WEBVTT 00:00.209 --> 00:02.320 Ladies and gentlemen , now presenting 00:02.320 --> 00:04.320 at the Warriors Corner , Lieutenant 00:04.320 --> 00:06.653 General Barrett Mr Pierce and Mr Moleko . 00:09.789 --> 00:13.020 All right . Oh , I think that's my cue . 00:13.270 --> 00:15.939 Um Let's go ahead to the next slide 00:15.949 --> 00:18.110 because I realize that we're the only 00:18.120 --> 00:19.959 thing standing between you and a 00:19.969 --> 00:22.530 beverage of your choice . Um 00:23.690 --> 00:25.912 Information and information advantage . 00:26.989 --> 00:29.290 Every good briefing starts off with a 00:29.299 --> 00:32.740 threat briefing . And so here we are , 00:32.950 --> 00:34.894 we're in another election season . 00:35.110 --> 00:37.380 We've got Cyber Mission forces actively 00:37.389 --> 00:40.540 working to ensure that foreign line 00:40.549 --> 00:42.939 interests do not impede our elections 00:42.950 --> 00:44.617 both in cyberspace and in the 00:44.617 --> 00:47.080 information dimension . We have two 00:47.090 --> 00:49.090 nation state adversaries , at least 00:49.090 --> 00:52.360 that stated doctrine . Information is 00:52.369 --> 00:55.169 part of their doctrine 00:55.889 --> 00:59.720 to fight adversaries . And 00:59.729 --> 01:01.951 then if you just take a look around the 01:01.951 --> 01:04.173 ecosystem , whether we're talking about 01:04.173 --> 01:06.507 cyber , we're talking about information , 01:08.050 --> 01:10.370 the speed and scale at which our 01:10.379 --> 01:13.709 adversaries are operating , just keep 01:13.720 --> 01:17.449 picking up , we're dealing with 01:17.459 --> 01:19.459 more sophistication in what they're 01:19.459 --> 01:21.626 doing , living off the land techniques 01:21.626 --> 01:23.889 and things like that . And this also 01:23.940 --> 01:25.940 manifests itself in the information 01:25.940 --> 01:28.162 dimension and we shouldn't be surprised 01:28.162 --> 01:29.829 with that because most of the 01:29.829 --> 01:32.069 information that we receive are ones 01:32.080 --> 01:34.247 and zeros that are promulgated through 01:34.247 --> 01:37.059 a network . And , and this is so this 01:37.069 --> 01:39.291 is not a surprise . And so this is what 01:39.291 --> 01:41.402 we're dealing with and the barrier to 01:41.402 --> 01:43.940 entry to these type of capabilities is 01:43.949 --> 01:46.250 getting , we knew it was already low . 01:46.260 --> 01:48.750 We've been saying that for years and 01:48.760 --> 01:52.209 even with tools like 01:53.019 --> 01:55.830 A I and machine learning right in the 01:55.839 --> 01:59.769 hands of , of competitors . That's 01:59.779 --> 02:03.050 another aspect of this , which to me is 02:03.059 --> 02:05.319 actually quite concerning . What does 02:05.330 --> 02:07.386 this look like if you're a commander 02:07.386 --> 02:10.320 getting ready to mob from the homeland 02:11.740 --> 02:13.851 and you're dealing with these type of 02:13.851 --> 02:16.073 threats , if you have a cyber contested 02:16.073 --> 02:18.350 homeland or a contested information 02:18.360 --> 02:20.416 dimension that you're dealing with . 02:20.699 --> 02:23.800 And so recently , um in August at Asia 02:24.210 --> 02:26.377 technet in Augusta , I decided to have 02:26.377 --> 02:29.729 a little fun with this and the staff 02:29.740 --> 02:32.070 and I put together a deep fake video 02:33.789 --> 02:37.380 and it was two people uh with 02:37.690 --> 02:39.929 not a lot of I would say with not a lot 02:39.940 --> 02:42.107 of experience in putting together deep 02:42.107 --> 02:44.389 fakes . And , and the story was that I 02:44.399 --> 02:46.940 got called away and couldn't give my 02:46.949 --> 02:49.339 keynote speech at the end of technet . 02:50.339 --> 02:52.561 And so they showed the video and it was 02:52.561 --> 02:54.899 a , it was a complete deep thing and I 02:54.910 --> 02:58.429 walked out on the stage . What really 02:58.440 --> 03:01.770 was fascinating to me was how many 03:01.779 --> 03:05.460 people who know me well , came up to me 03:05.470 --> 03:09.119 afterwards and said you had me 03:09.130 --> 03:12.759 fooled , they know me very 03:12.770 --> 03:16.089 well and it wasn't a top notch deep 03:16.100 --> 03:18.710 fake . These guys , these guys had 03:18.720 --> 03:20.720 seven days and again , not a lot of 03:20.720 --> 03:23.570 skill for putting it together . Um They 03:23.580 --> 03:26.300 pulled my , they pulled my voice off 03:26.309 --> 03:28.420 the internet from something else that 03:28.420 --> 03:30.698 had been recorded like seven years ago . 03:30.820 --> 03:34.610 Um The context was believable that I 03:34.619 --> 03:37.350 would be called away . The forum that I 03:37.360 --> 03:40.559 was in AFC was a trustworthy 03:41.779 --> 03:45.160 channel , so to speak and it was 03:45.169 --> 03:47.800 therefore totally believable that I had 03:47.809 --> 03:50.410 been called away . So you start 03:50.419 --> 03:53.389 thinking about this , how to put these 03:53.399 --> 03:55.010 things come together from an 03:55.010 --> 03:58.130 adversarial point of view and , and how 03:58.139 --> 04:01.690 do we now prepare commanders to think 04:01.699 --> 04:03.755 about the threats in the information 04:03.755 --> 04:05.699 dimension that they're going to be 04:05.699 --> 04:09.039 facing ? And so what has changed ? So 04:09.910 --> 04:12.021 it's been a year since we were here , 04:12.021 --> 04:15.600 gathered at a USA . And um right after 04:15.610 --> 04:17.980 we adjourned last year , the Combined 04:17.989 --> 04:21.230 Arms Center published AD P 313 , the 04:21.239 --> 04:23.295 Doctrine for Information Advantage . 04:23.959 --> 04:27.140 And so that then gave us the framework 04:27.149 --> 04:30.690 for how to think about how do we 04:30.700 --> 04:34.670 deliver capabilities that move us 04:34.679 --> 04:37.070 along this trajectory in information 04:37.079 --> 04:38.968 advantage . And one of the really 04:38.968 --> 04:41.023 important things that it did from my 04:41.023 --> 04:43.079 perspective is it introduced 04:43.350 --> 04:45.600 information as a dynamic of combat 04:45.609 --> 04:49.549 power and in doing so that 04:49.559 --> 04:51.799 makes this inherently commander's 04:51.809 --> 04:55.470 business . And so the idea that 04:56.220 --> 04:59.619 the information advantage um elements 04:59.630 --> 05:03.279 of enable c to protect from the 05:03.290 --> 05:06.839 forces attack , influence and 05:06.850 --> 05:09.529 inform , putting all of those things 05:09.540 --> 05:11.640 together . Now we have a place for a 05:11.649 --> 05:13.705 commander and a framework for how to 05:13.705 --> 05:15.649 think about those things . But the 05:15.649 --> 05:17.760 doctrine isn't enough . You've got to 05:17.760 --> 05:19.927 have some structure to support this as 05:19.927 --> 05:22.760 well . And with the um structured 05:22.769 --> 05:25.589 decisions by the army , we now have 05:25.600 --> 05:27.929 what we have is a theater information 05:27.940 --> 05:30.162 advantage attachment . And this is what 05:30.162 --> 05:32.440 we're really going to talk about today . 