford design has now

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transitioned to bottom up refinement .

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We've done the best thing we could

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possibly do . The great planning and

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programmatics has gone on at higher

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headquarters , and now we've put .

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capabilities , weapon systems in the

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hands of the United States Marines .

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Let them experiment with them . Let

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them get familiar with that , find out

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where the gaps and seams are so we can

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go do our nation's bidding . So I'm

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excited to be here , happy to go

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anywhere you want except for any

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political issues , and I look forward

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to your questions . Thanks a lot . All

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right . OK , uh , thanks ,

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homie . Can everyone hear me in the

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back ? A lot of background noise . All

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right . Well , as a bill highlighted ,

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my name is Vice Admiral John Wade ,

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commander of 3rd Fleet , and as I was

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preparing for today , I realized my

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first ACA conference was 1995 . I was a

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lieutenant , came down here from Naval

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Postgraduate school , and I was with ,

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uh , uh , Wayne . Us who wrote the book

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Fleet Tactics , and it's uh you know ,

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apropos when I was thinking about

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tactics and training back then as a

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young lieutenant tying into this panel

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where we're preparing for the high-end

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threats . Look , I'm just gonna have a

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couple of comments here and look

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forward to the dialogue , uh , you know ,

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my experience as a flag officer .

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Whether first as a war fighting

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development center through Strike Group ,

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into Paycom J3 , leader of a joint task

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force , it's become abundantly clear

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that the only constant in today's

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complex world is change , and , you

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know , the character of warfare as the

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panel before us is changing right

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before our very eyes , whether it's the

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range of sensors , the range and

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lethality of our weapon systems ,

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integration of manned . Unmanned

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artificial intelligence from space all

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the way to the seabed , everything in

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between , cyber , uh , information ,

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and it's happening fast . If you looked

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at the defense clips just today .

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Ukraine , Mediterranean , Black Sea ,

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Red Sea , uh , Western Pacific , the

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Baltic , it's global , OK , and it's

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really , really complex , uh , as we

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prepare for the higher end threat , as

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Admiral Kaylor highlighted today , it's

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an absolute imperative , right , that

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we've got to get after this . He wants

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it all , we gotta move at speed . The

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new SEF and his message to the force

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yesterday and his press conference

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highlighted the importance to increase

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lethality and the tactical proficiency

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of the force to deter and to ensure

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that we're ready to fight and win . And

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the CNO and her NAav plan , that's her

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focus with her P333 targets you

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highlighted the force design with the

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commandant , same thing . So when we

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think about this . When we're working

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to improve our lethality and tactical

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proficiency , I think you need to look

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at it temporarily at time stamp not

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only today but also in the future . In

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the future it's chunks , it's near ,

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mid and far because in order to outpace

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and to increase our lethality at speed ,

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you know , today we've got to do with

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the weapons , the sensors , the

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platforms , and the people that we have

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today . So we got to move at speed with

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high velocity learning at the same time

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integrating the modernization efforts

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and simultaneously planning for the

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future , OK ? And it's a , it's a very

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complex uh opportunity and that the way

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to get after this is . PF . OK , for

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those of you who are not familiar ,

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it's doctrine , it's organization ,

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it's training , certification , it's

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the material , it's the leadership ,

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education , personnel , facilities and

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policy , and that's really , really

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hard . Really , really hard . And so me

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as the 3rd fleet commander , I plug

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into this . Mill PF ecosystem and it's

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really important and I do it in a

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number of ways . First of all , with

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training and certification , uh ,

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second , it's with , uh , enabling the

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experimentation and piloting of new

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capabilities in the modernization

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efforts , and then it's also

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influencing everything else through the

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operations . And when I do it , I'm

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just gonna share with you 4 things that

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I think about every day . And then I'll

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get off the stage and turn it off to

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Cal . The first one is what I call the

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Gordney rule , and I'm honored that

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Ammi Gordney just came in and sat down

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here , but he was the director of the

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joint staff when I was the deputy for

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the chairman . I had a lot of time with

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him . Uh , he provided a lot of

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mentorship . I see I'm a cat . He , he ,

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uh , pulled us both aside all the time .

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Same with Homie here , but , um , he

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would always say , whenever you're

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working in a complex endeavor . Or if

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there's a challenge that you're in

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charge of or you're part of , you gotta

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look at the command and control of the

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C2 , you gotta look at the authorities

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and you got to look at the process . C2

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authorities in process . Every job

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since I've had that , uh , guidance and

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that wisdom , he's absolutely right .

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So that's my lens every day at Third

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Fleet , keeping myself in the 3 point

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stance . What's the C2 ? What are the

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authorities ? What's the process ? And

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if it's not right , then saying

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something about it . Number 2 is , uh ,

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you know , if you haven't read the book

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Team of Teams by Stanley McChrystal , I

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highly recommend it , but , uh , it ,

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it resonates with me just because I've

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played sports all my life . But in

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today's complex world , and honestly we

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don't have similar C2 structures .

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There's a lot of supported supporting .

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You gotta have cross functional teams

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that can get after the gaps in the

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seams at speed to get after speed of

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decision and speed of action . So I'm

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always thinking team of teams and for

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those of you who know me in the

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audience here , I really believe it you

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hear me say it all the time , but I say

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it to my . Because are we being a team

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of teams ? Are we helping ? Are we

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doing all we can to support everybody

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because the imperative is to move at

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speed and you know , Homie and I knew

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each other for a long time . How many

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times do we call each other phone ?

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It's a team of teams , right ? So

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that's important . Third , the Mattis

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rule , uh , if you look it up on Google ,

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it's , you know , General Mattis , then

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Seta Mattis said , what information do

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you have ? Who else needs to know it ?

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Do they know it ? Do they understand it ?

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So a 3rd fleet , that's what we're

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doing every day , any type of email ,

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any type of meeting . If we get

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something , if it's in our lane , we're

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gonna act on it . If it's something

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that someone else should know , ammo

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cat or homie oral , uh , we push it to

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them and then make sure that they

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understand it . Sometimes it's at speed

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to commander to commander , but in

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order to be able to move at speed ,

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sometimes we got to do it faster than

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our staffs . And then lastly , Uh , you

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know , the CNO , it was Admiral Gildea

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first , and Admiral Frank Kenny talks

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about get real , get better . It's not

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a bumper sticker , OK ? It's not just a

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slogan . It's really attacking the red .

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In other words , what isn't right ? And

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then don't shy away from it , embrace

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it , go after it for enterprise level ,

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do root cause analysis , you know , so

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we can get after the root causes and

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then attack it . But then at the junior

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level it's just being excellent every

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day , taking ownership . If it isn't

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right , fix it , and if you can't fix

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it , push it up to the next .

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Supervisor and that's what we're trying

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to do inculcate that culture again so

13:09.947 --> 13:11.947
we can move at speed so that we can

13:11.947 --> 13:15.224
achieve the higher force needs that are

13:15.224 --> 13:17.446
required for the higher end threat . So

13:17.446 --> 13:19.502
I look forward to your questions and

13:19.502 --> 13:21.724
thanks for letting me share some of the

13:21.724 --> 13:21.505
thoughts from the 3rd Fleet perspective .

13:21.594 --> 13:25.590
Thank you . First and foremost ,

13:25.619 --> 13:28.599
good afternoon . Thank you again to

13:28.599 --> 13:31.080
AFCA for the opportunity to just say

13:31.080 --> 13:33.989
some words here and represent toEF ,

13:34.150 --> 13:36.150
the expeditionary force on the east

13:36.150 --> 13:38.719
coast , the counterpart to Hoy and his

13:38.719 --> 13:41.520
one FF team . I would tell you that 3MF

13:41.520 --> 13:45.359
is not here , but in 2FF what you have

13:45.359 --> 13:47.520
a similar construct a marine

13:47.520 --> 13:49.687
expeditionary force that is focused at

13:49.687 --> 13:52.559
the tri-OCOM area , meaning that .

13:53.369 --> 13:57.169
Hoy 1 and 3FF focus against Indo

13:57.169 --> 13:59.369
Paycom as the pacing contingency , the

13:59.369 --> 14:02.250
pacing threat . 2MFF is the service

14:02.250 --> 14:04.472
retained Marine Expeditionary force for

14:04.472 --> 14:06.694
the commandant , and what that means is

14:06.694 --> 14:10.140
that we focus on first UCO ,

14:10.489 --> 14:13.099
then SENCOM and ARCO while also

14:13.099 --> 14:15.369
providing support to SOCOM when

14:15.369 --> 14:18.010
necessary and NorthCO when necessary .

14:18.280 --> 14:20.549
It's a large task , but our mission

14:20.549 --> 14:23.590
partners as Hoy partners and spends a

14:23.590 --> 14:25.869
lot of time with 7th Fleet , I spent a

14:25.869 --> 14:27.869
lot of time with 2nd Fleet and Doug

14:27.869 --> 14:30.070
Perry and his team and 6th Fleet and

14:30.070 --> 14:33.469
Marvin Anderson out in the European

14:33.469 --> 14:35.909
theater . We are partnered , Naval

14:35.909 --> 14:39.619
Integration is real every day for 2F .

14:40.059 --> 14:42.170
What we do as a service retained math

14:42.170 --> 14:43.837
again is provide combat ready

14:43.837 --> 14:45.890
formations which we also send into

14:45.890 --> 14:48.369
IndoACO to become part of the stand in

14:48.369 --> 14:51.770
formation and 3AF . We also stand and

14:51.770 --> 14:54.010
are tasked to be postured to respond to

14:54.010 --> 14:56.090
crisis again , being most ready when

14:56.090 --> 14:58.609
the nation is least ready , but be a

14:58.609 --> 15:00.950
crisis response option to the combatant

15:00.950 --> 15:03.989
commanders in that tri-COO area out of .

