WEBVTT 00:10.420 --> 00:14.289 That . Welcome 00:14.300 --> 00:17.690 back . I hope you had a uh a great 00:17.700 --> 00:20.389 lunch uh for the past hour and a half , 00:20.559 --> 00:23.260 we are excited to be back for our very 00:23.270 --> 00:25.920 much uh a great afternoon of jam packed 00:25.930 --> 00:28.780 uh two panels followed by rear rear 00:28.790 --> 00:31.079 admiral Berg's uh remarks . 00:32.449 --> 00:35.388 Uh It is my privilege to introduce the 00:35.398 --> 00:37.769 moderator of our next panel innovation , 00:37.778 --> 00:40.409 the law and the role of lawyers . He is 00:40.418 --> 00:43.328 a personal friend of mine and a fellow 00:43.339 --> 00:45.409 West Virginia native and mountaineer 00:46.689 --> 00:49.319 Corey Simpson has served on active duty 00:49.330 --> 00:51.930 uh served on active duty from 2004 to 00:51.939 --> 00:55.080 2006 in the arm or 16 in the Army Jag 00:55.119 --> 00:57.770 Corp and currently serves uh in a 00:57.779 --> 01:00.180 reserve capacity . He is the founder 01:00.189 --> 01:03.110 and CEO of Gray Space Strategies , a 01:03.119 --> 01:05.209 professional service and strategic 01:05.220 --> 01:08.190 advisory firm , a senior advisor to the 01:08.199 --> 01:11.860 CS C 2.0 A nonprofit and nonpartisan 01:11.870 --> 01:14.330 entity that continues the work of the 01:14.339 --> 01:17.330 US Cyberspace Solarium Commission and 01:17.339 --> 01:19.389 an adjunct professor . Thank you , 01:19.400 --> 01:21.580 Corey and take it here . Thank you . 01:22.089 --> 01:24.145 It's good to be here with everyone . 01:24.145 --> 01:26.145 Thank you to Colonel Hayden and the 01:26.145 --> 01:29.370 team for , for having us out . Um I am 01:29.379 --> 01:31.230 lucky to be joined today by two 01:31.239 --> 01:35.050 fantastic lawyers leaders 01:35.059 --> 01:37.281 and folks that I'm lucky enough to call 01:37.281 --> 01:40.470 friends . Um Karen Silverman and Brett 01:40.480 --> 01:43.589 Friedman . Um I'm going to allow each 01:43.599 --> 01:46.139 of them to introduce themselves because 01:46.150 --> 01:48.089 they know themselves best and the 01:48.099 --> 01:50.099 things that they would like to , to 01:50.099 --> 01:52.266 share with you . So Karen , go ahead . 01:52.266 --> 01:54.488 Sure . Um I am , as you said , a lawyer 01:54.488 --> 01:56.830 by training have a three or more 01:56.839 --> 01:59.269 decades mostly though in corporate 01:59.279 --> 02:01.390 practice . So sort of coming from the 02:01.390 --> 02:03.501 industry side at a brief stint in the 02:03.501 --> 02:06.040 Department of Justice have been in and 02:06.050 --> 02:08.106 out , but I was always , always with 02:08.106 --> 02:10.688 the government facing practice . I that 02:10.699 --> 02:12.998 a couple of years ago to start my firm 02:13.009 --> 02:15.176 called the Can Tellus Group . And what 02:15.176 --> 02:17.398 we do is we advise organizations on how 02:17.398 --> 02:19.287 to govern technology that they're 02:19.287 --> 02:21.453 bringing into their organizations kind 02:21.453 --> 02:23.509 of across the spectrum , but also in 02:23.509 --> 02:25.309 particular how it impacts their 02:25.319 --> 02:27.486 organizational governance as well . So 02:27.486 --> 02:29.597 governing the technology and the uses 02:29.597 --> 02:31.652 of those technologies , plus how you 02:31.652 --> 02:33.652 then govern an organization that is 02:33.738 --> 02:35.708 ingesting and utilizing these 02:35.718 --> 02:37.607 technologies which are as we will 02:37.607 --> 02:39.779 discuss , changing very quickly . All 02:39.789 --> 02:41.845 right . Well , thank you . Thank you 02:41.845 --> 02:43.845 for having me . Thanks to Corey for 02:43.845 --> 02:45.678 including me . Um essentially uh 02:45.678 --> 02:47.900 background , a variety of folks will be 02:47.900 --> 02:50.139 very comfortable with the acronyms . Uh 02:50.399 --> 02:54.119 So from NSA to N C T C to S S C 02:54.130 --> 02:58.059 I and now a DOJ N S D . So that 02:58.070 --> 03:00.240 pretty much covers my government 03:00.250 --> 03:02.472 service , which is the dominant side of 03:02.472 --> 03:04.660 my career . I started out on the hill 03:04.779 --> 03:06.946 and then bounced amongst the different 03:06.946 --> 03:09.860 agencies working on cus as well as 03:10.350 --> 03:13.100 72 , which a lot of folks are familiar 03:13.110 --> 03:15.277 with as it relates to the surveillance 03:15.277 --> 03:17.388 component . And now at the Department 03:17.388 --> 03:19.610 of Justice advising Matt Olsen , who is 03:19.610 --> 03:21.888 the assistant attorney general for S D . 03:21.888 --> 03:23.970 Thank you for being here , Karen for 03:23.979 --> 03:26.429 being here . So a little bit of Justine 03:26.440 --> 03:29.990 setting up front is innovation , the 03:30.000 --> 03:33.009 law , the role of lawyers , three big 03:33.020 --> 03:35.242 buckets at the tail end of this , we'll 03:35.242 --> 03:37.353 leave some time . So about 10 minutes 03:37.353 --> 03:40.339 for questions , please , you know , if 03:40.350 --> 03:42.572 there's something that comes up that we 03:42.572 --> 03:44.628 didn't address , please raise them , 03:44.628 --> 03:46.960 then I would tell you just as a general 03:46.970 --> 03:50.279 context , there's when I sat on the 03:50.289 --> 03:52.550 solarium . So it was three years ago , 03:52.559 --> 03:54.729 we released the report , there were 03:54.740 --> 03:57.018 three things that we were tasked to do . 03:57.018 --> 03:59.889 One as an overarching . Strategic goal 03:59.899 --> 04:02.119 was develop a strategy to defend the 04:02.130 --> 04:05.039 United States in cyber and make the 04:05.050 --> 04:07.383 policy recommendations to do that thing . 04:07.383 --> 04:09.606 Strategic goals specifically were to do 04:09.606 --> 04:12.029 three things defend the innovation base 04:12.039 --> 04:14.095 of the United States , the political 04:14.095 --> 04:16.095 system of the United States and the 04:16.095 --> 04:18.329 defense industrial base . So why those 04:18.338 --> 04:21.069 three things , those are the three most 04:21.079 --> 04:23.829 important things that they saw to the 04:23.998 --> 04:27.428 security of the nation . So as we dove 04:27.438 --> 04:29.660 into that , the defense industrial base 04:29.660 --> 04:31.994 defined by statute . We understand that . 04:31.994 --> 04:34.709 Well , the other two , a little bit 04:34.718 --> 04:37.748 more nebulous and we spent a very long 04:37.759 --> 04:41.040 time as a commission talking about 04:41.579 --> 04:44.529 what is the political system of the 04:44.540 --> 04:46.940 United States ? What is the innovation 04:46.950 --> 04:48.950 base ? So I understand that that's 04:48.959 --> 04:51.260 something that we continue to debate 04:51.269 --> 04:53.959 about and think through , even through 04:53.970 --> 04:57.450 to today . One thing that we , I 04:57.459 --> 05:00.230 believe we have taken come to accept as 05:00.239 --> 05:02.559 a truth is no matter how we think about 05:02.570 --> 05:06.470 those things , there are certain things 05:06.480 --> 05:08.536 or certain mistakes that define this 05:08.536 --> 05:10.647 new environment that we're in . Um in 05:10.647 --> 05:12.670 the report , there was a two page 05:12.679 --> 05:14.735 letter on the top that came from the 05:14.735 --> 05:16.579 chairman , so Senator King and 05:16.589 --> 05:19.160 Representative Gallagher and that 05:19.170 --> 05:22.209 letter had in every paragraph boded 05:22.220 --> 05:25.510 speed and agility , no matter where we 05:25.519 --> 05:28.320 are heading , we need there is going to 05:28.329 --> 05:30.440 be an environment that is moving very 05:30.440 --> 05:33.410 quickly and we need to be able to adapt 05:33.420 --> 05:35.779 as we head into that environment with 05:35.790 --> 05:39.489 speed . And so flash forward to the 05:39.500 --> 05:41.556 Posture statement from General Nakai 05:42.100 --> 05:44.980 just last month . And he said that for 05:44.989 --> 05:47.609 operational success in the cyber domain , 05:47.809 --> 05:50.640 it demands three things , speed , 05:50.769 --> 05:53.910 agility , and unity of effort . Again , 05:53.920 --> 05:57.209 speed and agility resonate through . 