WEBVTT 00:01.169 --> 00:03.910 All right , good afternoon . Everyone 00:04.039 --> 00:06.309 got a fair amount to pass along at the 00:06.320 --> 00:08.930 top here . So thank you in advance for 00:08.939 --> 00:12.250 your patience . Uh As you all know on 00:12.260 --> 00:14.079 January 8th , the Secretary of 00:14.090 --> 00:16.290 Defense's Chief of Staff directed the 00:16.299 --> 00:18.355 department's performance improvement 00:18.355 --> 00:20.521 officer and director of Administration 00:20.521 --> 00:22.466 and management to conduct a 30 day 00:22.466 --> 00:24.577 review to identify the relevant facts 00:24.577 --> 00:27.059 and circumstances related to Secretary 00:27.069 --> 00:29.250 Austin's hospitalization , January 1 00:29.260 --> 00:31.790 through five to evaluate the processes 00:31.799 --> 00:34.021 and procedures through which the Deputy 00:34.021 --> 00:36.188 Secretary of Defense was notified that 00:36.188 --> 00:38.299 she would carry out the functions and 00:38.299 --> 00:40.466 duties of the Secretary of Defense and 00:40.466 --> 00:42.188 to recommend recommend process 00:42.188 --> 00:44.410 improvements . The review was completed 00:44.410 --> 00:46.577 within the 30 day window and submitted 00:46.577 --> 00:48.632 to Secretary Austin who reviewed the 00:48.632 --> 00:50.799 document and signed out a memo today , 00:50.799 --> 00:52.799 February 26th to senior dod leaders 00:52.799 --> 00:54.577 outlining follow on actions the 00:54.577 --> 00:56.577 department will take in response to 00:56.577 --> 00:58.021 include implementation of 00:58.021 --> 01:00.243 recommendations contained in the review 01:00.909 --> 01:03.020 because the review includes sensitive 01:03.020 --> 01:04.742 details about the department's 01:04.742 --> 01:06.687 continuity of operations plans and 01:06.687 --> 01:08.742 personnel security . The drafters of 01:08.742 --> 01:10.742 the report wrote it as a classified 01:10.742 --> 01:12.849 document , classified version of the 01:12.860 --> 01:15.180 report has been shared with Congress as 01:15.190 --> 01:17.620 Secretary Austin has said we are 01:17.629 --> 01:19.685 committed to being as transparent as 01:19.685 --> 01:21.296 possible and sharing as much 01:21.296 --> 01:23.462 information about the 30 day review as 01:23.462 --> 01:25.573 possible . And today we are releasing 01:25.573 --> 01:27.740 unclassified summary of the classified 01:27.740 --> 01:29.907 30 day review written by the office of 01:29.907 --> 01:31.851 the Director of Administration and 01:31.851 --> 01:33.685 Management that summarizes their 01:33.685 --> 01:35.851 findings on the key events and related 01:35.851 --> 01:38.073 observations identified in the report . 01:38.250 --> 01:40.028 We are also releasing Secretary 01:40.028 --> 01:42.250 Austin's memo outlining the actions he 01:42.260 --> 01:44.038 is directing in response to the 01:44.038 --> 01:46.500 review's helpful recommendations . Of 01:46.510 --> 01:48.732 note . The review found that the Deputy 01:48.732 --> 01:50.843 Secretary was at all times positioned 01:50.843 --> 01:53.066 to perform all the functions and duties 01:53.066 --> 01:55.232 of the Secretary of Defense during the 01:55.232 --> 01:57.121 period of transfer from January 2 01:57.121 --> 02:00.029 through 5 2024 . It also identified 02:00.040 --> 02:01.980 several processes , process and 02:01.989 --> 02:04.100 procedural improvements that could be 02:04.100 --> 02:06.211 made as we highlighted . Last month , 02:06.211 --> 02:08.433 the department took immediate action to 02:08.433 --> 02:10.656 implement improvements to the processes 02:10.656 --> 02:12.378 and procedures employed when a 02:12.378 --> 02:14.156 designated official assumes the 02:14.156 --> 02:16.378 functions and duties of the secretary . 02:16.669 --> 02:18.891 The department also issued supplemental 02:18.891 --> 02:20.725 guidance to specifically require 02:20.725 --> 02:22.836 additional notifications to the White 02:22.836 --> 02:25.002 House and to clarify decision making . 02:25.002 --> 02:27.225 Regarding the need for an assumption of 02:27.225 --> 02:29.280 functions and duties , the Secretary 02:29.280 --> 02:31.169 and Deputy Secretary have already 02:31.169 --> 02:33.336 implemented two of the recommendations 02:33.336 --> 02:35.169 contained in the 30 day review , 02:35.169 --> 02:37.280 reaffirming their expectations around 02:37.280 --> 02:39.679 information sharing , staffing support , 02:39.690 --> 02:42.160 team relationships and understanding of 02:42.169 --> 02:45.279 any changes in process or staff support . 02:45.289 --> 02:47.511 When someone else assumes the functions 02:47.511 --> 02:49.400 and duties is Acting Secretary of 02:49.400 --> 02:51.729 Defense . Additionally , the chiefs of 02:51.740 --> 02:53.684 staff for The secretary and Deputy 02:53.684 --> 02:55.851 Secretary have issued written guidance 02:55.919 --> 02:58.210 and conveyed reporting expectations to 02:58.220 --> 03:00.679 make routine how information flowing to 03:00.690 --> 03:02.912 the secretary is shared with the Deputy 03:02.912 --> 03:05.440 secretary and immediate staff as 03:05.449 --> 03:07.505 outlined in his memo . There are six 03:07.505 --> 03:09.227 additional recommendations the 03:09.227 --> 03:10.838 secretary is directing to be 03:10.838 --> 03:12.838 implemented most within the next 90 03:12.838 --> 03:15.389 days . These actions are intended to 03:15.399 --> 03:17.910 ensure key department officials in the 03:17.919 --> 03:20.030 order of succession are familiar with 03:20.030 --> 03:22.899 relevant processes and procedures . And 03:22.910 --> 03:25.050 that mandatory reporting protocol is 03:25.059 --> 03:27.160 developed for personnel who provide 03:27.169 --> 03:29.179 support to the Secretary and Deputy 03:29.190 --> 03:31.190 Secretary of Defense related to 03:31.199 --> 03:33.380 situations or circumstances that might 03:33.389 --> 03:35.611 impact these leaders ability to perform 03:35.611 --> 03:37.389 their duties and functions . In 03:37.399 --> 03:39.455 addition , these actions require the 03:39.455 --> 03:41.649 department to review update and align 03:41.660 --> 03:43.438 internal reporting requirements 03:43.438 --> 03:45.660 associated with transfer of authorities 03:45.660 --> 03:47.827 situations relating to the Secretary , 03:48.119 --> 03:50.063 Deputy Secretary and others in the 03:50.063 --> 03:51.952 order of succession and to ensure 03:51.952 --> 03:53.897 continuity of operations plans are 03:53.897 --> 03:56.270 reviewed and updated as well . All of 03:56.279 --> 03:58.223 these actions demonstrate our deep 03:58.223 --> 04:00.001 commitment to strengthening our 04:00.001 --> 04:02.168 internal processes without delay . The 04:02.168 --> 04:04.335 Secretary Austin has repeatedly stated 04:04.335 --> 04:06.446 we are a learning organization and we 04:06.446 --> 04:08.223 will continue to strengthen our 04:08.223 --> 04:10.057 processes as we identify ways to 04:10.057 --> 04:12.399 improve upon existing procedures . The 04:12.410 --> 04:14.410 unclassified summary along with the 04:14.410 --> 04:16.466 secretary's memo can be found on the 04:16.466 --> 04:18.609 dod website . Finally , in support of 04:18.618 --> 04:20.618 multinational efforts to defend the 04:20.618 --> 04:22.618 lives of International Mariners and 04:22.618 --> 04:24.674 restore freedom of navigation in the 04:24.674 --> 04:26.896 Red Sea and surrounding waterways . The 04:26.896 --> 04:29.118 militaries of the United States and the 04:29.118 --> 04:30.951 United Kingdom with support from 04:30.951 --> 04:33.229 Australia , Bahrain , Canada , Denmark , 04:33.229 --> 04:32.959 the Netherlands and New Zealand 04:33.278 --> 04:35.789 conducted strikes February 23 against 04:35.799 --> 04:38.079 military targets in Houthi controlled 04:38.088 --> 04:40.779 areas in Yemen . Coalition forces 04:40.790 --> 04:43.140 targeted eight locations and struck 18 04:43.149 --> 04:44.820 targets which included Houthi 04:44.829 --> 04:47.051 underground weapon storage facilities , 04:47.051 --> 04:48.996 missile storage facilities one way 04:48.996 --> 04:51.329 attack unmanned aerial systems , air 04:51.339 --> 04:53.061 defense systems , radars and a 04:53.070 --> 04:54.959 helicopter to further disrupt and 04:54.959 --> 04:57.181 degrade the capabilities of the Iranian 04:57.181 --> 04:59.348 backed Houthi militia to conduct their 04:59.348 --> 05:01.514 stabilize , destabilizing and reckless 05:01.514 --> 05:03.681 attacks against us . And international 05:03.681 --> 05:06.014 vessels lawfully transiting the Red Sea , 05:06.014 --> 05:08.149 the Bab Al Mandeb Strait and the Gulf 05:08.160 --> 05:10.271 of Aden . It's important to highlight 05:10.271 --> 05:12.327 as well that the Houthis continue to 05:12.327 --> 05:14.327 demonstrate utter disregard for the 05:14.327 --> 05:16.327 regional and humanitarian impact of 05:16.327 --> 05:18.049 their indiscriminate attacks , 05:18.049 --> 05:19.993 threatening the fishing industry , 05:19.993 --> 05:22.216 coastal communities and imports of food 05:22.216 --> 05:24.079 supplies . As Secretary Austin 05:24.089 --> 05:25.867 underscored in his statement on 05:25.867 --> 05:27.978 Saturday , the United States will not 05:27.978 --> 05:30.033 hesitate to take action as needed to 05:30.033 --> 05:31.922 defend lives and the free flow of 05:31.922 --> 05:33.922 commerce in one of the world's most 05:33.922 --> 05:35.867 critical waterways . Again , we'll 05:35.867 --> 05:37.978 continue to make clear to the Houthis 05:37.978 --> 05:40.200 that they will bear the consequences if 05:40.200 --> 05:42.367 they do not stop their illegal attacks 05:42.367 --> 05:44.367 which harm Middle Eastern economies 05:44.367 --> 05:46.533 cause environmental damage and disrupt 05:46.533 --> 05:48.533 the delivery of humanitarian aid to 05:48.533 --> 05:50.756 Yemen and other countries . With that . 