15:04.890 --> 15:08.159
And then finally we also serve and have

15:08.159 --> 15:10.840
trained to serve as a JTF capable

15:10.840 --> 15:13.007
headquarters and that again is focused

15:13.007 --> 15:15.960
on UCO principally , but working with

15:15.960 --> 15:19.469
both Stuart Munch , Admiral Munch

15:19.469 --> 15:22.880
at UA Navy UAF working with Marvin

15:22.880 --> 15:26.190
Anderson , we're also prepared to serve

15:26.440 --> 15:28.607
a role and play a role as a joint task

15:28.607 --> 15:31.049
force capable headquarters . In a NATO

15:31.049 --> 15:33.105
role working with Doug Perry and his

15:33.105 --> 15:35.919
team as he responds to crisis , we are

15:35.919 --> 15:39.080
doing a lot out of TF today . We have

15:39.080 --> 15:40.760
an opportunity to talk to you

15:40.760 --> 15:43.479
specifically about how by war fighting

15:43.479 --> 15:45.646
function , whether that be command and

15:45.646 --> 15:47.535
control , whether that be fires ,

15:47.535 --> 15:49.312
whether that be information and

15:49.312 --> 15:51.739
intelligence , or Intelligence

15:51.739 --> 15:53.859
surveillance reconnaissance and the

15:53.859 --> 15:56.580
fires complex we're prepared to answer

15:56.580 --> 15:58.469
questions on how we're addressing

15:58.469 --> 16:00.780
modernization , participating in the

16:00.780 --> 16:03.059
refinement of force design from the

16:03.059 --> 16:05.169
bottom , from the deck plate up ,

16:05.630 --> 16:08.580
helping the comet understand where he

16:08.580 --> 16:10.929
is today in force design implementation ,

16:11.260 --> 16:14.119
where we might be tomorrow . In For

16:14.119 --> 16:16.650
design and therefore what requirements

16:16.650 --> 16:19.289
he needs to fight for inside the

16:19.289 --> 16:22.049
Beltway and with our industry partners

16:22.049 --> 16:24.216
to deliver capabilities that will make

16:24.216 --> 16:26.271
a difference . And when I say make a

16:26.271 --> 16:28.327
difference , that means maintain our

16:28.327 --> 16:30.382
asymmetric advantage with allies and

16:30.382 --> 16:32.438
partners . What I do know and what I

16:32.438 --> 16:34.549
can say , and I'll be willing to talk

16:34.549 --> 16:37.239
about today is that I can tell you in

16:37.239 --> 16:40.320
UCO our NATO allies are watching what

16:40.320 --> 16:42.750
it is we say with regard to joint all

16:42.750 --> 16:45.030
domain command and control . There's an

16:45.030 --> 16:47.799
expectation that the United States and

16:47.799 --> 16:51.200
our maritime forces lead the way with

16:51.200 --> 16:53.760
regard to command and control in the

16:53.760 --> 16:57.239
maritime domain and in the lateral

16:57.239 --> 16:59.659
complex . Certainly in the high north ,

16:59.859 --> 17:02.580
in the Baltics , in the Bosphorus , and

17:02.580 --> 17:04.819
now we've seen over the last year

17:04.819 --> 17:07.260
inside the Red Sea and the Bab al-Meb

17:07.699 --> 17:10.530
there are true missions and true

17:10.530 --> 17:12.752
requirements and capabilities that need

17:12.752 --> 17:15.290
to be delivered not tomorrow but today ,

17:15.579 --> 17:17.746
and they need to be delivered at speed

17:17.746 --> 17:20.260
and at a density that is relevant to

17:20.260 --> 17:22.448
our war fighting capability . Prepared

17:22.448 --> 17:24.448
to entertain your questions today ,

17:24.729 --> 17:26.618
prepared to provide you with some

17:26.618 --> 17:28.948
perspectives on a marine expeditionary

17:28.948 --> 17:31.115
force that is not necessarily oriented

17:31.115 --> 17:34.348
at Indo Paycom but plays a distinct

17:34.348 --> 17:37.780
role inside . The rest of the globe and

17:37.780 --> 17:40.140
with very , very important allies and

17:40.140 --> 17:42.420
partners that are watching what we do

17:42.420 --> 17:44.476
and how we conduct our business as a

17:44.476 --> 17:46.619
naval force . So subject to your

17:46.619 --> 17:48.397
questions , look forward to the

17:48.397 --> 17:51.180
conversation today . Thanks . Hey , so

17:51.180 --> 17:53.660
it is , uh , it's really great to see

17:53.660 --> 17:57.380
so many mentors , coaches , friends in

17:57.380 --> 18:00.140
the audience today , um , and I just

18:00.140 --> 18:01.807
want to say thank you for the

18:01.807 --> 18:04.140
opportunity to have a conversation , so .

18:04.609 --> 18:08.020
I'm the East Coast FG surface guy

18:08.530 --> 18:11.160
and so I , my message coming out of

18:11.160 --> 18:14.410
today is I want you to know that we in

18:14.410 --> 18:17.959
the surface community are laser focused

18:18.250 --> 18:20.290
on building combat readiness , and

18:20.290 --> 18:22.910
that's super important . What that

18:22.910 --> 18:25.229
really means and what I'll talk to you

18:25.229 --> 18:28.189
about for about 5 minutes is how we as

18:28.189 --> 18:29.959
a community are on a cultural

18:29.959 --> 18:33.310
renovation journey and we are learning

18:33.310 --> 18:36.989
at speed . The Red Sea has enabled us

18:36.989 --> 18:39.750
in the eastern med has enabled us to

18:39.750 --> 18:42.869
take that term and to drive it with

18:42.869 --> 18:46.359
urgency . So we're doing a lot

18:46.640 --> 18:50.359
of understanding about what needs to be

18:50.359 --> 18:53.189
ready , when does it need to be ready ,

18:53.319 --> 18:55.541
and what does it need to be ready to do

18:55.719 --> 18:57.800
as the changing character of war

18:57.800 --> 19:01.359
happens in front of us . For

19:01.359 --> 19:04.479
me , that really drives into as a 4th

19:04.479 --> 19:07.670
generation builder is war fighting ,

19:07.880 --> 19:10.270
war fighters , and then that foundation

19:10.270 --> 19:13.239
piece . For me across time , combat

19:13.239 --> 19:16.920
readiness um from a Tycom lens has

19:16.920 --> 19:19.939
really been about three primary factors

19:20.239 --> 19:22.760
that I have the ability to influence as

19:22.760 --> 19:25.079
a teammate to Admiral Wade's point on

19:25.079 --> 19:28.030
team of teams . That's in personnel .

19:28.239 --> 19:30.350
It's in material to include ordinance

19:30.350 --> 19:32.517
and logistics , and it's in training .

19:32.959 --> 19:35.119
Today in the surface community that's

19:35.119 --> 19:37.119
enabled by our readiness operation

19:37.119 --> 19:39.119
centers which are mirrored on our

19:39.119 --> 19:42.750
aviation teammates , rocks as well ,

19:43.000 --> 19:45.167
and that's across personnel , material

19:45.167 --> 19:47.389
and training . At the operational level

19:47.389 --> 19:49.760
of war , it gives me as a TICO using

19:49.760 --> 19:53.650
data . To understand the status of the

19:53.650 --> 19:56.180
force and then rapidly make changes

19:56.180 --> 19:58.458
across those three key lines of effort .

19:59.199 --> 20:01.469
In line of effort one for personnel .

20:02.849 --> 20:05.329
We are managing a lot of personnel risk

20:05.329 --> 20:07.440
right now . You've all have seen this

20:07.440 --> 20:09.890
from a recruiting perspective , and we

20:09.890 --> 20:12.689
are managing that as a TICO by not

20:12.689 --> 20:14.745
taking risk forward with our forward

20:14.745 --> 20:17.369
operating forces , nor those that are

20:17.369 --> 20:19.489
getting ready to go . Our recruiting

20:19.489 --> 20:22.199
teammates have done a great job in 24

20:22.199 --> 20:24.650
and brought in a difference between 2 .

20:24.834 --> 20:28.395
3 was 50 we recruited 25,000 new

20:28.395 --> 20:32.324
sessions and in 24 we recruited 40,000 .

20:32.604 --> 20:35.084
We're laser focused on how we onboard

20:35.084 --> 20:37.905
those new teammates into our warships

20:38.204 --> 20:40.093
because they're now coming in the

20:40.093 --> 20:42.005
spring and we're seeing these new

20:42.005 --> 20:45.285
teammates come at increasing numbers in

20:45.285 --> 20:47.849
scale . The other piece on this is

20:47.849 --> 20:50.329
warrior toughness . We've learned how

20:50.329 --> 20:53.930
to sustain sustain operations while

20:53.930 --> 20:56.729
operating in the west for extended

20:56.729 --> 21:00.000
periods of time for the last 14 months .

21:00.449 --> 21:03.989
Across over 200 offensive and

21:03.989 --> 21:07.800
200 defensive engagements over the last

21:07.800 --> 21:11.530
14 months . Our warships have operated

21:11.530 --> 21:14.349
in the west . And so that piece on

21:14.349 --> 21:16.405
warrior toughness that we've learned

21:16.405 --> 21:18.430
from our teammates and EOD and Navy

21:18.430 --> 21:20.486
Special Warfare , we've been able to

21:20.486 --> 21:22.910
apply that . And my message to you is

21:22.910 --> 21:25.310
the crews and sailors that man our

21:25.310 --> 21:27.500
warships for this nation are doing

21:27.500 --> 21:29.556
incredible work out there . They are

21:29.556 --> 21:32.150
tough , they are resilient , and they

21:32.150 --> 21:35.030
are war fighters operating forward on

21:35.030 --> 21:38.890
the edge . So In the material

21:38.890 --> 21:42.219
line of effort . This is really about a

21:42.219 --> 21:46.209
shift from just in time logistics to

21:46.209 --> 21:48.369
just in case , and it's incredibly

21:48.369 --> 21:51.050
relevant in the Western Pacific . We

21:51.050 --> 21:53.689
now talk about find to fixed timelines

21:53.969 --> 21:56.130
and driving down how we move those

21:56.130 --> 21:58.689
parts around . Our readiness operation

21:58.689 --> 22:00.911
centers have really driven that because

22:00.911 --> 22:03.650
we now have visibility into these

22:03.650 --> 22:06.920
systems , stakeholders , and processes

22:07.250 --> 22:09.369
that we can move at speed , much like

22:09.369 --> 22:11.599
an airline does and much like our

22:11.599 --> 22:14.250
aviation brethren are doing . But

22:14.250 --> 22:16.369
that's not enough because worship

22:16.369 --> 22:20.239
redundancy is combat readiness . And

22:20.239 --> 22:22.520
we are moving out to drive redundancy

22:22.520 --> 22:25.290
risk out of the equation . The next

22:25.290 --> 22:28.359
step on this is to shift from this just

22:28.359 --> 22:31.310
in time logistics to just in case .