05:32.440 --> 05:31.980 We're going to build three of these 05:31.989 --> 05:34.459 things in the army . One's going to go 05:34.470 --> 05:36.414 to the Pacific , one's gonna go to 05:36.414 --> 05:38.637 Europe and the other one is going to be 05:38.637 --> 05:40.803 at Army Cyber and we're going to spend 05:40.803 --> 05:42.803 a little bit of time going why army 05:42.803 --> 05:44.803 Cyber . But this is the campaign of 05:44.803 --> 05:48.540 learning that we're on um to understand 05:48.549 --> 05:51.769 how to deliver these type of um 05:52.369 --> 05:54.739 uh advantages to a commander , help 05:54.750 --> 05:57.450 them , help a commander visualize what 05:57.459 --> 05:59.515 the information dimension looks like 05:59.519 --> 06:01.630 and , and what is in the realm of the 06:01.630 --> 06:04.429 possible in terms of both protecting 06:04.440 --> 06:07.440 yourself , right ? Think go back to 06:07.450 --> 06:10.269 that deep fake at the time and place 06:10.600 --> 06:12.989 where you have a critical mission to 06:13.000 --> 06:16.640 occur . You do not want your formations 06:16.649 --> 06:19.399 be questioning whether or not that's 06:19.410 --> 06:23.179 you speaking to them , right ? Or , or 06:23.190 --> 06:26.440 a narrative that completely undercuts 06:26.450 --> 06:29.579 the trust in , in the institutions 06:30.350 --> 06:32.850 and the leaders that lead our soldiers . 06:34.410 --> 06:36.354 All right . And so with that , I'm 06:36.354 --> 06:38.466 gonna turn it over to um the director 06:38.466 --> 06:40.577 of the Army Cyber Theater Information 06:40.577 --> 06:42.700 Detachment , Mr Aaron Pierce and he's 06:42.709 --> 06:44.709 gonna talk to you a little bit more 06:44.709 --> 06:46.480 about the art cyber tie in . 06:48.709 --> 06:52.059 Thank you . M so , uh I'm gonna attempt 06:52.070 --> 06:54.690 to give you a provisional answer to the 06:54.700 --> 06:56.644 question that General Barrett just 06:56.644 --> 06:59.480 asked , you know why our cyber for a 06:59.489 --> 07:01.156 theater information advantage 07:01.156 --> 07:02.950 attachment . So 07:05.390 --> 07:08.630 right now , my proposition to you is 07:08.640 --> 07:12.519 that like cyberspace information is 07:12.529 --> 07:16.369 inherently trans regional information 07:16.380 --> 07:18.436 and information effects . They don't 07:18.436 --> 07:20.547 care what the geographic border looks 07:20.547 --> 07:22.658 like . You can't contain your effects 07:22.658 --> 07:25.209 to just one A O and you have to be 07:25.220 --> 07:27.276 prepared to follow those adversaries 07:27.276 --> 07:29.331 wherever they go in that information 07:29.331 --> 07:32.070 space . So while the two geographic T 07:32.339 --> 07:34.880 ads are going to be focused as they 07:34.890 --> 07:37.119 should down and in within their 07:37.130 --> 07:40.049 respective theaters , the trans 07:40.480 --> 07:44.149 regional focus of the , our cyber ty A 07:44.670 --> 07:47.250 is going to be threat focused . So 07:47.260 --> 07:49.420 specifically , we're going to be 07:49.429 --> 07:51.970 focused on those priority , adversary 07:51.980 --> 07:54.459 threats as they are articulated in the 07:54.470 --> 07:57.390 National Defense strategy . So we're 07:57.399 --> 08:00.410 going to look at those trans regionally . 08:00.420 --> 08:02.510 So not just how is , you know , a 08:02.519 --> 08:05.029 threat impacting the Pacific , but how 08:05.040 --> 08:08.230 is that same actor acting across 08:08.359 --> 08:10.730 halfway across the world or multiple 08:10.739 --> 08:14.149 places in the globe at the same time to 08:14.160 --> 08:16.104 have the effects that they want to 08:16.104 --> 08:18.649 achieve their military objectives . So 08:18.660 --> 08:20.771 that's kind of the Y trans regional . 08:20.771 --> 08:23.380 But why our Cyber uh and what I'd say 08:23.390 --> 08:26.769 there is we have 14 years of experience 08:26.779 --> 08:30.690 doing something very similar So as 08:30.700 --> 08:33.440 we've worked in cyberspace , it is 08:33.450 --> 08:36.400 trans regional as well as a domain . So 08:36.409 --> 08:38.599 we have had to through blood sweat and 08:38.609 --> 08:41.039 tears working underneath cybercom , 08:41.460 --> 08:43.520 figure out how to work in an 08:43.530 --> 08:45.752 environment where you're coordinating , 08:45.752 --> 08:48.000 not just with one service , you know , 08:48.010 --> 08:50.520 component commander , not just one 08:50.530 --> 08:52.909 geographic combatant commander , you 08:52.919 --> 08:55.030 have to come , you have to coordinate 08:55.030 --> 08:57.159 and deconflict amongst multiple 08:57.340 --> 09:00.130 combatant commanders , multiple 09:00.140 --> 09:03.090 interagency partners and even with some 09:03.099 --> 09:06.400 of our multinational partners . So not 09:06.409 --> 09:08.353 only do you have to do all of that 09:08.353 --> 09:10.429 coordinations ? But the authority 09:10.440 --> 09:12.890 structure in cyberspace operations is 09:12.900 --> 09:16.539 very fractured . So no one 09:16.549 --> 09:19.549 commander has all of the authorities 09:19.559 --> 09:23.030 needed to do cyberspace operations 09:23.039 --> 09:26.479 plus an influence operation , you know , 09:26.489 --> 09:28.880 plus a , you know , physical maneuver 09:28.890 --> 09:30.946 combined with all of those things to 09:30.946 --> 09:33.112 achieve an effect on the battlefield . 09:33.349 --> 09:36.880 We have to work together and use a 09:36.890 --> 09:39.599 complicated fused authority structure 09:39.770 --> 09:42.619 to do those cyberspace operations . And 09:42.630 --> 09:44.574 we're going to have to do the same 09:44.574 --> 09:46.519 thing in information . So we think 09:46.519 --> 09:48.630 we're incredibly well postured as our 09:48.630 --> 09:50.741 cyber to work through this as part of 09:50.741 --> 09:53.019 the campaign of learning to figure out , 09:53.019 --> 09:54.963 you know , how much of this can we 09:54.963 --> 09:58.460 actually do ? So if you believe me at 09:58.469 --> 10:00.580 least provisionally on the premise of 10:00.580 --> 10:02.802 why our cyber , I'm gonna talk to you a 10:02.802 --> 10:05.025 little bit about the what ? So what the 10:05.025 --> 10:08.239 heck is a tie a right ? Sounds buzzy 10:08.250 --> 10:11.630 sounds , you know , jargony . Well , 10:11.640 --> 10:14.250 easily put their , their broadly cross 10:14.260 --> 10:17.409 functional team of information 10:17.419 --> 10:20.960 specialists . So that that 10:20.969 --> 10:24.539 alone is not unique . The army and the 10:24.549 --> 10:26.771 joint force have done this in an ad hoc 10:26.771 --> 10:29.849 fa fashion throughout the years . Look 10:29.859 --> 10:32.539 at some task force structures like the 10:32.549 --> 10:35.099 information warfare task forces in the 10:35.109 --> 10:38.840 Pacific and Centcom A ors , you know , 10:38.849 --> 10:41.150 but those are again , those are ad hoc , 10:41.159 --> 10:43.381 they're always a pick up game , they're 10:43.381 --> 10:46.070 continuously rotating forces . The 10:46.080 --> 10:48.650 proposition here is that these standing 10:48.659 --> 10:51.640 cross functional teams will live in 10:51.650 --> 10:54.030 that environment , day in day out in 10:54.039 --> 10:57.219 competition provide their commanders 10:57.229 --> 11:00.159 opportunities to create information 11:00.169 --> 11:02.429 effects and to protect against 11:02.710 --> 11:05.549 adversary , information warfare effects 11:06.880 --> 11:08.991 in competition and then be there as a 11:08.991 --> 11:10.890 springboard so that we can get a 11:10.900 --> 11:13.419 running start in a crisis or 11:13.429 --> 11:15.429 contingency when you need to attach 11:15.429 --> 11:18.390 additional specialized forces to enable 11:18.400 --> 11:21.270 some of those more exquisite operations . 