WEBVTT

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Today in their service to our nation .

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It's been over a year since Vladimir

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Putin launched his illegal and brutal

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invasion into Ukraine . The cost of the

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war has been staggering tens of

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thousands dead , including over 8000

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innocent civilians . Over 13 million

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Ukrainians driven from their homes .

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Nearly 72,000 alleged Russian war

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crimes including indiscriminate

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killings , torture kidnappings and

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sexual assaults . Tens of billions of

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civilian infrastructure are destroyed

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including half of Ukraine's energy

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supply . But despite the relentless and

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appalling attacks against them , the

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Ukrainian people have held strong

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through innovation and grit . They've

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driven Putin's war machine back ,

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reclaiming much of the territory lost

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in the early days of the invasion . The

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American taxpayer has been a key

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enabler to that success . We've

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approved over $100 billion in military

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economic and humanitarian assistance to

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Ukraine and our NATO allies . This

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unprecedented level of support requires

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an unprecedented level of oversight as

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we move toward the markup of the N D A

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A . This committee will ensure that

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oversight is in place and is robust .

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This war has lasted longer than many of

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us thought it would , but that's

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because many of us thought the

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Ukrainians were no match for Putin's

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forces . We couldn't have been more

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wrong . I'm hopeful the coming counter

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offensive will provide a final stinging

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defeat for Putin . But that will

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require the president to stop being so

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reluctant to provide Ukraine with the

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capabilities . It needs to be

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successful . His hesitation over being

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too escalatory has only prolonged the

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war and driven up cost in terms of

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dollars and lives continued reluctance

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and indecision only empowers Vladimir

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Putin and it sends all the wrong

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signals to Xi and the Chinese Communist

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Party . Xi is watching how America

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responds to this conflict very closely .

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If America loses its resolve in Ukraine ,

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it sends a clear message that we won't

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be there to defend Taiwan . That is not

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the message we should be sending the C

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C P . Finally , the war in Ukraine has

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opened Europe's eyes to the threats

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they face . Some countries like Poland ,

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Romania , Finland and the Balts are

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stepping up to meet that threat .

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Others are not the awakening in Germany

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that so many thought was coming has yet

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to materialize . And in France , the

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denial runs even deeper . France has

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not met the minimum levels of NATO

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spending and it ranks at the very

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bottom of countries providing military

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assistance to Ukraine and President

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Macron's recent knee bending before

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President Xi has been shameful . Old

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Europe needs to learn the lessons of

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Nord stream two and not become

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dependent on adversaries , especially

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those that commit genocide and look to

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remake global borders through force . I

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believe the time has come for the US

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forces in Europe uh to move further

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east into the countries . They're

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investing more heavily into their own

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security . Poland Romania and the

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Baltics truly understand the threat

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from Putin . Unlike others , they've

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invested in their own defense and are

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real partners in our collective

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security . It's also where our troops

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will be the most useful and have the

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largest impact on deterrence . I look

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forward to our discussion today and

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hearing more from our witnesses about

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the best uh to the best way we can

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adjust our posture in Europe . And with

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that , I yield to the ranking member

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for any opening statement he may have .

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Thank you , Mr Chairman . It is just

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over one year since Putin's illegal

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invasion of Ukraine . I think that the

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message from the Biden administration

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and the message from the alliance has

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been incredibly strong in that year and

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that is that we will stand together ,

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we will stand up against Russian

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aggression and we will make sure that a

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sovereign democratic Ukraine remains .

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I think it's important to think back to

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where we were in January of 2022 . And

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as the chairman alluded to pretty much

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everyone thought that Ukraine was toast .

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Most everyone thought that there's no

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way that NATO would come together . You

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know , it was a bickering divisive . I

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think , you know , President Macron

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just a year before had said that it was

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basically brain dead . The overall

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assumption was that we would fail in

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Ukraine and the alliance would be

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weakened as we stand here today . I

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think everybody has to say that the

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alliance has been unbelievably

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successful in preserving Ukraine and

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turning back Russia , not only stopping

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the invasion but recapturing territory

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in Ukraine and NATO has never been

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stronger in terms of standing together

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as an alliance , not just on Ukraine ,

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but throughout eastern Europe , we have

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rallied , we are working with our

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partners across that portion of Europe

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to make sure that they have a strong

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defense to deter Russia . We have added

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Finland to NATO . Uh We're close on

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Sweden , not quite then . So I think

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it's important for all of us to have

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the proper perspective on this . We are

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being successful because of the

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leadership of the Biden administration ,

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the leadership of NATO . And most

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importantly because of the courage of

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the Ukrainian people and standing up to

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Russia . So what we need to do is is

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build on that success and continue to

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support it and and not threaten to cut

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it off for any of a variety of

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different reasons . And there's a lot

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of different reasons for that threat to

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be floated around . One of them is the

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accountability issue , but we've talked

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about that in this committee before .

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Um clearly the Ukrainians are using the

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aid and the weapons that we are giving

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them to maximum effect if they weren't ,

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they would have lost by now , there is

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oversight . Um And to challenge the

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existence of that oversight is a to

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undermine the overall effort and b not

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to be , you know , unsubtle here , but

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it is to restate Russian propaganda

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because the one thing that the Russians

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have continued to be very good at in

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this whole process is to spread every

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story that they can imagine to divide

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our alliance . That is their mission is

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to get us to back down from the United

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Front that we've shown on Ukraine by

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sowing seeds of discord . So we have to

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be really careful about which stories

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that we go ahead and spread China by

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the way , is very aggressive about that

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as well . China is one of the main

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places that is spreading the story that

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this aid is somehow not being used

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properly or is being um you know ,

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fostering corruption , none of which is

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true , all of which advances their

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interests and undermines ours . So

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first of all , let's let's recognize

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the success we've had and continue to

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build on it and be very careful about

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doing anything to undermine it . The

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next few months are going to be

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incredibly important . I think that

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alliance has stepped up incredibly well

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in the last couple of months as Ukraine

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prepares to try and retake even more

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territory , providing more weapons ,

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more training the systems that they

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need . I think we're in a strong

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position and we need to build on that ,

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but we will want to hear from our two

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witnesses about what we need to do ,

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not just in the next couple of months ,

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but certainly in those next couple of

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months and beyond , in order to make

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sure that we continue to build on those

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successes . What we want is we want a

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sovereign democratic Ukraine and we

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want peace . We want to force President

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Putin to the bargaining table to show

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him that he is not going to succeed .

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He must make peace . That is the plan .

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And I , I know our two witnesses before

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us today have had a lot to do with

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making sure that that plan has gotten

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as far as it has . And I think thank

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them for that . And then just two more

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issues more broadly European security

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going forward . Um This is a huge

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opportunity and that the NATO alliance

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has been strengthened . As I just

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described , how do we take advantage of

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that opportunity ? How do we resource

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it ? How do we strike our balance ,

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working with our partners in Europe to

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make sure that we have a strong defense

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posture um across Eastern Europe and

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that we're as close to the , the same

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page as possible . Uh It would be great

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if we could , you know , finally get

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Sweden um into uh NATO curious about

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your thoughts about how we can

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negotiate through that . So how do we

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strengthen Europe and then to the

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chairman's last point on uh China , the

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role that China is playing . And I

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think it was very clear from President

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Macron's visit and , and discussion

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after his visit with President Xi that

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this is a tough question , Europe wants

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to figure out how to sort of have , you

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know , a decent relationship with China

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while at the same time is aware of the

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challenges . But how do we strike that ?

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How do we work with our European

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partners to make sure that we're on the

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same page and trying to deal with the

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threat that that China presents . So I

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look forward to your testimony again .

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I thank you uh for , for where we're at

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and where we're going forward . It has

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been remarked , I think it's 54 nations

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that have come together um that are

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providing support to Ukraine . And

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again , let us remind ourselves that if

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we've been having this conversation in

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January of 2022 how many people in this

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room would have predicted that Ukraine

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would have been as successful as they

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have been or that the alliance would

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have held together as strongly as it

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has ? Um And with that , I yield back

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and I look forward to the uh testimony

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and , and the ranking member . Great ,

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makes a great point . And I would

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remind everybody that one of the

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reasons Ukraine has been so successful

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is we have been over there with our

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NATO allies since 2014 , training their

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military how to be a professional

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military and those dividends we're

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seeing today . Now , I like to

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recognize our witnesses . The honorable

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Celeste Wallander is Assistant

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Secretary of Defense for International

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Security Affairs . Uh General

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Christopher Cali is the commander of US

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European Command and the Supreme Allied

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Commander Europe . Miss W we'll start

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with you . Thank you , Chairman Rogers ,

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ranking member , Smith , distinguished

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members of the committee . Thank you

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for inviting me to testify . I would

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like to express my appreciation for the

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continued support from Congress and

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this committee in informing and

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enabling the Department of Defense's

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work in this region . It is an honor to

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appear alongside General Cali who is an

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outstanding colleague . Russia's

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unprovoked war of aggression has

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created the worst security crisis in

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Europe since the end of the second

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world War for over a year . This war

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has threatened Ukraine , the security

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of Europe , the global economy and the

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rules based international order . Yet

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thanks to the courage of the Ukrainian

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people supported by the United States

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and a broad coalition of allies and

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partners from around the world . Russia

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has failed to achieve its objectives

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and independent . Ukraine endures in

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Europe . NATO is more unified than ever .

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Just this month , Finland joined the

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alliance as its 31st member . We hope

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Sweden will follow soon . Our goal is a

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free , prosperous and democratic

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Ukraine able to defend its sovereignty

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and deter further aggression . The

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substantial commitment of the US

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military assistance to Ukraine reflects

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the American interests and values at

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stake . As Secretary Austin has said

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our support for Ukraine's self defense

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is an investment in our own security

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and prosperity and the United States is

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not alone . The Secretary's Ukraine

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defense contact group has rallied over

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50 allies and partners to commit more

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than $20 billion in security assistance

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to Ukraine including in the critical

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areas of air defense , armor and

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artillery . Ukraine has leveraged this

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assistance to deal Russia's significant

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blows on the battlefield . Although

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Russia's conventional military

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capabilities are diminished , Russia

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continues to present serious risk as it

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retains capabilities in nuclear , cyber

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information operations , counter space

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and undersea warfare among others .

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These capabilities combined with

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Russia's intent to undermine the

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independence of its neighbors and will

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to use force mean that Russia remains

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an acute threat . The department

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remains focused on deterring Russian

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attacks on the United States and our

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NATO allies , but it is not the United

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States alone , strengthening defense in

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Europe , European allies and partners

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have responded to Russia's invasion by

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investing in their defense capabilities

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at an accelerated pace . We are working

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with our NATO allies to ensure that the

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alliance is prepared for modern

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challenges and can deter aggression

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from any adversary allies have deployed

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land and air defense forces in the

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eastern part of the alliance and

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maritime assets across the NATO area

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for the first time in history . NATO

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has activated its defense plans and

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deployed portions of the NATO response

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force . Even as we focus on deterring

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the primary threat of Russian

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aggression , we remain vigilant and

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attuned to other threats to the Pr C

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and China . The Pr C , China and Russia

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collaborate across a variety of arenas

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to undermine the international rules

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based order . We recognize the PR C is

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taking lessons from our support for

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Ukraine and we continue to monitor

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their cooperation with Russia . It is

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clear that the Pr CS influence in

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Europe has waned in recent years in

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part due to its close alignment with

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Russia . We also advance work with

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allies and partners to address the

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interconnected challenges in Europe and

13:35.057 --> 13:37.168
beyond which the United States cannot

13:37.168 --> 13:38.834
address alone . These include

13:38.834 --> 13:41.057
complications posed by climate change ,

13:41.057 --> 13:43.880
cyber and hybrid threats and terrorism

13:44.309 --> 13:46.440
to address both these challenges and

13:46.450 --> 13:48.617
threats . The department will continue

13:48.617 --> 13:50.690
to pursue novel approaches for

13:50.700 --> 13:52.950
deterrence and defense that , that

13:52.960 --> 13:55.479
create advantages for ourselves and our

13:55.489 --> 13:58.320
allies and partners and pose dilemmas

13:58.330 --> 14:00.929
for our competitors . Congressional

14:00.940 --> 14:03.270
support for us forces deployed in the

14:03.280 --> 14:05.690
US European command area of

14:05.700 --> 14:08.229
responsibility as well as funding for

14:08.239 --> 14:11.559
defense initiatives across Europe . And

14:11.570 --> 14:14.099
Ukraine's security assistance have been

14:14.109 --> 14:16.500
and will remain critical to achieving

14:16.510 --> 14:19.979
us national security objectives . Thank

14:19.989 --> 14:21.822
you again for the opportunity to

14:21.822 --> 14:23.767
testify and I look forward to your

14:23.767 --> 14:25.750
questions . Thank you , Doctor

14:25.760 --> 14:28.789
Wallinger . I now recognize uh general

14:28.799 --> 14:31.099
Cali for five minutes . Thank you ,

14:31.109 --> 14:33.109
Chairman Rogers , uh ranking member

14:33.109 --> 14:35.165
Smith , distinguished members of the

14:35.165 --> 14:37.109
committee . Uh It's a privilege to

14:37.109 --> 14:39.276
testify before you today . Uh First of

14:39.276 --> 14:41.442
all , on behalf of the men , women and

14:41.442 --> 14:43.665
the families of us European command . I

14:43.665 --> 14:45.887
thank you for your steadfast support to

14:45.887 --> 14:47.942
their mission to their safety and to

14:47.942 --> 14:49.942
their well-being . I'd also like to

14:49.942 --> 14:52.165
personally thank members for supporting

14:52.165 --> 14:54.331
the rescheduling of today's session so

14:54.331 --> 14:56.553
that I can remain focused on my area of

14:56.553 --> 14:58.442
irresponsibility during a time of

14:58.442 --> 15:00.665
operational significance . Uh Thank you

15:00.665 --> 15:02.720
very much for that . It's a , a very

15:02.720 --> 15:04.720
busy spring . Uh It's a pleasure to

15:04.720 --> 15:06.776
appear next to uh Doctor Wallinger ,

15:06.776 --> 15:08.942
whose professionalism and expertise is

15:08.942 --> 15:08.719
well known to this committee and indeed

15:08.729 --> 15:11.210
to this whole city . Um So this is an

15:11.219 --> 15:13.500
unprecedented time in the Euro Atlantic

15:13.510 --> 15:16.900
area . 14 months ago , Russia's illegal

15:16.909 --> 15:18.700
unprovoked invasion of Ukraine

15:18.789 --> 15:20.789
dramatically shifted perceptions of

15:20.789 --> 15:23.210
European stability and broader global

15:23.219 --> 15:25.052
security and galvanized European

15:25.052 --> 15:27.700
governments resolve last year's NATO

15:27.710 --> 15:29.766
summit in Madrid was a turning point

15:29.766 --> 15:31.988
for the alliance nations committed to a

15:31.988 --> 15:33.710
new strategic concept that put

15:33.710 --> 15:35.821
collective territorial defense at the

15:35.821 --> 15:37.932
top of the alliance's task list . And

15:37.932 --> 15:40.154
for the first time since the end of the

15:40.154 --> 15:42.321
Cold War set into motion , a series of

15:42.321 --> 15:44.543
efforts that will profoundly change the

15:44.543 --> 15:46.710
military structure and the activity of

15:46.710 --> 15:48.877
NATO . We have been creating new plans

15:48.877 --> 15:51.099
for the general defense of the alliance

15:51.099 --> 15:53.210
and these will drive higher levels of

15:53.210 --> 15:55.266
readiness and more targeted national

15:55.266 --> 15:57.488
defense investments . Nations agreed to

15:57.488 --> 15:59.799
accelerate defense spending increases

15:59.809 --> 16:01.976
to establish enhanced force posture on

16:01.976 --> 16:04.031
the eastern flank of NATO to take an

16:04.031 --> 16:05.976
unprecedented number of troops and

16:05.976 --> 16:07.920
weapons and turn them over to NATO

16:07.920 --> 16:10.142
command and critically to bring two new

16:10.142 --> 16:12.142
members into the alliance . And I'm

16:12.142 --> 16:14.198
happy as Doctor Wallinger noted that

16:14.198 --> 16:16.476
one of them Finland has already joined .

16:16.900 --> 16:19.067
Over time , these efforts will lead to

16:19.067 --> 16:20.900
significantly increased European

16:20.900 --> 16:23.122
military capabilities and will continue

16:23.122 --> 16:25.344
to deter Russian aggression against the

16:25.344 --> 16:27.559
alliance . That deterrent posture has

16:27.570 --> 16:29.700
allowed us to work intensively in the

16:29.710 --> 16:32.080
past year to assist Ukraine in the past

16:32.090 --> 16:34.146
year . Thanks to your support , us ,

16:34.146 --> 16:36.423
donations of arms ammunition equipment ,

16:36.423 --> 16:38.549
vehicles and supplies have enabled

16:38.559 --> 16:41.090
Ukraine to halt Russia's invasion .

16:41.349 --> 16:43.460
We've not been alone in this effort .

16:43.460 --> 16:45.719
The dod and us lead an international

16:45.729 --> 16:47.799
effort to identify transport and

16:47.809 --> 16:50.080
deliver equipment and ammunition to

16:50.090 --> 16:52.257
Ukraine along with the training to use

16:52.257 --> 16:54.880
that equipment in combat the material

16:54.890 --> 16:56.723
support and training provided by

16:56.723 --> 16:59.229
international donors . Over 50 of them

16:59.250 --> 17:01.479
has been huge and fundamental to the

17:01.489 --> 17:03.760
Ukrainian military success over the

17:03.770 --> 17:06.209
winter . Our coalition has enabled the

17:06.219 --> 17:08.050
Ukrainian military to generate

17:08.060 --> 17:10.839
capabilities necessary to defend and to

17:10.849 --> 17:12.780
regain parts of their sovereign

17:12.790 --> 17:14.979
territory . We're confident our

17:14.989 --> 17:17.449
Ukrainian partners are good stewards of

17:17.459 --> 17:20.239
donated aid . Our embassy team in Kiev

17:20.250 --> 17:22.589
and the security assistance group in ,

17:22.630 --> 17:25.430
in Germany work diligently to monitor

17:25.640 --> 17:27.751
and to keep a close eye on all lethal

17:27.751 --> 17:29.918
aid and to ensure that it's getting to

17:29.918 --> 17:31.751
and staying in the right hands .

17:32.670 --> 17:34.559
Although we remain optimistic for

17:34.559 --> 17:36.781
Ukraine's future . This war is far from

17:36.781 --> 17:40.150
over Russia will remain an acute threat

17:40.170 --> 17:42.189
to your Atlantic security . And the

17:42.199 --> 17:44.421
national defense strategy rightly calls

17:44.421 --> 17:46.709
our attention to that Russia , of

17:46.719 --> 17:48.719
course , is not the only problem in

17:48.719 --> 17:50.941
Europe . The People's Republic of China

17:50.941 --> 17:52.997
continues to increase its access and

17:52.997 --> 17:54.830
influence in our theater and its

17:54.830 --> 17:57.052
activities pose risk to us , allied and

17:57.052 --> 17:59.069
partner interests . The PR C uses

17:59.079 --> 18:01.246
foreign direct investment , government

18:01.246 --> 18:03.357
backed business ventures and loans to

18:03.357 --> 18:05.412
gain access to technology and to get

18:05.412 --> 18:06.968
control over vital European

18:06.968 --> 18:08.869
infrastructure and transportation

18:08.880 --> 18:11.390
routes . Finally , Europe continues to

18:11.400 --> 18:13.579
face transnational challenges such as

18:13.589 --> 18:15.478
violent extremist organizations ,

18:15.478 --> 18:17.422
uncontrolled migration , organized

18:17.422 --> 18:19.700
crime , climate change , U C of course ,

18:19.700 --> 18:21.811
trains and cooperates with allies and

18:21.811 --> 18:23.533
partners to help counter those

18:23.533 --> 18:25.478
challenges as well . Our strategic

18:25.478 --> 18:27.589
approach fortifies our allies and our

18:27.589 --> 18:29.533
partners . It strengthens alliance

18:29.533 --> 18:31.422
interoperability and enhances our

18:31.422 --> 18:33.422
collective combat credibility which

18:33.422 --> 18:35.589
deters our adversaries and of course ,

18:35.589 --> 18:37.811
as always should deterrence fail us U C

18:37.811 --> 18:39.922
com alongside our allies and partners

18:39.939 --> 18:42.719
is ready to fight and win Congress .

18:42.729 --> 18:44.770
Your continued support for numerous

18:44.780 --> 18:46.947
funding initiatives remains absolutely

18:46.947 --> 18:48.780
critical to our strategy . These

18:48.780 --> 18:50.947
authorities and funding strengthen the

18:50.947 --> 18:53.113
US and NATO ability to rapidly respond

18:53.113 --> 18:55.380
in crisis or conflict . And your

18:55.390 --> 18:57.279
support demonstrates our nation's

18:57.279 --> 18:59.223
continued commitment to defend the

18:59.223 --> 19:01.334
homeland and to protect the peace for

19:01.334 --> 19:03.390
one billion people living in the the

19:03.390 --> 19:05.557
Euro Atlantic area . Chairman Rogers ,

19:05.557 --> 19:07.779
ranking member Smith , on behalf of the

19:07.779 --> 19:09.946
entire US European command . Thank you

19:09.946 --> 19:09.329
again for the opportunity to speak with

19:09.339 --> 19:11.561
you today . I very much look forward to

19:11.561 --> 19:13.617
your questions . Thank you , General

19:13.800 --> 19:16.140
Cali . I now recognize myself for , for

19:16.150 --> 19:18.280
five minutes . Uh of questions ,

19:18.449 --> 19:20.650
General Cali . It appears that the uh

19:20.660 --> 19:23.369
Putin Z Bromance has blossomed into a

19:23.380 --> 19:25.729
full blown alliance . Earlier this

19:25.739 --> 19:28.239
month , President Xi traveled to Moscow

19:28.709 --> 19:30.939
uh where they reached agreements on

19:30.949 --> 19:32.920
expanded military cooperation with

19:32.930 --> 19:35.439
Russia . Uh We know that Russia is

19:35.449 --> 19:37.505
providing China with highly enriched

19:37.505 --> 19:39.729
uranium that China is turning into

19:39.739 --> 19:42.459
plutonium uh for a strategic nuclear

19:42.469 --> 19:45.650
breakout . Can you please explain how

19:45.660 --> 19:47.549
you see the China Russia alliance

19:47.550 --> 19:49.661
evolving and why defeating Russia and

19:49.661 --> 19:52.859
Ukraine has ramifications for China and

19:52.869 --> 19:55.880
Taiwan . Yes , Mr Chairman , thanks for

19:55.890 --> 19:58.040
the uh the question , which is one of

19:58.050 --> 19:59.883
the big questions of the current

19:59.883 --> 20:02.310
situation in the globe clearly . Um

20:02.319 --> 20:05.300
during this conflict , Russia and China

20:05.310 --> 20:07.366
have grown closer together . China's

20:07.366 --> 20:10.040
diplomatic and political and moral

20:10.050 --> 20:12.520
support for Russia's illegal invasion

20:12.530 --> 20:14.859
has been notable and has assisted the

20:14.869 --> 20:17.079
Russians in their position and their

20:17.089 --> 20:19.209
domestic political position as well .

20:19.400 --> 20:22.219
It appears increasingly to be an uneven

20:22.229 --> 20:25.260
Bromance as you put it um in which

20:25.270 --> 20:28.189
Russia could become the junior partner ,

20:28.199 --> 20:30.540
but it is nevertheless a dangerous

20:30.550 --> 20:32.939
development or development of

20:32.949 --> 20:35.859
significant concern . We see military

20:35.869 --> 20:37.880
cooperation , we see economic

20:37.890 --> 20:39.612
cooperation , we see political

20:39.612 --> 20:42.479
cooperation . Um There are bright spots

20:42.489 --> 20:44.489
in this though Mr Chairman , um our

20:44.489 --> 20:47.339
European allies have spotted this ,

20:47.349 --> 20:49.071
have noticed this and with the

20:49.071 --> 20:51.238
encouragement of the United States and

20:51.238 --> 20:53.127
their own observations are taking

20:53.127 --> 20:56.130
significant actions to uh to limit the

20:56.140 --> 20:58.859
increasing influence . Uh and malign

20:58.869 --> 21:01.609
influence where it exists of the Pr C

21:01.619 --> 21:05.609
inside Europe . Uh General , I spoke

21:05.619 --> 21:07.508
in my opening statement about the

21:07.508 --> 21:09.563
administration not giving Ukraine uh

21:09.563 --> 21:11.675
the weapons it needs to win . Chief ,

21:11.675 --> 21:13.841
among them are the cluster munitions .

21:13.890 --> 21:16.250
The US military has over three million

21:16.260 --> 21:18.609
cluster munitions that can be fired

21:18.619 --> 21:22.500
from 155 . Currently current uh

21:22.510 --> 21:25.310
in Ukraine's position , we are going to

21:25.319 --> 21:27.375
spend millions of dollars destroying

21:27.375 --> 21:29.541
this if we don't use them . And Russia

21:29.541 --> 21:31.579
is using these munitions right now

21:31.599 --> 21:33.920
against the Ukrainians . Uh Can you

21:33.930 --> 21:36.041
please explain the battle battlefield

21:36.041 --> 21:38.430
military utility that giving the

21:38.439 --> 21:41.489
Ukraine uh the deep picks that we have

21:41.500 --> 21:43.849
would have in particular in places like

21:46.099 --> 21:49.729
uh yes , Chairman Rogers . Uh So uh

21:49.739 --> 21:51.979
the munition in question here is dual

21:51.989 --> 21:53.711
purpose , improve conventional

21:53.711 --> 21:55.878
munitions . Uh We call it dual purpose

21:55.878 --> 21:58.270
because it releases bomblets . Um Some

21:58.280 --> 21:59.959
of which are antipersonnel

21:59.969 --> 22:02.150
fragmentation grenades and some of

22:02.160 --> 22:04.382
which are shaped charges that attack uh

22:04.382 --> 22:06.630
vehicles uh from , from above . It's

22:06.640 --> 22:09.079
very effective munition . Um It's uh

22:09.089 --> 22:11.479
it's very effective against mixed

22:11.489 --> 22:15.069
targets of personnel and equipment . Um

22:15.079 --> 22:17.410
especially when those targets are

22:17.420 --> 22:20.650
gathered into uh dense formations and

22:20.660 --> 22:23.170
that's what's happening in it . It , it ,

22:23.180 --> 22:25.402
it is happening in Russians are sending

22:25.402 --> 22:27.959
waves of troops . It is happening in

22:28.020 --> 22:30.140
Baku sir . Um and it happens on most

22:30.150 --> 22:32.800
battlefields uh when , when one force

22:32.810 --> 22:35.020
goes into the offense Um So as a

22:35.030 --> 22:36.974
strictly military matter , it is a

22:36.974 --> 22:39.849
useful and um and very effective

22:39.859 --> 22:43.780
munition . Ok . Chair , chair

22:43.790 --> 22:45.679
yields the ranking member for any

22:45.679 --> 22:47.734
questions you may have . Thank you .

