WEBVTT 00:00.009 --> 00:03.430 Committee will come to order . Uh 00:03.440 --> 00:05.170 before we begin , I have one 00:05.179 --> 00:07.179 housekeeping matter . As soon as we 00:07.190 --> 00:09.789 adjourn the public hearing , uh we will 00:09.800 --> 00:11.578 immediately move upstairs for a 00:11.578 --> 00:13.689 classified briefing and we'll also be 00:13.689 --> 00:15.578 asking questions in reverse order 00:15.578 --> 00:19.309 seniority today . Uh Today we begin our 00:19.319 --> 00:22.590 fiscal 2025 posture hearings for North 00:22.600 --> 00:26.389 com and south com . I wanna 00:26.399 --> 00:28.343 thank our witnesses for being here 00:28.343 --> 00:30.288 today and for their service to our 00:30.288 --> 00:32.510 nation . Uh In eight months , President 00:32.510 --> 00:35.720 Z is expected to visit Peru uh 00:35.740 --> 00:38.119 inaugurate a brand to , to inaugurate a 00:38.130 --> 00:41.729 brand new $3.6 billion mega 00:41.759 --> 00:45.639 port . It was financed by China built 00:45.650 --> 00:48.319 by Chinese workers and it will be owned 00:48.330 --> 00:51.549 and operated by the CCP back company . 00:52.400 --> 00:54.590 It will be used to ship South American 00:54.599 --> 00:56.990 copper lithium and other critical 00:57.000 --> 00:59.569 materials to China to further their 00:59.580 --> 01:02.509 military modernization . This is just 01:02.520 --> 01:05.069 the latest effort . Uh Latest China of 01:05.080 --> 01:07.136 China's efforts to displace American 01:07.136 --> 01:08.913 influence and build a strategic 01:08.913 --> 01:11.989 footprint in our backyard . 25 of the 01:12.000 --> 01:15.370 31 countries in the South com A or are 01:15.379 --> 01:17.349 welcomed or have welcomed 01:17.360 --> 01:19.527 infrastructure investment from China . 01:19.900 --> 01:23.860 22 have formally joined China's Belt 01:23.870 --> 01:26.190 and road initiative . China is 01:26.199 --> 01:28.540 investing in critical sectors across 01:28.550 --> 01:31.760 Latin America including C space 01:32.019 --> 01:34.940 telecommunication , critical minerals 01:34.949 --> 01:37.889 and energy CCP . BACKED companies 01:37.900 --> 01:40.330 currently own or operate mines in 01:40.339 --> 01:43.690 Mexico , Argentina , Peru and Venezuela 01:44.150 --> 01:46.769 electrical grids in Peru and Chile . 01:47.410 --> 01:50.410 Five G wireless systems in Costa Rica 01:50.419 --> 01:53.650 and Bolivia Brazil and Mexico 01:53.889 --> 01:55.970 Space launch and satellite tracking 01:55.980 --> 01:58.669 facilities in Peru . Venezuela , 01:58.680 --> 02:02.389 Bolivia Argentina , as well as 40 02:02.400 --> 02:05.680 ports across 16 Latin American and 02:05.690 --> 02:08.630 Caribbean countries that includes ports 02:08.639 --> 02:11.369 on both ends of the Panama canal , one 02:11.380 --> 02:13.580 at the tip of South America and one 02:13.589 --> 02:16.339 just 100 miles away in the Bahamas . 02:17.279 --> 02:19.446 None of the agreements governing these 02:19.446 --> 02:21.699 port space and telecommunication 02:21.710 --> 02:23.619 projects ban the collection of 02:23.630 --> 02:26.449 intelligence by China and none of them 02:26.460 --> 02:29.029 banned the PL A from using them for 02:29.039 --> 02:32.059 military operations . In fact , many of 02:32.070 --> 02:33.737 these countries already share 02:33.737 --> 02:36.270 intelligence , host port calls , buy 02:36.279 --> 02:39.110 military equipment and receive training 02:39.119 --> 02:42.199 from the PL A . Unfortunately , China 02:42.210 --> 02:44.432 is not the only Malign influence in the 02:44.432 --> 02:46.809 western hemisphere since Putin's 02:46.820 --> 02:49.429 illegal invasion of Ukraine Russian 02:49.440 --> 02:51.329 propaganda efforts have increased 02:51.329 --> 02:54.729 across Latin America . Russia continues 02:54.740 --> 02:57.630 to invest heavily in Cuba's communist 02:57.639 --> 03:01.139 regime and military and and its 03:01.149 --> 03:03.339 military continues to provide training 03:03.350 --> 03:05.850 in arms to Venezuela , Cuba , Nicaragua 03:06.000 --> 03:09.210 where Russia has over 200 troops 03:09.220 --> 03:11.498 operating a satellite tracking station . 03:12.440 --> 03:15.229 Recent unrest in South com A or is also 03:15.240 --> 03:17.720 very troubling over the weekend . US 03:17.729 --> 03:19.618 forces were sent to Haiti to help 03:19.618 --> 03:21.340 evacuate non essential embassy 03:21.340 --> 03:24.639 personnel . Meanwhile , Venezuela 03:24.649 --> 03:26.816 continues to threaten its neighbors by 03:26.816 --> 03:28.927 moving the thousands of troops to its 03:28.927 --> 03:31.309 borders . We need to do more to 03:31.320 --> 03:33.860 encourage stability in this region . 03:34.350 --> 03:36.649 This means we must build and enhance 03:36.660 --> 03:39.190 partnerships to further our security 03:39.199 --> 03:41.779 interest in the region . We also need 03:41.789 --> 03:43.956 to focus on real threat , transitional 03:43.956 --> 03:45.678 crim uh transnational criminal 03:45.678 --> 03:48.529 organizations based in the region and 03:48.539 --> 03:51.479 what they pose to our nation . These 03:51.490 --> 03:53.779 brutal criminals prey on thousands of 03:53.789 --> 03:55.900 vulnerable men , women and Children . 03:55.979 --> 03:57.979 They steal their money and endanger 03:57.979 --> 04:00.090 their lives with perilous attempts to 04:00.090 --> 04:02.090 gain illegal entry at our borders . 04:02.240 --> 04:06.160 Last year . CBP encountered nearly 2.5 04:06.169 --> 04:08.679 million migrants trying to illegal 04:08.690 --> 04:10.690 cross and illegally cross into our 04:10.699 --> 04:13.490 Southwest border that set a new record 04:14.199 --> 04:17.290 and to make matters worse , that number 04:17.299 --> 04:19.540 includes at least 100 and 69 04:19.549 --> 04:22.100 individuals on the terrorist watch list . 04:22.959 --> 04:26.920 598 known gang members and 100 and 78 04:26.929 --> 04:30.750 of which were MS 13 gang members . Keep 04:30.760 --> 04:32.927 in mind , these are just the ones that 04:32.927 --> 04:35.600 the CBP called CBP . Estimates that 04:35.609 --> 04:39.029 another 1.7 million illegal 04:39.040 --> 04:42.410 immigrants got away south and central 04:42.420 --> 04:44.420 American criminal organizations are 04:44.420 --> 04:46.476 also the main source of fentaNYL and 04:46.476 --> 04:48.587 other dangerous drugs smuggled across 04:48.587 --> 04:51.250 our southern border . In fy 23 a record 04:51.260 --> 04:54.279 £27,000 of fentaNYL were 04:54.290 --> 04:57.089 seized at the Southwest border enough 04:57.100 --> 05:00.369 to kill 6 billion people and that's 05:00.380 --> 05:02.690 what was seized . Not what got in . 05:03.450 --> 05:05.559 Nearly 3000 military personnel are 05:05.570 --> 05:07.681 deployed to the us border the largest 05:07.681 --> 05:09.848 us deployment of forces in the western 05:09.848 --> 05:12.380 hemisphere . North com and south com 05:12.390 --> 05:14.557 are doing their best to try to provide 05:14.557 --> 05:16.501 support to civilian authorities to 05:16.501 --> 05:18.510 address the border crisis . But the 05:18.519 --> 05:21.190 real solution rests with our president . 05:21.570 --> 05:24.299 He needs to drop the excuses and secure 05:24.309 --> 05:26.476 our border . I look forward to hearing 05:26.476 --> 05:28.531 from our witnesses and getting their 05:28.531 --> 05:30.753 best military advice on how to overcome 05:30.753 --> 05:32.920 the security challenges that we face . 05:32.959 --> 05:35.292 And with that , I yield to my uh friend , 05:35.292 --> 05:37.515 the ranking member , Mr Panetta for any 05:37.515 --> 05:39.515 questions he may or comments he may 05:39.515 --> 05:39.489 have . Thank you , Mr Chairman . I 05:39.500 --> 05:42.149 appreciate this opportunity to sit in 05:42.160 --> 05:44.739 for ranking member Adam Smith , but I'd 05:44.750 --> 05:47.089 also like to welcome our witnesses for 05:47.100 --> 05:48.970 our hearing today . MS Rebecca 05:48.980 --> 05:50.924 Zimmerman performing the duties of 05:50.924 --> 05:52.869 Assistant Secretary of Defense for 05:52.869 --> 05:54.702 Homeland Defense and Hemispheric 05:54.702 --> 05:56.758 Affairs General , Laura Richardson . 05:56.758 --> 05:58.980 Welcome back as the again the Commander 05:58.980 --> 06:00.924 of us Southern Command and General 06:00.924 --> 06:02.758 Gregory Guillo , commander of us 06:02.758 --> 06:04.758 Northern Command and Northern North 06:04.758 --> 06:06.869 American Aerospace Defense Command in 06:06.869 --> 06:08.647 his first appearance before the 06:08.647 --> 06:10.647 committee . After taking command in 06:10.647 --> 06:12.647 February , it's appropriate for our 06:12.647 --> 06:14.813 first posture hearing to be focused on 06:14.813 --> 06:17.036 the defense of the United States . What 06:17.036 --> 06:18.813 happens here at home and in our 06:18.813 --> 06:20.480 neighborhood is of the utmost 06:20.480 --> 06:22.480 importance to securing our national 06:22.480 --> 06:24.091 interest . I appreciate Miss 06:24.091 --> 06:26.202 Zimmerman's focus on the new homeland 06:26.202 --> 06:27.924 defense policy guidance in her 06:27.924 --> 06:29.591 testimony and look forward to 06:29.591 --> 06:31.647 additional detail about the what the 06:31.647 --> 06:33.989 department intends to improve in its 06:34.000 --> 06:36.820 resilience across dod the interagency 06:36.829 --> 06:39.051 and our civil society to ensure that we 06:39.051 --> 06:41.459 can deter and if necessary survive and 06:41.470 --> 06:43.649 prevail against any adversary who 06:43.660 --> 06:46.510 chooses to test our defenses . I also 06:46.519 --> 06:48.408 look forward to hearing about the 06:48.408 --> 06:50.297 progress of General Glo's initial 06:50.297 --> 06:52.500 review upon taking command as well as 06:52.510 --> 06:54.621 his and Miss Zimmerman's views on the 06:54.621 --> 06:56.559 department's support to civilian 06:56.570 --> 06:58.839 authorities at the southern border , 06:58.850 --> 07:01.630 unidentified anomalous phenomena and 07:01.640 --> 07:03.899 dod and national interests in the high 07:03.910 --> 07:06.279 North and North . Calm further . I hope 07:06.290 --> 07:08.179 to understand Norad's posture and 07:08.179 --> 07:10.179 future requirements with respect to 07:10.179 --> 07:12.234 integrated air and missile defense , 07:12.234 --> 07:14.290 particularly in regard to increasing 07:14.290 --> 07:16.820 our domain aware awareness , regardless 07:16.829 --> 07:19.619 of the type of threat or origin . I 07:19.630 --> 07:21.797 expect to encourage General Guillo and 07:21.797 --> 07:23.963 Miss Zimmerman to speak to the threats 07:23.963 --> 07:26.130 to our national security and strategic 07:26.130 --> 07:28.380 cyber and traditional domains and 07:28.390 --> 07:30.619 across the full geographic breadth of 07:30.630 --> 07:32.899 our country . Strategic competitors are 07:32.910 --> 07:34.940 active in the South Com region and 07:34.950 --> 07:36.728 often engage in activities that 07:36.728 --> 07:38.859 undermine the rules based order . 07:39.329 --> 07:41.519 Despite other global events that are 07:41.529 --> 07:44.100 require our attention , we should not 07:44.109 --> 07:46.600 ignore our own hemisphere . The 07:46.609 --> 07:48.831 department needs to engage in agile and 07:48.831 --> 07:50.809 active ways in the region where 07:50.820 --> 07:53.700 resources can be limited in South com 07:53.899 --> 07:56.121 in South com . The department continues 07:56.121 --> 07:58.121 to pursue security cooper operation 07:58.121 --> 08:00.420 activities that enhance our partners 08:00.429 --> 08:02.869 ability to address challenges in the 08:02.880 --> 08:05.579 region like drug trafficking , migrant 08:05.589 --> 08:07.239 flows and the fallout of the 08:07.250 --> 08:10.329 humanitarian crisis in Venezuela . Such 08:10.339 --> 08:12.395 activities can effectively build the 08:12.395 --> 08:14.395 capacity of our partners while also 08:14.395 --> 08:16.489 deterring malign activity and 08:16.500 --> 08:18.260 aggression in the region . I'm 08:18.269 --> 08:19.991 interested in hearing how such 08:19.991 --> 08:22.047 activities build capacity and to the 08:22.047 --> 08:24.579 extent to which they reinforce human 08:24.589 --> 08:26.850 rights . And yes , we are keeping an 08:26.859 --> 08:29.010 eye on the situation in Haiti . The 08:29.019 --> 08:31.186 department is currently supporting the 08:31.186 --> 08:33.408 multinational stability support mission 08:33.408 --> 08:35.359 and augmenting security at the US 08:35.369 --> 08:37.147 Embassy and I encourage General 08:37.147 --> 08:38.925 Richardson to speak about these 08:38.925 --> 08:41.429 missions . Finally , I will repeat my 08:41.440 --> 08:44.539 conclude concluding question at our to 08:44.549 --> 08:47.190 our witnesses from last year . How do 08:47.200 --> 08:49.089 we continue to protect the United 08:49.089 --> 08:50.909 States continue to build our 08:50.919 --> 08:53.086 partnerships with the countries of the 08:53.086 --> 08:55.308 western hemisphere and continue to keep 08:55.308 --> 08:57.363 an eye on efforts that may undermine 08:57.363 --> 08:59.510 the United States interest . I thank 08:59.520 --> 09:01.742 the witnesses for being here and I look 09:01.742 --> 09:03.798 forward to hearing their testimony . 09:03.798 --> 09:06.020 Thank you , Mr Chairman . I yell back . 09:06.020 --> 09:08.242 Thank you . Now , I'd like to introduce 09:08.242 --> 09:10.353 the witnesses . We have the honorable 09:10.353 --> 09:12.464 Rebecca Zimmerman is acting principal 09:12.464 --> 09:12.359 Deputy Secretary of Defense for 09:12.369 --> 09:14.770 Homeland Defense and hemispheric 09:14.820 --> 09:17.320 Affairs . It's a pretty long title , 09:17.849 --> 09:20.210 General Law Richardson Commander US 09:20.219 --> 09:22.479 United States Southern Command General 09:22.489 --> 09:25.260 Gregor Gillow . How do you pronounce 09:25.270 --> 09:28.580 that ? Chairman ? It's Guillo Guillo . 09:29.900 --> 09:32.690 All right , General G General Gregory 09:33.049 --> 09:35.160 Guillo is the commander of the United 09:35.160 --> 09:37.216 States Northern Command and Northern 09:37.216 --> 09:39.327 Aerospace Defense Command . I welcome 09:39.327 --> 09:41.549 the witnesses M Zimmerman . We'll start 09:41.549 --> 09:43.660 with you . You're recognized for five 09:43.660 --> 09:45.882 minutes . Thank you , Chairman Rogers . 09:45.882 --> 09:48.105 Uh ranking member Smith and Congressman 09:48.105 --> 09:50.216 Panetta standing in and distinguished 09:50.216 --> 09:52.271 members of the committee . Thank you 09:52.271 --> 09:54.382 for the opportunity to testify before 09:54.382 --> 09:56.438 you today . I'll highlight how we're 09:56.438 --> 09:56.109 putting homeland defense and other 09:56.119 --> 09:58.341 interests across the hemisphere . Front 09:58.341 --> 10:00.179 and center to implement the 2022 10:00.190 --> 10:02.690 national defense strategy . But I want 10:02.700 --> 10:04.478 to first acknowledge the tragic 10:04.478 --> 10:06.367 helicopter crash on the Southwest 10:06.367 --> 10:08.311 border on Friday afternoon uh that 10:08.311 --> 10:10.589 killed two New York National Guardsmen , 10:10.589 --> 10:12.979 uh Casey Frankowski and John Gracia , 10:13.190 --> 10:16.380 uh and also uh us border patrol agent 10:16.390 --> 10:18.289 Chris Luna , on behalf of the 10:18.299 --> 10:20.355 Department of Defense , I extend our 10:20.355 --> 10:22.521 sincere condolences to the families of 10:22.521 --> 10:25.260 those lost the 2022 N Ds states that 10:25.270 --> 10:27.103 the department's top priority is 10:27.103 --> 10:29.159 defense of the homeland paced to the 10:29.159 --> 10:31.214 growing multi domain threat posed by 10:31.214 --> 10:33.381 the People's Republic of China per the 10:33.381 --> 10:35.640 N DS . The PR C is the pacing challenge 10:35.650 --> 10:38.119 for dod while Russia remains an acute 10:38.130 --> 10:40.690 threat . The Pr C in Russia currently 10:40.700 --> 10:42.630 pose more dangerous challenges to 10:42.640 --> 10:44.918 safety and security to the US homeland , 10:45.299 --> 10:47.739 but the N Ds also ensures vigilance of 10:47.750 --> 10:50.039 other persistent threats . North Korea 10:50.049 --> 10:52.105 is expanding its nuclear and missile 10:52.105 --> 10:54.216 capability to threaten the homeland . 10:54.216 --> 10:55.827 Iran is testing space launch 10:55.827 --> 10:57.716 technologies and global terrorist 10:57.716 --> 10:59.827 groups require continued monitoring . 10:59.827 --> 11:01.549 Emerging technologies pose new 11:01.549 --> 11:03.660 challenges to strategic stability and 11:03.660 --> 11:05.660 demand that we adapt and adjust our 11:05.660 --> 11:07.716 posture . Deterring adversaries from 11:07.716 --> 11:09.827 employing advanced threats by denying 11:09.827 --> 11:11.938 them the benefits of their aggression 11:11.938 --> 11:13.882 as small un crude aircraft systems 11:13.882 --> 11:15.827 proliferate in the open market and 11:15.827 --> 11:17.493 their costs decrease as their 11:17.493 --> 11:19.549 capabilities rapidly increase . Um , 11:19.549 --> 11:21.400 the threat of these small UAs is 11:21.409 --> 11:24.289 becoming more prominent . Our nation 11:24.299 --> 11:26.521 also continues to face the challenge of 11:26.521 --> 11:28.855 natural and manmade hazards . Last year , 11:28.855 --> 11:30.799 the US Homeland endured 100 and 14 11:30.799 --> 11:34.200 incidents . 24 more than in 2022 caused 11:34.210 --> 11:36.210 by natural hazards including severe 11:36.210 --> 11:38.099 storms , tornadoes , hurricanes , 11:38.099 --> 11:40.929 floods and wildfires . In December of 11:40.940 --> 11:43.119 2023 Secretary Austin approved a 11:43.130 --> 11:45.074 classified homeland defense policy 11:45.074 --> 11:47.130 guidance , updating the department's 11:47.130 --> 11:49.352 approach to homeland defense to account 11:49.352 --> 11:51.130 for major changes in the global 11:51.130 --> 11:53.241 security environment . We have shared 11:53.241 --> 11:55.130 this classified document with the 11:55.130 --> 11:56.908 Congress and plan to publish an 11:56.908 --> 11:59.074 unclassified version later this year . 11:59.074 --> 11:58.989 The guidance looks to meet the 11:59.000 --> 12:01.000 challenges we face today by driving 12:01.000 --> 12:03.111 action across the department to deter 12:03.111 --> 12:05.056 threats of aggression or strategic 12:05.056 --> 12:07.222 attack to the homeland across multiple 12:07.222 --> 12:09.389 domains and the spectrum of conflict . 12:09.389 --> 12:11.111 It identifies initiatives that 12:11.111 --> 12:13.278 contribute to dod s ability to project 12:13.278 --> 12:15.444 power , defend the homeland and in the 12:15.444 --> 12:17.167 event of a conflict , maintain 12:17.167 --> 12:19.119 continuity of wartime operations , 12:19.349 --> 12:21.570 those initiatives linked to the 2022 12:21.580 --> 12:24.369 and and ensure that dod will deter 12:24.380 --> 12:26.269 aggression against the homeland , 12:26.269 --> 12:28.460 improve resilience to an attack across 12:28.469 --> 12:30.869 the spectrum of conflict . Focus on 12:30.880 --> 12:32.491 defending defense , critical 12:32.491 --> 12:34.760 infrastructure against attacks , ensure 12:34.770 --> 12:36.992 continuity of operations and continuity 12:36.992 --> 12:39.289 of government build resiliency against 12:39.299 --> 12:41.280 the impacts of climate change and 12:41.289 --> 12:42.956 ensure resilience in chemical 12:42.956 --> 12:45.080 biological radiological and nuclear 12:45.090 --> 12:47.201 response capabilities associated with 12:47.201 --> 12:49.909 homeland defense missions , defense 12:49.919 --> 12:52.030 support of civil authorities or dis A 12:52.030 --> 12:54.252 is an important activity supporting the 12:54.252 --> 12:56.086 American public and our partners 12:56.086 --> 12:58.308 responding to disasters , public health 12:58.308 --> 13:00.475 emergencies and securing our borders . 13:00.475 --> 13:02.697 Per the N DS dod is prepared to support 13:02.697 --> 13:04.697 dis a activities that do not impair 13:04.697 --> 13:06.919 warfighting readiness . Today , between 13:06.919 --> 13:09.599 2500 and 3000 military personnel are 13:09.609 --> 13:11.442 deployed to the southwest border 13:11.442 --> 13:13.387 supporting us , customs and border 13:13.387 --> 13:15.609 protection activities dod has supported 13:15.609 --> 13:17.869 DH S's border security mission for 18 13:17.880 --> 13:20.760 of the last 21 years . The United 13:20.770 --> 13:22.881 States derives immense benefit from a 13:22.881 --> 13:25.048 stable peaceful and democratic Western 13:25.048 --> 13:26.881 hemisphere that reduces security 13:26.881 --> 13:29.103 threats to our nation . We're deepening 13:29.103 --> 13:31.103 partnerships with Canada , Mexico , 13:31.103 --> 13:33.190 Brazil , Colombia and Chile while 13:33.200 --> 13:35.349 reinforcing democratic institutions , 13:35.359 --> 13:37.510 civilian control of the military and 13:37.520 --> 13:39.631 respect for human rights and the rule 13:39.631 --> 13:42.400 of law in February , Secretary Austin 13:42.409 --> 13:44.353 participated in the North American 13:44.353 --> 13:45.965 Defense Ministerial with his 13:45.965 --> 13:48.469 counterparts from Mexico and Canada Dod 13:48.479 --> 13:50.590 is working to fulfill and sustain the 13:50.590 --> 13:52.812 department's supporting role in Central 13:52.812 --> 13:55.035 America and the Caribbean institutional 13:55.035 --> 13:56.979 capacity building and humanitarian 13:56.979 --> 13:59.090 assistance and disaster response . In 13:59.090 --> 14:00.701 addition , the department is 14:00.701 --> 14:02.868 participating in us government efforts 14:02.868 --> 14:04.757 to support a un backed multi high 14:04.757 --> 14:06.812 national security support mission in 14:06.812 --> 14:08.868 Haiti to assist the Haitian National 14:08.868 --> 14:10.757 Police . Our relationships in the 14:10.757 --> 14:12.868 hemisphere help ensure we can conduct 14:12.868 --> 14:14.923 humanitarian assistance and disaster 14:14.923 --> 14:16.812 relief . Bolster cyber defenses , 14:16.812 --> 14:18.979 promote climate resilience and conduct 14:18.979 --> 14:20.868 pandemic response to conclude the 14:20.868 --> 14:22.923 department is committed to defending 14:22.923 --> 14:25.090 the homeland and pursuing us interests 14:25.090 --> 14:26.979 in the Western hemisphere and the 14:26.979 --> 14:29.035 Arctic Thank you for your support of 14:29.035 --> 14:28.695 the Department of Defense and I look 14:28.705 --> 14:31.400 forward to your questions . Thank you , 14:31.409 --> 14:33.520 Miss Zimmerman , General Richardson . 14:33.520 --> 14:35.539 You recognized Chairman Rogers , 14:35.549 --> 14:37.160 ranking member , Panetta and 14:37.160 --> 14:39.438 distinguished members of the committee . 14:39.438 --> 14:41.660 Thank you for the opportunity to appear 14:41.660 --> 14:43.660 before you with assistant Secretary 14:43.660 --> 14:46.080 Zimmerman and General Guillo . I am 14:46.090 --> 14:48.257 honored to represent the dedicated men 14:48.257 --> 14:50.330 and women of us Southern Command to 14:50.340 --> 14:52.396 discuss the challenges we share with 14:52.396 --> 14:54.562 our neighbors in Latin America and the 14:54.562 --> 14:56.451 Caribbean . Our national security 14:56.451 --> 14:58.451 strategy recognizes the direct link 14:58.451 --> 15:00.618 between this region's security and our 15:00.618 --> 15:02.869 own security . We are harnessing the 15:02.880 --> 15:05.450 power of partnership from team USA in 15:05.460 --> 15:08.309 support of team democracy by leveraging 15:08.320 --> 15:10.340 all instruments of national power , 15:10.349 --> 15:13.429 diplomacy , information , military and 15:13.440 --> 15:16.010 economics to expeditiously assist 15:16.020 --> 15:18.330 partner nations in addressing the 15:18.340 --> 15:20.950 challenges that impact our collective 15:20.960 --> 15:24.229 security . This region which is our 15:24.239 --> 15:26.489 shared neighborhood remains under 15:26.500 --> 15:28.556 assault from a host of cross cutting 15:28.556 --> 15:30.778 trans boundary challenges that directly 15:30.780 --> 15:33.270 threaten our homeland . I have seen 15:33.280 --> 15:35.447 these challenges intensify since I met 15:35.447 --> 15:37.558 with you last year and this remains a 15:37.558 --> 15:40.289 call to action in almost 2.5 years in 15:40.299 --> 15:42.410 command . I've made it my priority to 15:42.410 --> 15:44.632 meet our partners where they are and to 15:44.632 --> 15:46.688 listen and understand the challenges 15:46.688 --> 15:48.910 that affect us . All the world is at an 15:48.910 --> 15:51.077 inflection point . Our partners in the 15:51.077 --> 15:53.077 western hemisphere with whom we are 15:53.077 --> 15:54.989 bonded by trade , share values , 15:55.000 --> 15:57.950 democratic traditions , family ties and 15:57.960 --> 16:01.780 increasingly impacted , impacted by 16:01.789 --> 16:05.090 interference and coercion . I've 16:05.099 --> 16:07.159 learned that our presence absolutely 16:07.169 --> 16:09.690 matters . The People's Republic of 16:09.700 --> 16:11.533 China has exploited the trust of 16:11.533 --> 16:14.070 democracies in this hemisphere using 16:14.080 --> 16:16.549 that trust to steal national secrets , 16:16.559 --> 16:19.150 intellectual property and research 16:19.159 --> 16:21.390 related to academia , agriculture and 16:21.400 --> 16:23.919 health care . The scope and scale of 16:23.929 --> 16:26.750 this espionage is unprecedented through 16:26.760 --> 16:28.982 the Belt and Road initiative . The PR C 16:28.982 --> 16:31.380 aims to amass power and influence at 16:31.390 --> 16:33.789 the expense of the world's democracies . 16:34.099 --> 16:36.266 Here in the western hemisphere , Latin 16:36.266 --> 16:38.210 America and the Caribbean have the 16:38.210 --> 16:40.377 potential to feed and fuel the world . 16:40.377 --> 16:42.320 Understanding this , the PR C is 16:42.330 --> 16:44.750 already busy extracting and exploiting 16:45.590 --> 16:47.539 predatory investment practices , 16:47.549 --> 16:49.771 construction of mega ports and dual use 16:49.771 --> 16:51.771 space facilities and criminal cyber 16:51.780 --> 16:53.947 activities are just a few of the Pr CS 16:53.947 --> 16:56.150 Malign activities that jeopardize the 16:56.159 --> 16:58.326 sovereignty and safety of the region . 16:58.760 --> 17:00.704 Russia remains an acute threat and 17:00.704 --> 17:02.840 seeks to increase its foothold by 17:02.849 --> 17:04.849 bolstering authoritarian regimes in 17:04.849 --> 17:08.010 Cuba , Nicaragua and Venezuela . In the 17:08.020 --> 17:10.020 last year , China , Russia and Iran 17:10.020 --> 17:11.687 have increased their presence 17:11.687 --> 17:13.742 diplomatically economically and even 17:13.742 --> 17:15.839 militarily in the region . These 17:15.849 --> 17:18.140 activities undermine democracies and 17:18.150 --> 17:20.729 challenge their credibility . Both 17:20.739 --> 17:22.850 China and Russia exploit the presence 17:22.850 --> 17:25.072 of transnational criminal organizations 17:25.072 --> 17:27.295 and amplify their destabilizing impacts 17:27.295 --> 17:30.119 on democratic governments , TC OS 17:30.130 --> 17:32.463 traffic weapons , drugs , people , gold , 17:32.463 --> 17:34.420 lithium , rare earth minerals , 17:34.430 --> 17:36.910 commodities and counterfeit goods while 17:36.920 --> 17:39.031 contributing to the surge of fentaNYL 17:39.031 --> 17:41.449 related dusts . Here at home . The good 17:41.459 --> 17:43.570 news is working with our very willing 17:43.570 --> 17:46.229 partners leads to the best defense we 17:46.239 --> 17:48.630 must use all available lovers to 17:48.640 --> 17:50.862 strengthen our partnerships with the 28 17:50.862 --> 17:52.640 like minded democracies in this 17:52.640 --> 17:55.150 hemisphere , who understand the pur the 17:55.160 --> 17:58.069 power of working together to counter 17:58.079 --> 18:00.589 these shared threats . The United 18:00.599 --> 18:02.829 States remains the pre preferred and 18:02.839 --> 18:05.180 most trusted security partner in the 18:05.189 --> 18:07.380 region . We build trust through 18:07.390 --> 18:09.446 investment and security co-operation 18:09.446 --> 18:11.334 programs that train and equip our 18:11.334 --> 18:13.770 partner militaries and security forces . 18:13.780 --> 18:16.329 A robust joint exercise program to 18:16.339 --> 18:18.780 build interoperability and the 18:18.790 --> 18:20.957 development and employment of emerging 18:20.957 --> 18:23.520 technologies . Moreover , we maximize 18:23.530 --> 18:25.252 the resources allocated by the 18:25.252 --> 18:27.252 Department of State's International 18:27.252 --> 18:29.520 Military Education and Training program 18:29.530 --> 18:32.280 or ime foreign military financing , 18:32.290 --> 18:34.068 foreign military sales to build 18:34.068 --> 18:36.290 interoperability and counterbalance the 18:36.290 --> 18:39.099 PR CS military engagements and 18:39.109 --> 18:41.819 investments . As the national defense 18:41.829 --> 18:44.030 strategy states , the US derives 18:44.040 --> 18:46.599 immense benefit from a stable peaceful 18:46.609 --> 18:49.209 and democratic Western hemisphere that 18:49.219 --> 18:50.997 reduces security threats to the 18:50.997 --> 18:53.729 homeland US south com continues to 18:53.739 --> 18:55.961 innovate and adapt , putting integrated 18:55.961 --> 18:59.000 deterrents into action every day . We 18:59.010 --> 19:01.177 remain committed to working across all 19:01.177 --> 19:03.121 domains with allies and partners . 19:03.121 --> 19:05.359 Combatant commands the joint force , 19:05.369 --> 19:07.380 the US interagency , nonfederal 19:07.390 --> 19:09.920 entities and the United States Congress 19:10.119 --> 19:13.579 to Guaran to guarantee safety security 19:13.589 --> 19:16.079 and prosperity throughout the western 19:16.089 --> 19:18.829 hemisphere . This work and promise of 19:18.839 --> 19:21.839 Us South com as a part of team USA in 19:21.849 --> 19:25.229 support of team democracy is our pledge . 19:25.430 --> 19:27.319 Thank you for your assistance and 19:27.319 --> 19:30.219 resourcing this team . Uh I I look 19:30.229 --> 19:32.451 forward to your questions . Thank you . 19:33.050 --> 19:34.883 Thank you , General Richardson , 19:34.883 --> 19:36.772 General Gle , you recognized five 19:36.772 --> 19:38.661 minutes Chairman Rogers , ranking 19:38.661 --> 19:40.606 member , Panetta and distinguished 19:40.606 --> 19:42.661 members of the committee . Thank you 19:42.661 --> 19:44.717 for the opportunity to appear before 19:44.717 --> 19:46.772 you today . It's a profound honor to 19:46.772 --> 19:48.994 command and represent the men and women 19:48.994 --> 19:50.994 of North American Aerospace Defense 19:50.994 --> 19:50.560 Command and United States Northern 19:50.569 --> 19:52.736 Command . And I thank MS Zimmerman for 19:52.736 --> 19:54.680 acknowledging the sacrifice of two 19:54.680 --> 19:56.902 soldiers and a border patrol agent . As 19:56.902 --> 19:59.125 well as remembering the injured soldier 19:59.125 --> 20:01.347 from last week's helicopter crash along 20:01.347 --> 20:03.347 the southwest border in Texas as we 20:03.347 --> 20:05.236 speak this morning , American and 20:05.236 --> 20:06.958 Canadian military and civilian 20:06.958 --> 20:08.791 personnel from both commands are 20:08.791 --> 20:10.625 actively defending our homelands 20:10.625 --> 20:12.791 against significant persistent threats 20:12.791 --> 20:14.958 from multiple vectors in all domains . 