05:50.756 --> 05:50.440 I'm happy to take your questions . 05:50.929 --> 05:53.207 We'll start with Associated press Tara . 05:53.549 --> 05:55.605 Hi general writer , thanks for doing 05:55.605 --> 05:58.220 this . Um First on the 30 day review of 05:58.230 --> 06:00.510 reading the unclassified summary , 06:01.160 --> 06:03.160 you're left with an impression that 06:03.160 --> 06:05.382 this was just somewhat blameless , like 06:05.382 --> 06:07.549 just couldn't be helped due to privacy 06:07.549 --> 06:09.438 laws , but the secretary is not a 06:09.438 --> 06:11.382 private person . He six in line in 06:11.382 --> 06:13.660 succession to the presidency . How did 06:13.670 --> 06:16.299 privacy keep this information from 06:16.309 --> 06:18.829 getting to the commander in chief uh 06:18.839 --> 06:21.061 and getting , you know , why was that a 06:21.061 --> 06:24.399 reason ? Well , Tara , the , as the 06:24.410 --> 06:26.470 secretary has said , the buck stops 06:26.480 --> 06:28.647 with him and he's taken responsibility 06:28.647 --> 06:30.369 for not notifying in the , the 06:30.369 --> 06:32.702 President uh and the White House sooner . 06:32.702 --> 06:35.820 Uh and the review is also clear uh that 06:35.829 --> 06:37.773 there can be more guidance for how 06:37.773 --> 06:39.940 determinations are made , executed and 06:39.940 --> 06:42.959 communicated . Um But again , as the uh 06:42.970 --> 06:44.414 office of the Director of 06:44.414 --> 06:46.637 Administration and Management conducted 06:46.637 --> 06:48.637 this review , they found nothing uh 06:48.637 --> 06:50.859 during the review that demonstrated any 06:50.859 --> 06:52.970 indication of ill attempt , intent or 06:52.970 --> 06:55.192 attempt to obfuscate by the individuals 06:55.192 --> 06:57.269 involved . So , uh as you saw us do 06:57.279 --> 06:59.001 very quickly , uh we took some 06:59.001 --> 07:02.809 immediate steps to ensure that there 07:02.820 --> 07:05.049 were actions taken to improve 07:05.059 --> 07:07.489 communication with organizations such 07:07.500 --> 07:09.667 as the White House and the President . 07:09.667 --> 07:11.722 And you saw us demonstrate that most 07:11.722 --> 07:13.899 recently uh when the secretary visited 07:13.910 --> 07:15.970 Walter Reed on February 11 . And 07:16.000 --> 07:18.200 secondly , you know , yesterday , an 07:18.209 --> 07:20.450 active duty service member settled 07:20.459 --> 07:22.700 himself on fire in front of the Israeli 07:22.709 --> 07:25.899 embassy in protest of us support for 07:25.910 --> 07:28.350 Israel's operations in Gaza . Has the 07:28.359 --> 07:30.692 secretary been briefed on airman Vishal ? 07:30.692 --> 07:33.170 And is he concerned that maybe this 07:33.179 --> 07:36.250 airman's actions uh may indicate 07:36.260 --> 07:38.410 there's a bigger issue within the 07:38.420 --> 07:40.690 military as far as us support for this 07:40.700 --> 07:43.779 ongoing operation . Yeah . So uh the 07:43.790 --> 07:45.957 secretary is following the situation , 07:45.957 --> 07:48.123 I know the Air Force has confirmed the 07:48.123 --> 07:50.123 airman's death . Uh They do plan to 07:50.123 --> 07:52.346 provide additional information 24 hours 07:52.346 --> 07:54.346 after next of kin notifications are 07:54.346 --> 07:56.940 complete . Uh It certainly is a tragic 07:56.950 --> 07:59.440 event . Uh We do extend our condolences 07:59.450 --> 08:01.820 to the airman's family uh in terms of 08:01.829 --> 08:03.996 the incident itself , Tara , uh as you 08:03.996 --> 08:05.885 know , the DC Metropolitan Police 08:05.885 --> 08:08.051 Department has the lead for responding 08:08.051 --> 08:10.273 to questions about that incident . So , 08:10.273 --> 08:12.385 so anything on that , uh I , I'd have 08:12.385 --> 08:15.299 to refer you to , to them . But is the 08:15.309 --> 08:17.309 secretary concerned that this might 08:17.459 --> 08:19.403 indicate that there's a , a deeper 08:19.403 --> 08:21.880 issue , maybe the US military being , 08:21.890 --> 08:23.668 uh military personnel are being 08:23.668 --> 08:25.890 concerned about how uh weapons and 08:25.899 --> 08:27.899 support for Israel is being used on 08:27.899 --> 08:30.066 civilians in Gaza . Well , look from a 08:30.066 --> 08:32.010 department of Defense standpoint , 08:32.010 --> 08:35.150 since Hamas's brutal attacks on October 08:35.159 --> 08:37.215 7th , we've been focused on the four 08:37.215 --> 08:39.270 key areas that the secretary set out 08:39.270 --> 08:41.270 from the onset that's protecting us 08:41.270 --> 08:43.270 forces and citizens in the region . 08:43.729 --> 08:46.119 Supporting Israel's inherent right to 08:46.129 --> 08:48.296 defend itself from terrorist attacks , 08:48.296 --> 08:50.539 working closely with Israel to support 08:50.549 --> 08:52.771 and secure the release of hostages from 08:52.771 --> 08:54.827 Hamas and ensuring that the crisis , 08:54.827 --> 08:57.028 the conflict between Hamas and Israel 08:57.189 --> 08:58.967 doesn't escalate into a broader 08:58.967 --> 09:01.398 regional conflict . And so those 09:01.638 --> 09:03.999 objectives are what continue to inform 09:04.008 --> 09:06.064 our approach to the situation in the 09:06.064 --> 09:08.286 Middle East . And as we've talked about 09:08.286 --> 09:10.508 before , while our support for Israel's 09:10.508 --> 09:12.452 inherent right to defend itself is 09:12.452 --> 09:14.397 ironclad . We've also continued to 09:14.397 --> 09:16.508 actively communicate our expectations 09:16.508 --> 09:18.564 that Israel take civilian safety and 09:18.564 --> 09:20.619 humanitarian assistance into account 09:20.619 --> 09:22.675 into their operations . You see that 09:22.675 --> 09:24.730 incorporated into every conversation 09:24.730 --> 09:26.897 the secretary has with his counterpart 09:26.897 --> 09:29.230 in Israel as well as other us officials . 09:29.230 --> 09:31.119 And we expect them to continue to 09:31.119 --> 09:33.286 adhere to the law of armed conflict in 09:33.286 --> 09:35.452 international humanitarian law . We'll 09:35.452 --> 09:35.440 continue to do that , Jennifer uh 09:35.450 --> 09:37.672 General Ryder , what is the name of the 09:37.672 --> 09:40.309 person who conducted this investigation ? 09:40.500 --> 09:42.969 And is it a political appointee ? Uh 09:42.979 --> 09:45.799 the uh director of the Office of 09:45.809 --> 09:48.580 Administration and Management uh is 09:48.590 --> 09:51.229 Jennifer Walsh uh career civil servant . 09:51.409 --> 09:54.380 Uh so her and a small team of uh civil 09:54.390 --> 09:57.320 uh servants conducted this review , but 09:57.330 --> 09:59.500 it's independent of the defense 09:59.510 --> 10:01.399 secretary's office . It's not the 10:01.399 --> 10:03.621 office investigating itself , correct . 10:03.780 --> 10:06.890 Why was Secretary Hicks not told it 10:06.900 --> 10:09.067 would be a good idea to return to DC ? 10:09.609 --> 10:11.776 Well , as we've highlighted previously 10:11.776 --> 10:13.998 and again , the the unclassified review 10:13.998 --> 10:16.340 talks about this . Uh it was not 10:16.349 --> 10:18.405 uncommon under the procedures at the 10:18.405 --> 10:21.140 time to not include an explanation for 10:21.150 --> 10:23.317 the reason for transfer of authority . 10:23.419 --> 10:25.252 And again , as this unclassified 10:25.252 --> 10:27.475 summary highlights the secretary's team 10:27.475 --> 10:29.252 was faced with an unprecedented 10:29.252 --> 10:31.197 situation . And so they executed a 10:31.197 --> 10:33.308 transfer of authority in the same way 10:33.308 --> 10:35.419 that they had previously done . And , 10:35.419 --> 10:37.530 and I would also highlight there were 10:37.530 --> 10:39.697 several factors that came into play uh 10:39.697 --> 10:41.808 that the the review found limited the 10:41.808 --> 10:43.975 secretary staff , first of all medical 10:43.975 --> 10:46.049 privacy laws uh to include hipaa 10:46.059 --> 10:48.340 prevented medical providers from 10:48.349 --> 10:50.349 sharing candid information with the 10:50.349 --> 10:52.460 secretary staff about his condition . 