22:47.734 --> 22:49.957
Looking forward as we're looking at our

22:49.957 --> 22:51.846
posture in Europe in light of the

22:51.846 --> 22:54.012
changes the , you know , certainly the

22:54.012 --> 22:53.170
addition of Finland and NATO ,

22:53.180 --> 22:55.347
hopefully an addition of Sweden uh and

22:55.349 --> 22:57.516
the new threat that Russia poses , you

22:57.516 --> 22:59.793
know , given their invasion of Ukraine ,

22:59.793 --> 23:01.905
what should our posture be in Eastern

23:01.905 --> 23:04.071
Europe ? And how do we have the budget

23:04.071 --> 23:06.238
to support that ? How do we coordinate

23:06.238 --> 23:08.238
with our allies ? You know , what ,

23:08.238 --> 23:10.293
what does the new force posture look

23:10.293 --> 23:13.250
like going forward ? Either one of you ?

23:14.119 --> 23:16.359
Uh So I can start that from , from the

23:16.369 --> 23:18.591
military perspective and where we stand

23:18.591 --> 23:20.480
right now and perhaps defer to uh

23:20.480 --> 23:22.536
Doctor Wallander for , for , for her

23:22.536 --> 23:24.536
additional comments . Um So we have

23:24.536 --> 23:26.790
changed uh uh both allied and US force

23:26.800 --> 23:29.619
posture significantly uh during this

23:29.630 --> 23:32.280
conflict . Um In fact , even before the

23:32.290 --> 23:34.179
conflict began , we began to flow

23:34.179 --> 23:37.989
forces from inside Europe eastward and

23:38.000 --> 23:40.869
from the US into Europe , uh fairly

23:40.880 --> 23:43.047
significant uplift right now , we have

23:43.047 --> 23:45.959
about just shy of 20,000 deployed

23:45.969 --> 23:48.630
service personnel who are not normally

23:48.640 --> 23:51.515
stationed in Europe for in Europe . Uh

23:51.526 --> 23:54.086
For the most part , those organizations

23:54.095 --> 23:56.286
we now have uh in the ground domain .

23:56.316 --> 23:57.983
We have all of the fifth core

23:57.983 --> 23:59.872
headquarters for it . We have two

23:59.872 --> 24:02.038
division headquarters and we have five

24:02.038 --> 24:04.135
brigade combat teams for it . Um The

24:04.145 --> 24:06.367
vast majority of that force is postured

24:06.367 --> 24:09.686
for specifically in Romania , Bulgaria ,

24:09.696 --> 24:12.235
Hungary , a limited amount in Slovakia ,

24:12.245 --> 24:15.362
a large amount in Poland and each of

24:15.371 --> 24:17.427
the three Baltic countries , we move

24:17.427 --> 24:19.651
them around for , for uh a certain

24:19.661 --> 24:21.939
amount of training purpose . I'm sorry .

24:21.939 --> 24:24.161
Are you satisfied that we're adequately

24:24.161 --> 24:26.272
resourced to , to , to meet the , the

24:26.272 --> 24:28.439
needs right now in the ground domain ?

24:28.439 --> 24:30.605
Yes . A a absolutely . We're resourced

24:30.605 --> 24:30.261
against the requirement we , we have

24:30.271 --> 24:32.641
right now . Should the situation change ?

24:32.651 --> 24:34.762
We're prepared to recommend different

24:34.762 --> 24:37.060
levels of posture . Thank you , Dr

24:37.069 --> 24:39.050
Waller . I would , in addition , I

24:39.060 --> 24:41.400
would highlight that the United States

24:41.410 --> 24:44.699
uh is leading um under General

24:44.709 --> 24:46.876
Cavalli's leadership at U . But we are

24:46.876 --> 24:49.890
not alone that allies have reinforced

24:49.900 --> 24:52.280
their forward posture . There are eight

24:52.290 --> 24:54.800
battle groups in one in each of the

24:54.810 --> 24:57.390
front line Eastern flank countries and

24:57.400 --> 24:59.567
each one of those battle groups is led

24:59.567 --> 25:01.678
by a different framework nation . The

25:01.678 --> 25:03.789
United States is the framework nation

25:03.789 --> 25:05.900
for Poland , but other allies have

25:05.910 --> 25:08.479
taken up leadership to ensure that

25:08.489 --> 25:10.656
there is the right mix of capabilities

25:10.656 --> 25:12.739
across the entire Eastern flank . So

25:12.750 --> 25:15.280
this is a whole of alliance achieved .

25:15.849 --> 25:17.849
And uh what we will be doing at the

25:17.849 --> 25:21.000
Vilnius summit is reinforcing further

25:21.010 --> 25:23.250
that uh enhanced posture and the

25:23.260 --> 25:26.479
multinational uh nature of that

25:26.489 --> 25:28.900
commitment , which is enhancing the

25:28.910 --> 25:31.359
credibility in the eyes of the Russian

25:31.369 --> 25:33.536
leadership . It is not only the United

25:33.536 --> 25:36.250
States alone , it is the alliance of 31

25:36.260 --> 25:38.260
soon to be 32 members . And on that

25:38.260 --> 25:40.204
alliance , um you know , there are

25:40.204 --> 25:42.569
ranges of concerns about , you know ,

25:42.920 --> 25:44.809
to which particularly Germany and

25:44.809 --> 25:47.087
France , you know , that early on were ,

25:47.087 --> 25:49.253
you know , traditionally trying to get

25:49.253 --> 25:51.364
along with Russia and what would they

25:51.364 --> 25:53.531
step up , you know , what sort of both

25:53.531 --> 25:55.587
of your assessments as to where that

25:55.587 --> 25:57.698
alliance is at in terms of adequately

25:57.698 --> 25:59.753
understanding the threat from , from

25:59.753 --> 26:01.753
Russia and from China as well . And

26:01.753 --> 26:03.920
actually stepping up to , to , to help

26:03.920 --> 26:06.142
us in meeting those challenges . Well ,

26:06.142 --> 26:08.364
uh Germany has stepped up to lead to be

26:08.364 --> 26:10.309
the framework nation of the battle

26:10.309 --> 26:12.309
group in Lithuania . And France has

26:12.309 --> 26:14.420
stood up to be the lead of the battle

26:14.420 --> 26:16.531
group in Romania . I believe I've got

26:16.531 --> 26:18.670
that right . So they are uh they are

26:18.680 --> 26:21.040
leading and supporting the forward

26:21.050 --> 26:25.010
posture and on uh the on reliance on

26:25.020 --> 26:28.709
Russia . It was uh unwelcome uh cold

26:28.719 --> 26:30.359
shower of recognition that

26:30.369 --> 26:33.135
vulnerability to Russian coercion and

26:33.145 --> 26:35.625
influence had left some countries in

26:35.635 --> 26:39.344
Europe at risk . But Europe as a whole

26:39.354 --> 26:42.125
has responded quickly and has reduced

26:42.135 --> 26:45.194
dependence on both Russian gas and

26:45.204 --> 26:48.265
Russian oil has imposed strict

26:48.275 --> 26:50.824
sanctions on Russian banking on

26:50.834 --> 26:53.744
individuals of influence in Putin's

26:53.755 --> 26:56.729
Russia . And so Russia has uh Europe

26:56.739 --> 26:58.906
has responded both militarily and so I

26:58.910 --> 27:00.966
just got a few seconds left here . I

27:00.966 --> 27:02.854
want to give General Cali a quick

27:02.854 --> 27:05.021
chance to comment on that as well . Um

27:05.021 --> 27:07.243
So , so their initial moves were , were

27:07.243 --> 27:09.280
extremely positive , sir . Uh The

27:09.290 --> 27:12.160
France was uh first out of the gate to

27:12.170 --> 27:14.719
form a new battle group is prepared to

27:14.729 --> 27:16.729
raise it up to brigade size if

27:16.739 --> 27:20.699
necessary . Uh The Germans had already

27:20.709 --> 27:22.542
been running the battle group in

27:22.542 --> 27:24.959
Lithuania and immediately put a brigade

27:24.969 --> 27:26.969
command element there to facilitate

27:26.969 --> 27:29.349
further reinforcement of it . Um uh

27:29.359 --> 27:31.209
Both nations have contributed

27:31.219 --> 27:33.280
significantly to Ukraine with lethal

27:33.290 --> 27:35.530
aid and I should note that the French

27:35.540 --> 27:37.810
um in their return to large scale

27:37.819 --> 27:40.359
operational capability have just staged

27:40.369 --> 27:43.550
the largest exercise exercise Orion

27:43.560 --> 27:45.616
that they've done in over 30 years .

27:45.616 --> 27:47.979
Thank you . Hey , you're back now ,

27:47.989 --> 27:49.933
recognize the gentleman from South

27:49.933 --> 27:52.156
Carolina , Mr Wilson for five minutes .

27:52.156 --> 27:54.322
Thank you , Mr Chairman and thank both

27:54.322 --> 27:54.180
of you for being here today . And uh

27:54.199 --> 27:56.366
General Cavalli , I wanna particularly

27:56.366 --> 27:58.780
commend you a proficiency uh in Italian

27:58.790 --> 28:01.119
very appropriate . Uh But uh add to

28:01.130 --> 28:03.589
that French and Russian , uh and uh I

28:03.599 --> 28:05.766
particularly identify my uh number two

28:05.766 --> 28:07.877
son was the navy doctor serving under

28:07.877 --> 28:10.043
your command at Naples Italy . And now

28:10.043 --> 28:12.210
I've got three grandchildren who speak

28:12.210 --> 28:14.377
perfectly Italian . So they'd , they'd

28:14.377 --> 28:14.349
be happy to be with you . But no , what ,

28:14.359 --> 28:16.526
what you all are doing is so important

28:16.526 --> 28:18.415
and then general , I particularly

28:18.415 --> 28:20.415
appreciate uh you raising um the uh

28:20.415 --> 28:22.359
issue with uh chairman Mike Rogers

28:22.359 --> 28:24.303
about the cluster bombs . Uh Those

28:24.303 --> 28:27.560
should be provided uh with the uh with

28:27.569 --> 28:29.800
war criminal Putin sacrificing young

28:29.810 --> 28:33.099
Russians for his personal Ament of oil

28:33.109 --> 28:36.060
money power , the human wave tactics ,

28:36.069 --> 28:38.829
this could help stop that and certainly

28:38.839 --> 28:41.780
would deter their effectiveness . And

28:41.790 --> 28:44.920
so I hope every effort will be made to

28:44.930 --> 28:47.041
look into providing the cluster bombs

28:47.041 --> 28:49.208
that we have two million available . I

28:49.208 --> 28:51.319
mean , that's just inconceivable that

28:51.319 --> 28:53.760
we don't do more madam secretary . So

28:53.770 --> 28:55.603
please look into that . Um , the

28:55.603 --> 28:57.770
European command uh general under your

28:57.770 --> 28:59.492
command has been outstanding ,

28:59.492 --> 29:01.492
increasing our readiness along with

29:01.492 --> 29:03.548
increasing support of our allies and

29:03.548 --> 29:05.492
partners . And NATO has stepped up

29:05.492 --> 29:07.659
bolstered and its forward defenses and

29:07.659 --> 29:09.410
enhanced posture to the border

29:09.420 --> 29:12.109
countries of Ukraine to deter war

29:12.119 --> 29:15.400
criminal Putin's regime . And then it's

29:15.410 --> 29:17.469
really significant that a NATO is

29:17.479 --> 29:20.359
growing and unintended consequence of

29:20.369 --> 29:23.050
war criminal Putin and his mass murder

29:23.060 --> 29:26.239
is for Finland and Sweden to join NATO .

29:26.250 --> 29:29.410
And so , and what that means to the

29:29.420 --> 29:31.642
Baltic Republics , I mean , just , it's

29:31.642 --> 29:33.698
just inconceivable how positive some

29:33.698 --> 29:36.489
things are . But what is your summary

29:36.500 --> 29:38.800
of the combined forces and capabilities

29:38.810 --> 29:40.780
and foreign military sales ,

29:40.790 --> 29:42.979
specialized training opportunities ?

29:42.989 --> 29:45.520
What more can we do to assist the

29:45.530 --> 29:47.079
people of Ukraine ?

29:49.750 --> 29:53.219
Thank you , sir . Um First of

29:53.229 --> 29:55.900
all , uh I'd like to underline your

29:55.910 --> 29:57.854
comments about the reaction of the

29:57.854 --> 30:00.021
alliance on , on , on , on this . It's

30:00.021 --> 30:01.910
been , it , it's been very , very

30:01.910 --> 30:04.077
significant . The alliance has reacted

30:04.077 --> 30:06.188
very , very quickly . I have about 40

30:06.188 --> 30:08.640
in my NATO role . I have over 40,000

30:08.650 --> 30:10.817
troops turned over to my command right

30:10.817 --> 30:12.817
now and nations are prepared to add

30:12.817 --> 30:15.039
more um with regard to what else we can

30:15.039 --> 30:17.094
do to help Ukraine . I think staying

30:17.094 --> 30:19.206
the course that we're on right now is

30:19.206 --> 30:21.317
very important . We are in a position

30:21.317 --> 30:24.280
where we're moving into a period where

30:24.290 --> 30:26.401
the Ukrainians will conduct offensive

30:26.401 --> 30:28.569
operations . We have good solid plans

30:28.579 --> 30:31.069
to continue to support them . Um but ,

30:31.079 --> 30:33.190
but we'll need to continue with those

30:33.190 --> 30:35.719
plans , sir . And we must . Uh Chairman

30:35.729 --> 30:37.951
Mike Rogers is correct again , pointing

30:37.951 --> 30:40.173
out the danger of the Chinese Communist

30:40.173 --> 30:42.118
Party , uh the relationship of the

30:42.118 --> 30:45.630
military aid being provided by Z . And

30:45.640 --> 30:48.430
then we've seen the pictures of Iran

30:48.560 --> 30:52.510
providing the weaponry to be provided

30:52.520 --> 30:56.520
across the Caspian Sea to war . Colonel

30:56.530 --> 30:59.130
Putin , it's really clear to me that we

30:59.140 --> 31:01.910
have what you're doing is so important

31:01.920 --> 31:04.900
to deter uh the Chinese Communist Party

31:04.910 --> 31:06.869
from threats to Taiwan and then to

31:06.880 --> 31:10.380
deter the regime and Tehran from its

31:10.390 --> 31:12.279
plans of death to Israel death to

31:12.279 --> 31:14.390
America . And so what you're doing is

31:14.390 --> 31:16.723
so critical and then to madam Secretary ,

31:16.839 --> 31:20.660
the Ukraine invasion by war

31:20.670 --> 31:23.469
criminal Putin continues that we must

31:23.479 --> 31:26.339
expedite foreign military sales and to

31:26.349 --> 31:29.959
our allies . And it's so incredible . I

31:29.969 --> 31:32.025
don't think the American people know

31:32.025 --> 31:33.969
that 10 countries actually see the

31:33.969 --> 31:36.369
United States in terms of military

31:36.469 --> 31:39.439
equipment being provided to Ukraine

31:39.550 --> 31:42.599
based on per capita GDP ,

31:42.800 --> 31:45.089
including a wonderful country called

31:45.099 --> 31:48.729
Bulgaria . And so it's , but we need to

31:48.739 --> 31:51.599
backfill foreign military sales to our

31:52.030 --> 31:55.459
allies . But in addition , and also

31:55.469 --> 31:58.060
we need to look into what happened .

31:58.150 --> 32:00.949
It's not , it's in your purview

32:00.959 --> 32:03.390
providing aid that's already been paid

32:03.400 --> 32:06.989
for by Taiwan . Um Thank you ,

32:07.000 --> 32:09.400
Congressman . I I thank you for the

32:09.410 --> 32:12.760
opportunity to thank Congress for

32:12.770 --> 32:16.119
providing heightened uh amounts of

32:16.130 --> 32:18.540
foreign military financing authorities

32:18.550 --> 32:20.661
and appropriations in order for us to

32:20.661 --> 32:22.717
do exactly what you rightly point to

32:22.717 --> 32:25.194
which is so many allies and partners

32:25.204 --> 32:27.944
have been so quick and so generous in

32:27.954 --> 32:30.344
contributing capabilities to Ukraine

32:30.435 --> 32:33.594
that flexibility and higher amounts you

32:33.604 --> 32:36.415
have given us will allow us to backfill

32:36.425 --> 32:38.481
those allies and partners . Well , I

32:38.481 --> 32:40.647
want to thank Chairman Mike Rogers and

32:40.647 --> 32:42.758
Chairman Mike mccaul . They have been

32:42.758 --> 32:45.092
uh working with the ranking members too .

32:45.092 --> 32:47.258
It's been , hey , this is bipartisan .

32:47.258 --> 32:49.314
Amazing and so let's work together .

32:49.314 --> 32:51.536
Thank you back . Do you not recognize a

32:51.536 --> 32:53.314
gentleman from Connecticut ? Mr

32:53.314 --> 32:55.536
Courtney for five minutes ? Thank you ,

32:55.536 --> 32:55.170
Mr Chairman and thank you to both

32:55.180 --> 32:57.469
witnesses for your outstanding work .

32:57.479 --> 32:59.646
Um At this time of again , the biggest

32:59.646 --> 33:01.646
security challenge since the end of

33:01.646 --> 33:03.989
World War two . Um I'd like to actually

33:04.000 --> 33:06.222
general shift the topic a little bit to

33:06.222 --> 33:08.660
not the well out of the eastern flank

33:08.670 --> 33:10.930
and more to the western flank . Um You

33:10.939 --> 33:13.319
know , in , in light of even in the

33:13.329 --> 33:15.900
midst of all of Russia's um degradation

33:15.910 --> 33:17.966
of its military force because of the

33:17.966 --> 33:19.819
conflict , its navy continues to

33:19.829 --> 33:22.219
operate . And um we heard from General

33:22.229 --> 33:24.173
Van Huk , your colleague , when he

33:24.173 --> 33:26.780
testified that , um , the , uh ,

33:26.790 --> 33:29.339
patrols in the Atlantic , which used to

33:29.349 --> 33:31.293
be sort of sporadic by the , the ,

33:31.293 --> 33:34.130
their submarine , um , patrols , uh ,

33:34.140 --> 33:37.380
are now , uh , becoming persistent and ,

33:37.390 --> 33:39.612
um , I wonder if you could just sort of

33:39.612 --> 33:41.723
talk about that as much as you can in

33:41.723 --> 33:43.890
terms of , you know , what we're doing

33:43.890 --> 33:46.001
in terms of anti submarine warfare to

33:46.001 --> 33:48.001
track this and address this Because

33:48.001 --> 33:50.057
again , um despite everything that's

33:50.057 --> 33:52.112
going on with your other portfolio ,

33:52.112 --> 33:54.334
this , this is uh different than it was

33:54.334 --> 33:56.668
even , you know , five or six years ago .

33:56.668 --> 33:58.668
Yes , sir . Thanks . Thanks for the

33:58.668 --> 34:00.890
opportunity and , and this is very much

34:00.890 --> 34:03.001
inside my , my portfolio . I share it

34:03.001 --> 34:05.001
with uh with uh Glenn Van . He , of

34:05.001 --> 34:07.223
course , defense of the homeland starts

34:07.223 --> 34:10.510
forward . Um First of all , sir , if I

34:10.520 --> 34:13.280
could , I'd , I'd like to um underline

34:13.290 --> 34:16.929
your comment about the specificity of

34:16.939 --> 34:19.939
the degradation of the Russian forces .

34:20.149 --> 34:23.439
Um Much of the Russian military has not

34:23.449 --> 34:26.169
been affected negatively by this

34:26.179 --> 34:28.879
conflict . One of those forces is their

34:28.889 --> 34:31.649
undersea forces . It's hard to talk in

34:31.659 --> 34:33.881
public as you well know , sir , about ,

34:33.881 --> 34:36.048
about undersea warfare and our efforts

34:36.048 --> 34:38.270
in that regard . But I can say that the

34:38.270 --> 34:40.270
Russians are more active than we've

34:40.270 --> 34:42.326
seen them in years and their patrols

34:42.326 --> 34:45.225
into the Atlantic . Um And throughout

34:45.235 --> 34:48.245
the Atlantic are , are um are are at a

34:48.254 --> 34:50.465
high level , uh most of the time at a

34:50.475 --> 34:52.697
higher level than we've seen in years .

34:52.697 --> 34:54.642
And this is , as you pointed out ,

34:54.642 --> 34:56.864
despite all of the efforts that they're

34:56.864 --> 34:58.969
undertaking inside Ukraine . So one

34:58.979 --> 35:01.146
development which uh again , maybe you

35:01.146 --> 35:03.368
could comment on is just again with the

35:03.368 --> 35:05.479
admission of Finland to uh NATO . And

35:05.479 --> 35:07.646
hopefully , you know , shortly after ,

35:07.646 --> 35:10.209
uh with Sweden that , um you know ,

35:10.219 --> 35:13.020
that brings to , to , to the table or

35:13.030 --> 35:16.570
to the sea . Uh another sort of um you

35:16.580 --> 35:19.500
know , a valuable ally and uh you

35:19.510 --> 35:21.677
mentioned some of the naval exercise ,

35:21.677 --> 35:23.566
I think it was on page 15 of your

35:23.566 --> 35:25.399
testimony that have been ongoing

35:25.399 --> 35:27.621
despite again , the in the midst of the

35:27.621 --> 35:29.732
Ukraine war . Uh again , can you talk

35:29.732 --> 35:31.732
about where you see , you know what

35:31.732 --> 35:33.954
they will add to those efforts to again

35:33.954 --> 35:36.399
uh strengthen the western flank ? Yes ,

35:36.409 --> 35:38.679
sir . Absolutely . So the accession of

35:38.689 --> 35:40.578
Finland is very important to us ,

35:40.578 --> 35:43.070
Finland brings a large army at full

35:43.080 --> 35:46.350
mobilization . 280,000 uh ground troops

35:46.360 --> 35:49.120
brings a very competent uh navy brings

35:49.129 --> 35:51.850
a large and growing air force . They're

35:51.860 --> 35:55.479
in the process of acquiring 64 F-35s

35:55.610 --> 35:58.969
which will create uh 255th

35:58.979 --> 36:01.959
generation fighters across the Northern

36:01.969 --> 36:04.320
three Scandinavian countries . So the

36:04.330 --> 36:06.639
accession of Finland is is very strong ,

36:06.709 --> 36:08.969
the the future . We hope accession of

36:08.979 --> 36:11.035
Sweden brings much of the same . The

36:11.035 --> 36:13.199
Swedish navy is very active , very

36:13.209 --> 36:15.431
confident , very powerful in the Baltic

36:15.431 --> 36:18.419
Sea area . And this will give us a huge

36:18.429 --> 36:21.090
additional capability to control all

36:21.100 --> 36:24.110
three domains , uh classical domains in

36:24.120 --> 36:26.350
the High North . And uh finally , I

36:26.360 --> 36:28.614
would point out that just the geography

36:28.625 --> 36:31.185
alone in a military sense of bringing

36:31.195 --> 36:33.425
those two huge borders of the Baltic

36:33.435 --> 36:35.814
Sea into the alliance . While we're

36:35.824 --> 36:39.665
adding 1300 kilometers of NATO border

36:39.675 --> 36:41.786
to the Russian Federation , those are

36:41.786 --> 36:43.842
very powerful in and of themselves ,

36:43.842 --> 36:46.064
sir . Thank you . Well , again , your ,

36:46.064 --> 36:48.119
your point about um in answer to the

36:48.119 --> 36:49.897
first question uh regarding the

36:49.897 --> 36:51.897
increased patrols , I mean , it's a

36:51.897 --> 36:54.008
team sport in terms of all our allies

36:54.008 --> 36:56.342
working together to sort of uh you know ,

36:56.342 --> 36:58.564
hopefully manage that and , and keep it

36:58.564 --> 37:00.731
under control . So , um and again , as

37:00.731 --> 37:02.953
you point out , these are two countries

37:02.953 --> 37:05.175
with very advanced uh capabilities . So

37:05.175 --> 37:07.064
I think it is going to be a force

37:07.064 --> 37:09.231
multiplier that yield back Mr Chairman

37:09.231 --> 37:11.564
chair and I recognize you from Virginia ,

37:11.564 --> 37:11.199
Mr Whitman for five minutes . Well ,

37:11.209 --> 37:13.431
thank you , Mr Chairman , Doctor Waller

37:13.431 --> 37:15.265
General Cao , thanks so much for

37:15.265 --> 37:17.431
joining us . Um I listen , I , I think

37:17.431 --> 37:19.487
we're all very , very steadfastly in

37:19.487 --> 37:21.653
support of Ukraine and their effort to

37:21.653 --> 37:23.431
maintain independence from this

37:23.431 --> 37:26.010
unprovoked and inhumane and barbaric

37:26.020 --> 37:29.649
invasion by Russia . Uh I'm

37:29.659 --> 37:32.689
very focused on making sure that every

37:33.520 --> 37:36.050
weapon , every round of ammunition that

37:36.060 --> 37:39.800
we send to Ukraine is tracked and that

37:39.810 --> 37:41.810
we are accountable for every bit of

37:41.810 --> 37:43.977
that . Uh The challenges we face today

37:43.977 --> 37:46.032
in the United States for many uh our

37:46.032 --> 37:47.754
constituents . Look at us very

37:47.754 --> 37:49.921
carefully and say , what are you doing

37:49.921 --> 37:52.088
to make sure that we are on track with

37:52.088 --> 37:51.939
that ? And we know we're sending a

37:51.949 --> 37:54.060
number of items over there from tanks

37:54.060 --> 37:56.840
to mars to javelins and stingers ,

37:56.850 --> 37:59.050
small arms ammunition across the whole

37:59.060 --> 38:01.439
spectrum . Can , can you give us an

38:01.449 --> 38:04.219
idea about what are we doing and making

38:04.229 --> 38:06.340
sure that tracking and accountability

38:06.340 --> 38:08.562
of every bit of what we send over there

38:08.562 --> 38:11.379
is , is very focused . Making sure too

38:11.389 --> 38:13.879
we track any potential for waste fraud

38:13.889 --> 38:16.179
and abuse as well as do we gather

38:16.189 --> 38:18.709
intelligence to understand who might be

38:18.719 --> 38:20.739
trying to intercept those weapons ,

38:20.750 --> 38:22.972
whether it's in Ukraine or even somehow

38:22.972 --> 38:25.320
on tracks in , in uh transportation in

38:25.330 --> 38:26.330
Ukraine ?

38:29.419 --> 38:31.530
Uh Thank you , sir . Yeah . Yeah , of

38:31.530 --> 38:34.020
course . So um starting with the

38:34.030 --> 38:36.979
monitoring of where the , where the

38:36.989 --> 38:39.909
equipment goes , um We , we perform a

38:39.919 --> 38:42.469
variety of things . First of all , we

38:42.479 --> 38:44.701
inventory everything that comes through

38:44.701 --> 38:46.923
us hands on the way into Ukraine and we

38:46.923 --> 38:48.757
do that in a couple of different

38:48.757 --> 38:50.923
locations that you're , you're already

38:50.923 --> 38:52.757
familiar with , sir . So , so we

38:52.757 --> 38:54.757
believe we have a very , very solid

38:54.757 --> 38:57.090
understanding of what goes into Ukraine .