20:14.958 --> 20:17.013 Although I've only been in command a 20:17.013 --> 20:19.125 few weeks , it is readily clear to me 20:19.125 --> 20:21.347 that the United States , Canada and our 20:21.347 --> 20:23.236 expansive network of partners are 20:23.236 --> 20:25.125 facing an extraordinarily complex 20:25.125 --> 20:27.125 strategic environment . Competitors 20:27.125 --> 20:29.180 seeking to diminish our military and 20:29.180 --> 20:30.958 economic advantage have fielded 20:30.958 --> 20:33.013 advanced kinetic systems designed to 20:33.013 --> 20:34.625 strike military and civilian 20:34.625 --> 20:36.791 infrastructure in North America , both 20:36.791 --> 20:39.013 above and below the nuclear threshold . 20:39.520 --> 20:41.619 Meanwhile , competitors have rapidly 20:41.630 --> 20:44.560 advanced and routinely use non kinetic 20:44.569 --> 20:46.680 capabilities , targeting our critical 20:46.680 --> 20:48.902 infrastructure and essential networks . 20:48.902 --> 20:51.069 Threats to the homeland are present in 20:51.069 --> 20:53.819 all domains along all avenues approach 20:53.829 --> 20:56.290 to include the Arctic region . As 20:56.300 --> 20:58.633 stated in the national defense strategy , 20:58.633 --> 21:00.800 the People's Republic of China remains 21:00.800 --> 21:02.856 our pacing challenge as the People's 21:02.856 --> 21:05.078 Liberation Army modernizes and grows at 21:05.078 --> 21:07.079 a rapid pace . The Pr CS expanding 21:07.089 --> 21:09.930 nuclear capability and capacity along 21:09.939 --> 21:11.661 with its development of modern 21:11.661 --> 21:13.717 submarines , missiles and hypersonic 21:13.717 --> 21:15.650 weapons all present significant 21:15.660 --> 21:18.770 challenges for homeland defense . While 21:18.780 --> 21:20.724 the Pr CS capabilities are growing 21:20.724 --> 21:22.780 quickly , Russia remains a threat to 21:22.780 --> 21:24.947 the homeland today and is an immediate 21:24.947 --> 21:27.670 nation state concern . Russia retains 21:27.680 --> 21:29.513 the world's largest stockpile of 21:29.513 --> 21:31.458 strategic and nonstrategic nuclear 21:31.458 --> 21:33.680 weapons along with significant capacity 21:33.680 --> 21:35.902 to strike inside North America with its 21:35.902 --> 21:37.513 air and sea launch precision 21:37.513 --> 21:39.939 conventional weapons despite heavy 21:39.949 --> 21:42.227 losses to its ground forces in Ukraine , 21:42.260 --> 21:44.427 Russia has invested heavily in systems 21:44.427 --> 21:46.427 that can threaten the United States 21:46.427 --> 21:48.371 such as advanced guided missiles , 21:48.371 --> 21:50.729 submarines , hypersonic light vehicles , 21:50.739 --> 21:53.739 ICBM S as well as significant cyber and 21:53.750 --> 21:56.069 undersea capabilities and developmental 21:56.079 --> 21:58.849 systems such as a nuclear torpedo and a 21:58.859 --> 22:00.692 nuclear powered cruise missile . 22:01.819 --> 22:03.930 Meanwhile , North Korea continues its 22:03.930 --> 22:06.189 bellicose rhetoric rhetoric while test 22:06.199 --> 22:08.255 launching increasingly advanced long 22:08.255 --> 22:10.366 range missiles and expanding its ties 22:10.366 --> 22:12.910 with China and Russia . While Iran 22:12.920 --> 22:14.809 currently lacks the capability to 22:14.809 --> 22:16.864 strike North America with long range 22:16.864 --> 22:18.976 missiles , it is investing heavily in 22:18.976 --> 22:21.031 that capability . Iran also supports 22:21.031 --> 22:23.142 violent militant groups in the Middle 22:23.142 --> 22:25.309 East and maintains a worldwide network 22:25.309 --> 22:27.920 of operational surrogates . And the 22:27.930 --> 22:29.874 most prevalent and growing threats 22:29.874 --> 22:32.097 include cyber and small unmanned aerial 22:32.097 --> 22:34.263 systems that are being employed inside 22:34.263 --> 22:36.430 the US and Canada against civilian and 22:36.430 --> 22:38.486 military infrastructure in ways that 22:38.486 --> 22:40.597 were not possible . A few years ago . 22:40.750 --> 22:42.972 With those risks firmly in mind , NORAD 22:42.979 --> 22:45.146 and North com strive to begin homeland 22:45.146 --> 22:47.930 defense well beyond North America to do 22:47.939 --> 22:50.161 so . Both commands are working with the 22:50.161 --> 22:52.383 services and Congress to improve domain 22:52.383 --> 22:55.239 awareness in order to detect track and 22:55.250 --> 22:57.459 defeat threats ranging from long range 22:57.469 --> 22:59.770 ballistic missiles to small unmanned 22:59.780 --> 23:02.550 aerial systems . The defense of North 23:02.560 --> 23:04.504 America is an active endeavor that 23:04.510 --> 23:06.732 requires Nora and North Com to campaign 23:06.732 --> 23:08.900 against all threats in all domains 23:08.910 --> 23:11.260 along all approaches . That effort 23:11.270 --> 23:12.937 requires seamless exchange of 23:12.937 --> 23:15.048 information with combatant commands , 23:15.048 --> 23:17.048 conventional and special operations 23:17.048 --> 23:19.159 forces and the intelligence community 23:19.159 --> 23:21.159 and the spectrum of interagency and 23:21.159 --> 23:23.381 international partners . The importance 23:23.381 --> 23:25.159 of collecting and disseminating 23:25.159 --> 23:26.826 information quickly cannot be 23:26.826 --> 23:28.826 overstated . I strongly support the 23:28.826 --> 23:30.659 department's work to advance the 23:30.659 --> 23:32.770 combined joint all domain command and 23:32.770 --> 23:34.826 control concept as we seek to detect 23:34.826 --> 23:36.937 and track potential threats and share 23:36.937 --> 23:39.159 information as quickly as possible with 23:39.159 --> 23:41.048 analysts , operators and decision 23:41.048 --> 23:43.849 makers around the world . Finally , 23:43.859 --> 23:46.026 upon taking command , I began a 90 day 23:46.026 --> 23:48.137 assessment to inform the department , 23:48.137 --> 23:50.520 the Joint Force and Congress on Nor AD 23:50.530 --> 23:52.474 and North Com's ability to execute 23:52.474 --> 23:54.641 assigned task and make recommendations 23:54.641 --> 23:56.863 on where the command could or should do 23:56.863 --> 23:58.974 more . Once complete . I look forward 23:58.974 --> 24:00.919 to sharing my findings and updated 24:00.919 --> 24:02.919 vision for how NOR AD and North Com 24:02.919 --> 24:05.086 will best execute the noble mission of 24:05.086 --> 24:07.339 homeland defense . The challenges 24:07.349 --> 24:09.589 facing our homelands are real but there 24:09.599 --> 24:11.543 should be no doubt about NORAD and 24:11.543 --> 24:13.766 North Com's resolve to deter aggression 24:13.766 --> 24:16.400 and if necessary defeat threats to our 24:16.410 --> 24:18.660 nations and our citizens . Again . 24:18.670 --> 24:20.892 Thank you for the opportunity to appear 24:20.892 --> 24:22.726 this morning . I look forward to 24:22.726 --> 24:24.670 working with the committee and I'm 24:24.670 --> 24:26.837 happy to take your questions . Great . 24:26.837 --> 24:28.837 Thank you all . And I now recognize 24:28.837 --> 24:30.559 myself for questions , General 24:30.559 --> 24:32.781 Richardson and Guillo . Uh You heard me 24:32.781 --> 24:34.670 outline and y'all talked about uh 24:34.670 --> 24:36.781 China's infrastructure investments in 24:36.781 --> 24:38.948 South and throughout Latin America and 24:38.948 --> 24:40.948 the Caribbean . Are y'all concerned 24:40.948 --> 24:43.430 about them taking those infrastructure 24:43.439 --> 24:45.661 investments and using them for military 24:45.661 --> 24:49.660 purposes ? Uh Chairman , yes . Uh we 24:49.670 --> 24:51.650 are worried about that . Uh and uh 24:51.660 --> 24:54.199 being able to flip uh the , the 24:54.209 --> 24:56.930 state-owned enterprise uh critical 24:56.939 --> 24:58.829 infrastructure , what looks to be 24:58.839 --> 25:01.300 investment in the region . Deepwater 25:01.310 --> 25:04.810 ports , five G clean energy , uh the 25:04.819 --> 25:07.160 safe city , smart city , technology and 25:07.170 --> 25:09.589 space , uh enabling infrastructure . 25:10.250 --> 25:14.219 General chairman , 25:14.229 --> 25:16.939 I completely agree with General 25:16.949 --> 25:19.660 Richardson uh from the north C north 25:19.699 --> 25:21.810 com homeland defense uh perspective . 25:21.910 --> 25:23.910 Uh It's something that I'm watching 25:23.910 --> 25:25.577 very closely in the uh 90 day 25:25.577 --> 25:27.410 assessment and I look forward to 25:27.410 --> 25:29.839 sharing what I uh what I learned as far 25:29.849 --> 25:33.079 as the specifics of uh what we can do 25:33.089 --> 25:34.910 to uh address that threat more 25:34.920 --> 25:37.569 completely . Well , obviously , I , I'm 25:37.579 --> 25:39.412 concerned about it and I'm , I'm 25:39.412 --> 25:41.357 particularly interested in both of 25:41.357 --> 25:43.301 y'all . What would you like to see 25:43.301 --> 25:45.412 Congress do to help you counter those 25:45.412 --> 25:47.523 malign influences in uh the Caribbean 25:47.523 --> 25:51.060 and Latin America . So chairman , I 25:51.069 --> 25:53.180 would say that we've got to be on the 25:53.180 --> 25:55.402 field competing for the tenders and the 25:55.402 --> 25:57.625 contracts that come out from the , from 25:57.625 --> 25:59.847 the countries . And so uh the countries 25:59.847 --> 26:03.689 put out the tenders and our uh team usa 26:03.739 --> 26:05.890 us companies have got to be competing 26:05.900 --> 26:08.180 on that critical infrastructure . And 26:08.189 --> 26:10.300 so I've been uh over this past year , 26:10.300 --> 26:12.300 I've been partnering uh us Southern 26:12.300 --> 26:14.411 Command with uh more closely with the 26:14.411 --> 26:16.356 inter agency to try and break down 26:16.356 --> 26:18.300 those barriers that are there also 26:18.300 --> 26:20.467 through the Inter American Development 26:20.467 --> 26:22.133 Bank , Development of Finance 26:22.133 --> 26:24.245 Corporation and all of the all of the 26:24.245 --> 26:26.133 projects that come out of there . 26:26.133 --> 26:28.133 That's those are big money projects 26:28.133 --> 26:29.967 that can compete uh with Western 26:29.967 --> 26:31.856 Solutions team , usa solutions in 26:31.856 --> 26:33.745 support of the countries and be a 26:33.745 --> 26:36.694 counter and an alternative uh to the 26:36.704 --> 26:38.482 Chinese companies , state owned 26:38.482 --> 26:40.704 enterprises that are competing on these 26:40.704 --> 26:42.760 contracts in the countries ? General 26:42.760 --> 26:44.815 Gill is there anything that you need 26:44.815 --> 26:47.037 from Congress to help you counter those 26:47.037 --> 26:49.204 influences ? Chairman ? Thank you . Uh 26:49.204 --> 26:51.315 First , we'll continue to cooper with 26:51.315 --> 26:53.426 General Richardson and her command uh 26:53.426 --> 26:55.800 as the seams between uh South com and 26:55.810 --> 26:58.500 North Com are seas that cannot be uh we 26:58.510 --> 27:00.232 need to make sure it cannot be 27:00.232 --> 27:02.209 exploited . Uh Our approach to uh 27:02.219 --> 27:05.729 partnering with Mexico is um primarily 27:05.739 --> 27:07.906 through the mill to mill arrangement . 27:07.906 --> 27:10.072 And with that , our special operations 27:10.072 --> 27:12.239 command uh which we call so North work 27:12.250 --> 27:15.150 side by side with uh Mexican military 27:15.319 --> 27:18.109 uh to build capacity capability and 27:18.119 --> 27:20.175 eventually interoperability . What I 27:20.175 --> 27:22.286 would appreciate is continued support 27:22.286 --> 27:24.508 for those efforts as we strengthen that 27:24.508 --> 27:26.563 relationship uh on the south side of 27:26.563 --> 27:29.270 our border are those mill to mill um 27:29.310 --> 27:31.143 authorizations that you have the 27:31.143 --> 27:33.239 funding levels adequate at present 27:34.420 --> 27:36.531 chairman , at the present time , they 27:36.531 --> 27:38.753 are sufficient . General Richardson are 27:38.753 --> 27:41.119 yours . So on the security 27:41.130 --> 27:44.369 co-operation . Uh , not , not just yet . 27:44.380 --> 27:46.436 And the , uh , with the , uh , the , 27:46.436 --> 27:48.269 the , the bill , uh defense bill 27:48.269 --> 27:51.140 that'll be coming out for 24 we hope to 27:51.150 --> 27:53.317 receive what we did last year and that 27:53.317 --> 27:55.428 would , uh , that would go a long way 27:55.428 --> 27:57.539 to meeting our requirement if we were 27:57.539 --> 27:59.706 to receive the same thing as uh we did 27:59.706 --> 28:01.599 in the previous year . Well , I 28:01.609 --> 28:03.331 appreciate your loyalty to the 28:03.331 --> 28:05.589 administration , but both of you are 28:05.599 --> 28:07.877 undercutting how much I think you need . 28:07.877 --> 28:09.932 I think the amount you received last 28:09.932 --> 28:11.988 year should be doubled at least this 28:11.988 --> 28:14.210 next year . Uh With that , I will yield 28:14.210 --> 28:16.321 to uh Mr Panetta for any questions he 28:16.321 --> 28:19.310 may have . Thank you , Mr Chairman . I 28:19.349 --> 28:21.300 think obviously Russia has been 28:21.310 --> 28:23.859 occupied recently . However , they're 28:23.869 --> 28:26.520 still pretty active in the Arctic and 28:26.530 --> 28:28.530 General Guillo . I want to focus on 28:28.530 --> 28:30.363 that area , obviously , with the 28:30.363 --> 28:32.252 expansion of NATO , creating more 28:32.252 --> 28:34.308 opportunities to secure the Arctic , 28:34.459 --> 28:36.459 it's becoming more critical that we 28:36.459 --> 28:38.626 leverage our Special Operations forces 28:38.626 --> 28:40.459 capabilities and ensure that our 28:40.459 --> 28:42.739 personnel are trained , readied and 28:42.750 --> 28:45.680 equipped to project power . However , 28:45.689 --> 28:47.911 I've had some discussions recently with 28:47.911 --> 28:50.133 some Special Operations Forces officers 28:50.133 --> 28:52.300 who talked about the difficulties that 28:52.300 --> 28:55.199 they've had be it in resources that 28:55.209 --> 28:58.949 they have to operate in that area and 28:58.959 --> 29:00.959 the extremes that they have to deal 29:00.959 --> 29:03.070 with . But also that they're training 29:03.070 --> 29:04.903 in Montana and Colorado , no way 29:04.903 --> 29:07.109 compared to the actual environment of 29:07.119 --> 29:09.550 being in the Arctic . So , and we can't 29:09.560 --> 29:11.782 address the tactical level difficulties 29:11.782 --> 29:13.727 without appropriately defining our 29:13.727 --> 29:15.671 mission in the Arctic . It remains 29:15.671 --> 29:18.060 unclear to many of our personnel , what 29:18.069 --> 29:20.060 we mean when we say Arctic , which 29:20.069 --> 29:22.530 differs significantly by season and 29:22.540 --> 29:25.599 what ARCTIC readiness is versus Arctic 29:25.609 --> 29:27.930 capable and how we should operate in an 29:27.939 --> 29:29.939 austere environment defined by both 29:29.939 --> 29:32.050 economic and military interests . So 29:32.060 --> 29:34.719 general , can you describe what our 29:34.729 --> 29:37.290 Arctic mission is and the department's 29:37.300 --> 29:39.356 efforts to better align that mission 29:39.356 --> 29:43.109 across services , Congressman Panetta . 29:43.119 --> 29:46.290 Uh our approach to the uh Arctic . 29:46.300 --> 29:48.467 Could you pull the microphone a little 29:48.467 --> 29:50.800 bit closer , please ? Thank you . Sorry , 29:50.800 --> 29:53.160 Chairman Congressman . Our approach to 29:53.170 --> 29:55.459 the Arctic is , is vital to our overall 29:55.469 --> 29:57.469 homeland defense because the Arctic 29:57.469 --> 30:00.729 comprises about 52% of the entire area 30:00.739 --> 30:04.260 of operation for uh uh NORAD and North 30:04.270 --> 30:07.300 coms uh areas . And uh although we 30:07.310 --> 30:09.310 frequently talk about the Arctic in 30:09.310 --> 30:11.421 terms of Alaska , it's important to , 30:11.421 --> 30:13.643 to note that the uh high north and then 30:13.643 --> 30:15.810 also the northeast uh approach , which 30:15.810 --> 30:17.977 we call the two o'clock uh position is 30:17.977 --> 30:19.866 extremely important . What you uh 30:19.866 --> 30:21.866 mentioned about the training of the 30:21.866 --> 30:24.069 forces uh is exactly right . We have 30:24.079 --> 30:26.412 well trained forces , but unfortunately , 30:26.412 --> 30:28.523 they train often in the United States 30:28.523 --> 30:30.746 and not up in , in , in the Arctic , in 30:30.746 --> 30:32.746 Alaska . And therefore they need to 30:32.746 --> 30:35.599 have specific equipment uh gear and kit 30:35.640 --> 30:37.640 to make sure that it can operate in 30:37.640 --> 30:39.696 that harsh environment as we speak . 30:39.696 --> 30:41.862 Our special operations command is , is 30:41.862 --> 30:44.800 conducting two operations in uh Alaska 30:44.810 --> 30:48.319 Arctic Edge and is X both of which are 30:48.329 --> 30:50.819 identifying the unique capabilities 30:50.829 --> 30:52.996 that we need to equip our forces to be 30:52.996 --> 30:55.107 able to fight there and on the same . 30:55.107 --> 30:57.051 And uh you pointed out the special 30:57.051 --> 30:59.051 operations on the other side , even 30:59.051 --> 31:00.996 with our air forces and , and army 31:00.996 --> 31:03.760 forces that operate very well in Alaska 31:03.770 --> 31:06.609 right now and are equipped for that if 31:06.619 --> 31:09.250 uh uh conflict in the Pacific would 31:09.260 --> 31:11.093 cause them to push forward . I'm 31:11.093 --> 31:13.093 concerned that the forces back that 31:13.093 --> 31:14.927 would backfill there may be well 31:14.927 --> 31:17.510 trained but not specifically uh in 31:17.520 --> 31:19.910 Arctic uh techniques and then also with 31:19.920 --> 31:21.750 the gear necessary . So that is 31:21.760 --> 31:23.871 something that I will address uh with 31:23.871 --> 31:25.871 the services to ensure that we have 31:25.871 --> 31:28.334 depth in our Arctic capability . Great . 31:28.344 --> 31:30.964 And , and you know , as you know , well , 31:31.104 --> 31:33.285 uh with the expansion of NATO , 31:33.295 --> 31:36.425 including Sweden and Finland , uh how 31:36.435 --> 31:39.805 will using them as reliable partners ? 31:39.814 --> 31:42.405 How do you think that's going to help 31:42.415 --> 31:44.193 us in our mission in the Arctic 31:45.589 --> 31:48.089 Congressman ? I think the , the , the 31:48.099 --> 31:49.770 uh immediate benefit will be 31:49.780 --> 31:52.002 strengthening that two o'clock approach 31:52.002 --> 31:54.169 that I just mentioned . If I could use 31:54.169 --> 31:56.280 a quick example for last week , uh we 31:56.280 --> 31:58.113 had two times where Russian bear 31:58.113 --> 32:01.349 bombers flew along that uh avenue for 32:01.359 --> 32:03.581 the first time in over two years . II I 32:03.581 --> 32:06.625 should add uh approaching the Canadian 32:06.635 --> 32:08.302 and United States air defense 32:08.302 --> 32:10.468 identification zones off the northeast 32:10.468 --> 32:13.084 United States as they approached our uh 32:13.094 --> 32:16.035 ability to share intelligence and radar 32:16.045 --> 32:18.156 picture with NATO partners to include 32:18.156 --> 32:20.212 Norway were vital for us to have the 32:20.212 --> 32:22.454 situation awareness as those bombers 32:22.464 --> 32:25.204 approached our area . Great General 32:25.395 --> 32:27.562 Guillo . Thank you for highlighting an 32:27.562 --> 32:29.784 area that I think we have to focus on a 32:29.784 --> 32:31.951 little bit more . I appreciate that Mr 32:31.951 --> 32:34.062 Chairman , I yield back . Thank you , 32:34.062 --> 32:36.117 gentlemen . We will now yield to the 32:36.117 --> 32:38.339 gentleman from Georgia , Mr mccormick . 32:38.339 --> 32:40.451 Thank you , Mr Chair and thank you to 32:40.451 --> 32:42.506 the witnesses and also thank you for 32:42.506 --> 32:42.329 the two sergeant majors in the Marine 32:42.339 --> 32:45.170 Corps because we know that uh four star 32:45.420 --> 32:47.540 generals and admirals are nowhere 32:47.550 --> 32:51.459 without their sergeant majors . Um I 32:51.469 --> 32:53.636 want to address the fact that our four 32:53.636 --> 32:55.747 deployed military performs a critical 32:55.747 --> 32:57.802 task in defending us in this western 32:57.802 --> 32:59.913 hemisphere , which is often neglected 32:59.913 --> 33:02.819 in this conversation . I think uh we 33:02.829 --> 33:04.551 cannot take this for granted , 33:04.551 --> 33:06.551 especially the People's Republic of 33:06.551 --> 33:08.607 China and this pa ST straight threat 33:08.607 --> 33:10.662 that we have increases its influence 33:10.662 --> 33:13.180 over Latin America . Honduras recently 33:13.189 --> 33:15.411 joined the Belt and Road initiative and 33:15.411 --> 33:17.467 Peru announced the construction of a 33:17.467 --> 33:19.745 massive Chinese finance deepwater port . 33:19.745 --> 33:21.967 Now by my estimates , I think China has 33:21.967 --> 33:24.189 over 50 deep water ports like this . We 33:24.189 --> 33:26.133 have about two but this tremendous 33:26.133 --> 33:28.356 disadvantage in what's growing over the 33:28.356 --> 33:30.522 past 10 years , China has replaced the 33:30.522 --> 33:32.522 US as Latin's top trading partner . 33:33.250 --> 33:35.250 This means that they basically have 33:35.250 --> 33:37.083 greater influence in the western 33:37.083 --> 33:39.306 hemisphere in some of the most populous 33:39.306 --> 33:41.650 areas in this region to include Brazil , 33:41.660 --> 33:45.469 Peru , Colombia , Panama , Venezuela , 33:46.400 --> 33:49.729 Cuba , Honduras . The list keeps on 33:49.739 --> 33:52.810 growing . Uh my concern is that as 33:52.819 --> 33:54.875 their influence continues to grow in 33:54.875 --> 33:57.140 Latin America , how has it impacted 33:57.150 --> 33:59.270 South Com's mission ? How do we 33:59.280 --> 34:03.170 reestablished ourselves as good friends 34:03.180 --> 34:06.050 and the choice between two nations ? 34:06.060 --> 34:08.116 One that I believe is very nefarious 34:08.280 --> 34:10.949 versus one that should be friendly as a 34:10.959 --> 34:12.848 global leader , especially in the 34:12.848 --> 34:14.737 western hemisphere and general uh 34:14.737 --> 34:16.792 Richardson , if you'd address this , 34:16.792 --> 34:18.903 please . Thank you , Congressman . So 34:18.903 --> 34:21.126 in my opening , I said , you know , the 34:21.126 --> 34:23.348 28 like minded democracies that we have 34:23.348 --> 34:23.209 in the region , we've got a partner 34:23.219 --> 34:26.520 better with them . And um and uh close 34:26.530 --> 34:28.810 to 15 to 20 years , receiving less than 34:28.820 --> 34:31.429 uh 50% of my security cooper operation 34:31.439 --> 34:33.540 requirement . As I mentioned last 34:33.550 --> 34:36.520 year's funding that we got in the 88068 34:36.530 --> 34:38.989 section was very , very helpful , but 34:39.000 --> 34:40.989 we , we can't just get one year of 34:41.000 --> 34:42.722 additional funding to meet the 34:42.722 --> 34:44.889 requirement . And I would say that our 34:44.889 --> 34:47.000 presence absolutely matters . And our 34:47.000 --> 34:49.222 security Cooper operation program is my 34:49.222 --> 34:51.389 number one lever uh in the South com A 34:51.389 --> 34:53.500 or to partner with our militaries and 34:53.500 --> 34:55.389 the public security forces in the 34:55.389 --> 34:57.100 region and to provide uh the 34:57.110 --> 34:59.939 counterbalance to uh what the PR C is 34:59.949 --> 35:02.229 doing And so our , as I said , our 35:02.239 --> 35:04.699 presence absolutely matters . But when 35:04.709 --> 35:06.487 we're not there . And with this 35:06.487 --> 35:08.598 additional funding last year , in the 35:08.598 --> 35:10.653 8068 appropriation , we were able to 35:10.653 --> 35:12.876 get further into the Southern Cone . So 35:12.876 --> 35:14.840 the countries of uh of Chile , 35:14.850 --> 35:18.080 Argentina , Paraguay , Uruguay uh with 35:18.090 --> 35:20.620 exercises and more engagement . Other 35:20.629 --> 35:23.580 than just a visit every once in a year , 35:23.820 --> 35:26.219 uh has really made a huge difference in 35:26.229 --> 35:28.340 terms of the partnering , but we have 35:28.340 --> 35:30.285 to be there . We have to have good 35:30.285 --> 35:32.507 security cooperations . We have to have 35:32.507 --> 35:34.225 flexible authorities that as 35:34.235 --> 35:36.475 opportunities open because they're only 35:36.485 --> 35:38.784 open for a short period of time to 35:38.794 --> 35:41.495 allow team usa to , to be able to be 35:41.504 --> 35:43.560 responsive to our partners . And I'd 35:43.560 --> 35:45.726 say we probably also have a neglect in 35:45.726 --> 35:47.837 africom too for the same reasons . Uh 35:47.837 --> 35:49.726 We just seem to look in different 35:49.726 --> 35:51.726 regions . We forget the places that 35:51.726 --> 35:53.893 we've in the past been very dominant . 35:53.893 --> 35:55.615 Now , we're losing ground . Uh 35:55.615 --> 35:57.560 Secretary Zimmerman , according to 35:57.560 --> 35:59.782 customs and border patrol . So far this 35:59.782 --> 35:59.625 year , we have encountered almost 35:59.635 --> 36:03.590 19,000 Chinese nationals at the US 36:03.600 --> 36:06.479 Mexican border . A more than 50 fold 36:06.489 --> 36:09.199 increase since 2021 . I might add , we 36:09.209 --> 36:11.098 have a record number crossing the 36:11.098 --> 36:12.931 northern border from the Chinese 36:12.931 --> 36:15.098 nationals as well . We acknowledge the 36:15.098 --> 36:17.153 threat from the People's Republic of 36:17.153 --> 36:19.376 China and it seems our poorest southern 36:19.376 --> 36:19.330 border is in crisis already which we've 36:19.350 --> 36:21.406 acknowledged the American people are 36:21.406 --> 36:23.350 absolutely concerned is one of the 36:23.350 --> 36:26.409 number one issues in America . We know 36:26.419 --> 36:29.300 this is potential devastation to what 36:29.310 --> 36:31.088 could be terrorist activities , 36:31.088 --> 36:33.421 stealing information , smuggling things . 36:33.421 --> 36:35.421 And we have almost 2 million people 36:35.421 --> 36:37.477 that got , we wouldn't even know who 36:37.477 --> 36:37.379 they are . We don't know how many of 36:37.389 --> 36:39.611 them are Chinese nationalists as well . 36:39.611 --> 36:41.939 On top of that 258 individuals on the 36:41.949 --> 36:43.727 terrorist list have crossed the 36:43.727 --> 36:46.300 southern border since the start of 2021 . 36:46.520 --> 36:48.687 And oh , by the way , we have a record 36:48.687 --> 36:50.742 number of Chinese coming in from all 36:50.742 --> 36:52.853 over the world , whether it be by air 36:52.853 --> 36:55.149 or by sea or by , across the borders . 36:55.350 --> 36:57.461 Uh Would you agree that the suspected 36:57.461 --> 36:59.461 terrorists and their potential pr c 36:59.461 --> 37:01.628 spies crossing the southern border are 37:01.628 --> 37:05.469 a national security threat ? Uh 37:05.580 --> 37:09.290 Congressman , um uh you , you 37:09.300 --> 37:11.522 speak of a very important challenge , I 37:11.522 --> 37:13.929 think um uh the crisis at the border 37:13.939 --> 37:15.883 includes a number of dimensions to 37:15.883 --> 37:18.050 include what we call extra hemispheric 37:18.050 --> 37:20.840 information . Uh uh immigration . Um I , 37:20.850 --> 37:24.370 I think that any time we talk about um 37:24.379 --> 37:27.600 uh those actors that would be the uh 37:27.610 --> 37:30.610 terrorists , um be they . Uh I hate to 37:30.620 --> 37:32.787 cut you off . I'm almost out of time . 37:32.787 --> 37:35.009 I just gonna make my point . I know you 37:35.009 --> 37:37.231 agree . It's , it's a , it's a threat . 37:37.231 --> 37:37.100 Uh I just want to point out that when 37:37.110 --> 37:39.166 we talk about the difference between 37:39.166 --> 37:41.332 undocumented versus documented expired 37:41.332 --> 37:43.499 chair and I recognize you from Texas . 37:43.499 --> 37:45.610 Mr Bey . Uh thank you , Mr Chairman . 37:45.610 --> 37:47.554 Um And thank , I want to thank the 37:47.554 --> 37:50.179 panel for being here today . And one of 37:50.189 --> 37:52.939 the things that is surprising to me uh 37:52.969 --> 37:55.600 around the uh issue that we're having 37:55.610 --> 37:57.989 at the border right now is people talk 37:58.000 --> 38:00.222 about it as if it's something that is , 38:00.222 --> 38:02.110 you know , brand , brand new or 38:02.120 --> 38:04.580 something that just happened . Uh But 38:04.590 --> 38:06.701 General Richard , so I wanted to , to 38:06.701 --> 38:08.923 ask you , I'm sure that , that you have 38:08.923 --> 38:11.146 studied the history . And remember when 38:11.146 --> 38:11.070 the Cali cartels and the Medellin 38:11.080 --> 38:13.629 cartels and Colombia was having issues 38:13.639 --> 38:16.229 dealing with far left uh paramilitary 38:16.239 --> 38:18.461 organizations in that country created a 38:18.461 --> 38:22.239 great deal of instability . Um um From 38:22.250 --> 38:24.361 estimates that I've seen depending on 38:24.361 --> 38:26.306 who you talk to , whether it's the 38:26.306 --> 38:28.306 Colombia government or from outside 38:28.306 --> 38:30.739 sources between 1985 and uh 2002 , 38:30.750 --> 38:33.689 perhaps uh anywhere from one to almost 38:33.699 --> 38:35.699 3 million Colombians were displaced 38:35.699 --> 38:38.250 some internally but uh some uh sought 38:38.260 --> 38:42.100 refuge uh outside of Colombia . Um And 38:42.110 --> 38:44.332 one of the things that I wanted to talk 38:44.332 --> 38:46.443 with you about was planned Colombia . 38:46.443 --> 38:49.320 Uh that proved to be very effective uh 38:49.330 --> 38:52.030 in helping uh deal with a lot of that 38:52.040 --> 38:55.189 uh regional uh uh uh destabilization 38:55.199 --> 38:56.977 that happened a lot of the mass 38:56.977 --> 38:59.032 migration that happened by , in , by 38:59.032 --> 39:01.810 sec by improving security measures , uh 39:01.820 --> 39:04.929 economic development , uh and other uh 39:04.939 --> 39:07.239 areas that really helped to finally 39:07.250 --> 39:10.379 bring and rein in some of the uh issues 39:10.389 --> 39:12.611 from the Wild West days under those two 39:12.611 --> 39:14.611 cartels . And I was hoping that you 39:14.611 --> 39:16.722 could perhaps tell us what additional 39:16.722 --> 39:18.833 steps do you think the US can take uh 39:18.833 --> 39:21.320 including its military forces to assist 39:21.550 --> 39:24.520 uh other unstable countries in the 39:24.530 --> 39:27.600 hemisphere in managing migration flows ? 