10:52.530 --> 10:54.474 Second , for privacy reasons , his 10:54.474 --> 10:56.586 staff were hesitant to prior or share 10:56.586 --> 10:59.109 information that they did learn . And 10:59.119 --> 11:01.059 third , the secretary's medical 11:01.070 --> 11:03.950 situation uh was in a state of flux . 11:03.960 --> 11:06.182 Uh And so , for example , you know , it 11:06.182 --> 11:08.293 wasn't clear in the beginning if this 11:08.293 --> 11:10.349 was gonna be a one day visit , a two 11:10.349 --> 11:12.127 day visit . And so , uh we find 11:12.127 --> 11:14.182 ourselves several days later uh in a 11:14.182 --> 11:16.349 situation where again , the deputy was 11:16.349 --> 11:18.627 notified on , on the fourth of January , 11:18.627 --> 11:21.640 we've obviously , and as this summary 11:21.650 --> 11:24.030 highlights uh realize that there was a 11:24.039 --> 11:26.260 process improvement required . We took 11:26.270 --> 11:28.381 immediate steps on January 8th to fix 11:28.381 --> 11:30.381 that . And as you saw most recently 11:30.381 --> 11:32.714 when the secretary went to the hospital , 11:32.714 --> 11:34.809 uh of course , the reason uh that he 11:34.820 --> 11:36.653 was transferring authorities was 11:36.653 --> 11:39.250 communicated , but in terms of uh hi a 11:39.260 --> 11:41.371 it seems like this is a misreading of 11:41.371 --> 11:43.450 Hia , did his staff not know he had 11:43.460 --> 11:46.320 been moved to the IC U on January 2nd . 11:46.330 --> 11:48.580 And how many hours was there a gap 11:48.599 --> 11:50.821 between transfer the authority and when 11:50.821 --> 11:53.043 he was in the IC U , how many hours was 11:53.043 --> 11:55.159 there ? No head , uh no person at the 11:55.169 --> 11:57.391 helm of the defense department ? Yeah , 11:57.391 --> 11:59.960 there , there was no gap . Uh in terms 11:59.969 --> 12:03.159 of um when the uh 12:03.369 --> 12:06.530 transfer of authorities occurred . Um 12:06.849 --> 12:09.799 The secretary's team um 12:10.890 --> 12:14.799 recognized that uh because he was being 12:14.809 --> 12:17.739 admitted uh into the critical care unit . 12:17.979 --> 12:20.146 Uh and his doctor , first of all , let 12:20.146 --> 12:22.368 me back up . So on January 2nd , uh the 12:22.368 --> 12:24.760 secretary's doctor recommended that the 12:24.770 --> 12:27.030 secretary be moved into the critical 12:27.039 --> 12:29.206 care unit to receive a higher level of 12:29.206 --> 12:31.261 care . And so given the inability to 12:31.261 --> 12:32.872 provide the secretary timely 12:32.872 --> 12:35.150 communications in that medical setting , 12:35.150 --> 12:37.317 uh the secretary's aides agreed that a 12:37.317 --> 12:39.428 transfer of authorities to the deputy 12:39.428 --> 12:41.595 Secretary was necessary . So there was 12:41.599 --> 12:44.770 never any gap in authorities or command 12:44.780 --> 12:46.447 and control . The transfer of 12:46.447 --> 12:48.613 authorities was initiated , the deputy 12:48.613 --> 12:50.780 secretary was notified of the transfer 12:50.780 --> 12:52.724 and throughout the duration of the 12:52.724 --> 12:54.613 secretary's care at Walter Reed , 12:54.613 --> 12:56.558 either the secretary or the deputy 12:56.558 --> 12:58.669 secretary was at all times positioned 12:58.669 --> 13:00.891 to perform all the functions and duties 13:00.891 --> 13:03.169 of the Secretary of Defense . So again , 13:03.169 --> 13:05.224 just to underscore the secretary and 13:05.224 --> 13:07.336 the deputy Deputy were fully prepared 13:07.336 --> 13:09.447 to support the president as commander 13:09.447 --> 13:11.447 in chief at all times . Thank you , 13:11.447 --> 13:13.502 David . So the way you describe that 13:14.049 --> 13:17.979 it's the secretary's aides making this 13:17.989 --> 13:21.169 decision to turn it over was it was the 13:21.179 --> 13:24.880 secretary not in a condition where he 13:24.890 --> 13:27.700 could make the decision that oh , I'm 13:27.710 --> 13:29.821 going into the critical care unit . I 13:29.830 --> 13:32.059 won't have communications . I better 13:32.070 --> 13:35.840 turn it over . Uh again , uh 13:35.869 --> 13:38.799 The secretary's aides found themselves 13:38.809 --> 13:41.039 in an unprecedented situation . And so 13:41.049 --> 13:44.489 they uh once they recognized again that 13:44.500 --> 13:46.479 the secretary would not have the 13:46.489 --> 13:49.599 ability to access communications , uh 13:49.609 --> 13:52.130 They agreed that a transfer of 13:52.140 --> 13:54.251 authority to the deputy secretary was 13:54.251 --> 13:56.739 necessary . Uh And so again , they 13:56.750 --> 13:58.880 executed that transfer authority in 13:58.890 --> 14:00.890 accordance with the procedures that 14:00.890 --> 14:03.001 they had used previously . And at the 14:03.001 --> 14:05.168 time , they were making the decision , 14:05.168 --> 14:07.299 not the correct . And why wasn't the 14:07.309 --> 14:10.250 secretary again , as the secretary was 14:10.260 --> 14:13.159 admitted to the critical care uh unit , 14:13.309 --> 14:15.900 the aides recognized that he would not 14:15.909 --> 14:18.130 have access to secure coms . And so 14:18.140 --> 14:20.196 once there was a recognition that he 14:20.196 --> 14:22.196 was going to not have acc access to 14:22.196 --> 14:25.619 secure coms , they did uh a what 14:25.630 --> 14:27.741 standard procedure at the time was if 14:27.741 --> 14:30.019 the secretary is not gonna have access , 14:30.019 --> 14:32.186 let's go ahead and initiate a transfer 14:32.186 --> 14:34.241 of authorities which they did to the 14:34.241 --> 14:36.408 deputy secretary . So , again , no gap 14:36.408 --> 14:38.559 in command and control . Um And you 14:38.570 --> 14:40.919 know , the the bottom line here is that 14:41.099 --> 14:43.432 uh we to get kind of what you're asking , 14:43.659 --> 14:45.437 we take civilian control of the 14:45.437 --> 14:47.437 military , incredibly serious . And 14:47.437 --> 14:49.437 again , either the secretary or the 14:49.437 --> 14:51.326 deputy secretary was at all times 14:51.326 --> 14:53.548 positioned to perform all functions and 14:53.548 --> 14:55.492 duties of the Secretary of Defense 14:55.492 --> 14:57.826 throughout his duration in the hospital , 14:57.826 --> 14:59.881 there was , and again , there was no 14:59.881 --> 15:01.937 gaps we've obviously learned through 15:01.937 --> 15:04.103 this process uh and have made steps to 15:04.103 --> 15:06.326 ensure uh that processes and procedures 15:06.326 --> 15:09.530 are improved and out as outlined in the 15:09.539 --> 15:12.080 secretary's memo making the decision to 15:12.090 --> 15:14.034 transfer . He made the decision to 15:14.200 --> 15:15.969 transfer again . This was an 15:15.979 --> 15:18.750 unprecedented situation and the staff 15:18.760 --> 15:21.950 was doing uh the pro using the process 15:21.960 --> 15:24.127 and procedures that they have employed 15:24.127 --> 15:26.127 previously and again to the best of 15:26.127 --> 15:28.349 their abilities , ensuring that command 15:28.349 --> 15:30.516 and control uh that there were no gaps 15:30.516 --> 15:33.239 in command and control or no . I think 15:33.250 --> 15:36.500 I did answer the question . He was a 15:36.760 --> 15:39.580 compass able to make 15:41.409 --> 15:43.576 he was not unconscious at any point in 15:43.576 --> 15:45.742 time . But again , as his doctors made 15:45.742 --> 15:47.742 the decision to put him in critical 15:47.742 --> 15:50.690 care as the unclassified , unclassified 15:50.700 --> 15:53.609 summary highlights his aides recognized 15:53.619 --> 15:55.940 the fact that he would not have access 15:55.950 --> 15:57.909 to secure coms . So they made the 15:57.919 --> 16:00.280 decision to contact the deputy staff 16:00.349 --> 16:02.739 and to begin the transfer of authority 16:02.750 --> 16:06.539 process . One follow up on this on the 16:06.549 --> 16:08.438 question of time here and another 16:08.438 --> 16:10.660 question , how long did this process of 16:10.660 --> 16:12.827 realization take ? Because this points 16:12.827 --> 16:14.882 out that when he was in the critical 16:14.882 --> 16:17.105 care unit , quote , timely , security , 16:17.105 --> 16:19.327 communications could not be assured was 16:19.327 --> 16:21.271 this instantaneous ? Because if it 16:21.271 --> 16:23.327 wasn't , it seems there there was at 16:23.327 --> 16:25.438 least a a gap in complete command and 16:25.438 --> 16:25.380 control . As you said , there wasn't , 16:25.640 --> 16:27.973 yeah , there , there was no gap . Again , 16:27.973 --> 16:29.696 the review is pretty clear and 16:29.696 --> 16:31.862 everything that they looked at that at 16:31.862 --> 16:33.918 no time , was there a gap in command 16:33.918 --> 16:36.029 and control ? Either the secretary uh 16:36.029 --> 16:38.029 had the authorities as Secretary of 16:38.029 --> 16:40.251 Defense or the deputy secretary had the 16:40.251 --> 16:42.307 authorities and again , the staff uh 16:42.307 --> 16:43.973 was executing this process in 16:43.973 --> 16:45.584 accordance with the transfer 16:45.584 --> 16:47.640 authorities procedures that they had 16:47.640 --> 16:49.862 used at the time . Uh And so , um it is 16:49.862 --> 16:51.918 crystal clear in this report in this 16:51.918 --> 16:54.029 review that there was never any gap , 16:54.429 --> 16:56.485 will you be able to tell us how long 16:56.485 --> 16:58.651 between him going to critical care and 16:58.651 --> 17:00.873 the transfer of authority ? I , I'm not 17:00.873 --> 17:02.818 gonna get into a specific timeline 17:02.818 --> 17:04.929 other than there was no gap in the in 17:04.929 --> 17:06.985 the review uh made that very clear . 