05:57.739 --> 06:00.790 And one of the things that defines sort 06:00.799 --> 06:03.369 of the age we're in are those 06:03.380 --> 06:05.436 characteristics . But what does that 06:05.436 --> 06:07.589 have to do with innovation , the law 06:07.600 --> 06:11.390 and lawyers ? So that's what the panel 06:11.399 --> 06:13.621 is about that's what we're here to talk 06:13.621 --> 06:15.732 about . And as we do that , I want to 06:15.732 --> 06:17.829 talk about innovation power and what 06:17.839 --> 06:19.899 that means to the United States , to 06:19.910 --> 06:23.109 our national security . So if any of 06:23.119 --> 06:25.175 you are foreign affairs , you know , 06:25.175 --> 06:27.570 subscribers , you've gotten this this 06:27.579 --> 06:30.649 month . The March April edition is 06:30.660 --> 06:33.230 Innovation Power . What is innovation 06:33.239 --> 06:36.160 power ? So it's the ability to create , 06:36.170 --> 06:39.720 adopt and adapt new technologies into , 06:39.730 --> 06:42.859 into our , our system , our governance . 06:43.940 --> 06:46.899 The author of that main article was , 06:46.910 --> 06:49.070 was also the co chair of the A I 06:49.079 --> 06:51.750 Commission and he defines the era that 06:51.760 --> 06:55.109 we're in is the A I age , the age of A 06:55.119 --> 06:58.980 I . And what makes this age different 06:58.989 --> 07:01.429 from any before ours ? You know , and 07:01.440 --> 07:04.980 if you think steel or bronze to steel , 07:05.149 --> 07:07.829 steam to nuclear , what is different 07:07.839 --> 07:10.920 about this age is that A I will make 07:10.929 --> 07:14.380 all innovation faster . And so we're 07:14.390 --> 07:17.799 moving very quickly from life 07:17.809 --> 07:21.459 sciences to weapons of war to , you 07:21.470 --> 07:23.660 know , communication capabilities , 07:23.809 --> 07:26.529 everything is going to be moving faster . 07:26.829 --> 07:29.739 And as we get moving through that , 07:30.899 --> 07:33.880 we have to answer these questions of 07:33.890 --> 07:36.190 what does it mean to innovate . And 07:36.200 --> 07:39.109 just in addition to speed is a question 07:39.119 --> 07:42.690 of velocity of speed is just how fast 07:42.700 --> 07:45.260 you're moving , think octopus on roller 07:45.269 --> 07:47.602 skates , right ? Lots of movement there , 07:47.602 --> 07:49.547 but maybe not a lot of direction , 07:49.579 --> 07:51.549 velocity is moving in a particular 07:51.559 --> 07:54.630 direction towards a goal . So how do we 07:54.640 --> 07:56.862 know with innovation that we're heading 07:56.862 --> 07:58.751 in the right direction that we're 07:58.751 --> 08:00.696 asking the right questions , we're 08:00.696 --> 08:02.929 thinking the right things . And so with 08:02.940 --> 08:06.380 A I in the placement of , of a 08:06.390 --> 08:08.730 driver for innovation , we're lucky 08:08.739 --> 08:10.739 enough to have Karen here with us . 08:10.739 --> 08:13.170 You're seen as a world expert in sort 08:13.179 --> 08:16.390 of a i in the thinking of it and its 08:16.399 --> 08:18.399 relationship to innovation . So why 08:18.399 --> 08:20.566 don't you help us contextualize that a 08:20.566 --> 08:22.670 little bit ? Thank you and thank you 08:22.679 --> 08:24.512 for having me . This is really a 08:24.512 --> 08:26.623 privilege to , to raise some of these 08:26.623 --> 08:28.790 issues with you . And it's interesting 08:28.790 --> 08:31.012 you raise velocity because because when 08:31.012 --> 08:32.679 we think about , as you say , 08:32.679 --> 08:34.790 innovation has been the hallmark of , 08:34.790 --> 08:36.735 well , I mean , civilization , but 08:36.735 --> 08:39.010 certainly this nation's progress from 08:39.020 --> 08:41.320 its inception , what's changing now is 08:41.330 --> 08:44.280 the pace at which we're doing it . But , 08:44.979 --> 08:47.201 but I think in terms when I think about 08:47.201 --> 08:49.423 A I and some of the innovations that it 08:49.423 --> 08:51.646 is fueling , we're really talking , not 08:51.646 --> 08:53.701 just about speed and agility , we're 08:53.701 --> 08:55.923 also talking about velocity and scale , 08:55.929 --> 08:57.818 right ? And when you start adding 08:57.818 --> 08:59.873 velocity and scale , you can sort of 08:59.873 --> 09:01.873 see where impact now becomes a very 09:01.873 --> 09:05.130 significant consideration much earlier 09:05.140 --> 09:07.251 in an innovation cycle . I mean , and 09:07.251 --> 09:09.307 people are trying to figure out what 09:09.307 --> 09:11.473 the right analogy for A I is . I think 09:11.473 --> 09:13.029 one way to think about it , 09:13.029 --> 09:15.196 particularly for lawyers is they think 09:15.196 --> 09:17.307 about it as like air water fire , you 09:17.307 --> 09:16.669 know , it's sort of like another 09:16.679 --> 09:18.789 element in a way . And we've had 09:18.799 --> 09:20.910 millennia to figure out how we handle 09:20.910 --> 09:22.966 fire , how we regulate fire , how we 09:22.966 --> 09:25.299 bring it into our homes , how we use it , 09:25.299 --> 09:27.188 you know , externally offensively 09:27.188 --> 09:29.299 defensively , we don't have millennia 09:29.299 --> 09:31.299 to figure this out . So part of the 09:31.299 --> 09:33.410 issue with this kind of innovation is 09:33.539 --> 09:35.650 the amount of kind of forethought and 09:35.650 --> 09:37.817 energy that's going to have to go into 09:37.817 --> 09:39.817 asking questions and thinking ahead 09:39.817 --> 09:41.817 about the sorts of governance tools 09:41.817 --> 09:45.200 controls that will serve us in whatever 09:45.210 --> 09:47.432 our state admissions are as we start to 09:47.432 --> 09:49.559 use this technology . Fundamentally , 09:49.700 --> 09:52.479 these are prediction engines that are 09:52.489 --> 09:55.489 statistical reasoning machines , these 09:55.500 --> 09:57.722 are not contextual reasoning machines , 09:57.722 --> 10:00.119 they can mimic that increasingly well . 10:00.130 --> 10:02.849 But fundamentally , they don't think 10:02.859 --> 10:05.000 the way human beings think and they 10:05.010 --> 10:07.340 don't start or stop the way human 10:07.349 --> 10:09.460 beings start or stop unless they're , 10:09.830 --> 10:11.530 they're instructed in very 10:11.539 --> 10:13.706 sophisticated ways and with generative 10:13.706 --> 10:15.960 ai that becomes an even more pronounced 10:15.969 --> 10:18.000 phenomenon . The interesting thing 10:18.010 --> 10:20.232 about generative A I , I mean , there's 10:20.232 --> 10:22.343 a million interesting things about it 10:22.343 --> 10:22.169 but the interesting thing from a , from 10:22.179 --> 10:24.830 a lawyers or sort of , you know , sort 10:24.840 --> 10:26.451 of the responsibility cohort 10:26.451 --> 10:28.570 perspective is that it puts in the 10:28.580 --> 10:32.030 hands of pretty much everyone , well 10:32.039 --> 10:34.206 intentioned and not well intentioned , 10:34.206 --> 10:37.419 an incredible set of skills and power , 10:37.429 --> 10:41.059 right ? That , that it's the um and , 10:41.070 --> 10:44.000 and what it does for most organizations 10:44.010 --> 10:47.619 is a little bit like what the like 10:47.630 --> 10:50.799 iphone did frankly is it means that the , 10:50.809 --> 10:52.920 it departments no longer have control 10:52.920 --> 10:55.142 over the technology that is used in the 10:55.142 --> 10:56.809 organization , right ? So the 10:56.809 --> 10:58.976 gatekeeper functions that we've set up 10:58.976 --> 11:01.229 to control how technology is used are 11:01.239 --> 11:03.461 falling apart . We'll talk a little bit 11:03.461 --> 11:05.683 about quantum and they're falling apart 11:05.683 --> 11:07.628 for a lot of technical advancement 11:07.628 --> 11:10.719 reasons . But just even from access to 11:10.729 --> 11:13.609 capabilities perspective , it's really 11:13.619 --> 11:16.530 hard now to control how employees 11:17.229 --> 11:19.451 and the , you know , at any level of an 11:19.451 --> 11:21.118 organization are now bringing 11:21.118 --> 11:23.285 technology into that organization that 11:23.285 --> 11:25.451 you're responsible for governing . And 11:25.451 --> 11:27.673 that's turning things upside down . And 11:27.673 --> 11:29.785 it's one of the dimensions of I would 11:29.785 --> 11:31.951 say disruption and sort of instability 11:31.951 --> 11:33.673 that innovation is starting to 11:33.673 --> 11:35.729 introduce at an organizational level 11:35.729 --> 11:38.469 now . So it's not just about the 11:38.479 --> 11:40.646 technologies themselves advancing very 11:40.646 --> 11:42.701 quickly , it's what they're doing to 11:42.701 --> 11:44.812 the organizations that are exposed to 11:44.812 --> 11:46.757 them . One of the things that it's 11:46.757 --> 11:48.701 doing well , first of all , from a 11:48.701 --> 11:50.868 lawyer's perspective , it's very clear 11:50.868 --> 11:52.812 now that what