11:23.650 --> 11:27.359 So what's actually in it ? 11:27.549 --> 11:29.771 Ok . So it's cross functional . Great . 11:29.771 --> 11:32.200 I guess nobody's gonna be surprised 11:32.640 --> 11:35.559 that the majority of the skill sets and 11:35.570 --> 11:38.559 capabilities in the ti a our 11:38.570 --> 11:40.580 psychological operations , 11:40.590 --> 11:44.419 electromagnetic warfare , civil affairs , 11:44.880 --> 11:47.500 cyberspace operations . That's a 11:47.510 --> 11:49.399 majority of the folks and I think 11:49.500 --> 11:51.556 shouldn't be a surprise to anybody . 11:52.190 --> 11:55.809 But additionally , there 11:55.820 --> 11:58.359 are other specialized information 11:58.369 --> 12:00.559 skills that may not usually come with 12:00.570 --> 12:03.099 those types of formations . So we'll 12:03.109 --> 12:06.010 have public affairs capabilities so 12:06.020 --> 12:08.710 that we can help inform people of the 12:08.719 --> 12:10.830 threats that they are facing , inform 12:10.830 --> 12:12.941 the forces and commanders of what the 12:12.941 --> 12:15.809 adversary is doing . We're going to 12:15.820 --> 12:19.469 have specialized data analytics , 12:19.479 --> 12:23.469 data science capabilities . Mhm as 12:23.479 --> 12:26.679 well as of modeling and simulation 12:26.690 --> 12:30.390 capability . So all of that together we 12:30.400 --> 12:33.700 think provides that backbone that a 12:33.710 --> 12:36.599 commander can use to really understand 12:36.609 --> 12:38.776 what they're facing in the environment 12:38.776 --> 12:40.831 and then figure out how to create an 12:40.831 --> 12:42.960 effect to leverage that information . 12:44.580 --> 12:48.320 So with what is it great ? 12:48.739 --> 12:51.580 Now how are we gonna use it ? And here 12:51.590 --> 12:54.729 I have another proposition for you as 12:54.739 --> 12:56.906 General Barrett mentioned , you know , 12:56.906 --> 12:59.619 the pace of information effects and 12:59.630 --> 13:02.210 technologies is increasing 13:03.549 --> 13:07.239 and you know , we need to stop 13:07.250 --> 13:10.090 thinking in terms of using information 13:10.099 --> 13:12.979 as we fight , you know , using it for 13:13.049 --> 13:15.049 targeting , using it for planning . 13:15.049 --> 13:17.210 Those are all important . But we also 13:17.219 --> 13:19.489 need to start fighting with that 13:19.500 --> 13:22.969 information . Information has to be a 13:22.979 --> 13:26.500 component of a commander's scheme of 13:26.510 --> 13:29.400 maneuver and scheme of fires and that's 13:29.409 --> 13:31.890 what the army's information advantage , 13:31.900 --> 13:34.510 transformation construct and doctrine 13:34.520 --> 13:37.669 really tells them . So 13:38.559 --> 13:41.200 how do we , how do we use a ti a to do 13:41.210 --> 13:43.640 that ? So I'm gonna give you uh a 13:43.650 --> 13:47.539 couple of operational vignettes . 13:48.349 --> 13:50.489 I would say these are not exhaustive 13:50.500 --> 13:53.150 but just exemplary . So 13:54.640 --> 13:58.250 in competition , we can , we can use a 13:58.260 --> 14:00.093 tie it in both the defensive and 14:00.093 --> 14:02.739 offensive manner . So on the defense , 14:03.109 --> 14:04.831 you know , it looks a lot like 14:05.510 --> 14:08.340 identifying foreign malign influence 14:08.349 --> 14:10.770 threats that are targeting army forces . 14:10.780 --> 14:13.210 We're not trying to boil the and figure 14:13.219 --> 14:15.900 out who's doing what to whom globally . 14:16.020 --> 14:18.469 But specifically how are they targeting 14:18.479 --> 14:21.030 that commander that is that is trying 14:21.039 --> 14:23.729 to mobilize , how are they targeting 14:23.890 --> 14:27.119 her or his soldiers ? And how do we 14:27.130 --> 14:30.989 blunt those attacks by both making 14:31.000 --> 14:34.479 sure that we can name and shame those 14:34.489 --> 14:37.229 malign influence actors . A lot of the 14:37.239 --> 14:40.280 times just letting people know , hey , 14:41.260 --> 14:43.429 this message is being sent to you . 14:44.650 --> 14:47.429 This is who's sending it . It's not 14:47.440 --> 14:51.289 authentic and you may want to think 14:51.299 --> 14:54.109 twice before you act on it . So that's 14:54.119 --> 14:56.369 one part . But then we can also blunt 14:56.380 --> 14:58.491 those attacks through technical means 14:58.869 --> 15:01.169 and working with our cyberspace 15:01.179 --> 15:04.559 partners with some other partners , we 15:04.570 --> 15:06.729 can create those technical effects 15:06.739 --> 15:09.580 against the adversary influence 15:09.590 --> 15:13.200 networks to make them less effective 15:13.400 --> 15:17.070 as they attempt to target our soldiers . 15:18.340 --> 15:22.320 Now , on the offense , I'm gonna 15:22.330 --> 15:25.750 give you a a big strategic level , 15:25.760 --> 15:28.900 theater level thing so a commander 15:28.909 --> 15:32.849 could leverage the to implement 15:33.219 --> 15:35.099 a reveal and conceal plan 15:37.049 --> 15:40.969 for their capabilities with the intent 15:40.979 --> 15:44.979 of throwing the adversary off balance 15:44.989 --> 15:48.049 in terms of decision making and maybe 15:48.059 --> 15:50.281 even help , help them , you know , help 15:50.281 --> 15:53.929 delay a decision by an adversary to use 15:53.940 --> 15:56.489 military force to achieve their 15:56.500 --> 16:00.070 political objectives . Now , in 16:00.210 --> 16:02.909 price and contingency , you , you could 16:02.919 --> 16:05.539 probably still do some of those things 16:05.559 --> 16:08.510 although capacity limited , but 16:08.989 --> 16:11.179 you're also going to have the 16:11.190 --> 16:14.359 opportunity to do some more tactical 16:14.369 --> 16:17.780 operational things . So on the defense 16:17.789 --> 16:20.419 in crisis and contingency , some of 16:20.429 --> 16:23.049 that for the R . Cyber T A specifically 16:23.059 --> 16:25.115 again , we're not going to look down 16:25.115 --> 16:27.590 and in , in the theater , especially , 16:27.599 --> 16:30.150 you know , an A O at the , you know , 16:30.159 --> 16:33.510 core or below level . But what we might 16:33.520 --> 16:37.349 be doing is helping to defend 16:37.760 --> 16:40.039 the information space in the joint 16:40.049 --> 16:43.530 security area . So , you know , helping 16:43.539 --> 16:46.570 to make sure those the information 16:46.580 --> 16:49.469 warfare , the propaganda that targets 16:49.580 --> 16:51.840 those areas and targets the populations 16:51.849 --> 16:54.390 in those areas , make sure that we 16:54.400 --> 16:56.622 understand what those threats look like 16:56.622 --> 16:58.844 where they're