22:32.260 --> 22:35.130
So at S1 we're investing significant

22:35.130 --> 22:37.849
amounts of resources and stocking out

22:37.849 --> 22:40.569
our warships with the right parts and

22:40.569 --> 22:43.010
the right technical capabilities so

22:43.010 --> 22:45.650
that we can sustain our forces

22:45.650 --> 22:49.010
operating in the west in a contested

22:49.010 --> 22:52.010
logistics space . That's fundamentally

22:52.010 --> 22:54.170
different for us as a community and

22:54.170 --> 22:56.489
it's new space and I'm excited that

22:56.489 --> 22:59.660
we're working about it . Ordinances for

22:59.660 --> 23:03.430
me as a type commander . In many cases

23:03.430 --> 23:06.569
I'm a logistician . I move combat

23:06.569 --> 23:09.250
potential around in the ordinance piece

23:09.250 --> 23:12.209
in the last two years we've gotten live

23:12.209 --> 23:15.170
reps and sets of how to reload our

23:15.170 --> 23:18.349
warships in the control area and

23:18.349 --> 23:21.189
execution . We're prototyping how to do

23:21.189 --> 23:23.459
that underway , and you've seen many

23:23.459 --> 23:26.079
things publicly where we're executing

23:26.079 --> 23:28.135
Tomahawk and standard missile reload

23:28.135 --> 23:30.650
prototypes at sea . That's an

23:30.650 --> 23:32.872
incredible enabler for our force in the

23:32.872 --> 23:35.599
Indo-Pacific . And the training line of

23:35.599 --> 23:38.229
effort , this is about a community

23:38.229 --> 23:41.380
journey to renovate . It began in

23:41.380 --> 23:43.819
2014 with the stand up of the Service

23:43.819 --> 23:46.097
in Mind Warfighting Development Center .

23:46.140 --> 23:48.029
We've got Wilson Marks here and a

23:48.029 --> 23:50.251
number of witties in the audience right

23:50.251 --> 23:52.540
now . It is modeled on Top Gun , and

23:52.540 --> 23:55.180
we're 10 years in . You're seeing that

23:55.180 --> 23:57.180
investment that many of you made in

23:57.180 --> 23:59.939
that that that organization 10 years

23:59.939 --> 24:03.660
ago pay off in combat every single

24:03.660 --> 24:06.810
day . You're seeing tactical excellence

24:06.810 --> 24:10.349
by design . As we execute multi-domain

24:10.349 --> 24:13.099
combat operations . So a little history .

24:13.510 --> 24:16.189
In 2014 when I was a plank owner at

24:16.189 --> 24:19.630
Smittic . We had 4 lines of effort

24:20.119 --> 24:23.680
build witty , write TTP , teach the

24:23.680 --> 24:26.160
TTP , and then inform future

24:26.160 --> 24:29.869
capabilities . In 2014 , we had

24:29.869 --> 24:33.270
10 warfare tactics instructors . Today

24:33.270 --> 24:36.739
we have 768 . No .

24:36.949 --> 24:40.229
Then we had zero witties on a warship .

24:40.589 --> 24:44.550
Today 66% of our witties , 66% of

24:44.550 --> 24:46.739
our warships have warfare tactic

24:46.739 --> 24:49.630
constructors on them , and 21% of our

24:49.630 --> 24:52.910
XOs and CEOs on warships today are

24:52.910 --> 24:55.030
warfare tactics instructors , and we

24:55.030 --> 24:58.719
are on plan to execute the next step

24:58.989 --> 25:01.859
in the 10 year model of Top Gun . When

25:01.859 --> 25:04.859
I came in as the original N5 , our

25:04.859 --> 25:08.819
average TTP was 17.5 years old . It

25:08.819 --> 25:12.060
was irrelevant . Our TTP today ,

25:12.189 --> 25:14.910
written by Whitty's is on average 2.5

25:14.910 --> 25:17.219
years old . We think that that's about

25:17.219 --> 25:20.329
the right amount of time frame . In the

25:20.329 --> 25:22.930
teaching piece , we've implemented SWAT

25:22.930 --> 25:25.650
at scale , and we are now executing

25:25.650 --> 25:28.160
quarterly SWATs with training that

25:28.160 --> 25:31.199
replicates as realistic with LVC

25:31.810 --> 25:34.329
combat conditions in the theater that

25:34.329 --> 25:36.496
the teams are going to go operate in .

25:36.699 --> 25:38.755
The final piece is on forming future

25:38.755 --> 25:42.479
capabilities . Witties are now PCSed

25:42.839 --> 25:46.239
into IWS and are working on future

25:46.239 --> 25:48.128
capabilities of the Aegis weapons

25:48.128 --> 25:50.569
system with the computer programmers

25:50.569 --> 25:53.819
and with industry . And we are learning

25:54.229 --> 25:57.880
Red Sea learning at speed . When I was

25:57.880 --> 26:00.359
a division officer , we used to pull

26:00.359 --> 26:04.160
tape after a live fire and my entire

26:04.160 --> 26:07.119
career up until we restarted live fire

26:07.119 --> 26:10.000
with a purpose with Smitic , I shot one

26:10.000 --> 26:12.680
standard missile in my entire career

26:12.680 --> 26:15.560
over 20 years . Now every single

26:15.560 --> 26:18.560
warship that goes out the door executes

26:18.560 --> 26:20.739
a live fire against a real

26:20.739 --> 26:23.160
representative threat that Smidick is

26:23.160 --> 26:25.800
training to . Our folks have confidence

26:25.800 --> 26:27.911
in their kit . And they're moving out

26:27.911 --> 26:30.133
and they're executing business . From a

26:30.133 --> 26:32.078
tape standpoint , this learning is

26:32.078 --> 26:35.430
enabled by live fire with a purpose ,

26:36.040 --> 26:39.689
LVC and tape . That tape

26:39.689 --> 26:42.920
data extraction took on average 3

26:42.920 --> 26:45.979
months . Smi is now doing that in the

26:45.979 --> 26:48.739
Red Sea in less than 48 hours . We're

26:48.739 --> 26:51.130
extracting the data to include voice

26:51.130 --> 26:54.060
tapes , internal and external . They're

26:54.060 --> 26:56.439
executing analysis and providing

26:56.439 --> 26:58.495
feedback to those that are operating

26:58.495 --> 27:00.717
forward . Those are getting ready to go

27:00.780 --> 27:02.989
in our schoolhouses and pipelines ,

27:03.420 --> 27:06.699
learning at speed . That's what we're

27:06.699 --> 27:09.219
executing as a community . And a team

27:09.219 --> 27:11.630
of teams model with our aviation

27:11.630 --> 27:13.949
teammates , our information warfare

27:13.949 --> 27:16.469
teammates , and our submarine teammates .

27:17.459 --> 27:19.900
This learning at speed , speed to

27:19.900 --> 27:23.489
enable us to fight and win with an

27:23.489 --> 27:26.140
urgency that I've never seen in my

27:26.140 --> 27:29.560
career in my community before . And

27:29.560 --> 27:32.439
we're doing this through a threat-based

27:32.800 --> 27:36.550
risk-informed , data enabled construct .

27:37.040 --> 27:39.262
And I look forward to the questions and

27:39.262 --> 27:41.318
conversations today . Thank you very

27:41.318 --> 27:43.484
much . All right , thank you . Uh , so

27:43.484 --> 27:45.651
first question actually Admiral Cahill

27:45.651 --> 27:47.762
just , uh , covered a lot of this , I

27:47.762 --> 27:50.096
think for the , uh , surface force , uh ,

27:50.096 --> 27:52.318
but I really want to hear about it from

27:52.318 --> 27:54.318
the Marine Corps perspective , um ,

27:54.318 --> 27:56.373
because your responsibility in large

27:56.373 --> 27:58.719
part is preparing Marines and sailors

27:58.719 --> 28:01.839
and um strike groups and , and , um .

28:02.599 --> 28:06.219
Um , you know , Marine groups to deploy

28:06.219 --> 28:08.330
and get ready for combat operations ,

28:08.330 --> 28:10.589
be prepared for combat operations . So

28:10.589 --> 28:14.189
how is the training evolving as you

28:14.189 --> 28:16.356
watch what's happening in the world as

28:16.356 --> 28:17.967
our adversaries evolve their

28:17.967 --> 28:19.522
capabilities and bring more

28:19.522 --> 28:21.633
capabilities online ? How is training

28:21.633 --> 28:24.030
in the Marine Corps 3rd Fleet ? Admiral

28:24.030 --> 28:26.030
Cahill , we already tested a lot of

28:26.030 --> 28:28.363
this . I'm hearing a lot about Wheaties .

28:28.363 --> 28:30.790
What's the Marine Corps equivalent of a

28:30.790 --> 28:34.359
WTI in the navy ? Don't see their home

28:34.810 --> 28:37.959
play . Well thanks and Cal , you can ,

28:38.170 --> 28:40.114
you can clean up the mess that I'm

28:40.114 --> 28:42.930
about ready to make . Yeah , so thanks

28:42.930 --> 28:44.930
for the question . I think that you

28:44.930 --> 28:46.708
know our training is constantly

28:46.708 --> 28:48.819
evolving and if you look at our basic

28:48.819 --> 28:51.050
mandate an immutable mandate for the

28:51.050 --> 28:53.050
United States Marine Corps is to be

28:53.050 --> 28:55.319
ready when our nation is least ready .

28:55.969 --> 28:58.302
So I think when you take a look at that ,

28:58.302 --> 29:00.580
it's perhaps my most sacred obligation .

29:00.729 --> 29:02.785
To the men and women that I have the

29:02.785 --> 29:05.619
privilege of serving at oneF to ensure

29:05.619 --> 29:07.841
that they're ready . How do you do that

29:07.979 --> 29:10.609
through a very detailed , oriented ,

29:10.900 --> 29:13.339
constantly revising to meet the threat

29:13.339 --> 29:15.660
and the mission standards training that

29:15.660 --> 29:17.939
goes on . I think it's a lot . What

29:17.939 --> 29:20.420
keeps me up at night is probably , and

29:20.420 --> 29:22.910
I know you didn't think you'd hear

29:22.910 --> 29:25.459
uttered from the Marine Corps officer's

29:25.459 --> 29:27.579
mouth , you know , a poem by Tuma .