the law prohibits or 11:52.812 --> 11:54.923 permits isn't going to answer most of 11:54.923 --> 11:56.979 the hardest questions , right . It's 11:56.979 --> 11:56.640 just we're now creating a whole 11:56.650 --> 11:58.594 category of questions that the law 11:58.594 --> 12:00.706 doesn't really address some of them , 12:00.905 --> 12:03.016 the law addresses in some way , shape 12:03.016 --> 12:05.238 or form . But these , some of these are 12:05.238 --> 12:07.405 going to be very , very novel types of 12:07.405 --> 12:09.684 questions . It's going to disrupt cost 12:09.695 --> 12:11.584 structures and the cost of almost 12:11.584 --> 12:13.639 everything , some of some costs will 12:13.639 --> 12:16.030 collapse and some will escalate , but 12:16.039 --> 12:18.340 it's going to change how organizations 12:18.349 --> 12:20.799 do what they do almost every one of 12:20.809 --> 12:23.840 them . It's very hard from an oversight , 12:23.849 --> 12:25.682 cohort perspective , given these 12:25.682 --> 12:27.793 technologies to set priorities well , 12:27.793 --> 12:30.016 or to really do risk assessment because 12:30.016 --> 12:31.929 we've been talking a lot almost 12:31.940 --> 12:34.051 exclusively about cyber security here 12:34.051 --> 12:36.715 and cyberspace in any , in a private 12:36.724 --> 12:38.724 organization . Anyway , it does not 12:38.724 --> 12:40.780 exist in isolation . You've got data 12:40.780 --> 12:42.946 protection issues , you've got privacy 12:42.946 --> 12:45.168 issues , you've got A I policy issues , 12:45.168 --> 12:47.335 you've got obviously revenue drivers . 12:47.335 --> 12:49.557 And so security is a part of that . But 12:49.557 --> 12:51.945 the way organizations are structured 12:51.955 --> 12:55.145 typically is the the issues come up in 12:55.155 --> 12:57.099 silos . And so from an oversight , 12:57.099 --> 12:59.211 cohort perspective , it's really hard 12:59.211 --> 13:02.320 to appreciate and set priorities 13:02.330 --> 13:05.320 without a lot of extra and new kinds of 13:05.330 --> 13:08.369 support . And then finally , what I 13:08.380 --> 13:10.436 would say , and it's worth observing 13:10.436 --> 13:12.491 just because this is where we end up 13:12.491 --> 13:14.713 spending a lot of time is it's creating 13:14.713 --> 13:17.669 a pretty jittery twitchy workforce and 13:17.679 --> 13:20.130 client base or customer base , right ? 13:20.140 --> 13:23.130 And just that twitchiness creates new 13:23.140 --> 13:25.460 kinds of risks and instability that as 13:25.469 --> 13:28.429 lawyers , we need to be alert to and 13:28.440 --> 13:30.840 kind of plan for and , and I think 13:30.849 --> 13:33.409 engage with because the more we ignore 13:33.419 --> 13:35.697 it kind of the worse it's going to get . 13:35.697 --> 13:39.590 So on that cheerful note . Well , 13:39.700 --> 13:41.320 that's I think a very good 13:41.330 --> 13:43.441 contextualization of the relationship 13:43.441 --> 13:45.770 between innovation and A I and Bret , 13:45.780 --> 13:49.669 you focus a lot now from current role 13:49.679 --> 13:51.679 from national security and a career 13:51.679 --> 13:54.500 focus on national security . Can you 13:54.510 --> 13:56.288 talk a little bit about framing 13:56.288 --> 13:58.500 innovation in the context of national 13:58.510 --> 14:01.020 security ? Yeah , I think , I mean , 14:01.030 --> 14:04.340 from my perspective , you've seen , um , 14:04.609 --> 14:07.539 an evolution where every discipline , 14:07.549 --> 14:10.070 whether you're talking about health 14:10.080 --> 14:13.489 care , the economy , transportation , 14:13.739 --> 14:15.710 forget about just the traditional 14:15.840 --> 14:17.630 military , industrial complex . 14:17.890 --> 14:20.719 Everything is now seen in a national 14:20.729 --> 14:24.229 security perspective , right ? 14:24.289 --> 14:26.233 Especially from where we sit , but 14:26.233 --> 14:28.400 there is no essential daylight between 14:28.400 --> 14:30.400 those two . And you can see ways in 14:30.400 --> 14:32.456 which , whether you're talking about 14:32.456 --> 14:34.400 synthetic biology , whether you're 14:34.400 --> 14:36.567 talking about technological innovation 14:36.567 --> 14:38.789 in terms of how people could cast votes 14:38.789 --> 14:41.011 potentially . If you're talking about , 14:41.011 --> 14:43.067 you know , bullet trains or means by 14:43.067 --> 14:45.067 which hypersonic craft and speed of 14:45.067 --> 14:46.900 travel , there's nothing that is 14:46.900 --> 14:49.820 essentially divorced from that optic 14:49.830 --> 14:52.070 from my vantage point . And so I think 14:52.080 --> 14:54.890 the real crux as we're talking about 14:54.900 --> 14:57.679 this is trying to think we , at least 14:57.690 --> 14:59.746 in the , in the legal side of things 14:59.746 --> 15:01.746 you think of things you often times 15:01.746 --> 15:03.690 look at . Well , it depends on the 15:03.690 --> 15:05.634 circumstances that that benefit of 15:05.634 --> 15:07.857 saying that it's going to be . You talk 15:07.857 --> 15:09.801 about Jittery , this , this throws 15:09.801 --> 15:11.968 everything up , up , up , ends on it . 15:11.968 --> 15:14.079 You basically are in a position where 15:14.079 --> 15:16.929 you're having a great deal of 15:16.960 --> 15:20.669 difficulty because the certainty 15:20.679 --> 15:22.950 or principles upon which you would deal 15:22.960 --> 15:25.030 with one set of facts , 15:26.109 --> 15:29.479 change , change immediately change 15:29.489 --> 15:32.530 dynamically . So whether you're talking 15:32.539 --> 15:34.317 about a procurement cycle , for 15:34.317 --> 15:37.280 instance , in the context of military , 15:37.289 --> 15:39.880 right , maybe it's a 10 year from 15:39.890 --> 15:42.320 concept to deployment potentially for 15:42.330 --> 15:44.270 purposes of say a satellite 15:44.280 --> 15:46.224 constellation or something of that 15:46.224 --> 15:48.070 nature , that 10 year piece the 15:48.080 --> 15:50.080 evolution of technology within that 15:50.080 --> 15:52.024 period of time makes obsolete that 15:52.024 --> 15:54.247 concept when you initially started it , 15:54.247 --> 15:56.358 let alone the deployment of that unit 15:56.358 --> 15:58.429 when that actually comes to E O D , 15:58.729 --> 16:01.979 right ? And so it really , I think is a 16:01.989 --> 16:05.599 significant challenge and it is 16:05.609 --> 16:09.419 permeating all aspects of where 16:09.640 --> 16:11.418 at least now where I sit in the 16:11.418 --> 16:13.418 national security division . But in 16:13.418 --> 16:15.640 previous my private role , but the last 16:15.640 --> 16:17.751 seven years as counsel for the Senate 16:17.751 --> 16:19.696 Select Committee on Intelligence , 16:20.760 --> 16:22.979 Senator Warner would often refer to it 16:22.989 --> 16:25.049 as the technology committee because 16:25.059 --> 16:26.837 there really isn't a technology 16:26.837 --> 16:28.837 committee , everybody has their own 16:28.837 --> 16:30.726 pieces , which makes it even more 16:30.726 --> 16:32.559 difficult to actually agree upon 16:32.559 --> 16:34.781 anything , let alone in the legislative 16:34.781 --> 16:34.289 context and the politicized environment 16:34.299 --> 16:37.000 that we operate today . And so there is 16:37.010 --> 16:39.760 no issue that I can think of that is 16:39.770 --> 16:42.150 essentially divorced from 16:43.390 --> 16:46.250 what one would term to be . You could 16:46.260 --> 16:48.316 think of a parade of horribles where 16:48.316 --> 16:50.149 that is , oh , that's a national 16:50.149 --> 16:52.204 security issue . And so that affects 16:52.204 --> 16:54.549 and is a uh I I think a lens with which 16:54.559 --> 16:57.429 you need to view innovation . Um And , 16:57.440 --> 16:59.710 and think of this because we cannot 17:00.010 --> 17:03.869 continue to operate in the context of 17:04.109 --> 17:06.459 past decades in terms of our decision 17:06.469 --> 17:09.219 making structures . If we're intending 17:09.229 --> 17:10.951 to , we're going to have to be 17:10.951 --> 17:13.007 uncomfortable we're going to have to 17:13.007 --> 17:15.062 essentially be willing to take risks 17:15.062 --> 17:17.670 and deploy things with the belief that 17:17.680 --> 17:19.902 the rules and the principles that we're 17:19.902 --> 17:21.847 operating from , they are going to 17:21.847 --> 17:24.013 change and we are going to change with 17:24.013 --> 17:26.124 that and you're going to break things 17:26.124 --> 17:28.347 as you're going along doing it . But if 17:28.347 --> 17:30.402 we don't take that modification from 17:30.402 --> 17:32.402 where I sit you , we're going to be 17:32.402 --> 17:34.569 woefully unprepared and really sitting 17:34.569 --> 17:36.624 on our back back foot , which is not 17:36.624 --> 17:39.829 where we want to be incredible insights . 