coming from and then work 16:58.844 --> 17:00.956 with the right partners , whether our 17:00.956 --> 17:04.319 organic forces or attached forces , you 17:04.329 --> 17:07.000 know , joint multinational forces , 17:07.140 --> 17:10.510 somebody to help action those uh and 17:10.859 --> 17:13.459 similarly , not just in the joint 17:13.469 --> 17:16.540 security area or support area , but 17:16.550 --> 17:19.459 also helping to identify where the 17:19.469 --> 17:22.280 adversary is attempting to expand the 17:22.290 --> 17:25.079 battlefield horizontally into other 17:25.459 --> 17:29.050 countries , not , not physically but in 17:29.060 --> 17:32.969 the information space . So how are they 17:32.979 --> 17:35.939 trying to make those populations turn 17:35.949 --> 17:38.005 off our access basing and overflight 17:38.005 --> 17:40.560 privileges ? That's an important thing 17:40.569 --> 17:44.300 to identify . Now , we can also on the 17:44.310 --> 17:47.689 offense again , create 17:47.910 --> 17:50.949 tailored and targeted technical and 17:50.959 --> 17:54.910 cognitive effects in 17:54.920 --> 17:58.380 multiple domains using our 17:58.390 --> 18:00.660 specialized information forces , either 18:00.670 --> 18:04.270 organic or attached in support of that 18:04.280 --> 18:07.819 operational commander . And I think 18:07.829 --> 18:09.940 it's important to emphasize again , I 18:09.940 --> 18:13.300 keep saying organic or attached the the 18:13.310 --> 18:15.477 TIAS as they're currently designed for 18:15.477 --> 18:17.400 this , this pilot period are 65 18:17.410 --> 18:21.380 personnel . We we are not under any 18:21.630 --> 18:24.329 illusion that we can do everything with 18:24.339 --> 18:27.959 65 personnel . But what we can do 18:28.550 --> 18:32.170 is provide a focal point to 18:32.180 --> 18:34.650 command and control some organic 18:34.660 --> 18:38.359 specialized forces , but also those 18:38.369 --> 18:41.560 forces like say expeditionary sema 18:41.569 --> 18:44.640 teams that our cyber has attach those 18:44.650 --> 18:48.020 to the T A to then create indicated 18:48.280 --> 18:50.670 effects for a commander . 18:51.890 --> 18:55.810 So now that I've talked about forces 18:56.349 --> 18:58.569 and have bored everybody to death . I 18:58.579 --> 19:01.219 am going to turn it over to Mr Al 19:01.229 --> 19:04.030 Moleko , our senior science advisor to 19:04.040 --> 19:06.373 talk to you a little bit more about the , 19:06.500 --> 19:08.111 the way we're going to wield 19:08.111 --> 19:11.439 information using uh capabilities that 19:11.449 --> 19:14.089 our cyber is looking at . Awesome . 19:14.099 --> 19:16.155 Awesome . Thank you , Mr Pierce . It 19:16.155 --> 19:18.210 was uh very enlightening and a great 19:18.210 --> 19:20.321 perspective to share . So hopefully , 19:20.321 --> 19:22.432 you've got some hard questions for us 19:22.432 --> 19:24.599 because we're ready , at least I think 19:24.599 --> 19:26.488 we're ready . So I'm gonna talk a 19:26.488 --> 19:26.310 couple of , I'm gonna talk to you about 19:26.319 --> 19:28.541 three really important things . I think 19:28.541 --> 19:30.875 you see them on the slide people , data , 19:30.875 --> 19:33.097 data platforms and A I and automation . 19:33.270 --> 19:35.437 We're going to save A I and automation 19:35.437 --> 19:37.548 to the end . We're going to start off 19:37.548 --> 19:39.714 with people . Although the information 19:39.714 --> 19:41.780 dimension is really , really complex 19:41.790 --> 19:44.869 and it's very , you know , it centric , 19:45.510 --> 19:48.640 it's a very much a people game and 19:48.729 --> 19:52.089 wielding people is going to allow us to 19:52.099 --> 19:54.479 have success here . For example , we'll 19:54.489 --> 19:56.900 be able to bring to bear data 19:56.910 --> 19:59.280 scientists , software developers and 19:59.290 --> 20:02.020 intelligence professionals bring those 20:02.030 --> 20:04.969 folks together to look at the essential 20:04.979 --> 20:07.790 elements of the information dimension . 20:08.270 --> 20:10.159 So what I'm talking about the raw 20:10.159 --> 20:12.159 materials there . I'm talking about 20:12.159 --> 20:15.219 data code , machine learning models and 20:15.229 --> 20:18.380 infrastructure . These people will pull 20:18.390 --> 20:21.770 this together and mold it into mission 20:21.780 --> 20:24.469 relevant capabilities that will enable 20:24.479 --> 20:26.646 the th ads to accomplish their mission 20:27.020 --> 20:29.187 and lead positive change in this space 20:29.187 --> 20:31.020 which is greatly desired at this 20:31.020 --> 20:33.910 juncture . Secondly , we're going to 20:33.920 --> 20:35.989 look out at some of our internal 20:36.000 --> 20:38.280 organizations , the Technical warfare 20:38.290 --> 20:41.449 Center and our army lab . We're going 20:41.459 --> 20:43.890 to wield their special authorities to 20:43.900 --> 20:46.170 help us gain accelerated access to 20:46.180 --> 20:48.229 cutting edge technologies that will 20:48.239 --> 20:51.069 enable the thad to stay ahead in the 20:51.079 --> 20:53.369 innovation space . That's really , 20:53.380 --> 20:55.602 really important . So at the end of the 20:55.602 --> 20:57.658 day , people is what's going to make 20:57.658 --> 20:58.991 this effort , the , the 20:58.991 --> 21:01.369 operationalization of the very 21:01.380 --> 21:04.349 successful . The second thing I would 21:04.359 --> 21:06.581 like to talk just a little bit about is 21:06.581 --> 21:09.119 data and data platforms . Everybody in 21:09.130 --> 21:11.352 here knows that data is something we're 21:11.352 --> 21:13.890 not taking as good of a advantage of as 21:13.900 --> 21:16.239 we could . But I'm going to tell you a 21:16.250 --> 21:18.139 couple of things about army cyber 21:18.139 --> 21:20.510 command and how we're going to wield 21:20.520 --> 21:23.719 data using our data platforms . Anybody 21:23.729 --> 21:25.840 in here heard of Gabriel Nimbus ? The 21:25.840 --> 21:28.007 army's big data . Oh , lots of hands . 21:28.007 --> 21:31.400 All right , good stuff . So , uh Mr 21:31.410 --> 21:33.632 Steve Rain , who's here in the audience 21:33.632 --> 21:35.589 somewhere is our TWC director . He 21:35.599 --> 21:38.709 recently led an effort to update and 21:38.719 --> 21:41.030 optimize the engine that Gabriel Nimbus 21:41.040 --> 21:43.609 operates on . Anybody in here heard of 21:43.619 --> 21:47.449 snowflake or data bricks All right , 21:47.979 --> 21:50.400 it's a big deal because those two 21:50.410 --> 21:52.577 companies , the engine that's powering 21:52.577 --> 21:55.290 their data platform allows customers to 21:55.300 --> 21:58.119 get really quick access to data . So 21:58.130 --> 22:01.839 that's what Mr Rain did by optimizing 22:01.849 --> 22:04.880 the data platform , we now have an 22:04.890 --> 22:07.459 engine inside our data platform which 22:07.469 --> 22:10.699 allows us to at very high rates of 22:10.709 --> 22:14.040 speed . Pull in data , apply a common 22:14.050 --> 22:16.359 schema and then make that data 22:16.369 --> 22:19.319 accessible to all of the analysts and 22:19.329 --> 22:21.760 data scientists and intel professionals 22:21.770 --> 22:24.979 as needed . The common scheme is really 22:24.989 --> 22:28.530 important . Also the system now allows 22:28.540 --> 22:32.260 us to anybody in here ever heard of 22:32.270 --> 22:35.800 SQL ? Structured query language . OK . 