39:27.610 --> 39:30.139 Uh And uh but I , I'll let you answer 39:30.149 --> 39:32.260 that one first and then have a follow 39:32.260 --> 39:34.520 up to that . So there's a lot to impact 39:34.530 --> 39:37.189 their congressmen because the uh uh the 39:37.199 --> 39:40.500 effects of Venezuela and uh the 7.5 39:40.510 --> 39:43.260 million uh migrants that have uh have 39:43.270 --> 39:45.969 poured out of uh Venezuela as a result 39:45.979 --> 39:48.540 of the conditions there and then coming 39:48.550 --> 39:50.699 into the region that is already 39:50.709 --> 39:53.560 economically impact for I impacted from 39:53.570 --> 39:55.626 COVID and still trying to dig out of 39:55.626 --> 39:59.189 the hole . And so uh as you uh as some 39:59.199 --> 40:01.370 will , will go through the Southern 40:01.379 --> 40:03.550 Cone all the way down from , to the 40:03.560 --> 40:06.350 Southern cone and back up uh to only go 40:06.360 --> 40:08.249 through the very dangerous Darien 40:08.249 --> 40:11.429 Jungle . Uh and make that trek . And so , 40:11.439 --> 40:13.889 uh as we see the insecurity and the 40:13.899 --> 40:16.135 instability families are on the move at 40:16.145 --> 40:18.256 unprecedented numbers . There used to 40:18.256 --> 40:20.485 be a lot of single movers . Uh But now 40:20.495 --> 40:22.662 there are families with young Children 40:22.662 --> 40:24.844 trying to find a better life . And so 40:24.854 --> 40:26.798 in my opening , I talked about the 40:26.798 --> 40:28.965 potential of this region a lot of talk 40:28.965 --> 40:31.132 about it 10 years ago to feed and fuel 40:31.132 --> 40:33.132 the world . That's the potential of 40:33.132 --> 40:35.604 this region . And uh and uh if we can 40:35.614 --> 40:38.524 help this region uh realize that 40:38.614 --> 40:41.949 potential uh to slow down the 40:41.959 --> 40:44.830 migration to have families feel secure 40:44.840 --> 40:47.007 and stable . But there's a lot of work 40:47.007 --> 40:49.340 to be done uh in , in order to do that 40:49.439 --> 40:51.620 ever since last April prior to the 40:51.629 --> 40:54.370 title 42 expiration , uh The United 40:54.379 --> 40:56.435 States signed a trilateral agreement 40:56.435 --> 40:58.590 with Colombia and Panama . That 40:58.600 --> 41:00.600 investment that you referenced plan 41:00.600 --> 41:02.500 Colombia was huge and our , our 41:02.510 --> 41:05.429 security relationship continues to be 41:05.439 --> 41:08.350 extremely strong with Colombia and uh 41:08.360 --> 41:10.590 the operations that both Colombia uh 41:10.600 --> 41:12.790 with their military and Panama with 41:12.800 --> 41:14.744 their public security forces going 41:14.744 --> 41:16.967 after the criminal networks that are uh 41:16.967 --> 41:19.022 trafficking the humans , but they're 41:19.022 --> 41:21.189 not just trafficking the humans , it's 41:21.189 --> 41:23.356 drugs and all of the other portfolio , 41:23.356 --> 41:25.300 illegal mining , illegal logging , 41:25.300 --> 41:27.530 counterfeit goods . And so as we 41:27.540 --> 41:30.239 continue with the migration , uh a lot 41:30.250 --> 41:33.020 of the countries uh in the uh south com 41:33.030 --> 41:36.540 a or have laws that um that migration 41:36.550 --> 41:39.229 is a human , right ? And so they don't 41:39.239 --> 41:42.010 try to , their laws don't uh allow them 41:42.020 --> 41:44.760 to stop migration or slow the flow . So 41:44.770 --> 41:46.992 that's why our investment in the region 41:46.992 --> 41:49.750 with the safe mobility offices , the 41:49.760 --> 41:53.350 legal pathways . Um Administrator Power 41:53.360 --> 41:55.360 said at best I think that everybody 41:55.360 --> 41:57.193 knows how to get in touch with a 41:57.193 --> 41:59.082 smuggler to , to uh get a illegal 41:59.082 --> 42:01.649 pathway to the United States . Uh But 42:01.659 --> 42:03.548 we have to , we have to have that 42:03.594 --> 42:06.925 campaign that folks know how to legally 42:06.935 --> 42:09.157 get to the United States , our policies 42:09.157 --> 42:11.524 matter in this respect . And uh and 42:11.534 --> 42:13.701 again , families are trying to realize 42:13.701 --> 42:15.645 the American dream . But how do we 42:15.645 --> 42:17.675 realize the American dream in the 42:17.685 --> 42:19.907 Americas with the potential to feed and 42:19.907 --> 42:22.385 fuel the world ? So I think economic 42:22.395 --> 42:24.254 investment as well as security 42:24.264 --> 42:26.695 investment is absolutely necessary . 42:27.114 --> 42:29.170 Thank you very much , Mr Chairman of 42:29.170 --> 42:31.336 you back . Thank you gentlemen , chair 42:31.336 --> 42:33.558 and I recognize gentleman from Missouri 42:33.558 --> 42:35.725 Mr Alford . Thank you , Mr Chair . I'm 42:35.725 --> 42:37.892 honored to represent two distinguished 42:37.892 --> 42:40.003 military installations , Whiteman Air 42:40.003 --> 42:42.170 Force Base in Fort Leonard Wood in our 42:42.170 --> 42:44.225 district . As you know , the Chinese 42:44.225 --> 42:44.020 spy balloon that penetrated our 42:44.030 --> 42:45.808 airspace last year , flew above 42:45.808 --> 42:48.030 Whiteman Air Force Base , the sole home 42:48.030 --> 42:50.510 to the B two stealth bomber and soon to 42:50.520 --> 42:54.179 be home to the B 21 . Uh General Guillo . 42:54.199 --> 42:56.255 I want to start with you the Chinese 42:56.255 --> 42:58.143 spy balloon last year highlighted 42:58.143 --> 43:00.199 disconcerting gaps in our all domain 43:00.199 --> 43:02.421 surveillance and system of sensors that 43:02.421 --> 43:05.350 protect our homeland . What steps has 43:05.360 --> 43:07.239 North Command and nored taken to 43:07.250 --> 43:09.709 eliminate these gaps and mitigate risks . 43:11.419 --> 43:13.649 Congressman , I uh outlined three 43:13.870 --> 43:16.659 immediate steps that I have shown uh uh 43:16.669 --> 43:19.360 promise and uh have been successful in 43:19.370 --> 43:21.481 identifying balloons that in the past 43:21.481 --> 43:23.537 we probably would not have seen . Uh 43:23.537 --> 43:25.814 First and foremost , uh my predecessor , 43:25.814 --> 43:27.899 General Van Herk uh directed the uh 43:27.909 --> 43:30.100 radar sensitivities to be adjusted 43:30.169 --> 43:33.080 which would allow uh better detection 43:33.090 --> 43:36.590 of uh low radar cross section , slow 43:36.600 --> 43:39.939 moving uh and high altitude uh objects . 43:40.080 --> 43:42.439 Although it introduces some clutter in 43:42.449 --> 43:44.616 the system because it's , uh the , the 43:44.616 --> 43:46.899 system is receiving more , uh , it does 43:46.909 --> 43:49.250 allow us to detect uh threats . Like 43:49.260 --> 43:51.316 the one that you just mentioned . Uh 43:51.316 --> 43:53.689 Second , when our operators see 43:53.699 --> 43:55.643 intermittent hits that in the past 43:55.643 --> 43:57.659 would be passed off to most usually 43:57.669 --> 43:59.780 weather or other phenomena that would 43:59.780 --> 44:02.149 cause an inconsistent hit . Uh They're 44:02.159 --> 44:05.080 now uh continuing to track those uh uh 44:05.090 --> 44:07.312 more carefully and more consistently to 44:07.312 --> 44:09.423 ensure that it is not uh a balloon or 44:09.423 --> 44:11.830 some other phenomena . And third is uh 44:11.840 --> 44:15.350 better um domain awareness between the 44:15.360 --> 44:17.729 uh other uh combatant commands . As we 44:17.739 --> 44:20.649 get uh J A DC two , the all Domain 44:20.659 --> 44:22.492 command and control system , the 44:22.492 --> 44:24.969 ability to share data from one 44:24.979 --> 44:27.290 combatant command to another instead of 44:27.300 --> 44:29.600 stopping at a , at a black line on a 44:29.610 --> 44:32.310 map that divides the uh regions . Now , 44:32.320 --> 44:33.931 we can seamlessly share that 44:33.931 --> 44:35.929 information uh electronically to 44:35.939 --> 44:37.939 increase our awareness further away 44:37.939 --> 44:40.106 from our shores . General Richardson , 44:40.106 --> 44:42.272 you've highlighted the attempts by the 44:42.272 --> 44:44.161 People's Republic of China in our 44:44.161 --> 44:46.217 hemisphere , the investments they've 44:46.217 --> 44:48.383 made , what is their end game in these 44:48.383 --> 44:50.260 investments ? It's uh to gain a 44:50.270 --> 44:52.048 foothold in all of the critical 44:52.048 --> 44:54.159 infrastructure . We've seen it . It's 44:54.159 --> 44:56.270 not new and uh just South America and 44:56.270 --> 44:57.992 uh and Central America and the 44:57.992 --> 45:00.600 Caribbean . Uh it's happened in Africa 45:00.610 --> 45:02.721 and in Europe as well . So this is an 45:02.721 --> 45:05.209 intermediate step . For what end . So I 45:05.219 --> 45:07.800 look at it as their way uh in this 45:07.810 --> 45:10.409 region , we worry about basing uh for 45:10.419 --> 45:13.739 the PL and the as we have seen in other 45:13.750 --> 45:15.861 areas . But I look at the state owned 45:15.861 --> 45:18.028 enterprises and the ability to be able 45:18.028 --> 45:20.028 to flip the use of that to possibly 45:20.028 --> 45:22.590 military application , being sort of a 45:22.600 --> 45:24.540 basing strategy through critical 45:24.550 --> 45:26.661 infrastructure in the region . And if 45:26.661 --> 45:28.717 we were to become in a conflict with 45:28.717 --> 45:30.939 China , this would be very useful . And 45:30.939 --> 45:33.350 that's my concern is exactly that Mr 45:33.419 --> 45:35.363 Zimmerman have members of Hamas or 45:35.363 --> 45:37.586 Hezbollah crossed our southern border . 45:37.586 --> 45:41.120 And if so , how many Congressman , I 45:41.129 --> 45:43.459 think I would have to uh take that back 45:43.469 --> 45:46.429 to get you rough uh numbers from DH S 45:46.439 --> 45:48.661 um since they have the lead on securing 45:48.661 --> 45:51.459 our nation's borders . Um but uh I'd be 45:51.469 --> 45:53.580 happy to talk to you in general about 45:53.580 --> 45:55.413 our , but have they crossed just 45:55.413 --> 45:57.580 without a number ? Can you give me any 45:57.580 --> 45:59.747 information on that ? I can't speak to 45:59.747 --> 46:01.913 that as has been said earlier , I know 46:01.913 --> 46:01.550 that there are members of the terrorist 46:01.560 --> 46:03.782 watch list who have been detained while 46:03.782 --> 46:06.070 crossing the border back to uh General 46:06.080 --> 46:08.136 Guillo . What is the current nuclear 46:08.136 --> 46:09.691 threat in space from Russia 46:12.360 --> 46:14.679 Congressman ? The threat of uh nuclear 46:14.689 --> 46:17.040 weapons in , in , in space primarily 46:17.050 --> 46:20.379 from Russia is uh is a constant and 46:20.389 --> 46:22.699 real concern if I could , I'd like to 46:22.709 --> 46:24.598 address the specifics in a closed 46:24.598 --> 46:26.876 session . If there is an actual threat . 46:26.876 --> 46:28.709 Should Americans know about it ? 46:29.350 --> 46:31.128 Congressman ? I think that it's 46:31.128 --> 46:33.406 important for all Americans to know of , 46:33.406 --> 46:35.517 uh , the wide variety of threats that 46:35.517 --> 46:37.461 face the homeland in all domains . 46:37.870 --> 46:40.037 Thank you for that . I appreciate your 46:40.037 --> 46:42.148 service to our nation . With that . I 46:42.148 --> 46:44.481 yield back chair . I recognize Mr Smith . 46:44.481 --> 46:46.814 Thank you very much , Mr Chairman first . 46:46.814 --> 46:48.870 I apologize for being late late this 46:48.870 --> 46:51.092 morning , believe it or not . I , I cut 46:51.092 --> 46:53.259 myself shaving and it simply would not 46:53.259 --> 46:55.148 stop bleeding . Uh And that's the 46:55.148 --> 46:54.570 reason I wasn't here . I wish I had a 46:54.580 --> 46:57.500 better story , but that's basically it . 46:57.510 --> 47:00.080 Um I don't , I don't wanna cover a lot 47:00.090 --> 47:02.312 of ground that's already been covered . 47:02.312 --> 47:04.479 Um But I did have an opening statement 47:04.479 --> 47:06.646 talking about , I mean , obviously the 47:06.646 --> 47:08.812 number one issue that we're facing out 47:08.812 --> 47:08.340 of , you know , the both of your 47:08.350 --> 47:10.294 regions is the migration challenge 47:10.294 --> 47:12.979 coming up um out of Latin America , how 47:12.989 --> 47:15.267 that's certainly pressuring our border . 47:15.267 --> 47:17.045 But it is also putting a lot of 47:17.045 --> 47:19.300 pressure on nations throughout . Um 47:19.310 --> 47:21.929 your a or uh I know Colombia , Panama 47:21.939 --> 47:24.050 Chile amongst others are , are facing 47:24.050 --> 47:26.050 that challenge and just the overall 47:26.050 --> 47:27.717 instability and of course now 47:27.717 --> 47:30.050 instability coming out of Haiti as well . 47:30.050 --> 47:32.161 I think it's crucially important that 47:32.161 --> 47:34.272 we try to figure out some way to work 47:34.272 --> 47:36.328 with the these countries to increase 47:36.328 --> 47:38.272 stability . You know , we can talk 47:38.272 --> 47:40.439 about the border and what should we do 47:40.439 --> 47:42.717 to secure it ? What law should we pass ? 47:42.717 --> 47:44.883 But at the end of the day , as long as 47:44.883 --> 47:47.050 there are millions of people desperate 47:47.050 --> 47:49.272 to , to get out of where they're at and 47:49.272 --> 47:53.159 come here , you would , there's no 100% 47:53.169 --> 47:55.336 fix to the problem in that situation . 47:55.336 --> 47:57.336 There just isn't so getting greater 47:57.336 --> 47:58.836 stability in that region . 47:58.836 --> 48:00.836 Understanding also that many of the 48:00.836 --> 48:02.780 migrants come from outside of your 48:02.780 --> 48:04.947 region , um get into Latin America and 48:04.947 --> 48:07.169 work their way up is number one thing . 48:07.169 --> 48:07.090 And also I think Mr Alfred's point 48:07.100 --> 48:08.889 about China , the answer to the 48:08.899 --> 48:10.955 question of what is their end game ? 48:10.955 --> 48:13.288 China wants more influence in the world . 48:13.288 --> 48:15.455 And very specifically , they want more 48:15.455 --> 48:17.621 influence than us . They want to build 48:17.621 --> 48:19.843 partnerships and relationships wherever 48:19.843 --> 48:22.379 they can to undermine our ability to 48:22.389 --> 48:24.389 have influence in the world and put 48:24.389 --> 48:26.389 themselves in a better and stronger 48:26.389 --> 48:28.389 position . And we can see what that 48:28.389 --> 48:30.278 means that it would put them in a 48:30.278 --> 48:32.600 better position to bully their way into 48:32.610 --> 48:34.610 gosh , a half dozen countries where 48:34.610 --> 48:36.888 they claim territory , the Philippines , 48:36.888 --> 48:38.999 Indonesia , India , ironically , even 48:38.999 --> 48:41.221 Russia . Um so that's really what we're 48:41.221 --> 48:43.332 fighting for is , is influence in the 48:43.332 --> 48:45.443 world , um what they wanna do . And I 48:45.443 --> 48:47.443 think it's really important that we 48:47.443 --> 48:49.277 build our relationships in Latin 48:49.277 --> 48:51.388 America to try and prevent that . And 48:51.388 --> 48:53.721 then on the North American side , again , 48:53.721 --> 48:55.943 I agree with Mr Alford tried to protect 48:55.943 --> 48:57.832 our airspace . Um Certainly we've 48:57.832 --> 49:00.054 learned of some modern abilities in the 49:00.054 --> 49:02.166 last couple of years , I know General 49:02.166 --> 49:01.939 Guillo , you have addressed those and I 49:01.949 --> 49:04.340 appreciate that . Uh But those are the 49:04.350 --> 49:06.760 broad concerns . One question I would 49:06.770 --> 49:10.000 have um is , you know , you mentioned 49:10.010 --> 49:11.954 the potential that exists in Latin 49:11.954 --> 49:15.139 America . I'd like um both uh General 49:15.149 --> 49:17.060 Richardson and Miss Zimmerman to 49:17.070 --> 49:19.979 address what can we be doing ? What 49:19.989 --> 49:22.219 partners can we be working with to 49:22.229 --> 49:24.419 better realize that potential and 49:24.429 --> 49:27.000 reduce the chaos , reduce the drive 49:27.010 --> 49:29.121 that is pushing so many people out of 49:29.121 --> 49:31.121 so many countries in enforcing this 49:31.121 --> 49:35.090 migration in the summer . 49:35.169 --> 49:37.502 And why don't you go ahead and go first ? 49:37.502 --> 49:39.939 Um uh Thank you so much , Congressman 49:39.949 --> 49:42.250 for that question . I think uh you , 49:42.260 --> 49:44.482 you speak to an important set of things 49:44.482 --> 49:46.593 which is not simply what can we do uh 49:46.593 --> 49:49.620 to respond in , you know , on , on 49:49.629 --> 49:51.351 America's worst day if we find 49:51.351 --> 49:53.518 ourselves in conflict with China . But 49:53.518 --> 49:55.185 how can we actually build the 49:55.185 --> 49:57.407 relationships now ? Because that speaks 49:57.407 --> 49:57.040 to the values that we share as 49:57.050 --> 49:59.989 democracies . Um And the department uh 50:00.000 --> 50:01.620 in conjunction with uh other 50:01.629 --> 50:03.796 departments and agencies across uh the 50:03.796 --> 50:05.740 US government is really working to 50:05.740 --> 50:07.907 reinforce those democratic values , is 50:07.907 --> 50:09.760 working to build strong defense 50:09.770 --> 50:11.939 partnerships . So for example , uh the 50:11.949 --> 50:13.959 secretary just attended the North 50:13.969 --> 50:16.629 American Defense Ministerial uh which 50:16.639 --> 50:18.806 is a trilateral conversation involving 50:18.810 --> 50:22.320 Canada and Mexico . Um We have uh the 50:22.330 --> 50:24.441 uh Conference of Defense Ministers of 50:24.441 --> 50:26.497 the Americas which will be coming up 50:26.497 --> 50:28.663 later this year . Um So to ensure that 50:28.663 --> 50:30.830 the department represents those values 50:30.830 --> 50:32.800 in those forums . Um But I think 50:32.810 --> 50:34.760 there's also work that we do uh in 50:34.770 --> 50:36.919 building partner capacity and I'll , 50:36.929 --> 50:38.985 I'll let General Richardson speak to 50:38.985 --> 50:41.151 that . Um But I , but also second , uh 50:41.151 --> 50:43.151 what , what General Richardson said 50:43.151 --> 50:45.318 earlier , which is that uh some of the 50:45.318 --> 50:47.318 development , development , finance 50:47.318 --> 50:49.262 corporation efforts , uh our other 50:49.262 --> 50:51.207 economic efforts where we can nest 50:51.207 --> 50:53.040 those , um where we can nest our 50:53.040 --> 50:55.840 activities in those common efforts . I 50:55.850 --> 50:58.219 think we can realize a lot of gains 50:58.229 --> 51:01.449 that um uh would otherwise working in 51:01.459 --> 51:03.909 silos in the government not be possible . 51:04.300 --> 51:08.169 Thank you . So , uh Congressman , the 51:08.179 --> 51:10.401 uh thank you for that and thank you for 51:10.401 --> 51:12.512 the question . Uh Certainly the , the 51:12.512 --> 51:14.568 uh funding that I received last year 51:14.568 --> 51:17.770 and the 8068 funding uh additional 51:17.780 --> 51:20.580 funding on top of what I receive uh 51:20.590 --> 51:23.060 really helped and it had flexible 51:23.070 --> 51:25.429 authorities to help us be responsive to 51:25.439 --> 51:27.810 our partner nations . And as you know , 51:27.820 --> 51:29.949 and as I've testified before , uh and 51:29.959 --> 51:32.015 working with the dod team , but also 51:32.015 --> 51:33.903 Department of State and the inter 51:33.903 --> 51:36.070 agencies to speed up our processes and 51:36.070 --> 51:38.070 for military sales , access defense 51:38.070 --> 51:40.237 articles and not take years to deliver 51:40.237 --> 51:42.090 a capability because these , our 51:42.100 --> 51:44.489 partner nations are uh these heads of 51:44.500 --> 51:46.611 state are in the seat , generally one 51:46.611 --> 51:48.778 term of four years and they're working 51:48.778 --> 51:50.944 on a stopwatch , not a calendar . They 51:50.944 --> 51:52.944 need uh results within months , not 51:52.944 --> 51:55.229 years . And so , um that's what has led 51:55.239 --> 51:58.090 me to also uh partner with Department 51:58.100 --> 52:00.267 of Commerce , Department of Treasury , 52:00.267 --> 52:02.267 uh the American Chamber of Commerce 52:02.267 --> 52:04.600 because our economic security is really , 52:04.600 --> 52:06.767 really important here . So when you're 52:06.767 --> 52:09.050 talking about the , the realization of 52:09.060 --> 52:11.282 feeding of the fuel in the world , when 52:11.282 --> 52:13.379 half the soybean for the globe comes 52:13.389 --> 52:16.270 from this region , 30% of the corn and 52:16.280 --> 52:18.850 the , and the uh sugar comes from this 52:18.860 --> 52:21.179 region for the globe . Uh You've got 52:21.189 --> 52:23.739 the Amazon , you've got 30 per , 31% of 52:23.750 --> 52:26.083 the world's fresh water . You got light , 52:26.083 --> 52:28.250 sweet crude , heavy crude , you've got 52:28.250 --> 52:30.361 gold , copper , rare earth elements , 52:30.361 --> 52:32.250 the lithium triangle , 60% of the 52:32.250 --> 52:34.417 world's lithium is in this region . Uh 52:34.417 --> 52:36.540 The potential is there . So how do we 52:36.550 --> 52:38.717 help with the economic investment ? We 52:38.717 --> 52:40.939 have a lot of foreign direct investment 52:40.939 --> 52:43.106 from the United States already but our 52:43.106 --> 52:45.780 us companies in the region , uh We need 52:45.790 --> 52:48.379 to brand and , and start bragging about 52:48.389 --> 52:51.169 what team USA does uh for the countries 52:51.179 --> 52:53.123 already . And then we have to help 52:53.123 --> 52:56.659 streamline the uh how are uh companies 52:56.669 --> 52:58.836 and if there are barriers to competing 52:58.836 --> 53:00.391 on the tenders for critical 53:00.391 --> 53:02.280 infrastructure in South America , 53:02.280 --> 53:04.447 Central America and the Caribbean . Uh 53:04.447 --> 53:06.169 and , and that is part of that 53:06.169 --> 53:08.058 partnership that we've been doing 53:08.058 --> 53:10.225 national security rests on uh economic 53:10.225 --> 53:12.729 security . And just one comment , 11 53:12.739 --> 53:14.683 final final question . I think the 53:14.683 --> 53:16.906 security piece of this is crucial and I 53:16.906 --> 53:19.072 know it's something that Congress Writ 53:19.072 --> 53:21.295 Large is wrestling with right now . You 53:21.295 --> 53:23.350 know , we , we have concerns when we 53:23.350 --> 53:25.560 sell arms or security , um , equipment 53:25.570 --> 53:27.792 to other nations , what do they do with 53:27.792 --> 53:29.459 them ? And those concerns are 53:29.459 --> 53:31.292 legitimate . But I hope everyone 53:31.292 --> 53:33.540 understands that every nation tries to 53:33.550 --> 53:35.494 figure out some way to provide for 53:35.494 --> 53:37.606 their own security . Ok . There is no 53:37.606 --> 53:39.772 nation out there that simply lays down 53:39.772 --> 53:42.050 their arms and hopes for the best . Ok ? 53:42.050 --> 53:43.939 They try to maintain security and 53:43.939 --> 53:45.939 that's never easy and it's always a 53:45.939 --> 53:48.106 very difficult balance , a partnership 53:48.106 --> 53:50.328 with these other countries , part of it 53:50.328 --> 53:52.550 is helping them provide that security . 53:52.550 --> 53:54.661 And our slow walking of arms sales is 53:54.661 --> 53:56.328 undermining our relationships 53:56.328 --> 53:58.383 throughout the world and opening the 53:58.383 --> 54:00.929 door wide for China and Russia . It is 54:00.939 --> 54:03.161 not like these nations are not going to 54:03.161 --> 54:05.272 get weapons . If we stop selling them 54:05.272 --> 54:07.383 to them , they're just going to build 54:07.383 --> 54:07.310 different relationships . We've 54:07.320 --> 54:09.487 certainly seen that in the Middle East 54:09.487 --> 54:11.598 and I hope we're mindful of the trade 54:11.598 --> 54:13.153 off . Final question is our 54:13.153 --> 54:15.209 relationships in Latin America . You 54:15.209 --> 54:17.431 know , one of the big things Russia and 54:17.431 --> 54:19.431 China have an incredibly aggressive 54:19.431 --> 54:21.598 messaging machine . They are out there 54:21.598 --> 54:23.598 24 7 , denigrating us . Basically , 54:23.600 --> 54:26.330 it's a , it's a massive worldwide 54:26.340 --> 54:29.050 negative campaign um that people here 54:29.060 --> 54:31.229 domestically pick up for a variety of 54:31.239 --> 54:33.183 different reasons . And one of the 54:33.183 --> 54:35.295 things they play off of is historical 54:35.295 --> 54:37.461 concerns about what the US has done in 54:37.461 --> 54:39.683 a bunch of places , but particularly in 54:39.683 --> 54:41.850 Latin America . So when you're working 54:41.850 --> 54:43.961 with Brazil and Argentina and Chile , 54:43.961 --> 54:46.040 how do you push back against that 54:46.050 --> 54:48.050 negative campaign ? Because it does 54:48.050 --> 54:50.219 seem to be having an effect ? I mean , 54:50.229 --> 54:52.451 you can correct me if I'm wrong on that 54:52.451 --> 54:54.673 point , but I think it is , it has hurt 54:54.673 --> 54:56.618 our relationships with a number of 54:56.618 --> 54:58.840 countries in Latin America . The battle 54:58.840 --> 55:01.062 with Cuba , the battle with Nicaragua . 55:01.062 --> 55:00.979 What's going on with Venezuela ? How 55:00.989 --> 55:04.100 can we better burnish our own image so 55:04.110 --> 55:06.784 that we can have a chance at building 55:06.794 --> 55:08.794 the partnerships we need to build ? 55:08.794 --> 55:10.405 Well , I would , I would say 55:10.405 --> 55:12.238 Congressman , thank you for that 55:12.238 --> 55:14.461 question because the uh we've got to be 55:14.461 --> 55:16.627 trusted partners and uh we have a , we 55:16.627 --> 55:19.094 have uh the uh American Partnership for 55:19.104 --> 55:21.625 Economic Prosperity A PP , which is a 55:21.635 --> 55:23.524 uh program from the summit of the 55:23.524 --> 55:26.814 Americas and A PP hosted uh at the 55:26.824 --> 55:29.695 White House in early November uh 11 , 55:29.705 --> 55:32.145 Latin America , uh Latin American heads 55:32.155 --> 55:34.760 of state that came and for a week uh 55:34.770 --> 55:37.040 they uh discussed the challenges in the 55:37.050 --> 55:39.689 region but then also uh rolled out the 55:39.699 --> 55:42.959 programs of economic help in terms of 55:42.969 --> 55:44.949 in modern ports , clean energy and 55:44.959 --> 55:47.520 digital technology and billions of 55:47.530 --> 55:50.149 dollars of programs and efforts of 55:50.159 --> 55:52.879 infuse of economic investment into the 55:52.889 --> 55:54.778 region through the Inter American 55:54.778 --> 55:56.833 Development Bank and also through uh 55:56.833 --> 55:59.330 Developmental Finance Corporation . And 55:59.340 --> 56:01.284 so , uh with that , there are some 56:01.284 --> 56:03.340 shares 75 million in shares that are 56:03.340 --> 56:05.396 coming up for vote this month that I 56:05.396 --> 56:08.000 would recommend that as we had this a 56:08.010 --> 56:10.280 pep in November and , and hosted these 56:10.290 --> 56:12.649 leaders at the White House that we have 56:12.659 --> 56:15.770 got to . Uh we've got to um recommend 56:15.780 --> 56:17.947 that we purchase those shares from the 56:17.947 --> 56:20.080 United States . So we don't give our 56:20.090 --> 56:22.257 adversaries an opportunity to purchase 56:22.257 --> 56:24.989 them uh as part of the investment that 56:25.000 --> 56:27.419 we rolled out in the November time 56:27.429 --> 56:29.762 frame . Thank you very much . Thank you , 56:29.762 --> 56:31.762 Mr Chairman . You're not recognized 56:31.762 --> 56:34.040 Gent lady from Virginia , Miss Higgins . 56:34.560 --> 56:36.671 Thank you , Mr Chair and thank you uh 56:36.671 --> 56:38.949 for our guests for being with us today . 56:38.949 --> 56:41.060 Just to comment about uh the security 56:41.060 --> 56:43.209 potential that we have in Central and 56:43.219 --> 56:45.052 South America . And I think just 56:45.052 --> 56:47.275 prioritizing our funding so that we can 56:47.275 --> 56:49.441 put our money where our mouth is , the 56:49.441 --> 56:51.663 defense budget is always inadequate and 56:51.663 --> 56:53.663 uh and just making sure that we are 56:53.663 --> 56:55.886 again prioritizing that funding because 56:55.886 --> 56:58.052 it is so important . I wanted to speak 56:58.052 --> 57:00.163 and ask a little bit about Cuba in my 57:00.163 --> 57:02.052 district . I represent Virginia's 57:02.052 --> 57:01.739 second congressional district . So we 57:01.750 --> 57:03.972 have Naval Air Station Oceana there and 57:03.972 --> 57:05.972 they've recently moved their strike 57:05.972 --> 57:08.083 fighter Advanced Readiness program or 57:08.083 --> 57:10.139 SARP exercises back home to Virginia 57:10.139 --> 57:12.361 Beach uh because they are worried about 57:12.361 --> 57:15.409 activity in Cuba from the Chinese . And 57:15.419 --> 57:17.475 so could you speak a little bit just 57:17.475 --> 57:19.419 about what concerns you have about 57:19.419 --> 57:21.308 Chinese activity in Cuba and what 57:21.308 --> 57:23.475 approaches we're taking to fortify the 57:23.475 --> 57:25.586 security encounter of our adversaries 57:25.586 --> 57:27.475 in this region . So , thank you , 57:27.475 --> 57:29.697 Congresswoman and the uh certainly that 57:29.697 --> 57:31.863 concern being so close to the homeland 57:31.863 --> 57:34.320 uh is , is very concerning . Uh the US 57:34.500 --> 57:36.719 agency is working very hard to uh 57:36.729 --> 57:39.129 counter that effort . And um and I can 57:39.139 --> 57:41.361 talk to more about that in the , in the 57:41.361 --> 57:44.270 classified session afterwards . Great . 57:44.320 --> 57:46.320 Thank you . And then I also want to 57:46.320 --> 57:48.264 talk about Haiti a little bit just 57:48.264 --> 57:50.320 because of the unrest and maybe Miss 57:50.320 --> 57:49.850 Emer Men , you can answer the question 57:49.860 --> 57:51.929 just with the recent news about the 57:51.939 --> 57:53.772 Prime Minister stepping down and 57:53.772 --> 57:55.939 understanding that we've increased our 57:55.939 --> 57:58.989 uh our a $300 million in addition to 33 57:59.000 --> 58:00.944 million in humanitarian assistance 58:00.944 --> 58:03.189 going to that region . And uh and then 58:03.199 --> 58:05.750 talks of sending perhaps military as 58:05.760 --> 58:08.449 well . So uh can you just speak to what 58:08.459 --> 58:10.181 is going on there ? Is there a 58:10.181 --> 58:12.403 possibility of us sending our troops to 58:12.403 --> 58:14.626 that region ? Um Absolutely , I'm , I'm 58:14.626 --> 58:16.792 happy to speak to that congresswoman . 58:16.792 --> 58:18.848 Um So the situation in Haiti remains 58:18.848 --> 58:21.330 obviously very tense . Um And the US is 58:21.340 --> 58:25.139 participating in uh both um uh uh 58:25.149 --> 58:28.270 its own efforts and also uh efforts in 58:28.280 --> 58:31.389 support of uh cara com and other allies 58:31.399 --> 58:34.070 um with , with respect to Haiti . So uh 58:34.199 --> 58:36.379 in terms of a troop commitment of us 58:36.389 --> 58:39.100 troops , um we are talking there only 58:39.110 --> 58:41.209 about security augmentation for our 58:41.219 --> 58:43.780 embassy in Port Au Prince . Um there 58:43.790 --> 58:46.280 isn't discussion of uh sending in our 58:46.385 --> 58:50.354 military . Um But we are in support of 58:50.364 --> 58:53.504 uh the MS S the multinational security 58:53.514 --> 58:55.965 support mission for Haiti . Uh This is 58:55.975 --> 58:59.324 the Kenyan led mission uh to train and 58:59.334 --> 59:01.445 support the Haitian National Police . 59:01.665 --> 59:04.165 Uh So there , the department has 59:04.175 --> 59:06.342 increased its funding from 100 million 59:06.342 --> 59:08.395 to 200 million in order to better 59:08.405 --> 59:11.274 support um uh the logistics and 59:11.284 --> 59:13.814 sustainment aspects of that mission in 59:13.824 --> 59:15.824 order to get the mission fielded as 59:15.824 --> 59:18.399 soon as we can . Thank you . And then 59:18.409 --> 59:21.560 also briefly , we see China adopting 59:21.570 --> 59:23.540 some of our tactics that we've 59:23.550 --> 59:25.550 developed , that we used to develop 59:25.550 --> 59:27.383 alliances with exercise military 59:27.383 --> 59:29.606 exercises specifically with , with some 59:29.606 --> 59:31.661 of those 28 democracy countries that 59:31.661 --> 59:33.883 that you mentioned . And that's kind of 59:33.883 --> 59:35.606 been how the United States has 59:35.606 --> 59:37.772 developed our , our friendships and we 59:37.772 --> 59:39.883 have done military exercises together 59:39.883 --> 59:41.994 uh so that we understand each other's 59:41.994 --> 59:41.979 capabilities that we're there for each 59:41.989 --> 59:44.520 other if needed . So we see China kind 59:44.530 --> 59:47.590 of adopting that and uh and now doing 59:47.600 --> 59:49.656 their own types of exercises , can , 59:49.656 --> 59:51.378 can you speak to where that is 59:51.378 --> 59:53.544 happening ? Are those 28 democracies ? 