17:06.985 --> 17:09.151 And my other question was quickly on , 17:09.151 --> 17:11.207 on February 1st , when the secretary 17:11.207 --> 17:10.969 came here , he said there was no 17:10.979 --> 17:12.979 culture of secrecy . And yet as you 17:12.979 --> 17:15.090 pointed out , this says , quote , the 17:15.090 --> 17:17.312 staff were hesitant to pry or share any 17:17.312 --> 17:19.535 information that they did learn . Isn't 17:19.535 --> 17:21.868 that a culture of secrecy ? Yeah , look , 17:21.868 --> 17:24.189 I'm not gonna speak for why any 17:24.199 --> 17:26.439 individuals did or did not , you know , 17:26.449 --> 17:28.969 take certain and specific actions . I 17:28.979 --> 17:31.146 think we can all agree , you know , it 17:31.146 --> 17:33.849 is not uncommon for a natural human 17:33.859 --> 17:35.915 response when it comes to thing like 17:35.915 --> 17:38.380 things like medical care to default to 17:38.390 --> 17:40.849 a privacy setting . But the secretary 17:40.859 --> 17:42.748 also made clear during that press 17:42.748 --> 17:44.915 briefing that he acknowledges we could 17:44.915 --> 17:47.081 do better , that we will do better and 17:47.081 --> 17:49.303 that his office has a responsibility to 17:49.303 --> 17:51.248 be more transparent , which is why 17:51.248 --> 17:53.248 you've seen us significantly change 17:53.248 --> 17:55.470 procedures and processes to include the 17:55.470 --> 17:57.692 rec uh implementing the recommendations 17:57.692 --> 17:59.970 that have been outlined in this review . 17:59.970 --> 18:01.970 So just getting back to what , what 18:01.970 --> 18:04.137 David was , was asking , I'm trying to 18:04.137 --> 18:06.359 understand . So the secretary is in the 18:06.359 --> 18:08.581 hospital , I'm guessing he's being kind 18:08.581 --> 18:10.803 of whooshed into the critical care unit 18:10.803 --> 18:10.109 and is it because they couldn't reach 18:10.119 --> 18:12.341 him that he couldn't be the one to make 18:12.341 --> 18:14.119 the decision ? I mean , I don't 18:14.119 --> 18:13.989 understand why it is that the Secretary 18:14.000 --> 18:16.540 of Defense couldn't decide ? Ok , my 18:16.550 --> 18:18.717 deputy has to take over or was it that 18:18.717 --> 18:20.772 he was unwilling to cede command and 18:20.772 --> 18:22.883 that his staff intervened against his 18:22.883 --> 18:24.772 wishes or ? Yeah , I , I , I'd be 18:24.772 --> 18:26.828 careful about , you know , uh making 18:26.828 --> 18:28.828 assumptions as , as I understand it 18:28.828 --> 18:30.883 here . As I highlighted the doctor , 18:30.883 --> 18:33.150 the secretary's doctors recommended 18:33.270 --> 18:35.437 that he go into the critical care unit 18:35.437 --> 18:37.548 for a higher , higher level of care . 18:37.548 --> 18:40.300 At that point , his staff recognizing 18:40.310 --> 18:42.421 that he was going to be in a separate 18:42.421 --> 18:45.310 area , made the decision that because 18:45.319 --> 18:47.375 they would not be able to get to him 18:47.375 --> 18:49.375 with , with secure communications , 18:49.375 --> 18:51.319 they did what they typically do in 18:51.319 --> 18:53.375 these kinds of situations where he's 18:53.375 --> 18:55.541 not gonna have access to coms to say , 18:55.541 --> 18:58.260 ok , let's go ahead and initiate this 18:58.270 --> 19:00.869 process , contact the deputy secretary 19:00.880 --> 19:03.047 staff and start the procedures going , 19:03.047 --> 19:05.089 taking the initiative . Recognizing 19:05.099 --> 19:07.043 that , you know , the secretary is 19:07.043 --> 19:09.099 focused on getting health care right 19:09.099 --> 19:11.266 now and they just did what they needed 19:11.266 --> 19:12.988 to do . And again , the review 19:12.988 --> 19:15.321 highlighted that there can be some , uh , 19:15.321 --> 19:17.377 process improvements , uh , to , you 19:17.377 --> 19:19.488 know , and again , I'd refer you back 19:19.488 --> 19:21.710 to that . So they did what they thought 19:21.710 --> 19:23.877 they needed to do to ensure that there 19:23.877 --> 19:26.155 was no gap in command and control , uh , 19:26.155 --> 19:28.266 contacted the deputy secretary , uh , 19:28.266 --> 19:30.321 staff and initiated that process . I 19:30.321 --> 19:32.488 guess . What , what's weird is that it 19:32.488 --> 19:34.655 seems like it's the staff that decides 19:34.655 --> 19:36.821 who's the secretary of Defense at that 19:36.821 --> 19:39.043 moment and not the Secretary of Defense 19:39.043 --> 19:42.219 again , unprecedented situation . The 19:42.229 --> 19:44.229 secret is in the hospital receiving 19:44.229 --> 19:46.451 care . His doctors decide that it would 19:46.451 --> 19:48.562 make uh make sense for him to go into 19:48.562 --> 19:50.510 the critical care unit . The staff 19:50.520 --> 19:52.770 demonstrating initiative recognized if 19:52.780 --> 19:55.058 he's not gonna have access to his coms , 19:55.058 --> 19:57.224 let's go ahead and initiate a transfer 19:57.224 --> 19:59.391 of authority . Again , we've gone back 19:59.391 --> 20:01.558 and looked at this , we recognize that 20:01.558 --> 20:03.891 there are areas for process improvement . 20:03.891 --> 20:05.836 We've implemented those to include 20:05.836 --> 20:07.947 ensuring that there are uh you know , 20:07.947 --> 20:10.058 procedures in place for notifying why 20:10.058 --> 20:12.113 things are being transferred , who's 20:12.113 --> 20:14.280 making those decisions . Um So , and , 20:14.280 --> 20:16.447 and again , we've already demonstrated 20:16.447 --> 20:18.502 that as evidenced by his most recent 20:18.502 --> 20:21.069 hospital visit . Let me on Tara's 20:21.079 --> 20:23.760 question on , on , on the Air Force . I 20:23.829 --> 20:26.107 mean , or more broadly in the military . 20:26.107 --> 20:28.329 Have there been other acts of protest ? 20:28.329 --> 20:30.551 I mean , we know maybe not rising , the 20:30.551 --> 20:32.496 level of self immolation have been 20:32.496 --> 20:36.030 other services . I just wanted to ask 20:36.040 --> 20:39.719 about the report . Is there anything 20:39.729 --> 20:42.010 more that you can tell us or , or that 20:42.020 --> 20:45.109 it delved into or learned about the , 20:45.119 --> 20:48.989 um , the delay in notifying the 20:49.000 --> 20:51.209 White House specifically and why the 20:51.219 --> 20:53.052 President's staff didn't do that 20:53.052 --> 20:55.689 because it , it , you know , it , this 20:55.699 --> 20:57.477 doesn't seem to me like it , it 20:57.477 --> 20:59.477 necessarily addresses that UN , you 20:59.477 --> 21:01.589 know , is it just that this wasn't a 21:01.599 --> 21:03.710 requirement ? And that , so then that 21:03.710 --> 21:06.310 was part of the established , um , 21:06.319 --> 21:09.589 mechanism for , to a , it's II , I feel 21:09.599 --> 21:11.432 like that's one thing that isn't 21:11.432 --> 21:13.599 directly addressed and that seems like 21:13.599 --> 21:15.821 it was a significant part of that . And 21:15.821 --> 21:18.043 then I guess my second thing would be , 21:18.043 --> 21:20.099 you know , in terms of the questions 21:20.099 --> 21:22.210 about like , you know , the tiktok of 21:22.210 --> 21:24.432 the different moments and the questions 21:24.432 --> 21:27.390 that like , um um or in had , I mean , 21:27.400 --> 21:29.622 you know , if we can get some of that , 21:29.622 --> 21:31.900 that would be great because , you know , 21:31.900 --> 21:34.122 for the last five weeks or so we , we , 21:34.122 --> 21:36.178 the answer when we ask those kind of 21:36.178 --> 21:38.122 questions has been , this is under 21:38.122 --> 21:40.233 review , I can't address this because 21:40.233 --> 21:42.400 it's under review . And now this , the 21:42.400 --> 21:44.289 review is done and it adds no new 21:44.289 --> 21:46.344 information for us about the Tic tac 21:46.344 --> 21:46.280 and there's some pretty significant 21:46.290 --> 21:48.179 detail . So I don't know what the 21:48.179 --> 21:50.457 mechanism for that would be , but like , 21:50.457 --> 21:52.679 it doesn't seem like that should be the 21:52.679 --> 21:54.790 end of the conversation because , you 21:54.790 --> 21:56.846 know , we've been told now for , for 21:56.846 --> 21:58.957 weeks that that's the reason we can't 21:58.957 --> 22:01.012 get those , those facts and I just , 22:01.012 --> 22:03.179 I'm , I'm , I'm making an appeal for , 22:03.179 --> 22:05.346 for more information . Um either as it 22:05.346 --> 22:07.457 comes up or is it , you know , we sit 22:07.457 --> 22:09.679 down and we get the answers to those in 22:09.679 --> 22:09.000 a dedicated session or something like 22:09.010 --> 22:11.010 that . But it just feels like , you 22:11.010 --> 22:12.899 know , if , if , if the spirit of 22:12.899 --> 22:15.819 transparency , you know , is , is um 22:16.040 --> 22:18.290 supposed to be forthcoming , then , you 22:18.300 --> 22:20.522 know , I , I feel like we need a little 22:20.522 --> 22:23.900 bit more . That's ok . Thanks , Missy . 