17:39.839 --> 17:42.800 And to add , I think a little bit of a 17:42.810 --> 17:44.588 direct connection with Cyber is 17:44.588 --> 17:47.520 underpinning all of this is more 17:47.530 --> 17:49.239 powerful and capable networks 17:49.250 --> 17:51.472 regardless of the generation of network 17:51.472 --> 17:53.459 five G six G . However , you think 17:53.469 --> 17:55.469 about it , the networks are getting 17:55.469 --> 17:57.358 more powerful , the technology is 17:57.358 --> 17:59.580 becoming more integrated into our daily 17:59.580 --> 18:02.130 lives , more connected devices means 18:02.140 --> 18:05.150 more data , which A I can make sense of 18:05.160 --> 18:07.709 more quickly . And this is sort of the 18:07.719 --> 18:10.130 trend that we see , which is also going 18:10.140 --> 18:13.380 to unlock a lot of innovation in 18:13.689 --> 18:17.189 unanticipated ways . As we think 18:17.199 --> 18:19.540 through speed agility , we talk a 18:19.550 --> 18:23.030 little bit about the government , we 18:23.119 --> 18:24.786 talked about maybe government 18:24.786 --> 18:26.675 procurement in the context of the 18:26.675 --> 18:28.786 legislative branch . When we think of 18:28.786 --> 18:32.260 the law , there will almost always be a 18:32.270 --> 18:35.219 gap between the pace at which law 18:35.229 --> 18:39.109 evolves in the pace at which technology 18:39.119 --> 18:41.063 is evolving . And that's certainly 18:41.063 --> 18:43.230 going to be true in the era that we're 18:43.230 --> 18:44.952 heading into where the pace of 18:44.952 --> 18:47.175 technology will continue to evolve very 18:47.175 --> 18:49.230 rapidly . So , what does that mean ? 18:49.230 --> 18:51.286 There is that there will always be a 18:51.286 --> 18:53.369 delta between where the law is and 18:53.380 --> 18:55.810 where technology is and in bridging 18:55.819 --> 18:59.560 that gap , our legislative body um , 18:59.569 --> 19:01.869 is , is they're , they're wrestling , I 19:01.880 --> 19:03.880 think , very hard with that . And I 19:03.880 --> 19:06.158 know that's something brad that you've , 19:06.158 --> 19:08.436 you've have a great deal of experience , 19:08.436 --> 19:10.658 at least within that body helping . And 19:10.658 --> 19:10.510 so could you maybe share a little bit 19:10.520 --> 19:12.853 of your thoughts on that in perspective ? 19:12.853 --> 19:15.020 Pardon me ? If I break out in hives or 19:15.020 --> 19:18.959 start to you sweat . Um , but the , uh , 19:18.969 --> 19:21.640 no , I think there's a sincere , 19:21.650 --> 19:23.750 regardless of the kind of the , the 19:23.760 --> 19:27.310 sides of issues and the politicization 19:27.510 --> 19:31.449 of , of our system right now , I think 19:31.459 --> 19:34.489 there are going to need to be , you 19:34.500 --> 19:36.778 constantly have the problem , you know , 19:37.020 --> 19:39.076 try to think of things in a coherent 19:39.076 --> 19:41.500 and logical way when things are calm 19:41.510 --> 19:43.677 and then when something hits the fan , 19:43.677 --> 19:45.621 whether it's the recent leak , for 19:45.621 --> 19:48.489 instance or something else , you can , 19:48.500 --> 19:50.611 then you have the pendulum shift in a 19:50.611 --> 19:52.667 particular direction and everybody's 19:52.667 --> 19:54.778 attention goes to that . I think that 19:55.280 --> 19:58.109 absent kind of an ability for Congress 19:58.119 --> 20:01.060 to be able to take a step back amongst 20:01.069 --> 20:04.560 a jurisdictional morass of committees 20:04.569 --> 20:07.010 that essentially have and make 20:07.020 --> 20:09.131 arguments towards . Well , that's our 20:09.131 --> 20:11.489 issue , this is our issue and a direct , 20:11.500 --> 20:13.650 honestly , a sincere 20:14.770 --> 20:17.979 piece of this . If we go back in the 20:17.989 --> 20:21.939 world 72 , that there are the 20:21.949 --> 20:24.569 judiciary committees on the House and 20:24.579 --> 20:27.540 on the Senate have the jurisdiction to 20:27.550 --> 20:29.540 work through those issues and to 20:29.550 --> 20:32.579 address in every reauthorization of 20:32.589 --> 20:34.645 this authority since its inception , 20:34.645 --> 20:38.339 who has taken that mantle and put forth 20:38.599 --> 20:40.766 the actual legislation that ultimately 20:40.766 --> 20:42.432 would pass . And that was the 20:42.432 --> 20:44.543 intelligence committees partially and 20:44.543 --> 20:46.877 quite frankly , I think there's utility , 20:46.877 --> 20:49.043 forget about the classification side . 20:49.043 --> 20:51.155 Although that is important , having a 20:51.155 --> 20:53.210 closed door ability to have a debate 20:53.210 --> 20:56.339 and have a absent take away the cameras 20:56.349 --> 20:58.530 just simply relate to one another as 20:58.540 --> 21:02.469 individuals leads to a much more clear , 21:02.479 --> 21:05.270 concise and frank discussion where you 21:05.280 --> 21:07.819 see a lot more of willingness and 21:07.829 --> 21:09.885 ability for people to agree with one 21:09.885 --> 21:11.829 another that immediately once they 21:11.829 --> 21:13.885 leave that office and they're out in 21:13.885 --> 21:15.829 front of the cameras , you're then 21:15.829 --> 21:17.885 immediately put back into the day to 21:17.885 --> 21:20.051 day kind of run of the mill where they 21:20.051 --> 21:22.560 go into their corners . And I think I 21:22.569 --> 21:24.680 consider myself fortunate to have had 21:24.680 --> 21:26.736 that experience and have seen that , 21:26.736 --> 21:28.847 but you consistently come out of that 21:28.847 --> 21:31.013 and with your colleagues on both sides 21:31.013 --> 21:33.125 of the aisle and just saying , well , 21:33.125 --> 21:35.291 man , I wish the American people could 21:35.291 --> 21:37.625 have heard what just transpired , right ? 21:37.625 --> 21:40.599 Or , or the conversation . And it just 21:40.609 --> 21:43.010 leads me to think that there it's still 21:43.020 --> 21:46.329 the the elements uh of our 21:46.479 --> 21:48.719 lack of effort for humanity and for the 21:48.729 --> 21:50.896 ability for us to be able to relate to 21:50.896 --> 21:52.840 one another and just talk as human 21:52.840 --> 21:55.062 beings . Is , is there , right ? It's , 21:55.062 --> 21:57.410 it's the question is more in the um in 21:57.420 --> 22:00.839 the ether in the , in the ultra the 22:00.849 --> 22:03.130 politicized media environment and the 22:03.670 --> 22:05.500 kind of bifurcation , not just 22:05.510 --> 22:07.959 bifurcation , but multipolar kind of 22:07.969 --> 22:11.099 area where there's just a whole sincere 22:11.109 --> 22:14.390 set of a panoply of different media 22:14.400 --> 22:16.233 entities . And you could have an 22:16.233 --> 22:18.400 individual who is just having a blog , 22:18.400 --> 22:20.609 is that blog seen or read by enough 22:20.619 --> 22:22.786 people that they could be considered a 22:22.786 --> 22:24.841 member of the media . Do they have a 22:24.841 --> 22:26.952 podcast ? Right ? What does that mean 22:26.952 --> 22:29.063 in the context ? And these are things 22:29.063 --> 22:31.175 that we are ultimately being reactive 22:31.175 --> 22:33.397 to ? And I don't think that necessarily 22:33.500 --> 22:36.719 to the point of , you know , the law is 22:36.729 --> 22:38.959 never going to be at the point at which 22:38.969 --> 22:41.191 the the pace of innovation is . I don't 22:41.191 --> 22:43.358 think that's necessarily a bad thing . 22:43.358 --> 22:45.525 And I think over time , we've actually 22:45.525 --> 22:47.869 been able to see the implications of 22:47.880 --> 22:50.589 certain technological innovations and 22:50.599 --> 22:53.150 then put in place the legal principles 22:53.160 --> 22:55.382 to govern that what I think the problem 22:55.382 --> 22:57.493 is and what Karen touched upon is the 22:57.493 --> 23:01.119 sincere just that dynamic and constant 23:01.130 --> 23:03.352 and the speed at which this is going to 23:03.352 --> 23:05.297 happen . I don't think we have the 23:05.297 --> 23:08.550 ability to be comforted by simply the 23:08.560 --> 23:10.709 aspect of say justice Kagan saying , 23:10.719 --> 23:12.830 you know , I don't think you want the 23:12.830 --> 23:14.719 nine of us to be adjudicating the 23:14.719 --> 23:18.180 internet Right . But that is really 23:18.189 --> 23:20.300 where the rubber meets the road . And 23:20.300 --> 23:22.411 so I don't know , ultimately how that 23:22.411 --> 23:25.040 plays out . But believe me , it's , 23:26.369 --> 23:28.780 I'm optimistic , but I think that's 23:28.790 --> 23:30.957 partially coming from the semblance of 23:30.957 --> 23:33.068 the Senate side where I felt as if we 23:33.068 --> 23:35.699 were very much in a bipartisan way and 23:35.709 --> 23:37.876 it really was relationship dependent . 