59:53.544 --> 59:55.100 Are they steadfast in their 59:55.100 --> 59:56.933 relationship with us or are they 59:56.933 --> 59:59.044 turning around and then participating 59:59.044 --> 01:00:01.267 in exercises with potential adversaries 01:00:01.267 --> 01:00:03.544 of ours ? I would uh say congresswoman , 01:00:03.544 --> 01:00:05.600 the uh in terms of you're absolutely 01:00:05.600 --> 01:00:07.378 right . The , the , the PR C is 01:00:07.378 --> 01:00:10.149 utilizing our playbook um as well and 01:00:10.159 --> 01:00:12.159 not just in exercises but key later 01:00:12.159 --> 01:00:14.270 engagements and things like that . So 01:00:14.270 --> 01:00:16.326 they're upping the ranks of the pl A 01:00:16.326 --> 01:00:18.492 that are now showing up to the , uh to 01:00:18.492 --> 01:00:21.439 the exercises and the marines . Uh And , 01:00:21.449 --> 01:00:24.429 um , and I would say that uh the way to , 01:00:24.439 --> 01:00:26.729 um , when I say our presence absolutely 01:00:26.739 --> 01:00:29.040 matters , it really does . And uh , and 01:00:29.050 --> 01:00:30.939 us being able to have an exercise 01:00:30.939 --> 01:00:33.161 several years ago , my exercise funding 01:00:33.161 --> 01:00:35.272 to get me down into the Southern Cone 01:00:35.272 --> 01:00:37.439 South com and all of our components uh 01:00:37.439 --> 01:00:39.439 was reinstalled with the additional 01:00:39.439 --> 01:00:41.661 funding last year . And so happy to say 01:00:41.661 --> 01:00:43.772 that we're , we're able to be there . 01:00:43.772 --> 01:00:45.883 But uh I would ask for that continued 01:00:45.883 --> 01:00:48.050 funding . I don't need to outspend the 01:00:48.050 --> 01:00:50.050 pier , see to out compete them . We 01:00:50.050 --> 01:00:52.050 just need to be there , we gotta be 01:00:52.050 --> 01:00:54.272 there . And I would say on the economic 01:00:54.272 --> 01:00:54.104 side of the house , if we're not there 01:00:54.114 --> 01:00:57.574 from team USA , then uh and responsive 01:00:57.584 --> 01:01:00.014 when opportunities open up and uh they 01:01:00.024 --> 01:01:02.175 need help . If we can't help them , 01:01:02.185 --> 01:01:04.407 then they're gonna look to , to whoever 01:01:04.407 --> 01:01:06.574 has uh the cash or the loans or things 01:01:06.574 --> 01:01:08.796 like that in order to uh fund what they 01:01:08.796 --> 01:01:10.963 need again for the presidents that are 01:01:10.963 --> 01:01:13.114 in the seat for a very short term of 01:01:13.125 --> 01:01:16.060 four years . So those the 28 01:01:16.070 --> 01:01:18.237 democracies that you talk about that , 01:01:18.237 --> 01:01:20.348 that are the friendly countries ? Are 01:01:20.348 --> 01:01:22.570 they , are they pretty steadfast though 01:01:22.570 --> 01:01:24.792 in those relationships ? Are they , are 01:01:24.792 --> 01:01:26.959 they questioning our uh alliances just 01:01:26.959 --> 01:01:29.070 based off kind of what they're seeing 01:01:29.070 --> 01:01:31.181 with Russia and Ukraine and , and our 01:01:31.181 --> 01:01:33.348 ability to uh to provide aid to allies 01:01:33.348 --> 01:01:35.403 throughout the world . Is it , is it 01:01:35.403 --> 01:01:37.292 having an impact ? And , and your 01:01:37.292 --> 01:01:39.514 General Lee's times expired chair ? And 01:01:39.514 --> 01:01:39.149 I recognize that General Lee from the 01:01:39.159 --> 01:01:41.290 great state of Alabama , MS Sewell , 01:01:41.820 --> 01:01:43.820 thank you , Mr Chairman . I want to 01:01:43.820 --> 01:01:45.764 thank our witnesses for being here 01:01:45.764 --> 01:01:47.969 today . And as the emerging threats uh 01:01:47.979 --> 01:01:50.035 environment facing the United States 01:01:50.035 --> 01:01:52.201 become increasingly complex , I really 01:01:52.201 --> 01:01:54.035 do appreciate your dedication to 01:01:54.035 --> 01:01:56.260 protecting our homeland , our citizens 01:01:56.270 --> 01:01:59.939 and our troops . Um General Guillo , 01:02:00.399 --> 01:02:02.719 is that right ? General Guillo , I 01:02:02.729 --> 01:02:04.820 first want to discuss hypersonic 01:02:04.830 --> 01:02:07.199 weapons uh which have become a key 01:02:07.209 --> 01:02:10.080 component for both Russia and China . 01:02:10.340 --> 01:02:13.030 Hypersonics , high speed , uh low 01:02:13.040 --> 01:02:15.379 trajectory and maneuvering capabilities 01:02:15.389 --> 01:02:17.929 pose a major challenge to our ability 01:02:17.939 --> 01:02:21.330 to identify and warn of inbound threats . 01:02:21.540 --> 01:02:24.639 With your priority of , of um detecting 01:02:25.469 --> 01:02:27.679 classifying and tracking potential 01:02:27.689 --> 01:02:29.739 threats to the homeland . Are we 01:02:29.750 --> 01:02:32.770 providing enough resources for reactive 01:02:32.780 --> 01:02:34.709 threat ? Representation from 01:02:34.719 --> 01:02:38.610 hypersonics ? Congresswoman I I share 01:02:38.620 --> 01:02:40.580 your assessment on hypersonics . I 01:02:40.590 --> 01:02:42.701 think that they are probably the most 01:02:42.701 --> 01:02:44.923 technologically challenging threat that 01:02:44.923 --> 01:02:46.757 we're facing as well as the most 01:02:46.757 --> 01:02:48.757 destabilizing because of where they 01:02:48.757 --> 01:02:50.812 operate between uh established norms 01:02:50.812 --> 01:02:52.868 and , and , and weapons specifically 01:02:52.868 --> 01:02:55.219 for uh NORAD and north com because both 01:02:55.229 --> 01:02:56.870 commands have a role with uh 01:02:56.939 --> 01:02:59.629 hypersonics . Uh I'm comfortable with 01:02:59.639 --> 01:03:01.709 the trajectory that we're on to , to 01:03:01.719 --> 01:03:04.052 build systems that can detect and track . 01:03:04.052 --> 01:03:06.229 We have some capability today . Uh But 01:03:06.239 --> 01:03:08.239 as the threat advances , we need to 01:03:08.239 --> 01:03:10.406 advance . And so staying on track with 01:03:10.406 --> 01:03:12.479 our over the horizon radar and some 01:03:12.489 --> 01:03:14.656 space based systems which will give us 01:03:14.656 --> 01:03:16.378 uh hypersonic detect and track 01:03:16.378 --> 01:03:18.939 capability is essential uh here in the 01:03:18.949 --> 01:03:21.005 coming years . So what about uh next 01:03:21.350 --> 01:03:23.760 generation technology with respect to 01:03:23.770 --> 01:03:25.937 hypersonics ? Do you feel like we have 01:03:25.937 --> 01:03:28.209 enough um resources around that ? 01:03:28.219 --> 01:03:30.386 Because I really don't think we do . I 01:03:30.386 --> 01:03:32.669 understand that we don't have to out um 01:03:32.679 --> 01:03:35.189 spin them , but we do have to be 01:03:35.199 --> 01:03:38.199 protective and , and , and , and , and 01:03:38.209 --> 01:03:41.040 show foresight . And so talk to me a 01:03:41.050 --> 01:03:43.272 little bit about that . Congresswoman . 01:03:43.272 --> 01:03:45.600 I agree , we need to uh double the 01:03:45.610 --> 01:03:47.777 efforts in like , like I said , we can 01:03:47.777 --> 01:03:49.943 detect what we have today , but that's 01:03:49.943 --> 01:03:51.999 not where our adversaries will be in 01:03:51.999 --> 01:03:54.110 just a couple of short years . Uh And 01:03:54.110 --> 01:03:55.832 that's on the defensive part , 01:03:55.832 --> 01:03:58.919 obviously uh not directly my realm , 01:03:58.929 --> 01:04:01.719 but then to , to deter keeping pace on 01:04:01.729 --> 01:04:03.896 the offensive side is , is important . 01:04:04.030 --> 01:04:06.030 And I know that my fellow combatant 01:04:06.030 --> 01:04:08.252 commanders are looking at as well . And 01:04:08.252 --> 01:04:10.030 I've also had some uh very good 01:04:10.030 --> 01:04:12.086 discussions with the missile defense 01:04:12.086 --> 01:04:14.086 agency MD A about uh some of the uh 01:04:14.086 --> 01:04:16.308 systems that they're developing um both 01:04:16.308 --> 01:04:18.197 in the future as well as adapting 01:04:18.197 --> 01:04:20.197 current systems today to be able to 01:04:20.197 --> 01:04:22.197 defeat hypersonics . I just want to 01:04:22.197 --> 01:04:24.363 make , you know , that there are those 01:04:24.363 --> 01:04:26.419 of us who are really quite concerned 01:04:26.419 --> 01:04:28.419 about that and would um welcome the 01:04:28.419 --> 01:04:30.586 opportunity to talk further about it , 01:04:30.586 --> 01:04:32.752 Miss uh Zimmerman and your testimony , 01:04:32.752 --> 01:04:34.752 you discussed the impact uh climate 01:04:34.752 --> 01:04:36.919 change has on our military readiness . 01:04:36.919 --> 01:04:39.419 Uh You highlight the Water Security 01:04:39.429 --> 01:04:41.429 Center at the University of Alabama 01:04:41.429 --> 01:04:44.139 which utilizes dod funding to provide 01:04:44.149 --> 01:04:46.290 education , training and research 01:04:46.379 --> 01:04:49.020 related uh water , food energy and 01:04:49.030 --> 01:04:51.899 natural disasters . Can you discuss how 01:04:52.120 --> 01:04:54.780 the um global Water Center uh 01:04:54.790 --> 01:04:57.969 assessments help combatant commands uh 01:04:58.000 --> 01:05:00.169 strategic planning and contribute to 01:05:00.179 --> 01:05:03.189 our national security ? Thank you very 01:05:03.199 --> 01:05:05.366 much . I , I think in terms of some of 01:05:05.366 --> 01:05:07.421 those specifics , uh I'd like to get 01:05:07.421 --> 01:05:09.755 back to you in a little bit more detail , 01:05:09.755 --> 01:05:11.921 but I will say that our ability to get 01:05:11.921 --> 01:05:14.143 on the same page as a department and as 01:05:14.143 --> 01:05:16.088 a government in our analysis , our 01:05:16.088 --> 01:05:18.310 understanding of the problem is what is 01:05:18.310 --> 01:05:20.477 right now allowing us to begin to take 01:05:20.477 --> 01:05:22.255 action with the goal uh for the 01:05:22.255 --> 01:05:24.088 department of really ensuring uh 01:05:24.088 --> 01:05:26.310 seamless operations when we need them , 01:05:26.310 --> 01:05:28.366 where we need them regardless of the 01:05:28.366 --> 01:05:30.421 impact of climate change and extreme 01:05:30.421 --> 01:05:32.889 weather . Um General Richardson , we 01:05:32.899 --> 01:05:35.090 continue to see our adversaries target 01:05:35.100 --> 01:05:37.850 our partners in South America from 01:05:37.860 --> 01:05:40.149 China's Belt and Road initiative to 01:05:40.159 --> 01:05:42.530 Russia's disinformation with China 01:05:42.540 --> 01:05:45.479 emerging as South America's top trading 01:05:45.489 --> 01:05:48.649 partner . How can we use our trade uh 01:05:48.659 --> 01:05:50.820 initiatives like the America's uh 01:05:50.830 --> 01:05:53.850 partnership for economic prosperity to 01:05:53.860 --> 01:05:57.729 deter China ? Uh I would say that the 01:05:57.739 --> 01:06:01.020 uh we have to be um what we said that 01:06:01.030 --> 01:06:03.086 we're gonna do , we've got to follow 01:06:03.086 --> 01:06:05.197 through with that and do what we said 01:06:05.197 --> 01:06:07.419 we're gonna do . And , uh , and I think 01:06:07.419 --> 01:06:09.530 that that is a huge investment in the 01:06:09.530 --> 01:06:11.929 region . 11 presidents from this region , 01:06:11.939 --> 01:06:13.790 out of the 31 that came here to 01:06:13.800 --> 01:06:16.550 Washington DC . That shows you , uh , I 01:06:16.560 --> 01:06:18.560 mean , that's , uh , uh , I look at 01:06:18.560 --> 01:06:20.504 that as just a foot in the door to 01:06:20.504 --> 01:06:22.504 expand that . I mean , what a great 01:06:22.510 --> 01:06:25.360 first effort and I'm so excited about 01:06:25.370 --> 01:06:27.469 this program , the attention , the 01:06:27.479 --> 01:06:30.330 investment , uh it's huge for , for 01:06:30.340 --> 01:06:32.639 team Jose and team democracy . And so 01:06:32.649 --> 01:06:34.750 if we can just make that even bigger 01:06:34.760 --> 01:06:36.927 and better , uh that's what we need to 01:06:36.927 --> 01:06:38.093 do . Thank you a man 01:06:41.070 --> 01:06:43.292 general . It's time to expire chair . I 01:06:43.292 --> 01:06:45.181 recognize General from Texas . Mr 01:06:45.181 --> 01:06:47.348 Larell . Thank you , Mr Chairman . I'd 01:06:47.348 --> 01:06:49.292 like to thank everybody for coming 01:06:49.292 --> 01:06:48.879 today and thank everybody for your 01:06:48.889 --> 01:06:51.530 service , everyone in , in uniform and 01:06:51.540 --> 01:06:53.762 our veterans . Thank you . Absolutely . 01:06:53.762 --> 01:06:55.873 Thank you for what you do to keep our 01:06:55.873 --> 01:06:57.929 family safe . Uh Mr Guillo , this is 01:06:57.929 --> 01:07:00.096 your first time in front of Congress . 01:07:00.096 --> 01:07:02.151 I think you missed an absolute great 01:07:02.151 --> 01:07:04.151 opportunity , Miss Richardson , you 01:07:04.151 --> 01:07:03.750 failed on that one too . If the 01:07:03.760 --> 01:07:05.959 chairman of Hak says , I think your 01:07:05.969 --> 01:07:07.747 budget should be doubled . Your 01:07:07.747 --> 01:07:09.913 immediate response is you will have it 01:07:09.913 --> 01:07:13.870 by the end of the day tracking . Ok , 01:07:13.879 --> 01:07:15.870 good . Let's let's move on . Uh my 01:07:15.879 --> 01:07:17.935 colleague from Alabama hit it on the 01:07:17.935 --> 01:07:19.823 head with hypersonics . It's very 01:07:19.823 --> 01:07:19.570 forward leaning and that's , I think 01:07:19.580 --> 01:07:23.250 that's a very , um , high , high risk 01:07:23.260 --> 01:07:25.482 profile that we need to be addressing . 01:07:25.482 --> 01:07:27.649 But my other , my concern besides that 01:07:27.649 --> 01:07:29.871 is , is cyber . So I was , I was hoping 01:07:29.871 --> 01:07:32.093 General Richardson and General Guillo , 01:07:32.093 --> 01:07:34.427 can you , can , you , can you give me a , 01:07:34.427 --> 01:07:33.830 a kind of a high level briefing on 01:07:33.840 --> 01:07:36.007 where we stand with cyber risk , cyber 01:07:36.007 --> 01:07:38.280 threat in both of your , uh A ors and 01:07:38.290 --> 01:07:40.179 the advances in A I that we're in 01:07:40.179 --> 01:07:42.179 placing and how we function and the 01:07:42.179 --> 01:07:44.401 functionality with our partners because 01:07:44.401 --> 01:07:47.280 their footprint is far inferior to ours . 01:07:48.270 --> 01:07:51.469 It is and the uh 14 major attacks on 01:07:51.479 --> 01:07:53.479 government networks in 10 countries 01:07:53.479 --> 01:07:55.646 over this past year , we can't respond 01:07:55.646 --> 01:07:57.812 fast enough and help our partners with 01:07:57.812 --> 01:08:00.479 training . Uh The uh additional funding 01:08:00.489 --> 01:08:02.489 I received last year helps with the 01:08:02.489 --> 01:08:04.600 Security co-operation initiative . Uh 01:08:04.600 --> 01:08:07.560 SSC I for Cyber , but our uh our 01:08:07.570 --> 01:08:10.030 authorities in institutional capacity 01:08:10.040 --> 01:08:11.818 building , triple three are not 01:08:11.818 --> 01:08:14.040 responsive enough . So I would say what 01:08:14.040 --> 01:08:16.410 help does uh do do the co coms need 01:08:16.419 --> 01:08:18.475 help with ? Is that flexible funding 01:08:18.475 --> 01:08:20.752 with triple three to help our partners ? 01:08:20.870 --> 01:08:22.926 So when these opportunities , they , 01:08:22.926 --> 01:08:24.926 they're crises , but there are also 01:08:24.926 --> 01:08:26.981 opportunities to help our partners . 01:08:26.981 --> 01:08:29.148 And so they , that's what they rely on 01:08:29.148 --> 01:08:31.470 us for being fast and being quick to uh 01:08:31.479 --> 01:08:34.399 help them . And so II , I would say 01:08:34.410 --> 01:08:36.521 that that would be what we would need 01:08:36.521 --> 01:08:38.759 help with in the process of line eyeing 01:08:39.100 --> 01:08:41.044 those exact thing . I mean , we're 01:08:41.044 --> 01:08:43.156 gonna need present that to us . So we 01:08:43.156 --> 01:08:45.378 know details and in our security cooper 01:08:45.378 --> 01:08:47.433 initiatives for cyber , we're laying 01:08:47.433 --> 01:08:49.600 that out and I I have what's called AJ 01:08:49.600 --> 01:08:51.600 CAT , a joint cyber assessment team 01:08:51.600 --> 01:08:53.544 from South com . It's like a quick 01:08:53.544 --> 01:08:55.711 reaction force us to help our partners 01:08:55.711 --> 01:08:57.878 and then do the institutional capacity 01:08:57.878 --> 01:09:00.211 building of training with them on Cyber . 01:09:00.211 --> 01:09:02.378 But we need to , we need to do more on 01:09:02.378 --> 01:09:04.267 cyber because they , the level of 01:09:04.267 --> 01:09:06.923 technology um is uh and how quick 01:09:06.934 --> 01:09:09.824 technology is uh is happening , they 01:09:09.833 --> 01:09:12.000 cannot keep up with it . And so that's 01:09:12.000 --> 01:09:14.000 why they , they need our assistance 01:09:14.000 --> 01:09:15.944 with that . Well , we're more than 01:09:15.944 --> 01:09:17.833 willing to assist you with that , 01:09:17.833 --> 01:09:20.055 especially giving the advancements in , 01:09:20.055 --> 01:09:22.166 in , in cyber risk and cyber threat . 01:09:22.166 --> 01:09:21.773 Thank you , Congressman . Yes , ma'am , 01:09:21.813 --> 01:09:24.423 General Congressman first . Uh thanks 01:09:24.434 --> 01:09:26.601 message received on the funding side . 01:09:26.601 --> 01:09:30.179 Uh uh As far as cyberspace , just with 01:09:30.188 --> 01:09:32.355 all the threats that we face uh in the 01:09:32.355 --> 01:09:34.410 homeland , in all domains , the most 01:09:34.410 --> 01:09:36.521 persistent and present threat that we 01:09:36.521 --> 01:09:38.577 face is the cyber threat . Uh We see 01:09:38.577 --> 01:09:40.958 attacks every day on our attempts to 01:09:40.969 --> 01:09:43.979 attack our networks every day . On both 01:09:43.988 --> 01:09:46.179 the uh we have four networks in 01:09:46.188 --> 01:09:48.299 Northern Command that we use to , you 01:09:48.309 --> 01:09:50.253 know , conduct our mission that we 01:09:50.253 --> 01:09:52.309 protect and then also across the dod 01:09:52.309 --> 01:09:55.148 network that we uh work in uh primarily 01:09:55.159 --> 01:09:57.270 with Cyber command to make sure we're 01:09:57.270 --> 01:09:59.381 defending as well as with CIA and the 01:09:59.381 --> 01:10:00.937 FBI on the defense critical 01:10:00.937 --> 01:10:03.318 infrastructure . Uh So , uh I share 01:10:03.329 --> 01:10:05.218 your concern on that . Uh That is 01:10:05.218 --> 01:10:08.619 certainly the most persistent and uh um 01:10:09.029 --> 01:10:11.196 challenging threat that , that we face 01:10:11.196 --> 01:10:13.689 uh have confidence in our de tech , but 01:10:13.970 --> 01:10:16.026 you don't know what you don't know . 01:10:16.026 --> 01:10:18.192 And then , so uh continued emphasis on 01:10:18.192 --> 01:10:20.359 this is something that you'll see from 01:10:20.359 --> 01:10:23.620 Nora and North com , this is a language 01:10:24.529 --> 01:10:27.390 not very many people speak and it seems 01:10:27.399 --> 01:10:31.069 as if one as these attacks happen daily 01:10:31.080 --> 01:10:33.080 every half second , they are are so 01:10:33.080 --> 01:10:35.339 repetitive . I I don't want it to be 01:10:35.350 --> 01:10:38.259 siloed in a way that the the Armageddon 01:10:38.270 --> 01:10:40.548 happens . And like , well , we've been , 01:10:40.548 --> 01:10:42.714 this has been happening for years . We 01:10:42.714 --> 01:10:42.680 just , we didn't know how to , to 01:10:42.689 --> 01:10:44.800 number one address that up and out of 01:10:44.800 --> 01:10:48.740 the organization or combat it . So I'm 01:10:48.750 --> 01:10:50.972 asking you to share with us as best you 01:10:50.972 --> 01:10:54.549 can , where we stand , where we need to 01:10:54.560 --> 01:10:56.782 move , how we need to flex left , right 01:10:56.782 --> 01:10:58.616 of center in order to not become 01:10:58.616 --> 01:11:02.009 victims in this space . Uh uh Mr 01:11:02.020 --> 01:11:04.850 Chairman , I , you bet Jimmy Hill is 01:11:04.859 --> 01:11:06.915 back chair and I recognize gentleman 01:11:06.915 --> 01:11:09.081 from North Carolina , Mr Davis . Thank 01:11:09.081 --> 01:11:10.970 you so much , Mr Chair and to our 01:11:10.970 --> 01:11:14.660 witnesses today , I've actually taken 01:11:14.720 --> 01:11:17.750 my second trip while um serving in the 01:11:17.759 --> 01:11:20.350 118 Congress to the southern border . I 01:11:20.359 --> 01:11:22.990 visited most recently the Del Rio 01:11:23.000 --> 01:11:24.990 sector um to witness the evolving 01:11:25.000 --> 01:11:27.589 crisis firsthand . Um While there . Uh 01:11:27.600 --> 01:11:29.950 We had the opportunity to meet with 01:11:29.959 --> 01:11:32.292 those who are working on the front line . 01:11:32.319 --> 01:11:35.399 Um So we definitely appreciate the 01:11:35.410 --> 01:11:37.521 service and all the work that's taken 01:11:37.521 --> 01:11:39.830 place that going into it so far , Miss 01:11:39.839 --> 01:11:43.040 Zimmerman . While on Eagle Pass , we 01:11:43.049 --> 01:11:45.160 learned there have been more than 100 01:11:45.160 --> 01:11:47.240 and 20,000 known gota ways . Um , so 01:11:47.250 --> 01:11:50.299 far , fiscal year 2024 . Um How do you 01:11:50.310 --> 01:11:52.620 compare the threat posed by these 01:11:52.629 --> 01:11:55.399 individuals , some of whom are , um , 01:11:55.410 --> 01:11:57.959 on the terror watch list ? Um , with 01:11:57.970 --> 01:11:59.803 those who are actually unknown , 01:12:02.490 --> 01:12:04.370 I couldn't understand your last 01:12:04.379 --> 01:12:06.435 question . Yeah , I said , how do we 01:12:06.435 --> 01:12:09.100 compare those to those who are unknown 01:12:09.629 --> 01:12:12.899 to those who are unknown ? Yes . Uh 01:12:12.910 --> 01:12:15.580 Well , Congressman , I think , uh you 01:12:15.589 --> 01:12:17.756 know , the , the work that we're doing 01:12:17.756 --> 01:12:19.756 not just in Eagle Pass but in other 01:12:19.756 --> 01:12:21.922 places in support of uh the Department 01:12:21.922 --> 01:12:23.756 of Homeland Security and our CBP 01:12:23.756 --> 01:12:25.899 colleagues is uh intended to minimize 01:12:25.910 --> 01:12:29.069 that number of known God ways . Um We 01:12:29.080 --> 01:12:31.410 do a lot of detection and monitoring in 01:12:31.419 --> 01:12:34.459 support of CBP , um which helps to 01:12:34.470 --> 01:12:36.890 ensure that CB He can respond uh where 01:12:36.899 --> 01:12:39.609 they need to when they need to in terms 01:12:39.620 --> 01:12:42.959 of uh those who might be uh affiliated 01:12:42.970 --> 01:12:45.470 with terrorist criminal organizations , 01:12:45.479 --> 01:12:47.990 et cetera . Uh I think it's a , a small 01:12:48.000 --> 01:12:51.040 number relative to the , the other God 01:12:51.049 --> 01:12:54.629 ways . Um But of course , uh as , as 01:12:54.640 --> 01:12:56.751 General Guillo said , with respect to 01:12:56.751 --> 01:12:58.973 Cyber , we can't know what we , what we 01:12:58.973 --> 01:13:02.560 don't know . Is it safe to say 01:13:03.000 --> 01:13:06.970 if we know that what we don't 01:13:06.979 --> 01:13:09.430 know that there are some unknowns ? I 01:13:09.439 --> 01:13:11.950 mean , is it only an , an assumption 01:13:12.310 --> 01:13:14.532 that there are likely some who may have 01:13:14.532 --> 01:13:16.699 been on a terror watch that could have 01:13:16.699 --> 01:13:19.290 been unknown or identified as unknown ? 01:13:20.669 --> 01:13:23.339 Uh Congressman ? I think this is really 01:13:23.350 --> 01:13:25.183 a question for the Department of 01:13:25.183 --> 01:13:27.239 Homeland Security , uh which , which 01:13:27.239 --> 01:13:29.406 leads those efforts . Ok . Thank you . 01:13:29.406 --> 01:13:31.890 Um Moving on then , uh M Zimmerman and 01:13:31.899 --> 01:13:34.810 General Guillo , um when we talked then 01:13:34.819 --> 01:13:37.310 in terms of uh transnational criminal 01:13:37.319 --> 01:13:39.729 organizations uh like uh the drug 01:13:39.740 --> 01:13:43.209 cartels , um my question is how can we 01:13:43.220 --> 01:13:46.390 better predict than the next 01:13:46.399 --> 01:13:50.370 epicenter of the crisis um based 01:13:50.379 --> 01:13:53.020 on resources that may be at our hands . 01:13:55.629 --> 01:13:57.879 Congressman uh with regard to uh 01:13:57.890 --> 01:14:00.740 countering the TC OS uh NORAD has some 01:14:00.750 --> 01:14:02.779 very uh specific guidance from the 01:14:02.790 --> 01:14:05.012 department on how we can assist and the 01:14:05.012 --> 01:14:06.901 way we present that is through uh 01:14:06.901 --> 01:14:09.060 partnering with various lead federal 01:14:09.069 --> 01:14:11.660 agencies in the area of intel support 01:14:11.669 --> 01:14:14.970 more particularly uh by targeting uh 01:14:14.979 --> 01:14:16.979 the , the network using some of the 01:14:16.979 --> 01:14:19.201 techniques that uh special operations , 01:14:19.201 --> 01:14:21.312 command and central command have used 01:14:21.312 --> 01:14:23.479 effectively overseas uh with terrorist 01:14:23.479 --> 01:14:25.368 networks using some of those same 01:14:25.368 --> 01:14:27.350 techniques uh to , to help uh 01:14:27.359 --> 01:14:29.790 illuminate on the , on the cartels . 01:14:29.799 --> 01:14:32.560 And so uh through our uh JTF North , 01:14:32.569 --> 01:14:34.791 that's where we present that capability 01:14:34.791 --> 01:14:38.169 to the interagency . Yeah , it , 01:14:38.270 --> 01:14:40.492 it's hard to add to that . I think that 01:14:40.492 --> 01:14:42.603 was a very comprehensive answer . But 01:14:42.603 --> 01:14:44.437 uh broadly speaking , we work in 01:14:44.437 --> 01:14:46.603 conjunction with other departments and 01:14:46.603 --> 01:14:48.548 agencies making sure that um we're 01:14:48.548 --> 01:14:50.603 breaking down those silos . Uh I , I 01:14:50.603 --> 01:14:52.770 was also on the border just uh I think 01:14:52.770 --> 01:14:55.419 the week before last , uh speaking with 01:14:55.430 --> 01:14:58.169 um our , our colleagues from JTF North 01:14:58.180 --> 01:15:00.069 and hearing from them uh that our 01:15:00.069 --> 01:15:02.660 cooper operation with CBP and , and by 01:15:02.669 --> 01:15:04.891 extension , the border patrol , I think 01:15:04.891 --> 01:15:07.629 is , is uh more thorough and deeper 01:15:07.640 --> 01:15:09.751 than it has been in , in many years . 01:15:09.751 --> 01:15:12.970 Ok . And um general um go your men and 01:15:12.979 --> 01:15:16.240 women who've augmented um in terms of 01:15:16.250 --> 01:15:18.472 the Department of Homeland Security for 01:15:18.472 --> 01:15:20.890 I believe 18 years now . Um It's my 01:15:20.899 --> 01:15:23.129 understanding that uh this was never 01:15:23.140 --> 01:15:25.810 intended to be an enduring mission as 01:15:25.819 --> 01:15:28.209 it's become . Um can you describe the 01:15:28.220 --> 01:15:31.490 impact that it has on those who 01:15:31.500 --> 01:15:34.310 continue to serve congressman uh uh 01:15:34.319 --> 01:15:36.790 while it hasn't uh been attended to be 01:15:36.799 --> 01:15:38.910 in a during mission ? Uh We recognize 01:15:38.910 --> 01:15:41.077 that uh our partners need help and the 01:15:41.077 --> 01:15:43.299 department has tasked North com to , to 01:15:43.299 --> 01:15:45.132 do that . The readiness that you 01:15:45.132 --> 01:15:47.355 alluded to is a , is a very big concern 01:15:47.355 --> 01:15:50.410 of mine . We operate in three primary 01:15:50.419 --> 01:15:52.586 areas , you know , in the aviation . I 01:15:52.586 --> 01:15:54.308 think that we can maintain our 01:15:54.308 --> 01:15:56.141 readiness for other worldwide uh 01:15:56.141 --> 01:15:57.975 missions uh in the course of the 01:15:57.975 --> 01:15:59.919 support missions . But some of the 01:15:59.919 --> 01:16:02.086 other ones , the logistical support uh 01:16:02.086 --> 01:16:03.959 and the detection and monitoring 01:16:04.009 --> 01:16:06.065 require us to take them off the line 01:16:06.065 --> 01:16:08.231 and conduct other training so they can 01:16:08.231 --> 01:16:10.342 uh keep the worldwide readiness while 01:16:10.342 --> 01:16:12.565 they're conducting the Southwest border 01:16:12.565 --> 01:16:14.676 mission . And that's something that I 01:16:14.676 --> 01:16:16.620 and JTF North track very closely . 01:16:16.620 --> 01:16:16.240 Thank you . You're back , Mr , chair 01:16:17.770 --> 01:16:19.659 thing , gentlemen , chair . And I 01:16:19.659 --> 01:16:21.770 recognize as a general from Alabama , 01:16:21.770 --> 01:16:23.992 Mr Strong . Thank you , Mr Chairman . I 01:16:23.992 --> 01:16:26.270 thank each of you for being here today . 01:16:26.270 --> 01:16:28.799 Um General uh go the next generation 01:16:28.810 --> 01:16:30.921 interceptor will play a critical role 01:16:30.930 --> 01:16:33.779 in us Northern Command um mission and 01:16:33.790 --> 01:16:35.901 homeland defense . Your predecessor , 01:16:35.901 --> 01:16:38.068 General Van Herk told the Senate Armed 01:16:38.068 --> 01:16:41.029 Services Committee on March 20 of 2022 01:16:41.089 --> 01:16:43.256 that the United States needs to deploy 01:16:43.256 --> 01:16:46.229 the next generation interceptor NG I by 01:16:46.240 --> 01:16:48.939 2028 or sooner to keep pace with our 01:16:48.950 --> 01:16:51.061 adversaries . What is your assessment 01:16:51.061 --> 01:16:53.339 of the current NG I schedule ? Given 01:16:53.350 --> 01:16:55.459 the evolving uh threat picture ? 01:16:56.810 --> 01:16:58.977 Congressman , I agree with General Van 01:16:58.977 --> 01:17:01.032 Hk's assessment . Uh It's one of the 01:17:01.032 --> 01:17:03.088 first things I looked at upon taking 01:17:03.088 --> 01:17:06.100 command . Uh I still uh feel that 2028 01:17:06.109 --> 01:17:09.319 is the uh the , the , the point where 01:17:09.330 --> 01:17:11.441 if we have not fielded this system by 01:17:11.441 --> 01:17:13.497 then that we run the risk of falling 01:17:13.497 --> 01:17:15.552 behind the advances of competitors , 01:17:15.552 --> 01:17:17.663 most , most notably North Korea . But 01:17:17.663 --> 01:17:19.939 at this time , I feel that uh we have 01:17:19.950 --> 01:17:22.117 the capability to defeat that threat , 01:17:22.117 --> 01:17:24.228 but we must stay on time with NG I in 01:17:24.228 --> 01:17:26.228 order to preserve that capability . 01:17:26.228 --> 01:17:28.339 Thank you just to confirm , you agree 01:17:28.339 --> 01:17:30.228 that fielding the NG I as soon as 01:17:30.228 --> 01:17:32.394 possible uh is critical for defense of 01:17:32.394 --> 01:17:34.617 the Homeland Congressman . I absolutely 01:17:34.617 --> 01:17:36.839 agree with that . Thank you . If you uh 01:17:36.839 --> 01:17:39.061 if NG I uh the NG I program failed like 01:17:39.061 --> 01:17:41.283 its predecessor , uh what uh would that 01:17:41.283 --> 01:17:43.680 mean for the homeland defense uh system , 01:17:43.689 --> 01:17:46.640 missile defense system ? Congressman ? 01:17:46.649 --> 01:17:48.593 I'll , I'll go into details in the 01:17:48.593 --> 01:17:50.816 closed session , but it would mean that 01:17:50.816 --> 01:17:52.982 we are not keeping pace with the rogue 01:17:52.982 --> 01:17:55.093 nations in particular , North Korea . 01:17:55.093 --> 01:17:57.205 That would be a very bad thing . Be a 01:17:57.205 --> 01:17:59.371 very bad thing as we have seen . Um uh 01:17:59.371 --> 01:18:01.939 others now canceled uh portions of the 01:18:01.950 --> 01:18:04.228 ground based mid course defense system . 