22:23.910 --> 22:26.132 Um So a few things . So , uh you know , 22:26.132 --> 22:28.180 in his press briefing earlier this 22:28.189 --> 22:31.380 month , Secretary Austin highlighted uh 22:31.390 --> 22:34.140 and took responsibility for the 22:34.160 --> 22:36.327 shortcomings when it came to notifying 22:36.327 --> 22:38.549 the President and the White House about 22:38.549 --> 22:40.660 his cancer diagnosis and acknowledged 22:40.660 --> 22:42.771 that we , the department can and need 22:42.771 --> 22:44.993 to do and will do a better job in terms 22:44.993 --> 22:47.104 of not notifying the White House . So 22:47.104 --> 22:49.049 we've learned from that we've made 22:49.049 --> 22:51.160 changes to those procedures and those 22:51.160 --> 22:54.010 are in place today . Um in terms of the 22:54.270 --> 22:57.630 uh transparency as it as it relates to 22:57.640 --> 23:00.329 this review . Uh as the secretary has 23:00.339 --> 23:02.172 said , we are committed to being 23:02.172 --> 23:04.061 transparent and providing as much 23:04.061 --> 23:07.000 information as possible . Um This 23:07.250 --> 23:09.760 unclassified summary was prepared by 23:09.770 --> 23:11.530 the office of the Director of 23:11.540 --> 23:13.979 Administration and management to uh 23:13.989 --> 23:17.079 capture unclassified information in the 23:17.109 --> 23:19.969 classified report . Uh The secretary 23:19.979 --> 23:22.930 came and talked to you uh earlier this 23:22.939 --> 23:25.410 month . Uh He'll be testifying on the 23:25.420 --> 23:28.229 hill to the hak later this week . Uh 23:28.239 --> 23:30.350 and as you know , there is an ongoing 23:30.350 --> 23:32.461 dod IG review which we are supporting 23:32.461 --> 23:34.810 and cooperating with Foley . Uh some of 23:34.819 --> 23:36.719 which may get to some of the the 23:36.729 --> 23:39.007 questions uh that , that you're asking . 23:39.130 --> 23:41.352 Um But again , I'd have to refer you to 23:41.352 --> 23:43.352 them . Follow up on the secretary , 23:43.352 --> 23:45.241 what Secretary Austin said in the 23:45.241 --> 23:47.352 briefing was that he did not instruct 23:47.352 --> 23:49.463 anyone on his staff not to inform the 23:49.463 --> 23:49.180 White House . So I still have the 23:49.189 --> 23:51.411 question of , you know what he said was 23:51.411 --> 23:53.522 he did not direct anyone on his staff 23:53.522 --> 23:55.578 to keep his hospitalization secret . 23:55.578 --> 23:57.800 And as we've as , as we've talked about 23:57.800 --> 24:00.022 uh in multiple briefings to include his 24:00.022 --> 24:02.089 briefing to include the findings of 24:02.099 --> 24:04.266 this review , there were shortfalls in 24:04.266 --> 24:07.729 the processes . And so again , uh we , 24:07.739 --> 24:10.530 we have acknowledged those uh all eight 24:10.540 --> 24:12.596 recommendations that are outlined in 24:12.596 --> 24:14.959 the 30 day review uh are highlighted in 24:14.969 --> 24:17.136 the secretary's memo which we provided 24:17.136 --> 24:19.302 today to include his direction that we 24:19.302 --> 24:21.469 will implement those recommendations . 24:21.550 --> 24:24.119 Nancy . I , I'm , I'm sorry , Pat I , I 24:24.130 --> 24:25.908 wanna just follow up on Missy's 24:25.908 --> 24:28.019 question and with all due respect , I 24:28.019 --> 24:29.852 don't think those questions were 24:29.852 --> 24:31.963 answered . You keep saying that there 24:31.963 --> 24:31.599 were shortfalls that you've made 24:31.609 --> 24:33.831 determinations . But I think what we're 24:33.831 --> 24:35.998 all saying is , I don't think it's for 24:35.998 --> 24:37.498 the department to make the 24:37.498 --> 24:39.720 determinations of what those shortfalls 24:39.720 --> 24:41.720 were . We were asking for the basic 24:41.720 --> 24:43.831 facts about what happened and what we 24:43.831 --> 24:45.887 keep hearing is , you've just said , 24:45.887 --> 24:48.109 now , a dod ig investigation is looking 24:48.109 --> 24:49.942 into this and therefore we can't 24:49.942 --> 24:52.165 release things . I think what we're all 24:52.165 --> 24:54.331 asking for is as precise as possible . 24:54.331 --> 24:57.380 Who knew what when ? And I , I think 24:57.390 --> 24:59.557 the challenge that we're all having is 24:59.557 --> 25:01.446 what we keep hearing both in this 25:01.446 --> 25:03.668 report and in your comments is that the 25:03.668 --> 25:03.439 department has made the determination 25:03.449 --> 25:05.560 that the head shortfalls , the dear , 25:05.560 --> 25:07.616 the department has assessed how it's 25:07.616 --> 25:09.560 going to address those . And we're 25:09.560 --> 25:11.505 never given an opportunity to just 25:11.505 --> 25:13.782 independently understand what happened . 25:13.782 --> 25:15.949 And so I , I just think we're owed the 25:15.949 --> 25:18.171 respect of the answer to the question . 25:18.171 --> 25:20.227 Why can't we know who knew what when 25:20.227 --> 25:22.393 and who made the determination of when 25:22.393 --> 25:22.189 information would be shared ? Because 25:22.199 --> 25:24.719 neither you uh answers with all due 25:24.729 --> 25:26.750 respect nor did this report answers 25:26.760 --> 25:29.290 that ? Yeah . No , thanks , Nancy again . 25:29.689 --> 25:31.689 You know , we are working to try to 25:31.689 --> 25:33.911 provide you with as much information as 25:33.911 --> 25:35.745 possible to be as transparent as 25:35.745 --> 25:37.689 possible about the findings of the 25:37.689 --> 25:40.589 review . Uh A again , I know it doesn't 25:40.599 --> 25:42.839 necessarily address your specific 25:42.849 --> 25:45.959 questions . But if we take a step back 25:45.969 --> 25:47.802 and look at what this review was 25:47.802 --> 25:50.000 focused on the relevant facts uh 25:50.010 --> 25:51.640 regarding the secretary's 25:51.650 --> 25:54.239 hospitalization and the process by 25:54.250 --> 25:56.520 which uh authorities were transferred 25:56.530 --> 25:58.586 from the Secretary of Defense to the 25:58.586 --> 26:00.252 Deputy Secretary of Defense . 26:00.252 --> 26:02.819 Recognizing by virtue of the fact that 26:02.829 --> 26:04.959 we initiated a review that there were 26:04.969 --> 26:07.136 some process shortfalls that needed to 26:07.136 --> 26:10.530 be addressed . And so uh we have tried 26:10.540 --> 26:12.429 to provide as much information as 26:12.429 --> 26:14.484 possible about why the secretary was 26:14.484 --> 26:16.262 hospitalized , the care that he 26:16.262 --> 26:19.020 received the process that was taken to 26:19.030 --> 26:22.000 transfer those authorities . Uh And to 26:22.010 --> 26:24.920 ensure that at all times , there was um 26:25.449 --> 26:28.069 uh a solid chain of command in terms of 26:28.079 --> 26:30.412 command and control with the department . 26:30.412 --> 26:32.790 Uh But then importantly , uh a primary 26:32.800 --> 26:34.911 focus of this review was where can we 26:34.911 --> 26:36.911 improve process wise to ensure that 26:36.911 --> 26:39.244 this kind of thing doesn't happen again . 26:39.244 --> 26:41.467 And again , I , I know this doesn't get 26:41.467 --> 26:43.578 to your specific questions . Um But I 26:43.578 --> 26:45.689 would just highlight it recently when 26:45.689 --> 26:47.967 the secretary went back to Walter Reed , 26:47.967 --> 26:50.078 uh you saw those process improvements 26:50.078 --> 26:52.133 playing themselves out . It's not to 26:52.133 --> 26:54.078 say that there's not additional uh 26:54.078 --> 26:56.300 process improvements uh in the future . 26:56.300 --> 26:58.522 Uh But again , you know , we'll , we'll 26:58.522 --> 26:58.290 keep you updated on that front , the 26:58.300 --> 27:00.467 determination , whether the guidelines 27:00.467 --> 27:02.689 spelled out are sufficient to make sure 27:02.689 --> 27:05.219 that this doesn't happen again . What 27:05.229 --> 27:06.896 do you mean ? There are eight 27:06.896 --> 27:09.062 recommendations . They include various 27:09.062 --> 27:11.173 forms of , we need to be more precise 27:11.173 --> 27:13.507 in our guidelines of transfer authority , 27:13.507 --> 27:15.118 how it works . Who makes the 27:15.118 --> 27:16.840 determination that's if that's 27:16.840 --> 27:19.062 sufficient or if they're not followed ? 