29:28.520 --> 29:31.750
Right ? Tecusa talks about in this poem

29:31.750 --> 29:33.917
about living your life , and there's a

29:33.917 --> 29:36.083
section in there that talks about when

29:36.083 --> 29:38.479
the moment comes , don't be like those

29:38.479 --> 29:41.640
who weep and beg for more time to live

29:41.640 --> 29:43.959
their lives differently . We don't have

29:43.959 --> 29:46.219
that luxury . In the United States

29:46.219 --> 29:48.275
Marine Corps or in the United States

29:48.275 --> 29:50.859
Navy , when that call comes for the

29:50.859 --> 29:53.026
next fight and the next fight is going

29:53.026 --> 29:55.248
to be nasty and it's going to be ugly ,

29:55.300 --> 29:58.209
we better take a maximum amount of time ,

29:58.540 --> 30:01.050
maximize our training time to do there .

30:01.300 --> 30:03.619
So John and I , our staffs work

30:03.619 --> 30:07.619
constantly to improve and revise our

30:07.619 --> 30:11.420
certification process . I'd look at the

30:11.420 --> 30:14.959
recent addition to CO 2X certification

30:14.959 --> 30:18.469
process . It's now a 17 day evolution

30:18.719 --> 30:20.663
that takes into account real world

30:20.663 --> 30:22.886
scenarios . And if you haven't seen the

30:22.886 --> 30:25.108
syllabus and all the injects that go on

30:25.108 --> 30:27.219
there , I mean , it is a hard problem

30:27.219 --> 30:29.441
set just like Joe talked about training

30:29.441 --> 30:31.719
for real world operations informs our

30:31.719 --> 30:33.989
constantly evolving training ,

30:34.119 --> 30:36.920
evaluation , and certification process

30:36.920 --> 30:39.142
that goes on . So that's the thing that

30:39.142 --> 30:41.150
keeps me up the most at night . is

30:41.150 --> 30:43.094
ensuring that we've provided those

30:43.094 --> 30:45.317
opportunities at generating readiness .

30:45.317 --> 30:47.539
We've provided the proper safe training

30:47.670 --> 30:49.837
to put the Marines in a position to go

30:49.837 --> 30:51.979
answer our nation's call , and it's ,

30:51.989 --> 30:55.280
uh , and you'd be proud of them . Those

30:55.280 --> 30:58.599
44,133 Marines and sailors .

30:59.469 --> 31:01.580
They're different . They're different

31:01.580 --> 31:03.691
than the generation you read about in

31:03.691 --> 31:05.636
the newspapers . They're smarter ,

31:05.750 --> 31:07.917
they're stronger , they're faster than

31:07.917 --> 31:10.028
we were , and it's a humble privilege

31:10.028 --> 31:12.869
every day to serve with them and for

31:12.869 --> 31:14.758
them , and I have every trust and

31:14.758 --> 31:16.869
confidence that they'll be ready with

31:16.869 --> 31:19.420
their training and go out and win our

31:19.420 --> 31:23.359
next battle . No way . So I will

31:23.359 --> 31:25.569
riff off of where Lieutenant General

31:25.569 --> 31:27.736
Cedar Holme left off . I will tell you

31:27.736 --> 31:31.589
that principally the modality

31:31.589 --> 31:33.811
of delivering Marine Corps capabilities

31:33.811 --> 31:35.589
forward is generation of Marine

31:35.589 --> 31:37.560
expeditioner units and compositing

31:37.560 --> 31:39.680
those expeditionary units with an

31:39.680 --> 31:41.839
amphibious ready group . That forward

31:41.839 --> 31:44.699
presentation is the most flexible and

31:44.699 --> 31:47.540
responsive option . For combat

31:47.540 --> 31:50.079
commanders forward position , sovereign

31:50.079 --> 31:52.540
US territory trained to the high end of

31:52.540 --> 31:54.900
the range of military operations and

31:54.900 --> 31:57.979
also available and present for

31:57.979 --> 32:00.119
competition . So scaling from

32:00.119 --> 32:02.099
competition through crisis into

32:02.099 --> 32:04.400
contingency is simply what we do .

32:05.020 --> 32:07.699
Similarly , one math and 2FF have the

32:07.699 --> 32:11.660
responsibility of generating . Marine

32:11.660 --> 32:14.380
Expeditionary units and with our naval

32:14.380 --> 32:17.380
counterparts making sure that we put

32:17.380 --> 32:20.410
together integrated training that

32:20.619 --> 32:22.890
trains to the high end and to the true

32:22.890 --> 32:26.829
complexity of operations . 17 day CO2X

32:26.829 --> 32:30.349
on the west coast , 15 day CO2X on the

32:30.349 --> 32:32.510
east coast . We deliver our marine

32:32.510 --> 32:34.343
expeditionary units into the UCO

32:34.343 --> 32:37.780
theater . And they will shoot through

32:38.020 --> 32:40.359
the Suez Canal and present themselves

32:40.359 --> 32:43.750
in the SENCO AOR . Just recently , over

32:43.750 --> 32:45.694
the last two years , our 26 Marine

32:45.694 --> 32:48.349
Expeditionary unit was stretched and

32:48.349 --> 32:50.469
disaggregated , operating both in the

32:50.469 --> 32:54.060
Red Sea . Against the Houthis with 5th

32:54.060 --> 32:56.859
Fleet , while a single ship deployer ,

32:56.900 --> 32:59.067
the Mesa Verde , was positioned in the

32:59.067 --> 33:01.459
eastern Ned and prepared to respond to

33:01.459 --> 33:03.819
crisis and conduct non-combatant

33:03.819 --> 33:07.199
evacuation operations in support of 6th

33:07.199 --> 33:10.579
Fleet UCO in support of SENCOM . That

33:10.579 --> 33:13.180
flexibility is something that we have a

33:13.180 --> 33:16.430
lot of sets and reps on over many ,

33:16.459 --> 33:19.189
many years . Additionally , what's

33:19.189 --> 33:21.619
changing what the demand signal now

33:22.189 --> 33:24.630
causes us to do is also work with our

33:24.630 --> 33:27.430
fleet counterparts in integrated battle

33:27.430 --> 33:30.640
problems , large scale exercises , and

33:30.640 --> 33:33.479
ensure that as a naval force , Marines

33:33.479 --> 33:35.312
and sailors are prepared to work

33:35.312 --> 33:38.339
together in the high north . And we use

33:38.339 --> 33:41.449
steadfast steadfast serious exercises

33:41.979 --> 33:45.739
or exercise like Atlantic Alliance to

33:45.739 --> 33:47.961
exercise to train together to make sure

33:47.961 --> 33:50.183
that we are truly integrated as a naval

33:50.183 --> 33:52.295
force , whether that means delivering

33:52.295 --> 33:54.183
Marines from amphibious platforms

33:54.183 --> 33:57.780
ashore or operating ashore as

33:57.780 --> 34:00.260
Marines go forward and seize and hold

34:00.260 --> 34:02.739
key maritime terrain and then hold at

34:02.739 --> 34:05.770
risk adversary formations . In the

34:05.770 --> 34:07.689
maritime domain operating in the

34:07.689 --> 34:11.489
littorals conducting . The operations

34:11.489 --> 34:13.610
in a contested environment conducting

34:14.010 --> 34:16.439
expeditionary advance based operations .

34:16.770 --> 34:18.881
We can't do these things if we do not

34:18.881 --> 34:20.992
have a habitual relationship with our

34:20.992 --> 34:23.159
counterparts . These relationships are

34:23.159 --> 34:25.489
as healthy as I've seen them in my 33

34:25.489 --> 34:27.639
years . We're working routinely with

34:27.639 --> 34:29.929
Second Fleet . And we work with Doug

34:29.929 --> 34:33.030
Perry routinely to make sure that under

34:33.030 --> 34:35.159
both of his hats as a fleet commander

34:35.159 --> 34:37.489
and as a joint force commander inside

34:37.489 --> 34:39.929
of his NATO responsibilities that he is

34:39.929 --> 34:42.040
prepared to respond to crisis , skill

34:42.040 --> 34:44.330
the contingency , and fight and win in

34:44.330 --> 34:46.639
the maritime domain . Similarly ,

34:47.129 --> 34:49.320
inside of the 6th Fleet , we work with

34:49.320 --> 34:51.719
Marvin Anderson and his team to ensure

34:51.719 --> 34:53.919
that the combat commander has options

34:53.919 --> 34:57.279
in UCO . And that training therefore

34:57.279 --> 35:00.139
needs to be real . The live virtual and

35:00.139 --> 35:02.439
constructive opportunities that must

35:03.270 --> 35:05.492
continue to be refined and delivered to

35:05.492 --> 35:07.590
the fleet so that we can train using

35:07.590 --> 35:10.229
our battleI centers using our live

35:10.229 --> 35:13.919
virtual constructive construct to train

35:13.919 --> 35:16.639
from Halifax all the way to Avon Park

35:16.989 --> 35:19.750
along the eastern seaboard . Those are

35:19.750 --> 35:22.449
requirements for training . Outside of

35:22.449 --> 35:25.199
large scale exercises , outside of

35:25.370 --> 35:28.810
those gift mapped exercises . We must

35:28.810 --> 35:31.129
train as we fight and we are evolving

35:31.129 --> 35:34.580
very , very rapidly . To ensure that

35:34.580 --> 35:36.739
industry and that our headquarters

35:36.739 --> 35:38.979
inside the Pentagon understand what the

35:38.979 --> 35:41.070
requirements are live , virtual ,

35:41.139 --> 35:44.219
constructive , making sure that Navy

35:44.219 --> 35:46.275
sailors aboard amphibious shipping ,

35:46.300 --> 35:48.356
Marines aboard amphibious shipping ,

35:48.356 --> 35:50.340
and Marines and sailors ashore can

35:50.340 --> 35:52.580
operate seamlessly when called to

35:52.580 --> 35:54.747
respond . And so I would tell you that

35:54.747 --> 35:56.747
we've made great gains and we could

35:56.747 --> 35:58.913
talk more specifically about what some

35:58.913 --> 36:01.500
of those gains are in . Your questions

36:01.500 --> 36:03.760
or additional comments . Thanks .

36:04.830 --> 36:06.941
Thanks . I'll keep it quick . Uh , so

36:06.941 --> 36:09.052
your , your question was , you know ,

36:09.052 --> 36:10.997
how are we evolving training ? And

36:10.997 --> 36:10.979
again it goes to the temporal aspect .