23:37.876 --> 23:40.260 But then you're on a six year time 23:40.270 --> 23:42.326 frame , you're on a six year clock , 23:42.326 --> 23:44.548 vice a two year , it's a very different 23:44.548 --> 23:47.199 construct on the house side , Karen . 23:47.209 --> 23:49.750 What thoughts do you have to , to sort 23:49.760 --> 23:51.959 of add to that contrast or perspective 23:51.969 --> 23:54.150 you'd want to share ? I , I mean , I , 23:54.160 --> 23:56.739 I think um 23:57.260 --> 24:01.079 from an industry perspective there , 24:01.089 --> 24:03.430 there's , there's still a lot of room 24:03.439 --> 24:07.280 for . So there's going to be regulation , 24:07.290 --> 24:09.512 there will be compliance apparatus that 24:09.512 --> 24:11.869 kind of builds up around that . I think 24:11.880 --> 24:13.991 there's a lot of advocacy right now , 24:14.030 --> 24:16.086 not against regulation , but against 24:16.086 --> 24:18.086 regulation that sort of becomes for 24:18.086 --> 24:20.252 lack of a better word , performative , 24:20.252 --> 24:22.308 right ? Where it's not really making 24:22.308 --> 24:24.197 the product better , safer , more 24:24.197 --> 24:27.660 robust , it's satisfying a 24:27.989 --> 24:30.859 laundry list of somebody's anticipated 24:30.869 --> 24:34.339 issues . I think there's a lot of 24:34.349 --> 24:36.349 hesitation around regulation that 24:36.359 --> 24:38.359 purports to go to the technology as 24:38.359 --> 24:40.500 opposed to the use cases of the 24:40.510 --> 24:43.349 technology and having very clear rules 24:43.359 --> 24:46.209 around , you know , frauds committed 24:46.219 --> 24:49.709 using innovative technologies are still 24:49.719 --> 24:51.719 frauds and we have a way to kind of 24:51.719 --> 24:53.719 deal with that and we need a robust 24:54.380 --> 24:57.650 enforcement mechanism around that . But 24:57.660 --> 24:59.827 all of that said , I , well , and then 24:59.827 --> 25:01.993 one other point and then all of that , 25:01.993 --> 25:03.993 the other , one other point is that 25:03.993 --> 25:05.827 there's , I think also a growing 25:05.827 --> 25:07.882 understanding that even once we have 25:07.882 --> 25:09.993 regulation , it's not going to answer 25:09.993 --> 25:12.104 again , it's not going to answer most 25:12.104 --> 25:14.216 of the hard day to day questions in a 25:14.216 --> 25:13.390 way that you guys deal with all the 25:13.400 --> 25:16.339 time , which is you have the , you have 25:16.349 --> 25:18.516 the rule is articulated , it has a lot 25:18.516 --> 25:20.460 of room for interpretation . These 25:20.460 --> 25:22.405 rules are going to have words like 25:22.405 --> 25:24.238 fairness and trustworthiness and 25:24.238 --> 25:26.300 transparency in them , which mean 25:26.310 --> 25:28.829 absolutely nothing out of context of 25:28.839 --> 25:31.006 what you're doing or what technologies 25:31.006 --> 25:32.783 you're using or what impact you 25:32.783 --> 25:35.117 anticipate or what you've done to build , 25:35.219 --> 25:37.497 you know , the tool in the first place . 25:37.497 --> 25:39.552 So , so there's going to be a lot of 25:39.552 --> 25:42.619 room for lawyers and advisers to do the 25:42.630 --> 25:45.500 counseling that sort of fills in . It's 25:45.510 --> 25:47.677 not just lawyers , it's the , it's the 25:47.677 --> 25:49.843 whole advisory community . It's like , 25:49.843 --> 25:52.010 how do we , how do we make these rules 25:52.010 --> 25:54.121 mean something in the context or with 25:54.121 --> 25:53.150 the problems that we're actually 25:53.160 --> 25:57.130 staring at ? And that , that is a 25:57.140 --> 25:59.209 process that is still very nascent I 25:59.219 --> 26:01.330 would say . And then the last thing I 26:01.330 --> 26:03.386 was going to say is that for all the 26:03.386 --> 26:05.052 anxiety around , can we get a 26:05.052 --> 26:07.079 regulation ? Will it fit , will it 26:07.089 --> 26:10.050 serve its purpose ? It is true that 26:10.060 --> 26:12.229 there is still a lot of room for just 26:12.239 --> 26:15.439 more thoughtfulness and incentivizing 26:16.550 --> 26:19.069 better work flows , right ? That , that 26:19.079 --> 26:21.357 we heard earlier today that , you know , 26:21.357 --> 26:24.329 builds security in by design builds , 26:24.339 --> 26:26.719 you know , a I sort of responsibility 26:26.729 --> 26:29.790 in by design builds data protection in 26:29.800 --> 26:33.000 by design . And most organizations are 26:33.010 --> 26:36.489 not necessarily approaching 26:36.500 --> 26:39.369 innovation with that design constraint 26:39.380 --> 26:42.650 in place . They are , they'll build it 26:42.660 --> 26:44.827 first and then they'll assess it after 26:44.827 --> 26:47.650 once we know it works . That I think 26:47.660 --> 26:50.130 those days , I hope those days are 26:50.140 --> 26:52.307 numbered . But I think that's the real 26:52.307 --> 26:54.473 transformation we need to make is that 26:54.473 --> 26:56.696 we all understand that this is all part 26:56.696 --> 26:58.807 of product quality as opposed to kind 26:58.807 --> 27:00.696 of a bolt on fix it later kind of 27:00.696 --> 27:02.140 approach . So 27:03.489 --> 27:06.060 incredible . Yeah , no incredible 27:06.069 --> 27:09.969 insights . And I on the timing of 27:09.979 --> 27:12.201 the conference with the release of some 27:12.201 --> 27:15.089 of the strategy documents , the new 27:15.099 --> 27:17.089 Cyber strategy is it talks to 27:17.099 --> 27:19.266 rebalancing responsibility through the 27:19.266 --> 27:21.869 ecosystem and then realigning marketed 27:21.880 --> 27:24.400 centers , the two big themes that align 27:24.410 --> 27:27.630 the five pillars in both of those . And 27:27.640 --> 27:30.410 we heard Steve talk about it in great 27:30.420 --> 27:34.170 depth and Brandon . But I think when 27:34.180 --> 27:37.430 you think through this as it relates to 27:37.439 --> 27:40.900 this panel , you have innovation , 27:41.359 --> 27:45.189 you have the law and then that sort of 27:45.199 --> 27:47.255 interaction . However , we fill that 27:47.255 --> 27:49.310 delta between wherever our law is , 27:49.319 --> 27:51.486 wherever our policy resides , wherever 27:51.486 --> 27:54.760 our strategy sits , how is that gap 27:54.770 --> 27:57.619 filled ? Well , we have to operate and 27:57.630 --> 27:59.797 we will continue to operate and you're 27:59.797 --> 28:01.741 always going to have that voice of 28:01.741 --> 28:03.686 somebody trying to do something in 28:03.686 --> 28:05.908 private organizations . It's one set of 28:05.908 --> 28:08.019 actors in military organizations . It 28:08.019 --> 28:09.963 may be a different set of actors , 28:09.963 --> 28:12.186 intel organizations , whatever the case 28:12.186 --> 28:14.297 may be , we have leaders that need to 28:14.297 --> 28:16.352 decide whether or not we're going to 28:16.352 --> 28:18.519 approve those actions that could go to 28:18.540 --> 28:21.479 a private sector setting ac board and 28:21.489 --> 28:23.545 they have different cares at each of 28:23.545 --> 28:25.322 those levels . The C suite very 28:25.322 --> 28:27.433 different from the board . You know , 28:27.433 --> 28:29.656 maybe an operational level command very 28:29.656 --> 28:31.489 different from a strategic level 28:31.489 --> 28:33.489 command . And then you have between 28:33.489 --> 28:35.322 that somebody needing to explain 28:35.322 --> 28:37.959 technology , that voice is very 28:37.969 --> 28:39.913 important in those rooms when that 28:39.913 --> 28:42.989 decision is being made . And then what , 28:43.000 --> 28:45.989 what's probably the last element of who 28:46.000 --> 28:48.800 is helping make all of those decisions 28:48.869 --> 28:50.790 is lawyers . They're going to be 28:50.800 --> 28:52.911 sitting in those boardrooms , they're 28:52.911 --> 28:54.967 going to be sitting in the C suite , 28:54.967 --> 28:57.078 they're going to be sitting hopefully 28:57.078 --> 28:59.189 in your commands from the tactical to 28:59.189 --> 29:01.411 the strategic level and they're helping 29:01.411 --> 29:04.760 inform how organizations 29:04.869 --> 29:08.680 continue to operate in this delta . And 29:08.689 --> 29:11.609 in that , I want to drill down as the , 29:11.619 --> 29:14.630 the sort of panel suggests into the 29:14.640 --> 29:16.862 role of the attorney and Karen . I know 29:16.862 --> 29:19.029 that's something that you've thought a 29:19.029 --> 29:21.489 lot about . Um , and I'm interested to 29:21.500 --> 29:23.719 just if you could maybe share some of 29:23.729 --> 29:26.750 your thinking on the role of attorneys 29:26.890 --> 29:28.959 in , in today's environment . Yeah . 