27:19.062 --> 27:21.285 Yeah , you'll see in the memo , it , it 27:21.285 --> 27:23.118 talks about that there will be a 27:23.118 --> 27:25.285 regular review process . The secretary 27:25.285 --> 27:27.118 and the Deputy Secretary will be 27:27.118 --> 27:28.951 briefed by those responsible for 27:28.951 --> 27:31.007 implementing these recommendations . 27:31.007 --> 27:33.173 The implement is not happening the way 27:33.173 --> 27:35.229 it should . Well , the secretary and 27:35.229 --> 27:37.959 the deputy secretary . Ok . But I can , 27:37.969 --> 27:39.802 can I just ask that you take the 27:39.802 --> 27:41.747 following questions ? When did the 27:41.747 --> 27:43.913 chief of staff know that the secretary 27:43.913 --> 27:46.080 was hospitalized ? Who was , who did , 27:46.080 --> 27:48.302 who did the chief of staff inform , who 27:48.302 --> 27:51.050 else knew ? Well , you , so we already 27:51.060 --> 27:53.282 talked about that . She was notified on 27:53.282 --> 27:55.420 the second of January . Uh , it , it 27:55.430 --> 27:57.859 talks about in the unclassified summary . 27:57.869 --> 28:00.290 Um , the senior military assistant 28:00.300 --> 28:02.859 notified the chief of staff and , and 28:02.869 --> 28:05.036 I'd refer you back to the unclassified 28:05.036 --> 28:06.925 summary , but it , it talks about 28:06.925 --> 28:06.900 notified the chief of staff . She 28:06.910 --> 28:09.819 notified the deputy secretary staff on 28:09.829 --> 28:11.996 the , the fourth of January . Let me , 28:11.996 --> 28:14.760 let me get to Laura . Uh Thank you . Um 28:14.959 --> 28:16.959 I'm wondering , you keep , you keep 28:16.959 --> 28:18.681 saying , you know , there were 28:18.681 --> 28:18.599 shortfalls in the process and the 28:18.609 --> 28:20.776 review says there were shortfalls . So 28:20.939 --> 28:23.170 is anyone going to be reprimanded or 28:23.180 --> 28:25.290 fired because something clearly went 28:25.300 --> 28:27.660 wrong ? And I'm just wondering if , and 28:27.670 --> 28:29.670 there will be any repercussions for 28:29.670 --> 28:31.670 anyone that failed in their tasks ? 28:31.680 --> 28:33.624 Yeah , thanks Laura . So , so as I 28:33.624 --> 28:36.109 highlighted , uh , as the secretary 28:36.119 --> 28:38.319 said , the buck stops with him . Uh , 28:38.329 --> 28:40.589 he has said , and he recognizes that we 28:40.599 --> 28:42.543 should have done a much better job 28:42.543 --> 28:44.599 notifying those who should have been 28:44.599 --> 28:46.321 notified . I will say that the 28:46.321 --> 28:48.321 secretary is very proud of the team 28:48.321 --> 28:48.199 that he has supporting him . When you 28:48.209 --> 28:50.339 look at the review , it highlighted 28:50.349 --> 28:54.260 that there was uh no findings of ill 28:54.569 --> 28:57.060 uh will or , or ill intent or 28:57.069 --> 29:00.550 obstruction . Um but that people , 29:00.650 --> 29:02.594 public servants , dedicated public 29:02.594 --> 29:04.706 servants were doing what they thought 29:04.706 --> 29:06.650 was the right thing uh in order to 29:06.650 --> 29:08.761 continue to carry out the , the dod S 29:08.761 --> 29:11.369 national security mission . Uh And so , 29:11.380 --> 29:13.658 um I'll just leave it at that . Thanks . 29:14.219 --> 29:16.552 Then I'll get to the phone here , Megan . 29:16.552 --> 29:18.979 So the privacy concerns here , it seems 29:18.989 --> 29:21.045 like there's maybe a little bit of a 29:21.045 --> 29:23.211 misunderstanding about who is bound by 29:23.211 --> 29:25.267 HIPAA . The senior military aide was 29:25.267 --> 29:27.322 able to tell the chief of staff that 29:27.322 --> 29:30.800 wasn't a HIPAA violation . Um But so it 29:30.810 --> 29:33.032 would stand a reason , it wouldn't be a 29:33.032 --> 29:35.254 HIPAA violation to then turn around and 29:35.254 --> 29:34.479 tell the Congress or tell the White 29:34.489 --> 29:38.310 House . So my question is , what , what 29:38.829 --> 29:41.000 privacy laws are people adhering to ? 29:41.010 --> 29:43.420 Is there a change a clarification for 29:43.430 --> 29:45.597 what these privacy laws actually are ? 29:45.599 --> 29:48.599 Um And I if all of this was in place 29:48.609 --> 29:50.720 and these privacy concerns were still 29:50.720 --> 29:52.720 in place , what changed on Thursday 29:52.720 --> 29:54.942 when Os D then turned around and said , 29:54.942 --> 29:54.719 ok , now we tell the White House , now 29:54.729 --> 29:56.840 we tell Congress , now we tell Pat to 29:56.840 --> 29:59.118 put out a statement what changed there . 29:59.118 --> 30:01.340 Yeah , so to be clear what , what I'm , 30:01.340 --> 30:03.660 what I'm citing here is the review's 30:03.670 --> 30:05.719 findings in terms of how we got to 30:05.729 --> 30:08.719 where we got right , perceptions of 30:08.739 --> 30:11.530 medical laws , perceptions of , you 30:11.540 --> 30:14.579 know , I I need to protect the boss's 30:14.589 --> 30:17.160 privacy . Um And so again , we've 30:17.170 --> 30:20.010 learned from that and we've , the , the 30:20.020 --> 30:22.130 secretary himself has recognized the 30:22.140 --> 30:24.729 need for more transparency as it 30:24.739 --> 30:26.906 relates to the office of the Secretary 30:26.906 --> 30:29.017 of Defense and his duties . Uh And so 30:29.017 --> 30:31.880 again , you've seen us since this work 30:31.890 --> 30:34.930 very hard , uh particularly , for 30:34.939 --> 30:37.050 example , you know , working with his 30:37.050 --> 30:38.939 doctors to try to provide as much 30:38.939 --> 30:40.995 information about his medical status 30:40.995 --> 30:43.050 and condition when he does go to the 30:43.050 --> 30:44.883 hospital . Uh So again , I'm I'm 30:44.883 --> 30:47.050 offering what I'm highlighting here is 30:47.050 --> 30:49.161 what the review found in terms of why 30:49.161 --> 30:51.272 we got to where we get . So there was 30:51.272 --> 30:53.439 confusion about privacy and who should 30:53.439 --> 30:55.606 tell what when , what I also wanna lay 30:55.606 --> 30:57.328 out here is that it seems like 30:57.328 --> 30:59.383 throughout this entire process at no 30:59.383 --> 31:01.739 point , did the secretary think someone 31:01.750 --> 31:03.806 should tell my boss I'm not going to 31:03.806 --> 31:05.972 work tomorrow or possibly for the rest 31:05.972 --> 31:08.189 of the week ? Um And when he was going 31:08.199 --> 31:10.479 to be admitted to the IC U at no point , 31:10.489 --> 31:12.433 did he say someone should tell the 31:12.433 --> 31:14.489 Deputy Secretary of Defense that I'm 31:14.489 --> 31:16.822 going to be in the hospital for a while ? 31:16.822 --> 31:19.100 But this was all back to David's point . 31:19.100 --> 31:20.989 This is all being made by outside 31:20.989 --> 31:23.211 forces . I know the secretary has taken 31:23.211 --> 31:25.100 responsibility for what he did or 31:25.100 --> 31:27.267 didn't do , but I just want to be very 31:27.267 --> 31:29.489 clear that at no point , did he think I 31:29.489 --> 31:29.079 should tell my boss I'm not going to 31:29.089 --> 31:31.680 work and I should get my deputy um my 31:31.689 --> 31:33.800 authorities because I'm gonna be here 31:33.800 --> 31:35.800 for a while . Yeah , Megan . Well , 31:35.800 --> 31:38.022 again , I in part point you back to his 31:38.022 --> 31:40.245 comments in his press briefing where he 31:40.245 --> 31:42.356 highlighted the rationale , he wasn't 31:42.356 --> 31:44.467 making excuses . He was just offering 31:44.467 --> 31:46.356 an explanation in terms of why he 31:46.356 --> 31:48.356 didn't want to bother the president 31:48.356 --> 31:50.578 with that information . He also again , 31:50.578 --> 31:52.522 did not direct anybody to keep his 31:52.522 --> 31:54.633 hospitalization secret and counted on 31:54.633 --> 31:56.949 the staff to do , you know the jobs 31:56.959 --> 31:59.015 they do . And in terms , again , not 31:59.015 --> 32:00.737 making excuses , just offering 32:00.737 --> 32:02.792 explanations in terms of the staff . 32:02.792 --> 32:05.099 Again , recognizing through past 32:05.109 --> 32:07.165 procedures that were in place at the 32:07.165 --> 32:09.220 time when the secretary doesn't have 32:09.220 --> 32:11.442 access to secure communications , we're 32:11.442 --> 32:13.276 gonna do what we do , you know , 32:13.276 --> 32:15.498 military take initiative , go ahead and 32:15.498 --> 32:17.665 start doing this without necessarily , 32:17.665 --> 32:19.776 you know , uh thinking through uh the 32:19.776 --> 32:22.439 broader picture here . So again , uh we 32:22.449 --> 32:24.199 recognize there are areas for 32:24.209 --> 32:26.599 improvement . Uh The secretary's memo 32:26.609 --> 32:29.599 highlights the unclassified uh summary , 32:29.609 --> 32:31.665 highlights where those areas are and 32:31.665 --> 32:33.776 the steps that we're taking to ensure 32:33.776 --> 32:35.831 these kinds of things don't happen . 