01:18:04.228 --> 01:18:06.172 Maintaining competition as long as 01:18:06.172 --> 01:18:08.479 possible is critical . The acquisition 01:18:08.490 --> 01:18:11.240 uh strategy for NG I is the gold 01:18:11.250 --> 01:18:13.859 standard and uh the plan has always 01:18:13.870 --> 01:18:15.814 been to carry two teams through at 01:18:15.814 --> 01:18:18.479 least critical design review . Uh This 01:18:18.490 --> 01:18:20.379 is why I'm extremely concerned by 01:18:20.379 --> 01:18:22.323 reports that the department is now 01:18:22.323 --> 01:18:24.546 officially planning to conduct an early 01:18:24.546 --> 01:18:27.709 down select for Nging I is the future 01:18:27.720 --> 01:18:29.664 of homeland missile defense and we 01:18:29.664 --> 01:18:31.720 don't have another capability in the 01:18:31.720 --> 01:18:33.890 pipeline if these programs fail . Are 01:18:33.899 --> 01:18:36.010 you concerned with the amount of risk 01:18:36.010 --> 01:18:38.629 that hasty uh cost cut measures would 01:18:38.640 --> 01:18:42.640 add Congressman . I'm , I'm 01:18:42.649 --> 01:18:44.871 concerned with anything that would give 01:18:44.871 --> 01:18:47.205 us a less than capable . Uh NG I system , 01:18:47.205 --> 01:18:49.316 I'll defer to the department and MD A 01:18:49.316 --> 01:18:51.482 on the specifics of the uh contracting 01:18:51.482 --> 01:18:53.816 measure , but I do have uh frequent and , 01:18:53.816 --> 01:18:55.927 and thorough discussions with MD A to 01:18:55.927 --> 01:18:57.482 ensure that the operational 01:18:57.482 --> 01:18:59.593 requirements that were established by 01:18:59.593 --> 01:19:01.816 North com are being met . Thank you . I 01:19:01.816 --> 01:19:03.982 understand that you're not going to go 01:19:03.982 --> 01:19:03.509 against your boss . But would you say 01:19:03.520 --> 01:19:05.242 that the next generation in uh 01:19:05.242 --> 01:19:07.790 interceptor is a no fail mission ? 01:19:09.000 --> 01:19:11.129 Congressman ? I believe NG I is a no 01:19:11.140 --> 01:19:13.649 fail mission . Then why would we put 01:19:13.660 --> 01:19:15.882 all our eggs in one basket earlier than 01:19:15.882 --> 01:19:19.569 planned Congressman to the 01:19:19.580 --> 01:19:21.636 specifics of the of the contract and 01:19:21.636 --> 01:19:23.802 the procurement . I I have to defer to 01:19:23.802 --> 01:19:25.802 the MD A experts . Again , I'm very 01:19:25.802 --> 01:19:27.969 concerned by the proposed major change 01:19:27.969 --> 01:19:30.191 to policy for NG I . And I look forward 01:19:30.191 --> 01:19:32.358 to continuing discussions with the dod 01:19:32.358 --> 01:19:34.620 on how it intends to mitigate the 01:19:34.629 --> 01:19:37.629 extreme risk of an early down select Mr 01:19:37.640 --> 01:19:40.490 Chairman . I yield back . Thank the 01:19:40.500 --> 01:19:42.389 gentleman . You now recognize the 01:19:42.389 --> 01:19:44.222 gentleman from Pennsylvania , Mr 01:19:44.222 --> 01:19:46.222 Deluzio . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 01:19:46.222 --> 01:19:48.278 Good morning , everybody . Thank you 01:19:48.278 --> 01:19:48.089 for being here . Uh You've highlighted 01:19:48.100 --> 01:19:50.322 examples today in your testimony and in 01:19:50.322 --> 01:19:52.211 your written testimony of how the 01:19:52.211 --> 01:19:54.322 Chinese Communist Party is increasing 01:19:54.322 --> 01:19:56.211 infrastructure investments in the 01:19:56.211 --> 01:19:57.933 Western hemisphere . Certainly 01:19:57.933 --> 01:19:59.933 concerning uh what also concerns me 01:19:59.933 --> 01:20:01.822 though is their access to our own 01:20:01.822 --> 01:20:03.933 infrastructure here in this country . 01:20:03.933 --> 01:20:06.044 Uh Our maritime ports , for example , 01:20:06.044 --> 01:20:06.000 the Wall Street Journal highlighted 01:20:06.009 --> 01:20:08.990 just last week , nearly 80% of our ship 01:20:09.000 --> 01:20:11.167 to shore cranes are Chinese built many 01:20:11.167 --> 01:20:12.833 containing unexplained covert 01:20:12.833 --> 01:20:14.939 communications capabilities and 01:20:14.950 --> 01:20:17.172 equipment . I think the vulnerabilities 01:20:17.172 --> 01:20:19.339 there are are obvious . I was happy to 01:20:19.339 --> 01:20:22.080 see uh last year's NDA A section 7405 01:20:22.089 --> 01:20:24.089 require an assessment of the threat 01:20:24.089 --> 01:20:26.145 posed by these cranes . I support hr 01:20:26.145 --> 01:20:28.680 3169 Mr Jimenez and Garamendi and 01:20:28.689 --> 01:20:30.633 others as well . Uh The Port Crane 01:20:30.633 --> 01:20:33.049 Security Inspection Act . So general 01:20:33.060 --> 01:20:35.450 gull start with you , given that much 01:20:35.459 --> 01:20:37.681 of our port infrastructure is privately 01:20:37.681 --> 01:20:39.848 owned and we see these vulnerabilities 01:20:39.848 --> 01:20:41.848 in public reporting . What is North 01:20:41.848 --> 01:20:44.015 Com's responsibility here and where is 01:20:44.015 --> 01:20:46.015 private or corporate responsibility 01:20:46.015 --> 01:20:48.181 lies as well ? Congressman , primarily 01:20:48.181 --> 01:20:50.759 the uh defense of the , the ports is a 01:20:50.770 --> 01:20:53.120 uh is , is a private matter . Uh 01:20:53.129 --> 01:20:56.259 However , uh in uh in particular , in 01:20:56.270 --> 01:20:58.750 the cyber realm , North com has a , a 01:20:58.759 --> 01:21:01.000 very vested interest in , in it because 01:21:01.009 --> 01:21:02.676 of our uh defense of critical 01:21:02.676 --> 01:21:04.676 infrastructure role in particular . 01:21:04.676 --> 01:21:07.569 This is where uh we on on behalf of uh 01:21:07.580 --> 01:21:09.959 requested support from the private 01:21:09.970 --> 01:21:13.240 companies . Uh If , if they request 01:21:13.250 --> 01:21:15.361 help in the Cyber in Cooper operation 01:21:15.361 --> 01:21:18.169 with CIA and uh Cyber command , any uh 01:21:18.180 --> 01:21:20.180 support given to them uh with Cyber 01:21:20.180 --> 01:21:22.040 defense from Dod would be uh 01:21:22.049 --> 01:21:23.993 synchronized and presented through 01:21:23.993 --> 01:21:26.160 North Com . Do our adversaries care if 01:21:26.160 --> 01:21:27.993 our infrastructure is owned by a 01:21:27.993 --> 01:21:30.216 private or a public entity ? Well , I , 01:21:30.216 --> 01:21:32.271 I don't believe so . I think they uh 01:21:32.271 --> 01:21:34.438 congressman , I think they worry about 01:21:34.438 --> 01:21:36.605 their own interest and , and , and not 01:21:36.605 --> 01:21:39.520 ours uh related to that and my district 01:21:39.529 --> 01:21:41.870 and , and many others saw nation state 01:21:41.879 --> 01:21:44.212 actors attacked critical infrastructure , 01:21:44.212 --> 01:21:46.268 the Al AA Water Authority in Western 01:21:46.268 --> 01:21:48.435 Pennsylvania , my district experienced 01:21:48.435 --> 01:21:50.601 an attack . I'm not alone in that . Uh 01:21:50.601 --> 01:21:52.823 How do you see those vulnerabilities to 01:21:52.823 --> 01:21:52.810 our critical infrastructure ? Not just 01:21:52.819 --> 01:21:54.708 threatening our way of life , our 01:21:54.708 --> 01:21:56.763 prosperity , but undermining defense 01:21:57.640 --> 01:21:59.362 congressman . The way I see it 01:21:59.362 --> 01:22:01.140 undermining defense is it could 01:22:01.140 --> 01:22:03.196 potentially uh you mentioned water , 01:22:03.196 --> 01:22:05.418 the ports , electricity , any number of 01:22:05.418 --> 01:22:07.759 rail , any number of those systems that 01:22:07.770 --> 01:22:09.979 aren't considered to be military or , 01:22:09.990 --> 01:22:12.209 or the uh defense Department actually 01:22:12.220 --> 01:22:14.331 are very important to us . As we look 01:22:14.331 --> 01:22:16.442 to project forces overseas . We would 01:22:16.442 --> 01:22:18.553 use all those capabilities to support 01:22:18.553 --> 01:22:20.664 combatant commands around the world . 01:22:20.664 --> 01:22:22.887 So that's why in my homeland defense uh 01:22:22.887 --> 01:22:24.887 responsibilities , I take a special 01:22:24.887 --> 01:22:26.776 interest in that . Thank you , MS 01:22:26.776 --> 01:22:26.689 Zimmer . I'm going to come to you . 01:22:26.700 --> 01:22:28.589 I'll just say this . I mean , you 01:22:28.589 --> 01:22:30.644 outlined the homeland defense policy 01:22:30.644 --> 01:22:32.700 guidance in your testimony . A quote 01:22:32.700 --> 01:22:34.680 here must be a quote , focus on 01:22:34.689 --> 01:22:36.300 defending defense , critical 01:22:36.300 --> 01:22:38.467 infrastructure against the tax and all 01:22:38.467 --> 01:22:40.300 domains and build resiliency and 01:22:40.300 --> 01:22:42.245 redundancy and quote and , and the 01:22:42.245 --> 01:22:44.356 general went to it . There are pieces 01:22:44.356 --> 01:22:44.009 of non defense critic , critical 01:22:44.020 --> 01:22:46.298 infrastructure that defense department , 01:22:46.298 --> 01:22:48.353 military facilities rely on . If you 01:22:48.353 --> 01:22:50.353 tell me more about that and how you 01:22:50.353 --> 01:22:52.353 worry about those vulnerabilities . 01:22:52.353 --> 01:22:54.576 Congressman . I'd be glad to um this is 01:22:54.576 --> 01:22:54.500 a major effort that the department is 01:22:54.509 --> 01:22:56.398 undertaking now in support of the 01:22:56.398 --> 01:22:58.120 resilience of defense critical 01:22:58.120 --> 01:23:00.287 infrastructure . And we recognize that 01:23:00.287 --> 01:23:02.580 a large part of uh the infrastructure 01:23:02.589 --> 01:23:04.620 on which the Department of Defense 01:23:04.629 --> 01:23:07.009 relies is not defense owned . Some of 01:23:07.020 --> 01:23:09.390 it is federal infrastructure owned by 01:23:09.399 --> 01:23:11.510 federal partners and some of it is in 01:23:11.510 --> 01:23:13.677 the private sector . Um The Department 01:23:13.677 --> 01:23:15.343 of Defense is the Sector Risk 01:23:15.343 --> 01:23:17.510 Management Agency for Defense Critical 01:23:17.510 --> 01:23:19.677 Infrastructure . There are Sr Ma S for 01:23:19.677 --> 01:23:21.694 all of the varieties of critical 01:23:21.705 --> 01:23:24.375 infrastructure . We come together in uh 01:23:24.384 --> 01:23:26.440 the Federal Senior Leader Council uh 01:23:26.440 --> 01:23:29.055 which is managed by CISA to talk about 01:23:29.064 --> 01:23:31.286 cyber threats . And we talk about those 01:23:31.286 --> 01:23:33.694 in a cross forum uh where we're able to 01:23:33.705 --> 01:23:37.145 talk with those agencies about uh the 01:23:37.154 --> 01:23:39.321 infrastructure on which the Department 01:23:39.321 --> 01:23:41.569 of Defense depends . And so we're able 01:23:41.580 --> 01:23:43.747 to make decisions , we're able to make 01:23:43.747 --> 01:23:45.413 sure that the risk management 01:23:45.413 --> 01:23:47.524 constructs uh that those agencies are 01:23:47.524 --> 01:23:50.069 pursuing , accommodate the needs of the 01:23:50.080 --> 01:23:52.302 defense department . But in addition to 01:23:52.302 --> 01:23:54.358 that , we're making efforts to reach 01:23:54.358 --> 01:23:56.859 out to our federal state , local tribal 01:23:56.870 --> 01:23:58.926 and territorial and private sector , 01:23:58.926 --> 01:24:01.092 defense industrial based partners . So 01:24:01.092 --> 01:24:03.259 we've recently uh reformed some of our 01:24:03.259 --> 01:24:05.370 guidance about how we're able to talk 01:24:05.370 --> 01:24:07.669 about these issues in order to allow us 01:24:07.680 --> 01:24:10.814 to have uh classified conversations and 01:24:10.825 --> 01:24:12.881 unclassified conversations in a much 01:24:12.881 --> 01:24:15.274 more fulsome way with those partners so 01:24:15.285 --> 01:24:17.229 that they can understand where our 01:24:17.229 --> 01:24:19.875 dependencies are . We're also working 01:24:19.884 --> 01:24:22.214 uh in conjunction with uh uh CISA , 01:24:22.225 --> 01:24:25.015 some of our FEMA colleagues to support 01:24:25.024 --> 01:24:26.746 the better mapping of critical 01:24:26.746 --> 01:24:28.924 infrastructure in order to draw out 01:24:28.935 --> 01:24:30.935 what those dependencies look like . 01:24:30.935 --> 01:24:33.157 Thank you and I'll , I'll just close to 01:24:33.157 --> 01:24:35.435 the question I asked to General Guillo . 01:24:35.435 --> 01:24:37.602 Do , do you think our adversaries care 01:24:37.602 --> 01:24:37.104 if the thing they are targeting is 01:24:37.115 --> 01:24:39.884 defense , civilian private , uh , does 01:24:39.895 --> 01:24:41.728 it matter to them ? I think they 01:24:41.728 --> 01:24:43.839 absolutely do not . I think they will 01:24:43.839 --> 01:24:45.951 target the areas that are weakest and 01:24:45.951 --> 01:24:45.910 we have to be prepared . Thank you , Mr 01:24:45.959 --> 01:24:48.560 Chairman . I go back chair and I 01:24:48.569 --> 01:24:50.791 recognized gentleman from New York . Mr 01:24:50.791 --> 01:24:52.680 Liloa . Thank you chairman . Uh I 01:24:52.680 --> 01:24:54.847 represent a district in New York . And 01:24:54.847 --> 01:24:56.569 I want to start by offering my 01:24:56.569 --> 01:24:58.736 condolences to the families of two New 01:24:58.736 --> 01:25:00.958 York national Guardsmen , Chief warrant 01:25:00.958 --> 01:25:03.013 officers , Casey Frankowski , and um 01:25:03.013 --> 01:25:05.180 and John Gracia who were killed in the 01:25:05.180 --> 01:25:04.779 recent helicopter crash on our southern 01:25:04.790 --> 01:25:06.957 border . Their services and sacrifices 01:25:06.957 --> 01:25:09.290 to our great nation cannot be forgotten . 01:25:09.689 --> 01:25:11.856 Uh General uh M Zimmerman , uh We have 01:25:11.856 --> 01:25:14.022 a problem in America's southern border 01:25:14.022 --> 01:25:15.967 uh and crises at many of America's 01:25:15.967 --> 01:25:18.078 cities and states . And I want to use 01:25:18.078 --> 01:25:20.189 my time to address the impact of your 01:25:20.189 --> 01:25:22.411 areas of operation south com especially 01:25:22.411 --> 01:25:24.300 uh General Richardson um have our 01:25:24.300 --> 01:25:26.411 security at America's southern border 01:25:26.411 --> 01:25:28.633 and in states like New York . Uh just a 01:25:28.640 --> 01:25:30.751 few years ago , MS 13 with many roots 01:25:30.751 --> 01:25:32.640 in El Salvador had a massive and 01:25:32.649 --> 01:25:34.649 destructive presence on Long Island 01:25:34.649 --> 01:25:36.919 where I represent uh the motto of MS 13 01:25:36.930 --> 01:25:39.041 for folks at home who may not know is 01:25:39.041 --> 01:25:41.640 kill , rape and control . Uh And while 01:25:41.649 --> 01:25:43.870 MS 13 was largely eradicated on Long 01:25:43.879 --> 01:25:46.046 Island several years ago . Credit to a 01:25:46.046 --> 01:25:48.101 good partnership between the federal 01:25:48.101 --> 01:25:50.268 government and local law enforcement . 01:25:50.268 --> 01:25:52.435 I am concerned about the resurgence of 01:25:52.435 --> 01:25:54.546 MS 13 or a group like it . Uh And I'm 01:25:54.546 --> 01:25:56.601 concerned because there's two policy 01:25:56.601 --> 01:25:58.768 choices going on that are exacerbating 01:25:58.768 --> 01:26:00.546 the flow of migrants across the 01:26:00.546 --> 01:26:02.879 southern border and to states like mine , 01:26:02.879 --> 01:26:04.990 those policies are the administration 01:26:04.990 --> 01:26:07.046 paroling millions of noncitizen into 01:26:07.046 --> 01:26:09.157 the United States and New York City's 01:26:09.157 --> 01:26:11.268 migrant crisis , which is exacerbated 01:26:11.268 --> 01:26:13.268 by their sanctuary policies . Uh In 01:26:13.268 --> 01:26:15.435 light of these concerns , I'm eager to 01:26:15.435 --> 01:26:17.323 explore how we uh can bolster our 01:26:17.323 --> 01:26:19.379 defenses and ensure that Long Island 01:26:19.379 --> 01:26:21.546 continues to contribute effectively to 01:26:21.546 --> 01:26:23.546 our national defense architecture . 01:26:23.546 --> 01:26:25.101 General Richardson . Um the 01:26:25.101 --> 01:26:27.268 administration states they're properly 01:26:27.268 --> 01:26:29.323 vetting all the migrants who come to 01:26:29.323 --> 01:26:29.200 the United States before paroling them 01:26:29.209 --> 01:26:31.153 in the United States . Yet critics 01:26:31.153 --> 01:26:33.265 contend that the proper vetting would 01:26:33.265 --> 01:26:35.487 entail much more . It would entail full 01:26:35.487 --> 01:26:37.487 cooper operation from the migrants' 01:26:37.487 --> 01:26:39.709 home country and awareness of that home 01:26:39.709 --> 01:26:41.765 country . And what that individual's 01:26:41.765 --> 01:26:43.931 background is cooper between that host 01:26:43.931 --> 01:26:46.042 nation's law enforcement intelligence 01:26:46.042 --> 01:26:48.265 services uh general in your capacity as 01:26:48.265 --> 01:26:50.487 South com Commander . Is it safe to say 01:26:50.487 --> 01:26:52.709 that you've become familiar with the El 01:26:52.709 --> 01:26:56.040 Salvador military ? Uh Yes , I am 01:26:56.049 --> 01:26:58.327 familiar with the El Salvador military . 01:26:58.740 --> 01:27:00.518 Uh Are you familiar with the El 01:27:00.518 --> 01:27:02.470 Salvador government ? Ah , no , 01:27:02.479 --> 01:27:05.000 congressman . Uh How about some of the 01:27:05.009 --> 01:27:07.500 local police departments , congressman ? 01:27:07.529 --> 01:27:09.640 Ok . Given your expertise with the 01:27:09.649 --> 01:27:12.680 military component . Um Can you tell us 01:27:12.879 --> 01:27:15.189 um how the intelligence apparatus in 01:27:15.200 --> 01:27:17.430 countries like El Salvador compares to 01:27:17.439 --> 01:27:20.629 the United States . Uh It's 01:27:20.640 --> 01:27:23.240 definitely not as robust congressman 01:27:23.370 --> 01:27:25.592 scale of 1 to 10 . If the United States 01:27:25.592 --> 01:27:27.648 is the 10 standard , where would you 01:27:27.648 --> 01:27:31.359 put nations in your a or uh in terms of 01:27:31.370 --> 01:27:34.609 the intelligence capacity ? I would say , 01:27:34.620 --> 01:27:38.410 um they have the advantage of uh 01:27:38.419 --> 01:27:41.279 having home turf advantage . Uh But I 01:27:41.290 --> 01:27:43.810 would say uh inside their country , it 01:27:43.819 --> 01:27:47.029 would be a 10 . And then uh as we 01:27:47.040 --> 01:27:49.549 encourage our partners to work together , 01:27:49.560 --> 01:27:51.970 cross their borders uh to share 01:27:51.979 --> 01:27:54.319 information because all of them are 01:27:54.330 --> 01:27:57.470 experiencing some uh some form of all 01:27:57.479 --> 01:27:59.701 of the threats that I've talked about . 01:27:59.701 --> 01:28:02.399 And so uh them working together 01:28:02.410 --> 01:28:04.632 together better , not just within their 01:28:04.632 --> 01:28:07.439 own borders by national operations that 01:28:07.450 --> 01:28:09.506 we see taking place between Colombia 01:28:09.506 --> 01:28:12.509 and Ecuador . Uh The work that Colombia 01:28:12.520 --> 01:28:14.520 and Panama is doing cross border on 01:28:14.520 --> 01:28:16.990 migration as well . So , so inside the 01:28:17.000 --> 01:28:19.167 home country , you're saying they have 01:28:19.167 --> 01:28:21.444 a decent awareness , I appreciate that . 01:28:21.444 --> 01:28:23.611 Um You also said that you don't , it's 01:28:23.611 --> 01:28:25.611 no fault of your own . Your command 01:28:25.611 --> 01:28:27.833 doesn't necessarily have a relationship 01:28:27.833 --> 01:28:27.330 with the government there or law 01:28:27.339 --> 01:28:29.561 enforcement . I understand as well . Uh 01:28:29.561 --> 01:28:31.728 What would you say with respect to the 01:28:31.728 --> 01:28:33.728 intelligence sharing from countries 01:28:33.728 --> 01:28:35.950 like El Salvador to the United States ? 01:28:35.950 --> 01:28:38.228 Is that a mutual thing ? Is it one way ? 01:28:38.228 --> 01:28:40.390 Is it minimal ? How would you 01:28:40.399 --> 01:28:42.510 characterize the intelligence sharing 01:28:42.510 --> 01:28:44.566 between us and El Salvador ? I would 01:28:44.566 --> 01:28:46.510 say that the work that uh that the 01:28:46.510 --> 01:28:48.677 ambassador has done on the ground . Uh 01:28:48.677 --> 01:28:51.419 our US ambassador to El Salvador and 01:28:51.430 --> 01:28:53.097 the work that we have and the 01:28:53.097 --> 01:28:55.041 relationships that we have with El 01:28:55.041 --> 01:28:56.597 Salvador , we have a robust 01:28:56.597 --> 01:28:59.270 relationship uh military to military . 01:28:59.390 --> 01:29:01.501 And so the sharing of information , I 01:29:01.501 --> 01:29:03.520 think uh from El Salvador with the 01:29:03.529 --> 01:29:05.751 United States is good in that respect . 01:29:06.149 --> 01:29:08.316 But you don't , are , are you aware of 01:29:08.316 --> 01:29:10.189 any relationships either state 01:29:10.200 --> 01:29:12.311 department or other US officials have 01:29:12.311 --> 01:29:14.311 with some of those more national or 01:29:14.311 --> 01:29:16.819 local law enforcement entities ? Uh 01:29:16.870 --> 01:29:19.203 You'd have to speak to them congressman . 01:29:19.290 --> 01:29:22.160 OK . Um Focusing on drug trafficking , 01:29:22.169 --> 01:29:24.729 narcotics , uh transitional uh 01:29:24.740 --> 01:29:27.939 organizations like MS 13 . Um What sort 01:29:27.950 --> 01:29:30.172 of intelligence have you shared in this 01:29:30.172 --> 01:29:32.140 setting ? I understand uh with 01:29:32.470 --> 01:29:34.692 countries like El Salvador with respect 01:29:34.692 --> 01:29:37.020 to entities like MS 13 and drug 01:29:37.029 --> 01:29:39.620 trafficking . I have relied on the uh 01:29:39.629 --> 01:29:41.407 the state Department and the US 01:29:41.407 --> 01:29:43.629 ambassador in terms of the intelligence 01:29:43.629 --> 01:29:45.796 sharing uh that they would do with the 01:29:45.796 --> 01:29:47.851 country of El Salvador . Thank you . 01:29:47.851 --> 01:29:49.962 Appreciate your service . My time has 01:29:49.962 --> 01:29:51.851 expired at you back . Thank you , 01:29:51.851 --> 01:29:53.962 gentlemen , chair and I recognize the 01:29:53.962 --> 01:29:53.240 gentleman from North Carolina , Mr 01:29:53.250 --> 01:29:55.569 Jackson . Thank you , Mr Chair . I'd 01:29:55.580 --> 01:29:57.802 like to share my sense of the situation 01:29:57.802 --> 01:29:59.969 with respect to fentaNYL production in 01:29:59.969 --> 01:30:02.024 Mexico . And if I'm wrong , I'd like 01:30:02.024 --> 01:30:04.247 you to correct me . My understanding is 01:30:04.247 --> 01:30:06.247 that there are two cartels that are 01:30:06.247 --> 01:30:08.191 producing the vast majority of the 01:30:08.191 --> 01:30:08.089 fentaNYL that comes into the United 01:30:08.100 --> 01:30:10.520 States that we know where these cartels 01:30:10.529 --> 01:30:13.509 are . That the Mexican government , 01:30:13.520 --> 01:30:15.576 more specifically , the President of 01:30:15.576 --> 01:30:17.464 Mexico has been very reluctant to 01:30:17.464 --> 01:30:19.520 acknowledge this problem , let alone 01:30:19.520 --> 01:30:21.076 respond to this problem and 01:30:21.076 --> 01:30:23.298 specifically has been very reluctant to 01:30:23.298 --> 01:30:25.076 enter into any kind of military 01:30:25.076 --> 01:30:27.131 partnership with us that we could be 01:30:27.660 --> 01:30:31.430 much more effective and 01:30:31.439 --> 01:30:34.770 helpful . Then we are being allowed to 01:30:34.779 --> 01:30:38.720 be by the Mexican government . 01:30:39.970 --> 01:30:41.803 Is any of that wrong ? That's my 01:30:41.803 --> 01:30:44.137 understanding , feel free to correct me , 01:30:46.680 --> 01:30:49.839 Congressman . I uh I , I can't refute 01:30:49.850 --> 01:30:51.870 anything that you said . Uh I would 01:30:51.879 --> 01:30:54.209 point out that uh as part of the 90 day 01:30:54.220 --> 01:30:56.350 assessment that I'm undergoing , uh I 01:30:56.359 --> 01:30:58.339 am looking uh very closely at the 01:30:58.350 --> 01:31:01.069 operational environment uh specifically 01:31:01.080 --> 01:31:04.379 with uh Mexico and , and uh ho how we 01:31:04.390 --> 01:31:07.000 address that transnational uh uh 01:31:07.009 --> 01:31:09.919 criminal organizations . And uh at the 01:31:09.930 --> 01:31:12.041 conclusion of this , I will brief the 01:31:12.041 --> 01:31:14.208 secretary on my findings and then I'll 01:31:14.208 --> 01:31:16.430 be happy to share uh after that uh with 01:31:16.430 --> 01:31:20.419 this body . My sense is that part of uh 01:31:20.470 --> 01:31:22.692 one of the success stories that we have 01:31:22.692 --> 01:31:24.859 to tell with the introduction of drugs 01:31:24.859 --> 01:31:27.229 and combating cartels is with Venezuela 01:31:27.240 --> 01:31:29.462 because many years ago , the Venezuelan 01:31:29.462 --> 01:31:32.810 government accepted our help , accepted 01:31:32.819 --> 01:31:35.041 our military assistance with respect to 01:31:35.041 --> 01:31:36.986 running offense on the cartels . J 01:31:36.986 --> 01:31:39.359 Richardson . Am I right in my 01:31:39.370 --> 01:31:41.426 understanding of that , that we were 01:31:41.426 --> 01:31:43.203 able to be very helpful there . 01:31:45.240 --> 01:31:49.120 Um So the uh Joe Guillo has Mexico and 01:31:49.129 --> 01:31:51.180 his a or in terms of uh with the 01:31:51.189 --> 01:31:54.020 cartels and , and uh and I would say 01:31:54.029 --> 01:31:55.807 with the transnational criminal 01:31:55.807 --> 01:31:58.859 organizations in my region uh and the 01:31:58.870 --> 01:32:00.870 insecurity and the instability that 01:32:00.870 --> 01:32:03.669 they continue to create and uh and 01:32:03.680 --> 01:32:06.609 their uh portfolio has diversified and 01:32:06.620 --> 01:32:09.009 they become more powerful as I was 01:32:09.020 --> 01:32:11.430 saying , uh before this , the , the our 01:32:11.439 --> 01:32:13.550 countries working together to try and 01:32:13.550 --> 01:32:15.661 eliminate those threats and share the 01:32:15.661 --> 01:32:17.717 information on those , those threats 01:32:17.779 --> 01:32:20.001 that are in the South America , Central 01:32:20.001 --> 01:32:21.779 American region is uh extremely 01:32:21.779 --> 01:32:24.001 important . I think what I'm driving at 01:32:24.009 --> 01:32:27.709 is I think there's a , there are good 01:32:27.720 --> 01:32:30.580 examples of times in which other 01:32:30.589 --> 01:32:32.645 countries have entered into military 01:32:32.645 --> 01:32:34.759 partnership with us in order to run 01:32:34.770 --> 01:32:37.600 offense on cartels . And it feels like 01:32:37.609 --> 01:32:39.220 that would be an appropriate 01:32:39.220 --> 01:32:42.810 partnership right now with Mexico and 01:32:42.819 --> 01:32:44.875 the president of Mexico is resisting 01:32:44.875 --> 01:32:47.819 this for reasons that I'm sure none of 01:32:47.830 --> 01:32:51.069 us fully understand . And at the 01:32:51.080 --> 01:32:53.919 conclusion of your 90 day assessment , 01:32:54.140 --> 01:32:56.307 this is going to be a point of extreme 01:32:56.307 --> 01:32:58.490 interest for a lot of people . Um 01:32:59.220 --> 01:33:01.220 because I have people who are dying 01:33:01.220 --> 01:33:03.640 every day in my state , every single 01:33:03.649 --> 01:33:06.819 day . And the sense is when we hear 01:33:06.830 --> 01:33:09.052 statements from the Mexican president , 01:33:09.052 --> 01:33:12.990 like this is not a problem , this does 01:33:13.000 --> 01:33:16.430 not exist as a problem . We know that's 01:33:16.439 --> 01:33:20.200 not true and it colors all of our 01:33:20.209 --> 01:33:22.209 thinking about . Well , what , what 01:33:22.209 --> 01:33:24.431 does the solution to the problem really 01:33:24.431 --> 01:33:27.419 look like ? Can we solve the problem 01:33:27.770 --> 01:33:30.029 when the President of Mexico refuses to 01:33:30.040 --> 01:33:33.950 acknowledge its existence , let alone 01:33:33.959 --> 01:33:37.149 refuses to accept our assistance in 01:33:37.160 --> 01:33:39.382 dealing with this as other nations have 01:33:39.382 --> 01:33:42.770 to their benefit in the past . Um 01:33:44.609 --> 01:33:46.553 Can you describe and I know you're 01:33:46.553 --> 01:33:48.629 still within an assessment , the 01:33:48.640 --> 01:33:51.680 current scope of our assistance to 01:33:51.689 --> 01:33:53.856 Mexico with respect to running offense 01:33:53.856 --> 01:33:56.022 on cartels . What's it look like right 01:33:56.022 --> 01:33:58.640 now ? Such as you can congressman uh 01:33:58.649 --> 01:34:01.759 north com is , is , is authorized to uh 01:34:01.770 --> 01:34:05.680 uh participate in the counter TCO by 01:34:05.689 --> 01:34:08.149 providing intelligence support . Uh We 01:34:08.160 --> 01:34:10.470 run the uh info Analysis Center in 01:34:10.479 --> 01:34:13.859 Mexico City where we uh coordinate with 01:34:13.870 --> 01:34:16.870 the lead federal agencies for the US as 01:34:16.879 --> 01:34:18.712 well as cooperating with General 01:34:18.712 --> 01:34:20.935 Richardson's uh giant of South uh for a 01:34:20.935 --> 01:34:23.919 full um uh approach of South of our 01:34:23.930 --> 01:34:26.152 border to include move into uh Southern 01:34:26.152 --> 01:34:29.830 commands uh A or so uh by target uh in 01:34:29.839 --> 01:34:32.759 that center , we target the um the 01:34:32.770 --> 01:34:34.881 network we , we assist with targeting 01:34:34.881 --> 01:34:36.548 the network with our intel uh 01:34:36.548 --> 01:34:38.548 specialists and then distribute the 01:34:38.548 --> 01:34:40.714 information to the interagency . Which 01:34:40.714 --> 01:34:42.881 what I hear you saying is purely intel 01:34:42.881 --> 01:34:44.992 at this point . Nothing tactical . Is 01:34:44.992 --> 01:34:47.103 that rough the assessment , correct ? 01:34:47.103 --> 01:34:49.159 Thank you . I yield back . Gentleman 01:34:49.159 --> 01:34:51.326 yields back to you and I recognize you 01:34:51.326 --> 01:34:53.548 from Texas , Mr Fallon . Uh Thank you , 01:34:53.548 --> 01:34:55.881 Mr Chairman . You know , when I saw the , 01:34:55.881 --> 01:34:57.881 the topic of the hearing a few days 01:34:57.881 --> 01:34:59.992 back , you know , security challenges 01:34:59.992 --> 01:34:59.750 of North America , South America , I 01:34:59.759 --> 01:35:01.926 immediately I'll admit , I immediately 01:35:01.926 --> 01:35:04.092 thought about Venezuela . I wanna take 01:35:04.092 --> 01:35:05.981 my five minutes and not ask about 01:35:05.981 --> 01:35:08.148 Venezuela in , in Cuba . And the uh MS 01:35:08.148 --> 01:35:10.203 13 , like my colleague from New York 01:35:10.203 --> 01:35:12.370 did or uh the Mexican drug cartels and 01:35:12.370 --> 01:35:14.520 then it dawned on me , uh that I did 01:35:14.529 --> 01:35:16.696 pay attention in elementary school and 01:35:16.696 --> 01:35:18.807 America is part of North America . So 01:35:18.807 --> 01:35:18.459 why aren't we talking more about 01:35:18.470 --> 01:35:20.620 focusing my five minutes on securing 01:35:20.629 --> 01:35:22.950 our own border ? And , uh what I wanted 01:35:22.959 --> 01:35:25.292 to do is , uh , ask , uh General Guillo , 01:35:26.740 --> 01:35:30.700 do you think that if you had or I would ? 01:35:30.709 --> 01:35:34.140 Iii I assume we all agree that 01:35:34.879 --> 01:35:37.200 border security is a national security 01:35:37.209 --> 01:35:39.450 issue . Just do we , do we agree on 01:35:39.459 --> 01:35:41.515 that General Gill Congressman ? I do 01:35:41.515 --> 01:35:43.626 agree . Ok . I don't think that's AAA 01:35:43.626 --> 01:35:46.450 real reach . And what concerns me is 01:35:46.459 --> 01:35:47.903 when I look back at prior 01:35:47.910 --> 01:35:50.350 administrations and the two prior 01:35:50.359 --> 01:35:52.526 administrations before the current one 01:35:52.526 --> 01:35:53.970 at this juncture in their 01:35:53.970 --> 01:35:56.060 administrations , they had about 1.7 01:35:56.069 --> 01:35:58.013 million illegal border crossings . 