36:11.229 --> 36:13.285
So if you're talking about today and

36:13.285 --> 36:15.062
how the character of warfare is

36:15.062 --> 36:16.951
changing , every operation at the

36:16.951 --> 36:18.840
operational level war down to the

36:18.840 --> 36:20.951
tactical level war is currently being

36:20.951 --> 36:23.062
assessed . You know , not only what's

36:23.062 --> 36:25.285
going well , but importantly what's not

36:25.285 --> 36:27.340
going well , and then we inject that

36:27.340 --> 36:29.562
into either schoolhouse training , uh ,

36:29.562 --> 36:31.785
tactical bulletins , leveraging the the

36:31.785 --> 36:33.951
war fighting development centers , and

36:33.951 --> 36:35.840
then getting the sets and reps in

36:35.840 --> 36:37.840
training . Uh , I mentioned Admiral

36:37.840 --> 36:40.062
Caer and I . We talk all the time about

36:40.062 --> 36:42.173
his operations , the 7th Fleet . What

36:42.173 --> 36:42.080
doesn't go well ? How can I then

36:42.080 --> 36:44.600
incorporate it , work with the TICOMs

36:44.600 --> 36:46.280
for basic training , advanced

36:46.280 --> 36:48.447
integrated , so we get those sailors ,

36:48.447 --> 36:50.447
the sets and reps that they need to

36:50.447 --> 36:52.391
become confident , competent , and

36:52.391 --> 36:54.280
proficient before they go out and

36:54.280 --> 36:56.447
deploy . Uh , another force enabler is

36:56.447 --> 36:58.780
the LVC . We talked about it a lot , uh ,

36:58.840 --> 37:00.840
but again , going back to my sports

37:00.840 --> 37:03.080
analogy , it's about practice sets and

37:03.080 --> 37:05.399
reps , right , building that muscle

37:05.399 --> 37:07.510
memory , and you can stop the problem

37:07.510 --> 37:09.621
when something doesn't go right . You

37:09.621 --> 37:11.843
can do element training immediately and

37:11.843 --> 37:13.955
then get right back up and keep going

37:13.955 --> 37:16.177
after it , so that's important . At the

37:16.177 --> 37:18.177
operational level of war , uh , not

37:18.177 --> 37:20.232
only in CO2X we now fully integrated

37:20.232 --> 37:22.455
and joint , but , uh , you know , Homie

37:22.455 --> 37:24.732
and I just participated in a , uh , uh ,

37:24.732 --> 37:26.899
my mock certification , uh , next week

37:26.899 --> 37:29.179
we're doing a rehearsal , all joint Air

37:29.179 --> 37:31.840
Force Army . Marine combination of

37:31.840 --> 37:34.139
physical , live , but also virtual

37:34.139 --> 37:36.280
constructive , so it's evolving . So

37:36.280 --> 37:38.800
that's today . In the future as we

37:38.800 --> 37:40.911
bring modernization , as we bring new

37:40.911 --> 37:43.179
capabilities to the forefront , it's

37:43.179 --> 37:45.235
critical that we've got the dot iLPF

37:45.235 --> 37:47.179
process right . You know , I would

37:47.179 --> 37:49.346
argue you could bring a platform out ,

37:49.346 --> 37:51.457
but if that platform doesn't have the

37:51.457 --> 37:53.568
requisite training , doesn't have the

37:53.568 --> 37:55.457
TTP , doesn't have the life cycle

37:55.457 --> 37:57.568
management , it's worth nothing . And

37:57.568 --> 37:59.623
so that's the speed piece and that's

37:59.623 --> 38:01.679
why process and C2 and authorities ,

38:01.679 --> 38:03.679
the Courtney rule has to be applied

38:03.679 --> 38:05.679
down and in , but then . Up and out

38:05.679 --> 38:07.623
across the joint but also with our

38:07.623 --> 38:09.679
allies and partners . I'm not saying

38:09.679 --> 38:11.846
it's easy . This is hard , but there's

38:11.846 --> 38:14.012
push ups , sit ups and pull ups we got

38:14.012 --> 38:16.068
to do . And as Admiral Caylor and as

38:16.068 --> 38:17.901
the SEF and the chairman and CNO

38:17.901 --> 38:20.123
commanant , you know , it's this is the

38:20.123 --> 38:22.235
year that we got to work this so that

38:22.235 --> 38:24.568
we're ready in the next couple of years .

38:24.568 --> 38:26.790
So I'll just share a story with you and

38:26.790 --> 38:29.459
um as all of you know , these stories

38:29.459 --> 38:31.515
are great , some of which are true .

38:31.580 --> 38:34.699
This one is actually true . Um , so .

38:35.320 --> 38:37.320
And this is about how quickly we're

38:37.320 --> 38:39.431
learning , not just in the training ,

38:39.431 --> 38:41.376
but I believe with our partners in

38:41.376 --> 38:43.610
industry . So Wilson Marks called me on

38:43.610 --> 38:46.330
a Friday night . And said we've got a

38:46.330 --> 38:49.729
problem with a specific baseline

38:49.729 --> 38:51.840
capability that's in the Wes and they

38:51.840 --> 38:53.840
were in the middle of a fight . I

38:53.840 --> 38:57.510
called Stem Meguez that night . Smidt

38:57.510 --> 39:00.709
had already built TTP as a workaround

39:00.709 --> 39:03.310
within about 48 hours . It was trained

39:03.310 --> 39:06.110
to by Witty's . Lockheed Martin came in

39:06.110 --> 39:08.949
on the weekend and worked a patch . We

39:08.949 --> 39:11.116
fielded the patch that had been tested

39:11.116 --> 39:13.229
on a ship out at 3rd fleet to verify

39:13.229 --> 39:15.870
that the patch worked , and 17 days

39:15.870 --> 39:17.870
later we had an update to the Aegis

39:17.870 --> 39:20.092
weapon system that enabled that ship to

39:20.092 --> 39:22.148
fight in the Wes . That's what we've

39:22.148 --> 39:24.709
got to do at speed and that story about

39:24.709 --> 39:28.350
this team of teams and folks moving

39:28.350 --> 39:31.909
with urgency is now what we have to

39:31.909 --> 39:35.389
continue to stay laser focused on , and

39:35.389 --> 39:38.469
the piece for me is we can do it .

39:39.419 --> 39:41.760
It's been amazing what we can actually

39:41.760 --> 39:43.982
accomplish when we bring folks together

39:43.982 --> 39:47.520
as a team of teams . So I want to pull

39:47.520 --> 39:49.576
the thread a little bit more on live

39:49.576 --> 39:51.760
virtual and constructive training . A

39:51.760 --> 39:54.760
couple of you mentioned it . Is there

39:54.760 --> 39:57.800
enough fidelity for individuals

39:57.800 --> 40:00.639
training on individual weapon systems

40:00.639 --> 40:02.909
all the way up to the maritime

40:02.909 --> 40:05.131
operation centers , integrated training

40:05.131 --> 40:07.750
across different warfare areas , for

40:07.750 --> 40:09.417
example , and even across the

40:09.417 --> 40:11.719
blue-green team ? Do you feel like

40:11.719 --> 40:15.350
you've got Um , the LVC capabilities

40:15.350 --> 40:18.070
that allow you to exercise the full

40:18.070 --> 40:20.292
spectrum of capabilities that your that

40:20.292 --> 40:22.550
your forces need to be able to train

40:22.550 --> 40:25.179
for , uh , for combat operations .

40:25.419 --> 40:28.590
Start with General Cedar . The short

40:28.590 --> 40:32.399
answer is no , not yet . So I

40:32.399 --> 40:34.566
know from a Marine Corps perspective ,

40:34.566 --> 40:36.510
and then I'll talk about the great

40:36.510 --> 40:38.566
integration that goes on between one

40:38.566 --> 40:40.455
meth and third fleet , but from a

40:40.455 --> 40:42.621
Marine Corps perspective to Lieutenant

40:42.621 --> 40:46.159
General Ijas put us on an LVC training

40:46.159 --> 40:49.919
continuum project in 2023 , beginning

40:49.919 --> 40:53.899
in FY 23 . It's , it is a

40:53.949 --> 40:56.750
four year march with four phases .

40:57.040 --> 40:58.873
Right now we've just entered the

40:58.873 --> 41:02.379
integration phase of LVC . For the

41:02.379 --> 41:06.000
Marine Corps , and then we will go into

41:06.000 --> 41:08.340
the beginning of 26 , we go into the

41:08.340 --> 41:11.100
global integration space . So what we

41:11.100 --> 41:13.610
need to be able to do that we currently

41:13.860 --> 41:15.804
cannot do is we need to be able to

41:15.804 --> 41:19.699
rehearse and do operations across three

41:19.699 --> 41:22.659
things number one , across all domains ,

41:22.860 --> 41:25.780
number two , across all echelons , and

41:25.780 --> 41:29.129
number 3 , across all functions . We're

41:29.129 --> 41:31.649
not there yet , but we have a very good

41:31.649 --> 41:34.530
plan with Project Tripoli that may have

41:34.530 --> 41:36.808
started with you , General Cropperrata ,

41:36.808 --> 41:38.974
when you were sitting in the seat . So

41:38.974 --> 41:41.141
that's the Marine Corps bid at LVC . I

41:41.141 --> 41:43.308
have the utmost trust and confidence .