32:35.831 --> 32:37.942 Again , the secretary address that he 32:37.942 --> 32:37.229 didn't want to share his cancer 32:37.239 --> 32:39.849 diagnosis with President Biden as as so 32:39.859 --> 32:41.915 as not to burden him , but he didn't 32:41.915 --> 32:45.530 address that , that whether he , 32:45.540 --> 32:47.707 whether he thought it would make sense 32:47.707 --> 32:50.530 for him to have his staff say , hey , 32:50.760 --> 32:52.760 if you're looking for the secretary 32:52.760 --> 32:54.760 tomorrow President Biden , he's not 32:54.760 --> 32:56.927 here . Uh That's different than , than 32:56.927 --> 32:59.093 saying he didn't want to tell him that 32:59.093 --> 32:59.040 he had cancer . He , that was , this is 32:59.050 --> 33:01.217 a simple issue of saying I'm not going 33:01.217 --> 33:03.217 to show up to work tomorrow and you 33:03.217 --> 33:05.328 need to let my boss know all the rest 33:05.328 --> 33:04.930 of us . If we're not showing up to work , 33:04.939 --> 33:07.050 would be the first thing is you gotta 33:07.050 --> 33:09.383 make sure your boss knows where you are . 33:09.383 --> 33:11.383 Yeah . Again , look , I'd point you 33:11.383 --> 33:13.383 back to the classified summary that 33:13.383 --> 33:15.439 talks about some of the factors that 33:15.439 --> 33:17.606 contributed to that . Um Again , there 33:17.606 --> 33:19.550 was no finding of ill intent or an 33:19.550 --> 33:21.717 attempt to obstruct . Uh A lot of this 33:21.717 --> 33:23.839 was procedural . A lot of this was uh 33:23.849 --> 33:26.660 again , recognizing that , that we were 33:26.670 --> 33:28.900 doing things the way we had done them . 33:29.180 --> 33:31.469 Uh And so , you know , we're working 33:31.479 --> 33:33.701 hard to fix that and have already taken 33:33.701 --> 33:35.923 significant action uh to address that . 33:35.923 --> 33:38.090 Let , let me get a couple on the phone 33:38.090 --> 33:40.312 here . Uh Let me go to , uh Jeff Shog . 33:41.800 --> 33:45.250 Thank you . If Congress doesn't pass a 33:45.260 --> 33:47.630 spending bill by March 1st or March 8th . 33:47.640 --> 33:49.949 At what point do troops stop getting 33:49.959 --> 33:52.500 paid and death gratuities and other 33:52.510 --> 33:54.719 benefits for service members who die ? 33:54.790 --> 33:58.140 Would they cease ? Thank you . Yeah , 33:58.150 --> 34:00.428 thanks , Jeff . Um , obviously I don't , 34:00.428 --> 34:02.039 I don't want to get into the 34:02.039 --> 34:04.317 hypotheticals at this point . You know , 34:04.317 --> 34:04.209 we'll , we'll certainly , uh , you know , 34:04.219 --> 34:06.479 continue to work closely with Congress 34:06.489 --> 34:09.219 and hope , uh , that there is a budget 34:09.229 --> 34:12.310 passed . Um , I , I'd refer you to omb 34:12.320 --> 34:15.500 uh for any potential ramifications on 34:15.510 --> 34:17.843 the US government . But needless to say , 34:17.843 --> 34:20.010 uh , you know , we will certainly hope 34:20.010 --> 34:22.121 that a budget is passed . Um , let me 34:22.121 --> 34:25.388 go to Courtney . When did the S ma know , 34:25.398 --> 34:27.620 because I was under the impression that 34:27.620 --> 34:29.787 he found out . Well , I guess it's not 34:29.787 --> 34:31.731 clear in here , do you know ? Um , 34:31.731 --> 34:33.787 Courtney ? I don't , I don't have it 34:33.787 --> 34:35.842 right in front of me . But , uh , if 34:35.842 --> 34:38.176 you go back to the unclassified summary , 34:38.176 --> 34:40.231 I believe it , it highlights when he 34:40.231 --> 34:42.287 was notified . See it here . It says 34:42.287 --> 34:44.342 the secretary and deputy secretaries 34:44.342 --> 34:46.231 were team , um , multiple calls . 34:46.231 --> 34:48.342 Secretary , senior military assistant 34:48.342 --> 34:48.330 informed secretary's chief of staff and 34:48.340 --> 34:50.507 chairman of the joint chiefs about the 34:50.507 --> 34:52.396 hospitalization and to a , and he 34:52.396 --> 34:54.451 informed Deputy Secretary of Defense 34:54.451 --> 34:54.310 for public affairs , but I don't see 34:54.679 --> 34:57.429 when he was actually notified , did he ? 34:57.439 --> 34:59.495 And because we , we found out in the 34:59.495 --> 35:01.709 day or two after that he was , he did 35:01.719 --> 35:03.886 not go to the hospital that it was the 35:03.886 --> 35:05.663 junior military who went to the 35:05.663 --> 35:07.941 hospital with Secretary Austin . Right . 35:07.941 --> 35:09.608 Courtney , what I have in the 35:09.608 --> 35:11.830 unclassified summary is , is what I can 35:11.830 --> 35:11.689 provide at this point . It's just that , 35:11.699 --> 35:13.810 that seems like a strange one . We're 35:13.810 --> 35:15.699 finding out when other people are 35:15.699 --> 35:15.439 notified , why it's not included , 35:15.449 --> 35:17.671 right , when he was notified . Yeah , I 35:17.671 --> 35:20.005 think the , the key point here is again , 35:20.005 --> 35:22.620 uh we recognize procedurally process 35:22.629 --> 35:25.469 wise , uh improvements could be made . 35:25.770 --> 35:27.909 Uh and we are taking steps and have 35:27.919 --> 35:30.086 taken steps to improve those processes 35:30.090 --> 35:32.146 and procedures . But I think you can 35:32.146 --> 35:34.368 understand why that we still have a lot 35:34.368 --> 35:36.257 of like the press , you know , we 35:36.257 --> 35:35.770 covered this . Well , we still have 35:35.780 --> 35:38.002 questions about the timeline here and , 35:38.002 --> 35:40.224 and with all due respect this answers , 35:40.224 --> 35:42.224 none of them . I mean , most of the 35:42.224 --> 35:41.989 information about the timeline in here 35:42.000 --> 35:44.209 we were already aware of . So , II , I 35:44.219 --> 35:46.497 mean , unless I'm , I don't see . Well , 35:46.497 --> 35:48.663 again , I mean , part of this , uh you 35:48.663 --> 35:50.719 know , is the fact that we have been 35:50.719 --> 35:52.830 trying to provide as much information 35:52.830 --> 35:54.886 as we can as , as we get it . Um And 35:54.886 --> 35:57.108 you know , this uh unclassified summary 35:57.108 --> 35:59.330 is again , uh an effort to try to be as 35:59.330 --> 36:01.600 transparent as possible uh and provide 36:01.610 --> 36:03.832 you as much information as possible . I 36:03.832 --> 36:05.943 appreciate that . But again , I think 36:05.943 --> 36:08.166 the , the glaring question that remains 36:08.166 --> 36:10.277 is where was the vulnerability here ? 36:10.277 --> 36:09.810 So who was the person who knew that 36:09.820 --> 36:11.876 Secretary Austin was at the hospital 36:11.876 --> 36:14.042 had been taken by ambulance and didn't 36:14.042 --> 36:16.570 notify whomever it is . And we still 36:16.580 --> 36:18.802 even with , with , with this , we still 36:18.802 --> 36:20.969 don't have an answer to that . And the 36:20.969 --> 36:23.080 only thing that we know is that there 36:23.080 --> 36:25.247 were some communications personnel and 36:25.247 --> 36:27.302 security who went with them and then 36:27.302 --> 36:29.524 fast forward to the next day when the S 36:29.524 --> 36:31.747 MA is notifying people . Yeah , again , 36:31.747 --> 36:31.600 at the , at this point , Courtney , I'm 36:31.610 --> 36:33.721 not going to have anything to provide 36:33.721 --> 36:35.777 beyond what's , what's in the review 36:35.777 --> 36:37.999 there . Yeah . The other thing that the 36:37.999 --> 36:40.054 report doesn't mention is whether or 36:40.054 --> 36:42.166 not there was a transfer of authority 36:42.166 --> 36:43.721 um December 22nd during his 36:43.721 --> 36:45.832 hospitalization when I believe he was 36:45.832 --> 36:48.054 under anesthesia . Can you confirm that 36:48.054 --> 36:50.166 there was a transfer there was and we 36:50.166 --> 36:52.277 have talked about that uh publicly in 36:52.277 --> 36:54.443 the past , it's also included there in 36:54.443 --> 36:56.666 the review . Uh And uh but yes , it was 36:56.666 --> 36:58.666 and I'm assuming there is no gap in 36:58.666 --> 37:00.832 authority and all of that . So then my 37:00.832 --> 37:02.832 other question is there are several 37:02.832 --> 37:05.054 mentions um in this and elsewhere about 37:05.054 --> 37:06.943 uh the secretary being online and 37:06.943 --> 37:09.054 responding to emails . Was there ever 37:09.054 --> 37:11.195 any confusion about who was making 37:11.205 --> 37:13.385 decisions when there was a transfer of 37:13.395 --> 37:15.395 authority ? Yet , the secretary was 37:15.395 --> 37:17.284 online answering emails and , and 37:17.284 --> 37:19.506 working ? No , when , when the transfer 37:19.506 --> 37:21.395 of authorities were made from the 37:21.395 --> 37:24.610 secretary to the Deputy Secretary uh B 37:24.790 --> 37:27.012 account , she's the acting Secretary of 37:27.012 --> 37:29.439 Defense during that time . So , uh no 37:29.449 --> 37:31.790 confusion in terms of who those 37:31.800 --> 37:34.300 authorities uh were with . And then of 37:34.310 --> 37:36.588 course , on the evening of January 5th , 37:36.588 --> 37:38.754 the Secretary of Defense resumed those 37:38.754 --> 37:40.532 authorities . And then one last 37:40.532 --> 37:42.477 question , did she ever the deputy 37:42.477 --> 37:44.532 secretary ever ask why she was given 37:44.532 --> 37:46.477 the responsibilities ? Well , look 37:46.477 --> 37:48.532 again as we've talked about uh under 37:48.532 --> 37:50.754 the procedures at the time , it was not 37:50.754 --> 37:52.810 uncommon for transfer authorities to 37:52.810 --> 37:54.921 occur uh without an explanation . And 37:54.921 --> 37:57.199 so uh as we've highlighted before this , 37:57.199 --> 37:59.310 the Deputy Secretary was not informed 37:59.310 --> 38:01.254 of the secretary's hospitalization 38:01.254 --> 38:02.977 until January 4th . Again , we 38:02.977 --> 38:05.088 recognize uh that there was a process 38:05.088 --> 38:07.143 improvement to be made and made that 38:07.143 --> 38:09.534 change uh right at the initiation of 38:09.544 --> 38:11.544 this review . So any time there's a 38:11.544 --> 38:13.766 transfer of authority now , it includes 38:13.766 --> 38:16.215 uh an explanation as to why uh that 38:16.225 --> 38:18.225 transfer has happened . And so that 38:18.225 --> 38:20.336 will continue to be the process going 38:20.336 --> 38:22.503 forward . I have time for a few more . 