38:57.090 --> 38:59.257
First of all , second , um we over the

38:59.257 --> 39:01.949
last few months have fielded to Ukraine ,

39:01.959 --> 39:04.929
a NATO standard logistics tracking

39:04.939 --> 39:08.939
system and they us

39:08.949 --> 39:11.530
access to their networks to monitor

39:11.540 --> 39:15.179
that . So as we inventory stuff , we

39:15.189 --> 39:17.959
ingest it into log fast and then they

39:17.969 --> 39:20.080
track it as it goes forward . This is

39:20.080 --> 39:22.191
their system of tracking and we watch

39:22.191 --> 39:24.080
over their shoulder . Of course ,

39:24.080 --> 39:25.691
that's not enough . So we do

39:25.691 --> 39:27.358
inspections enhanced and used

39:27.358 --> 39:29.469
monitoring . In fact , um , those are

39:29.469 --> 39:31.580
done by the Defense Attache office in

39:31.590 --> 39:33.649
Kiev under Brigadier General Garrick

39:33.659 --> 39:36.060
Harman . Um , there's an invest today

39:36.070 --> 39:38.810
is Wednesday . There's an , uh , an on

39:38.820 --> 39:41.219
site inspection going on in Odessa

39:41.229 --> 39:43.340
right now . Today there's another one

39:43.340 --> 39:45.451
scheduled , uh , next Thursday . Uh ,

39:45.451 --> 39:47.689
those go based on the security

39:47.699 --> 39:49.421
situation . However , sir , so

39:49.421 --> 39:51.532
sometimes we don't get those off when

39:51.532 --> 39:54.270
we're unable to get to a location . We

39:54.280 --> 39:57.080
have bar coded the critical pieces of

39:57.090 --> 39:59.479
equipment and issued um handheld

39:59.489 --> 40:02.189
scanners , uh that project on to a

40:02.199 --> 40:04.560
network that we control and the

40:04.570 --> 40:07.020
Ukrainians will inventory by a handheld

40:07.030 --> 40:08.974
scanner . So that's how we look at

40:08.974 --> 40:11.540
things inside Ukraine as far as our

40:11.550 --> 40:14.040
efforts um outside of Ukraine to make

40:14.050 --> 40:16.699
sure that we're doing a good job . Um

40:16.709 --> 40:19.770
We have had in our security security

40:19.780 --> 40:22.000
assistance enterprise . I believe it's

40:22.010 --> 40:25.379
nine dod I G evaluations

40:25.389 --> 40:28.540
for audits and numerous visits . So I'm

40:28.550 --> 40:30.661
pretty confident we're doing the best

40:30.661 --> 40:32.883
we can there . And then finally , yes ,

40:32.883 --> 40:34.939
of course , we do gather intel on it

40:34.939 --> 40:36.994
and I'd be delo delighted to talk to

40:36.994 --> 40:36.399
you about it in closed session , sir .

40:37.360 --> 40:39.790
Very good . Thank you . Let me ask

40:39.800 --> 40:42.060
questions about munition stockpiles as

40:42.070 --> 40:45.189
we know we are at incredible burn rates

40:45.199 --> 40:47.449
on munitions that we are sending to

40:47.459 --> 40:49.626
Ukraine many times . Having to ask our

40:49.626 --> 40:51.681
friends around the world if they can

40:51.681 --> 40:53.348
help with that . Give me your

40:53.348 --> 40:55.515
perspective on where we are today with

40:55.515 --> 40:57.459
burn rates on critical munitions ,

40:57.459 --> 41:00.169
especially those that hold utility in

41:00.179 --> 41:02.719
the Indo paycom . And what are we doing

41:02.729 --> 41:05.719
to address when those stockpiles ?

41:05.729 --> 41:07.860
Those magazine depths are at critical

41:07.870 --> 41:10.620
rates in regenerating that and then

41:10.629 --> 41:12.518
modernizing some of those weapons

41:12.518 --> 41:14.740
systems that many of those like stinger

41:14.740 --> 41:18.489
circa 19 sixties weapon systems . Well ,

41:18.500 --> 41:20.719
let me start with the , when , when we

41:20.729 --> 41:22.840
create , when we work on a package of

41:22.840 --> 41:25.007
security assistance to Ukraine , there

41:25.007 --> 41:27.370
is a cross department working group

41:27.379 --> 41:30.729
that includes um the services , it

41:30.739 --> 41:34.570
includes input from other Cocos for to

41:34.580 --> 41:36.949
address exactly the issue you raise

41:36.959 --> 41:40.760
that our contributions to Ukraine are

41:40.780 --> 41:43.610
done in light of our own readiness

41:43.620 --> 41:46.760
requirements and priorities to support

41:46.770 --> 41:49.129
other allies and partners , not least

41:49.139 --> 41:51.939
Taiwan . So that is baked into our

41:51.949 --> 41:55.820
process uh as we decide how we are best

41:55.830 --> 41:58.080
able to supply Ukraine with its

41:58.090 --> 42:00.889
requirements . Are , are we calling

42:00.899 --> 42:03.219
upon our friends and allies to help in

42:03.229 --> 42:05.285
that effort , especially when we are

42:05.285 --> 42:07.062
critically low on some of those

42:07.062 --> 42:09.800
munitions ? We , yes , congressman , we

42:09.810 --> 42:11.921
are . And the main structure for that

42:11.921 --> 42:13.977
is the Ukraine defense contact group

42:13.977 --> 42:16.032
which meets monthly , but in between

42:16.032 --> 42:18.032
those meetings , we are in constant

42:18.032 --> 42:20.199
contact with allies and partners , not

42:20.199 --> 42:22.439
just in Europe , but globally to source

42:22.449 --> 42:24.505
those capabilities . And they really

42:24.505 --> 42:26.671
have stepped up a lot of the artillery

42:26.671 --> 42:28.729
ammunition is is coming from other

42:28.739 --> 42:30.906
countries at this point , not directly

42:30.906 --> 42:32.795
from the United States to support

42:32.795 --> 42:35.017
Ukraine . Thank you , Mr Chairman . Are

42:35.017 --> 42:37.183
you back now recognize uh Mr Gallego ?

42:40.030 --> 42:43.370
Thank you Mr Kelly Doctor . In your

42:43.379 --> 42:45.601
written written remarks , I was pleased

42:45.601 --> 42:47.768
to see you highlight the Baltic States

42:47.768 --> 42:49.823
and the important work that they are

42:49.823 --> 42:49.580
doing to enhance security in the face

42:49.590 --> 42:51.757
of an increasingly aggressive Russia .

42:51.757 --> 42:53.979
In fact , one of my proudest moments in

42:53.979 --> 42:55.979
Congress was introducing the Baltic

42:55.979 --> 42:57.923
Security initiative which provides

42:57.923 --> 43:00.257
targeted security assistance to Estonia ,

43:00.257 --> 42:59.850
Laa and Lithuania through our most

42:59.860 --> 43:02.139
critical and crucial allies . Could you

43:02.149 --> 43:04.371
describe any particular areas where you

43:04.371 --> 43:06.371
would like to see the United States

43:06.371 --> 43:08.316
deepen cooperation with the Baltic

43:08.316 --> 43:10.538
States ? And do you think there is more

43:10.538 --> 43:10.169
that we can do and should be doing to

43:10.179 --> 43:13.770
support our Baltic allies ? Thank you ,

43:13.780 --> 43:16.729
Congressman and I share your

43:17.100 --> 43:19.840
support for assisting the Baltic

43:19.850 --> 43:21.906
countries , given their position and

43:21.906 --> 43:23.906
given how forward leaning they have

43:23.906 --> 43:26.183
been on security assistance to Ukraine .

43:26.183 --> 43:28.580
I think that one of the most important

43:28.590 --> 43:30.312
aspects of the Baltic security

43:30.312 --> 43:32.368
initiative has been the resources to

43:32.368 --> 43:34.312
build infrastructure for the three

43:34.312 --> 43:35.979
countries because now we have

43:35.979 --> 43:38.399
commitments from NATO allies and we

43:38.409 --> 43:40.419
have a an American persistent

43:40.429 --> 43:42.651
rotational presence in all three of the

43:42.651 --> 43:44.800
Baltic countries . But in order to

43:44.810 --> 43:47.409
support those troop presences and in

43:47.419 --> 43:49.530
order to make sure that they are at a

43:49.530 --> 43:51.641
high readiness , the Baltic countries

43:51.641 --> 43:53.641
need to have training ranges . They

43:53.641 --> 43:55.808
need to have storage facilities , they

43:55.808 --> 43:57.752
need to have the infrastructure to

43:57.752 --> 43:59.641
support the substantial number of

43:59.641 --> 44:01.697
allied forces as well as their own .

44:01.697 --> 44:03.863
And they have been focused on spending

44:03.863 --> 44:06.086
their own national defense resources to

44:06.086 --> 44:08.419
build that uh those that infrastructure .

44:08.419 --> 44:10.419
But the fact that the United States

44:10.419 --> 44:12.308
been willing to put money to that

44:12.308 --> 44:14.252
requirement and also there is NATO

44:14.252 --> 44:16.363
money on that requirement is uh helps

44:16.363 --> 44:18.669
them to plan . But it also then helps

44:18.679 --> 44:20.846
General Cali when he is planning those

44:20.846 --> 44:22.679
rotational presences , when he's

44:22.679 --> 44:25.320
planning the exercises uh to know that

44:25.330 --> 44:27.699
us troops will remain at a high level

44:27.709 --> 44:29.820
of readiness and really interoperable

44:29.820 --> 44:32.889
with our allies . Thank you . Uh

44:32.899 --> 44:35.121
Speaking of Lithuania , we are at a few

44:35.121 --> 44:37.121
months away from a NATO summit that

44:37.121 --> 44:39.455
will take place in wildness this summer ,

44:39.455 --> 44:41.177
the administration has done an

44:41.177 --> 44:43.399
impressive job uh to further strain our

44:43.399 --> 44:45.232
alliance uh cohesion . Also look

44:45.232 --> 44:47.232
forward to eventually for Sweden to

44:47.232 --> 44:47.159
joining Finland and other allies .

44:47.169 --> 44:49.391
Could you share your expectations going

44:49.391 --> 44:51.502
to that upcoming summit ? And what in

44:51.502 --> 44:53.225
your mind could would signal a

44:53.225 --> 44:55.002
successful summit ? Thank you ,

44:55.002 --> 44:57.058
Congressman . I think the most , the

44:57.058 --> 44:59.149
most important uh aspect of uh the

44:59.159 --> 45:01.048
summit that I want to point to is

45:01.048 --> 45:03.381
something that General Cali referred to ,

45:03.381 --> 45:05.548
which is that uh the work that's going

45:05.548 --> 45:07.770
on building into the summit is our NATO

45:07.770 --> 45:10.250
plans which will then enforce the , the

45:10.260 --> 45:12.159
new , the new plans given the new

45:12.169 --> 45:14.629
security environment will be um uh

45:14.850 --> 45:17.209
approved in the run up to the , the

45:17.219 --> 45:20.139
summit . And then uh defense ministers

45:20.149 --> 45:22.093
and foreign ministers ahead of the

45:22.093 --> 45:24.038
summit will agree on what kinds of

45:24.065 --> 45:26.496
resources , what kinds of capabilities

45:26.565 --> 45:28.732
and what kinds of defense spending are

45:28.732 --> 45:31.355
required to , to make sure that all of

45:31.365 --> 45:33.726
the NATO allies have the capabilities

45:33.736 --> 45:36.095
to resource those plans . And it is at

45:36.105 --> 45:38.272
the Vilnius Summit that heads of state

45:38.272 --> 45:40.926
and government will endorse those uh

45:40.936 --> 45:43.716
those appropriate resources in order to

45:43.726 --> 45:45.726
make those plans real and make them

45:45.726 --> 45:47.976
credible . That's number one , number

45:47.986 --> 45:50.716
two , is that uh what will be important

45:50.736 --> 45:54.511
is a NATO state on the

45:54.521 --> 45:58.011
importance of Ukraine as a European

45:58.021 --> 46:01.991
country and its right to exist within

46:02.001 --> 46:04.201
its internationally recognized borders

46:04.211 --> 46:06.721
as a sovereign and independent state

46:06.731 --> 46:08.852
and a NATO commitment to help in the

46:08.862 --> 46:12.312
areas of defense institution building

46:12.322 --> 46:14.602
and sort of the host of activities that

46:14.612 --> 46:17.632
NATO has invested in Ukraine over the

46:17.642 --> 46:20.052
past 30 years , which has contributed

46:20.062 --> 46:22.731
to Ukraine's ability to defend itself

46:22.741 --> 46:25.320
and remain an independent country . So

46:25.330 --> 46:27.219
I would point to those two from a

46:27.219 --> 46:29.386
defense point of view , those would be

46:29.386 --> 46:31.497
uh the two uh highlights that we need

46:31.497 --> 46:33.608
to focus on for Vilnius . Thank you ,

46:33.608 --> 46:35.386
Doctor uh Gli , thanks for your

46:35.386 --> 46:37.163
testimony . I want to ask about

46:37.163 --> 46:39.274
Russia's actions in the gray zone . I

46:39.274 --> 46:39.100
remain deeply concerned by this story

46:39.110 --> 46:40.943
and believe that regular warfare

46:40.943 --> 46:42.999
training with allies and partners is

46:42.999 --> 46:45.110
crucial to counter that . Recognizing

46:45.110 --> 46:46.999
that we're in this setting . What

46:46.999 --> 46:49.221
insights can you share about how you is

46:49.221 --> 46:51.929
approaching this challenge ? Uh Thank

46:51.939 --> 46:54.106
you , Congressman . Yeah , I , I share

46:54.106 --> 46:56.217
your concern . I I in that regard and

46:56.217 --> 46:59.580
the um our cooperation with our

46:59.590 --> 47:01.534
allies and our partners , I should

47:01.534 --> 47:03.580
point out um in terms of a regular

47:03.590 --> 47:06.139
warfare training and preparation , um

47:06.149 --> 47:08.149
is an important part of our overall

47:08.149 --> 47:11.280
defense plans uh both in U C and

47:11.290 --> 47:14.689
through uh NATO . Uh um we have NATO

47:14.699 --> 47:16.866
Special Operations headquarters and we

47:16.866 --> 47:19.260
have us Special Operations Command

47:19.270 --> 47:21.830
Europe . Both of them work intensively

47:21.840 --> 47:24.270
on a bilateral basis and multilateral

47:24.280 --> 47:26.320
basis to prepare countries for

47:26.330 --> 47:29.669
resilience resistance and , um , and

47:29.679 --> 47:31.901
irregular warfare in general . Um There

47:31.901 --> 47:34.012
are some real , real great cases that

47:34.012 --> 47:36.123
I'd love to talk to you about in , in

47:36.123 --> 47:38.068
close session , of course , but in

47:38.068 --> 47:37.979
general , it's a , it's a big success

47:37.989 --> 47:40.156
story and it , it importantly includes

47:40.156 --> 47:42.780
non ally partners . Yeah , regular

47:42.790 --> 47:44.901
warfare . I think it's something that

47:44.901 --> 47:47.012
we have , uh , not , uh recognized as

47:47.012 --> 47:49.020
being a very important approach to

47:49.030 --> 47:51.610
Ukraine's resiliency against uh Russia .

47:51.689 --> 47:53.522
Thank you , Mr Chair . You'll be

47:53.522 --> 47:55.356
gentleman's time expired . Now ,

47:55.356 --> 47:57.522
recognize the gentleman from Tennessee

47:57.522 --> 47:59.467
doctor Dear . Thank you , Chairman

47:59.467 --> 48:01.356
General Cavalli . Throughout this

48:01.356 --> 48:03.467
conflict , we have had the specter of

48:03.467 --> 48:05.578
tactical nuclear weapons looming over

48:05.578 --> 48:07.745
us by the Russians and frankly , Putin

48:07.745 --> 48:09.911
has put these threats to effective use

48:09.911 --> 48:11.967
in restraining our policy makers and

48:11.967 --> 48:14.133
leaders from involving themselves more

48:14.133 --> 48:16.078
thoroughly in this conflict on the

48:16.078 --> 48:18.245
Ukrainians behalf . Uh In my opinion ,

48:18.245 --> 48:20.356
the Russians know they're overmatched

48:20.356 --> 48:20.330
when it comes to the big guns in our

48:20.340 --> 48:22.562
respective nuclear arsenals . However ,

48:22.562 --> 48:24.784
it seems to me that they feel they have

48:24.784 --> 48:26.896
an advantage when it comes to the low

48:26.896 --> 48:28.896
yield tactical nuclear weapons . So

48:28.896 --> 48:31.062
first , do you believe that there is a

48:31.062 --> 48:33.396
gap in our nuclear deterrent at present ?

48:33.396 --> 48:35.507
And also knowing that Chairman Milley

48:35.507 --> 48:37.618
General Cotton and your predecessor ,

48:37.618 --> 48:39.784
General Walter supported the continued

48:39.784 --> 48:41.896
development of the nuclear sea launch

48:41.896 --> 48:41.610
cruise missile . Do you share their

48:41.620 --> 48:43.810
position that this system would fill a

48:43.820 --> 48:46.050
key deterrence in that gap ?

48:47.629 --> 48:50.199
First year ? Second question , sir . Uh

48:50.209 --> 48:53.840
Yes , I think that the man is , is an

48:53.850 --> 48:56.183
important weapon to your first question .

48:56.183 --> 48:58.350
I don't think we have significant gaps

48:58.350 --> 49:00.683
in our nuclear deterrent capability . I ,

49:00.683 --> 49:03.260
I am very confident in our nuclear

49:03.270 --> 49:05.214
deterrents as well as our extended

49:05.214 --> 49:08.379
nuclear deterrence in an open setting .

49:08.389 --> 49:10.790
Can you give us an estimate of how many

49:10.800 --> 49:14.429
uh technical or nuclear low yield

49:14.439 --> 49:17.300
weapons ? Russia has not in an open

49:17.310 --> 49:19.643
setting , sir , but I'd be delighted to ,

49:19.643 --> 49:21.866
I've seen unclassified estimates around

49:21.866 --> 49:23.977
2000 warheads . Does that sound about

49:23.977 --> 49:26.840
correct ? Um I , I , I haven't seen

49:26.850 --> 49:29.899
those , sir . So , ok . Uh

49:30.300 --> 49:33.850
Doctor uh Wallinger , one area that I

49:33.860 --> 49:35.916
think the administration has kind of

49:35.916 --> 49:37.804
failed the American people is its

49:37.804 --> 49:40.027
communications surrounding the conflict

49:40.027 --> 49:42.138
in Ukraine . Uh I don't think they've

49:42.138 --> 49:43.638
done a satisfactory job in

49:43.638 --> 49:45.638
communicating the reason why we are

49:45.638 --> 49:47.804
supporting Ukraine or what our desired

49:47.804 --> 49:50.027
end goal in this conflict is . So , I'd

49:50.027 --> 49:51.638
like to give you a minute to

49:51.638 --> 49:53.471
communicate why you believe it's

49:53.471 --> 49:55.527
imperative that we take the fight to

49:55.527 --> 49:57.749
Russia at this moment . What interest ,

49:57.749 --> 49:59.971
interest does the United States have in

49:59.971 --> 50:02.919
this conflict ? And you know , how ,

50:02.929 --> 50:05.040
how are we doing and how do we expect

50:05.040 --> 50:07.870
to do ? What's the end game ? Thank you ,

50:07.879 --> 50:10.570
Congressman . First of all , the stakes

50:10.580 --> 50:12.802
are European security . Of course , our

50:12.810 --> 50:15.280
values and our interests are connected

50:15.290 --> 50:17.401
to Ukraine as a sovereign independent

50:17.401 --> 50:20.020
country . But European security in the

50:20.030 --> 50:23.139
21st century is built on a foundation

50:23.149 --> 50:25.459
of respect for international law . And

50:25.469 --> 50:28.500
the resilience of the UN Charter and

50:28.510 --> 50:31.083
Russia's assault in Ukraine is an

50:31.093 --> 50:33.413
attempt to change that rules based

50:33.423 --> 50:35.583
international order , which is to say

50:35.593 --> 50:37.462
that sovereignty is contingent ,

50:37.482 --> 50:39.649
borders can be changed through the use

50:39.649 --> 50:41.843
of force . And big countries get to

50:41.853 --> 50:43.909
decide what the foreign and security

50:43.909 --> 50:45.964
policies of their neighbors are . So

50:45.964 --> 50:48.020
the stakes are larger than Ukraine ,

50:48.020 --> 50:49.909
but they go beyond Europe as well

50:49.909 --> 50:52.072
because China is engaging in similar

50:52.083 --> 50:55.035
kinds of probes and its attempts to

50:55.045 --> 50:56.775
erode that same rules based

50:56.785 --> 50:59.506
international order in the Indo Pacific

50:59.516 --> 51:01.572
and China , we know is watching very

51:01.572 --> 51:03.572
closely to see if the international

51:03.572 --> 51:05.794
community will allow Russia to get away

51:05.794 --> 51:07.738
with this and would take the wrong

51:07.738 --> 51:10.065
lessons from our failure to ensure

51:10.075 --> 51:12.345
Russia's strategic failure in Ukraine .

51:12.716 --> 51:14.938
And I think that's a good explanation .

51:14.938 --> 51:16.827
I wish we could get it out to the

51:16.827 --> 51:18.827
American people in a more effective

51:18.827 --> 51:20.772
manner . Uh General Cali less than

51:20.772 --> 51:22.994
about a third of our NATO allies remain

51:22.994 --> 51:24.716
compliant with their commit to

51:24.716 --> 51:26.938
commitment to maintain defense spending

51:26.938 --> 51:29.049
at a minimum of 2% GDP . Uh With this

51:29.049 --> 51:30.994
going on literally in the European

51:30.994 --> 51:33.216
backyard . What is it gonna take to get

51:33.216 --> 51:36.199
them to step up ? Uh Sir , I think that

51:36.209 --> 51:38.669
this is one of the things it's taken to

51:38.679 --> 51:42.419
get them to step up . So um in 2014 ,

51:42.780 --> 51:45.959
the average expenditure per GDP

51:46.189 --> 51:49.209
inside NATO was 1.4% today . It's

51:49.219 --> 51:52.260
1.8% not yet at the target but closing

51:52.270 --> 51:54.790
in on it . Um We've come up to nine

51:54.800 --> 51:58.790
nations meeting the um meeting the 2%

51:58.800 --> 52:01.189
goal to include one nation Poland ,

52:01.199 --> 52:03.790
which spends more per GDP as of this

52:03.800 --> 52:05.969
year than the United States does . Um

52:05.979 --> 52:08.035
With the accession of Finland , that

52:08.035 --> 52:10.270
number has grown to 10 , that spend 2%

52:10.280 --> 52:13.040
or more . And there are 11 more nations

52:13.050 --> 52:16.550
that are uh on a very definite glide

52:16.560 --> 52:20.360
path to get to 2% by 2024 which

52:20.370 --> 52:23.320
was the Wales summit pledge . That's

52:23.330 --> 52:25.552
not all the nations in NATO . However ,

52:25.552 --> 52:27.663
sir , and so we continue to have work

52:27.663 --> 52:30.389
to do to get all our , all our allies

52:30.399 --> 52:32.570
sharing the burden equally . I think

52:32.580 --> 52:34.802
that's really important considering our

52:34.802 --> 52:36.913
looming debt crisis , our exponential

52:36.913 --> 52:38.858
debt we have in this country . I I

52:38.858 --> 52:41.110
think Americans uh are , are definitely

52:41.120 --> 52:43.580
wanting to see other countries step up

52:43.590 --> 52:45.534
and do their fair share . And it's

52:45.534 --> 52:47.757
extremely important that we build these

52:47.757 --> 52:49.979
alliance , strengthen these alliances ,

52:49.979 --> 52:49.840
especially with the looming threats as

52:49.850 --> 52:52.072
we mentioned with China and Taiwan . So

52:52.072 --> 52:54.294
I thank you both for being here today .

52:54.294 --> 52:56.406
Yel Beck . I recognize gentleman from

52:56.406 --> 52:58.350
Massachusetts , Mr Molton for five

52:58.350 --> 53:00.294
minutes . Thank you very much , Mr

53:00.294 --> 53:02.406
Chairman and thank you both for being

53:02.406 --> 53:02.370
here . Uh your statements both

53:02.379 --> 53:04.889
discussed uh the practice of the

53:04.899 --> 53:07.090
People's Republic of China in creating

53:07.100 --> 53:09.100
agreements with individual European

53:09.100 --> 53:11.820
nations that ostensibly are for

53:11.830 --> 53:14.169
improving trade but create dependencies

53:14.179 --> 53:17.419
on China . And we've seen the same

53:17.429 --> 53:19.479
strategy in Africa . It's been much

53:19.489 --> 53:22.199
maligned by us because we say these are

53:22.209 --> 53:24.439
bad deals . But even if they are bad

53:24.449 --> 53:26.505
deals for the host uh nations , they

53:26.505 --> 53:28.727
work well for China because they create

53:28.727 --> 53:30.727
this dependency . Have you seen any

53:30.727 --> 53:32.782
change in this trend in light of the

53:32.782 --> 53:35.489
war in Ukraine ? Doctor W thank you ,

53:35.500 --> 53:37.444
Congressman . Yes , we have seen a

53:37.444 --> 53:40.070
change . Uh three of the countries

53:40.080 --> 53:42.689
who've been members of the 17 plus one

53:42.919 --> 53:45.239
uh arrangement by which you uh China

53:45.250 --> 53:47.250
was seeking to build those kinds of

53:47.250 --> 53:49.939
dependencies through trade investment

53:49.949 --> 53:52.060
have actually . Uh and it's not

53:52.070 --> 53:53.848
surprisingly , the three Baltic

53:53.848 --> 53:56.100
countries have uh quit that structure .