22:36.089 --> 22:38.200 The good thing about structured query 22:38.200 --> 22:40.256 language , it's the lingua franca of 22:40.256 --> 22:42.560 data access . If you can learn to speak 22:42.569 --> 22:44.829 SQL , you can get access to the data 22:44.839 --> 22:47.239 you want from the data source you need . 22:47.810 --> 22:49.959 So now that Gabriel Nimbus has been 22:49.969 --> 22:52.136 modified into more of a data warehouse 22:52.136 --> 22:54.599 architecture and our analysts are able 22:54.609 --> 22:57.729 to leverage SQL to get access to that 22:57.739 --> 23:00.449 data . And we've got a modern engine , 23:00.489 --> 23:02.979 we can ingest tons of data very quickly 23:03.079 --> 23:06.339 and give really good granular access to 23:06.349 --> 23:09.589 all of our analysts . Another thing 23:09.599 --> 23:11.655 about Gabriel Nimbus , that's pretty 23:11.655 --> 23:13.710 important that everybody should walk 23:13.710 --> 23:16.170 away . Having confidence in anybody in 23:16.180 --> 23:18.270 here ever used a Jupiter notebook to 23:18.280 --> 23:21.180 write Python code . Maybe a few folks . 23:21.189 --> 23:23.250 OK , sir . Thank you . Thank you for 23:23.260 --> 23:26.250 the help . Jupiter notebook is a really 23:26.260 --> 23:28.239 important tool and now we have an 23:28.250 --> 23:30.859 enterprise version of it installed and 23:30.869 --> 23:33.550 cack enabled on Gabriel Nimbus . So all 23:33.560 --> 23:36.000 of our analysts can simply log in , 23:36.219 --> 23:39.390 they can bring their own data or they 23:39.400 --> 23:41.689 can access the data in Gabriel Nimbus , 23:41.699 --> 23:43.866 or they can dump their data into an S3 23:43.866 --> 23:46.088 bucket if it's too big to bring along . 23:46.270 --> 23:48.326 But what this does for us , it gives 23:48.329 --> 23:50.410 all of our analysts hack enabled 23:50.420 --> 23:52.689 ability to create visualizations , 23:54.699 --> 23:56.810 analytics and machine learning models 23:56.810 --> 23:58.755 to help them understand what their 23:58.755 --> 24:02.329 particular problems are and how 24:02.339 --> 24:05.000 to develop mission relevant products 24:05.229 --> 24:07.340 that can help lead decisions in their 24:07.340 --> 24:10.239 space . So two really important updates 24:10.250 --> 24:13.170 for Gabriel Nimbus . One last thing 24:13.180 --> 24:17.089 about the data platform , it's cloud 24:17.099 --> 24:19.810 based and it's also exists at three 24:19.819 --> 24:22.349 different classification levels . So we 24:22.359 --> 24:24.449 have a Gabriel nimbus nipper net , a 24:24.609 --> 24:27.170 Gabriel Nimbus zipper net and a Gabriel 24:27.180 --> 24:30.209 Nimbus JW that gives us basically a 24:30.219 --> 24:32.770 data processing ecosystem that will 24:32.780 --> 24:34.920 give us operational agility to help 24:34.930 --> 24:37.199 operationalize the T ads as well as 24:37.209 --> 24:40.569 assist us in many other missions . OK . 24:40.719 --> 24:42.886 We talked about data platforms . Let's 24:42.886 --> 24:44.941 talk about A I and automation just a 24:44.941 --> 24:47.163 little bit . So everybody wants to talk 24:47.163 --> 24:49.380 about A I I heard a lot about A I as 24:49.390 --> 24:51.612 I've been walking around here today and 24:51.612 --> 24:53.668 we've got a lot of learning to do in 24:53.668 --> 24:55.834 the A I space . But army Cyber command 24:55.834 --> 24:57.834 has actually made a lot of progress 24:57.890 --> 25:00.057 over the past two years in learning in 25:00.057 --> 25:03.314 this space . We have 11 A I initiatives , 25:03.625 --> 25:06.474 one of them called panoptic junction , 25:06.494 --> 25:08.383 which is more of a cyber security 25:08.383 --> 25:11.375 related capability that links EMAS 25:11.655 --> 25:14.805 directly to A I agents that are 25:14.814 --> 25:17.036 evaluating data to determine if we have 25:17.036 --> 25:19.994 malicious cyber attacks , you know , 25:20.005 --> 25:21.894 operating against our systems and 25:21.894 --> 25:24.814 platforms . The moral of that story is 25:24.824 --> 25:27.795 it's taken us 18 months to learn how to 25:27.805 --> 25:30.969 build this massive A I platform . It's 25:30.979 --> 25:33.201 got nine machine learning models . It's 25:33.201 --> 25:35.423 got one massive transformer based large 25:35.423 --> 25:37.535 language model . It's got a couple of 25:37.535 --> 25:39.670 open CV models . So it's an apparatus 25:39.680 --> 25:42.369 that's taught us a lot about how to 25:42.380 --> 25:44.547 operationalize artificial intelligence 25:44.630 --> 25:47.010 and what the pros and cons where it's 25:47.020 --> 25:48.853 not a good fit because A I quite 25:48.853 --> 25:51.076 frankly , is not a panacea , it's not a 25:51.076 --> 25:54.689 good fit for everything . OK ? Um 25:54.780 --> 25:56.836 Automation is gonna be key for us as 25:56.836 --> 25:59.410 well . We're going to need automation 25:59.619 --> 26:01.675 to help us lead positive change in a 26:01.675 --> 26:04.530 lot of spaces . But the A I plus 26:04.540 --> 26:06.790 automation will help us to do two 26:06.800 --> 26:09.540 things . It will help us enable the TY 26:09.869 --> 26:13.229 A to have scale , operate against data 26:13.239 --> 26:15.406 at scale in ways that they can't today 26:15.930 --> 26:18.260 A I and automation put together can 26:18.270 --> 26:21.050 help us to see trends in data that is 26:21.060 --> 26:23.290 very difficult for us to see at the 26:23.300 --> 26:26.609 current scale just by adding people to 26:26.619 --> 26:28.530 the mix , to understand what data 26:28.540 --> 26:31.250 products and services we need to derive 26:31.260 --> 26:33.989 from this information . So automation 26:34.000 --> 26:36.222 can really help us , you put automation 26:36.222 --> 26:38.222 together with A I and it's going to 26:38.222 --> 26:40.689 give us a significant advantage . Ok . 26:40.900 --> 26:43.739 So I've talked about quite a few things . 26:43.750 --> 26:45.861 I'm going to pitch it back to General 26:45.861 --> 26:48.083 Barrett and take any questions that you 26:48.083 --> 26:50.510 might have as we continue our dialogue 26:50.520 --> 26:52.576 here about the T ads and operational 26:52.680 --> 26:54.069 them . Thank you . 26:58.479 --> 27:00.689 Questions . Yes . 27:05.060 --> 27:08.630 Thank you , ma'am , Jason Laclair , 27:08.729 --> 27:11.089 Soft Tech Solutions . Thank you so much 27:11.099 --> 27:13.099 to you and your team for being here 27:13.099 --> 27:15.043 today . You spoke about developing 27:15.043 --> 27:18.540 capabilities along with AD P 313 for 27:18.550 --> 27:20.717 you at Army Cyber headquarters are the 27:20.717 --> 27:22.560 theater information uh advantage 27:22.569 --> 27:24.458 attachments . Are there published 27:24.458 --> 27:26.319 hardware software or service 27:26.329 --> 27:28.560 requirements ? And where can we in 27:28.569 --> 27:30.625 industry , find those so that we can 27:30.625 --> 27:32.760 support your mission or will those 27:32.770 --> 27:34.992 requirements go to the SE MA units that 27:34.992 --> 27:37.103 you talked about supporting the T A ? 