38:22.580 --> 38:24.802 You keep calling , you keep saying that 38:24.802 --> 38:26.858 this is an unprecedented situation . 38:26.858 --> 38:29.080 But then you also keep saying that they 38:29.080 --> 38:31.191 did what they typically do . I mean , 38:31.191 --> 38:33.360 can you can you ? Absolutely . So , so 38:33.370 --> 38:36.010 just to kind of give you an example . 38:36.020 --> 38:38.209 Um and , and I , I know I've used this 38:38.219 --> 38:40.275 in the past . So just bear with me . 38:40.275 --> 38:42.497 But when the secretary was traveling uh 38:42.497 --> 38:44.552 in the Middle East and went to visit 38:44.552 --> 38:46.386 the US S Ford and he transferred 38:46.386 --> 38:48.552 authority to the transport authorities 38:48.552 --> 38:50.663 to the deputy secretary . So here's a 38:50.663 --> 38:53.429 situation where his staff uh identifies 38:53.439 --> 38:55.383 the fact that hey , you know , the 38:55.383 --> 38:57.495 secretary is not going to have access 38:57.495 --> 38:59.550 to secure communications . Uh And so 38:59.550 --> 39:01.750 the the standard procedure would be uh 39:01.760 --> 39:05.239 to initiate a transfer of authority . 39:05.360 --> 39:07.360 So here's a situation now where the 39:07.360 --> 39:09.360 secretary is in the hospital , he's 39:09.360 --> 39:11.860 been admitted to the IC U uh and he's 39:11.870 --> 39:14.037 not gonna have access to secure coms , 39:14.040 --> 39:16.290 that , that's not what you would call a 39:16.300 --> 39:18.600 precedented situation . He's not going 39:18.610 --> 39:20.666 to the hospital into a critical care 39:20.666 --> 39:22.943 unit , uh , on a regular basis . Right . 39:22.943 --> 39:25.166 And I'm being facetious there . So , so 39:25.166 --> 39:27.332 that's what I mean by an unprecedented 39:27.332 --> 39:30.669 situation . But , uh , air of the , uh , 39:31.179 --> 39:33.909 the , uh , airman Erin Bushnell , would 39:33.919 --> 39:36.169 he be considered an extremist under the 39:36.179 --> 39:38.840 Pentagon's definition of extremism ? 39:38.850 --> 39:41.128 That , because I know this has been an , 39:41.128 --> 39:43.350 it's been an issue for the Pentagon and 39:43.350 --> 39:45.572 has he ever come up on the radar at all 39:45.572 --> 39:47.979 in the past , Mike at , at this point 39:47.989 --> 39:50.250 again ? Um You know , like I said 39:50.260 --> 39:52.371 earlier , the air , the Air Force has 39:52.371 --> 39:54.482 confirmed his death . I'm not able to 39:54.482 --> 39:56.593 provide additional details about this 39:56.593 --> 39:58.649 particular airman . Uh The Air Force 39:58.649 --> 40:01.560 will uh after 24 hours from next of kin 40:01.570 --> 40:03.737 notification . Uh Again , I would just 40:03.737 --> 40:05.792 highlight that it , it's certainly a 40:05.792 --> 40:07.681 tragic event . Um And again , our 40:07.681 --> 40:09.459 condolences go to the film that 40:09.459 --> 40:11.626 determines whether or not he's a quote 40:11.626 --> 40:13.626 unquote extremist . I mean , at the 40:13.626 --> 40:13.379 Pentagon . Yeah , I'm not going to 40:13.389 --> 40:15.611 characterize the situation other than , 40:15.611 --> 40:18.020 again , it's very , very tragic . Hey , 40:18.030 --> 40:20.252 welcome back . I just want to follow up 40:20.252 --> 40:22.560 quickly on Mike's first question um in 40:22.570 --> 40:24.681 calling this unprecedented while this 40:24.681 --> 40:26.903 particular case may not have happened . 40:26.903 --> 40:28.626 Um It seems surely the sort of 40:28.626 --> 40:30.681 contingency the Secretary of Defense 40:30.681 --> 40:32.626 having to be out of pocket for any 40:32.626 --> 40:35.750 unforeseen reasons is predictable one . 40:35.760 --> 40:37.649 So you're saying that there is no 40:37.649 --> 40:39.969 policy , no procedures in place in such 40:39.979 --> 40:42.889 a contingency that no , I'm not , I'm 40:42.899 --> 40:44.788 not saying that what I , what I'm 40:44.788 --> 40:46.843 saying is , uh I mean , we certainly 40:46.843 --> 40:49.010 have processes and procedures but this 40:49.010 --> 40:51.679 particular situation highlighted uh 40:51.689 --> 40:53.760 that some improvements needed to be 40:53.770 --> 40:57.149 made . Uh And so we have embarked on uh 40:57.159 --> 40:59.600 and this review was a key , that was a 40:59.610 --> 41:01.610 key reason for this review is to go 41:01.610 --> 41:03.666 back and look at those processes and 41:03.666 --> 41:06.500 procedures uh and see where we could 41:06.580 --> 41:08.802 potentially need to make some changes . 41:08.802 --> 41:10.691 And , and as I've highlighted the 41:10.691 --> 41:13.149 review found eight areas where we can 41:13.159 --> 41:15.159 improve . And the secretary and the 41:15.159 --> 41:16.992 deputy secretary have already uh 41:16.992 --> 41:19.103 implemented two of those . Uh and the 41:19.110 --> 41:21.221 secretary has directed that the other 41:21.221 --> 41:24.370 six recommendations uh be implemented 41:24.379 --> 41:26.601 and I highlighted some of those in , in 41:26.601 --> 41:28.657 the top . Thanks , the unprecedented 41:28.657 --> 41:30.949 nature of the situation and that being 41:30.959 --> 41:32.959 the excuse for why people didn't do 41:32.959 --> 41:35.100 certain things . It seems to me if it 41:35.110 --> 41:36.943 was unprecedented and you have a 41:36.943 --> 41:39.979 defense secretary in an IC U , who was 41:39.989 --> 41:41.969 it who called down to the deputy 41:41.979 --> 41:44.689 defense secretary who was on a beach in 41:44.699 --> 41:47.409 Puerto Rico and not say it might be 41:47.419 --> 41:49.290 time to come back even without 41:49.620 --> 41:51.620 violating HIPAA . And talking about 41:51.620 --> 41:54.290 what the uh secretary's condition was . 41:54.300 --> 41:57.229 Why didn't anybody think to say it 41:57.239 --> 41:59.461 might be a good idea to come back given 41:59.461 --> 42:01.517 that it was unprecedented . Well , a 42:01.517 --> 42:03.517 again , uh , Jennifer , I , I'm not 42:03.517 --> 42:05.795 gonna have much to provide beyond , uh , 42:05.795 --> 42:07.850 what's in the unclassified summary , 42:07.850 --> 42:10.239 other than to say , uh , that when the 42:10.250 --> 42:12.719 transfer of authority occurred , uh , 42:12.729 --> 42:15.280 the secretary's , uh , military aides 42:15.290 --> 42:17.800 notified the deputy secretary's staff , 42:18.129 --> 42:20.073 uh , that a transfer authority was 42:20.073 --> 42:22.185 going to occur . The deputy secretary 42:22.185 --> 42:24.240 had full access to all the coms that 42:24.240 --> 42:27.399 she needed , uh , to execute her duties , 42:27.409 --> 42:29.742 uh , as the acting Secretary of Defense . 42:29.979 --> 42:33.389 Uh And , um , you know , again , I , I 42:33.399 --> 42:35.510 won't go over everything we've talked 42:35.510 --> 42:37.677 about in the past in terms of when she 42:37.677 --> 42:39.621 was notified about the secretary's 42:39.621 --> 42:41.732 hospitalization , you know , she took 42:41.732 --> 42:43.677 uh subsequent actions . Um , but I 42:43.677 --> 42:45.955 think the key point here is at no time , 42:45.955 --> 42:45.790 was there any gap in command and 42:45.800 --> 42:47.967 control of the Department of Defense ? 42:47.967 --> 42:49.911 We , again , as I've highlighted , 42:49.911 --> 42:51.967 learned from this experience , we've 42:51.967 --> 42:54.189 made changes already and we'll continue 42:54.189 --> 42:56.356 to make additional changes to ensure , 42:56.356 --> 42:58.522 uh , that we have better processes and 42:58.522 --> 43:00.689 procedures going forward . All right . 43:00.689 --> 43:02.578 Thank you very much . Everybody . 43:02.578 --> 43:01.550 Appreciate it .