29:28.969 --> 29:31.080 Well , I think we've touched on a lot 29:31.080 --> 29:33.959 of it but it , it it's a , there's 29:33.969 --> 29:36.630 going to be a role for domain expertise 29:36.640 --> 29:40.400 and specialization , but there's also 29:40.410 --> 29:42.619 going to be a role for this more kind 29:42.630 --> 29:44.349 of trusted advisor , I think 29:44.359 --> 29:46.790 functionality where we need to be 29:46.800 --> 29:49.079 looking scanning a landscape and not 29:49.089 --> 29:51.200 just issue spotting , but also what I 29:51.200 --> 29:53.469 call resource spotting . That a lot of 29:53.479 --> 29:55.359 the capability in any , in any 29:55.369 --> 29:58.130 organization isn't necessarily where 29:58.140 --> 30:00.689 historically , we've looked to find it . 30:00.699 --> 30:04.239 And so the ability to , and this one 30:04.250 --> 30:06.306 small example , I had one client who 30:06.306 --> 30:08.890 was trying to figure out a complicated , 30:08.900 --> 30:11.969 they were trying to bring a , a tool to 30:11.979 --> 30:14.910 help with some hr functionality and 30:15.800 --> 30:17.930 somebody sort of articulated , they 30:17.939 --> 30:19.995 just didn't have any data scientists 30:19.995 --> 30:22.106 who understood how this stuff works . 30:22.106 --> 30:24.050 And like you have a whole consumer 30:24.050 --> 30:26.161 insights department that's been doing 30:26.161 --> 30:28.383 some version of , you know , predictive 30:28.383 --> 30:30.550 modeling and analytics for decades , 30:30.560 --> 30:33.130 right ? And so we went and we rated the 30:33.250 --> 30:35.417 consumer insights group for people who 30:35.417 --> 30:38.609 had just the capacity to understand 30:38.619 --> 30:40.786 what was happening in relation to this 30:40.786 --> 30:43.008 tool over on the human resources side . 30:43.160 --> 30:45.719 And I think just broadening our view to 30:45.890 --> 30:49.469 move more into kind of a solution , set 30:49.479 --> 30:53.069 mindset , you know , also not to the 30:53.079 --> 30:55.689 exclusion of our traditional role where 30:55.699 --> 30:57.921 I think we are , you know , guard rails 30:57.921 --> 31:00.479 in some ways and need to be and need to 31:00.489 --> 31:02.760 remain and have the kind of authority 31:02.770 --> 31:05.589 to remain guard rails , but to also 31:05.939 --> 31:07.995 understand the new kinds of problems 31:07.995 --> 31:10.180 that are , you know , our clients are 31:10.189 --> 31:12.579 going to have the , the last thing I 31:12.589 --> 31:14.756 would say about that and we could talk 31:14.756 --> 31:16.978 about the future of the practice of law 31:16.978 --> 31:19.200 forever . Um And some people like to do 31:19.200 --> 31:22.229 that . Um But , but I think one 31:22.239 --> 31:24.760 overlooked aspect of how these 31:24.770 --> 31:27.103 technologies is going to change the law , 31:27.103 --> 31:29.048 like it's going to change a lot of 31:29.048 --> 31:31.103 industries is we're going to have to 31:31.103 --> 31:33.214 change how we train our , our , our , 31:33.214 --> 31:35.239 our cohorts coming up because the 31:35.250 --> 31:37.250 traditional ways that we've trained 31:37.250 --> 31:39.939 lawyers , you know , to review lots of 31:39.949 --> 31:42.099 documents or sit in on lots of , you 31:42.109 --> 31:44.276 know , process to sort of get familiar 31:44.276 --> 31:46.331 with how it works and how the issues 31:46.331 --> 31:48.553 really come up . I think a lot of those 31:48.553 --> 31:50.609 moments are going are part of what's 31:50.609 --> 31:52.609 going to be displaced by these more 31:52.609 --> 31:54.790 advanced technologies and we're not 31:54.800 --> 31:57.979 going to have , we're going to have to 31:57.989 --> 32:01.640 insert opportunities to ask the 32:01.650 --> 32:04.410 questions and to develop capability 32:04.430 --> 32:06.541 because the pressure on time is going 32:06.550 --> 32:08.328 to mean that we're not going to 32:08.328 --> 32:10.439 traditionally , we may have taken the 32:10.439 --> 32:13.290 time to do that training . My strong 32:13.300 --> 32:15.439 suspicion is that that's not going to 32:15.449 --> 32:17.616 be a luxury afforded us unless we kind 32:17.616 --> 32:19.939 of engineer it in . So just the thought 32:20.150 --> 32:23.739 that um you know , looking downfield a 32:23.750 --> 32:27.390 bit . Right . No , I 32:27.400 --> 32:30.880 think um I mean , it , it , I think the 32:30.890 --> 32:32.890 trusted advisor piece resonates 32:32.900 --> 32:35.011 significantly for me because I mean , 32:35.011 --> 32:37.178 though my title has always been either 32:37.178 --> 32:40.250 counsel or senior advisor , attorney , 32:40.280 --> 32:44.079 I especially on the hill . And in most 32:44.089 --> 32:46.439 of my experience in at least the 32:46.449 --> 32:48.282 positions that I occupied in the 32:48.282 --> 32:50.338 executive branch . Yes , I was there 32:50.338 --> 32:52.393 because I had AJ D and the , and the 32:52.393 --> 32:54.727 passage of the bar and all those pieces . 32:54.727 --> 32:56.560 But it was not , I was a trusted 32:56.560 --> 32:58.505 advisor . I was , I was looking at 32:58.505 --> 33:00.560 documents , I was reviewing them . I 33:00.560 --> 33:02.727 was issue spotting . I was providing a 33:02.727 --> 33:04.949 value in that there was an element of , 33:04.949 --> 33:07.171 I guess increased confidence associated 33:07.171 --> 33:09.393 with the fact that I could say , oh , I 33:09.393 --> 33:11.560 went to law school , I had the J D and 33:11.560 --> 33:13.782 I had those pieces . Um that , that was 33:13.782 --> 33:15.727 more a comfort associated with the 33:15.727 --> 33:17.727 position that I was occupying . But 33:17.727 --> 33:19.727 also the degree to which you had an 33:19.727 --> 33:21.505 excuse almost to get involved , 33:21.505 --> 33:24.130 particularly on the hill in almost any , 33:24.140 --> 33:26.760 any issue because it was all 33:26.770 --> 33:29.500 essentially based upon law making . But 33:29.510 --> 33:31.729 how much of what Congress does is law 33:31.739 --> 33:34.380 making , right ? These days , it's very 33:34.390 --> 33:37.439 little and one could argue same with 33:37.449 --> 33:39.689 budget , right ? But the , the 33:40.010 --> 33:43.930 nonetheless the degree of discourse and 33:43.939 --> 33:45.760 consistent , you know , putting 33:45.770 --> 33:48.199 together just ideas as it relates to 33:48.209 --> 33:50.420 things either in the press that your 33:50.430 --> 33:53.319 boss is now asking , OK , what could we 33:53.329 --> 33:56.060 do about this and putting forth 33:56.069 --> 33:58.400 something that is essentially outside 33:58.410 --> 34:01.050 of the box with a degree of kind of 34:01.170 --> 34:04.719 coherent and relevant talking points 34:04.729 --> 34:06.959 associated with that to make the case 34:06.969 --> 34:09.080 for that piece knowing full well that 34:09.080 --> 34:11.302 it's not that idea that's going to lead 34:11.302 --> 34:13.247 itself to the president's desk for 34:13.247 --> 34:15.358 signature . It's simply the beginning 34:15.358 --> 34:17.419 of that process that is going that 34:17.429 --> 34:19.596 you're going to have to be comfortable 34:19.596 --> 34:19.510 with and it's going to take a lot of 34:19.520 --> 34:23.199 time and it , it may post date your 34:23.209 --> 34:25.769 tenure on the hill . But ultimately , 34:25.779 --> 34:28.428 that hopefully comes to pass . I mean , 34:28.438 --> 34:30.868 in some ways , I feel like I hate to 34:30.878 --> 34:32.989 keep going back to it , but it's just 34:32.989 --> 34:35.156 so much a part of my life right now is 34:35.156 --> 34:37.322 seven oh two reauthorization . But the 34:37.322 --> 34:39.545 mere fact of , I feel like I'm in Hotel 34:39.545 --> 34:41.711 California because I checked in at NSA 34:41.711 --> 34:43.600 when I started out in the General 34:43.600 --> 34:45.600 Counsel's office and no matter what 34:45.600 --> 34:45.168 position I've been in , I've never been 34:45.178 --> 34:47.178 able to get myself away from this , 34:47.178 --> 34:49.289 even though I've said , ah , six year 34:49.289 --> 34:51.456 reauthorization , I'm good . I can get 34:51.456 --> 34:53.511 my next position and I won't have to 34:53.511 --> 34:53.319 deal with this again . And here I am . 