27:37.103 --> 27:40.020 Thank you . I I don't know if you want 27:40.030 --> 27:43.109 to take that . Um So I know we have 27:43.119 --> 27:46.760 some requirements outlined in a CD D I 27:47.989 --> 27:51.040 I SI CD . Uh And so I don't know if you 27:51.050 --> 27:54.869 want to elaborate on that . Yeah . So 27:54.920 --> 27:57.142 um as general Barrett mentioned , there 27:57.142 --> 28:01.109 is an A O approved Information Systems 28:01.300 --> 28:04.020 initial capabilities document for 28:04.500 --> 28:06.729 Information advantage , not , not just 28:06.739 --> 28:09.189 for the T I ads but more broadly for 28:09.199 --> 28:12.270 information advantage . Um I know our 28:12.459 --> 28:15.430 uh AFC counterparts are in the process 28:15.439 --> 28:17.339 of working the more granular 28:17.349 --> 28:19.469 requirements definition packages that 28:19.479 --> 28:22.410 are gonna provide those , those more 28:22.420 --> 28:24.531 detailed aspects that you're probably 28:24.531 --> 28:25.531 looking for . 28:30.780 --> 28:33.500 Hi uh Mark PLO with defense scoop for 28:33.510 --> 28:36.510 here . Um What's the joint tie in for 28:36.520 --> 28:39.229 the T ads ? Um Can you communicate with 28:39.239 --> 28:41.609 your other uh service cyber components 28:41.619 --> 28:44.359 if you need , you know , help with 28:44.369 --> 28:46.660 possibly offensive cyber operations to 28:46.670 --> 28:49.180 help enable army commanders or army 28:49.189 --> 28:53.119 operations . So , Mark , I think 28:53.130 --> 28:55.439 this is one of the areas where the TI A 28:55.449 --> 28:57.839 will become an advantage . Um 28:59.260 --> 29:01.969 What my observation has been and we've 29:01.979 --> 29:04.439 got some folks from user pack here . It 29:04.449 --> 29:07.689 is very difficult to then work your way 29:07.699 --> 29:10.609 into the battle rhythm with the COCOM , 29:10.619 --> 29:12.341 especially where some of those 29:12.341 --> 29:14.563 authorities lie . So if you're thinking 29:14.563 --> 29:16.452 about information , authorities , 29:16.452 --> 29:18.508 unless they're delegated down to the 29:18.508 --> 29:21.469 Army element , um you're asking for 29:21.479 --> 29:23.646 permission and you're pushing that con 29:23.646 --> 29:25.646 up there . Uh If you're looking for 29:25.646 --> 29:27.701 Cyber authorities , it's going up to 29:27.701 --> 29:29.923 Cyber command . But the timing in tempo 29:29.923 --> 29:33.439 is at , at the choice of the G uh 29:33.619 --> 29:36.030 geographic command commander . What I 29:36.040 --> 29:38.207 think the T A is going to enable us to 29:38.207 --> 29:41.400 do though is really kind of help um 29:41.410 --> 29:44.000 with integrating those type of effects 29:44.339 --> 29:46.450 and work that communication , whether 29:46.450 --> 29:48.506 that and , and this still is from an 29:48.506 --> 29:50.561 experimentation standpoint . I think 29:50.561 --> 29:52.450 we've got to give a little bit of 29:52.450 --> 29:54.450 permission for General Williams and 29:54.450 --> 29:56.561 General Flynn and General Clark later 29:56.561 --> 29:58.729 on to , to say this is the way that I 29:58.739 --> 30:00.979 actually want to do that . I want all 30:00.989 --> 30:03.910 of that coming through my G 38 or I 30:03.920 --> 30:06.142 want all of this going through my , the 30:06.142 --> 30:08.930 fires element . I think that is going 30:08.939 --> 30:11.880 to play out in some of the exercises 30:11.890 --> 30:15.719 that we've seen . And a as , and again , 30:15.729 --> 30:18.530 that's ok . And we saw this really with 30:18.540 --> 30:21.329 the MDT FS as well , how each one of 30:21.339 --> 30:24.040 the theaters really chose how to 30:24.050 --> 30:26.489 command and control and wield them . 30:27.089 --> 30:29.311 And so I think we're just going to have 30:29.311 --> 30:31.533 to let some of this play out . But it's 30:31.533 --> 30:33.645 a good question because it's not only 30:33.645 --> 30:35.478 going to be there from the joint 30:35.478 --> 30:35.449 standpoint . I think there's also a 30:35.459 --> 30:38.099 great opportunity here to really 30:38.109 --> 30:40.165 understand and work with partners in 30:40.170 --> 30:42.226 this space because I'm going to tell 30:42.229 --> 30:44.479 you partners know more about their 30:44.489 --> 30:48.010 information environment than we do . It 30:48.020 --> 30:49.964 may be that we're bringing in some 30:49.964 --> 30:52.359 capabilities that maybe they don't have 30:52.540 --> 30:55.290 and , and we can tell them things and 30:55.300 --> 30:57.300 then come up with something that is 30:57.300 --> 30:59.189 effective for them . And , and so 30:59.510 --> 31:01.566 anyway , hopefully that answers your 31:01.566 --> 31:03.843 question . Um You had a question , sir . 31:04.939 --> 31:08.099 Oh , thank you . Uh One quick comment 31:08.109 --> 31:10.800 for uh Aaron don't ever associate 31:10.810 --> 31:13.239 propaganda with us forces operations . 31:13.250 --> 31:15.361 That word should never be mentioned . 31:15.550 --> 31:17.550 Uh I learned that from psy operas I 31:17.550 --> 31:19.606 hung with and they told me you can't 31:19.606 --> 31:21.828 use that word for we have ours basis of 31:21.828 --> 31:23.717 truth . So just a little , the py 31:23.717 --> 31:25.930 operas are probably bristling too . Um 31:26.270 --> 31:28.381 I look forward to your comments uh at 31:28.381 --> 31:30.603 Billington tomorrow Uh , so I'll , I'll 31:30.603 --> 31:32.937 ask my question tomorrow with you . The , 31:32.937 --> 31:34.770 uh , question I've got is on the 31:34.770 --> 31:36.437 acquisition side , you're the 31:36.437 --> 31:38.603 functionals trying to do the mission , 31:38.603 --> 31:40.770 experiencing the pain . But I just sat 31:40.770 --> 31:42.548 through a session , I think two 31:42.548 --> 31:44.603 Warriors corners ago where it seemed 31:44.603 --> 31:47.109 like , uh , pe OC three N and in other 31:47.119 --> 31:51.050 readings , Iews are in the cyberspace , 31:51.060 --> 31:53.004 they each have a role . Who do you 31:53.004 --> 31:55.260 consider your acquisition as ? 31:56.489 --> 32:00.449 Yes . both of them are Iews takes 32:00.459 --> 32:02.237 care of some of our cyber cyber 32:02.237 --> 32:04.439 capabilities . Um And then when we're 32:04.449 --> 32:06.671 talking about everything from a network 32:06.680 --> 32:09.780 and , and security on the Doen , um 32:09.790 --> 32:13.160 that is all C three N and , and so , 32:13.849 --> 32:15.849 but I think this is , but this is , 32:15.849 --> 32:18.199 this is better than we had this divided 32:18.209 --> 32:22.130 with C three Teisniews . Uh 32:22.140 --> 32:24.251 There was a little bit of a debate of 32:24.251 --> 32:26.251 whether , you know , should DC O be 32:26.251 --> 32:28.362 over here or be over there because it 32:28.362 --> 32:30.529 kind of rides the seam on , on Cyber . 32:30.579 --> 32:34.410 Um But that's ok . We're , we're in a 32:34.420 --> 32:36.309 better place , all of the network 32:36.309 --> 32:39.109 things being under C three N . Um um 32:39.130 --> 32:41.241 You , you had me at , hello on that . 