41:43.308 --> 41:45.474
They've been on the glide slopes since

41:45.474 --> 41:47.586
23 , delivering on the objectives and

41:47.586 --> 41:49.419
the wickets along the way . With

41:49.419 --> 41:51.308
regards to at the operational and

41:51.308 --> 41:53.308
tactical level , I know that we are

41:53.308 --> 41:55.860
starting to incorporate LVC into some

41:55.860 --> 41:59.250
of our big exercises , Balakotan 24 ,

41:59.530 --> 42:02.739
which is about 16,000 service members

42:02.739 --> 42:05.540
from across . The armed forces of the

42:05.540 --> 42:07.860
Philippines and United States service

42:07.860 --> 42:10.540
members across all services . Last year

42:10.540 --> 42:13.979
we held the first live and constructive

42:13.979 --> 42:17.419
formations battle SIM test , and this

42:17.419 --> 42:19.641
year we will scale that up in Balakotan

42:19.641 --> 42:22.929
25 . It was kind of cutting edge . Also

42:22.929 --> 42:25.250
as we do steel night back and forth ,

42:25.300 --> 42:28.379
we just did steel Night , which CO

42:28.379 --> 42:31.060
referred . We did it in September or

42:31.060 --> 42:33.260
December and during that , during the

42:33.260 --> 42:35.489
mock certification , during the workup

42:35.489 --> 42:37.830
and certification phase for our marine

42:37.830 --> 42:40.739
rotation For Darwin , we also use some

42:40.739 --> 42:44.379
LVC cutting edge comment capabilities

42:44.379 --> 42:46.490
both on the Navy and the Marine Corps

42:46.490 --> 42:48.101
side . So I'm excited at the

42:48.101 --> 42:50.323
opportunities that lie off the bow with

42:50.323 --> 42:52.820
LVC , but we're not there yet from a

42:52.820 --> 42:54.820
Marine Corps perspective . Yeah , I

42:54.820 --> 42:56.987
would just echo that , uh , you know ,

42:56.987 --> 42:59.042
where we are today compared to , you

42:59.042 --> 43:00.931
know , 5 years ago when I was the

43:00.931 --> 43:02.876
director of maritime operations of

43:02.876 --> 43:04.987
Fleet Forces were better , but we got

43:04.987 --> 43:07.153
to continue to make our progress . You

43:07.153 --> 43:09.264
asked about balance . I would say the

43:09.264 --> 43:11.431
surface fleet and the navy is probably

43:11.431 --> 43:13.653
more advanced . We're getting better in

43:13.653 --> 43:15.820
aviation . Uh , we're also integrating

43:15.820 --> 43:17.876
at the operational level of war . We

43:17.876 --> 43:19.876
also need to uh transition with the

43:19.876 --> 43:21.931
unmanned . We're doing that a little

43:21.931 --> 43:23.820
bit , but as you look at unmanned

43:23.820 --> 43:25.931
manned integration that it's coming ,

43:25.931 --> 43:27.987
it's coming fast . So that's part of

43:27.987 --> 43:30.153
LVC . There's a difference between the

43:30.153 --> 43:29.649
East Coast and the West Coast . There's

43:29.649 --> 43:31.824
a number of factors . For that , but

43:31.824 --> 43:34.046
there's a lot of money that's being put

43:34.046 --> 43:36.213
towards that . And then when I look at

43:36.213 --> 43:38.504
joint and our allies and partners ,

43:38.625 --> 43:41.175
it's improving each exercise ,

43:41.625 --> 43:43.736
everyone's putting money towards it ,

43:43.736 --> 43:45.736
but there's still more to do to get

43:45.736 --> 43:47.792
those sets and reps across the joint

43:47.792 --> 43:51.760
force . On the east coast I would

43:51.760 --> 43:53.760
tell you that over the last year we

43:53.760 --> 43:55.982
have spent time working with the Marine

43:55.982 --> 43:58.038
Corps Warfighting Laboratory and the

43:58.038 --> 44:00.120
Naval Information Warfare Center

44:00.120 --> 44:03.959
Atlantic to improve the use

44:03.959 --> 44:07.120
of our programs of record systems AAIDs ,

44:07.320 --> 44:10.959
JOCS , CC2S , all of our

44:10.959 --> 44:14.179
command and control architectures . We

44:14.179 --> 44:16.401
are training and working with our naval

44:16.401 --> 44:19.739
counterparts to ensure that as we sense

44:19.739 --> 44:21.906
and make sense of the environment , as

44:21.906 --> 44:24.659
we gain and maintain target quality

44:24.659 --> 44:27.340
tracks , we can pass that information

44:27.340 --> 44:30.729
seamlessly into the mock . Into the

44:30.729 --> 44:34.050
mock for prosecution of set targets

44:34.050 --> 44:36.649
or in a broader sense be able to hand

44:36.649 --> 44:39.530
off those targets that have been

44:39.530 --> 44:42.800
tracked and have the level of quality

44:43.129 --> 44:45.449
those targets handed off to a joint

44:45.449 --> 44:48.689
force or allied partner for prosecution

44:48.689 --> 44:51.489
of targets . We're training time now on

44:51.489 --> 44:53.409
the eastern Seaboard to make sure

44:53.409 --> 44:55.631
within our battleI centers working with

44:55.631 --> 44:59.300
EWTG LA and specifically as we generate .

44:59.889 --> 45:02.729
Muse and Armuse we're making sure that

45:02.729 --> 45:05.129
within the CO2X's we're challenging

45:05.129 --> 45:08.770
them , training with the systems so

45:08.770 --> 45:10.959
that they are proficient and confident

45:11.209 --> 45:14.610
that any sensor can in fact hand

45:14.610 --> 45:17.810
off track quality target quality . To

45:17.810 --> 45:20.330
any shooter for prosecution , that is

45:20.330 --> 45:22.219
what we advertise in the maritime

45:22.219 --> 45:24.441
domain . We're training to that now and

45:24.441 --> 45:26.386
we are leveraging live virtual and

45:26.386 --> 45:29.120
constructive constructs inside of again

45:29.120 --> 45:31.342
exercise like Atlantic Alliance . We're

45:31.342 --> 45:34.080
working routinely inside the Arm .

45:35.370 --> 45:37.570
Certification process and outside of

45:37.570 --> 45:40.090
the RU certification process with both

45:40.090 --> 45:42.570
2nd Fleet and 6th Fleet , but there's

45:42.570 --> 45:44.409
work to be done . There's user

45:44.409 --> 45:46.530
interface and there's feedback at the

45:46.530 --> 45:48.959
tactical edge for the individual user

45:49.169 --> 45:51.209
that needs to be improved . We need

45:51.209 --> 45:53.042
further integration of logistics

45:53.042 --> 45:55.209
challenges inside the live virtual and

45:55.209 --> 45:58.389
constructive . We tend to ferry dust

45:58.389 --> 46:01.229
and present formations without actually

46:01.229 --> 46:03.229
working through logistics in a

46:03.229 --> 46:05.350
contested environment and causing our

46:05.350 --> 46:07.899
logisticians to really work through

46:08.149 --> 46:10.205
what it means to conduct distributed

46:10.205 --> 46:12.389
operations in a maritime domain in a

46:12.389 --> 46:14.167
contested environment where the

46:14.167 --> 46:16.056
adversary is going to confuse and

46:16.056 --> 46:18.111
frustrate your efforts to keep those

46:18.111 --> 46:20.689
distributed formations sustained . So

46:20.689 --> 46:22.467
we need to make sure that we're

46:22.467 --> 46:24.578
exercising in a way and we build live

46:24.578 --> 46:27.370
virtual and constructive constructs to

46:27.370 --> 46:29.481
challenge ourselves a little bit more

46:29.481 --> 46:31.592
distinctly and then of course there's

46:31.592 --> 46:33.929
just sharing of information moving

46:33.929 --> 46:36.090
across the firewalls . What does it

46:36.090 --> 46:38.620
mean to be truly integrated . In terms

46:38.620 --> 46:40.699
of our system of systems , this is a

46:40.699 --> 46:42.699
challenge . There's more work to be

46:42.699 --> 46:44.755
done . Live virtual and constructive

46:44.755 --> 46:46.921
will allow us to work the challenges ,

46:47.020 --> 46:49.050
train as we will fight along the

46:49.050 --> 46:51.419
eastern seaboard again from Halifax to

46:51.419 --> 46:53.939
Avon Park , because that is exactly

46:53.939 --> 46:55.883
what we're going to be asked to do

46:55.883 --> 46:58.580
against the pacing threat or against a

46:58.580 --> 47:01.060
persistent and more evident and real

47:01.060 --> 47:03.280
threat . When you look at the Russian

47:03.280 --> 47:05.447
problem set , yeah , can I just , uh ,

47:05.447 --> 47:07.502
and I'll give it over to you , Joe ,

47:07.502 --> 47:09.669
for industry especially , um , I don't

47:09.669 --> 47:09.439
want to sugarcoat it . This is an East

47:09.439 --> 47:11.760
Coast West Coast thing , uh , you know ,

47:11.919 --> 47:14.141
it's , it's not just plug and play very

47:14.141 --> 47:15.808
easy . There's , there's some

47:15.808 --> 47:17.975
challenges configuration variants with

47:17.975 --> 47:20.197
all our weapons and sensors , uh , ones

47:20.197 --> 47:22.308
and zeros don't necessarily translate

47:22.308 --> 47:24.363
to systems that were not built to be

47:24.363 --> 47:26.280
integrated . So there's a lot of

47:26.280 --> 47:28.919
band-aids and so it was we partner with

47:28.919 --> 47:31.030
industries . We look to the future of

47:31.030 --> 47:33.141
LVC . We got to make it more plug and

47:33.141 --> 47:35.308
play , able to adapt and to be able to

47:35.308 --> 47:37.570
spiral in new sensors , new software

47:37.570 --> 47:39.969
firmware and hardware because it makes

47:39.969 --> 47:42.129
it hard for those young sailors that

47:42.129 --> 47:44.351
are trying to get those sets and reps .

47:44.351 --> 47:46.518
So I don't want you to think that it's

47:46.518 --> 47:46.479
easy . It's hard , it's tough work ,

47:46.610 --> 47:49.719
but we're getting after it . So before ,

47:49.899 --> 47:52.219
uh , before you go , I just want to get

47:52.219 --> 47:54.449
to audience Q and A . So while Admiral

47:54.449 --> 47:56.949
Cahill talks , if you've got a question ,

47:57.030 --> 47:59.141
please come to one of the microphones

47:59.141 --> 48:01.252
and get ready to ask your questions .

48:01.252 --> 48:03.530
We've got about 1012 more minutes left .

48:03.530 --> 48:05.641
So Adil , go ahead and then we'll get

48:05.641 --> 48:07.752
to audience Q and A . So I think back

48:07.752 --> 48:09.919
to the what we've learned from the Red

48:09.919 --> 48:12.030
Sea and the Eastern Met over the last

48:12.030 --> 48:14.939
14 months and It's about all domain

48:14.939 --> 48:17.161
operations about the value of the Arm .

48:17.161 --> 48:19.161
It's about the value of the carrier

48:19.161 --> 48:21.383
strike group , right ? That that is the

48:21.383 --> 48:23.495
bottom line that are executing combat

48:23.495 --> 48:25.772
operations across all domains . So the ,

48:25.772 --> 48:29.510
the piece for me is that LVC enables us

48:29.510 --> 48:32.620
to do rehearsals , and that's a key

48:32.620 --> 48:35.510
word that for me as a community guy ,

48:35.959 --> 48:38.360
but as a former carrier strike group 15

48:38.360 --> 48:42.030
commander , we transition to rehearsals

48:42.199 --> 48:44.879
and that is super important for us as

48:44.879 --> 48:48.760
we build cohesion at the unit level and

48:48.760 --> 48:52.159
then at the CSG and RV level . And so

48:52.159 --> 48:55.320
that cohesion that LBC enables is

48:55.320 --> 48:58.760
really , really important and that not

48:58.760 --> 49:01.280
only is enabled when they're underway

49:01.280 --> 49:03.840
or at the pier , but the team comes

49:03.840 --> 49:05.896
together , for example , in the , in

49:05.896 --> 49:09.110
the CSG comes together in Fallon . With

49:09.110 --> 49:12.679
a joint CSG CBW , CBN

49:13.189 --> 49:17.179
crew as team that does rehearsals that

49:17.179 --> 49:20.229
replicate not only the plan but the

49:20.229 --> 49:22.469
combat conditions that these teammates

49:22.469 --> 49:25.550
are gonna face and so we have to scale

49:25.550 --> 49:29.020
it and continue to improve it . And I

49:29.020 --> 49:31.760
think that hope is important . And I

49:31.760 --> 49:33.982
think what I want to give you some hope

49:33.982 --> 49:36.204
here is when I was in , when I relieved

49:36.204 --> 49:39.000
Admiral Wade on Prebble . Um , and we

49:39.000 --> 49:41.419
went through our basic phase and then

49:41.419 --> 49:43.530
advanced phase and integrated phase .