01:35:58.013 --> 01:36:00.236 Unfortunately , that's now depending on 01:36:00.236 --> 01:36:02.180 exactly what statute it's hovering 01:36:02.180 --> 01:36:04.402 around 8 million . Uh , would you agree 01:36:04.402 --> 01:36:06.500 that that is a , a troubling trend 01:36:10.140 --> 01:36:12.589 congressman . Uh , the role of North 01:36:12.600 --> 01:36:15.399 com on the border is to support the uh 01:36:15.410 --> 01:36:17.632 Department of Homeland Security and the 01:36:17.632 --> 01:36:19.854 Customs and border protection in , uh , 01:36:19.979 --> 01:36:22.560 in support roles that , that don't , uh , 01:36:22.609 --> 01:36:24.776 relate to the law enforcement or the . 01:36:24.776 --> 01:36:26.831 But general , I count eight stars on 01:36:26.831 --> 01:36:28.887 your shoulders . Do you think that , 01:36:28.887 --> 01:36:30.942 that's a , a troubling trend . Would 01:36:30.942 --> 01:36:32.810 you rather the , the , the fewer 01:36:32.819 --> 01:36:34.959 illegal crossings we have ? Is that , 01:36:34.970 --> 01:36:36.970 would , that , would you agree that 01:36:36.970 --> 01:36:39.248 that's better , the fewer , the better ? 01:36:39.248 --> 01:36:39.220 Yes , I would agree with that . Uh , 01:36:39.229 --> 01:36:41.173 because we don't know who a lot of 01:36:41.173 --> 01:36:43.062 these folks are in , in the prior 01:36:43.062 --> 01:36:45.062 administration . We had a couple of 01:36:45.062 --> 01:36:47.270 years where we had 33 individuals on 01:36:47.279 --> 01:36:49.112 the tariffs watch list that were 01:36:49.112 --> 01:36:51.223 apprehended and then this past fiscal 01:36:51.223 --> 01:36:53.279 year , I believe it was 100 and 69 . 01:36:53.279 --> 01:36:55.501 That is , uh , an alarming difference . 01:36:55.501 --> 01:36:58.410 Would you not agree ? Congressman ? I , 01:36:58.419 --> 01:37:01.169 I agree , uh , that , that any threats 01:37:01.180 --> 01:37:03.939 that come into the US , uh , would be a 01:37:03.950 --> 01:37:06.089 concern to me as the North Com 01:37:06.100 --> 01:37:08.879 commander . So with , um , let's talk 01:37:08.890 --> 01:37:11.709 about the Mexican drug cartels a clear 01:37:11.720 --> 01:37:14.053 and present danger to the United States . 01:37:14.053 --> 01:37:16.164 Would you agree with that statement ? 01:37:16.164 --> 01:37:18.164 Congressman ? I would , I would , I 01:37:18.164 --> 01:37:19.942 would say that it's certainly a 01:37:19.942 --> 01:37:21.831 national challenge and a national 01:37:21.831 --> 01:37:21.729 concern . So I'd say you would , would 01:37:21.740 --> 01:37:24.129 agree with that , that the cartels are 01:37:24.140 --> 01:37:26.819 a danger to the United States . The 01:37:26.830 --> 01:37:29.160 Mexican drug cartels cartel activity 01:37:29.169 --> 01:37:31.502 does pose a danger to the United States . 01:37:31.502 --> 01:37:33.669 So we don't wanna embolden them . We'd 01:37:33.669 --> 01:37:35.836 like to have them weakened because the 01:37:35.836 --> 01:37:38.058 more , uh , the stronger they get , the 01:37:38.058 --> 01:37:40.225 more they endanger American citizens , 01:37:40.225 --> 01:37:42.689 would that be accurate ? It's not a 01:37:42.700 --> 01:37:46.350 trick question . General , but really , 01:37:46.359 --> 01:37:48.470 I mean , all right . Well , we've got 01:37:48.470 --> 01:37:50.637 General Richardson . Do you think , do 01:37:50.637 --> 01:37:49.740 you think that that is a clear and 01:37:49.750 --> 01:37:51.694 present danger if the Mexican drug 01:37:51.694 --> 01:37:53.750 cartels are emboldened and make more 01:37:53.750 --> 01:37:55.861 money , does that endanger the United 01:37:55.861 --> 01:37:57.694 States ? Because they're getting 01:37:57.694 --> 01:37:59.750 stronger , more powerful and they're 01:37:59.750 --> 01:38:01.639 diversifying their portfolio ? So 01:38:01.639 --> 01:38:03.472 they're not just doing drugs and 01:38:03.472 --> 01:38:05.583 trafficking people , but it's illegal 01:38:05.583 --> 01:38:07.750 mining , illegal logging , counterfeit 01:38:07.750 --> 01:38:09.917 goods . Uh Some of the worst people on 01:38:09.917 --> 01:38:11.972 the planet it is and they're getting 01:38:11.972 --> 01:38:14.028 stronger . So we have to , we really 01:38:14.028 --> 01:38:16.139 have to band together with all of our 01:38:16.139 --> 01:38:18.306 countries . Um , all the countries and 01:38:18.306 --> 01:38:20.417 all of the , uh , across the globe to 01:38:20.417 --> 01:38:22.417 counter this because they're taking 01:38:22.417 --> 01:38:24.528 advantage of countries that haven't , 01:38:24.528 --> 01:38:26.639 uh , experience this kind of activity 01:38:26.639 --> 01:38:28.528 before and this kind of crime and 01:38:28.528 --> 01:38:30.583 they're behind the eight ball , uh , 01:38:30.583 --> 01:38:32.917 trying to counter this before , um , uh , 01:38:32.917 --> 01:38:34.806 trying to get ahead of it once it 01:38:34.806 --> 01:38:36.528 occurred . And I apologize for 01:38:36.528 --> 01:38:36.330 interrupting a little bit . I just have 01:38:36.339 --> 01:38:38.830 limited time and as A 03 , I don't 01:38:38.839 --> 01:38:40.910 usually , uh , interrupt , uh , oh , 01:38:41.080 --> 01:38:44.339 tens . But , um , so Mexican drug 01:38:44.350 --> 01:38:46.350 cartels present a clear and present 01:38:46.350 --> 01:38:48.517 danger and they are charging depending 01:38:48.517 --> 01:38:50.799 on , um , who you talk to between four 01:38:50.810 --> 01:38:53.430 and $7000 per illegal migrant coming 01:38:53.439 --> 01:38:55.328 into the country . So it stand to 01:38:55.328 --> 01:38:57.439 reason that the more illegal migrants 01:38:57.439 --> 01:38:59.661 crossing the southern border , the more 01:38:59.661 --> 01:39:01.772 emboldened the cartels get , the more 01:39:01.772 --> 01:39:03.995 power they get , the more they endanger 01:39:03.995 --> 01:39:02.799 the American people . And that's 01:39:02.810 --> 01:39:05.830 exactly why we want to limit 01:39:06.009 --> 01:39:08.890 the , uh , the the illegal crossings on 01:39:08.899 --> 01:39:11.066 the southern border . And that's why , 01:39:11.066 --> 01:39:13.232 for instance , I'm also very concerned 01:39:13.232 --> 01:39:15.232 and , uh , we'll give it another go 01:39:15.232 --> 01:39:17.343 General Guillo with Chinese nationals 01:39:17.343 --> 01:39:17.009 crossing the southern border . There 01:39:17.020 --> 01:39:19.242 was a couple of years back where we had 01:39:19.242 --> 01:39:21.298 450 apprehended most of the military 01:39:21.298 --> 01:39:23.242 age men . Now , depending on who . 01:39:23.242 --> 01:39:25.298 Again , what you , you talked to was 01:39:25.298 --> 01:39:27.409 43,000 , 50,000 . Is that an alarming 01:39:27.409 --> 01:39:29.576 trend for you ? General Guillo ? Yes , 01:39:29.580 --> 01:39:31.747 congressman . It is . Yeah , it , it , 01:39:31.747 --> 01:39:33.913 it , it tremendously so and that's why 01:39:33.913 --> 01:39:36.247 again , we have to do everything we can . 01:39:36.247 --> 01:39:38.810 Uh Director Raven said that um that 01:39:38.819 --> 01:39:40.819 there's isis elements that are also 01:39:40.819 --> 01:39:43.041 crossing the border uh as well . So I , 01:39:43.041 --> 01:39:45.359 I just can't emphasize enough how 01:39:45.370 --> 01:39:47.648 important it is to take this seriously . 01:39:47.648 --> 01:39:49.870 I don't think it's a political matter . 01:39:49.870 --> 01:39:51.814 I think it's an absolute matter of 01:39:51.814 --> 01:39:53.981 national security . And uh I thank you 01:39:53.981 --> 01:39:53.839 for coming today , Mr Chairman . I , 01:39:53.870 --> 01:39:56.200 you back , thanks Jeremy Hill is back 01:39:56.209 --> 01:39:58.209 chair and I recognize Jen Lady from 01:39:58.209 --> 01:40:00.431 California , MS Jacobs . Thank you , Mr 01:40:00.431 --> 01:40:03.160 Chairman . Um You know , as one of the 01:40:03.169 --> 01:40:05.058 few members on this committee who 01:40:05.058 --> 01:40:07.280 actually represent a border community . 01:40:07.280 --> 01:40:09.447 Um I , I feel like I just need to make 01:40:09.447 --> 01:40:11.669 sure we are setting the record straight 01:40:11.669 --> 01:40:13.780 on , on these issues . First of all , 01:40:13.780 --> 01:40:15.891 San Diego , the community I represent 01:40:15.891 --> 01:40:18.169 is one of the safest cities in America , 01:40:18.169 --> 01:40:20.280 not despite being on the border , but 01:40:20.280 --> 01:40:22.447 I'd argue because of it and I think my 01:40:22.447 --> 01:40:24.669 colleague from El Paso would likely say 01:40:24.669 --> 01:40:26.669 the same thing . Uh And despite the 01:40:26.669 --> 01:40:28.836 fear mongering on display here today , 01:40:28.836 --> 01:40:31.002 uh on my regular trips to the border , 01:40:31.002 --> 01:40:30.919 I think it's clear that the best way to 01:40:30.930 --> 01:40:33.097 actually weaken the drug cartels is to 01:40:33.097 --> 01:40:34.986 make sure that we have more legal 01:40:34.986 --> 01:40:37.208 pathways for people to come here and to 01:40:37.208 --> 01:40:39.374 make sure we can let our border patrol 01:40:39.374 --> 01:40:41.430 agents uh actually focus on national 01:40:41.430 --> 01:40:43.652 security um by , for instance , funding 01:40:43.652 --> 01:40:45.708 the child Well being program . Uh so 01:40:45.708 --> 01:40:47.819 that we're not having border patrol , 01:40:47.819 --> 01:40:49.930 acting like social workers . Um And I 01:40:49.930 --> 01:40:52.097 would just , you know , all the people 01:40:52.097 --> 01:40:54.208 they're saying on the terrorist watch 01:40:54.208 --> 01:40:56.374 list that we've seen come through , we 01:40:56.374 --> 01:40:58.597 know that because we have caught them , 01:40:58.597 --> 01:41:00.541 which means the system is actually 01:41:00.541 --> 01:41:02.486 working . So in any case , um just 01:41:02.486 --> 01:41:04.708 wanted to , to put that at the top . Um 01:41:04.708 --> 01:41:06.930 uh General Richardson , I'd like to ask 01:41:06.930 --> 01:41:09.097 you actually about the South com human 01:41:09.097 --> 01:41:11.152 rights office . Um You know , it was 01:41:11.152 --> 01:41:13.319 established in the late nineties and I 01:41:13.319 --> 01:41:15.486 think it's been a clear success in how 01:41:15.486 --> 01:41:17.708 we integrate human rights directly into 01:41:17.708 --> 01:41:19.819 daily operations . Um Could you speak 01:41:19.819 --> 01:41:21.763 to how the human rights office has 01:41:21.763 --> 01:41:23.986 benefited South com , how it's improved 01:41:23.986 --> 01:41:23.680 the command's relationship with human 01:41:23.689 --> 01:41:25.785 rights at in civil society . And if 01:41:25.794 --> 01:41:27.961 there's anything more you need from us 01:41:27.961 --> 01:41:30.016 to best be able to utilize the human 01:41:30.016 --> 01:41:32.127 rights office . So thank you for that 01:41:32.127 --> 01:41:34.350 congresswoman , the Human rights office 01:41:34.350 --> 01:41:36.572 in South Com that we've had for over 20 01:41:36.572 --> 01:41:38.734 years has been a huge enabler and uh 01:41:38.745 --> 01:41:41.044 and the ability to uh you know , 01:41:41.055 --> 01:41:43.214 everything that we do it's baked in . 01:41:43.225 --> 01:41:45.114 It's a , it's a core foundational 01:41:45.114 --> 01:41:47.234 principle and human rights , the rule 01:41:47.245 --> 01:41:49.356 of law and the professionalization of 01:41:49.356 --> 01:41:51.301 the militaries as we work with our 01:41:51.301 --> 01:41:53.356 military partners in the region . Uh 01:41:53.356 --> 01:41:55.578 that is at the top of the list and then 01:41:55.740 --> 01:41:58.899 just uh uh infusing that in terms of 01:41:58.910 --> 01:42:00.688 all of the programs and then it 01:42:00.688 --> 01:42:02.910 dovetails nicely into women , peace and 01:42:02.910 --> 01:42:04.910 security , the integration of women 01:42:04.910 --> 01:42:06.966 into the forces , the militaries and 01:42:06.966 --> 01:42:09.188 the public security forces are enlisted 01:42:09.188 --> 01:42:11.410 leader development program , which is a 01:42:11.410 --> 01:42:13.521 rock star program . That's what makes 01:42:13.521 --> 01:42:15.521 our us military so strong is our uh 01:42:15.521 --> 01:42:17.632 enlisted force . And what we do is we 01:42:17.632 --> 01:42:19.521 bring that uh that program to the 01:42:19.521 --> 01:42:21.688 region and help our partners make that 01:42:21.688 --> 01:42:24.209 stronger . And so , uh with my uh 01:42:24.220 --> 01:42:26.498 sergeant major sitting behind me today , 01:42:26.498 --> 01:42:28.831 very , very proud of that program . And , 01:42:28.831 --> 01:42:30.950 but our human rights office , I just 01:42:30.959 --> 01:42:33.129 did a human rights engagement uh last 01:42:33.140 --> 01:42:36.089 Friday and I try to do that uh just 01:42:36.100 --> 01:42:38.322 about every six months . Uh I meet with 01:42:38.322 --> 01:42:40.520 human rights organizations um when I 01:42:40.529 --> 01:42:42.585 travel in the region as well to hear 01:42:42.585 --> 01:42:44.418 their perspective because it's a 01:42:44.418 --> 01:42:46.640 perspective that you have to understand 01:42:46.640 --> 01:42:48.529 not just our military to military 01:42:48.529 --> 01:42:50.696 perspective , but what is happening on 01:42:50.696 --> 01:42:52.918 the ground , what they're seeing , what 01:42:52.918 --> 01:42:54.918 they're concerned about , uh and uh 01:42:54.918 --> 01:42:56.973 because that factors into everything 01:42:56.973 --> 01:42:59.029 that we do to help countries . And I 01:42:59.029 --> 01:43:01.140 think with the human rights uh office 01:43:01.140 --> 01:43:03.251 that we've been able to , um over the 01:43:03.251 --> 01:43:05.473 years with the relationships we built . 01:43:05.473 --> 01:43:07.585 But actually , as , as uh our partner 01:43:07.585 --> 01:43:09.585 nations have had to be mobilized to 01:43:09.585 --> 01:43:11.807 help their police . And we talk about , 01:43:11.807 --> 01:43:13.973 you know , honoring their constitution 01:43:13.973 --> 01:43:16.029 and the importance of honoring their 01:43:16.029 --> 01:43:18.174 constitution , not just a person , uh 01:43:18.185 --> 01:43:20.352 that , that might be in the leadership 01:43:20.352 --> 01:43:22.814 seat . Uh When , when those gray zone 01:43:22.825 --> 01:43:24.936 areas come into effect , that's where 01:43:24.936 --> 01:43:27.115 we really see the uh the benefits of 01:43:27.125 --> 01:43:29.347 the hard work of our h our human rights 01:43:29.347 --> 01:43:32.140 office in South com . Thank you . And , 01:43:32.149 --> 01:43:34.910 and could you um share a little bit 01:43:34.919 --> 01:43:37.470 about the 25th anniversary celebration 01:43:37.479 --> 01:43:40.750 that happened in Miami in 2022 . So 01:43:40.759 --> 01:43:42.648 thank you for that . Uh We had uh 01:43:42.648 --> 01:43:45.709 numerous countries close to 20 partner 01:43:45.720 --> 01:43:47.750 nations that came and there were so 01:43:47.759 --> 01:43:49.926 many people that wanted to come and it 01:43:49.926 --> 01:43:51.981 was , we had just really extended an 01:43:51.981 --> 01:43:54.203 invitation to the , to the militaries . 01:43:54.203 --> 01:43:56.537 But ministers of defense wanted to come . 01:43:56.537 --> 01:43:58.600 A couple of congressional folks from 01:43:58.609 --> 01:44:00.442 the countries wanted to come too 01:44:00.442 --> 01:44:02.665 because they were so excited about it . 01:44:02.665 --> 01:44:04.831 And then we've had a couple of nations 01:44:04.831 --> 01:44:07.053 join the Human Rights Initiative . It's 01:44:07.053 --> 01:44:09.165 a non binding agreement . It's just a 01:44:09.165 --> 01:44:11.053 commitment to double down on , on 01:44:11.053 --> 01:44:13.109 supporting human rights and being uh 01:44:13.109 --> 01:44:15.250 being aware of it . And uh and the 01:44:15.259 --> 01:44:17.259 training that goes into the partner 01:44:17.259 --> 01:44:19.490 nations , uh militaries and public 01:44:19.500 --> 01:44:21.722 security forces . Thank you . And in my 01:44:21.722 --> 01:44:23.889 last 30 seconds , could you just share 01:44:23.889 --> 01:44:26.000 how the Human Rights office interacts 01:44:26.000 --> 01:44:28.111 with the civilian harm mitigation and 01:44:28.111 --> 01:44:32.100 response policy ? And so the uh uh the 01:44:32.109 --> 01:44:34.640 uh chimer as we call it for the uh uh 01:44:34.649 --> 01:44:36.919 as an acronym , but the , those 01:44:36.930 --> 01:44:39.080 meetings occur regularly with our uh 01:44:39.089 --> 01:44:41.311 office of the Secretary of Defense . So 01:44:41.311 --> 01:44:43.367 with Os D and the joint staff and so 01:44:43.367 --> 01:44:45.520 the engagement and uh and the 01:44:45.529 --> 01:44:47.919 importance of that uh only brings that 01:44:47.930 --> 01:44:50.879 up to a higher level with uh a broader 01:44:51.009 --> 01:44:52.919 uh engagement strategy . And so I 01:44:52.930 --> 01:44:55.097 appreciate the work by the joint staff 01:44:55.097 --> 01:44:58.169 and uh and Os D uh to , to do that , 01:44:58.180 --> 01:45:00.819 that forum . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 01:45:00.830 --> 01:45:03.299 I go back . Thank you , Mrs mclean for 01:45:03.310 --> 01:45:05.643 Michigan is recognized for five minutes . 01:45:05.643 --> 01:45:07.754 Thank you , Mr Chairman and thank you 01:45:07.754 --> 01:45:10.049 all for being here , General Richardson 01:45:10.060 --> 01:45:12.500 with the recent breakout in violence in 01:45:12.509 --> 01:45:15.740 Haiti . The administration has done um 01:45:15.750 --> 01:45:18.299 has seemingly abandoned Americans 01:45:18.310 --> 01:45:21.700 abroad . Again , the administration was 01:45:21.709 --> 01:45:24.649 able to pull out State department staff 01:45:24.660 --> 01:45:27.500 in our embassy this weekend but made 01:45:27.509 --> 01:45:29.459 little attempt to rescue other 01:45:29.470 --> 01:45:32.859 Americans on the island . While I 01:45:32.870 --> 01:45:35.037 appreciate the part , the department's 01:45:35.037 --> 01:45:37.810 announced uh additional funding for the 01:45:37.819 --> 01:45:40.459 M MS mission , the additional funding 01:45:40.470 --> 01:45:43.229 will not solve the problem . So General 01:45:43.240 --> 01:45:45.351 Richardson , um my question is , were 01:45:45.351 --> 01:45:48.660 you contacted or consulted by anyone at 01:45:48.669 --> 01:45:51.609 the White House or the State Department 01:45:51.620 --> 01:45:54.770 about Americans uh trapped in Haiti 01:45:57.290 --> 01:45:59.549 uh regarding uh Americans trapped in 01:45:59.560 --> 01:46:02.020 Haiti . No , we had uh we were pulling 01:46:02.029 --> 01:46:04.459 out non-essential uh personnel . So you 01:46:04.669 --> 01:46:06.910 didn't have any discussion regarding 01:46:06.919 --> 01:46:10.410 the Americans um that were trapped in 01:46:10.419 --> 01:46:14.049 Haiti , just government officials 01:46:14.060 --> 01:46:16.680 or non essential government personnel 01:46:16.689 --> 01:46:19.129 to , to reduce that number . Was there 01:46:19.140 --> 01:46:21.250 any conversation among your staff on 01:46:21.259 --> 01:46:23.426 the rescue of the Americans in Haiti ? 01:46:23.426 --> 01:46:25.592 What was the plan for those there ? Uh 01:46:25.592 --> 01:46:27.537 possibly were discussions above my 01:46:27.537 --> 01:46:29.592 level uh regarding that . And I know 01:46:29.592 --> 01:46:31.740 that as the political negotiations 01:46:31.750 --> 01:46:34.569 continue in Jamaica with our uh with 01:46:34.580 --> 01:46:37.479 our uh Secretary of State and uh 01:46:37.490 --> 01:46:40.069 Caricom leaders uh to try and get to a 01:46:40.080 --> 01:46:41.770 political solution on Haiti . 01:46:43.810 --> 01:46:47.270 So , as of right now , what is the plan 01:46:47.279 --> 01:46:49.335 for the Americans trapped in Haiti ? 01:46:50.169 --> 01:46:53.779 And so uh the uh as we work 01:46:53.790 --> 01:46:55.950 forward , uh the uh as the 01:46:55.959 --> 01:46:58.549 administration creates a requirement 01:46:58.560 --> 01:47:02.470 for dod to um to bring out chopped 01:47:02.479 --> 01:47:05.029 Americans in Haiti , uh We will 01:47:05.040 --> 01:47:07.299 absolutely do that from South com and I 01:47:07.310 --> 01:47:09.643 can appreciate it . But as of right now , 01:47:09.643 --> 01:47:11.366 we don't have any plans to get 01:47:11.366 --> 01:47:14.319 Americans home . That's what I heard 01:47:14.330 --> 01:47:16.660 you say . I don't have a request for 01:47:16.669 --> 01:47:19.430 support to um I just want any American , 01:47:19.439 --> 01:47:22.509 I appreciate that . Thank you . And 01:47:22.520 --> 01:47:24.689 what is the situation in your opinion 01:47:24.700 --> 01:47:26.890 in Haiti right now ? Well , the uh in 01:47:26.899 --> 01:47:29.010 terms of the violence uh that uh that 01:47:29.010 --> 01:47:32.060 the gangs um the over 300 gangs , about 01:47:32.069 --> 01:47:34.959 7200 gang members that we're tracking 01:47:34.970 --> 01:47:37.192 and the activities that they've taken , 01:47:37.192 --> 01:47:39.137 uh , over this past week to create 01:47:39.137 --> 01:47:41.430 violence . They've made four demands 01:47:41.504 --> 01:47:43.854 for the Prime Minister to resign for 01:47:43.865 --> 01:47:46.185 elections to be held within 90 days 01:47:46.194 --> 01:47:48.745 that they be given amnesty for uh , the 01:47:48.754 --> 01:47:50.698 crimes that they've been , they've 01:47:50.698 --> 01:47:52.921 committed . And again , ma'am , I don't 01:47:52.921 --> 01:47:55.087 mean to cut you off . Is the situation 01:47:55.087 --> 01:47:56.865 pretty dire over there or is it 01:47:56.865 --> 01:47:58.865 business as usual in Haiti ? No , I 01:47:58.865 --> 01:48:00.976 would say that they , because of what 01:48:00.976 --> 01:48:03.198 the gangs have done and taken advantage 01:48:03.198 --> 01:48:05.365 of the Prime Minister being out of the 01:48:05.365 --> 01:48:07.310 country , they've consolidated and 01:48:07.310 --> 01:48:09.421 conducted simultaneous attacks across 01:48:09.421 --> 01:48:11.198 so pretty dire . Is that a fair 01:48:11.198 --> 01:48:13.198 assessment or am I over exaggerated 01:48:13.198 --> 01:48:15.310 situation ? The security situation is 01:48:15.310 --> 01:48:17.270 dire in Haiti . Was there any 01:48:17.279 --> 01:48:20.240 intelligence indicating the potential 01:48:20.250 --> 01:48:22.979 threat of a violent takeover prior to 01:48:22.990 --> 01:48:26.410 last week ? Uh That was not expected 01:48:26.419 --> 01:48:28.586 that the gangs would , we had not seen 01:48:28.586 --> 01:48:30.475 the gangs really work together or 01:48:30.475 --> 01:48:33.069 coordinate together before uh the uh 01:48:33.080 --> 01:48:35.279 once the Prime Minister left , there 01:48:35.290 --> 01:48:37.346 was no indication that they had done 01:48:37.346 --> 01:48:39.512 that before or that they were going to 01:48:39.512 --> 01:48:41.457 do that once he departed . So , so 01:48:41.475 --> 01:48:43.725 prior to there was really no indication 01:48:43.734 --> 01:48:46.174 or no intel that we would end up in 01:48:46.185 --> 01:48:48.074 this situation that they would be 01:48:48.074 --> 01:48:49.852 working together and conducting 01:48:49.852 --> 01:48:52.055 simultaneous attacks . No . Ok . MS 01:48:52.064 --> 01:48:53.897 Zimmerman , did the Secretary of 01:48:53.897 --> 01:48:56.008 Defense consult with the Secretary of 01:48:56.008 --> 01:48:57.731 State regarding any options on 01:48:57.731 --> 01:49:00.660 protecting Americans in Haiti . Um uh 01:49:00.669 --> 01:49:02.613 Thank you , Congresswoman for that 01:49:02.613 --> 01:49:04.979 question . Um The Secretary of Defense 01:49:04.990 --> 01:49:07.101 and the Secretary of State along with 01:49:07.101 --> 01:49:09.323 other members of the US government have 01:49:09.323 --> 01:49:11.546 had numerous discussions about Haiti uh 01:49:11.546 --> 01:49:13.490 as this situation has continued to 01:49:13.490 --> 01:49:15.601 evolve with respect to Americans . Uh 01:49:15.601 --> 01:49:17.546 in particular , of course , uh the 01:49:17.546 --> 01:49:19.657 department maintains prudent planning 01:49:19.657 --> 01:49:21.490 for evacuations wherever we have 01:49:21.490 --> 01:49:23.546 diplomatic , but the embassy remains 01:49:23.546 --> 01:49:26.600 open as of now . Um OK , I I'm asking 01:49:26.609 --> 01:49:28.609 these questions because this is the 01:49:28.609 --> 01:49:31.169 third time this administration has 01:49:31.180 --> 01:49:34.930 abandoned Americans abroad in dangerous 01:49:34.939 --> 01:49:36.995 situations . We don't have a plan to 01:49:36.995 --> 01:49:39.490 get them out . You just said that last 01:49:39.500 --> 01:49:41.979 night , I coordinate with Congressman 01:49:41.990 --> 01:49:44.750 Corey Mills to rescue several Americans 01:49:44.779 --> 01:49:47.109 trapped in Port Au Prince Congressman 01:49:47.120 --> 01:49:49.970 Mills actually participated in the 01:49:49.979 --> 01:49:53.209 rescue of those Americans abandoned by 01:49:53.220 --> 01:49:55.609 the Biden administration and the State 01:49:55.620 --> 01:49:58.520 Department . So I ask you all , what 01:49:58.529 --> 01:50:01.359 exactly is the plan to get Americans 01:50:01.370 --> 01:50:04.160 trapped in Haiti out ? We don't have 01:50:04.169 --> 01:50:06.890 one , Mr Chairman . This administration 01:50:06.899 --> 01:50:08.899 doesn't seem to have a problem with 01:50:08.899 --> 01:50:11.010 abandon the Americans overseas . This 01:50:11.010 --> 01:50:12.788 is now the third instance where 01:50:12.788 --> 01:50:14.899 President Biden and Secretary Lincoln 01:50:14.899 --> 01:50:17.066 have decided that American lives are a 01:50:17.066 --> 01:50:19.640 relative first in Afghanistan , Israel . 01:50:19.649 --> 01:50:21.927 And now Haiti , I yield back with that , 01:50:21.927 --> 01:50:24.038 Miss Escobar from Texas is recognized 01:50:24.038 --> 01:50:25.816 for five minutes . Thank you Mr 01:50:25.816 --> 01:50:27.760 Chairman and I'd like to thank our 01:50:27.760 --> 01:50:29.982 witnesses for your service and for your 01:50:29.982 --> 01:50:32.093 presence here today . This is such an 01:50:32.093 --> 01:50:34.205 important conversation . I'm eager to 01:50:34.205 --> 01:50:36.560 dive in . But first , um I want to say 01:50:36.569 --> 01:50:40.020 we recently lost to New York guardsmen 01:50:40.029 --> 01:50:42.520 and a border patrol agent . And I'd 01:50:42.529 --> 01:50:45.379 like to express my condolences , uh , 01:50:45.390 --> 01:50:47.680 especially to the families and , and 01:50:47.689 --> 01:50:50.879 recognize their incredible service . Um , 01:50:51.259 --> 01:50:53.426 General Richardson . I , I wanna thank 01:50:53.426 --> 01:50:56.180 you in particular for all of the 01:50:56.189 --> 01:50:59.330 engagement that , uh I've had the honor 01:50:59.339 --> 01:51:01.729 and privilege to have with you over the 01:51:01.740 --> 01:51:03.962 years . Thank you for your leadership . 01:51:03.962 --> 01:51:05.709 I have the incredible honor of 01:51:05.720 --> 01:51:07.831 representing El Paso Texas , which is 01:51:07.831 --> 01:51:11.000 home to Fort Bliss . And uh over the 01:51:11.009 --> 01:51:13.560 course of that time , uh you know , I 01:51:13.569 --> 01:51:15.125 will share one of the , the 01:51:15.125 --> 01:51:18.359 frustrations for me has been that 01:51:18.370 --> 01:51:22.029 Congress has not focused on the western 01:51:22.040 --> 01:51:24.509 hemisphere uh to the extent that I 01:51:24.520 --> 01:51:27.839 believe we need to and when we 01:51:27.850 --> 01:51:31.000 are um encountering challenges at our 01:51:31.009 --> 01:51:33.819 nation's front door , uh It's , it's , 01:51:33.830 --> 01:51:37.350 that's an example of us acting too 01:51:37.359 --> 01:51:41.020 slowly and not quickly enough . And uh 01:51:41.029 --> 01:51:43.140 you know , as I listened to one of uh 01:51:43.140 --> 01:51:45.307 my colleagues on the other side of the 01:51:45.307 --> 01:51:47.685 day is talk about the border which 01:51:47.694 --> 01:51:51.564 again , II I agree with my colleague . 01:51:51.745 --> 01:51:55.165 Um uh MS Jacobs , uh you know , 01:51:55.174 --> 01:51:57.044 presents challenges but border 01:51:57.055 --> 01:51:59.325 communities like El Paso are among the 01:51:59.334 --> 01:52:02.084 safest in the nation for a reason . Um 01:52:02.095 --> 01:52:04.404 But a as we think about challenges that 01:52:04.415 --> 01:52:06.471 we face at the border , we've got to 01:52:06.471 --> 01:52:08.495 think about investments beyond the 01:52:08.504 --> 01:52:11.424 border and strategies beyond the border . 01:52:11.435 --> 01:52:14.330 If we , if we want to be successful and , 01:52:14.339 --> 01:52:16.395 and that's what I'd like to focus on 01:52:16.395 --> 01:52:18.395 actually , with my first question , 01:52:18.580 --> 01:52:20.850 beginning with you General Richardson 01:52:21.040 --> 01:52:23.799 South Com in particular is one theater 01:52:23.810 --> 01:52:26.200 where our dollars though small in 01:52:26.209 --> 01:52:28.359 comparison to investments in other 01:52:28.370 --> 01:52:31.129 theaters can stretch quite far in terms 01:52:31.140 --> 01:52:33.799 of return on investment . There is 01:52:33.810 --> 01:52:36.140 immense value in looking to secure our 01:52:36.149 --> 01:52:38.310 homeland and address these threats at 01:52:38.319 --> 01:52:40.910 the source before they arrive at our 01:52:40.919 --> 01:52:43.520 door . Can you give us some insight on 01:52:43.529 --> 01:52:45.585 the feedback you're getting from our 01:52:45.585 --> 01:52:47.696 personnel in South com as well as the 01:52:47.696 --> 01:52:49.751 counterparts of our coop cooperating 01:52:49.751 --> 01:52:52.370 nations on the value of these dollars ? 01:52:52.379 --> 01:52:55.129 What risks do we take on by under 01:52:55.160 --> 01:52:57.390 investing in these efforts , especially 01:52:57.399 --> 01:52:59.890 in an era of great power competition ? 01:53:00.830 --> 01:53:03.270 Yeah , so they thanks congresswoman and 01:53:03.279 --> 01:53:05.580 uh thank you for your service . And um 01:53:06.049 --> 01:53:08.271 and so certainly the investment that we 01:53:08.271 --> 01:53:10.160 make with our partner nations and 01:53:10.160 --> 01:53:12.216 security cooper operation . Uh And I 01:53:12.216 --> 01:53:14.438 mentioned the uh the work that Colombia 01:53:14.438 --> 01:53:16.660 and Panama do together . So as migrants 01:53:16.660 --> 01:53:20.000 flow out of uh Venezuela , looking for 01:53:20.009 --> 01:53:22.176 a better life and uh being able to get 01:53:22.176 --> 01:53:24.830 food and health care and , and uh and 01:53:24.839 --> 01:53:27.950 be safe uh the operations that the 01:53:27.959 --> 01:53:30.310 military is doing to go after the , the 01:53:30.319 --> 01:53:32.589 criminal , uh the criminal gangs in 01:53:32.600 --> 01:53:34.950 Colombia and then the border forces 01:53:34.959 --> 01:53:37.015 center front and Sanan and Panama as 01:53:37.015 --> 01:53:39.490 they work to do the same thing uh to go 01:53:39.500 --> 01:53:41.611 after the criminal groups that are uh 01:53:41.611 --> 01:53:43.722 conducting all the crimes , the , the 01:53:43.722 --> 01:53:45.979 counter , the drug trafficking , the 01:53:45.990 --> 01:53:48.046 human trafficking , illegal mining , 01:53:48.046 --> 01:53:50.370 logging all of it , counterfeit goods . 