32:41.520 --> 32:43.859 Uh I think it is much better from 32:43.869 --> 32:45.980 delivering an integrated and then for 32:45.980 --> 32:47.647 some of the , the more unique 32:47.647 --> 32:50.689 capabilities that we have . Um And that 32:50.729 --> 32:53.229 it is OK , we're a big army and we 32:53.239 --> 32:55.350 actually can do coordinations between 32:55.350 --> 32:57.420 organizations and talk to each other 32:57.430 --> 32:59.541 and there's a method and that's Young 32:59.541 --> 33:01.541 Bang's problem . We , I , hopefully 33:01.541 --> 33:05.260 he's not here but , yeah . Hi . Uh , 33:05.270 --> 33:07.619 Jonathan Cham . Uh , Rand Corporation . 33:07.630 --> 33:09.630 Um , thank you so much for a really 33:09.630 --> 33:11.739 exciting presentation . Um , I , you 33:11.750 --> 33:13.750 spoke about this a little bit but I 33:13.750 --> 33:16.000 just wanted to , you to expound on what 33:16.010 --> 33:18.750 improvements and changes in doctrine 33:18.760 --> 33:20.704 and policy would better enable the 33:20.704 --> 33:22.816 information advantage activities that 33:22.816 --> 33:26.689 you talked about . Thank you . Yeah , I , 33:28.530 --> 33:30.709 I , I think it's funny 33:31.709 --> 33:35.030 information is the new and the marines 33:35.040 --> 33:38.270 have already got the army . Yeah , 33:38.890 --> 33:41.001 I , I do think we're gonna be pushing 33:41.001 --> 33:43.057 up against a number of things in the 33:43.057 --> 33:46.520 information sphere that um 33:47.469 --> 33:51.359 as people who are profound 33:51.369 --> 33:54.689 defenders of free speech 33:55.489 --> 33:58.550 and we defend the rights of us persons 33:58.560 --> 34:02.520 to access information . This is we do 34:02.530 --> 34:05.589 run into some tension when we're 34:05.719 --> 34:09.350 looking at operations overseas and , 34:09.639 --> 34:11.583 and I think those are areas from a 34:11.583 --> 34:13.806 policy standpoint , we're going to have 34:13.806 --> 34:15.750 to work through and really kind of 34:15.750 --> 34:17.879 understand is , are these things very 34:17.889 --> 34:20.979 black and white or are there shades of , 34:21.280 --> 34:24.459 are there shades of gray ? And if I'm 34:24.469 --> 34:28.399 only if I'm not limiting information 34:28.409 --> 34:31.060 within the homeland , right ? Can I 34:31.070 --> 34:33.181 execute this thing ? I'm sorry . It's 34:33.181 --> 34:35.292 really , it's hard to talk about this 34:35.292 --> 34:38.719 in , in abstract terms . Um But 34:39.570 --> 34:42.030 you do you have any other things that 34:42.040 --> 34:44.318 you would add on it ? That was kind of , 34:44.318 --> 34:46.540 that's kind of the big one and , and to 34:46.540 --> 34:48.707 the point of our friends from the user 34:48.739 --> 34:51.850 pac Ty sitting over here . Um The 34:51.860 --> 34:54.250 marines have had some success in doing 34:54.260 --> 34:56.482 this , but I do still think that from a 34:56.482 --> 34:58.770 policy standpoint , um the 34:58.780 --> 35:02.530 coordinations uh with the GC at 35:02.739 --> 35:05.899 the State Department is , is good . But 35:05.909 --> 35:08.020 if you're going to be doing this at , 35:08.020 --> 35:10.550 at speed and , and I think this is 35:10.560 --> 35:12.782 going to just play out like we did with 35:12.782 --> 35:14.949 Cyber . Uh we've done a number , we've 35:14.949 --> 35:17.060 done hundreds of cyber operations now 35:17.060 --> 35:20.129 and we have not triggered any dire 35:20.139 --> 35:22.570 consequences with this . So , you know , 35:22.580 --> 35:25.719 we can do these discrete targeted 35:26.129 --> 35:29.520 missions that Aaron talked about um 35:30.100 --> 35:32.409 in a way that is , that is safe , it is 35:32.419 --> 35:34.610 consistent with us messages . It does 35:34.620 --> 35:36.342 need to be co ordinated with a 35:36.342 --> 35:39.040 geographic command commander . Um But , 35:39.120 --> 35:42.489 but it , there's there 35:42.500 --> 35:46.120 is um maneuver space in there . Um 35:47.149 --> 35:51.050 Thanks sir , General 35:51.060 --> 35:53.338 Sydney Friedberg from breaking defense . 35:53.338 --> 35:55.393 Thanks for doing this . Let me ask a 35:55.393 --> 35:57.649 two fold sort of pragmatic question . 35:57.879 --> 36:00.101 One is , you know , what's the timeline 36:00.101 --> 36:04.020 for getting the 65 times three teams 36:04.030 --> 36:06.790 of people uh in place and getting all 36:06.800 --> 36:09.270 the somewhat rare specialties you need 36:09.280 --> 36:11.800 for those for your skill sets , nut 36:11.939 --> 36:15.030 language presumably . And b um I think 36:15.040 --> 36:17.151 I forget which of you mentioned , you 36:17.151 --> 36:19.262 know , not trying to boil the ocean , 36:19.262 --> 36:21.207 trying to focus on things that are 36:21.207 --> 36:23.560 targeting the army and you know , army 36:23.570 --> 36:26.649 formations . How do you sort through 36:26.659 --> 36:28.937 that ? I mean , you can argue you know , 36:28.937 --> 36:30.992 you know , a lot of payday scams for 36:30.992 --> 36:33.103 instance , target soldiers , but they 36:33.103 --> 36:35.437 are also broad brush across the economy . 36:35.437 --> 36:35.350 A lot of , you know , misinformation 36:35.360 --> 36:37.527 about the disaster relief we're seeing 36:37.527 --> 36:39.639 now , you know , clearly affects army 36:39.649 --> 36:41.705 guard units that are staying in that 36:41.705 --> 36:43.871 relief , but also affects the civilian 36:43.871 --> 36:46.038 population . So I can see , you know , 36:46.038 --> 36:49.040 how do you end up not boiling the ocean 36:49.050 --> 36:51.217 anyway , because these things are very 36:51.217 --> 36:53.550 broad brush often and target both army 36:53.560 --> 36:55.679 personnel and the civilian population 36:55.689 --> 36:57.860 and international audiences , right ? 36:58.330 --> 37:01.899 Um So the first one is Eur 37:02.239 --> 37:04.439 PAC will come online first . They 37:04.449 --> 37:08.290 actually activate in October 2025 . But 37:08.300 --> 37:10.750 we are sliding as much as we can to the 37:10.760 --> 37:13.570 left in this assignment cycle to get 37:13.580 --> 37:17.189 them some initial capability ahead of 37:17.199 --> 37:19.310 it because we know that it's approved 37:19.310 --> 37:21.421 and that way they're not going to air 37:21.421 --> 37:23.532 everything at once after that is army 37:23.532 --> 37:27.179 cyber and then followed by user which , 37:27.189 --> 37:29.620 which is purely a function of , I think 37:29.629 --> 37:32.419 some station work that has to be done 37:32.429 --> 37:34.860 by the army in order to get them into 37:34.870 --> 37:37.739 theater . Yes , there are some 37:37.750 --> 37:39.806 capabilities in there that linguists 37:39.806 --> 37:41.830 and things like that . Uh But they 37:41.840 --> 37:43.951 exist , some of these things do exist 37:43.951 --> 37:46.062 already and some of the organizations 37:46.062 --> 37:49.010 that the army has , has shifted around . 