49:43.800 --> 49:47.149
We could keep our LVC up for

49:47.149 --> 49:50.469
about 3-ish hours maybe .

49:52.320 --> 49:55.280
Today , when I was at CSG 15 last year

49:55.340 --> 49:57.340
and now on the east coast , Admiral

49:57.340 --> 50:00.699
Wade's points . The air wing , the

50:00.699 --> 50:04.550
carrier . All of the crew , they're

50:04.550 --> 50:07.590
in it 24/7 on the east coast and so at

50:07.590 --> 50:11.219
0 2:30 in the morning , those sailors

50:11.550 --> 50:15.260
don't know that the LBC is or isn't on ,

50:15.669 --> 50:18.770
and so we add an element of the unknown

50:18.770 --> 50:21.629
of combat and we can pressurize them

50:21.989 --> 50:24.800
and do an actual rehearsal with a

50:24.800 --> 50:27.709
thinking adversary in an LBC

50:27.709 --> 50:29.620
environment and that's gold .

50:32.129 --> 50:34.479
Sergeant Major Sergeant Major Harkins ,

50:34.600 --> 50:36.949
United States Marine Corps retired . My

50:36.949 --> 50:39.270
question is gonna bleed off on the Navy

50:39.479 --> 50:42.439
and then to the Marines . Start off

50:42.439 --> 50:45.429
with , we no longer have LSTs landing

50:45.429 --> 50:48.439
ship tanks . We no longer have APAs ,

50:48.760 --> 50:52.719
attack personnel , amphibious . The

50:52.719 --> 50:55.120
mission of the Marine Corps , as I

50:55.120 --> 50:57.120
understand it is to secure advanced

50:57.120 --> 50:59.320
naval bases . I want to go back to the

50:59.320 --> 51:03.290
second . Second , to

51:03.290 --> 51:05.560
me , yes , we had Marines in the

51:05.560 --> 51:07.560
eastern Pacific in the eastern

51:07.770 --> 51:10.129
Mediterranean to assist in evacuating

51:10.129 --> 51:13.010
civilians from Lebanon if it was

51:13.010 --> 51:16.290
necessary about 434 months ago . It

51:16.290 --> 51:18.457
wasn't necessary the last time we were

51:18.457 --> 51:21.040
in Lebanon . was Ronald Reagan and it

51:21.040 --> 51:23.760
went very , very poorly . So now what I

51:23.760 --> 51:25.927
want to go to is the nuts and bolts of

51:25.927 --> 51:28.038
the question here . The Navy , when I

51:28.038 --> 51:30.204
spoke with the CNO two years ago , did

51:30.204 --> 51:32.679
not want to advance any closer to land

51:32.679 --> 51:36.399
than 10 nautical miles . I want to know

51:36.399 --> 51:38.649
how the Marine Corps is gonna get fill

51:38.649 --> 51:42.399
in that 10 nautical miles . And

51:42.399 --> 51:45.139
landing marines in a wartime

51:45.139 --> 51:48.669
environment rather than a not wartime

51:48.669 --> 51:51.750
environment . Thank you . I'll just

51:51.750 --> 51:53.639
start , yeah . I think I'll start

51:53.639 --> 51:55.861
because I gotta get the Marines there ,

51:55.861 --> 51:57.972
right ? Uh , so listen , uh , just as

51:57.972 --> 52:00.083
we talked about Sergeant Major , uh ,

52:00.083 --> 52:02.139
we live in a dangerous complex and a

52:02.139 --> 52:04.306
rapidly changing world . We don't have

52:04.306 --> 52:06.472
the luxury anymore to just take an arg

52:06.590 --> 52:08.812
and move it from point A to point B and

52:08.812 --> 52:10.757
then to put it 10 miles offshore .

52:10.757 --> 52:13.090
There's threats all domain all the time ,

52:13.090 --> 52:15.312
so that's where naval integration joint

52:15.312 --> 52:16.979
force integration , coalition

52:16.979 --> 52:19.340
integration comes so that we can create

52:19.340 --> 52:22.629
that defensive in depth to be able to

52:22.629 --> 52:24.830
get us there and then to protect what

52:24.830 --> 52:27.070
we're doing now we have the ability to

52:27.070 --> 52:29.389
go ashore and power project with our

52:29.389 --> 52:32.060
Marine Corps many different ways from

52:32.429 --> 52:35.260
many years ago our ospreys with our air ,

52:35.510 --> 52:37.732
we've got different landing craft we're

52:37.732 --> 52:40.010
practicing that all the time , but . We

52:40.010 --> 52:42.689
don't have domain uh guarantee and

52:42.689 --> 52:44.745
superiority . We might have to fight

52:44.745 --> 52:46.745
our way in and then we have to stay

52:46.745 --> 52:48.911
there and that's what we're practicing

52:48.911 --> 52:51.078
right now . It's hard , but that's why

52:51.078 --> 52:53.189
this integration , this teamwork here

52:53.189 --> 52:55.245
is so critically important , whether

52:55.245 --> 52:57.300
it's in the Middle East , which is a

52:57.300 --> 52:59.300
different fight compared to what we

52:59.300 --> 53:01.300
would see in the South China Sea or

53:01.300 --> 53:03.411
somewhere in the Western Pacific . So

53:03.411 --> 53:05.578
it's a range of capabilities and skill

53:05.578 --> 53:07.578
sets that are hard and that's where

53:07.578 --> 53:11.500
we're working every day . Major , again ,

53:11.580 --> 53:13.636
thank you for your question . Um , I

53:13.636 --> 53:17.110
would tell you that . I'm not sure if

53:17.110 --> 53:19.919
there is a prohibition upon how close

53:19.919 --> 53:22.909
our naval counterparts are willing to

53:22.909 --> 53:24.965
get to shoreline . I don't know that

53:25.149 --> 53:27.260
we're going to allow any adversary to

53:27.260 --> 53:29.590
cause us to stay outside of an area

53:29.590 --> 53:31.923
that we know is going to be challenging .

53:31.923 --> 53:33.868
We know it's going to be rife with

53:33.868 --> 53:35.868
threats , but I'll just stay in the

53:35.868 --> 53:38.034
Marine Corps business . The commandant

53:38.034 --> 53:40.899
right now is pursuing the solution .

53:41.060 --> 53:43.479
For connectivity connectors

53:43.479 --> 53:45.535
specifically , whether it be landing

53:45.535 --> 53:47.757
ship medium , whether that be going out

53:47.757 --> 53:51.050
and purchasing LCUs , LCU 2000s to make

53:51.050 --> 53:52.883
sure that we have the connectors

53:52.883 --> 53:54.661
necessary to deliver amphibious

53:54.661 --> 53:56.760
capability ashore . Forcible entry

53:56.760 --> 53:58.927
simply looks different . It's going to

53:58.927 --> 54:01.149
be different than it was when I started

54:01.149 --> 54:04.000
30 years ago . And that's just change .

54:04.330 --> 54:06.810
My problem . My problem as commander is

54:06.810 --> 54:08.921
to engineer the unfair fight with our

54:08.921 --> 54:11.143
naval counterparts . As we close on the

54:11.143 --> 54:13.649
shoreline , if in the event we have to

54:13.649 --> 54:15.729
conduct forceful entry , then the

54:15.729 --> 54:18.007
solutions and the challenges are there ,

54:18.007 --> 54:19.896
but the solutions will have to be

54:19.896 --> 54:21.673
different . How we close in the

54:21.673 --> 54:23.562
objective area , how we use naval

54:23.562 --> 54:25.562
surface fires , how we use aviation

54:25.562 --> 54:27.729
fires to eliminate a hardened position

54:27.729 --> 54:29.785
as shore so that we can affect . And

54:29.785 --> 54:32.409
deliver marine corps formations we have

54:32.409 --> 54:35.610
options . We have ranges in the Osprey .

54:35.649 --> 54:39.600
We have long range precision munitions

54:39.810 --> 54:41.754
that change the calculus and maybe

54:41.754 --> 54:43.810
change what it is . Either one of us

54:43.810 --> 54:46.032
would have thought forcible entry might

54:46.032 --> 54:48.310
look like 30 years ago or 40 years ago .

54:48.310 --> 54:50.477
I won't get you start , Major , but as

54:50.477 --> 54:53.449
things change , we , we , the 3 stars ,

54:53.610 --> 54:55.850
the commanders have to deliver that

54:55.850 --> 54:57.850
unfair fight . That means I need to

54:57.850 --> 54:59.628
close on that objective from 50

54:59.628 --> 55:02.129
kilometers , 25 kilometers to 15

55:02.129 --> 55:04.185
kilometers rather than think about a

55:04.185 --> 55:07.000
very tactical last 300 m . We engineer

55:07.169 --> 55:10.209
the unfair fight . We have an

55:10.209 --> 55:12.487
asymmetric advantage . We're not alone .