53:56.110 --> 53:59.280
Recognizing the challenge that China

53:59.290 --> 54:02.449
poses and the vulnerabilities that it

54:02.459 --> 54:04.879
seeks to create and successfully often

54:04.889 --> 54:07.820
creates through technology through uh

54:07.830 --> 54:10.679
one problematic investment contracts uh

54:10.689 --> 54:13.679
through acquisition of , of companies

54:13.689 --> 54:15.745
of ports . And so there is a greater

54:15.745 --> 54:17.967
awareness among European countries that

54:17.967 --> 54:20.459
even as they trade with China , uh that

54:20.469 --> 54:22.525
they need to not allow themselves to

54:22.525 --> 54:25.030
become vulnerable to coercion . And we

54:25.040 --> 54:27.290
certainly hope that that trend expands

54:27.300 --> 54:29.522
and continues . General Cali . Uh we're

54:29.522 --> 54:31.620
very much anticipating the Ukrainian

54:31.629 --> 54:33.629
counter offensive , anticipating it

54:33.629 --> 54:35.740
will be much more successful than the

54:35.740 --> 54:37.851
Russian offensive of the past several

54:37.851 --> 54:39.962
months . But are the Ukrainians going

54:39.962 --> 54:41.962
to get all the weapons they need in

54:41.962 --> 54:45.860
time for this offensive ? Uh

54:46.000 --> 54:49.340
Congressman ? Thank you . Um , yes . Um ,

54:49.350 --> 54:52.669
so we sat down uh with the

54:52.679 --> 54:54.899
Ukrainians and with our Ukrainian

54:54.909 --> 54:58.449
colleagues and we , um , we calculated

54:58.479 --> 55:01.899
the amount of material they would need

55:01.909 --> 55:04.209
for this offensive . We checked it a

55:04.219 --> 55:07.320
couple of times and , um , and we

55:07.580 --> 55:10.189
gathered it from our allies , um who

55:10.199 --> 55:12.255
were very generous , especially with

55:12.255 --> 55:14.310
regard to tanks and armored fighting

55:14.310 --> 55:16.255
vehicles . And , um , we have been

55:16.255 --> 55:18.659
shipping it into the country . Um We

55:18.669 --> 55:22.350
are over 98% of the combat

55:22.360 --> 55:24.590
vehicles are already there and I'd

55:24.600 --> 55:26.711
hesitate to describe too much more in

55:26.711 --> 55:28.711
an open setting , but I , I am very

55:28.711 --> 55:30.878
confident that we have delivered the ,

55:30.878 --> 55:32.933
the material that they need and will

55:32.933 --> 55:34.989
continue a pipeline to sustain their

55:34.989 --> 55:37.100
operations as well . Well , it's good

55:37.100 --> 55:39.156
to hear and I certainly hope that we

55:39.156 --> 55:41.100
hear from the Ukrainians that they

55:41.100 --> 55:43.590
agree with you . Uh doctor someday ,

55:43.600 --> 55:45.656
hopefully , sooner than later , this

55:45.656 --> 55:47.600
war is going to end and we can all

55:47.600 --> 55:50.540
imagine that uh Russia will uh go back

55:50.550 --> 55:54.090
home , uh assess their truly

55:55.629 --> 55:58.010
dramatic losses and then start to

55:58.020 --> 56:01.250
rebuild the military . How do we think

56:01.260 --> 56:04.280
about deterrence in the future 5 , 10

56:04.290 --> 56:06.234
years from now where we don't want

56:06.234 --> 56:08.570
Russia to simply get back to where they

56:08.580 --> 56:11.250
were before this war started and start

56:11.260 --> 56:14.659
another war in Europe ? Uh Thank you ,

56:14.669 --> 56:16.725
Congressman . Well , first , I would

56:16.725 --> 56:19.129
note that Russia will I I share your

56:19.139 --> 56:21.139
assessment that Russia will seek to

56:21.139 --> 56:23.306
rebuild and will be able to rebuild to

56:23.306 --> 56:26.330
some extent . But uh the international

56:26.340 --> 56:28.550
community has imposed uh export

56:28.560 --> 56:30.727
restrictions , technology restrictions

56:30.780 --> 56:33.229
and sanctions on Russia and those

56:33.239 --> 56:35.350
restrictions will likely make it very

56:35.350 --> 56:37.572
di make it very difficult for Russia to

56:37.572 --> 56:39.739
achieve all of the objectives that the

56:39.739 --> 56:41.850
leadership might have in the military

56:41.850 --> 56:44.183
sphere . So that said they will rebuild .

56:44.183 --> 56:46.072
And so how do you structure those

56:46.072 --> 56:48.128
sanctions so that the allies who put

56:48.128 --> 56:50.239
them together are willing to continue

56:50.239 --> 56:52.461
them to your point to prevent them from

56:52.461 --> 56:54.517
rebuilding while also showing Russia

56:54.517 --> 56:56.295
that if they're to change their

56:56.295 --> 56:58.350
behavior , they have an off ramp and

56:58.350 --> 57:00.350
can be welcomed back into the world

57:00.350 --> 57:02.517
community if they significantly change

57:02.517 --> 57:02.040
their approach . Well , many of the

57:02.050 --> 57:03.828
most important restrictions are

57:03.828 --> 57:06.780
American export control restrictions .

57:06.790 --> 57:08.734
And while it is good to do them in

57:08.734 --> 57:10.901
concert with allies , we have the lead

57:10.901 --> 57:13.219
on many of the technologies that Russia

57:13.250 --> 57:15.770
seeks and has benefited from , but it

57:15.780 --> 57:17.947
is our close alliance relationship and

57:17.947 --> 57:20.113
our constructive relationship with the

57:20.113 --> 57:22.224
European Union because it is the , it

57:22.224 --> 57:24.113
is the European Union that is the

57:24.113 --> 57:26.002
organization that agrees upon and

57:26.002 --> 57:27.947
enforces sanctions on Russia uh in

57:27.947 --> 57:30.169
cooperation with us that will enable us

57:30.169 --> 57:32.489
to maintain that unity and the

57:32.500 --> 57:34.500
awareness of the threat that Russia

57:34.500 --> 57:36.929
poses to Europe remains high . And I

57:36.939 --> 57:38.828
believe , I hope we have a way of

57:38.828 --> 57:40.828
communicating to the Russian people

57:40.828 --> 57:40.729
that there is a choice here when they

57:40.739 --> 57:43.072
get to their next leader , General Cali .

57:43.072 --> 57:45.128
What do we need to do for Ukraine on

57:45.128 --> 57:48.659
this front , post post uh war ? I , I ,

57:48.790 --> 57:51.419
I'm sorry , on what ? From post war on ,

57:51.429 --> 57:53.590
on their future force . Yes , their

57:53.600 --> 57:55.544
future force . We , we , we um are

57:55.544 --> 57:57.600
working hard on the question of what

57:57.600 --> 57:59.711
their future force needs to be looked

57:59.711 --> 58:01.933
like . One thing we know right up front

58:01.933 --> 58:04.100
congressman is that the um gentleman's

58:04.100 --> 58:04.090
time expired chair . And I recognize

58:04.100 --> 58:06.100
the gentleman from Mississippi , Mr

58:06.100 --> 58:08.540
Kelly . Thank you , Mr Chairman and I

58:08.550 --> 58:10.439
ywe my time to the gentleman from

58:10.439 --> 58:14.429
Missouri , Mr Alford . Thank you

58:14.439 --> 58:16.661
for seeing your time , Chairman Kelly .

58:16.661 --> 58:18.883
Thank you , Chairman Rogers and ranking

58:18.883 --> 58:20.883
member Smith and our witnesses here

58:20.883 --> 58:20.689
today . I appreciate you being here .

58:21.300 --> 58:23.689
Warn Ukraine has exposed some big gaps

58:23.699 --> 58:25.866
in our defense industrial base . And I

58:25.866 --> 58:28.032
along with Mr Whitman , have some deep

58:28.032 --> 58:30.255
concerns about our ability to replenish

58:30.255 --> 58:32.588
and keep up with our weapons stockpiles .

58:32.588 --> 58:34.659
We must accelerate munitions

58:34.669 --> 58:36.891
productions capacity to be prepared for

58:36.891 --> 58:38.947
a potential conflict with China . We

58:38.947 --> 58:41.002
know is watching what's happening in

58:41.002 --> 58:43.113
Ukraine supporting Russia through its

58:43.113 --> 58:45.280
no limits partnership with Putin . And

58:45.280 --> 58:47.169
I also want to make sure that our

58:47.169 --> 58:49.113
European allies are carrying their

58:49.113 --> 58:51.336
weight through burden sharing . General

58:51.336 --> 58:53.502
Cali , as you mentioned , the majority

58:53.502 --> 58:55.725
of our allies are not meeting nato's 2%

58:55.725 --> 58:57.947
GDP defense spending target . In fact ,

58:57.947 --> 59:00.379
as you said , only nine of our NATO 30

59:00.389 --> 59:03.530
member states met its 2% in 22 .

59:05.770 --> 59:07.714
Doctor Wallinger , considering the

59:07.714 --> 59:10.830
recent NATO report uh that these

59:10.840 --> 59:13.062
nations just are not living up to their

59:13.062 --> 59:14.507
obligations . What is the

59:14.507 --> 59:16.729
administration doing to put pressure on

59:16.729 --> 59:18.951
these nations to pay their fair share ?

59:20.399 --> 59:23.959
Congressman ? The first , the most

59:23.969 --> 59:26.679
important is that we are making meeting

59:26.689 --> 59:29.389
the 2% commitment

59:29.899 --> 59:33.350
of a deliverable of the Vilnius Summit .

59:33.360 --> 59:35.527
In other words , we are not letting up

59:35.527 --> 59:37.527
on the focus and the requirement of

59:37.527 --> 59:40.629
meeting 2% . And as I suggested , going

59:40.639 --> 59:43.320
beyond 2% if that is required to

59:43.330 --> 59:45.939
actively and correctly build the

59:45.949 --> 59:48.310
capabilities required by the NATO

59:48.320 --> 59:51.939
regional plans . So we are , we are

59:51.949 --> 59:54.590
pressuring and working with allies to

59:54.600 --> 59:56.378
take seriously the capabilities

59:56.385 --> 59:59.314
requirements to make those plans more

59:59.324 --> 01:00:01.425
than just plans on paper but actual

01:00:01.435 --> 01:00:03.657
real capabilities . And that's going to

01:00:03.657 --> 01:00:05.713
require defense spending , increased

01:00:05.713 --> 01:00:07.713
defense spending by many if not all

01:00:07.713 --> 01:00:10.264
NATO allies in particular , Germany

01:00:10.274 --> 01:00:14.094
only contributed 1.44% . That's a big

01:00:14.104 --> 01:00:16.271
disappointment . What type of pressure

01:00:16.271 --> 01:00:18.604
specifically are you putting on Germany ?

01:00:18.604 --> 01:00:21.439
We are expecting Germany to live up to

01:00:21.449 --> 01:00:25.050
this government's commitment to meet 2% .

01:00:25.250 --> 01:00:27.689
They have already increased their

01:00:27.699 --> 01:00:29.588
defense spending over a five year

01:00:29.588 --> 01:00:33.280
period , which should get them to near

01:00:33.290 --> 01:00:36.830
2% if not above . But we continue to

01:00:36.840 --> 01:00:39.080
emphasize to German leadership , the

01:00:39.090 --> 01:00:41.919
importance of Germany to fulfill its

01:00:41.929 --> 01:00:43.939
commitment . Are there any real

01:00:44.600 --> 01:00:47.320
consequences if they do not meet that

01:00:47.330 --> 01:00:50.770
and meet it soon ? I think the

01:00:50.780 --> 01:00:52.780
consequences for European countries

01:00:52.780 --> 01:00:55.002
that don't meet that commitment is that

01:00:55.002 --> 01:00:57.639
they um their standing as leaders in

01:00:57.649 --> 01:01:00.610
Europe uh is predicated on the , in

01:01:00.620 --> 01:01:02.676
part , on the seriousness with which

01:01:02.676 --> 01:01:05.280
they take , undertake to fulfill the

01:01:05.290 --> 01:01:07.179
commitments they've made to other

01:01:07.179 --> 01:01:09.401
allies and we hold them accountable for

01:01:09.401 --> 01:01:11.401
that . Thank you , General Cali . I

01:01:11.401 --> 01:01:13.512
have a very simple question for you .

01:01:13.512 --> 01:01:15.734
What happens if Russia wins and Ukraine

01:01:15.734 --> 01:01:19.239
loses ? Well , so from a military

01:01:19.250 --> 01:01:22.080
perspective , it depends on um what

01:01:22.090 --> 01:01:24.399
winds means where , where the force

01:01:24.409 --> 01:01:26.576
ends up , where the Russian Force ends

01:01:26.576 --> 01:01:28.576
up geographically , what , what its

01:01:28.576 --> 01:01:30.798
composition is , what capabilities they

01:01:30.798 --> 01:01:32.909
have left . Um But it would certainly

01:01:32.909 --> 01:01:34.687
mean that we have to change our

01:01:34.687 --> 01:01:36.798
deterrent posture if they ended up um

01:01:36.798 --> 01:01:38.879
significantly farther west uh than ,

01:01:38.889 --> 01:01:41.050
than , than they've managed to get so

01:01:41.060 --> 01:01:43.739
far , who would be next ?

01:01:45.070 --> 01:01:47.292
So that's a , that's a great question .

01:01:47.292 --> 01:01:49.403
We think about that a lot and we work

01:01:49.403 --> 01:01:51.514
with the nations that , that we think

01:01:51.514 --> 01:01:53.348
would be vulnerable . Um Clearly

01:01:53.348 --> 01:01:55.459
geographically speaking , the ones on

01:01:55.459 --> 01:01:57.292
their immediate periphery of the

01:01:57.292 --> 01:01:59.514
Russian Federation would be the first ,

01:01:59.514 --> 01:01:59.479
but they wouldn't be the only ones the

01:01:59.489 --> 01:02:01.600
Russians are active globally , very ,

01:02:01.600 --> 01:02:03.604
very active in , in Africa , for

01:02:03.614 --> 01:02:06.405
example . Um So , so I think it would

01:02:06.415 --> 01:02:08.637
depend on a lot of things . We do spend

01:02:08.637 --> 01:02:10.471
quite a bit of time working with

01:02:10.471 --> 01:02:12.415
partners and allies who are in the

01:02:12.415 --> 01:02:14.526
immediate periphery of Russia to make

01:02:14.526 --> 01:02:16.637
them resilient and , and defensible .

01:02:16.637 --> 01:02:18.582
Got a minute left . I want to talk

01:02:18.582 --> 01:02:20.693
about the C C P and their investments

01:02:20.693 --> 01:02:22.859
in Europe right now . Uh What are some

01:02:22.859 --> 01:02:24.859
of the projects that they are , are

01:02:24.859 --> 01:02:26.971
doing that you can talk about in this

01:02:26.971 --> 01:02:29.193
setting and how are we countering those

01:02:29.193 --> 01:02:31.193
measures ? I think the areas of our

01:02:31.193 --> 01:02:33.949
greatest concern are when China uh is

01:02:33.959 --> 01:02:36.649
largely through technology uh companies .

01:02:36.659 --> 01:02:38.770
Uh Huawei is the kind of poster child

01:02:38.770 --> 01:02:41.139
for that . And so we work closely in

01:02:41.149 --> 01:02:43.479
sharing intelligence uh and our

01:02:43.489 --> 01:02:46.709
information about the risks that that

01:02:46.719 --> 01:02:48.719
creates for countries in Europe and

01:02:48.719 --> 01:02:51.189
more more broadly globally uh for them

01:02:51.199 --> 01:02:52.755
to be able to control their

01:02:52.755 --> 01:02:54.643
infrastructure , to control their

01:02:54.643 --> 01:02:56.755
communications . So that is one major

01:02:56.755 --> 01:02:58.810
line of effort . But the other major

01:02:58.810 --> 01:03:01.032
concern is when we see China seeking uh

01:03:01.032 --> 01:03:04.705
majority control for its . Um and while

01:03:04.715 --> 01:03:07.135
there were some uh instances in Europe

01:03:07.145 --> 01:03:09.256
some time ago where countries did not

01:03:09.256 --> 01:03:11.478
take that seriously , they are now very

01:03:11.478 --> 01:03:13.478
much attuned to that and have taken

01:03:13.478 --> 01:03:15.589
steps to make sure that even if there

01:03:15.589 --> 01:03:17.812
is investment , it does not uh allow re

01:03:17.834 --> 01:03:19.945
recognize Jennifer Massachusetts . Mr

01:03:19.945 --> 01:03:23.520
Keating , thank you , Mr Chairman . The

01:03:23.530 --> 01:03:25.459
greatest strength that the US

01:03:25.469 --> 01:03:28.070
government has security wise , military

01:03:28.080 --> 01:03:31.179
wise uh is something that Russia

01:03:31.189 --> 01:03:33.078
doesn't have something that China

01:03:33.078 --> 01:03:35.245
doesn't have . That's our coalition of

01:03:35.245 --> 01:03:37.709
allies . That's our strength and

01:03:37.719 --> 01:03:40.090
foremost among our allies are our

01:03:40.100 --> 01:03:43.629
transatlantic allies . Um They've had

01:03:43.879 --> 01:03:46.639
however , a soft underbelly uh in terms

01:03:46.649 --> 01:03:50.520
of their own security uh surrounding an

01:03:50.530 --> 01:03:52.141
issue that concern to us too

01:03:52.141 --> 01:03:54.086
domestically here . And that's the

01:03:54.086 --> 01:03:58.040
energy issue , energy and our security ,

01:03:58.050 --> 01:04:00.272
energy and the security of our allies .

01:04:00.350 --> 01:04:02.830
You can't separate them , they're

01:04:02.840 --> 01:04:05.530
intertwined and they're important and

01:04:05.540 --> 01:04:08.110
we see how important it is with Saudi

01:04:08.120 --> 01:04:10.899
Arabia's recent change in the position

01:04:10.909 --> 01:04:13.310
with Iran . We see Russia's influence

01:04:13.320 --> 01:04:17.000
on OPEC , we've seen Putin use it

01:04:17.010 --> 01:04:20.850
as a weapon of war and the strength of

01:04:20.860 --> 01:04:23.139
the Ukrainian people to withstand this

01:04:23.149 --> 01:04:25.800
winter . But the targeting of the

01:04:25.810 --> 01:04:28.489
energy infrastructure and how important

01:04:28.500 --> 01:04:31.290
that is strategically . So given

01:04:31.300 --> 01:04:33.522
everything that's happened , one of the

01:04:33.522 --> 01:04:35.744
things that's not , I don't think fully

01:04:35.744 --> 01:04:37.856
appreciated that we should be looking

01:04:37.856 --> 01:04:40.022
at uh very much in terms of our own us

01:04:40.022 --> 01:04:42.610
self interest is the miscalculation of

01:04:42.620 --> 01:04:45.989
Putin . Uh When he thought the using

01:04:46.000 --> 01:04:48.570
weapon , the weapon of energy with

01:04:48.580 --> 01:04:50.747
Europe and our allies , how that would

01:04:50.747 --> 01:04:52.580
be a strategic advantage and the

01:04:52.580 --> 01:04:54.636
changes that have occurred , changes

01:04:54.636 --> 01:04:56.858
that would have taken decades to get to

01:04:56.858 --> 01:04:59.080
where they are now . Can you comment on

01:04:59.080 --> 01:05:00.913
because it's so important to our

01:05:00.913 --> 01:05:02.913
security . Can you comment on those

01:05:02.913 --> 01:05:05.080
changes and how Putin's miscalculation

01:05:05.080 --> 01:05:07.370
has dramatically changed the energy

01:05:07.379 --> 01:05:10.070
posture of our allies that have , that

01:05:10.080 --> 01:05:12.419
has such a dramatic effect domestically

01:05:12.429 --> 01:05:15.139
here in the US as well . Uh uh If , if

01:05:15.149 --> 01:05:17.260
I could start , uh Doctor Wallinger ,

01:05:17.280 --> 01:05:19.391
um because there , there's a military

01:05:19.391 --> 01:05:21.336
quotient to this and , and , and a

01:05:21.336 --> 01:05:23.058
legal equity , that's , that's

01:05:23.058 --> 01:05:25.391
important congressman . Um First of all ,

01:05:25.391 --> 01:05:27.613
uh the change has been dramatic . So in

01:05:27.613 --> 01:05:30.229
general Europe's dependence on Russian

01:05:30.239 --> 01:05:33.969
gas has gone from 40% to just under 10%

01:05:34.639 --> 01:05:37.449
overnight in , in , in a year . Um It

01:05:37.459 --> 01:05:39.459
wasn't without pain and some of the

01:05:39.459 --> 01:05:41.626
pain was shared by us , servicemen and

01:05:41.626 --> 01:05:44.870
women . Um because the prices increased

01:05:45.439 --> 01:05:48.379
by several fold . Um in Germany , the

01:05:48.389 --> 01:05:51.399
gas prices increased 600% for a period

01:05:51.409 --> 01:05:53.576
there . They've leveled back out now .

01:05:53.576 --> 01:05:55.409
Um But nevertheless , it was not

01:05:55.409 --> 01:05:57.520
without pain that they did this . Why

01:05:57.520 --> 01:05:59.719
is that important for , um for us as

01:05:59.729 --> 01:06:01.729
you know , there's legislation that

01:06:01.729 --> 01:06:04.120
requires us not to us , the US military

01:06:04.129 --> 01:06:07.025
not to depend on Russian gas and oil .

01:06:07.186 --> 01:06:10.196
And I in the operational energy field ,

01:06:10.206 --> 01:06:12.428
that was easy for us . That's the , the

01:06:12.428 --> 01:06:14.539
gas and petroleum that we buy to fuel

01:06:14.539 --> 01:06:16.595
ships to drive tanks and things like

01:06:16.595 --> 01:06:18.650
that , we could control where we got

01:06:18.650 --> 01:06:20.539
that from . But our installations

01:06:20.539 --> 01:06:22.595
overseas were dependent on the local

01:06:22.595 --> 01:06:25.105
systems and so we were unable to comply ,

01:06:25.115 --> 01:06:27.402
but in Germany where we have 30 9000

01:06:27.412 --> 01:06:29.691
Americans and their families . We

01:06:29.701 --> 01:06:33.181
actually went from being 40% dependent

01:06:33.191 --> 01:06:36.562
to 0% dependent on Russian gas . The

01:06:36.572 --> 01:06:38.516
only exceptions would be countries

01:06:38.516 --> 01:06:40.516
where we really don't have a lot of

01:06:40.516 --> 01:06:42.350
people . So countries that still

01:06:42.350 --> 01:06:44.461
receive gas from Russia would include

01:06:44.461 --> 01:06:46.183
Hungary . We have very limited

01:06:46.183 --> 01:06:48.350
president if they could . Uh , looking

01:06:48.350 --> 01:06:50.620
at the future , this is a tremendous

01:06:50.629 --> 01:06:53.790
shift and it's advantageous to our own

01:06:53.800 --> 01:06:55.522
security interests and defense

01:06:55.522 --> 01:06:57.522
interests in this country . Can you

01:06:57.522 --> 01:06:59.356
just comment also along with the

01:06:59.356 --> 01:07:01.578
general Kali ? Absolutely because , and

01:07:01.578 --> 01:07:03.744
it's not just the dependent , it's the

01:07:03.744 --> 01:07:05.800
fact that Russia has a long standing

01:07:05.800 --> 01:07:07.856
track record of using dependence for

01:07:07.856 --> 01:07:09.967
political coercion . And that was the

01:07:09.967 --> 01:07:12.590
vulnerability that was created by

01:07:12.600 --> 01:07:14.322
investing or accepting Russian

01:07:14.322 --> 01:07:16.044
investment particularly in gas

01:07:16.044 --> 01:07:19.564
pipelines by diversifying to L N G by

01:07:19.574 --> 01:07:23.294
diversifying to new sourcess by moving

01:07:23.304 --> 01:07:26.915
away from carbon based fuels . Europe

01:07:26.925 --> 01:07:29.534
is reducing that vulnerability that

01:07:29.544 --> 01:07:32.175
Russia could use the turning off or the

01:07:32.185 --> 01:07:35.034
metering of energy for political

01:07:35.044 --> 01:07:37.100
effects . And that is a very welcome

01:07:37.100 --> 01:07:39.044
development and getting back to my

01:07:39.044 --> 01:07:41.330
primary point that makes this coalition

01:07:41.340 --> 01:07:43.909
stronger because Putin had thought that

01:07:43.919 --> 01:07:46.379
this would be a wedge . So looking

01:07:46.389 --> 01:07:49.500
forward , how important has it been uh

01:07:49.510 --> 01:07:51.739
in the decades to come to our greatest

01:07:51.750 --> 01:07:53.917
strength that this is something that's

01:07:53.917 --> 01:07:56.028
being dealt with so dramatically . As

01:07:56.028 --> 01:07:58.250
as general said , I I will just point ,

01:07:58.250 --> 01:08:00.472
I fully agree and I'll point to another

01:08:00.472 --> 01:08:02.417
element , which is in 2014 when we

01:08:02.417 --> 01:08:04.583
first looked at sanctioning Russia for

01:08:04.583 --> 01:08:06.694
its initial invasion of Ukraine . One

01:08:06.694 --> 01:08:08.861
of the limitations on strong sanctions

01:08:08.861 --> 01:08:10.806
was exactly that energy dependence

01:08:10.806 --> 01:08:12.972
going forward , sustaining sanctions ,

01:08:12.972 --> 01:08:15.139
tightening them when necessary will be

01:08:15.139 --> 01:08:17.306
easier for Europe because they are not

01:08:17.306 --> 01:08:19.472
dependent and that will be a long term

01:08:19.472 --> 01:08:21.694
disadvantage for the Putin leadership .

01:08:21.694 --> 01:08:23.806
Thank you . Thank you for your work .

01:08:23.838 --> 01:08:25.560
Now , recognize gentleman from

01:08:25.560 --> 01:08:27.727
Wisconsin , Mr Gallagher , thank you ,

01:08:27.727 --> 01:08:30.008
Mr Chairman . Uh the phrase um lessons

01:08:30.019 --> 01:08:32.019
learned from the war in Ukraine has

01:08:32.019 --> 01:08:33.852
become one of the most popular ,

01:08:33.852 --> 01:08:35.963
perhaps overused phrases in , in sort

01:08:35.963 --> 01:08:38.186
of the DC national security community ,

01:08:38.186 --> 01:08:40.130
I guess in simplest terms , Doctor

01:08:40.130 --> 01:08:42.352
Wallinger , what lessons do you believe

01:08:42.352 --> 01:08:44.463
the Department of Defense has learned

01:08:44.463 --> 01:08:47.859
from the war in Ukraine ? Three lessons .

01:08:47.870 --> 01:08:51.359
One is um needing to pay close

01:08:51.370 --> 01:08:53.620
attention to readiness and supply

01:08:53.629 --> 01:08:57.470
chains . We neglected that as a country

01:08:57.479 --> 01:08:59.646
in the last 30 years and we've learned

01:08:59.646 --> 01:09:02.029
that lesson and we're taking action to

01:09:02.040 --> 01:09:05.330
remedy those that neglect . Number two

01:09:05.339 --> 01:09:08.540
is the importance of alliance , allies

01:09:08.549 --> 01:09:12.279
and partners . G A global network of

01:09:12.290 --> 01:09:14.640
allies and partners . It's not just

01:09:14.649 --> 01:09:16.871
NATO , although it's importantly NATO ,

01:09:16.871 --> 01:09:19.299
it is the G7 . It is other like minded

01:09:19.310 --> 01:09:20.977
countries who care about that

01:09:20.977 --> 01:09:23.430
international rules based order . And I

01:09:23.439 --> 01:09:26.990
think the third lesson is that we need

01:09:27.000 --> 01:09:29.370
to make investments and partners that

01:09:29.379 --> 01:09:31.490
we did make in a country like Ukraine

01:09:31.490 --> 01:09:33.910
to build basic defense institution

01:09:33.919 --> 01:09:36.060
capabilities to build relationships .

01:09:36.069 --> 01:09:38.125
Because all of the work that you has

01:09:38.125 --> 01:09:40.140
been able to do to surge support to

01:09:40.149 --> 01:09:42.205
Ukraine would not have been possible

01:09:42.205 --> 01:09:44.316
without those relationships that were

01:09:44.316 --> 01:09:46.427
built over several decades . And when

01:09:46.427 --> 01:09:48.205
it comes to our sort of initial

01:09:48.205 --> 01:09:50.427
inability to deter Russia from invading

01:09:50.427 --> 01:09:52.260
and miscalculation there in what

01:09:52.260 --> 01:09:54.371
lessons are to be derived from that .