37:49.250 --> 37:51.472 So this is part of , you know , we took 37:51.472 --> 37:54.679 the first IO brigade , the IO special 37:54.689 --> 37:57.750 specialists there . We're taking some 37:57.760 --> 37:59.816 of those and putting them into these 37:59.816 --> 38:02.149 and sprinkling them across these t outs . 38:02.149 --> 38:04.316 I actually think this is part of , you 38:04.316 --> 38:06.371 know , first IO has been a victim of 38:06.371 --> 38:08.316 their own success of sending small 38:08.316 --> 38:11.110 teams out and having effect and being 38:11.120 --> 38:13.429 in demand . Let's make that capability 38:13.439 --> 38:15.495 permanent in the theaters where they 38:15.495 --> 38:17.661 can immerse themselves in the , in the 38:17.661 --> 38:19.828 target space . And I think that really 38:19.828 --> 38:22.409 gets to your second question . How do 38:22.419 --> 38:24.419 you not boil the ocean ? Well , you 38:24.419 --> 38:27.330 have a commander who has a campaign 38:27.340 --> 38:30.929 that he wants to execute an effect and 38:30.939 --> 38:32.828 then it's on the planners to come 38:32.828 --> 38:34.939 through and go , what kind of effects 38:34.939 --> 38:36.883 do we want to have that , that get 38:36.883 --> 38:38.939 after that campaign ? And then where 38:38.939 --> 38:40.995 are the assets going to ? Aaron kept 38:40.995 --> 38:43.580 talking about , you know , assigned or 38:43.590 --> 38:47.149 organic or attached . So if it's a 38:47.159 --> 38:49.669 cyber effect and the team itself , the 38:49.679 --> 38:51.512 TIA doesn't have that particular 38:51.512 --> 38:53.679 capability or resource within the team 38:53.679 --> 38:56.929 to do that . We go seek that and 38:56.939 --> 39:00.520 go to the cyber mission force in order 39:00.530 --> 39:03.639 to get that type of effect executed . 39:03.820 --> 39:07.000 If it's information operations , right ? 39:07.090 --> 39:09.257 If we have it organically , then we'll 39:09.257 --> 39:11.201 execute that . And so I think it's 39:11.201 --> 39:13.312 going to be up to the commander , how 39:13.312 --> 39:15.312 they're organizing their campaign , 39:15.312 --> 39:17.479 what kind of effects they want to have 39:17.479 --> 39:19.701 and what the planner has come up with . 39:19.939 --> 39:22.050 There is a potential there that there 39:22.050 --> 39:24.106 is a lot of small things that we can 39:24.106 --> 39:26.217 worry about and it's it's probably no 39:26.217 --> 39:28.383 different than I , what I deal with on 39:28.383 --> 39:30.106 a daily basis . From a network 39:30.106 --> 39:32.439 standpoint , there's a million things 39:32.449 --> 39:34.560 happening on the network every single 39:34.560 --> 39:37.790 day we have to focus on , on the things 39:37.800 --> 39:39.911 that really matter . And we're pretty 39:39.911 --> 39:41.744 good at focusing on , you know , 39:41.744 --> 39:43.800 figuring out how to triage something 39:43.800 --> 39:46.840 and , and get after it , this will be 39:46.850 --> 39:48.906 the last question we have time for . 39:49.459 --> 39:51.459 Yeah , good afternoon , everybody . 39:51.459 --> 39:53.792 Actually , this is a great presentation , 39:53.792 --> 39:55.681 Ash Banerji from the Bright Group 39:55.681 --> 39:57.737 question is actually generally , but 39:57.737 --> 39:57.639 you know , Mr Molko , you probably are 39:57.669 --> 39:59.780 the most uh I guess like , you know , 39:59.780 --> 40:01.947 capable to answer this . This is about 40:01.947 --> 40:04.120 adversarial A I . Um you know , a lot 40:04.129 --> 40:06.351 of different parts of army are actually 40:06.351 --> 40:08.296 exploring what happens if the data 40:08.296 --> 40:10.240 actually has been poisoned or data 40:10.240 --> 40:12.518 integrity actually has been , you know , 40:12.518 --> 40:14.564 compromised or if the the ML models 40:14.574 --> 40:16.241 themselves actually have been 40:16.241 --> 40:18.352 compromised or there is an issue with 40:18.352 --> 40:20.407 the platform . So , you know , where 40:20.407 --> 40:22.630 you are trying to leverage A I for your 40:22.630 --> 40:22.524 operational efficiency or you know , 40:22.534 --> 40:24.985 other things and you know , multiple 40:24.995 --> 40:27.217 components could be compromised one way 40:27.217 --> 40:29.495 or the other . I bring this up because , 40:29.495 --> 40:31.606 you know , Iwns with project Linchpin 40:31.606 --> 40:34.449 is actually quite uh you know , into 40:34.459 --> 40:36.403 this process and they are actually 40:36.403 --> 40:38.515 seeking a lot of idea solutions . Has 40:38.515 --> 40:41.370 our cyber developed any strategic um I 40:41.379 --> 40:44.530 guess like concepts capabilities that 40:44.540 --> 40:46.810 could be shared with the rest of the 40:46.820 --> 40:48.959 army components and actually has that 40:48.969 --> 40:51.689 been shared with the dod uh you know 40:51.699 --> 40:54.239 Cyber command . Hey sir , that was a 40:54.250 --> 40:56.417 great question . Uh There was a lot of 40:56.417 --> 40:58.694 question there , but I think I got the , 40:58.694 --> 41:00.694 the crux of it , you know , when we 41:00.694 --> 41:02.694 were working on panoptic junction , 41:02.694 --> 41:04.917 which was kind of our big platform , uh 41:04.917 --> 41:07.028 you know , pathway of learning . We , 41:07.028 --> 41:09.250 we partnered with C five ISR , it's a , 41:09.250 --> 41:11.780 it's a SAT organization and they were 41:11.790 --> 41:13.901 part of our team as we built out this 41:13.901 --> 41:15.901 program . And one of the key things 41:15.901 --> 41:19.020 that C five IR agreed to do was take a 41:19.030 --> 41:21.459 copy of panoptic junction and run 41:21.469 --> 41:24.429 resiliency testing again against it so 41:24.439 --> 41:26.550 that we could then understand , hey , 41:26.550 --> 41:28.328 were we on par with the hashing 41:28.328 --> 41:30.272 mechanisms with all the protection 41:30.272 --> 41:32.328 mechanisms or did we need to go , do 41:32.328 --> 41:34.328 you know , take other steps to make 41:34.328 --> 41:36.606 sure that we were able to protect that ? 41:36.606 --> 41:38.959 But that was a per project thing we are 41:38.969 --> 41:41.191 working through now , the governance of 41:41.191 --> 41:43.302 how we're going to apply that type of 41:43.302 --> 41:45.302 thing broadly across all of our A I 41:45.302 --> 41:47.525 initiatives . And that's probably going 41:47.525 --> 41:49.747 to require a whole of army , a whole of 41:49.747 --> 41:51.525 joint force effort . And we are 41:51.525 --> 41:53.302 actually working with the Cyber 41:53.302 --> 41:55.610 National Mission Force and us cyber 41:55.719 --> 41:58.469 coms a task force to work on that 41:58.479 --> 42:01.639 governance structure . So I want to 42:01.649 --> 42:03.593 thank everybody for your attention 42:03.593 --> 42:05.927 today and your very excellent questions . 42:05.927 --> 42:08.149 Um as we , this is really actually very 42:08.149 --> 42:10.316 helpful for us to also hear from you . 42:10.316 --> 42:12.780 So please be safe . Uh as you head to 42:12.790 --> 42:14.679 wherever you're heading to next , 42:21.489 --> 42:23.600 we want to thank everybody for coming 42:23.600 --> 42:25.656 out . This concludes Warriors Corner 42:25.656 --> 42:27.878 for day one . Please come back tomorrow 42:27.878 --> 42:29.649 at 905 . Ok .