01:53:50.379 --> 01:53:52.779 And as they've done these uh operations 01:53:52.790 --> 01:53:54.679 against these criminal groups and 01:53:54.679 --> 01:53:56.846 transnational criminal organizations , 01:53:56.846 --> 01:54:00.390 they've actually um been able to uh 01:54:00.419 --> 01:54:03.240 uh uh find all these other things , all 01:54:03.250 --> 01:54:05.194 these counterfeit goods , uh , the 01:54:05.194 --> 01:54:07.361 drugs , the human trafficking . And so 01:54:07.609 --> 01:54:09.442 they've actually doubled down uh 01:54:09.442 --> 01:54:11.109 operations and continue those 01:54:11.109 --> 01:54:13.109 operations would say , started last 01:54:13.109 --> 01:54:15.350 April in 2023 . And they've continued 01:54:15.359 --> 01:54:18.680 those uh to get after uh the re you 01:54:18.689 --> 01:54:20.800 know , helping in their respect to re 01:54:20.800 --> 01:54:23.459 to try and reduce uh migration and the 01:54:23.470 --> 01:54:25.414 criminals that are doing the human 01:54:25.414 --> 01:54:27.414 trafficking . And so the investment 01:54:27.414 --> 01:54:29.581 that we make with our partners is , is 01:54:29.581 --> 01:54:32.359 huge uh in terms of them being able to 01:54:32.370 --> 01:54:34.370 counter the threats inside of their 01:54:34.370 --> 01:54:36.537 countries . And I think that they're , 01:54:36.537 --> 01:54:38.648 they're doing uh everything that they 01:54:38.648 --> 01:54:40.870 can to get after that . Uh but as their 01:54:40.870 --> 01:54:42.981 laws , some of their laws don't fit , 01:54:42.981 --> 01:54:45.604 facilitate stopping migration and uh 01:54:45.615 --> 01:54:48.234 and uh stemming the flow , we see 01:54:48.245 --> 01:54:50.725 activities to do that , but their laws 01:54:50.734 --> 01:54:52.845 don't support the military and police 01:54:52.845 --> 01:54:55.515 to do that as a see human , right ? As 01:54:55.524 --> 01:54:58.134 a uh uh migration as a human , right ? 01:54:58.919 --> 01:55:01.141 Thank you , General Richardson . And in 01:55:01.141 --> 01:55:03.252 my closing few seconds , I would just 01:55:03.252 --> 01:55:06.080 say I am equally alarmed by the growing 01:55:06.089 --> 01:55:09.299 sophistication and power of the cartels . 01:55:09.310 --> 01:55:12.290 They are a global threat . But one of 01:55:12.299 --> 01:55:14.830 the ways to address the cartels and 01:55:14.839 --> 01:55:17.919 undercut them and take vulnerable 01:55:17.930 --> 01:55:20.310 humans out of the hands of them . As 01:55:20.319 --> 01:55:22.486 human traffickers would be for us to o 01:55:22.486 --> 01:55:26.180 for Congress to open up legal pathways 01:55:26.189 --> 01:55:29.160 um ins instead of uh you know what I 01:55:29.169 --> 01:55:30.836 consider a dereliction of our 01:55:30.836 --> 01:55:32.884 responsibility to reform outdated 01:55:32.895 --> 01:55:34.951 immigration laws for decades . Thank 01:55:34.951 --> 01:55:36.951 you all again for your service , Mr 01:55:36.951 --> 01:55:39.062 Chairman , I yield back . Thank you , 01:55:39.062 --> 01:55:41.284 Mr Walsh from Florida is recognized for 01:55:41.284 --> 01:55:43.562 five minutes . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 01:55:43.562 --> 01:55:45.562 Uh Two weeks ago , the FB I's Miami 01:55:45.562 --> 01:55:47.506 field office issued a public alert 01:55:47.506 --> 01:55:49.673 seeking information on Majd Farhan , a 01:55:49.854 --> 01:55:51.465 member of Iran's Ministry of 01:55:51.465 --> 01:55:53.521 Intelligence and Security who's been 01:55:53.521 --> 01:55:55.620 recruiting individuals quote for 01:55:55.629 --> 01:55:58.100 operations in the US to include lethal 01:55:58.109 --> 01:56:00.140 targeting of current and former 01:56:00.149 --> 01:56:02.205 government officials . Those are the 01:56:02.205 --> 01:56:03.927 Trump administration , cabinet 01:56:03.927 --> 01:56:06.220 officials that to this day have to have 01:56:06.229 --> 01:56:08.919 security because of the threat from 01:56:08.930 --> 01:56:11.649 Iranian operatives on American soil and 01:56:11.660 --> 01:56:13.604 they're seeking to avenge the 2020 01:56:13.604 --> 01:56:16.919 death of Qasem Soleimani . Uh As you 01:56:16.930 --> 01:56:19.529 all know , the justice department has 01:56:19.540 --> 01:56:23.379 convicted uh a an Iranian operative for 01:56:23.390 --> 01:56:27.100 cooperating with Mexican cartels uh and 01:56:27.109 --> 01:56:29.470 conspiring to blow up a restaurant here 01:56:29.479 --> 01:56:32.919 in Washington DC uh some years ago . So 01:56:32.930 --> 01:56:35.419 General Richardson has Iran attempted 01:56:35.430 --> 01:56:38.220 or is Iran using Venezuela as a 01:56:38.229 --> 01:56:40.200 springboard to launch clandestine 01:56:40.209 --> 01:56:42.098 operations in the United States ? 01:56:44.779 --> 01:56:47.350 Uh The I'd be able to talk to you about 01:56:47.359 --> 01:56:49.819 that in a better in a closed session . 01:56:49.830 --> 01:56:51.941 But in terms of the , well , I mean , 01:56:51.941 --> 01:56:54.163 it's publicly reported general that the 01:56:54.163 --> 01:56:56.163 Maduro regime is cooperating with , 01:56:56.163 --> 01:56:59.609 with Iran is providing documentation to 01:56:59.620 --> 01:57:01.787 help them get into the United States . 01:57:01.787 --> 01:57:03.676 I mean , this is for the American 01:57:03.676 --> 01:57:05.787 people to understand we have a public 01:57:05.787 --> 01:57:07.729 notice of their uh cooper and 01:57:07.740 --> 01:57:10.629 activities with , with China Russia and 01:57:10.640 --> 01:57:13.270 Iran . Um can you comment to the level 01:57:13.279 --> 01:57:15.649 of cooper operation ? I mean , the 01:57:15.660 --> 01:57:17.438 Maduro regime is sponsoring and 01:57:17.438 --> 01:57:19.660 facilitating these activities , right ? 01:57:19.700 --> 01:57:22.240 Uh Yes , they are sponsoring activities 01:57:22.250 --> 01:57:24.879 and uh and allowing visits to occur and 01:57:24.890 --> 01:57:27.057 the Cooper operation that they do with 01:57:27.057 --> 01:57:29.279 these countries . And so let the record 01:57:29.279 --> 01:57:31.680 show the Maduro regime uh where we have 01:57:31.689 --> 01:57:34.359 now uh are easing sanctions . This 01:57:34.370 --> 01:57:36.314 administration is easing sanctions 01:57:36.314 --> 01:57:38.092 under the Barbados agreement is 01:57:38.092 --> 01:57:40.314 facilitating assassins to come into the 01:57:40.314 --> 01:57:43.160 United States to assassinate senior 01:57:43.169 --> 01:57:45.810 American uh officials , General 01:57:45.819 --> 01:57:49.049 Richardson . Uh also changing topics to 01:57:49.060 --> 01:57:51.450 the narcotics that are flowing into uh 01:57:51.459 --> 01:57:53.439 this country J of South currently 01:57:53.450 --> 01:57:57.089 employs a special um a , a 01:57:57.100 --> 01:57:58.878 ship , special mission which is 01:57:58.878 --> 01:58:01.810 essentially a refueling uh resupply 01:58:01.819 --> 01:58:04.259 ship uh to allow our partners to extend 01:58:04.270 --> 01:58:07.180 their range . We have one which is I 01:58:07.189 --> 01:58:09.330 think incredibly valuable but Miss 01:58:09.339 --> 01:58:12.180 Zimmerman , I'm surprised that we've 01:58:12.189 --> 01:58:13.967 received a report back from the 01:58:13.967 --> 01:58:16.022 Pentagon that adding another ship so 01:58:16.022 --> 01:58:18.689 that we can interdict on the Pacific 01:58:18.700 --> 01:58:22.450 and the Caribbean . Uh The Pentagon is 01:58:22.459 --> 01:58:24.626 basically saying there's a , there's a 01:58:24.626 --> 01:58:26.681 low return on investment there . Can 01:58:26.681 --> 01:58:28.870 you explain to the mothers and fathers 01:58:28.879 --> 01:58:31.290 in Florida the families that are being 01:58:31.299 --> 01:58:34.020 devastated by the flow of fentaNYL and 01:58:34.029 --> 01:58:36.251 other drugs into this country . Why one 01:58:36.251 --> 01:58:39.009 resupply ship not for the US Navy , but 01:58:39.020 --> 01:58:42.450 to help our partners extend their range 01:58:42.459 --> 01:58:44.570 and interduct , interdict these drugs 01:58:44.570 --> 01:58:46.737 is , is not a good investment of their 01:58:46.737 --> 01:58:48.903 dollars . Uh Congressman , I'd like to 01:58:48.903 --> 01:58:50.792 take that back and get you a more 01:58:50.792 --> 01:58:53.070 detailed answer . You don't have an an , 01:58:53.070 --> 01:58:55.237 I mean , you have a report saying that 01:58:55.237 --> 01:58:59.169 it wasn't a good investment . We do . 01:58:59.180 --> 01:59:01.600 I I understand that we're working to 01:59:01.609 --> 01:59:04.069 make sure the best use of our resources , 01:59:04.080 --> 01:59:06.302 but I'd like to get you a more specific 01:59:06.302 --> 01:59:08.524 answer . Thank you . I'll look for that 01:59:08.524 --> 01:59:10.413 for the record and I I do find it 01:59:10.413 --> 01:59:12.747 disturbing . You don't have that uh you , 01:59:12.747 --> 01:59:14.858 you don't have that information given 01:59:14.858 --> 01:59:17.080 your portfolio . Can we just talk a bit 01:59:17.080 --> 01:59:19.024 more about Haiti ? Us citizens are 01:59:19.024 --> 01:59:21.191 trapped in Haiti . We have a member of 01:59:21.191 --> 01:59:24.729 Congress leading a group down to rescue 01:59:24.799 --> 01:59:28.049 us citizens from orphanages . We've had 01:59:28.060 --> 01:59:30.282 multiple members of Congress , rescuing 01:59:30.282 --> 01:59:32.500 us citizens that were trapped in the 01:59:32.509 --> 01:59:34.676 West Bank and elsewhere in Israel that 01:59:34.676 --> 01:59:36.787 were trapped and are still trapped in 01:59:36.787 --> 01:59:39.160 Afghanistan . Uh We have a breakdown 01:59:39.169 --> 01:59:42.169 here between the State Department and 01:59:42.180 --> 01:59:45.279 dod in terms of having assets and 01:59:45.290 --> 01:59:47.759 resources available to go get Americans . 01:59:48.069 --> 01:59:50.180 I mean , it's just a basic function . 01:59:50.330 --> 01:59:52.970 Uh And at this point , I was informed 01:59:52.979 --> 01:59:55.040 last night that the State Department 01:59:55.339 --> 01:59:58.910 revoked the clearance for these 01:59:58.919 --> 02:00:00.975 individuals to land in the Dominican 02:00:00.975 --> 02:00:03.439 Republic . So can you can you just talk 02:00:03.450 --> 02:00:06.620 to me more broadly about our not a neo 02:00:06.629 --> 02:00:09.000 for just the embassy , the embassy 02:00:09.009 --> 02:00:11.176 personnel will get taken care of . I'm 02:00:11.176 --> 02:00:13.009 worried about Americans that are 02:00:13.009 --> 02:00:14.842 trapped uh in this deteriorating 02:00:14.842 --> 02:00:16.953 situation . General Richardson , Miss 02:00:16.953 --> 02:00:18.953 Zimmerman . Can you just talk about 02:00:18.953 --> 02:00:21.176 what we have positioned because we have 02:00:21.176 --> 02:00:23.398 a mass not only to get Americans but is 02:00:23.398 --> 02:00:25.565 Guantanamo ready to take on what could 02:00:25.565 --> 02:00:27.676 be a mass refugee flow on the Florida 02:00:27.676 --> 02:00:29.470 shores ? So we have plans ready 02:00:29.479 --> 02:00:31.701 congressman in terms of a non combatant 02:00:31.701 --> 02:00:34.450 evacuation . A neo plan , also a mass 02:00:34.459 --> 02:00:36.589 migration plan that we would uh 02:00:36.600 --> 02:00:38.822 establish what about for us , citizen . 02:00:38.959 --> 02:00:41.319 And if we get a request uh from the 02:00:41.330 --> 02:00:43.608 state Department , in order to do that , 02:00:43.608 --> 02:00:45.663 we have a plan to do that , you take 02:00:45.663 --> 02:00:47.386 that up . And I recognize as a 02:00:47.386 --> 02:00:49.552 gentleman from California , Mr Carba , 02:00:49.552 --> 02:00:51.552 thank you , Mr Chairman and ranking 02:00:51.552 --> 02:00:53.669 member and thank you to all the 02:00:53.680 --> 02:00:56.319 witnesses for being here today . Uh the 02:00:56.330 --> 02:00:58.879 political crisis in Haiti , Venezuela 02:00:58.890 --> 02:01:00.834 and other countries in the western 02:01:00.834 --> 02:01:03.100 hemisphere have put the United States 02:01:03.109 --> 02:01:05.410 in a difficult situation at the border . 02:01:06.080 --> 02:01:08.069 I'm eager to hear your plans to 02:01:08.080 --> 02:01:10.379 overcome some of these challenges as 02:01:10.390 --> 02:01:12.680 well as plans to influence and sustain 02:01:12.689 --> 02:01:15.220 advantages with China and Russia to 02:01:15.229 --> 02:01:17.700 gain foothold in our backyard . 02:01:20.600 --> 02:01:22.822 Thank you , Congressman . And uh and so 02:01:22.822 --> 02:01:24.933 certainly the funding that I received 02:01:24.933 --> 02:01:26.822 last year to increase my security 02:01:26.822 --> 02:01:28.878 co-operation initiatives . Uh it was 02:01:28.878 --> 02:01:32.430 hugely helpful . And uh and the uh 02:01:32.439 --> 02:01:34.772 funding that we would receive this year , 02:01:34.772 --> 02:01:36.939 uh as soon as the defense bills are uh 02:01:36.939 --> 02:01:40.180 approved , uh will be uh extremely 02:01:40.189 --> 02:01:42.509 important uh to continue that effort . 02:01:42.520 --> 02:01:44.549 But I would say 15 to 20 years of 02:01:44.560 --> 02:01:46.229 getting less than 50% of the 02:01:46.240 --> 02:01:48.018 requirement for security cooper 02:01:48.018 --> 02:01:49.907 operation for South Com . And the 02:01:49.907 --> 02:01:52.018 investment that , that brings that uh 02:01:52.018 --> 02:01:54.240 it , it can't be made up in just one or 02:01:54.240 --> 02:01:56.240 two years . So , uh , the sustained 02:01:56.240 --> 02:01:58.407 funding and the predictable funding is 02:01:58.407 --> 02:02:00.462 very , very important . And so , but 02:02:00.462 --> 02:02:02.573 it's not , it's not just the security 02:02:02.573 --> 02:02:04.796 cooper operation , it's the exercises , 02:02:04.796 --> 02:02:07.018 it's our ability of the , of the , uh , 02:02:07.018 --> 02:02:09.129 process with foreign military sales , 02:02:09.129 --> 02:02:11.765 excess defense articles as our nations 02:02:11.774 --> 02:02:13.944 are dealing with very old equipment , 02:02:13.955 --> 02:02:16.604 uh , outdated ground based radar 02:02:16.615 --> 02:02:18.615 systems so they can see threats and 02:02:18.615 --> 02:02:21.134 things like that . Uh , we've got to 02:02:21.145 --> 02:02:23.367 continue to work hard and the Secretary 02:02:23.367 --> 02:02:25.478 of Defense has led a program to speed 02:02:25.478 --> 02:02:27.256 that up , uh , with the foreign 02:02:27.256 --> 02:02:29.423 military sales and things like that to 02:02:29.423 --> 02:02:31.534 deliver capability , uh , much , much 02:02:31.534 --> 02:02:33.589 quicker . And I appreciate the inter 02:02:33.589 --> 02:02:35.812 agency's work on that and then the work 02:02:35.812 --> 02:02:38.034 we've done with the whole of government 02:02:38.034 --> 02:02:40.145 and the interagency to bring together 02:02:40.145 --> 02:02:42.367 all those instruments of national power 02:02:42.367 --> 02:02:41.750 that I talked about in my opening 02:02:41.759 --> 02:02:44.109 statement , not just on the military 02:02:44.120 --> 02:02:45.953 side of the house , it's working 02:02:45.953 --> 02:02:47.564 together the diplomats , the 02:02:47.564 --> 02:02:49.731 information environment , the military 02:02:49.731 --> 02:02:51.842 and the economics because we are , we 02:02:51.842 --> 02:02:54.064 are doing a lot of things . We just got 02:02:54.064 --> 02:02:56.176 to integrate and synchronize a little 02:02:56.176 --> 02:02:58.398 bit better from team USA and supportive 02:02:58.398 --> 02:03:00.453 team of team democracy . Thank you , 02:03:00.453 --> 02:03:02.453 General General Richardson , as the 02:03:02.453 --> 02:03:04.564 ranking member of the Coast Guard and 02:03:04.564 --> 02:03:06.787 maritime transportation sub-committee . 02:03:06.787 --> 02:03:08.787 I am focused on G out of South this 02:03:08.787 --> 02:03:11.149 detection and monitoring operations in 02:03:11.160 --> 02:03:13.790 your A or what support do you need to 02:03:13.799 --> 02:03:16.169 accomplish your objectives for better 02:03:16.180 --> 02:03:19.040 drug interdiction ? So , the work that 02:03:19.049 --> 02:03:21.160 uh Gay Out of South has done with the 02:03:21.160 --> 02:03:23.399 inter agency , we have just a , a huge 02:03:23.410 --> 02:03:25.521 synergy with Gay Out of South and the 02:03:25.529 --> 02:03:27.751 law enforcement community and the inter 02:03:27.751 --> 02:03:30.520 agency . And so , uh to continue to 02:03:30.529 --> 02:03:32.418 build that . And every year , our 02:03:32.418 --> 02:03:35.589 partner nations uh abilities to utilize 02:03:35.600 --> 02:03:37.870 that detection and monitoring both our 02:03:37.879 --> 02:03:39.990 law enforcement , but partner nations 02:03:39.990 --> 02:03:42.500 too , uh because we want that uh in 02:03:42.509 --> 02:03:44.640 terms of them being able to increase 02:03:44.649 --> 02:03:46.816 the , the interdictions as a result of 02:03:46.816 --> 02:03:48.982 that information and that continues to 02:03:48.982 --> 02:03:51.240 go up every year at 76% by our partner 02:03:51.250 --> 02:03:54.000 nations . And so , um we see that they 02:03:54.009 --> 02:03:56.640 are ve very effective . Um The , the 02:03:56.649 --> 02:03:58.760 ship special mission was brought up . 02:03:58.760 --> 02:04:01.419 Uh before that a second , uh SSM would 02:04:01.430 --> 02:04:03.439 be hugely helpful and would uh 02:04:03.450 --> 02:04:06.470 definitely uh raise the bar for Gay Out 02:04:06.479 --> 02:04:08.770 of South and the ability to uh work 02:04:08.779 --> 02:04:11.160 with partner nations . And so uh the , 02:04:11.169 --> 02:04:13.280 the funding and the resourcing that's 02:04:13.280 --> 02:04:15.479 provided for Gayet of South and that 02:04:15.490 --> 02:04:18.589 ability for them to only continuous uh 02:04:18.629 --> 02:04:21.549 enable uh those interdictions and 02:04:21.560 --> 02:04:24.979 disruptions is very helpful . Thank you . 02:04:24.990 --> 02:04:28.109 Uh General Gio congratulations on your 02:04:28.120 --> 02:04:30.990 new command . As China continues its 02:04:31.000 --> 02:04:33.529 goal to project power outside of its 02:04:33.540 --> 02:04:36.589 borders . What new developments have 02:04:36.600 --> 02:04:38.640 resulted from China's risky and 02:04:38.649 --> 02:04:41.419 aggressive intercepts of us aircraft 02:04:41.430 --> 02:04:44.520 operating internationally that concern 02:04:44.529 --> 02:04:47.029 in regard to your primary mission to 02:04:47.040 --> 02:04:48.350 defend the homeland 02:04:50.520 --> 02:04:52.459 Congressman . Uh Fortunately , we 02:04:52.470 --> 02:04:55.379 haven't seen uh uh Chinese aircraft 02:04:55.390 --> 02:04:58.069 operate near our defense uh uh or 02:04:58.080 --> 02:05:00.247 excuse me , air defense identification 02:05:00.247 --> 02:05:02.247 zones yet . But I think that that's 02:05:02.247 --> 02:05:05.339 coming uh as early as this year . Um 02:05:06.220 --> 02:05:08.649 that shows uh overall concern I have 02:05:08.660 --> 02:05:10.939 about the growing capability of of uh 02:05:10.950 --> 02:05:13.310 China . Uh not only with the aircraft , 02:05:13.319 --> 02:05:15.430 as you just mentioned , but also with 02:05:15.430 --> 02:05:17.879 the ships and even uh submarines being 02:05:17.890 --> 02:05:20.330 able to range further from China and 02:05:20.339 --> 02:05:23.770 closer to , to our shores . Thank you , 02:05:23.779 --> 02:05:25.799 General Richardson . With the 25 02:05:25.810 --> 02:05:27.699 seconds . I have left hundreds of 02:05:27.699 --> 02:05:29.810 thousands of Venezuelan migrants have 02:05:29.810 --> 02:05:32.459 made their way north uh due to years 02:05:32.470 --> 02:05:34.830 long economic and humanitarian crisis . 02:05:35.000 --> 02:05:36.950 Can you , can you speak about how 02:05:36.959 --> 02:05:39.126 Southern Command is collaborating with 02:05:39.126 --> 02:05:41.292 the State Department to alleviate this 02:05:41.292 --> 02:05:43.779 crisis ? So the work that uh that we do 02:05:43.790 --> 02:05:45.979 um very strong relationship with 02:05:45.990 --> 02:05:47.823 Department of State with all the 02:05:47.823 --> 02:05:49.990 ambassadors in the region and then the 02:05:49.990 --> 02:05:52.046 work that uh that we've done to work 02:05:52.046 --> 02:05:54.157 with our partners times expired chair 02:05:54.157 --> 02:05:56.323 and I recognize General from Florida . 02:05:56.323 --> 02:05:56.100 Mr Gates . So what's the difference 02:05:56.109 --> 02:05:58.053 between Haiti and a failed state ? 02:06:02.819 --> 02:06:04.986 It's telling , right , we can't really 02:06:04.986 --> 02:06:06.875 identify because the gangs are in 02:06:06.875 --> 02:06:09.097 charge . The government has been thrown 02:06:09.097 --> 02:06:11.319 out . And as a Florida man , I'm deeply 02:06:11.319 --> 02:06:13.319 concerned about this wave of people 02:06:13.319 --> 02:06:15.375 that we're about to have that we are 02:06:15.375 --> 02:06:17.430 having coming from Haiti and it will 02:06:17.430 --> 02:06:17.350 accelerate because I've gone to Opa 02:06:17.359 --> 02:06:19.303 Locka and I've spent time with the 02:06:19.303 --> 02:06:21.303 folks that are engaged in operation 02:06:21.303 --> 02:06:23.303 vigilant century . And they say the 02:06:23.303 --> 02:06:25.248 number one push factor that drives 02:06:25.248 --> 02:06:27.303 these Haitians into Broward County , 02:06:27.303 --> 02:06:29.248 Palm Beach County where they don't 02:06:29.248 --> 02:06:29.180 disperse throughout the country . They 02:06:29.189 --> 02:06:31.522 stay in Southeast Florida . That , that , 02:06:31.529 --> 02:06:33.029 that driving factor is the 02:06:33.029 --> 02:06:35.196 deterioration of conditions in Haiti . 02:06:35.196 --> 02:06:38.640 So what are we doing to prepare for 02:06:38.649 --> 02:06:40.959 that wave and to ensure that these 02:06:40.970 --> 02:06:43.137 people are not paroled into the United 02:06:43.137 --> 02:06:45.248 States as the administration has done 02:06:45.248 --> 02:06:47.303 with people on the southern border , 02:06:47.303 --> 02:06:49.526 but instead are repatriated back at the 02:06:49.526 --> 02:06:52.339 dock at Port Au Prince . Go ahead . 02:06:53.959 --> 02:06:56.129 Uh Congressman , we're doing a number 02:06:56.140 --> 02:06:58.307 of things to ensure that we're keeping 02:06:58.307 --> 02:07:00.140 track of the situation and we're 02:07:00.140 --> 02:07:02.196 prepared at the moment . We have not 02:07:02.196 --> 02:07:04.362 yet seen large numbers , what we would 02:07:04.362 --> 02:07:06.529 characterize as a , as a maritime mass 02:07:06.529 --> 02:07:08.862 migration . Um But we are alert to that . 02:07:08.862 --> 02:07:10.529 We are , we are alert to that 02:07:10.529 --> 02:07:12.640 possibility . Um I think you're right 02:07:12.640 --> 02:07:14.862 uh that the , the driving conditions in 02:07:14.862 --> 02:07:17.196 Haiti could very well press more people . 02:07:17.196 --> 02:07:19.729 So , uh we've recently pro approved 02:07:19.740 --> 02:07:21.851 some uh additional assistance that we 02:07:21.851 --> 02:07:24.500 can provide to uh the Coast Guard II , 02:07:24.509 --> 02:07:26.565 I think that that has now fully been 02:07:26.565 --> 02:07:28.398 approved . Uh We'll be providing 02:07:28.398 --> 02:07:30.565 notifications if we haven't already uh 02:07:30.565 --> 02:07:32.509 uh to provide additional shipboard 02:07:32.509 --> 02:07:34.731 assist because I've talked to the Coast 02:07:34.731 --> 02:07:34.680 Guard and what they say would really 02:07:34.689 --> 02:07:36.790 support them would be more naval 02:07:36.799 --> 02:07:39.399 vessels would be dod support . And 02:07:39.410 --> 02:07:41.979 because I think you correctly said that 02:07:41.990 --> 02:07:44.850 there is an anticipated mass migration . 02:07:44.859 --> 02:07:46.637 Here , there are specific legal 02:07:46.637 --> 02:07:48.859 authorities that we can access , that I 02:07:48.859 --> 02:07:50.415 would implore you to access 02:07:50.415 --> 02:07:52.303 specifically George W Bush signed 02:07:52.303 --> 02:07:56.169 executive order uh 13276 . And in 02:07:56.180 --> 02:07:58.180 that executive order , there is the 02:07:58.180 --> 02:08:01.009 ability for any president to designate 02:08:01.020 --> 02:08:03.439 an anticipated mass migration and that 02:08:03.450 --> 02:08:06.669 get gray hull naval vessels into the 02:08:06.680 --> 02:08:08.600 straits of Florida to deter that 02:08:08.609 --> 02:08:10.776 migration and then to repatriate those 02:08:10.776 --> 02:08:12.942 people before they get to Florida . So 02:08:12.942 --> 02:08:14.998 General Richardson , is it your best 02:08:14.998 --> 02:08:17.109 military advice based on what we just 02:08:17.109 --> 02:08:18.887 heard from MS Zimmerman that we 02:08:18.887 --> 02:08:21.580 activate the authorities anticipating a 02:08:21.589 --> 02:08:24.049 mass migration . So I think that we 02:08:24.060 --> 02:08:26.950 need to be postured appropriately uh 02:08:26.959 --> 02:08:29.339 for that uh exactly what you're talking 02:08:29.350 --> 02:08:31.572 about . And I have put in a request for 02:08:31.572 --> 02:08:33.970 increased capability to do exactly that . 02:08:34.490 --> 02:08:36.839 And uh and we are ready if a mass 02:08:36.850 --> 02:08:38.961 migration , if we need to deal with a 02:08:38.961 --> 02:08:40.683 mass migration , we did a full 02:08:40.683 --> 02:08:42.850 walkthrough of our contingency plan on 02:08:42.850 --> 02:08:44.739 Gitmo last summer with all of the 02:08:44.739 --> 02:08:47.120 interagency and all of my components . 02:08:47.129 --> 02:08:49.407 When I talked to the Coast Guard folks , 02:08:49.407 --> 02:08:51.573 they seem to say that we don't have to 02:08:51.573 --> 02:08:53.740 go drop these folks off at Gitmo where 02:08:53.740 --> 02:08:55.851 they , they become a burden on the US 02:08:55.851 --> 02:08:58.018 taxpayer . We can interdict at sea and 02:08:58.018 --> 02:09:00.018 then repatriate directly at Port Au 02:09:00.018 --> 02:08:59.779 Prince . When you say you're preparing 02:08:59.790 --> 02:09:01.957 for that , does that specifically mean 02:09:01.957 --> 02:09:05.870 dod assets ? So 02:09:05.879 --> 02:09:08.189 for what happens on a daily basis that 02:09:08.200 --> 02:09:10.144 the Coast Guard is doing ? And the 02:09:10.144 --> 02:09:12.379 repatriation under homeland security 02:09:12.390 --> 02:09:14.709 authorities back to cap ha happens on a 02:09:14.720 --> 02:09:17.500 daily basis . Yeah , no , I got that . 02:09:17.660 --> 02:09:19.771 But what the co when I go down to Opa 02:09:19.771 --> 02:09:21.882 Locka and get eyeball to eyeball with 02:09:21.882 --> 02:09:24.104 these folks , they say Congressman , we 02:09:24.104 --> 02:09:26.216 really could use the dod assistance , 02:09:26.216 --> 02:09:28.271 not more money for the Coast Guard , 02:09:28.271 --> 02:09:30.327 not more meetings , conference calls 02:09:30.327 --> 02:09:32.493 and committees , but gray hull vessels 02:09:32.493 --> 02:09:34.493 in the straits of Florida doing the 02:09:34.493 --> 02:09:36.716 interdictions doing the repatriations . 02:09:36.716 --> 02:09:36.169 So when you say you're , you're 02:09:36.180 --> 02:09:38.402 anticipating that , I think M Zimmerman 02:09:38.402 --> 02:09:40.569 laid it out correctly . So given the , 02:09:40.569 --> 02:09:42.736 the fact that in anticipation maritime 02:09:42.736 --> 02:09:44.458 mass migration is specifically 02:09:44.458 --> 02:09:46.645 contemplated , pursuant to 46 US C 02:09:46.654 --> 02:09:50.444 70051 . Can , can I leave this 02:09:50.455 --> 02:09:52.511 discussion believing that it will be 02:09:52.511 --> 02:09:54.511 your best military advice uh to the 02:09:54.511 --> 02:09:57.104 administration to utilize dod assets 02:09:57.115 --> 02:09:59.337 for this purpose ? General Richard , if 02:09:59.337 --> 02:10:01.226 I'm requested to do that , I will 02:10:01.226 --> 02:10:03.448 definitely do that . No , I want you to 02:10:03.448 --> 02:10:05.448 make the request not be requested . 02:10:05.448 --> 02:10:05.444 That's what I'm trying to ascertain . 02:10:06.189 --> 02:10:09.609 Ok . Yes . Con Congressman . Yes , you , 02:10:09.620 --> 02:10:11.731 you will make that request for dod si 02:10:11.731 --> 02:10:13.842 will talk with District seven and our 02:10:13.842 --> 02:10:15.898 coast guard on the , on the Atlantic 02:10:15.898 --> 02:10:18.069 side , uh Atlantic area . And uh , see 02:10:18.080 --> 02:10:20.660 if they need additional , uh , gray dod 02:10:20.669 --> 02:10:22.930 gray holes . They have not requested 02:10:22.939 --> 02:10:25.750 that specifically from South com . And 02:10:25.759 --> 02:10:27.981 so , but if there's a need for that , I 02:10:27.981 --> 02:10:30.203 would absolutely request it . Thank you 02:10:30.203 --> 02:10:32.203 for that because I , I really think 02:10:32.203 --> 02:10:34.370 getting ahead of this will ensure that 02:10:34.370 --> 02:10:37.299 the humanitarian conditions um uh will 02:10:37.310 --> 02:10:39.143 will be far better that we could 02:10:39.143 --> 02:10:41.890 perhaps deter some of this because I 02:10:41.930 --> 02:10:44.097 mean , it's tragic conditions when you 02:10:44.097 --> 02:10:46.319 talk to these folks and they , they say 02:10:46.319 --> 02:10:48.097 that these Haitians are pouring 02:10:48.097 --> 02:10:50.097 gasoline on little babies and doing 02:10:50.097 --> 02:10:49.540 everything they can to deter 02:10:49.549 --> 02:10:52.169 interdictions . Um It , it sharpens the 02:10:52.180 --> 02:10:54.291 minds of my fellow Floridians to want 02:10:54.291 --> 02:10:56.069 to make sure you guys are doing 02:10:56.069 --> 02:10:55.910 everything possible and I greatly 02:10:55.919 --> 02:10:58.086 appreciate the exchange today . You're 02:10:58.086 --> 02:11:00.252 back . Gentleman yields back chair and 02:11:00.252 --> 02:11:02.363 I recognize you from Connecticut , Mr 02:11:02.363 --> 02:11:04.586 Courtney . Thank you uh Chairman Rogers 02:11:04.586 --> 02:11:06.697 and thank you to all the witnesses um 02:11:06.697 --> 02:11:08.530 for your uh testimony today . Uh 02:11:08.530 --> 02:11:10.970 General Gal . Um Again , it was a 02:11:10.979 --> 02:11:12.368 pleasure to meet you and 02:11:12.368 --> 02:11:14.850 congratulations again on your uh uh new 02:11:14.859 --> 02:11:17.669 assignment . Um In your testimony , you 02:11:17.680 --> 02:11:19.569 spoke about , you spoke about the 02:11:19.569 --> 02:11:21.624 ability to detect classify and track 02:11:21.624 --> 02:11:23.791 potential threats to the homeland from 02:11:23.791 --> 02:11:25.791 the sea floor to space in the cyber 02:11:25.791 --> 02:11:27.958 domain is a critical need for us North 02:11:27.958 --> 02:11:30.124 com and no ad and that investments and 02:11:30.124 --> 02:11:32.124 capabilities such as the integrated 02:11:32.124 --> 02:11:34.347 undersea surveillance system , the I US 02:11:34.347 --> 02:11:36.347 S will significantly enhance domain 02:11:36.347 --> 02:11:38.180 awareness to limit competitors , 02:11:38.180 --> 02:11:40.069 ability to approach North America 02:11:40.069 --> 02:11:42.069 undetected . Can you speak a little 02:11:42.069 --> 02:11:44.069 more again ? I know in your written 02:11:44.069 --> 02:11:46.291 testimony , you mentioned the fact that 02:11:46.291 --> 02:11:48.124 now um Russia is about to deploy 02:11:48.124 --> 02:11:50.124 another sever Devins um which again 02:11:50.124 --> 02:11:52.830 would be um on the West coast , they 02:11:52.839 --> 02:11:55.979 already 2014 , they deployed their 02:11:55.990 --> 02:11:58.212 first severed events which , uh , again 02:11:58.212 --> 02:12:00.189 has been , um , you know , a real 02:12:00.200 --> 02:12:02.140 challenge for uh , anti submarine 02:12:02.149 --> 02:12:04.371 warfare and our allies working together 02:12:04.371 --> 02:12:06.482 to , to , um , you know , keep an eye 02:12:06.482 --> 02:12:09.529 on that . And the I US s um , is again 02:12:09.540 --> 02:12:11.819 an another capability . Um Again , 02:12:11.830 --> 02:12:14.052 could you talk again about , you know , 02:12:14.052 --> 02:12:16.108 the , the homelands facing something 02:12:16.108 --> 02:12:18.219 that we really haven't seen since the 02:12:18.219 --> 02:12:20.552 Cold War in terms of the undersea ? And , 02:12:20.552 --> 02:12:22.386 and , um , would appreciate your 02:12:22.386 --> 02:12:24.274 thoughts , Congressman . You're , 02:12:24.274 --> 02:12:26.386 you're exactly right . The , uh , the 02:12:26.386 --> 02:12:28.497 under ability to detect with undersea 02:12:28.497 --> 02:12:30.552 sensors is more important today than 02:12:30.552 --> 02:12:32.719 ever before because of the advances in 02:12:32.719 --> 02:12:34.774 the se as you mentioned . Uh , now a 02:12:34.774 --> 02:12:36.941 threat to both coasts , uh , and , and 02:12:36.950 --> 02:12:39.100 the uh quiet nature with which those 02:12:39.109 --> 02:12:41.930 submarines can operate , mean that they 02:12:41.939 --> 02:12:43.828 could , uh , very easily get much 02:12:43.828 --> 02:12:46.470 closer to the , uh , us and then deploy 02:12:46.479 --> 02:12:48.701 their , uh , uh large arsenal of cruise 02:12:48.701 --> 02:12:51.490 missiles , uh to a point where if that 02:12:51.500 --> 02:12:53.444 were allowed to happen . The first 02:12:53.444 --> 02:12:55.722 detection we would likely get would be , 02:12:55.722 --> 02:12:57.889 could be the explosions of the uh , of 02:12:57.889 --> 02:13:00.000 the cruise missiles . So , uh keeping 02:13:00.000 --> 02:13:02.290 our undersea advantage is imperative . 