01:09:56.080 --> 01:09:58.191
Well , I think they are , the lessons

01:09:58.191 --> 01:10:00.629
are the positive lessons of how we

01:10:00.640 --> 01:10:02.807
successfully deter Russia every single

01:10:02.807 --> 01:10:05.629
day because Russia , despite potential

01:10:05.640 --> 01:10:07.807
incentives to have not threatened NATO

01:10:07.807 --> 01:10:10.689
have not threatened the US homeland ,

01:10:10.839 --> 01:10:13.279
we know how to create credible

01:10:13.290 --> 01:10:15.839
deterrent that works . And that's a

01:10:15.850 --> 01:10:19.720
lesson I know that you is taking and

01:10:19.729 --> 01:10:21.785
that the defense department wants to

01:10:21.785 --> 01:10:23.951
continue forward as we think about the

01:10:23.951 --> 01:10:26.007
importance of the Vilnius Summit and

01:10:26.007 --> 01:10:27.875
making sure we have a credible

01:10:27.884 --> 01:10:30.294
deterrent for NATO . But as a matter of

01:10:30.305 --> 01:10:33.325
fact , on February 24th , we obviously

01:10:33.334 --> 01:10:35.774
did not have a credible deterrent or we

01:10:35.785 --> 01:10:37.952
failed to deter notwithstanding what's

01:10:37.952 --> 01:10:40.063
happened afterwards . And that's sort

01:10:40.063 --> 01:10:42.229
of not a positive development any time

01:10:42.229 --> 01:10:44.479
you have , you know , hundreds of

01:10:44.490 --> 01:10:46.268
billions of dollars and tens of

01:10:46.268 --> 01:10:48.379
thousands of lives lost . I guess I'm

01:10:48.379 --> 01:10:50.609
sort of honing in on that failure of

01:10:50.620 --> 01:10:52.787
deterrence . Is it mirror imaging ? Is

01:10:52.787 --> 01:10:55.009
there something about Putin ? We failed

01:10:55.009 --> 01:10:58.250
to understand ? I think tactically

01:10:58.259 --> 01:11:01.379
we underestimated the stakes that the

01:11:01.390 --> 01:11:03.390
Russian leadership . Well , I don't

01:11:03.390 --> 01:11:05.557
know if it's technically , but we , we

01:11:05.557 --> 01:11:07.668
miscalculated and , and believed that

01:11:07.668 --> 01:11:09.870
uh Russia , this Russian leadership

01:11:09.879 --> 01:11:13.669
would uh be daunted by the

01:11:13.680 --> 01:11:15.939
international costs that it would pay .

01:11:16.439 --> 01:11:18.661
But I think the other lesson learned is

01:11:18.661 --> 01:11:20.870
when we are um we are already

01:11:20.879 --> 01:11:22.810
implementing , which is to take

01:11:22.819 --> 01:11:25.770
seriously the actual defense

01:11:25.779 --> 01:11:28.240
capabilities of partners like Ukraine

01:11:28.290 --> 01:11:30.179
so that they can mount a credible

01:11:30.179 --> 01:11:32.569
deterrent . And while work was done by

01:11:32.600 --> 01:11:35.029
bipartisan work was done on that in the

01:11:35.040 --> 01:11:37.096
last decade , clearly , we didn't do

01:11:37.096 --> 01:11:39.160
enough and that we have definitely

01:11:39.169 --> 01:11:41.391
learned that lesson and are carrying it

01:11:41.391 --> 01:11:43.613
forward . General same question on , on

01:11:43.613 --> 01:11:45.780
sort of Putin and deterrence failure .

01:11:45.780 --> 01:11:47.891
What was our central miscalculation ?

01:11:47.891 --> 01:11:50.058
And then an added question about , you

01:11:50.058 --> 01:11:52.280
know , a lot of people refer to Ukraine

01:11:52.280 --> 01:11:54.502
as a sort of test bed for technology in

01:11:54.502 --> 01:11:57.189
modern warfare . How are we

01:11:57.729 --> 01:11:59.600
capturing that innovation on the

01:11:59.609 --> 01:12:01.890
battlefield and importing it into ,

01:12:01.899 --> 01:12:05.580
into dod ? So sir , uh

01:12:05.589 --> 01:12:08.279
starting with your second question . Um

01:12:09.160 --> 01:12:11.660
Well , we have , we have a ton of

01:12:11.669 --> 01:12:14.799
different um uh initiatives and

01:12:14.810 --> 01:12:17.490
activities uh to observe from the

01:12:17.500 --> 01:12:20.509
technical level to the operational

01:12:20.520 --> 01:12:23.620
level . Um and to the institutional

01:12:23.629 --> 01:12:25.629
level , what's working in Ukraine ?

01:12:25.629 --> 01:12:27.740
What's not working in Ukraine ? And ,

01:12:27.740 --> 01:12:30.490
and we're importing those . Um We have

01:12:30.500 --> 01:12:32.333
at all echelons , talks with the

01:12:32.333 --> 01:12:34.790
services about what we're seeing . They

01:12:34.799 --> 01:12:38.709
have questions for us . Um We , we talk

01:12:38.720 --> 01:12:40.887
with the Ukrainians , they're evolving

01:12:40.887 --> 01:12:42.776
very quickly because , you know ,

01:12:42.776 --> 01:12:44.664
they're , they're under selective

01:12:44.664 --> 01:12:46.498
pressure as it were . So they're

01:12:46.498 --> 01:12:48.220
developing new techniques . Um

01:12:48.220 --> 01:12:50.331
Sometimes we develop them together in

01:12:50.331 --> 01:12:52.442
consultation with each other . Um but

01:12:52.442 --> 01:12:54.664
all of this is permeating back into the

01:12:54.664 --> 01:12:57.490
services as they generate future forces

01:12:57.500 --> 01:12:59.279
just as important . We're in

01:12:59.290 --> 01:13:01.457
consultation constantly with the other

01:13:01.457 --> 01:13:04.009
combat and commands . Uh Admiral

01:13:04.490 --> 01:13:06.839
Aquilino in us , Indo Paycom uh is

01:13:06.850 --> 01:13:09.017
paying great attention to this has had

01:13:09.017 --> 01:13:11.183
many teams come out and visit . I have

01:13:11.183 --> 01:13:13.294
18 seconds . Is there , is there like

01:13:13.294 --> 01:13:15.609
an obvious battlefield innovation in

01:13:15.620 --> 01:13:17.731
Ukraine that could be exported to the

01:13:17.731 --> 01:13:20.660
Indo Pacific ? For a ? Yes , I think

01:13:20.669 --> 01:13:24.290
our method of um equipping and uh

01:13:24.299 --> 01:13:27.660
advising from afar . My time has

01:13:27.669 --> 01:13:29.725
expired chair and I recognize gentle

01:13:29.725 --> 01:13:32.002
lady from Pennsylvania , Miss Hoolihan .

01:13:32.002 --> 01:13:34.225
Thank you , Mr Chair and thank you both

01:13:34.225 --> 01:13:36.336
for your testimony , both here and uh

01:13:36.336 --> 01:13:38.502
in the closed setting as well . I have

01:13:38.502 --> 01:13:40.502
a couple of questions and I want to

01:13:40.502 --> 01:13:42.725
pull on a couple of threads . One is we

01:13:42.725 --> 01:13:45.750
spoke about um the addition of Finland

01:13:45.759 --> 01:13:49.470
to NATO and the power of uh their

01:13:49.479 --> 01:13:51.535
capabilities . And one of the things

01:13:51.535 --> 01:13:54.250
you spoke about was their air um power

01:13:54.259 --> 01:13:57.089
and their plans to have , I think 60

01:13:57.100 --> 01:13:59.359
F-35s at least . Is that correct or

01:13:59.370 --> 01:14:03.069
around then ? 64 64 . Um

01:14:03.080 --> 01:14:05.413
And then we've also spent a lot of time ,

01:14:05.413 --> 01:14:07.589
of course , talking about Ukraine and

01:14:07.600 --> 01:14:09.822
what we would expect would be offensive

01:14:09.822 --> 01:14:11.933
operations that are forthcoming . And

01:14:11.933 --> 01:14:13.989
you sir General talked about staying

01:14:13.989 --> 01:14:16.450
the course um good solid plans that are

01:14:16.459 --> 01:14:19.129
uh outlined . But I and a number of

01:14:19.140 --> 01:14:21.140
other people bipartisanly have been

01:14:21.140 --> 01:14:23.251
asking of you all , whether or not it

01:14:23.251 --> 01:14:25.140
would be appropriate to allow for

01:14:25.140 --> 01:14:27.700
Ukraine to have access to aircraft as

01:14:27.709 --> 01:14:29.850
well . Uh Whether they're a 10 S or

01:14:29.859 --> 01:14:32.339
F-16s or M , I think the Polish have ,

01:14:32.350 --> 01:14:34.294
have been uh in the press recently

01:14:34.294 --> 01:14:36.720
talking about that . Uh What is the

01:14:36.729 --> 01:14:39.009
latest thought on that ? Why is that

01:14:39.020 --> 01:14:41.242
not something that we would want in a ,

01:14:41.242 --> 01:14:43.720
in an active war zone to be providing

01:14:43.729 --> 01:14:45.279
for an ally of ours ?

01:14:48.629 --> 01:14:52.089
All right . Um Our focus has been on uh

01:14:52.100 --> 01:14:54.490
with generous support of the American

01:14:54.500 --> 01:14:56.919
people through Congress , focus on

01:14:56.930 --> 01:15:00.060
Ukrainian priorities for the fight and

01:15:00.069 --> 01:15:03.069
aircraft while on the list , uh Western

01:15:03.080 --> 01:15:05.339
modern aircraft is about eighth on the

01:15:05.350 --> 01:15:08.009
list . And so we have focused with

01:15:08.020 --> 01:15:10.729
resources on the highest priority uh

01:15:10.740 --> 01:15:13.640
capabilities and that has been air

01:15:13.649 --> 01:15:16.020
defense , artillery and armor . Um I

01:15:16.029 --> 01:15:18.259
think General Kali can speak to this

01:15:18.270 --> 01:15:21.370
better than I . There is also a timing

01:15:21.500 --> 01:15:24.370
issue . Um What do they require right

01:15:24.379 --> 01:15:26.546
now , which is what we've been focused

01:15:26.546 --> 01:15:28.546
on for the battles they're facing .

01:15:28.546 --> 01:15:30.768
What can we deliver that will be timely

01:15:30.768 --> 01:15:32.823
and effective . And in that regard ,

01:15:32.830 --> 01:15:35.339
the contributions that some uh NATO

01:15:35.350 --> 01:15:38.390
allies have made of legacy Soviet

01:15:38.399 --> 01:15:40.288
aircraft have been helpful to the

01:15:40.290 --> 01:15:42.290
Ukrainians because their pilots are

01:15:42.290 --> 01:15:44.401
trained on those aircraft , they know

01:15:44.401 --> 01:15:46.346
how to use them , they know how to

01:15:46.346 --> 01:15:48.810
maintain them . Thanks , Celeste , uh

01:15:48.819 --> 01:15:52.459
ma'am in the , in the near term and and

01:15:52.470 --> 01:15:56.080
into the midterm , what Ukraine really

01:15:56.089 --> 01:15:58.220
needs to do is control the airspace

01:15:58.229 --> 01:16:00.396
over its country and over its forces .

01:16:00.396 --> 01:16:02.396
Right ? And they've been doing that

01:16:02.396 --> 01:16:04.562
very effectively with ground based air

01:16:04.562 --> 01:16:06.562
defense . And we spoke a little bit

01:16:06.562 --> 01:16:08.618
about our efforts uh to introduce uh

01:16:08.618 --> 01:16:10.896
more ground based air defense recently .

01:16:10.896 --> 01:16:13.007
Um So , so , so that's like the thing

01:16:13.007 --> 01:16:15.173
that's most imperative right now and ,

01:16:15.173 --> 01:16:17.118
and it's being very well served by

01:16:17.118 --> 01:16:19.229
ground based air defense . Um They've

01:16:19.229 --> 01:16:21.459
also got some capabilities that , that

01:16:21.470 --> 01:16:24.979
we've married to their Soviet era air

01:16:24.990 --> 01:16:27.549
frames for offensive operations that I

01:16:27.560 --> 01:16:30.819
best talk about in closed session . Um

01:16:30.830 --> 01:16:32.959
um And , and , and finally , I would

01:16:32.970 --> 01:16:35.081
note that uh there are countries that

01:16:35.081 --> 01:16:37.669
have given uh airframes and Slovakia

01:16:37.680 --> 01:16:39.779
and Poland specifically have given a

01:16:39.790 --> 01:16:41.790
significant number just in the past

01:16:41.790 --> 01:16:43.790
couple of weeks and , and they were

01:16:43.790 --> 01:16:45.846
readily integrated into operations .

01:16:45.846 --> 01:16:45.779
Yes , and I've been following that and

01:16:45.790 --> 01:16:47.901
I appreciate that . Um I'm just gonna

01:16:47.901 --> 01:16:50.068
leave that part of my questioning with

01:16:50.068 --> 01:16:52.179
saying that what I'm , I'm curious to

01:16:52.179 --> 01:16:54.123
know if there is any point in time

01:16:54.123 --> 01:16:56.234
where it makes sense to continue that

01:16:56.732 --> 01:16:58.954
because the , the , the Congress has at

01:16:58.954 --> 01:17:00.732
least been asking that question

01:17:00.732 --> 01:17:02.843
officially since last April . So it's

01:17:02.843 --> 01:17:05.010
been more than a year and I understand

01:17:05.010 --> 01:17:07.176
that these timelines are long and it's

01:17:07.176 --> 01:17:07.172
very expensive and prioritization and ,

01:17:07.192 --> 01:17:09.303
but we have no indication necessarily

01:17:09.303 --> 01:17:11.359
that this is going to abate any time

01:17:11.359 --> 01:17:13.470
soon . And so it just feels as though

01:17:13.470 --> 01:17:15.081
it's still um an appropriate

01:17:15.081 --> 01:17:17.248
conversation to continue to ask and to

01:17:17.248 --> 01:17:19.359
continue to have with what remains of

01:17:19.359 --> 01:17:21.525
my time . I would like to follow up on

01:17:21.525 --> 01:17:23.636
what Mr uh I think he was keating was

01:17:23.636 --> 01:17:25.803
asking about our efforts in the dod uh

01:17:25.803 --> 01:17:28.025
within to make sure that we are helping

01:17:28.025 --> 01:17:30.886
um our allies uh be less reliable on

01:17:30.895 --> 01:17:33.465
Russian energy sources . Um And I was

01:17:33.476 --> 01:17:35.476
wondering if you could specifically

01:17:35.476 --> 01:17:37.532
comment on the energy resilience and

01:17:37.532 --> 01:17:39.532
conservation investment program and

01:17:39.532 --> 01:17:41.698
whether or not any of those funds have

01:17:41.698 --> 01:17:43.754
been particularly useful in um being

01:17:43.754 --> 01:17:45.976
less dependent as you mentioned , sir ,

01:17:45.976 --> 01:17:48.198
in our , in our own uh use of energy or

01:17:48.198 --> 01:17:50.520
our allies being less dependent . Um

01:17:50.990 --> 01:17:53.212
Congressman , I would have to take that

01:17:53.212 --> 01:17:55.390
question for uh a a response in the

01:17:55.399 --> 01:17:57.510
record . I'm not , I would , I've not

01:17:57.510 --> 01:17:59.621
been tracking whether we've been able

01:17:59.621 --> 01:18:01.677
to use that funding for specifically

01:18:01.677 --> 01:18:03.843
for allies . It's a great question and

01:18:03.843 --> 01:18:03.419
I would like to get you a good answer .

01:18:03.640 --> 01:18:05.862
Thank you . I appreciate it . I'm gonna

01:18:05.862 --> 01:18:09.850
go ahead and yell back chair and I

01:18:09.859 --> 01:18:11.899
recognize a gentleman from Nebraska

01:18:11.910 --> 01:18:13.743
General Bacon for five minutes ,

01:18:13.743 --> 01:18:15.966
Chairman Rogers . Thank you and I thank

01:18:15.966 --> 01:18:18.243
Doctor Weer for you being here in Cali .

01:18:18.243 --> 01:18:20.466
Appreciate your uh your perspective . I

01:18:20.466 --> 01:18:22.354
have a series of questions on the

01:18:22.354 --> 01:18:24.521
Baltics and then I also want to talk a

01:18:24.521 --> 01:18:26.950
little bit about um energy energy to

01:18:26.959 --> 01:18:28.939
our own bases in Europe . So if we

01:18:28.950 --> 01:18:31.283
could be concise , I'd be very grateful .

01:18:31.283 --> 01:18:33.561
Uh So I'm on the Baltic security chair .

01:18:33.561 --> 01:18:35.339
I'm the co chair for the Baltic

01:18:35.339 --> 01:18:37.450
Security Caucus . Also served in NATO

01:18:37.450 --> 01:18:39.283
for a few years . You know , the

01:18:39.283 --> 01:18:41.506
Baltics deserve a lot of our focus . Uh

01:18:41.506 --> 01:18:43.617
They are on the front lines . They've

01:18:43.617 --> 01:18:45.728
embraced democracy , our free markets

01:18:45.728 --> 01:18:47.950
and they are shining bright . They're ,

01:18:47.950 --> 01:18:50.172
they're prosperous . Uh but they are on

01:18:50.172 --> 01:18:49.959
the front lines , I think , very

01:18:49.970 --> 01:18:52.192
vulnerable . So , first of all , Doctor

01:18:52.192 --> 01:18:54.359
Wilder , are we doing enough to create

01:18:54.359 --> 01:18:56.581
deterrents in the three Baltic States ?

01:18:57.620 --> 01:18:59.870
I think that we are , we've really

01:18:59.879 --> 01:19:02.310
stepped up the United States and allies

01:19:02.319 --> 01:19:05.549
and have heard their concerns . And in

01:19:05.560 --> 01:19:07.727
particular , one of the achievements ,

01:19:07.727 --> 01:19:09.810
there was the uh the Madrid summit

01:19:09.819 --> 01:19:12.859
decision to focus on credible uh

01:19:12.870 --> 01:19:16.080
defense uh forward defense . And you've

01:19:16.089 --> 01:19:18.799
seen that then materialized through the

01:19:18.810 --> 01:19:20.794
battle group , but also with uh

01:19:20.805 --> 01:19:22.916
persistent us , rotational presence ,

01:19:22.916 --> 01:19:25.564
persistent air policing . Uh And we've

01:19:25.575 --> 01:19:27.725
uh prioritized all three countries in

01:19:27.734 --> 01:19:30.455
some of their F MS cases and F M F I

01:19:30.464 --> 01:19:32.686
appreciate that . We've dedicated about

01:19:32.686 --> 01:19:35.044
250 year for the Baltic Security

01:19:35.055 --> 01:19:37.166
Initiative . And we're gonna try to ,

01:19:37.166 --> 01:19:39.277
at least I'm proposing to raise it uh

01:19:39.277 --> 01:19:41.499
this following year . But we'll see how

01:19:41.499 --> 01:19:43.722
well we do . Joe . I know that the last

01:19:43.722 --> 01:19:45.611
NATO conference was to talk about

01:19:45.611 --> 01:19:47.666
putting a , a ground division in the

01:19:47.666 --> 01:19:49.833
Baltics . Not necessarily all American

01:19:49.833 --> 01:19:52.166
could be a blended of various countries .

01:19:52.379 --> 01:19:54.546
What's your opinion of that ? I mean ,

01:19:54.546 --> 01:19:56.490
I personally think it's needed for

01:19:56.490 --> 01:19:58.712
deterrence . But where do you lie ? And

01:19:58.712 --> 01:19:58.600
what and what's the , where the , where

01:19:58.609 --> 01:20:00.979
are we going with this ? Thank you ,

01:20:00.990 --> 01:20:04.919
Congressman . Um So the new plans

01:20:04.930 --> 01:20:06.986
that we've put together the regional

01:20:06.986 --> 01:20:09.152
plans that we've put together are of a

01:20:09.152 --> 01:20:11.859
pretty big advance in a number of ways .

01:20:11.870 --> 01:20:13.481
One of the ways is that they

01:20:13.481 --> 01:20:15.814
incorporate for the first time in years ,

01:20:15.814 --> 01:20:17.870
national Defense Forces and national

01:20:17.870 --> 01:20:19.759
defense planning when you put the

01:20:19.759 --> 01:20:22.720
Baltics , uh National forces together ,

01:20:23.169 --> 01:20:25.113
and when you put the multinational

01:20:25.113 --> 01:20:27.336
forces , those three battle groups that

01:20:27.336 --> 01:20:29.447
can come up to brigade level and when

01:20:29.447 --> 01:20:31.669
you put the us unilateral contributions

01:20:31.669 --> 01:20:34.080
of special enablers together and then

01:20:34.089 --> 01:20:36.359
you put the multinational division

01:20:36.370 --> 01:20:38.720
northeast on top of that , which is the

01:20:38.729 --> 01:20:41.009
NATO force that I control . You have

01:20:41.020 --> 01:20:43.180
well over a NATO division in the

01:20:43.189 --> 01:20:45.411
Baltics right now and this is all baked

01:20:45.411 --> 01:20:47.467
into the plans that I was discussing

01:20:47.467 --> 01:20:49.522
earlier , sir . I think that's a big

01:20:49.522 --> 01:20:51.578
step forward for deterrence . Russia

01:20:51.578 --> 01:20:53.745
needs to know they're fighting with us

01:20:53.745 --> 01:20:53.580
when they , when they pick on the

01:20:53.589 --> 01:20:55.756
Baltics , it doesn't appear to me that

01:20:55.756 --> 01:20:57.700
the Baltics have a very modern air

01:20:57.700 --> 01:20:59.700
defense capability . I know we have

01:20:59.700 --> 01:21:01.589
fighters that move in and out but

01:21:01.589 --> 01:21:03.700
surface of our missiles . What can we

01:21:03.700 --> 01:21:06.680
do about that , sir ? Um So we are in

01:21:06.689 --> 01:21:09.160
year three of a five year special

01:21:09.169 --> 01:21:12.160
security cooperation in initiative for

01:21:12.189 --> 01:21:14.740
uh integrated air and missile defense

01:21:14.750 --> 01:21:16.972
in the Baltics . I know you're familiar

01:21:16.972 --> 01:21:19.250
with it . Already sir . Um And , and so

01:21:19.259 --> 01:21:22.160
the first phase of that was to lay down

01:21:22.169 --> 01:21:24.169
the communications networks and the

01:21:24.169 --> 01:21:26.336
secure communications necessary that's

01:21:26.336 --> 01:21:28.280
been done . We're now in the phase

01:21:28.280 --> 01:21:30.270
where we lay out more sensors and

01:21:30.279 --> 01:21:32.470
importantly integrate those sensors .

01:21:32.479 --> 01:21:34.701
We're doing pretty well with that phase

01:21:34.701 --> 01:21:36.923
three will be the last year of the five

01:21:36.923 --> 01:21:39.035
year plan . And that is to put actual

01:21:39.035 --> 01:21:41.201
weapon systems in separately from that

01:21:41.201 --> 01:21:43.209
sir . I would say that um those uh

01:21:43.220 --> 01:21:45.310
battle groups that NATO has put out

01:21:45.319 --> 01:21:47.410
there do come with ground based air

01:21:47.419 --> 01:21:49.419
defense that we've been integrating

01:21:49.419 --> 01:21:51.641
with the overall air picture . And then

01:21:51.641 --> 01:21:53.586
finally , for the Vilnius Summit ,

01:21:53.586 --> 01:21:55.586
we've created a special air defense

01:21:55.586 --> 01:21:57.819
plan that will help us drive forward .

01:21:57.830 --> 01:22:00.540
Uh The rest of the Baltic uh I A MD

01:22:00.549 --> 01:22:02.716
program . I think that's good news for

01:22:02.716 --> 01:22:04.882
the Baltic States . So the more we can

01:22:04.882 --> 01:22:06.938
build on , that's great because they

01:22:06.938 --> 01:22:08.938
are very vulnerable . I'm switching

01:22:08.938 --> 01:22:10.993
gears a little bit . I , I served at

01:22:10.993 --> 01:22:10.770
Ramstein . I , I'm very familiar with

01:22:10.779 --> 01:22:12.950
the hospital was a part of uh putting

01:22:12.959 --> 01:22:15.181
that together as a base commander there

01:22:15.181 --> 01:22:17.292
uh years ago . Uh But the one thing I

01:22:17.292 --> 01:22:19.515
always told me , Ramstein and land , we

01:22:19.515 --> 01:22:21.737
always on Russian gas and I've tried to

01:22:21.737 --> 01:22:23.737
chip away at that over the last few

01:22:23.737 --> 01:22:25.737
years . But last N D A A we finally

01:22:25.737 --> 01:22:27.950
said no ins or butts you got , you

01:22:27.959 --> 01:22:30.070
cannot be using Russian gas . How are

01:22:30.070 --> 01:22:32.126
we doing on this with Tyler one , if

01:22:32.126 --> 01:22:34.450
you got the information . Uh So we're

01:22:34.459 --> 01:22:36.626
doing great on that right now and it's

01:22:36.626 --> 01:22:38.626
because of the conversation that we

01:22:38.626 --> 01:22:38.470
were having earlier with a couple of

01:22:38.479 --> 01:22:41.580
other representatives . Um So we were

01:22:41.589 --> 01:22:43.790
unable to comply because we were

01:22:43.799 --> 01:22:45.966
dependent on German infrastructure and

01:22:45.970 --> 01:22:48.081
German energy infrastructure that has

01:22:48.081 --> 01:22:50.303
changed dramatically . Over the last 14

01:22:50.303 --> 01:22:53.049
months , the Germans went from 39.6% of

01:22:53.060 --> 01:22:56.200
their energy use coming from Russia to

01:22:56.209 --> 01:22:58.600
zero . I mean , I think it's 00.1% and

01:22:58.609 --> 01:23:00.776
I can't even figure out what that is .

01:23:00.776 --> 01:23:02.720
So we're no longer reliant on , on

01:23:02.720 --> 01:23:04.887
Russian gas in those locations . Thank

01:23:04.887 --> 01:23:06.887
you very much . I thank you both Mr

01:23:06.887 --> 01:23:08.998
Chairman . You'll be back chair and I

01:23:08.998 --> 01:23:11.220
recognize gently from Texas M Escobar .

01:23:11.459 --> 01:23:14.060
Thank you so much , Mr Chairman and uh

01:23:14.069 --> 01:23:16.125
many thanks to our witnesses . Thank

01:23:16.125 --> 01:23:17.958
you for your service and for the

01:23:17.958 --> 01:23:20.180
incredible work that you've done . Uh I

01:23:20.180 --> 01:23:22.180
think context is so important and I

01:23:22.180 --> 01:23:24.236
wanted to , to share with you all uh

01:23:24.236 --> 01:23:26.319
when I attended the 2019 Munich

01:23:26.330 --> 01:23:29.250
Security Conference , the conversations

01:23:29.259 --> 01:23:33.060
at that conference uh were alarming and ,

01:23:33.069 --> 01:23:35.229
and jarring when it came to Western

01:23:35.240 --> 01:23:38.620
Unity . Uh when it came to uh our

01:23:38.629 --> 01:23:41.569
commitment to NATO , I was at this

01:23:41.580 --> 01:23:44.720
year's conference and it was radically

01:23:44.729 --> 01:23:47.560
different and I am so proud of the work

01:23:47.569 --> 01:23:49.370
that our country and that our

01:23:49.379 --> 01:23:51.770
administration has done in order to

01:23:51.779 --> 01:23:54.490
shore up those alliances , alliances

01:23:54.520 --> 01:23:56.439
and to ensure that , that we are

01:23:56.450 --> 01:23:58.520
together , especially in this very

01:23:58.529 --> 01:24:01.680
important fight uh to support Ukraine .

01:24:01.910 --> 01:24:04.919
So I wanna focus a little bit on , um ,

01:24:04.930 --> 01:24:06.708
what lessons that we've learned

01:24:06.708 --> 01:24:09.359
actually general , uh , Cavalli from

01:24:09.450 --> 01:24:12.169
Russian readiness failures . What

01:24:12.180 --> 01:24:13.902
readiness lessons particularly

01:24:13.902 --> 01:24:15.847
regarding sustainment supplies and

01:24:15.847 --> 01:24:17.847
logistics have you learned thus far

01:24:17.919 --> 01:24:20.169
from Russian operational failures ?