55:12.560 --> 55:14.727
We can still get ashore . We can still

55:14.727 --> 55:16.838
force our way ashore . It will simply

55:16.838 --> 55:19.060
look different , OK ? And that's what I

55:19.060 --> 55:21.171
can tell you . For connectors , we're

55:21.171 --> 55:22.949
working those very tactical and

55:22.949 --> 55:22.870
operational problems to make sure that

55:22.870 --> 55:24.926
we can deliver marines as shore when

55:24.926 --> 55:27.037
the time comes . Common has that high

55:27.037 --> 55:29.148
on his priority list and he's working

55:29.148 --> 55:31.259
with Admiral Franchetti to solve that

55:31.259 --> 55:33.426
connector issue time now , but we have

55:33.830 --> 55:36.409
partners in our naval formation . So if

55:36.409 --> 55:38.631
I can , I just want to give you a sense

55:38.631 --> 55:41.050
of what I would call an awakening on

55:41.050 --> 55:43.530
this Navy Marine Corps team and it's on

55:43.530 --> 55:46.250
the Navy side , and I think it's a good

55:46.250 --> 55:49.459
awakening to your point . So we

55:49.459 --> 55:51.681
recognize in the eastern met associated

55:51.681 --> 55:54.570
with that , the ASPAM that executed

55:54.570 --> 55:56.626
tremendous operations for the nation

55:56.626 --> 55:59.590
over the last 7 months , um , that I ,

55:59.610 --> 56:03.530
as a destroyer CEO , I did a SWAT with

56:03.530 --> 56:05.770
other destroyers . And then I did a

56:05.770 --> 56:07.881
comp2X with my carrier strike group .

56:08.209 --> 56:10.889
Well , I can tell you that for the Iwo

56:10.889 --> 56:13.810
Jima , that SWAT that we're gonna do

56:13.810 --> 56:17.050
here for that AMU , we're integrating 3

56:17.050 --> 56:19.969
destroyers into it . Because of just

56:19.969 --> 56:22.399
what you said , because we recognize

56:22.919 --> 56:25.250
that the sea control area and the sea

56:25.250 --> 56:27.959
denial area and that deny control line

56:28.250 --> 56:31.560
is moving based on the threat . And so

56:31.560 --> 56:33.560
we're now , what I would say is

56:33.560 --> 56:36.399
returning to what I think is an 80s

56:36.399 --> 56:39.360
construct back to Wayne Hughes where we

56:39.360 --> 56:41.193
are applying a threat based risk

56:41.193 --> 56:43.639
informed data enabled approach even in

56:43.639 --> 56:46.280
how we're training destroyer captains

56:46.560 --> 56:49.929
to integrate with the AGM . And as a

56:49.929 --> 56:52.570
destroyer and cruiser CEO we never did

56:52.570 --> 56:55.879
that in my last 15 or 20 years here .

56:56.090 --> 56:58.146
So I think that's an important piece

56:58.146 --> 57:01.080
that I'm seeing movement that I never

57:01.080 --> 57:04.689
experienced as a younger officer . You

57:04.689 --> 57:06.879
keep All right , we got time for one

57:06.879 --> 57:10.149
more question , sir , over here . For

57:10.149 --> 57:12.149
the Marines to get ashore and to be

57:12.149 --> 57:14.350
supplied , I think we also need to

57:14.350 --> 57:16.461
think about the threat of mines . And

57:16.461 --> 57:18.669
one son in 1950 and 40 years later off

57:18.669 --> 57:20.502
the coast of Kuwait , mines were

57:20.502 --> 57:22.336
effective , keeping Marines from

57:22.336 --> 57:24.558
landing where they wanted to go . Where

57:24.558 --> 57:26.891
are we in our mine hunting capabilities ,

57:26.891 --> 57:29.113
which I think atrophied some more after

57:29.113 --> 57:31.058
the end of the Cold War , and what

57:31.058 --> 57:33.169
capabilities would you like to see by

57:33.169 --> 57:35.469
2027 that you don't have today yet to

57:35.469 --> 57:39.250
accomplish your mission ? I I took foot

57:39.250 --> 57:42.239
there . Yeah , thanks for your question .

57:42.570 --> 57:44.570
Uh , when I was the surface of Mind

57:44.570 --> 57:46.737
warfighting Development Center , I say

57:46.737 --> 57:48.570
surface and mine warfighting , I

57:48.570 --> 57:50.792
learned a lot about mine warfare . Uh ,

57:50.850 --> 57:53.017
you know , just the threat of mines in

57:53.017 --> 57:54.760
the water changes the calculus

57:54.760 --> 57:56.760
strategically , operationally , and

57:56.760 --> 57:59.038
tactically . Uh , yes , we've got some ,

57:59.038 --> 58:01.159
uh , mine hunting , mine clearance

58:01.159 --> 58:04.000
challenges for the US Navy , but I'd

58:04.000 --> 58:06.000
just like to highlight that we have

58:06.000 --> 58:08.479
enhanced capacity with our allies and

58:08.479 --> 58:11.040
partners . OK . Uh , we're also

58:11.040 --> 58:13.879
transitioning to the LCS theoral combat

58:13.879 --> 58:17.219
ship mine mission package . Uh , hey ,

58:17.560 --> 58:19.560
call a spade a spade . There's been

58:19.560 --> 58:21.616
some challenges , but we have turned

58:21.616 --> 58:24.040
the corner . And the 1st 3 LCS mission

58:24.040 --> 58:26.151
packages will be deploying to the 5th

58:26.151 --> 58:29.399
Fleet AOR here this spring to finally

58:29.399 --> 58:32.310
allow our old MCMs to decommission ,

58:32.560 --> 58:35.199
bring a new capability . Uh , so

58:35.199 --> 58:37.909
there's more work to be done . Also

58:37.909 --> 58:40.076
from an organizational structure again

58:40.076 --> 58:42.242
getting after . Mill PF , the Navy has

58:42.242 --> 58:44.899
made the decision to split mining

58:45.110 --> 58:48.020
offensive and defensive , uh , to , uh ,

58:48.030 --> 58:50.879
now lead that into the submarine force .

58:51.229 --> 58:53.285
So that's a , a decision that's been

58:53.285 --> 58:55.507
made to . Split that up capabilities to

58:55.507 --> 58:57.673
bring to bear and then it's also joint

58:57.673 --> 59:00.300
capabilities that uh you're probably

59:00.300 --> 59:03.050
well aware of uh from a tactical air

59:03.050 --> 59:06.020
strategic air capability and some

59:06.020 --> 59:08.639
others that we're testing and exploring

59:08.639 --> 59:10.629
with experimentation . So it's

59:10.629 --> 59:12.909
important I know that uh our

59:12.909 --> 59:15.659
competitors view mining and mine

59:15.659 --> 59:17.659
warfare is important . We've got to

59:17.659 --> 59:20.479
take it as a real threat . And I don't

59:20.479 --> 59:22.535
know if you want to talk about the ,

59:22.535 --> 59:25.270
you know , shore aspect in this , uh ,

59:25.639 --> 59:28.479
it's a challenge for sure . With regard

59:28.479 --> 59:30.646
to mines , obviously I'll defer to the

59:30.646 --> 59:33.040
navy with regard to In the sea echelon ,

59:33.090 --> 59:35.201
how they'll deal with that particular

59:35.201 --> 59:37.489
threat for the Marine Corps and the

59:37.489 --> 59:39.879
delivery of marine formations ashore ,

59:40.070 --> 59:42.459
there are options again , the sea

59:42.459 --> 59:45.409
echelon , if denied , if frustrated by

59:45.409 --> 59:47.889
a mine or sensor effort that is

59:47.889 --> 59:50.409
intended to deny space or access , then

59:50.409 --> 59:52.959
the marine . simply goes back to its

59:52.959 --> 59:56.760
roots seizing key maritime terrain in

59:56.760 --> 59:59.159
order to facilitate maneuver that could

59:59.159 --> 01:00:01.560
mean a fires expeditionary advance base .

01:00:01.620 --> 01:00:03.731
It could mean a sensing expeditionary

01:00:03.731 --> 01:00:06.280
advance base . It could mean simply

01:00:06.280 --> 01:00:08.639
moving and conducting a deep

01:00:08.639 --> 01:00:11.330
operational maneuver that . Moves

01:00:11.330 --> 01:00:14.969
around or over a denied space . That is

01:00:14.969 --> 01:00:16.802
exactly what the Marine Corps is

01:00:16.802 --> 01:00:19.025
designed to do . That is what our force

01:00:19.025 --> 01:00:21.610
design modernization efforts are

01:00:21.610 --> 01:00:23.770
intended to provide a force with

01:00:23.770 --> 01:00:26.689
flexibility . So yes , the adversary is

01:00:26.689 --> 01:00:29.770
going to attempt to deny terrain and

01:00:29.770 --> 01:00:31.826
particularly in the sea echelon that

01:00:31.826 --> 01:00:33.937
might take many different forms , but

01:00:33.937 --> 01:00:37.199
you have options . Reach and proximity

01:00:37.409 --> 01:00:39.465
can be overcome with the delivery of

01:00:39.465 --> 01:00:41.879
platforms . Well , through the delivery

01:00:41.879 --> 01:00:44.229
of marine formations using some of our

01:00:44.229 --> 01:00:46.879
platforms with extended reach and then

01:00:46.879 --> 01:00:49.040
leveraging extended range munitions

01:00:49.040 --> 01:00:50.984
such as Navy strike missile , long

01:00:50.984 --> 01:00:53.207
range precision fires , and high mars ,

01:00:53.207 --> 01:00:55.040
there are options to the command

01:00:55.040 --> 01:00:58.709
commander , homie . Oh , I think you

01:00:58.709 --> 01:01:01.530
said it will . Alright , we are out of

01:01:01.530 --> 01:01:03.586
time . I want to thank our panelists

01:01:03.586 --> 01:01:05.808
for their time today and their insights

01:01:05.808 --> 01:01:08.330
and all they do to prepare sailors and

01:01:08.330 --> 01:01:10.729
marines for combat and for deployments

01:01:10.729 --> 01:01:13.007
around the world . I want to thank you ,

01:01:13.007 --> 01:01:15.118
the audience , for your attention and

01:01:15.118 --> 01:01:17.340
your being here and also your questions

01:01:17.340 --> 01:01:19.850
today to thank our members , we have a

01:01:19.850 --> 01:01:22.475
small gift from the Naval Institute . A

01:01:22.475 --> 01:01:24.586
Naval Institute press book countering

01:01:24.586 --> 01:01:26.586
China's Great Game , a strategy for

01:01:26.586 --> 01:01:28.808
American dominance by Michael Soullik .

01:01:29.034 --> 01:01:31.145
Please join me in a round of applause

01:01:31.145 --> 01:01:33.514
for our panelists and before you leave

01:01:33.514 --> 01:01:35.915
today , um , be sure to go into the

01:01:35.915 --> 01:01:38.082
West app and provide your thoughts and

01:01:38.082 --> 01:01:40.715
your comments on the the conversation

01:01:40.715 --> 01:01:42.937
that we've had . Once again , thank you

01:01:42.937 --> 01:01:42.915
very much .