34:53.709 --> 34:56.020 Um , and it's , it's critical , it's 34:56.030 --> 34:59.330 not a bad thing . It's just , um , the , 34:59.340 --> 35:01.250 it actually , in a way from an 35:01.260 --> 35:03.909 innovation standpoint is actually one 35:03.919 --> 35:06.790 of the few pieces as this has evolved 35:06.800 --> 35:08.522 from a counterterrorism tool , 35:08.522 --> 35:11.280 specifically , it has gone beyond that . 35:11.290 --> 35:13.012 And I would say that it wasn't 35:13.012 --> 35:15.290 anticipated as such when Congress put 35:15.300 --> 35:17.356 it across . But it actually has been 35:17.356 --> 35:19.669 utilized by the executive branch in 35:19.679 --> 35:21.735 ways that it wasn't foreseen when it 35:21.735 --> 35:23.957 first came to pass . And I think that's 35:23.957 --> 35:26.068 a very significant benefit and a part 35:26.068 --> 35:28.068 of the discourse that we need to be 35:28.068 --> 35:30.068 open and honest and transparent and 35:30.068 --> 35:32.235 showcase the degree of value that that 35:32.235 --> 35:33.901 has for purposes of hopefully 35:33.901 --> 35:35.846 reauthorization regardless of what 35:35.846 --> 35:37.901 modifications are being discussed on 35:37.901 --> 35:40.800 the hill . Thank you . Um That's 35:40.810 --> 35:43.399 wonderful insights . And as we uh we 35:43.409 --> 35:45.760 get ready to start questions here , if 35:45.770 --> 35:47.881 you could just please raise your hand 35:47.881 --> 35:50.159 and use the microphone in front of you . 35:50.159 --> 35:52.840 Yes , sir . Hi uh Bill Whitman from Dia 35:53.010 --> 35:55.570 at my prior agency was research and 35:55.580 --> 35:57.691 development . And one of the projects 35:57.691 --> 35:59.580 they were working on was applying 35:59.580 --> 36:01.691 artificial intelligence algorithms to 36:01.691 --> 36:03.802 legal reasoning and decision making . 36:03.802 --> 36:07.620 Um So as that innovation uh analyzes 36:07.629 --> 36:09.629 the law . Uh where do you think the 36:09.639 --> 36:13.080 role of lawyers will go if that becomes 36:13.090 --> 36:16.570 a more mainstream capability to do your 36:16.580 --> 36:19.139 research for you and do a , a more 36:19.149 --> 36:22.580 accurate predictive uh decision and 36:22.590 --> 36:26.110 risk analysis , Karen . I 36:26.979 --> 36:30.850 Yeah . So um and there's a lot of 36:30.860 --> 36:33.979 energy out in the field 36:33.989 --> 36:36.479 around some of these solutions , right ? 36:36.489 --> 36:40.139 You know , and I think the role of 36:40.149 --> 36:43.320 lawyers and this is going to afflict 36:43.330 --> 36:45.409 all professions but lawyers in 36:45.419 --> 36:49.189 particular , but the ability to , as I 36:49.199 --> 36:51.209 always say , ask good questions and 36:51.219 --> 36:54.250 question good answers . Um Those are 36:54.260 --> 36:56.316 the two things we need to get really 36:56.316 --> 36:58.204 good at and the critical thinking 36:58.204 --> 37:00.316 around that and these tools are going 37:00.316 --> 37:02.427 to be really good at generating first 37:02.427 --> 37:04.600 drafts um helping us . Well , they're 37:04.610 --> 37:06.888 good , they're good at a lot of things , 37:06.888 --> 37:08.832 but really what they're good at is 37:08.832 --> 37:10.999 automating repetitive process where we 37:10.999 --> 37:13.166 have very established clearly where we 37:13.166 --> 37:15.332 can validate and verify outcomes based 37:15.332 --> 37:17.959 on sort of well established rules and 37:17.969 --> 37:20.780 standards for performance . So like R P 37:20.790 --> 37:24.239 A robotics , certain 37:24.479 --> 37:27.290 certain of the chat bots , but where , 37:27.300 --> 37:29.189 where we're automating repetitive 37:29.189 --> 37:31.229 process , very good . And some law 37:31.239 --> 37:34.550 falls into that category 100% . It's 37:34.560 --> 37:37.219 also really good at generating brand 37:37.229 --> 37:39.396 new insights and helping us brainstorm 37:39.396 --> 37:41.939 and problem solve in new ways , utterly 37:41.949 --> 37:45.060 new ways when we're using it for that , 37:45.310 --> 37:47.540 I think it calls for a different kind 37:47.550 --> 37:49.606 of governance and different sorts of 37:49.606 --> 37:51.883 controls . And so the role of a lawyer , 37:51.883 --> 37:54.419 if it's involving a question of law 37:55.070 --> 37:57.560 needs to be really critical because I 37:57.570 --> 37:59.737 think the tendency of these tools even 37:59.737 --> 38:01.848 as they get better and better . And I 38:01.848 --> 38:04.070 like to think about what are the issues 38:04.070 --> 38:06.237 going to be when it's GPT 12 , right ? 38:06.237 --> 38:08.348 You know , the technology is fine and 38:08.348 --> 38:10.570 there's a whole bunch of questions that 38:10.570 --> 38:12.737 get harder , the better the technology 38:12.737 --> 38:14.848 gets , right ? And one of them is how 38:14.848 --> 38:14.750 do we tell the difference between a 38:14.760 --> 38:17.060 solid answer and a not solid answer ? 38:17.320 --> 38:20.560 How do we , how do we tell when we , 38:20.570 --> 38:22.626 when the answer we've been served is 38:22.626 --> 38:25.030 overly , is basically over fitted , 38:25.580 --> 38:27.636 right ? I mean to use an algorithmic 38:27.636 --> 38:30.010 concept , but I think the tendency of 38:30.020 --> 38:32.760 these tools is to over fit . And so as 38:32.770 --> 38:36.639 lawyers , we , we run the risk of , 38:36.649 --> 38:39.300 of operating with blinders if we're not 38:39.310 --> 38:41.366 sort of always forcing that aperture 38:41.366 --> 38:43.689 open a little bit to consider other 38:43.699 --> 38:46.739 possibilities and other um other 38:46.750 --> 38:49.760 solution sets with that answer the 38:49.810 --> 38:52.780 question , I would defer , I do think 38:52.790 --> 38:54.901 that answers the question I would say 38:54.901 --> 38:57.199 too . I think , I think we've talked 38:57.209 --> 38:59.376 about this , but there's been a couple 38:59.376 --> 39:01.350 of judicial opinions in different 39:01.360 --> 39:03.389 jurisdictions that have at least 39:03.399 --> 39:06.919 originated with a large language 39:06.929 --> 39:09.830 model . And as that begins to happen , 39:09.840 --> 39:12.350 it's going to be very interesting the 39:12.360 --> 39:14.629 relationship between the technology , 39:14.639 --> 39:18.429 the clerks and the courts and just 39:19.929 --> 39:21.899 quick , just point of caution for 39:21.909 --> 39:24.530 anybody who's using it now is it's the 39:24.540 --> 39:26.596 better perspective on this . Is that 39:26.596 --> 39:28.429 anything you put up there is not 39:28.429 --> 39:30.651 privileged . So if it's confidential or 39:30.651 --> 39:32.818 if it's attorney client privilege , it 39:32.818 --> 39:34.873 should not go into any of these chat 39:34.873 --> 39:37.096 tools that are the generic chat tools . 39:37.096 --> 39:36.689 I'm sure you have your own chat tools . 39:36.699 --> 39:38.921 But , but , but , but , but , and , and 39:38.921 --> 39:41.143 this is something that , that companies 39:41.143 --> 39:43.199 are dealing with , you know , up and 39:43.199 --> 39:45.143 down with lots of cautionary tales 39:45.143 --> 39:48.989 about that . Any , any 39:49.000 --> 39:51.250 other questions , sir ? 39:53.229 --> 39:55.285 I think this is probably for Brett , 39:55.285 --> 39:57.396 but just as , as you walk through the 39:57.396 --> 39:59.673 acronym soup of your career . And , uh , 39:59.673 --> 40:02.479 setting aside seven oh two , I , if you 40:02.489 --> 40:06.310 could just wave your magic wand and 40:06.320 --> 40:09.469 say there are one or two pieces of 40:09.479 --> 40:12.270 critical legislation , critical laws 40:12.280 --> 40:14.336 that could be passed that would help 40:14.336 --> 40:16.580 protect the national security of the 40:16.590 --> 40:19.570 United States in the cyber domain . And 40:19.580 --> 40:21.802 you could actually make it happen , cut 40:21.802 --> 40:23.969 through the partisanship . What , what 40:23.969 --> 40:26.136 would those things be that you would , 40:26.136 --> 40:28.302 that you would think would really help 40:28.302 --> 40:30.524 us that could pass as a matter of law . 