01:24:20.180 --> 01:24:22.419
Where have Russian forces vastly

01:24:22.430 --> 01:24:25.299
improved on their early failures and

01:24:25.310 --> 01:24:27.532
what problems continue to plague them ?

01:24:27.532 --> 01:24:30.410
How are our support efforts preventing

01:24:30.419 --> 01:24:33.040
Ukrainian forces from making similar

01:24:33.049 --> 01:24:36.419
mistakes ? Um

01:24:36.430 --> 01:24:38.597
Thank you , ma'am . And , and first of

01:24:38.597 --> 01:24:40.959
all , I I I was at both of those

01:24:40.970 --> 01:24:43.081
security conferences also and I share

01:24:43.081 --> 01:24:46.000
your observations and , and uh and the

01:24:46.009 --> 01:24:48.065
the sense of gratification um that ,

01:24:48.065 --> 01:24:50.231
that you have about that . I think , I

01:24:50.231 --> 01:24:52.398
think the theme of the 2019 1 was West

01:24:52.398 --> 01:24:54.398
less if I remember correctly , that

01:24:54.398 --> 01:24:56.700
that was not the theme this year . Um

01:24:56.709 --> 01:24:58.820
Two lessons learned specifically with

01:24:58.820 --> 01:25:01.759
regard to um to logistics , first

01:25:01.770 --> 01:25:05.089
stockpiles um and consumption rates .

01:25:05.319 --> 01:25:08.720
Um They are just off the charts . Um

01:25:08.729 --> 01:25:10.840
And , and I think that we and the dod

01:25:10.840 --> 01:25:13.080
have taken note of that . I know that

01:25:13.089 --> 01:25:15.311
we and NATO have taken note of that and

01:25:15.311 --> 01:25:17.478
have incorporated that lesson into our

01:25:17.478 --> 01:25:19.645
new new plans and that will be part of

01:25:19.645 --> 01:25:22.194
driving defense spending higher in , in ,

01:25:22.205 --> 01:25:24.604
in Europe and among our allies . Um

01:25:24.615 --> 01:25:27.234
Second , logistics is an end to end

01:25:27.245 --> 01:25:29.794
system . And uh the Russians have

01:25:29.805 --> 01:25:32.365
proven extremely adept at operational

01:25:32.375 --> 01:25:34.625
level logistics , they can move large

01:25:34.634 --> 01:25:36.654
amounts of stuff lo long distances

01:25:36.665 --> 01:25:39.259
quickly . But once it gets off the

01:25:39.270 --> 01:25:42.109
train that last mile as it were , um ,

01:25:42.120 --> 01:25:44.453
that is part of the system too and they ,

01:25:44.453 --> 01:25:46.649
and they were not ready for that . And

01:25:46.660 --> 01:25:48.990
that is shown over the days . Part of

01:25:49.000 --> 01:25:51.430
the system also is the operational

01:25:51.439 --> 01:25:54.180
design of your operation . One of the

01:25:54.189 --> 01:25:56.300
key weaknesses of the initial Russian

01:25:56.300 --> 01:25:58.522
plan was the fact that it , it attacked

01:25:58.522 --> 01:26:00.689
from five different directions at once

01:26:00.689 --> 01:26:03.169
converging . So the Russian army was

01:26:03.180 --> 01:26:05.370
operating on what we call exterior

01:26:05.500 --> 01:26:08.250
mines that is from outside and you had

01:26:08.259 --> 01:26:10.890
to really work hard to shift an effort

01:26:10.899 --> 01:26:13.229
from one access to another . So those

01:26:13.240 --> 01:26:15.462
are , those are three or four lessons .

01:26:15.462 --> 01:26:17.684
I think that we could draw from their ,

01:26:17.684 --> 01:26:19.629
their logistic experience . On the

01:26:19.629 --> 01:26:21.684
other hand , our logistic experience

01:26:21.684 --> 01:26:23.796
has been extremely successful . Um uh

01:26:23.796 --> 01:26:25.890
Jackie Van Ovos in in us Transcom

01:26:25.899 --> 01:26:29.709
ability to move things huge amounts of

01:26:29.720 --> 01:26:32.149
stuff strategically overnight is

01:26:32.160 --> 01:26:35.089
unmatched in the globe . Excellent .

01:26:35.100 --> 01:26:37.770
Thank you . Um Doctor Wallinger . I

01:26:37.779 --> 01:26:41.009
have a follow up question for you . Uh

01:26:41.020 --> 01:26:43.242
I wanna pick up on some of the concerns

01:26:43.242 --> 01:26:45.569
that Mr Whitman and uh Alfred raised

01:26:45.580 --> 01:26:48.270
regarding munition stockpiles . Uh I've

01:26:48.279 --> 01:26:49.779
urged integrating additive

01:26:49.779 --> 01:26:51.990
manufacturing into this process in the

01:26:52.000 --> 01:26:54.819
past . I think it is where uh we can

01:26:54.830 --> 01:26:56.774
have tremendous success and we can

01:26:56.774 --> 01:26:59.830
really uh capitalize on the innovation

01:26:59.839 --> 01:27:02.319
and brilliance of it . You referenced

01:27:02.330 --> 01:27:04.441
the cross department working group to

01:27:04.441 --> 01:27:06.330
oversee munition expenditures and

01:27:06.330 --> 01:27:08.870
backfill efforts is this group also

01:27:08.879 --> 01:27:11.259
tasked with exploring innovative ways

01:27:11.270 --> 01:27:13.381
to meet those backfill requirements .

01:27:14.649 --> 01:27:16.427
Um Thank you , Congressman . Uh

01:27:16.427 --> 01:27:19.220
Congresswoman I will , the main focus

01:27:19.229 --> 01:27:22.759
of work on those issues is led by

01:27:22.770 --> 01:27:25.220
the acquisition and sustainment part of

01:27:25.229 --> 01:27:27.950
OS D um and uh is led by a

01:27:27.959 --> 01:27:31.100
undersecretary uh bill plant . And

01:27:31.109 --> 01:27:34.549
there he is so busy , so

01:27:34.560 --> 01:27:38.100
focused , so active in finding ways

01:27:38.109 --> 01:27:41.600
to solve bottlenecks to uh use exactly

01:27:41.609 --> 01:27:44.000
the kind of creativity and innovation

01:27:44.009 --> 01:27:47.240
advantages that us the US economy and

01:27:47.250 --> 01:27:49.361
US companies have and they've already

01:27:49.370 --> 01:27:51.395
solved some of the creative uh

01:27:51.404 --> 01:27:53.725
solutions uh that they've already come

01:27:53.734 --> 01:27:55.956
up with some creative solutions that we

01:27:55.956 --> 01:27:58.178
could we can't talk about in public for

01:27:58.178 --> 01:28:00.415
Ukraine but also have managed to go far

01:28:00.424 --> 01:28:02.591
beyond what we expected a year ago and

01:28:02.591 --> 01:28:05.055
now being able to count on uh enhanced

01:28:05.064 --> 01:28:07.120
artillery ammunition production over

01:28:07.120 --> 01:28:09.175
the coming years . Thank you both so

01:28:09.175 --> 01:28:11.319
much , Mr Chairman , I yield back . I

01:28:11.339 --> 01:28:13.506
recognize the gentleman from Indiana ,

01:28:13.506 --> 01:28:15.506
Mr Banks providing . Thank you , Mr

01:28:15.506 --> 01:28:17.561
Chairman , Doctor Roland . Since the

01:28:17.561 --> 01:28:19.680
war began in Ukraine , the dod has

01:28:19.689 --> 01:28:21.856
deployed or extended the deployment of

01:28:21.856 --> 01:28:25.060
over 20,000 additional US troops to

01:28:25.069 --> 01:28:28.470
Europe . This surge included

01:28:28.479 --> 01:28:31.069
includes additional air land and naval

01:28:31.080 --> 01:28:33.839
capabilities . And now we have 100,000

01:28:33.850 --> 01:28:36.072
US service members who are stationed in

01:28:36.072 --> 01:28:38.290
Europe , given the depleted state of

01:28:38.299 --> 01:28:40.521
the Russian military and the increasing

01:28:40.521 --> 01:28:42.632
defense spending of our NATO allies .

01:28:42.632 --> 01:28:44.855
Does the United States need those surge

01:28:44.855 --> 01:28:47.569
forces in the Yom area of operation

01:28:47.580 --> 01:28:51.319
after the war passes . Uh

01:28:51.330 --> 01:28:55.000
Congressman , I believe that uh the

01:28:55.009 --> 01:28:57.176
dod in close support with the joint uh

01:28:57.176 --> 01:28:59.839
joint staff and uh U C will take

01:28:59.850 --> 01:29:01.961
exactly that assessment when the time

01:29:01.961 --> 01:29:04.319
comes , it's premature to make that

01:29:04.330 --> 01:29:06.497
assessment right now because we do not

01:29:06.497 --> 01:29:09.600
know precisely how the conflict ends ,

01:29:09.609 --> 01:29:11.831
how the battles over the next couple of

01:29:11.831 --> 01:29:14.120
months will resolve . But I assure you ,

01:29:14.129 --> 01:29:16.296
we will look carefully at exactly that

01:29:16.296 --> 01:29:18.810
issue . So you don't know the surge

01:29:18.819 --> 01:29:22.390
forces might be permanent . We don't

01:29:22.399 --> 01:29:24.566
know what the requirements will be for

01:29:24.566 --> 01:29:26.700
credible defense and deterrence uh

01:29:26.709 --> 01:29:29.350
after the next couple of months because

01:29:29.359 --> 01:29:31.470
we're still in the middle of this hot

01:29:31.470 --> 01:29:34.109
war and a high level of Russian

01:29:34.120 --> 01:29:36.609
activity in Ukraine . Ok . So do you

01:29:36.620 --> 01:29:38.676
think the department should redeploy

01:29:38.676 --> 01:29:41.240
temporary surge forces to other

01:29:41.250 --> 01:29:44.129
theaters like the Indo Pacific or back

01:29:44.140 --> 01:29:47.390
to the continental United States based

01:29:47.399 --> 01:29:51.109
on other priorities ? My ,

01:29:51.450 --> 01:29:55.140
my support is surge is permanent , a

01:29:55.149 --> 01:29:57.799
permanent surge . I let me be clear .

01:29:57.810 --> 01:30:00.609
The the surge is uh by no means assumed

01:30:00.620 --> 01:30:03.189
to be permanent . There is a process

01:30:03.200 --> 01:30:05.930
for uh sourcing global employment of

01:30:05.939 --> 01:30:09.049
the force . And at this point , the

01:30:09.060 --> 01:30:11.569
surge was , is assessed to be

01:30:11.580 --> 01:30:14.660
sustainable and to not come at the cost

01:30:14.669 --> 01:30:16.391
of forces elsewhere . In the ,

01:30:16.391 --> 01:30:18.502
according to a recent study conducted

01:30:18.502 --> 01:30:20.970
by C SI S , the US military would run

01:30:20.979 --> 01:30:23.201
out of certain munitions in a potential

01:30:23.201 --> 01:30:26.770
conflict with China in less than a week

01:30:26.779 --> 01:30:28.890
in part because of what we've sent of

01:30:28.890 --> 01:30:31.450
our stockpile to Ukraine . Is it

01:30:31.459 --> 01:30:33.348
possible for the dod to replenish

01:30:33.348 --> 01:30:35.570
crucial us weapons stockpiles for items

01:30:35.570 --> 01:30:38.009
like javelin stingers , 155 millimeter

01:30:38.020 --> 01:30:40.660
artillery shells to what they were a

01:30:40.669 --> 01:30:43.140
year ago while maintaining security

01:30:43.149 --> 01:30:45.205
assistance to Ukraine at the current

01:30:45.205 --> 01:30:47.459
rate , I'm not aware of that study ,

01:30:47.470 --> 01:30:50.439
but I will reinforce something I spoke

01:30:50.450 --> 01:30:53.069
to earlier which is all decisions to

01:30:53.080 --> 01:30:55.247
provide security assistance to Ukraine

01:30:55.247 --> 01:30:58.430
are taken in light of us readiness

01:30:58.439 --> 01:31:00.640
requirements and that input includes

01:31:00.649 --> 01:31:03.459
all Cocos including in dope . So even

01:31:03.470 --> 01:31:05.919
given the surge in munitions funding

01:31:06.740 --> 01:31:08.962
and the expansion of production lines ,

01:31:08.962 --> 01:31:11.073
what's the soonest that it would take

01:31:11.073 --> 01:31:12.907
to replace our stocks of javelin

01:31:12.907 --> 01:31:15.129
stingers on our 55 millimeter ? I would

01:31:15.129 --> 01:31:17.073
have to take that question for the

01:31:17.073 --> 01:31:16.790
record . I don't know a date , sir .

01:31:17.270 --> 01:31:19.381
Does the dod consider the strength of

01:31:19.381 --> 01:31:21.270
us stockpiles when deciding which

01:31:21.270 --> 01:31:23.437
munitions that we provide to Ukraine ?

01:31:23.437 --> 01:31:25.214
Yes , sir . That is part of the

01:31:25.214 --> 01:31:27.326
readiness assessment and does the dod

01:31:27.326 --> 01:31:29.548
consider the need for Taiwan to receive

01:31:29.548 --> 01:31:29.049
some of these weapons to defend

01:31:29.060 --> 01:31:31.279
themselves before we supply aid to

01:31:31.290 --> 01:31:33.890
Ukraine assessing Taiwan's requirements

01:31:33.899 --> 01:31:35.843
as part of that process and making

01:31:35.843 --> 01:31:37.899
decisions . And if the dod considers

01:31:37.899 --> 01:31:39.955
the danger that supplying particular

01:31:39.955 --> 01:31:41.788
munitions to Ukraine poses to us

01:31:41.788 --> 01:31:43.899
stockpiles , as you said , why did it

01:31:43.899 --> 01:31:45.843
take the department so long to ink

01:31:45.843 --> 01:31:48.010
deals to boost the production of these

01:31:48.010 --> 01:31:49.955
systems after the war ? In Ukraine

01:31:49.955 --> 01:31:53.740
began . I don't believe that

01:31:53.750 --> 01:31:56.220
it uh we , we might disagree about what

01:31:56.229 --> 01:31:58.100
was a , a quick response to the

01:31:58.109 --> 01:32:02.009
requirement uh those uh new contracts

01:32:02.020 --> 01:32:04.770
and those new advances on uh supply

01:32:04.779 --> 01:32:07.490
lines and defense industrial base came

01:32:07.500 --> 01:32:11.040
within months . Is that quick

01:32:11.049 --> 01:32:14.850
enough ? He just told us that we

01:32:14.859 --> 01:32:17.137
haven't replaced the stockpile studies ,

01:32:17.137 --> 01:32:19.810
prove it . So is it , can we replace

01:32:19.819 --> 01:32:23.319
them quick enough ? We can replace

01:32:23.330 --> 01:32:26.060
stockpiles as required by readiness

01:32:26.069 --> 01:32:28.330
input from the services . And the Cocos

01:32:32.939 --> 01:32:34.939
chair . And I recognize General Lee

01:32:34.939 --> 01:32:37.106
from California , Miss Jacobs . Well ,

01:32:37.106 --> 01:32:39.161
thank you Mr Chair . Um uh Thank you

01:32:39.161 --> 01:32:41.050
both for , for being here and for

01:32:41.050 --> 01:32:43.290
testifying . Um uh as you may know , uh

01:32:43.299 --> 01:32:45.540
even well before the war in Ukraine , I

01:32:45.549 --> 01:32:47.950
was focused a lot on adequate and use

01:32:47.959 --> 01:32:50.015
monitoring of our weapons around the

01:32:50.015 --> 01:32:52.070
world . Um And I want to commend the

01:32:52.070 --> 01:32:54.750
administration for the admirable work

01:32:54.759 --> 01:32:56.709
you all have done to do and use

01:32:56.720 --> 01:32:58.498
monitoring and enhanced and use

01:32:58.498 --> 01:33:00.553
monitoring in Ukraine . I saw it for

01:33:00.553 --> 01:33:02.720
myself first hand when I was out there

01:33:02.720 --> 01:33:04.553
in December . Um and I know it's

01:33:04.553 --> 01:33:06.220
incredibly hard to do and use

01:33:06.220 --> 01:33:08.442
monitoring in a place like Ukraine that

01:33:08.442 --> 01:33:10.664
has active conflict where we uh rightly

01:33:10.664 --> 01:33:12.720
do not have boots on the ground . Um

01:33:12.720 --> 01:33:15.350
But we also know um even outside of war

01:33:15.359 --> 01:33:17.870
zones as the GAO has recently detailed

01:33:17.879 --> 01:33:20.279
in two different reports this year um

01:33:20.359 --> 01:33:24.049
that uh end use monitoring uh can be

01:33:24.060 --> 01:33:25.782
challenging and that we've had

01:33:25.782 --> 01:33:28.359
challenges with it . Um So , Assistant

01:33:28.370 --> 01:33:30.592
Secretary Wilder , I , I was hoping you

01:33:30.592 --> 01:33:32.759
could speak to one the challenges of

01:33:32.770 --> 01:33:35.009
conducting enhanced and use monitoring

01:33:35.020 --> 01:33:36.964
uh in a context like Ukraine or an

01:33:36.964 --> 01:33:39.890
active war zone . And uh how , what

01:33:39.899 --> 01:33:41.939
we're doing in Ukraine compares to

01:33:42.029 --> 01:33:44.029
other previous and current conflict

01:33:44.029 --> 01:33:45.862
affected countries and how we're

01:33:45.862 --> 01:33:47.751
thinking about and use monitoring

01:33:47.751 --> 01:33:49.640
moving forward , given what we're

01:33:49.640 --> 01:33:51.696
learning in the context of Ukraine .

01:33:51.700 --> 01:33:54.790
Thank you , Congressman . I I want to

01:33:54.799 --> 01:33:57.930
uh reinforce uh General Cavalli's

01:33:57.939 --> 01:34:00.629
presentation of the processes as being

01:34:00.640 --> 01:34:02.899
innovative , comprehensive and

01:34:02.910 --> 01:34:05.569
providing a high level of confidence

01:34:05.580 --> 01:34:08.279
that we know how much we've what has

01:34:08.290 --> 01:34:10.560
happened to all of the capabilities

01:34:10.569 --> 01:34:12.859
that we've provided to the Ukrainians ,

01:34:12.870 --> 01:34:14.814
that the Ukrainians have been very

01:34:14.814 --> 01:34:17.263
forward leaning uh and operative and

01:34:17.272 --> 01:34:19.439
provide a lot of transparency and that

01:34:19.439 --> 01:34:21.439
leads to the high confidence of our

01:34:21.439 --> 01:34:23.605
reports about end use monitoring . And

01:34:23.605 --> 01:34:25.716
that um we can we have not detected a

01:34:25.716 --> 01:34:29.542
diversion of capabilities that we have .

01:34:29.553 --> 01:34:32.223
Um we have provided in particular .

01:34:32.362 --> 01:34:34.418
It's extraordinary what U C has been

01:34:34.418 --> 01:34:37.292
able to do given that it is a combat

01:34:37.393 --> 01:34:39.982
environment and us military forces

01:34:39.993 --> 01:34:42.395
cannot be towards the lines to do the

01:34:42.405 --> 01:34:44.627
end use monitoring or American citizens

01:34:44.806 --> 01:34:47.416
and the innovations using technology uh

01:34:47.425 --> 01:34:50.596
that general Cali um provided is , is

01:34:50.605 --> 01:34:52.605
something extraordinary and to your

01:34:52.605 --> 01:34:54.827
question about how does that compare to

01:34:54.827 --> 01:34:57.049
previous instances ? Uh I don't believe

01:34:57.049 --> 01:34:59.272
we had those in place and this is gonna

01:34:59.272 --> 01:35:01.327
be one of the lessons learned we can

01:35:01.327 --> 01:35:03.327
now do this uh in other areas where

01:35:03.327 --> 01:35:05.438
we're assisting partners in ways that

01:35:05.438 --> 01:35:07.605
we could , we didn't think we could do

01:35:07.605 --> 01:35:09.772
before . Well , thank you . Thanks for

01:35:09.772 --> 01:35:09.049
all of your innovative work on that .

01:35:09.060 --> 01:35:11.116
And please let us know what you need

01:35:11.116 --> 01:35:13.116
from our end to be able to continue

01:35:13.116 --> 01:35:15.227
improving our end use , monitoring of

01:35:15.227 --> 01:35:17.338
weapons , not only in Ukraine , but ,

01:35:17.338 --> 01:35:19.560
but all over the world and particularly

01:35:19.560 --> 01:35:19.390
as we're looking at sort of moving

01:35:19.399 --> 01:35:22.270
forward uh further uh equipping partner

01:35:22.279 --> 01:35:24.629
forces . Um uh Assistant Secretary War ,

01:35:24.709 --> 01:35:26.876
I wanted to also ask you a question um

01:35:26.876 --> 01:35:29.169
about war powers as you know , Congress

01:35:29.180 --> 01:35:32.160
is who the constitution gives the um

01:35:32.169 --> 01:35:34.391
power to declare war and , and fund and

01:35:34.391 --> 01:35:36.270
regulate the military . Um

01:35:38.080 --> 01:35:40.549
Are you aware of any legal analysis

01:35:40.560 --> 01:35:42.449
produced within the Department of

01:35:42.449 --> 01:35:44.616
Defense , the Department of Justice or

01:35:44.616 --> 01:35:46.838
any other part of government that would

01:35:46.838 --> 01:35:48.671
allow the president to use force

01:35:48.671 --> 01:35:50.727
against Russia without congressional

01:35:50.727 --> 01:35:52.949
authorization ? And that includes force

01:35:52.949 --> 01:35:55.089
applied through foreign surrogates .

01:35:57.270 --> 01:36:00.149
Uh being clear , I am not a lawyer and

01:36:00.160 --> 01:36:02.382
not speaking from a legal perspective .

01:36:02.382 --> 01:36:04.640
Um I am not aware of such discussions

01:36:04.649 --> 01:36:07.759
because our uh in , in supporting

01:36:07.770 --> 01:36:10.069
Ukraine because we are not at war or

01:36:10.080 --> 01:36:12.479
involved in combat or hostilities with

01:36:12.490 --> 01:36:14.919
Russia . We are supporting Ukraine and

01:36:14.930 --> 01:36:17.959
providing capabilities to Ukraine . The

01:36:17.970 --> 01:36:19.970
Russia contingency from an American

01:36:19.970 --> 01:36:22.990
point of view would be inherent right

01:36:23.000 --> 01:36:25.279
of self defense . Were Russia to attack

01:36:25.290 --> 01:36:28.970
the United States or our allies . Thank

01:36:28.979 --> 01:36:30.757
you . I ask because there was a

01:36:30.757 --> 01:36:32.812
concerning article in the Washington

01:36:32.812 --> 01:36:34.979
Post that said that dod was working on

01:36:34.979 --> 01:36:37.201
plans to potentially do kinetic strikes

01:36:37.201 --> 01:36:39.660
against Wagner group uh outside the U C

01:36:39.810 --> 01:36:42.500
A O R . Um And so I just hope that you

01:36:42.509 --> 01:36:44.731
will notify Congress and this committee

01:36:44.731 --> 01:36:46.919
if uh ever there is starts to be

01:36:46.930 --> 01:36:49.097
discussion about , you know , directly

01:36:49.097 --> 01:36:51.319
attacking Russia or its proxies with us

01:36:51.319 --> 01:36:53.740
or one of our surrogate forces . Thank

01:36:53.750 --> 01:36:55.917
you , Congressman . I will , I will be

01:36:55.917 --> 01:36:58.083
mindful of your question and take that

01:36:58.083 --> 01:37:00.139
back . Thank you , Mr Chairman . Are

01:37:00.139 --> 01:37:02.194
you back chair ? And I recognize the

01:37:02.194 --> 01:37:04.194
gentleman from Florida . Mr Waltz .

01:37:04.194 --> 01:37:06.194
Thank you Mr Chairman and thank you

01:37:06.194 --> 01:37:08.250
both for , for coming today . I just

01:37:08.250 --> 01:37:10.250
wanted to add to some other members

01:37:10.250 --> 01:37:12.139
questions and conversations about

01:37:12.139 --> 01:37:14.629
burden sharing . Uh And uh I just

01:37:14.640 --> 01:37:18.470
wanted to draw your attention to where

01:37:18.479 --> 01:37:20.569
we are at this point in terms of the

01:37:20.580 --> 01:37:22.359
United States and the taxpayer

01:37:22.370 --> 01:37:25.370
providing military assistance compared

01:37:25.379 --> 01:37:28.209
with our allies . Notably , there you

01:37:28.220 --> 01:37:32.209
have Germany at 2.5 billion . These

01:37:32.220 --> 01:37:34.910
are pledges uh compared to the United

01:37:34.919 --> 01:37:38.350
States at 46 . You have the United

01:37:38.359 --> 01:37:41.680
Kingdom . Uh a little over five uh

01:37:41.689 --> 01:37:44.359
Poland , despite having an economy ,

01:37:44.680 --> 01:37:47.759
1/4 the size of France has contributed

01:37:47.770 --> 01:37:51.240
more secretary . Would you call this

01:37:51.250 --> 01:37:53.361
burden sharing ? Do you think this is

01:37:53.361 --> 01:37:55.180
fair to the American people and

01:37:55.189 --> 01:37:58.399
taxpayer congressman ? I think your

01:37:58.410 --> 01:38:02.020
chart illustrates American

01:38:02.029 --> 01:38:04.799
leadership and we are very concerned

01:38:04.810 --> 01:38:07.069
about burden sharing . I will note that

01:38:07.080 --> 01:38:09.020
there are eight countries that

01:38:09.029 --> 01:38:11.251
contribute a larger percentage of their

01:38:11.251 --> 01:38:13.418
GDP and security assistance to Ukraine

01:38:13.418 --> 01:38:15.529
than the United States , Poland among

01:38:15.529 --> 01:38:17.585
them . No , absolutely . And I don't

01:38:17.585 --> 01:38:19.807
want to take away from what our Eastern

01:38:19.807 --> 01:38:21.640
European allies are doing uh and

01:38:21.640 --> 01:38:24.140
contributing . But Germany , France ,

01:38:24.149 --> 01:38:27.109
Italy , Spain , some of the largest

01:38:27.120 --> 01:38:29.479
economies in Europe , this is have

01:38:29.490 --> 01:38:32.629
contributed a pittance compared to the

01:38:32.640 --> 01:38:34.584
United States , even though the eu

01:38:34.584 --> 01:38:37.040
economy is the same as the United

01:38:37.049 --> 01:38:40.140
States collectively . So one of my

01:38:40.149 --> 01:38:42.260
other colleagues asked , what are the

01:38:42.260 --> 01:38:44.316
consequences ? I mean , listen , the

01:38:44.316 --> 01:38:46.538
American people and this is what I need

01:38:46.538 --> 01:38:48.705
you to take away . And I made the same

01:38:48.705 --> 01:38:51.040
point to uh uh to Secretary Austin ,

01:38:51.049 --> 01:38:53.216
the American people are sick and tired

01:38:53.216 --> 01:38:56.169
of this . If I had $100 for every

01:38:56.180 --> 01:38:58.180
speech that a defense secretary has

01:38:58.180 --> 01:39:01.750
written in the last 20 years , begging

01:39:01.759 --> 01:39:05.040
our European allies to step up . I'd be

01:39:05.049 --> 01:39:07.410
a very rich man but they haven't , I

01:39:07.419 --> 01:39:09.530
mean , they just haven't . The United

01:39:09.530 --> 01:39:11.752
States has subsidized European security

01:39:11.752 --> 01:39:14.459
and social programs for the last 20

01:39:14.470 --> 01:39:16.500
years . So when does this end ?