02:13:02.450 --> 02:13:05.169 And I think the , the first step in 02:13:05.180 --> 02:13:07.729 that is to increase our undersea sensor 02:13:07.740 --> 02:13:10.009 capability to allow us to detect these 02:13:10.020 --> 02:13:12.242 threats further away from the US shores 02:13:12.242 --> 02:13:14.409 than we can today . Well , thank you . 02:13:14.409 --> 02:13:16.464 And , and as we discussed , I mean , 02:13:16.464 --> 02:13:19.160 the , the present um , situation , at 02:13:19.169 --> 02:13:21.259 least on the Atlantic is , uh , is a 02:13:21.270 --> 02:13:24.390 team sport with our allies um in the 02:13:24.399 --> 02:13:26.232 air on the surface and under the 02:13:26.232 --> 02:13:28.930 surface in terms of trying to track um , 02:13:28.939 --> 02:13:31.050 that , that threat . I , I remember , 02:13:31.050 --> 02:13:34.240 um , a ruffed who was the former CNO uh 02:13:34.250 --> 02:13:36.250 one time saying that the , the best 02:13:36.250 --> 02:13:38.139 anti submarine warfare is another 02:13:38.139 --> 02:13:40.139 submarine . I mean , that obviously 02:13:40.139 --> 02:13:42.589 also has to be kind of um viewed as a 02:13:42.600 --> 02:13:45.080 priority . Uh If , if again , we're 02:13:45.089 --> 02:13:47.145 going to have an effective system of 02:13:47.145 --> 02:13:50.200 defense . Is that correct ? Sir ? It is 02:13:50.209 --> 02:13:52.330 absolutely correct . And , uh we get 02:13:52.339 --> 02:13:54.395 great partnership , uh especially in 02:13:54.395 --> 02:13:56.506 the Atlantic , we have a one Atlantic 02:13:56.506 --> 02:13:59.140 uh te technique , tactic technique and 02:13:59.149 --> 02:14:01.890 procedure where north com U com and 02:14:01.899 --> 02:14:03.566 Southern Command with General 02:14:03.566 --> 02:14:05.621 Richardson , all share information . 02:14:05.621 --> 02:14:07.750 And we don't use the strict line that 02:14:07.759 --> 02:14:11.299 you see on the UCP map as uh a , a way 02:14:11.310 --> 02:14:13.254 to limit our capability . We allow 02:14:13.254 --> 02:14:15.421 forces to flow freely across all those 02:14:15.421 --> 02:14:17.421 lines wherever it makes sense . For 02:14:17.421 --> 02:14:19.366 that other , uh you know , for the 02:14:19.366 --> 02:14:21.366 overall situation , even if it goes 02:14:21.366 --> 02:14:23.421 between combatant commands to ensure 02:14:23.421 --> 02:14:25.532 that we can detect . And then once we 02:14:25.532 --> 02:14:27.699 get those uh undersea uh uh submarines 02:14:28.104 --> 02:14:30.326 track and follow them uh to ensure that 02:14:30.326 --> 02:14:32.215 they don't become a threat to the 02:14:32.215 --> 02:14:34.160 United States and with the severed 02:14:34.160 --> 02:14:36.493 events now on the west coast , um again , 02:14:36.493 --> 02:14:38.715 that's just another mission . Um , that 02:14:38.715 --> 02:14:40.937 again , we don't quite have the same um 02:14:40.937 --> 02:14:42.937 team line up uh in that part of the 02:14:42.937 --> 02:14:45.048 world . So it's uh if , if anything , 02:14:45.048 --> 02:14:48.640 it's more um uh demand to the Navy . 02:14:49.299 --> 02:14:51.410 Uh Yes , congressman , you're right . 02:14:51.410 --> 02:14:53.577 And , and the fact that the Pacific is 02:14:53.577 --> 02:14:56.040 so much larger and , you know , we , 02:14:56.049 --> 02:14:58.271 we're now facing two threats there with 02:14:58.271 --> 02:15:00.438 a , with a Russian specific threat and 02:15:00.438 --> 02:15:02.959 then also the uh Chinese uh makes the 02:15:02.970 --> 02:15:05.140 uh Pacific threat , uh a particular 02:15:05.149 --> 02:15:07.316 concern of mine and , and North Coms . 02:15:07.410 --> 02:15:09.688 Well , thank you . Um You know , again , 02:15:09.688 --> 02:15:11.466 your timing uh in terms of this 02:15:11.466 --> 02:15:14.060 discussion is um you know , very apt 02:15:14.069 --> 02:15:16.180 since we got a budget yesterday which 02:15:16.180 --> 02:15:18.236 talks about cutting a Virginia class 02:15:18.236 --> 02:15:20.458 submarine um from the Navy shipbuilding 02:15:20.458 --> 02:15:22.600 plan . And uh obviously , you know , 02:15:22.609 --> 02:15:25.479 not just in North Com but in frankly , 02:15:25.490 --> 02:15:27.649 every command that's gonna just again 02:15:27.660 --> 02:15:30.720 make a , a high demand uh platform uh 02:15:30.729 --> 02:15:32.951 even more stressed . So , um you know , 02:15:32.951 --> 02:15:35.173 this is gonna be very helpful for us as 02:15:35.173 --> 02:15:37.229 we move towards uh markup later . Um 02:15:37.229 --> 02:15:39.229 this session that will yield back . 02:15:39.709 --> 02:15:41.820 Thank you , gentlemen . Uh , before I 02:15:41.820 --> 02:15:43.765 recognize Mr Bacon , uh one of the 02:15:43.765 --> 02:15:45.987 mounts , we're gonna be going up to the 02:15:45.987 --> 02:15:48.098 classified portion of this hearing in 02:15:48.098 --> 02:15:50.153 about 15 minutes . Uh Mr Bacon , you 02:15:50.153 --> 02:15:52.320 recognized ? Thank you , Mr Chairman . 02:15:52.320 --> 02:15:54.542 I welcome all three of you here . Thank 02:15:54.542 --> 02:15:54.069 you . And I've enjoyed working with 02:15:54.080 --> 02:15:56.399 General Richardson in recent years , so 02:15:56.410 --> 02:15:58.577 I appreciate seeing you and Jo Gel and 02:15:58.577 --> 02:16:00.354 I were fellow commanders of the 02:16:00.354 --> 02:16:02.354 fighting 55th wing , uh the largest 02:16:02.354 --> 02:16:04.299 wing in Air Combat command , third 02:16:04.299 --> 02:16:06.466 largest in the Air Force , I think for 02:16:06.466 --> 02:16:08.688 two decades , that most busy up tempo , 02:16:08.688 --> 02:16:10.577 tempo that the Air force had . So 02:16:10.577 --> 02:16:12.688 congrats on your new position . Uh My 02:16:12.688 --> 02:16:14.854 first question is for John Guillo . Uh 02:16:14.854 --> 02:16:18.229 how does hypersonic weapons affect your 02:16:18.240 --> 02:16:20.296 warning times ? Because I think it's 02:16:20.296 --> 02:16:22.296 important for the Americans to hear 02:16:22.296 --> 02:16:24.073 with China having nuclear armed 02:16:24.073 --> 02:16:26.184 hypersonics , Russian building them . 02:16:26.184 --> 02:16:28.407 What does it do for our warning times ? 02:16:28.407 --> 02:16:30.629 Uh Thank you , Congressman . Uh Good to 02:16:30.629 --> 02:16:32.407 see you and , and uh thanks for 02:16:32.407 --> 02:16:34.129 recognizing the fight and 55th 02:16:34.129 --> 02:16:35.740 contributions worldwide . Uh 02:16:35.740 --> 02:16:37.962 hypersonics are , are probably the most 02:16:37.962 --> 02:16:40.419 destabilizing weapon that we face now . 02:16:40.429 --> 02:16:43.500 And uh one of the prime reasons is , is 02:16:43.509 --> 02:16:45.231 what you mentioned the shorten 02:16:45.231 --> 02:16:47.669 detection time . Uh And the fact that 02:16:47.679 --> 02:16:49.846 they don't follow a , a traditional uh 02:16:49.846 --> 02:16:51.809 ballistic track means they're very 02:16:51.820 --> 02:16:53.487 unpredictable and the area of 02:16:53.487 --> 02:16:55.709 uncertainty is , is huge based on their 02:16:55.709 --> 02:16:57.764 speed and their maneuverability . Uh 02:16:57.764 --> 02:16:59.820 That's what makes them such a such a 02:16:59.820 --> 02:17:01.820 challenge to not only detect but to 02:17:01.820 --> 02:17:03.820 track and eventually defeat . Is it 02:17:03.820 --> 02:17:05.931 fair to say we have about a 15 minute 02:17:05.931 --> 02:17:08.153 warning time ? I don't know if I'm just 02:17:08.153 --> 02:17:10.376 trying to give our citizens a sense how 02:17:10.376 --> 02:17:12.153 this changes . Intercontinental 02:17:12.153 --> 02:17:14.264 ballistic missiles gave us about a 35 02:17:14.264 --> 02:17:14.029 minute warning time . And I'm just 02:17:14.039 --> 02:17:16.095 trying to , how much is this warning 02:17:16.095 --> 02:17:19.740 time reduced ? Uh Yes , Congressman . 02:17:19.750 --> 02:17:21.917 There , there are cases where it would 02:17:21.917 --> 02:17:24.139 be about half and , but I , I would add 02:17:24.139 --> 02:17:26.250 to that though , is the unpredictable 02:17:26.250 --> 02:17:28.472 nature of their maneuvering . Even with 02:17:28.472 --> 02:17:30.639 uh uh ICBM . If it was 30 minutes very 02:17:30.639 --> 02:17:32.583 quickly , we could figure out just 02:17:32.583 --> 02:17:34.917 about where exactly that's going into a , 02:17:34.917 --> 02:17:37.083 you know , very small circle circle of 02:17:37.083 --> 02:17:39.194 uh error probability . However , with 02:17:39.194 --> 02:17:41.472 the hypersonic , not only is it faster , 02:17:41.472 --> 02:17:43.694 giving us less time to detect it can uh 02:17:43.694 --> 02:17:45.853 fly lower uh which , which gives our 02:17:45.864 --> 02:17:47.586 sensors problems and then that 02:17:47.586 --> 02:17:50.133 maneuverability means it , uh you know , 02:17:50.143 --> 02:17:52.032 a typical threat warning could be 02:17:52.032 --> 02:17:54.463 something as vague as Western United 02:17:54.473 --> 02:17:56.864 States as opposed to a particular city . 02:17:56.994 --> 02:17:59.105 And Mr Chairman , this is why I think 02:17:59.105 --> 02:18:01.272 it's so important that we address this 02:18:01.272 --> 02:18:03.438 with stratcom and the Pentagon and our 02:18:03.438 --> 02:18:05.661 just our National Command authorities . 02:18:05.661 --> 02:18:07.716 I don't think we're positioned right 02:18:07.716 --> 02:18:10.839 with our nuclear command survivability 02:18:10.849 --> 02:18:12.793 and ensuring that we always have a 02:18:12.793 --> 02:18:15.016 survivable element , not at a base . Uh 02:18:15.016 --> 02:18:16.738 I think we're making ourselves 02:18:16.738 --> 02:18:18.738 vulnerable . It's one of the things 02:18:18.738 --> 02:18:20.960 we're trying to push our deity . I know 02:18:20.960 --> 02:18:23.127 this is not a North Com's uh purview , 02:18:23.179 --> 02:18:25.400 but I think we as in the , in the in 02:18:25.410 --> 02:18:27.410 the ha here working with senior 02:18:27.419 --> 02:18:29.641 military leaders have to come up with a 02:18:29.641 --> 02:18:31.586 plan that ensures we always have a 02:18:31.586 --> 02:18:33.530 survivable command element that we 02:18:33.530 --> 02:18:35.586 can't be caught flatfooted because I 02:18:35.586 --> 02:18:37.697 worry about the current , our current 02:18:37.697 --> 02:18:39.475 posture and I think at least is 02:18:39.475 --> 02:18:41.419 vulnerable and I want the Russians 02:18:41.419 --> 02:18:43.697 Chinese to know no matter what they do , 02:18:43.697 --> 02:18:45.752 we can always respond . Uh So , so I 02:18:45.752 --> 02:18:47.919 appreciate your aspect of this is very 02:18:47.919 --> 02:18:50.141 important of this discussion . So thank 02:18:50.141 --> 02:18:52.252 you , John Richardson . I was talking 02:18:52.252 --> 02:18:54.475 to the previous ambassador from Jamaica 02:18:54.660 --> 02:18:56.382 and he was telling me that the 02:18:56.382 --> 02:18:58.549 Jamaicans would like to have our Coast 02:18:58.549 --> 02:19:00.549 Guard assigned there and they would 02:19:00.549 --> 02:19:02.604 help with facilities and it's in the 02:19:02.604 --> 02:19:05.080 perfect position for interdicting drugs 02:19:05.089 --> 02:19:07.256 coming out of Venezuela and Colombia . 02:19:07.256 --> 02:19:09.478 Can you comment on it , comment on that 02:19:09.478 --> 02:19:11.589 at all or if you , have you heard any 02:19:11.589 --> 02:19:13.589 of this dialogue ? I have not heard 02:19:13.589 --> 02:19:15.589 that dialogue but we were we have a 02:19:15.589 --> 02:19:17.645 very good close working relationship 02:19:17.645 --> 02:19:19.700 with Jamaica and uh and the chief of 02:19:19.700 --> 02:19:21.867 defense there who is a , a Coast Guard 02:19:21.867 --> 02:19:23.922 officer . Well , I'm hearing this is 02:19:23.922 --> 02:19:25.978 indirect that drug from him . Uh but 02:19:25.978 --> 02:19:28.030 via the ambassador that this is an 02:19:28.040 --> 02:19:29.873 opportunity and this is from the 02:19:29.873 --> 02:19:32.040 Jamaicans perspective that they'd like 02:19:32.040 --> 02:19:34.207 to work with us and that that location 02:19:34.207 --> 02:19:36.262 is would be important you know , for 02:19:36.262 --> 02:19:38.429 the drug routes coming out of Columbia 02:19:38.429 --> 02:19:40.540 Venezuela . So I hope you take a look 02:19:40.540 --> 02:19:42.707 at it . I would be grateful for that . 02:19:42.707 --> 02:19:44.929 Uh Going back to General Guillo , how's 02:19:44.929 --> 02:19:47.096 our surveillance radars ? Do they need 02:19:47.096 --> 02:19:49.530 investment ? The current Congressman ? 02:19:49.540 --> 02:19:51.651 They do . Uh we do have some programs 02:19:51.651 --> 02:19:53.596 in place most notably the over the 02:19:53.596 --> 02:19:56.269 horizon radar system uh that would give 02:19:56.280 --> 02:19:58.080 us uh capability against cruise 02:19:58.089 --> 02:20:00.330 missiles , traditional air tracks as 02:20:00.339 --> 02:20:02.506 well as the hypersonics that you and I 02:20:02.506 --> 02:20:04.530 just discussed uh keeping that uh 02:20:04.540 --> 02:20:06.484 program on track is the number one 02:20:06.484 --> 02:20:09.410 priority uh from north com because of 02:20:09.419 --> 02:20:11.419 that great capability that it would 02:20:11.419 --> 02:20:13.586 bring . How would you prioritize the A 02:20:13.586 --> 02:20:15.919 BM elements that we have in Alaska ? Do ? 02:20:15.919 --> 02:20:18.190 Do they need upgrading as well ? The uh 02:20:18.639 --> 02:20:20.806 yes , all , all of the systems that we 02:20:20.806 --> 02:20:22.929 have that allow uh give us the domain 02:20:22.940 --> 02:20:25.160 awareness that we need uh are are at 02:20:25.169 --> 02:20:28.030 the top priorities uh of mine . The um 02:20:28.040 --> 02:20:30.262 there would be one of these uh over the 02:20:30.262 --> 02:20:32.429 horizon systems there . The LRDR , the 02:20:32.429 --> 02:20:34.540 uh long range discriminating radar is 02:20:34.540 --> 02:20:37.469 key uh for us to defeat uh uh missiles 02:20:37.480 --> 02:20:39.758 from North Korea . Thank you very much . 02:20:39.758 --> 02:20:41.924 I appreciate all three of you . You're 02:20:41.924 --> 02:20:43.924 back . You now recognized gentleman 02:20:43.924 --> 02:20:46.036 from Nevada , Mr Horsford . Thank you 02:20:46.036 --> 02:20:48.147 uh Chairman Rogers and to the ranking 02:20:48.147 --> 02:20:50.202 member uh for holding this important 02:20:50.202 --> 02:20:53.059 hearing um General Richardson . It is 02:20:53.070 --> 02:20:56.040 uh good to see you again . Um Last year 02:20:56.049 --> 02:20:58.216 I was in Trinidad and Tobago attending 02:20:58.216 --> 02:21:00.700 the care com uh heads of government 02:21:00.709 --> 02:21:03.870 conference uh during that trip and in 02:21:03.879 --> 02:21:06.480 meetings afterward , I've had uh 02:21:06.690 --> 02:21:09.330 several conversations with regional 02:21:09.339 --> 02:21:12.389 partners uh discussing how the United 02:21:12.400 --> 02:21:14.500 States and the Caribbean must work 02:21:14.509 --> 02:21:17.230 together to address challenges in the 02:21:17.240 --> 02:21:19.669 region . Uh Today's resignation of 02:21:19.679 --> 02:21:21.980 Prime Minister Henry of Haiti as a 02:21:21.990 --> 02:21:24.660 result of increased gang violence , 02:21:24.849 --> 02:21:27.071 really further highlights the fact that 02:21:27.080 --> 02:21:29.830 regional security , economic growth and 02:21:29.839 --> 02:21:32.360 addressing the climate crisis , as well 02:21:32.370 --> 02:21:35.540 as energy resiliency are all imperative 02:21:35.549 --> 02:21:38.209 to the success of the region . So 02:21:38.219 --> 02:21:40.910 general , um how do you believe that 02:21:40.919 --> 02:21:43.530 the United States uh would work with 02:21:43.540 --> 02:21:45.484 Caribbean nations to address these 02:21:45.484 --> 02:21:47.410 shared issues and to create long 02:21:47.419 --> 02:21:50.129 lasting partnerships in order to show 02:21:50.139 --> 02:21:52.500 an alternative to China's influence in 02:21:52.509 --> 02:21:55.089 the region . Yes . So the uh thank you 02:21:55.099 --> 02:21:57.321 Congressman and the uh the work that we 02:21:57.321 --> 02:21:59.266 do with the Caribbean is extremely 02:21:59.266 --> 02:22:01.389 important because of uh obviously how 02:22:01.400 --> 02:22:03.400 close the Caribbean is to our , our 02:22:03.400 --> 02:22:05.490 homeland . And so the security 02:22:05.500 --> 02:22:07.589 co-operation , the exercises , the 02:22:07.599 --> 02:22:09.599 regional conference uh that I do to 02:22:09.599 --> 02:22:11.839 bring leaders together . Uh but not 02:22:11.849 --> 02:22:14.389 just talk about things actually uh have 02:22:14.400 --> 02:22:17.480 liberal de deliverables on getting 02:22:17.490 --> 02:22:19.212 after those challenges that we 02:22:19.212 --> 02:22:21.679 identified during the conferences . Um 02:22:21.690 --> 02:22:23.919 is , is what we have really put 02:22:23.929 --> 02:22:27.150 emphasis on . And so uh with cyber with 02:22:27.160 --> 02:22:29.599 critical infrastructure and uh the 02:22:29.610 --> 02:22:31.721 activities that we do in the exercise 02:22:31.721 --> 02:22:34.669 program . Well , I'm glad to see that 02:22:34.679 --> 02:22:36.568 the department is taking uh these 02:22:36.568 --> 02:22:38.790 challenges seriously I , I look forward 02:22:38.790 --> 02:22:40.679 to continuing to work uh with the 02:22:40.679 --> 02:22:42.990 department and this committee uh to 02:22:43.000 --> 02:22:45.269 address the threats facing our national 02:22:45.280 --> 02:22:48.150 security and the immediate risk uh that , 02:22:48.160 --> 02:22:52.139 that faces us uh with the situation 02:22:52.150 --> 02:22:54.269 in Haiti , Haiti . Uh Assistant 02:22:54.280 --> 02:22:57.230 Secretary Zimmerman , uh I agree with 02:22:57.240 --> 02:22:59.351 you that the challenge of natural and 02:22:59.351 --> 02:23:01.950 manmade hazards do not wait for us to 02:23:01.959 --> 02:23:04.900 resolve other ongoing national security 02:23:04.910 --> 02:23:08.389 crises . We must act . Now , how is the 02:23:08.400 --> 02:23:10.289 Department of Defense taking into 02:23:10.289 --> 02:23:12.178 account climate resiliency in its 02:23:12.178 --> 02:23:16.160 everyday decision making process ? Uh 02:23:16.169 --> 02:23:18.225 Congressman , thank you so much . Uh 02:23:18.225 --> 02:23:20.058 climate resilience has become an 02:23:20.058 --> 02:23:22.391 important part of uh how we do business , 02:23:22.391 --> 02:23:24.502 not just in terms of looking directly 02:23:24.502 --> 02:23:26.559 at climate change as , as an issue , 02:23:26.769 --> 02:23:29.160 but really in terms of how we integrate 02:23:29.169 --> 02:23:31.169 across the range of activities that 02:23:31.169 --> 02:23:33.754 that department does in order to ensure 02:23:33.764 --> 02:23:35.985 that we have the operational advantage 02:23:35.995 --> 02:23:38.514 wherever we need it . Uh So an example 02:23:38.525 --> 02:23:40.634 would be uh in the Pacific uh the 02:23:40.644 --> 02:23:42.588 Ronald Reagan Missile Defense test 02:23:42.588 --> 02:23:44.811 Range uh sits on a site that I think is 02:23:44.811 --> 02:23:47.719 only 6 ft above sea level . And uh with 02:23:47.730 --> 02:23:50.120 the challenge of sea level rise , uh we 02:23:50.129 --> 02:23:52.351 have to make sure that we're taking the 02:23:52.351 --> 02:23:54.573 steps to enforce that infrastructure so 02:23:54.573 --> 02:23:56.796 that we can continue to do what we need 02:23:56.796 --> 02:23:58.796 to do from a security perspective . 02:23:58.796 --> 02:24:00.851 Likewise , I think another example I 02:24:00.851 --> 02:24:03.073 would give would be in the Arctic where 02:24:03.073 --> 02:24:05.073 uh climate change happening uh at a 02:24:05.073 --> 02:24:07.839 rate uh three times that , that we see 02:24:07.849 --> 02:24:10.139 in certain other places , has opened up 02:24:10.150 --> 02:24:12.959 new approaches and has made it really 02:24:12.969 --> 02:24:15.191 an arena for strategic competition . So 02:24:15.191 --> 02:24:17.413 we see the militarization of the Arctic 02:24:17.413 --> 02:24:20.179 by Russia China considering itself as a 02:24:20.190 --> 02:24:22.412 near Arctic nation . And that creates a 02:24:22.412 --> 02:24:24.634 lot of dilemmas that I think we have to 02:24:24.634 --> 02:24:26.801 ensure that we're on top of . And then 02:24:26.801 --> 02:24:28.968 the last I will say is that um when we 02:24:28.968 --> 02:24:30.746 see extreme weather here in the 02:24:30.746 --> 02:24:32.980 homeland , uh that is something that we 02:24:32.990 --> 02:24:36.900 need to respond to in support of uh our 02:24:36.910 --> 02:24:39.339 uh civil authorities when they ask for 02:24:39.349 --> 02:24:41.182 it and when we can do so without 02:24:41.182 --> 02:24:43.349 affecting readiness . But that uh that 02:24:43.349 --> 02:24:45.405 increasing challenge , the number of 02:24:45.405 --> 02:24:47.738 incidents that we are now responding to , 02:24:47.738 --> 02:24:50.309 I think also creates um the possibility 02:24:50.320 --> 02:24:52.542 that will be uh stretched more thinly . 02:24:52.589 --> 02:24:54.756 I I would add uh obviously the western 02:24:54.756 --> 02:24:56.867 hemisphere , the devastating storms , 02:24:56.867 --> 02:24:58.830 droughts and flooding which have 02:24:58.839 --> 02:25:01.030 inflamed conflicts and contributed to 02:25:01.040 --> 02:25:03.780 instability and mass migration . Uh So 02:25:03.790 --> 02:25:05.959 how can the department then Assistant 02:25:05.969 --> 02:25:08.709 Secretary Zimmerman , uh better partner 02:25:08.719 --> 02:25:11.110 with these vulnerable countries so that 02:25:11.120 --> 02:25:14.070 existing risks are not exacerbated by 02:25:14.080 --> 02:25:16.919 these extreme weather events ? Um One 02:25:16.929 --> 02:25:18.985 of the ways that we're looking to do 02:25:18.985 --> 02:25:20.596 that is through our security 02:25:20.596 --> 02:25:22.762 co-operation efforts . So , uh we have 02:25:22.762 --> 02:25:24.929 uh recently initiated a program called 02:25:24.929 --> 02:25:27.151 Doric , which works with partners right 02:25:27.151 --> 02:25:29.151 now in uh the western hemisphere in 02:25:29.151 --> 02:25:32.490 Africa uh to try to gear some of our , 02:25:32.500 --> 02:25:34.820 we have uh I think $10 million this 02:25:34.830 --> 02:25:37.009 year and we'll be renewing that uh 02:25:37.030 --> 02:25:39.769 which works with our partners to build 02:25:39.780 --> 02:25:42.559 partner capacity in areas that affect 02:25:42.570 --> 02:25:44.403 uh climate change or affected by 02:25:44.403 --> 02:25:46.870 climate change chair . And I recognize 02:25:46.879 --> 02:25:48.879 General from Florida , Mr Jimenez . 02:25:48.879 --> 02:25:51.059 Thank you , Mr Chairman . Um We could 02:25:51.070 --> 02:25:53.237 put the entire entire US fleet and the 02:25:53.237 --> 02:25:55.790 entire assets of the Coast Guard in the 02:25:55.799 --> 02:25:57.966 Florida Straits and it wouldn't matter 02:25:58.080 --> 02:26:00.400 um if we had the wrong policy . So Miss 02:26:00.410 --> 02:26:02.521 Zimmer , Miss Zimmerman , do you know 02:26:02.521 --> 02:26:04.743 what the Biden administration policy is 02:26:04.743 --> 02:26:07.250 towards ? If we , if we face a mass mi 02:26:07.290 --> 02:26:10.120 migration from Haiti , what is the uh 02:26:10.129 --> 02:26:14.089 Biden administration policy ? Uh I 02:26:14.099 --> 02:26:16.469 think our policy remains as it has been 02:26:16.480 --> 02:26:18.570 that we will uh endeavor to conduct 02:26:18.580 --> 02:26:20.209 repatriation as , as soon as 02:26:20.219 --> 02:26:22.275 practicable um as General Richardson 02:26:22.275 --> 02:26:24.200 outlined , if the president does 02:26:24.209 --> 02:26:27.139 declare um uh Caribbean mass migration , 02:26:27.150 --> 02:26:29.039 we have additional tools that the 02:26:29.039 --> 02:26:31.206 department will be able to leverage in 02:26:31.206 --> 02:26:33.049 terms of uh directly responding 02:26:33.059 --> 02:26:35.730 ourselves . So you expect the spec if 02:26:35.740 --> 02:26:37.851 anybody interdicted uh on the way the 02:26:37.860 --> 02:26:40.019 United States will be , will be 02:26:40.030 --> 02:26:42.252 returned back to Haiti to their country 02:26:42.252 --> 02:26:45.480 of origin . Uh That is pursuant to , to 02:26:45.490 --> 02:26:48.259 laws and policy . OK . And you haven't 02:26:48.269 --> 02:26:49.991 heard otherwise from the Biden 02:26:49.991 --> 02:26:52.639 administration . Uh I have , I have not . 02:26:53.139 --> 02:26:56.759 OK . Uh Switching gears here . Uh um 02:26:57.500 --> 02:26:59.667 General Richardson , good to see you . 02:26:59.667 --> 02:27:01.944 Uh I've been down to South America and , 02:27:01.944 --> 02:27:04.360 and I can say that um , everybody 02:27:04.370 --> 02:27:06.481 really , really , uh , appreciate you 02:27:06.481 --> 02:27:09.000 down , uh , in South America and , um , 02:27:09.870 --> 02:27:10.280 um , 02:27:13.400 --> 02:27:16.669 fentaNYL who's , who is , who's 02:27:16.679 --> 02:27:18.735 producing it , who's , who is , uh , 02:27:18.735 --> 02:27:20.679 transporting the fentaNYL into the 02:27:20.679 --> 02:27:24.580 United States . And so what , what 02:27:24.589 --> 02:27:27.410 we see in , uh , in the South com a or 02:27:27.419 --> 02:27:29.419 in terms of fentaNYL is more of the 02:27:29.419 --> 02:27:31.950 medical fentaNYL that's being stolen 02:27:31.959 --> 02:27:34.015 out of the hospitals and things like 02:27:34.015 --> 02:27:36.169 that . Uh , in terms of the , uh , 02:27:36.179 --> 02:27:38.709 precursor chemicals that are coming in , 02:27:38.719 --> 02:27:40.830 we're starting to see a little bit of 02:27:40.830 --> 02:27:43.052 that . Uh I think that that is just the 02:27:43.052 --> 02:27:45.163 beginning , possibly in this region . 02:27:45.163 --> 02:27:47.690 And so , um obviously working with our 02:27:47.700 --> 02:27:49.756 partners as they're discovering this 02:27:49.756 --> 02:27:51.700 and those sorts of things of where 02:27:51.700 --> 02:27:53.756 these precursor chemicals are coming 02:27:53.756 --> 02:27:55.756 and then putting together by the uh 02:27:55.756 --> 02:27:57.799 cartels and then uh funneled into 02:27:57.809 --> 02:28:00.150 Mexico or put together in Mexico and I , 02:28:00.160 --> 02:28:02.438 I only got five minutes . So I have to , 02:28:02.438 --> 02:28:04.549 I have to go se Senator , I'm sorry . 02:28:04.549 --> 02:28:06.771 Uh General Guillotte , is , that's your 02:28:06.771 --> 02:28:10.509 name ? Yeah . Ok . So Mexico , 02:28:11.419 --> 02:28:13.475 the fentaNYL is flown in from Mexico 02:28:13.475 --> 02:28:16.150 who's , who's , who's , who's 02:28:16.160 --> 02:28:18.339 manufacturing it , who's , ah , who's 02:28:18.349 --> 02:28:20.919 transporting it . Uh Congressman , as 02:28:20.929 --> 02:28:23.849 General Richardson said , uh we see the 02:28:23.860 --> 02:28:25.804 uh the precursor elements being uh 02:28:25.804 --> 02:28:28.879 brought in from abroad , uh many or 02:28:28.889 --> 02:28:32.049 much from China and then uh assembled 02:28:32.059 --> 02:28:34.410 there under the , um , under the 02:28:34.419 --> 02:28:36.752 cartels and then distributed from there . 02:28:36.752 --> 02:28:38.752 So , if I were to tell you that the 02:28:38.752 --> 02:28:40.919 fentanyls killed more Americans by far 02:28:40.990 --> 02:28:42.879 than all the Americans we lost in 02:28:42.879 --> 02:28:46.839 Vietnam in Afghanistan in Iraq . Ah , 02:28:46.849 --> 02:28:49.360 would that surprise you ? Unfortunately , 02:28:49.370 --> 02:28:51.481 Congressman , it would not , ah , I'm 02:28:51.481 --> 02:28:54.089 aware of that . So , so the Chinese are , 02:28:54.099 --> 02:28:56.610 are shipping the , the , the precursor 02:28:56.620 --> 02:28:59.990 chemicals to their allies , the 02:29:00.030 --> 02:29:02.129 multinational , ah , criminal 02:29:02.139 --> 02:29:04.250 organizations based out of Mexico and 02:29:04.250 --> 02:29:06.429 other places . They then , ah , 02:29:06.440 --> 02:29:09.540 manufacture it , then send it to United 02:29:09.690 --> 02:29:13.139 ST States and kills Americans . 02:29:13.599 --> 02:29:16.209 Is that fair to say ? Yes , congressman . 02:29:17.000 --> 02:29:20.370 Um , and since back in 02:29:20.379 --> 02:29:23.919 2001 , a group of 19 terrorists came 02:29:23.929 --> 02:29:27.120 and killed 3000 Americans and then we 02:29:27.129 --> 02:29:30.980 waged war like 7000 miles away for 20 02:29:30.990 --> 02:29:34.429 years . What do you think our response 02:29:34.440 --> 02:29:35.940 should be to some s , ah , 02:29:35.940 --> 02:29:38.107 organizations that are killing tens of 02:29:38.107 --> 02:29:40.107 thousands of Americans every single 02:29:40.107 --> 02:29:44.080 year , sir ? I think , 02:29:44.089 --> 02:29:46.790 uh , North com is , is , uh , ready to 02:29:46.799 --> 02:29:48.966 support within the , within the policy 02:29:48.966 --> 02:29:51.077 and has directed , uh , at this point 02:29:51.077 --> 02:29:53.132 to address the threat . Uh , we're , 02:29:53.132 --> 02:29:55.132 we're providing , uh , intelligence 02:29:55.132 --> 02:29:57.188 support to the lead federal agencies 02:29:57.188 --> 02:29:59.410 that are , that are addressing that and 02:29:59.410 --> 02:30:01.188 working with the , uh , Mexican 02:30:01.188 --> 02:30:03.410 agencies , uh , and our contribution to 02:30:03.410 --> 02:30:05.521 that is , is intelligence support . I 02:30:05.521 --> 02:30:05.509 think our , this government is failing 02:30:05.519 --> 02:30:08.259 the American people in a very big way , 02:30:08.570 --> 02:30:11.360 failing to protect our c our Children . 02:30:11.370 --> 02:30:13.481 It's the big , it's the largest cause 02:30:13.481 --> 02:30:15.592 of death of , uh , men and women from 02:30:15.592 --> 02:30:18.240 18 , I think to like 49 in the United 02:30:18.250 --> 02:30:21.759 States . And our duty , our collective 02:30:21.769 --> 02:30:23.936 duty is to protect the citizens of the 02:30:23.936 --> 02:30:26.047 United States . That's the number one 02:30:26.047 --> 02:30:28.047 duty that we have and we're failing 02:30:28.047 --> 02:30:31.620 miserably at it . Not you because you , 02:30:31.629 --> 02:30:33.518 you only follow orders , but this 02:30:33.518 --> 02:30:36.030 administration is failing miserably at 02:30:36.040 --> 02:30:38.679 protecting the United States . Um My 02:30:38.690 --> 02:30:40.801 time's just about up . So , thank you 02:30:40.801 --> 02:30:42.523 and I yield back . Thank you , 02:30:42.523 --> 02:30:44.746 gentlemen . Uh We will now adjourn this 02:30:44.746 --> 02:30:46.679 open session and reconvene the 02:30:46.690 --> 02:30:50.540 classified session in room 2212 in 02:30:50.549 --> 02:30:51.750 about five minutes .