01:39:18.299 --> 01:39:20.620
When do they actually get to the point ?

01:39:20.629 --> 01:39:22.962
What are the consequences if they don't ,

01:39:23.899 --> 01:39:26.589
we continually push NATO allies to do

01:39:26.600 --> 01:39:28.822
their part both in the NATO context and

01:39:28.979 --> 01:39:31.035
madam Secretary , we've been pushing

01:39:31.035 --> 01:39:32.590
for decades across multiple

01:39:32.590 --> 01:39:35.000
administrations and sending strongly

01:39:35.009 --> 01:39:37.209
worded memos over tea and crumpets in

01:39:37.220 --> 01:39:40.729
Europe isn't getting the job done .

01:39:41.370 --> 01:39:43.648
So here's what I need you to take away .

01:39:43.648 --> 01:39:46.459
This continued support is at risk

01:39:46.470 --> 01:39:49.200
domestically politically here . If we

01:39:49.209 --> 01:39:51.520
don't see the administration getting

01:39:51.529 --> 01:39:54.259
results , not asking forcefully ,

01:39:54.390 --> 01:39:57.000
getting results in terms of this

01:39:57.009 --> 01:40:00.120
pathetic contribution here .

01:40:01.399 --> 01:40:03.510
And you need to understand that there

01:40:03.510 --> 01:40:06.910
is a domestic issue here with continued

01:40:06.919 --> 01:40:09.609
support to Ukraine , given everything

01:40:09.620 --> 01:40:12.950
that we've done that said , um we have

01:40:12.959 --> 01:40:15.126
done a lot . We've been very effective

01:40:15.126 --> 01:40:17.348
post facto after deterrent failed . And

01:40:17.348 --> 01:40:19.181
after thousands and thousands of

01:40:19.181 --> 01:40:21.839
Ukrainians are dead uh in suffering .

01:40:22.069 --> 01:40:24.640
But you agree . And you've testified ,

01:40:24.649 --> 01:40:26.705
the Russian military is devastated ,

01:40:26.810 --> 01:40:30.669
correct its conventional

01:40:30.680 --> 01:40:32.919
forces , ground forces that are in

01:40:32.930 --> 01:40:35.097
Ukraine has been devastated , unlikely

01:40:35.097 --> 01:40:37.879
for them to take the entire country of

01:40:37.890 --> 01:40:40.419
Ukraine at this point . Fair to say

01:40:40.750 --> 01:40:44.180
very unlikely pro I

01:40:44.399 --> 01:40:47.509
think , fair to say that the 31

01:40:48.040 --> 01:40:50.979
most modern militaries in the world and

01:40:50.990 --> 01:40:53.157
a strengthened NATO alliance that many

01:40:53.157 --> 01:40:55.459
people in this room uh have , have

01:40:55.470 --> 01:40:58.919
celebrated could handle the remnants of

01:40:58.930 --> 01:41:01.250
the Russian military . Should it decide

01:41:01.689 --> 01:41:03.633
uh to take action in a , in a NATO

01:41:03.633 --> 01:41:05.919
country or , or , or be aggressive in a

01:41:05.930 --> 01:41:08.041
NATO country ? Fair to say ? I mean ,

01:41:08.041 --> 01:41:10.041
they can't , they can't take all of

01:41:10.041 --> 01:41:12.097
Ukraine . I don't see how they could

01:41:12.097 --> 01:41:14.263
take a modern European . I don't think

01:41:14.263 --> 01:41:14.209
I would agree with you with respect to

01:41:14.220 --> 01:41:16.053
congressman because Russia still

01:41:16.053 --> 01:41:19.109
retains strategic capabilities and air

01:41:19.120 --> 01:41:22.189
force , cyber under its air force can't

01:41:22.200 --> 01:41:24.367
establish air superiority in Ukraine .

01:41:24.367 --> 01:41:26.367
I can't imagine it establishing air

01:41:26.367 --> 01:41:29.729
superiority in Poland . I think we have

01:41:29.740 --> 01:41:31.796
to take , we should not , should not

01:41:31.796 --> 01:41:33.796
make the mistake of underestimating

01:41:33.796 --> 01:41:36.089
Russia's military capabilities because

01:41:36.100 --> 01:41:38.267
the stakes of getting it wrong are too

01:41:38.267 --> 01:41:40.322
high . But I think at the end of the

01:41:40.322 --> 01:41:44.000
day , we have a very serious threat in

01:41:44.009 --> 01:41:46.120
Western , in the Western Pacific , in

01:41:46.120 --> 01:41:48.899
the Indo Peco Theater . And I noted

01:41:48.910 --> 01:41:51.132
that you would not commit to this surge

01:41:51.132 --> 01:41:53.279
being permanent yet . We have taken

01:41:53.290 --> 01:41:55.620
assets from the Indo Pacific . We've

01:41:55.629 --> 01:41:58.089
taken air force and other assets to put

01:41:58.100 --> 01:42:01.979
them in Europe . Yet we have uh 31 NATO

01:42:01.990 --> 01:42:04.910
nations that are able to stand their

01:42:04.919 --> 01:42:07.141
own ground against a diminished Russian

01:42:07.141 --> 01:42:09.141
military time expired . Thank you ,

01:42:09.141 --> 01:42:11.308
Chair and I recognize General Lee from

01:42:11.308 --> 01:42:13.475
Virginia , MS mcclelland . Thank you ,

01:42:13.475 --> 01:42:15.870
Mr Chairman . Thank you madam ,

01:42:15.879 --> 01:42:18.430
Secretary and General , my staff uh

01:42:18.439 --> 01:42:21.319
recently had the opportunity to meet

01:42:21.330 --> 01:42:23.450
with members of uh the Ukraine's

01:42:23.459 --> 01:42:25.626
National Emergency Services , which is

01:42:25.626 --> 01:42:28.859
their equivalent of fema . Um And they

01:42:28.870 --> 01:42:30.926
mentioned that one of the tools that

01:42:30.926 --> 01:42:33.180
would be most helpful for them is the

01:42:33.189 --> 01:42:35.709
provision of remotely controlled mine

01:42:35.720 --> 01:42:38.020
detection and removal equipment such as

01:42:38.029 --> 01:42:40.520
M V four S and N V tens to

01:42:40.529 --> 01:42:43.310
decontaminate areas uh heavily mined

01:42:43.319 --> 01:42:46.354
with unexploded ordinances . Um There

01:42:46.365 --> 01:42:48.294
are currently only two of these

01:42:48.305 --> 01:42:50.395
machines in the Ukraine despite

01:42:50.404 --> 01:42:52.794
multiple cities being littered with um

01:42:52.805 --> 01:42:56.285
unexploded ordinances . Is you working

01:42:56.294 --> 01:42:58.516
to ensure that more of this life saving

01:42:58.516 --> 01:43:00.375
technology ? Is being provided .

01:43:03.580 --> 01:43:05.910
Yes , absolutely . A lot of it's being

01:43:05.919 --> 01:43:09.279
provided by allies , ma'am . Um And um

01:43:09.290 --> 01:43:11.234
uh a lot of it's being provided by

01:43:11.234 --> 01:43:13.720
other international organizations that

01:43:13.729 --> 01:43:16.490
are uh uh go beyond a single country .

01:43:16.500 --> 01:43:19.330
Uh The whole question of demining and

01:43:19.339 --> 01:43:21.870
demilitarizing the landscape at the end

01:43:21.879 --> 01:43:23.657
of this is , is a big one . The

01:43:23.657 --> 01:43:25.768
Ukrainians have been doing it as they

01:43:25.768 --> 01:43:28.046
go along when they recapture territory .

01:43:28.046 --> 01:43:30.157
But it is a large test that's gonna ,

01:43:30.157 --> 01:43:32.268
that's gonna have a lot to do with uh

01:43:32.268 --> 01:43:34.490
Ukraine's recovery from this . One of .

01:43:34.490 --> 01:43:34.479
Sorry , I didn't know if you , well , I

01:43:34.490 --> 01:43:36.490
was just gonna point exactly to the

01:43:36.490 --> 01:43:38.657
fact that that is , this is actually a

01:43:38.657 --> 01:43:40.657
major focus of a number . There's a

01:43:40.657 --> 01:43:42.490
consortium of European countries

01:43:42.490 --> 01:43:44.601
contributing to that capability . I'm

01:43:44.601 --> 01:43:44.589
glad to hear that because one of the

01:43:44.600 --> 01:43:46.899
key takeaways we took was the , the

01:43:46.910 --> 01:43:50.384
number of people lost uh in the

01:43:50.395 --> 01:43:52.228
emergency services through these

01:43:52.228 --> 01:43:55.685
unexploded ordinances . Um At least 53

01:43:55.694 --> 01:43:57.794
have been injured and 13 dead as of

01:43:57.805 --> 01:44:00.564
March 24th . Um And so I think doing

01:44:00.575 --> 01:44:03.415
all we can to , to , to assist in that

01:44:03.424 --> 01:44:05.745
endeavor uh would definitely be

01:44:05.754 --> 01:44:09.009
appreciated by , by them . Um Assistant

01:44:09.020 --> 01:44:11.850
Secretary under Russia has targeted

01:44:11.859 --> 01:44:14.299
several of our allies using irregular

01:44:14.310 --> 01:44:17.020
warfare tactics such as strengthening

01:44:17.029 --> 01:44:19.251
separatist sentiments and planning coup

01:44:19.251 --> 01:44:22.129
attempts in nations like Montenegro and

01:44:22.140 --> 01:44:25.339
Moldova . Um Can you all talk about

01:44:25.350 --> 01:44:28.330
what is doing to help uh partner

01:44:28.339 --> 01:44:30.970
nations to thwart these efforts ? Well ,

01:44:30.979 --> 01:44:32.979
I'll start from a , from a whole of

01:44:32.979 --> 01:44:35.410
government approach . The United States

01:44:35.419 --> 01:44:37.990
has focused on combating corruption ,

01:44:38.299 --> 01:44:40.779
improving transparency rule of law ,

01:44:40.790 --> 01:44:43.020
good governance because one of the main

01:44:43.270 --> 01:44:46.399
uh vectors by which Russia is able to

01:44:46.410 --> 01:44:48.899
undermine allies , undermine countries

01:44:48.910 --> 01:44:51.080
in Europe and try and influence their

01:44:51.089 --> 01:44:52.867
political leadership is through

01:44:52.867 --> 01:44:55.310
corruption , poor governance . Uh And

01:44:55.319 --> 01:44:57.541
so that is a major focus of our efforts

01:44:57.541 --> 01:45:00.040
as well as uh the European Union's

01:45:00.049 --> 01:45:01.716
efforts as well to build that

01:45:01.716 --> 01:45:03.770
resilience against uh that kind of

01:45:03.779 --> 01:45:07.160
Russian influence . Uh Ma'am , we also

01:45:07.169 --> 01:45:10.770
take a number of uh uh efforts in the

01:45:10.779 --> 01:45:13.229
information space . We work with our

01:45:13.240 --> 01:45:16.080
allies and our partners very carefully

01:45:16.149 --> 01:45:19.089
to identify misinformation and then

01:45:19.100 --> 01:45:21.779
rapidly to counter it critically . We

01:45:21.790 --> 01:45:24.990
help to train um the governmental

01:45:25.000 --> 01:45:28.350
organs of our allies , how to do that

01:45:28.359 --> 01:45:30.415
as well so that they can go into the

01:45:30.415 --> 01:45:32.415
future . And then finally , we work

01:45:32.415 --> 01:45:34.692
with them on cyber defense quite a bit .

01:45:34.692 --> 01:45:36.803
So they maintain an awareness of some

01:45:36.803 --> 01:45:39.026
of the various ways that uh that , that

01:45:39.026 --> 01:45:40.959
Russia can manipulate the public

01:45:40.970 --> 01:45:42.970
conversation on things we do all of

01:45:42.970 --> 01:45:44.803
those under authorities from the

01:45:44.803 --> 01:45:47.026
Department of Defense . Thank you . You

01:45:47.026 --> 01:45:48.803
anticipated my next question on

01:45:48.803 --> 01:45:50.914
disinformation and propaganda . Um In

01:45:50.914 --> 01:45:53.080
February of this year , uh Russia

01:45:53.089 --> 01:45:55.459
suspended its participation in new

01:45:55.470 --> 01:45:57.660
start . Uh One of the few remaining

01:45:57.669 --> 01:45:59.700
nuclear arms control treaties that

01:45:59.709 --> 01:46:01.979
remain following the disastrous foreign

01:46:01.990 --> 01:46:05.330
policy of the previous administration

01:46:05.339 --> 01:46:08.060
in this area . Does this make nuclear

01:46:08.069 --> 01:46:10.140
weapons a more prescient threat .

01:46:10.149 --> 01:46:12.250
Should Russia seek to escalate its

01:46:12.259 --> 01:46:15.450
illegal war in Ukraine ? Further uh

01:46:15.459 --> 01:46:17.580
Congressman , we , we share your

01:46:17.589 --> 01:46:20.549
concern that Russia is no longer in uh

01:46:20.720 --> 01:46:23.250
implementing and in compliance with the ,

01:46:23.259 --> 01:46:25.959
the new treaty . The immediate loss is

01:46:25.970 --> 01:46:28.549
a loss of uh transparency and sharing

01:46:28.560 --> 01:46:31.229
data which helps to create reassurance

01:46:31.240 --> 01:46:33.296
and stability and is a fun is a main

01:46:33.299 --> 01:46:35.350
function of arms control and it's

01:46:35.359 --> 01:46:37.580
something that we would uh want to

01:46:37.589 --> 01:46:40.359
prioritize uh in discussions with

01:46:40.370 --> 01:46:42.314
Russia about them coming back into

01:46:42.314 --> 01:46:44.481
compliance . At this point , they have

01:46:44.481 --> 01:46:46.537
shown no interest or willingness and

01:46:46.537 --> 01:46:48.759
that is a matter of concern . It's less

01:46:48.759 --> 01:46:50.870
of a concern in the near term because

01:46:50.870 --> 01:46:53.037
we have a pretty good understanding of

01:46:53.037 --> 01:46:52.819
Russian strategic nuclear forces and

01:46:52.830 --> 01:46:55.060
capabilities , but it becomes AAA

01:46:55.069 --> 01:46:57.490
greater concern over time and it's

01:46:57.500 --> 01:46:59.611
something we're going to have to work

01:46:59.611 --> 01:47:01.556
on . Thank you . Uh Thank you , Mr

01:47:01.556 --> 01:47:04.020
Chair . I back . Thank the General Lady

01:47:04.029 --> 01:47:06.140
chair and I recognize there's another

01:47:06.140 --> 01:47:08.307
great member from Virginia M Giggs for

01:47:08.307 --> 01:47:10.418
five minutes . Thank you very much Mr

01:47:10.418 --> 01:47:12.418
Chair . Uh I just wanted to kind of

01:47:12.418 --> 01:47:14.240
piggyback off of my Republican

01:47:14.250 --> 01:47:16.250
colleagues , some of their comments

01:47:16.250 --> 01:47:17.750
today that have been about

01:47:17.750 --> 01:47:20.028
accountability and spending in Ukraine .

01:47:20.028 --> 01:47:22.250
And I will say that I was uh definitely

01:47:22.250 --> 01:47:24.472
very much with them at the beginning of

01:47:24.472 --> 01:47:26.583
this , this process and I'm new , new

01:47:26.583 --> 01:47:28.639
to Congress , but over the course of

01:47:28.639 --> 01:47:30.750
the past 100 or so days and listening

01:47:30.750 --> 01:47:32.861
to some of these briefings that we've

01:47:32.861 --> 01:47:34.972
received . I am uh understanding more

01:47:34.972 --> 01:47:37.194
of the importance of the US involvement

01:47:37.194 --> 01:47:39.250
in the Ukraine fight . So I guess Dr

01:47:39.250 --> 01:47:41.472
Waller , I just asked that maybe you go

01:47:41.472 --> 01:47:43.083
back to Secretary Austin and

01:47:43.083 --> 01:47:45.250
administration and I think it's really

01:47:45.250 --> 01:47:47.417
messaging , you know , we are privy to

01:47:47.417 --> 01:47:47.109
a lot of information in this committee

01:47:47.120 --> 01:47:49.342
that , that the general public is not .

01:47:49.342 --> 01:47:51.509
So when we talk about , you know , our

01:47:51.509 --> 01:47:53.620
constituents that care about how much

01:47:53.620 --> 01:47:55.842
we're spending compared to how much the

01:47:55.842 --> 01:47:55.299
rest of the world is spending . Uh I

01:47:55.310 --> 01:47:57.477
just think we're not doing a great job

01:47:57.477 --> 01:47:59.643
of informing them about the importance

01:47:59.643 --> 01:48:01.866
of what might happen if Russia , Russia

01:48:01.866 --> 01:48:04.088
was to succeed and was to be victorious

01:48:04.088 --> 01:48:06.254
in that fight . What would then happen

01:48:06.254 --> 01:48:08.199
with China and Taiwan ? You know ,

01:48:08.199 --> 01:48:10.366
these are , these are important issues

01:48:10.366 --> 01:48:12.477
that I think , I think we've just not

01:48:12.477 --> 01:48:14.643
done a great job with messaging of the

01:48:14.643 --> 01:48:16.588
importance of , of our role in the

01:48:16.588 --> 01:48:18.620
Russia Ukraine fight and of Ukraine

01:48:18.629 --> 01:48:20.462
coming out on the right side and

01:48:20.462 --> 01:48:22.640
winning . So , uh so because of that ,

01:48:22.649 --> 01:48:24.760
uh you know , I'm a supporter of , of

01:48:24.760 --> 01:48:26.982
what we are doing there . Uh You know ,

01:48:26.982 --> 01:48:28.705
you talked earlier about China

01:48:28.705 --> 01:48:30.593
increasing access and interest in

01:48:30.593 --> 01:48:32.538
Russia and then you mentioned that

01:48:32.538 --> 01:48:34.593
we've seen the PR C diminishing ties

01:48:34.593 --> 01:48:36.649
with some of our NATO ally allies in

01:48:36.649 --> 01:48:36.279
Europe in favor of strengthening ties

01:48:36.290 --> 01:48:38.457
with Russia . Can you expand on that a

01:48:38.457 --> 01:48:40.568
little bit ? And just in what ways is

01:48:40.568 --> 01:48:42.623
the pr c diminishing those ties with

01:48:42.623 --> 01:48:46.250
allies . It as the Eu as a

01:48:46.259 --> 01:48:49.169
structure has got has become more

01:48:49.180 --> 01:48:53.129
attuned to the risk of being dependent

01:48:53.140 --> 01:48:56.209
on China . Uh The Eu has taken a more

01:48:56.220 --> 01:48:58.709
active role in implementing its

01:48:58.720 --> 01:49:00.950
oversight over contracts over

01:49:00.959 --> 01:49:03.779
investments and um sometimes pushing

01:49:03.790 --> 01:49:05.830
against individual countries which

01:49:05.839 --> 01:49:08.060
maybe don't prioritize that as much .

01:49:08.069 --> 01:49:09.958
Uh But the EU has played a a as a

01:49:09.958 --> 01:49:11.958
structure has played a constructive

01:49:11.958 --> 01:49:14.069
role . Uh But mostly it's happened at

01:49:14.069 --> 01:49:16.125
the level of individual countries uh

01:49:16.125 --> 01:49:18.291
that have decided they are not willing

01:49:18.291 --> 01:49:20.402
to take the risk and I mentioned some

01:49:20.402 --> 01:49:22.125
of them . Um but uh we , it is

01:49:22.125 --> 01:49:24.236
something we need to continue to work

01:49:24.236 --> 01:49:24.100
on as Americans in talking to our

01:49:24.109 --> 01:49:26.350
European allies and partners so that

01:49:26.359 --> 01:49:28.470
they understand the risks they create

01:49:28.470 --> 01:49:30.692
when they make themselves vulnerable to

01:49:30.692 --> 01:49:32.915
coercion and influence very much . So .

01:49:32.915 --> 01:49:35.081
And along those lines , uh we talked a

01:49:35.081 --> 01:49:36.803
little bit about uh the French

01:49:36.803 --> 01:49:38.915
President , you know , Macron's visit

01:49:38.915 --> 01:49:41.137
to the visit with , you know , with the

01:49:41.137 --> 01:49:40.870
PR C in his comments . And I'm

01:49:40.879 --> 01:49:43.046
concerned that our European allies are

01:49:43.046 --> 01:49:45.101
not taking the threat of the PR C as

01:49:45.101 --> 01:49:47.157
seriously as they should . So do you

01:49:47.157 --> 01:49:46.750
believe that European leaders

01:49:46.759 --> 01:49:48.426
understand and appreciate the

01:49:48.426 --> 01:49:50.481
significant threat posed by the Pr C

01:49:50.481 --> 01:49:52.537
and their aggressive posture towards

01:49:52.537 --> 01:49:54.580
Taiwan Europe has come a long way .

01:49:54.589 --> 01:49:56.600
NATO for example , now has in its

01:49:56.609 --> 01:49:59.049
strategic concept , a recognition of

01:49:59.060 --> 01:50:02.290
the dangers that the PR C poses to

01:50:02.299 --> 01:50:04.132
global security and therefore to

01:50:04.132 --> 01:50:06.355
European security . But it is something

01:50:06.355 --> 01:50:08.521
we , we need to continue to work on uh

01:50:08.521 --> 01:50:10.299
and make sure that that as that

01:50:10.299 --> 01:50:12.521
challenge evolves as it remains acute ,

01:50:12.521 --> 01:50:14.688
as it maybe changes shape in different

01:50:14.688 --> 01:50:16.859
aspects of uh China's activities that

01:50:16.870 --> 01:50:18.814
we share that information with our

01:50:18.814 --> 01:50:21.080
allies and partners . And I guess

01:50:21.089 --> 01:50:23.311
general Cali along those lines , are we

01:50:23.311 --> 01:50:25.422
doing , uh you know , on the military

01:50:25.422 --> 01:50:27.145
side , are we working on those

01:50:27.145 --> 01:50:28.811
relationships ? Yes , ma'am .

01:50:28.811 --> 01:50:31.649
Absolutely . Um The um an example would

01:50:31.660 --> 01:50:35.330
be the way we use ports . Um So uh it ,

01:50:35.339 --> 01:50:37.395
it's uh not a surprise to you that ,

01:50:37.395 --> 01:50:39.506
that China has been investing heavily

01:50:39.609 --> 01:50:41.970
um in an effort to gain control of

01:50:41.979 --> 01:50:44.257
critical transportation infrastructure ,

01:50:44.257 --> 01:50:46.368
transportation infrastructure that we

01:50:46.368 --> 01:50:48.701
um both the US and the alliance rely on .

01:50:48.701 --> 01:50:52.540
Um So the way we run our exercises and

01:50:52.549 --> 01:50:55.720
the ports we choose to exercise is very

01:50:55.729 --> 01:50:57.896
strategic choice . It allows us to see

01:50:57.896 --> 01:51:00.459
things and when we um reveal um

01:51:00.470 --> 01:51:02.810
limitations in our port usage for an

01:51:02.819 --> 01:51:05.979
example , um countries take action very

01:51:05.990 --> 01:51:08.157
quickly . They , they , they spot it .

01:51:08.157 --> 01:51:10.268
We've opened new ports , we've worked

01:51:10.268 --> 01:51:12.323
with countries to establish new port

01:51:12.323 --> 01:51:14.268
capabilities . And that's just one

01:51:14.268 --> 01:51:16.490
example . Uh earlier , Doctor Wallander

01:51:16.490 --> 01:51:18.546
talked about five G capabilities and

01:51:18.546 --> 01:51:20.768
other things . Um So we are able to use

01:51:20.768 --> 01:51:22.823
the military instrument to , to open

01:51:22.823 --> 01:51:25.046
eyes , good , good . Those are all good

01:51:25.046 --> 01:51:26.990
things . And then uh just thinking

01:51:26.990 --> 01:51:29.212
about that relationship between China ,

01:51:29.212 --> 01:51:31.434
between the Pr C and Russia and they're

01:51:31.434 --> 01:51:33.490
meeting more and , and uh you know ,

01:51:33.490 --> 01:51:35.712
there's part of me that thinks they are

01:51:35.712 --> 01:51:35.695
more aligned than , than we know , but

01:51:35.706 --> 01:51:37.873
uh do you feel like Russia will , will

01:51:37.873 --> 01:51:39.928
fall in line behind China because it

01:51:39.928 --> 01:51:41.762
kind of seems like China is , is

01:51:41.762 --> 01:51:43.817
leading the way and , and uh kind of

01:51:43.817 --> 01:51:45.996
dictating , you know , there's

01:51:46.005 --> 01:51:48.116
certainly more of a world power in my

01:51:48.116 --> 01:51:50.116
mind than Russia . But do you think

01:51:50.116 --> 01:51:52.283
that Russia would fall in behind China

01:51:52.283 --> 01:51:54.172
or is there some just controversy

01:51:54.172 --> 01:51:56.283
between the two ? Uh I , I'll say one

01:51:56.283 --> 01:51:58.449
thing quickly and give it to Celeste .

01:51:58.449 --> 01:52:00.669
I think they're in danger of that just

01:52:00.680 --> 01:52:02.791
happening , whether they choose it or

01:52:02.791 --> 01:52:05.124
not . Ma'am . I just share that concern .

01:52:05.124 --> 01:52:07.347
I think that's exactly right . Russia's

01:52:07.347 --> 01:52:09.124
weakness is actually gonna be a

01:52:09.124 --> 01:52:10.847
strength expired chair . And I

01:52:10.847 --> 01:52:12.958
recognize gentleman from California ,

01:52:12.958 --> 01:52:15.291
Mr Panetta for five minutes . Thank you ,

01:52:15.291 --> 01:52:17.180
Mr Chairman , uh General Koli , a

01:52:17.180 --> 01:52:19.291
Ukrainian counter events is offensive

01:52:19.291 --> 01:52:21.370
as we're hearing is due in weeks , I

01:52:21.379 --> 01:52:23.435
guess , is what they're saying . And

01:52:23.435 --> 01:52:25.657
while an ample supply and replenishment

01:52:25.657 --> 01:52:27.268
of artillery will clearly be

01:52:27.268 --> 01:52:29.379
instrumental for the Ukrainian forces

01:52:29.379 --> 01:52:31.323
to be successful . I would also uh

01:52:31.323 --> 01:52:34.750
think that um you gotta have sort of a

01:52:34.759 --> 01:52:37.560
surprise attack as well and a

01:52:37.569 --> 01:52:39.680
successful surprise attack would just

01:52:39.680 --> 01:52:41.902
be the first half if Ukraine can manage

01:52:41.902 --> 01:52:43.791
this and preserve its command and

01:52:43.791 --> 01:52:46.013
control their forces will have to break

01:52:46.013 --> 01:52:48.013
through Russia's defensive line and

01:52:48.013 --> 01:52:50.069
quickly mobilize troops forward . So

01:52:50.069 --> 01:52:52.470
what capabilities do our Ukrainian

01:52:52.479 --> 01:52:55.450
partners still need to be successful in

01:52:55.479 --> 01:52:57.509
this breakthrough in this surprise

01:52:57.520 --> 01:52:59.419
attack , including air defense

01:52:59.430 --> 01:53:02.549
capabilities ? Uh

01:53:02.560 --> 01:53:05.729
Congressman , obviously any , any force

01:53:05.740 --> 01:53:08.770
can always use more of , of everything .

01:53:08.779 --> 01:53:11.140
But uh according to the modeling that

01:53:11.149 --> 01:53:13.260
we've very carefully done with them ,

01:53:13.260 --> 01:53:15.260
the Ukrainians are in are in a good

01:53:15.260 --> 01:53:18.040
position . Um um The Ukrainians are ,

01:53:18.049 --> 01:53:20.271
are in a good position . They have some

01:53:20.271 --> 01:53:22.327
weaknesses that I prefer not to talk

01:53:22.327 --> 01:53:24.493
about in public if I could talk to you

01:53:24.493 --> 01:53:26.493
in private about those . I I I'd be

01:53:26.493 --> 01:53:28.216
happy to . Um but , but we are

01:53:28.216 --> 01:53:30.271
confident in terms of their surprise

01:53:30.271 --> 01:53:32.216
and things like that . Of course ,

01:53:32.216 --> 01:53:34.493
we've worked on all that with them and ,

01:53:34.493 --> 01:53:33.959
and of course , it wouldn't be

01:53:33.970 --> 01:53:35.914
surprised if we talked about it in

01:53:35.914 --> 01:53:37.692
public also , sir . So I I'd be

01:53:37.692 --> 01:53:39.748
delighted to have the chance to , to

01:53:39.748 --> 01:53:41.970
talk to you in more detail in private .

01:53:41.970 --> 01:53:44.137
I appreciate that . And obviously , uh

01:53:44.137 --> 01:53:46.359
Poland has come up a little bit here in

01:53:46.359 --> 01:53:48.526
this hearing and obviously it provides

01:53:48.526 --> 01:53:50.748
critical security for the eastern flank

01:53:50.748 --> 01:53:52.859
of NATO and it's deepened . Uh Poland

01:53:52.859 --> 01:53:54.859
has done a good job deepening their

01:53:54.859 --> 01:53:56.914
defense relationship with the United

01:53:56.914 --> 01:53:56.609
States . I would say in response to the

01:53:56.620 --> 01:53:58.564
growing security challenges across

01:53:59.129 --> 01:54:01.569
including management of prepositioned

01:54:01.580 --> 01:54:04.540
equipment . Now , the US leads the

01:54:04.549 --> 01:54:06.839
enhanced forward presence battle group

01:54:06.850 --> 01:54:09.180
in Poland and deploys a rotational

01:54:09.189 --> 01:54:11.740
armored brigade brigade combat team

01:54:11.779 --> 01:54:15.060
under operation Atlantic Resolve . Uh

01:54:15.069 --> 01:54:17.310
And at the June 2022 NATO summit in

01:54:17.319 --> 01:54:19.152
Madrid Biden announced the first

01:54:19.152 --> 01:54:21.152
President Biden announced the first

01:54:21.152 --> 01:54:23.319
permanently stationed us forces on the

01:54:23.319 --> 01:54:26.140
eastern flank . Uh As NATO continues to

01:54:26.149 --> 01:54:28.371
assess the distribution of forces along

01:54:28.371 --> 01:54:30.260
that flank . Can you describe the

01:54:30.260 --> 01:54:32.205
benefits of stationing a permanent

01:54:32.205 --> 01:54:35.069
brigade si sized team in Poland ?

01:54:36.129 --> 01:54:38.259
Uh The , the benefit is to have a

01:54:38.270 --> 01:54:40.649
permanent presence uh of , of , of a

01:54:40.660 --> 01:54:43.580
team for um whether it's permanently

01:54:43.589 --> 01:54:45.589
assigned or not . There , there are

01:54:45.589 --> 01:54:47.589
other service equities that go into

01:54:47.589 --> 01:54:49.811
that , that really uh general mcconnell

01:54:49.811 --> 01:54:51.811
would be better uh uh to talk about

01:54:51.811 --> 01:54:53.922
stress on the force from rotation and

01:54:53.922 --> 01:54:55.978
things like that . But it's , it's ,

01:54:55.978 --> 01:54:58.089
it's very important and um and the US

01:54:58.089 --> 01:55:00.256
government has found it very important

01:55:00.256 --> 01:55:02.145
for us to have an armored brigade

01:55:02.145 --> 01:55:04.200
combat team Ford deployed there . Uh

01:55:04.200 --> 01:55:06.311
It's saves a lot of time . The second

01:55:06.311 --> 01:55:08.367
thing is the preposition stocks that

01:55:08.367 --> 01:55:10.367
you mentioned , Congressman , those

01:55:10.367 --> 01:55:12.422
have been absolutely critical to our

01:55:12.422 --> 01:55:14.705
ability to uh respond quickly to the

01:55:14.714 --> 01:55:16.770
events of the last year and a half .

01:55:16.770 --> 01:55:18.992
And um it was all enabled with uh E D I

01:55:18.992 --> 01:55:21.270
funding . Uh Thanks to the US Congress ,

01:55:21.270 --> 01:55:23.381
great and uh uh Secretary Wallinger .

01:55:23.754 --> 01:55:26.245
Um what might that type of permanent if

01:55:26.254 --> 01:55:28.421
there was permanent stationing provide

01:55:28.421 --> 01:55:30.310
us from a policy standpoint as we

01:55:30.310 --> 01:55:32.198
continue to work closely with our

01:55:32.198 --> 01:55:34.032
Polish partners . Uh Thank you ,

01:55:34.032 --> 01:55:36.254
Congressman . Well , Poland has been uh

01:55:36.254 --> 01:55:38.087
it is an extraordinary ally , uh

01:55:38.087 --> 01:55:40.580
reliable , a wonderful host to these

01:55:40.589 --> 01:55:43.399
American forces . Um Poland has also

01:55:43.410 --> 01:55:47.319
been incredibly stalwart and helpful in

01:55:47.330 --> 01:55:50.459
uh our ability to provide security

01:55:50.470 --> 01:55:53.560
assistance to Ukraine to um

01:55:53.589 --> 01:55:56.205
to support the training of Ukrainian

01:55:56.214 --> 01:55:58.436
forces so that they can effectively use

01:55:58.436 --> 01:56:00.924
those capabilities . And so , you know ,

01:56:00.935 --> 01:56:03.046
Poland has really emerged as a , as a

01:56:03.046 --> 01:56:05.154
leader among NATO allies in Europe .

01:56:05.165 --> 01:56:07.334
And we're actually I consider us very

01:56:07.345 --> 01:56:09.512
lucky that we are the framework nation

01:56:09.512 --> 01:56:11.734
for the battle group in Poland and have

01:56:11.734 --> 01:56:13.956
these capabilities because we can count

01:56:13.956 --> 01:56:16.289
on them . Great , thanks to both of you ,

01:56:16.289 --> 01:56:18.456
Mr Chairman , I yield back . Thank the

01:56:18.456 --> 01:56:20.512
gentleman and I wholeheartedly agree

01:56:20.512 --> 01:56:23.270
with uh Mr uh Panetta on this . Um I've

01:56:23.279 --> 01:56:25.446
been very upfront about this . We , we

01:56:25.446 --> 01:56:27.446
need to be moving more of our troop

01:56:27.446 --> 01:56:29.720
presence uh into Poland , Romania and

01:56:29.729 --> 01:56:31.785
the Baltics and , and out of Germany

01:56:31.785 --> 01:56:34.459
where the real threat is with that . Uh

01:56:34.470 --> 01:56:36.692
Mr Davis , North Carolina is recognized

01:56:36.692 --> 01:56:38.859
for five minutes . Thank you so much ,

01:56:38.859 --> 01:56:40.970
Mr Chair and to our witnesses who are

01:56:40.970 --> 01:56:43.137
here today . Thank you for your , your

01:56:43.137 --> 01:56:45.137
service . Um And thank you for your

01:56:45.137 --> 01:56:48.459
timely um presence today . Russia

01:56:48.470 --> 01:56:51.379
continues to remain a persistent threat

01:56:51.390 --> 01:56:54.490
to European security by employing a

01:56:54.500 --> 01:56:57.779
range of tools to coerce its neighbors

01:56:57.790 --> 01:57:00.029
and divide the alliance . Could you

01:57:00.040 --> 01:57:04.020
elaborate on how Russia uses cyber

01:57:04.029 --> 01:57:06.620
operations in energy supply

01:57:06.629 --> 01:57:09.660
manipulation to coerce our allies and

01:57:09.669 --> 01:57:13.359
partners ? Um

01:57:13.370 --> 01:57:17.109
Thanks Congressman . Um First of

01:57:17.120 --> 01:57:21.060
all , the energy manipulation , um it

01:57:21.069 --> 01:57:23.649
has reduced dramatically over the last

01:57:23.660 --> 01:57:26.370
year because of the our our allies

01:57:26.379 --> 01:57:29.850
desire to come off of Russian gas . So

01:57:29.859 --> 01:57:32.192
it's , it's moving in a good trajectory .

01:57:32.192 --> 01:57:34.415
Some of our partners however , have not

01:57:34.415 --> 01:57:36.581
had the luxury of being able to adjust

01:57:36.581 --> 01:57:38.415
their economies yet . And Russia

01:57:38.415 --> 01:57:40.303
continues to turn on and off . Um

01:57:40.310 --> 01:57:42.930
contracts switches , gas flow , et

01:57:42.939 --> 01:57:45.089
cetera . Moldova has been a victim of

01:57:45.100 --> 01:57:47.299
this recently uh in , in , in the last

01:57:47.310 --> 01:57:49.254
winter . So it remains important .

01:57:49.254 --> 01:57:53.240
Cyber um Cyber is hard to talk about

01:57:53.250 --> 01:57:55.779
in public , but they use cyber to

01:57:55.790 --> 01:57:59.020
create disinformation and they also use

01:57:59.029 --> 01:58:02.709
cyber to delete information um data and

01:58:02.720 --> 01:58:05.149
to attack um infrastructure . And we

01:58:05.160 --> 01:58:07.104
have to work quite hard across the

01:58:07.109 --> 01:58:08.998
alliance and with our partners to

01:58:08.998 --> 01:58:11.109
defend against that . And finally , I

01:58:11.109 --> 01:58:13.276
would say some of the work that Russia

01:58:13.276 --> 01:58:15.276
does still is with its conventional

01:58:15.276 --> 01:58:17.442
force . So the Russian Air Force , the

01:58:17.442 --> 01:58:19.470
Russian Ground Force has been , has

01:58:19.479 --> 01:58:23.000
been uh uh degenerated somewhat by this

01:58:23.009 --> 01:58:25.419
conflict , although it is bigger today

01:58:25.430 --> 01:58:27.430
than it was at the beginning of the

01:58:27.430 --> 01:58:29.486
conflict . Um The Air Force has lost

01:58:29.486 --> 01:58:31.652
very little , they've lost 80 planes .

01:58:31.652 --> 01:58:33.652
They have another 1000 fighters and

01:58:33.652 --> 01:58:35.874
fighter bombers , the navy has lost one

01:58:35.874 --> 01:58:37.986
ship . Um um So they still use all of

01:58:37.986 --> 01:58:39.986
that conventional power as well and

01:58:39.986 --> 01:58:41.930
they mix them all together , sir .

01:58:41.930 --> 01:58:44.529
According to the Department of Defense ,

01:58:44.540 --> 01:58:47.479
since February 2022 the United States

01:58:47.490 --> 01:58:49.979
has deployed and or extended about

01:58:49.990 --> 01:58:53.700
20,000 additional armed forces to

01:58:53.709 --> 01:58:56.479
Europe . Um bringing the total US Force

01:58:56.490 --> 01:58:59.220
Posture in Europe including permanently

01:58:59.229 --> 01:59:02.040
stationed forces to approximately

01:59:02.069 --> 01:59:05.189
100,000 military personnel . So , um ,

01:59:05.200 --> 01:59:08.600
do you see additional changes um to

01:59:08.609 --> 01:59:11.160
force posture um to approximately uh

01:59:11.169 --> 01:59:14.640
stand against Russia , Russia ? Uh Sir ,

01:59:14.649 --> 01:59:16.593
let me just start with the current

01:59:16.593 --> 01:59:18.427
force posture . The , the figure

01:59:18.427 --> 01:59:20.799
100,000 includes uh department of

01:59:20.810 --> 01:59:22.700
Defense civilians as well . The

01:59:22.709 --> 01:59:25.200
uniformed force posture is about 82,000

01:59:25.209 --> 01:59:27.549
this , this afternoon , a a as we sit

01:59:27.560 --> 01:59:29.504
here . But nevertheless , it's all

01:59:29.504 --> 01:59:31.727
Department of Defense . And as you , as

01:59:31.727 --> 01:59:33.727
you point out , um force posture is

01:59:33.727 --> 01:59:35.893
going to depend from my perspective as

01:59:35.893 --> 01:59:35.475
a military matter , largely on the

01:59:35.484 --> 01:59:37.706
outcome of this conflict , sir . And we

01:59:37.706 --> 01:59:39.984
just don't know where it's going to go .

01:59:39.984 --> 01:59:41.873
We don't know what the size , the

01:59:41.873 --> 01:59:43.651
composition and the disposition

01:59:43.651 --> 01:59:45.817
geographically of the Russian military

01:59:45.817 --> 01:59:44.895
is going to be and that's going to

01:59:44.904 --> 01:59:47.015
drive a lot of this . Some of it will

01:59:47.015 --> 01:59:49.182
be our policies as well and I'll defer

01:59:49.182 --> 01:59:51.293
to doctor for those . Yeah , uh other

01:59:51.293 --> 01:59:53.689
decisions about posture will uh first

01:59:53.700 --> 01:59:56.169
and foremost , depend upon military

01:59:56.180 --> 01:59:58.950
advice and assessments . Um And they

01:59:58.959 --> 02:00:01.015
will also , I want to emphasize this

02:00:01.015 --> 02:00:03.439
came up earlier . They will uh be based

02:00:03.450 --> 02:00:06.879
upon um uh advice you ,

02:00:07.194 --> 02:00:09.138
assessments of what's required but

02:00:09.138 --> 02:00:11.104
balanced across the global force

02:00:11.115 --> 02:00:13.171
because the United States has global

02:00:13.171 --> 02:00:15.435
responsibilities . Uh and the defense

02:00:15.444 --> 02:00:17.555
department will make sure that all of

02:00:17.555 --> 02:00:20.084
the Cocos are resourced appropriate up

02:00:20.095 --> 02:00:23.774
to the challenges and threats that we

02:00:23.785 --> 02:00:27.390
face . And can you talk about how um

02:00:27.399 --> 02:00:29.439
the People's Republic of China is

02:00:29.450 --> 02:00:32.060
threatening us and allied interests in

02:00:32.069 --> 02:00:34.459
Europe , including how their technology

02:00:34.470 --> 02:00:37.180
related activities are advancing their

02:00:37.189 --> 02:00:41.020
military capabilities . Uh

02:00:41.029 --> 02:00:42.807
Congressman , there's first the

02:00:42.807 --> 02:00:45.890
vulnerability that uh that reliant that

02:00:45.899 --> 02:00:47.899
for those countries in Europe , but

02:00:47.899 --> 02:00:50.810
also globally uh create for themselves

02:00:50.819 --> 02:00:53.770
when they rely exclusively on Chinese

02:00:53.779 --> 02:00:56.649
technologies which come in the in the

02:00:56.660 --> 02:00:59.029
appearance of private investment . But

02:00:59.040 --> 02:01:01.479
in fact , have close ties to the PR C

02:01:01.490 --> 02:01:03.657
and and to the government . So that is

02:01:03.657 --> 02:01:06.339
one vulnerability . There is also uh

02:01:06.350 --> 02:01:10.100
there are active um efforts by

02:01:10.109 --> 02:01:12.165
uh Chinese different elements of the

02:01:12.165 --> 02:01:14.859
Chinese government or influencers in

02:01:14.870 --> 02:01:17.529
the Chinese economy and uh trade and

02:01:17.540 --> 02:01:19.660
investment community to seek

02:01:19.669 --> 02:01:22.060
relationships for , to exploit access

02:01:22.069 --> 02:01:24.189
to sensitive technology . It's

02:01:24.200 --> 02:01:26.256
information that we share constantly

02:01:26.256 --> 02:01:28.422
with the European allies . So they can

02:01:28.422 --> 02:01:30.839
be aware of the need to be careful and

02:01:30.850 --> 02:01:34.209
to not get bought into those kinds of

02:01:34.220 --> 02:01:36.729
vulnerabilities . Thank you so much and

02:01:36.740 --> 02:01:38.740
Mr Chair back , thank the gentleman

02:01:38.740 --> 02:01:40.740
chair and I recognize the gentleman

02:01:40.740 --> 02:01:42.907
from Texas , Mr Fallon , Mr Chairman .

02:01:42.907 --> 02:01:45.073
Thank you very much . Um Just a couple

02:01:45.073 --> 02:01:48.729
of questions , we see the largest land

02:01:48.740 --> 02:01:50.962
invasion in general since world war two

02:01:50.962 --> 02:01:53.529
in Europe . And you , you know , NATO

02:01:53.540 --> 02:01:56.529
allies agreed many years ago to spend

02:01:56.540 --> 02:01:59.479
two at minimum 2% of our GDP on defense .

02:01:59.490 --> 02:02:02.069
And some of us do that . And some don't .

02:02:02.470 --> 02:02:04.581
I'm , I'm a big supporter of NATO . I

02:02:04.581 --> 02:02:06.748
always have many people . Uh In fact ,

02:02:06.748 --> 02:02:08.914
the vast majority of this committee is

02:02:08.914 --> 02:02:10.803
as well . I remember , you know ,

02:02:10.803 --> 02:02:12.914
former President Trump getting on our

02:02:12.914 --> 02:02:15.081
allies about spending their fair share

02:02:15.081 --> 02:02:18.990
and after this invasion , what , why is

02:02:19.000 --> 02:02:21.379
Germany delaying , you know , have they

02:02:21.390 --> 02:02:23.459
made a concrete commitment to that ,

02:02:23.470 --> 02:02:25.700
that 2% threshold because I haven't

02:02:25.919 --> 02:02:28.141
seen it and I don't know if I've missed

02:02:28.141 --> 02:02:30.197
anything . So I wanted to ask you uh

02:02:30.197 --> 02:02:32.689
about that . Sure , thanks Congressman .

02:02:32.879 --> 02:02:34.939
Um Yeah , Germany's made a fairly

02:02:34.950 --> 02:02:37.299
significant shift . Previously . There

02:02:37.310 --> 02:02:40.229
was not a road map that got them to uh

02:02:40.240 --> 02:02:43.540
2% . Not , not only by 20 it , there

02:02:43.549 --> 02:02:45.899
wasn't one by 2024 there wasn't one

02:02:46.140 --> 02:02:48.362
there is now they , they have a plan to

02:02:48.362 --> 02:02:51.979
get to 2% by 2024 . 2nd thing I would

02:02:51.990 --> 02:02:55.200
point out um um the German Ministry of

02:02:55.209 --> 02:02:57.320
Defense and the Armed forces have new

02:02:57.320 --> 02:02:59.320
leadership . The leadership is very

02:02:59.320 --> 02:03:02.629
focused on achieving those goals and on

02:03:02.640 --> 02:03:04.759
spending the special fund on real

02:03:04.770 --> 02:03:07.560
capabilities . Um So , so I think um I ,

02:03:07.569 --> 02:03:09.791
I think we see a very different Germany

02:03:09.819 --> 02:03:12.041
today than we did 14 months ago when it

02:03:12.041 --> 02:03:13.986
comes to defense . So maybe one of

02:03:13.986 --> 02:03:16.152
those silver linings in a pretty awful

02:03:16.152 --> 02:03:18.263
cloud as far as commitments like from

02:03:18.263 --> 02:03:19.986
Spain , Italy , Canada , other

02:03:19.986 --> 02:03:22.097
countries like that . And of course ,

02:03:22.097 --> 02:03:24.208
the small very wealthy countries like

02:03:24.208 --> 02:03:26.430
Netherlands , Belgium , Denmark come to

02:03:26.430 --> 02:03:25.350
mind because they weren't hitting that

02:03:25.359 --> 02:03:28.790
2% either . Do you agree ? Are they all

02:03:28.799 --> 02:03:31.080
on a road map to it now ? So , we , we ,

02:03:31.089 --> 02:03:34.509
we have , uh , 10 allies today spend

02:03:34.520 --> 02:03:37.529
more than 2% or 2% or greater to

02:03:37.540 --> 02:03:39.759
include , um , one ally Poland , which

02:03:39.770 --> 02:03:42.049
spends more per GDP than , than the

02:03:42.060 --> 02:03:44.740
United States does . Um , we have 11

02:03:44.750 --> 02:03:47.549
allies that now have credible plans ,

02:03:47.560 --> 02:03:50.200
detailed some of them laid out in law

02:03:50.209 --> 02:03:53.629
to get to 2% by 2024 . We do have 20

02:03:53.640 --> 02:03:55.807
more allies however , and we have work

02:03:55.807 --> 02:03:57.751
to do . Yeah . And I wanna laud uh

02:03:57.751 --> 02:03:59.939
Romania too . When we , I visited them

02:03:59.950 --> 02:04:02.283
uh with a code , they were at , I think ,

02:04:02.283 --> 02:04:04.506
believe 2% then and they have committed

02:04:04.506 --> 02:04:06.672
to 2.5 and that's a developing country

02:04:06.672 --> 02:04:08.783
that's not quite , you know , has the

02:04:08.783 --> 02:04:10.894
strong economies of some of the their

02:04:10.894 --> 02:04:10.660
Western allies . Well , I , I agree ,

02:04:10.669 --> 02:04:12.990
sir , uh Romania is a , is a wonderful

02:04:13.000 --> 02:04:15.169
ally . Romania is modernizing very

02:04:15.180 --> 02:04:17.347
quickly and Romania is main support of

02:04:17.347 --> 02:04:19.513
both of the United States and NATO and

02:04:19.513 --> 02:04:21.791
general . What are your thought on the ,

02:04:21.791 --> 02:04:21.334
the posture , the force posture of

02:04:21.345 --> 02:04:24.095
roughly 81 82,000 right now ? Uh As far

02:04:24.104 --> 02:04:26.215
as moving east when we went on that ,

02:04:26.215 --> 02:04:28.048
moving east , moving more toward

02:04:28.048 --> 02:04:30.215
eastern Europe , we talked and visited

02:04:30.215 --> 02:04:32.326
with the Prime Minister of Romania as

02:04:32.326 --> 02:04:34.271
well . And I said that uh well , I

02:04:34.271 --> 02:04:36.382
think we , we probably need to ensure

02:04:36.382 --> 02:04:38.271
that the troops we have there now

02:04:38.271 --> 02:04:40.437
remain and make it permanent . And his

02:04:40.437 --> 02:04:42.715
response was very telling one sentence ,

02:04:42.715 --> 02:04:41.645
he said , I don't think you all have

02:04:41.654 --> 02:04:43.774
any choice . Um So I just wanted to

02:04:43.785 --> 02:04:45.618
visit with you on that as well .

02:04:46.370 --> 02:04:49.919
Absolutely . Uh uh Prime Minister Chua

02:04:50.049 --> 02:04:52.271
and I have uh have known each other for

02:04:52.271 --> 02:04:54.493
a few years and uh he's made that point

02:04:54.493 --> 02:04:56.660
clear to me frequently . I , I hope he

02:04:56.660 --> 02:04:58.660
pointed out to you . However , that

02:04:58.660 --> 02:05:00.827
there is a US division headquarters in

02:05:00.827 --> 02:05:02.660
Romania right now . There's a US

02:05:02.660 --> 02:05:04.493
brigade combat team in Romania .

02:05:04.493 --> 02:05:06.549
There's a US helicopter battalion in

02:05:06.549 --> 02:05:08.327
Romania right now and there are

02:05:08.327 --> 02:05:10.549
periodically US US fighters with regard

02:05:10.549 --> 02:05:12.605
to the rest of our posture . We have

02:05:12.605 --> 02:05:14.605
moved east significantly since just

02:05:14.605 --> 02:05:16.716
before the beginning of this conflict

02:05:16.716 --> 02:05:18.882
and throughout it , um that's a lot of

02:05:18.882 --> 02:05:21.216
the surge forces that have come forward .

02:05:21.216 --> 02:05:23.049
Some , some of it's a little bit

02:05:23.049 --> 02:05:25.216
limited by um capacity , the house and

02:05:25.216 --> 02:05:27.105
to train all those forces , we go

02:05:27.105 --> 02:05:29.271
forward and we're working closely with

02:05:29.271 --> 02:05:31.493
our allies . That would be , I think it

02:05:31.493 --> 02:05:31.100
would be great to have a plan in place

02:05:31.109 --> 02:05:33.053
where we can continue that move in

02:05:33.053 --> 02:05:35.276
moving east . Uh Madam Secretary myself

02:05:35.276 --> 02:05:37.220
and uh Representative Panetta have

02:05:37.220 --> 02:05:40.000
introduced Ukrainian Human Rights

02:05:40.009 --> 02:05:42.680
Policy Act and we want to shed light on

02:05:42.689 --> 02:05:44.800
the war atrocities . I mean , there's

02:05:44.800 --> 02:05:46.967
been mass killings , deportations , et

02:05:46.967 --> 02:05:48.967
cetera . You you , you know the the

02:05:48.967 --> 02:05:51.078
drill and as the war rages on what do

02:05:51.078 --> 02:05:53.200
you think we can do to better hold

02:05:53.209 --> 02:05:55.470
Russia accountable for these actions

02:05:55.479 --> 02:05:57.569
today and in , in , in the future ?

02:05:58.580 --> 02:06:00.810
Thank you , Congressman . We , the

02:06:00.819 --> 02:06:02.708
defense department fully supports

02:06:02.708 --> 02:06:05.759
holding Russia accountable in February

02:06:05.770 --> 02:06:08.910
of 2023 . Vice President Harris

02:06:09.040 --> 02:06:12.810
spoke out and made clear that us policy

02:06:12.819 --> 02:06:16.129
is that what Russia is doing in Ukraine

02:06:16.140 --> 02:06:18.910
constitute crimes against humanity . So

02:06:18.919 --> 02:06:21.990
we will support , there are multiple

02:06:22.000 --> 02:06:25.490
proposals for developing International

02:06:25.500 --> 02:06:28.609
Fora for supporting Ukraine's domestic

02:06:28.620 --> 02:06:32.089
capability to hold Russians accountable .

02:06:32.100 --> 02:06:34.310
But the first step is the kind of work

02:06:34.319 --> 02:06:36.890
that so many have done to publicize uh

02:06:36.899 --> 02:06:39.069
these actions and document them uh

02:06:39.080 --> 02:06:41.080
publicly in the US . Government has

02:06:41.080 --> 02:06:43.024
supported those . Well , I want to

02:06:43.024 --> 02:06:45.191
thank you all my time has expired . Um

02:06:45.191 --> 02:06:47.413
Thank you for coming in , Mr Chairman .

02:06:47.413 --> 02:06:49.524
I go back . I thank the gentlemen . I

02:06:49.524 --> 02:06:49.259
thank , thank the witnesses for their

02:06:49.270 --> 02:06:51.326
testimony today . And with that , we

02:06:51.326 --> 02:06:51.569
are adjourned .