40:30.524 --> 40:33.580 That's a tough one . I think um one and 40:33.590 --> 40:35.760 I I know tangentially it becomes more 40:35.770 --> 40:38.449 of a , it's not directly related 40:38.459 --> 40:40.570 necessarily , but I think it provides 40:40.570 --> 40:42.626 predictability as a national privacy 40:42.626 --> 40:44.737 law . I think that that one is just a 40:44.737 --> 40:46.792 very significant , very tough nut to 40:46.792 --> 40:49.060 crack and you might get to 50 different 40:49.070 --> 40:51.348 models of that before Congress is like , 40:51.348 --> 40:53.570 oh , now we got to the business case is 40:53.570 --> 40:55.403 going to be , we can't operate , 40:55.403 --> 40:57.292 especially when the international 40:57.292 --> 40:59.459 context even becomes more fragmented . 40:59.729 --> 41:01.229 So that's one piece from a 41:01.229 --> 41:03.780 predictability standpoint . And I think 41:04.939 --> 41:06.995 I'm not holding out hope that that's 41:06.995 --> 41:09.106 going to happen . But I do think that 41:09.106 --> 41:11.217 that's a significant issue that needs 41:11.217 --> 41:14.530 to be dealt with the other , I think is 41:14.540 --> 41:16.596 it relates to the cyber strategy . I 41:16.596 --> 41:18.879 think putting responsibilities upon the 41:18.889 --> 41:20.778 businesses themselves in terms of 41:20.899 --> 41:24.330 baking in and not adding on as it 41:24.340 --> 41:26.118 relates to bolting on , right , 41:26.118 --> 41:28.750 security , but having security be baked 41:28.760 --> 41:31.870 in and yes , in the end , that likely 41:31.879 --> 41:35.560 will force say the cost model like 41:35.570 --> 41:38.590 increase to some extent . But I think 41:38.600 --> 41:41.330 that unfortunately , I think , I think 41:41.340 --> 41:43.562 that there needs to be a consensus upon 41:43.562 --> 41:46.590 that . And I think if you will and this 41:46.600 --> 41:49.449 isn't a legislative fix , but the , the , 41:49.459 --> 41:52.590 the more the , the real crux of this 41:53.610 --> 41:55.332 honestly is the jurisdictional 41:55.332 --> 41:58.129 component within the hill , everybody 41:58.139 --> 42:01.169 has a piece of cyber . So if you , 42:01.179 --> 42:03.235 unless you solve that , by virtue of 42:03.235 --> 42:05.457 saying there is a select cyber security 42:05.457 --> 42:07.123 committee or something , some 42:07.123 --> 42:09.346 instantiation of that , which naturally 42:09.346 --> 42:11.568 leads people to abdicate authority that 42:11.568 --> 42:13.568 their committee has and put it into 42:13.568 --> 42:15.790 this body that they might not be a part 42:15.790 --> 42:19.489 of so politically . It's a mine , I 42:19.500 --> 42:21.719 don't know whether or not you're the 42:21.729 --> 42:24.030 difficulty of getting to a consensus on 42:24.040 --> 42:26.889 any matter is significant . But I think 42:26.899 --> 42:28.843 the privacy piece and I also think 42:28.909 --> 42:32.310 baking in security from a coding 42:32.320 --> 42:35.409 perspective , especially from the I O T 42:35.419 --> 42:37.969 piece is just , I think it's going to 42:37.979 --> 42:40.035 be driven by cases where somebody is 42:40.035 --> 42:42.189 going to realize , oh my God , my so 42:42.199 --> 42:44.310 and so device that talks to my garage 42:44.310 --> 42:46.199 door and my refrigerator all of a 42:46.199 --> 42:48.459 sudden is going haywire or being used 42:48.469 --> 42:50.889 in some nefarious way . And that then 42:50.899 --> 42:52.899 leads to a public outcry which then 42:52.899 --> 42:55.066 they say , well , why didn't this have 42:55.066 --> 42:57.232 it in the first place ? But I think we 42:57.232 --> 42:56.909 should be proactive because we 42:56.919 --> 42:58.808 understand that that in fact is a 42:58.808 --> 43:01.030 significant vulnerability . That's what 43:01.030 --> 43:04.760 I could , I just add to that hugely 43:04.770 --> 43:07.580 important to get all that , right . The 43:07.590 --> 43:09.534 people part of this is also really 43:09.534 --> 43:11.810 important and there's , there's , I 43:11.820 --> 43:13.876 mean , obviously in security , we've 43:13.876 --> 43:16.098 known that for a long time , that's the 43:16.098 --> 43:18.264 weakest link . Also true in A I policy 43:18.264 --> 43:20.431 also true in data protection , right ? 43:20.431 --> 43:23.719 And so not , not neglecting to , I 43:23.729 --> 43:25.729 don't know if it's regulation , but 43:25.729 --> 43:27.785 we're incentivizing people to really 43:27.785 --> 43:31.689 invest in the training , the controls , 43:31.699 --> 43:34.350 the support , the kind of work flows 43:34.360 --> 43:36.340 that are required to support a 43:36.419 --> 43:39.280 workforce and a customer base in a 43:39.290 --> 43:41.012 world that is going to be that 43:41.012 --> 43:42.689 connected and that exposed 43:45.530 --> 43:48.239 Corey Karen Brett . Thank you . What a 43:48.250 --> 43:50.361 wonderful conversation on the role of 43:50.361 --> 43:52.709 lawyers . I know we certainly enjoyed 43:52.719 --> 43:54.775 that on behalf of Colonel Hayden and 43:54.775 --> 43:57.052 the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate . 44:02.560 --> 44:03.070 I know 44:07.310 --> 44:10.159 we are on break until 14 30 . 44:14.610 --> 44:17.330 Yeah , I would like to introduce you to 44:17.340 --> 44:19.459 the newest Sub Unified Command in the 44:19.469 --> 44:22.320 Department of Defense on December 19 44:22.330 --> 44:25.600 2022 General Nakai presided over a 44:25.610 --> 44:27.689 ceremony formally establishing the 44:27.699 --> 44:29.810 Cyber National Mission Force as a sub 44:29.810 --> 44:32.330 Unified command under the United States . 44:32.340 --> 44:34.330 Cyber Command following Secretary 44:34.340 --> 44:36.810 Austin's direction . Earlier that year , 44:37.590 --> 44:40.199 the Cyber National Mission Force or CNF 44:40.250 --> 44:42.250 is a joint command available to the 44:42.250 --> 44:44.083 United States . Cyber Command to 44:44.083 --> 44:46.830 respond to its toughest challenges us . 44:46.840 --> 44:50.120 Cyber com established CNF in 2014 . 44:50.209 --> 44:52.239 Recognizing the need for an agile 44:52.250 --> 44:54.629 enough force to respond to any crisis 44:54.639 --> 44:57.000 at any time , composed of highly 44:57.010 --> 44:59.280 trained and qualified cyber operators 44:59.290 --> 45:02.610 drawn from across the services . Today , 45:02.709 --> 45:04.709 the Cyber National Mission Force is 45:04.709 --> 45:07.110 composed of 39 joint cyber teams 45:07.120 --> 45:09.560 organized across six task forces 45:09.590 --> 45:11.899 consisting of soldiers , sailors , 45:11.909 --> 45:14.110 airmen , marines , coast guard men , 45:14.120 --> 45:17.370 guardians and Air force . NSA and dia 45:17.379 --> 45:20.770 civilians . CMFS . Mission is to plan 45:20.780 --> 45:23.399 direct and synchronize full spectrum 45:23.409 --> 45:26.429 cyberspace operations to deter disrupt 45:26.439 --> 45:29.260 and if necessary defeat adversary Cyber 45:29.270 --> 45:31.979 and Malign influence actors . The Cyber 45:31.989 --> 45:34.045 National Mission force conducts full 45:34.045 --> 45:36.610 spectrum operations including offensive , 45:36.620 --> 45:39.070 defensive and information operations . 45:39.280 --> 45:41.739 CNF supports us . Cyber command and 45:41.750 --> 45:44.250 national priorities such as election 45:44.260 --> 45:46.870 defense , counter ransomware , global 45:46.879 --> 45:49.360 cyber security threat , hunt operations 45:49.540 --> 45:51.439 and other operations of national 45:51.449 --> 45:54.629 importance . CNF works closely with 45:54.639 --> 45:56.639 other partners in the United States 45:56.639 --> 45:58.861 government . The Cyber National Mission 45:58.861 --> 46:02.149 Force works routinely with the FBI DHS 46:02.159 --> 46:04.270 NSA and others to defend the nation . 46:04.429 --> 46:06.649 These partnerships are vital to defend 46:06.659 --> 46:08.949 the nation . Each agency possesses 46:08.959 --> 46:11.237 differing authorities and capabilities , 46:11.290 --> 46:12.939 the ability to quickly share 46:12.949 --> 46:15.171 information to leverage the appropriate 46:15.171 --> 46:17.330 authorities secures the nation and 46:17.340 --> 46:19.310 keeps our adversaries off guard , 46:19.320 --> 46:21.098 engaging them as far forward in 46:21.098 --> 46:23.659 cyberspace as possible . The Cyber 46:23.669 --> 46:25.502 National Mission Force is on the 46:25.502 --> 46:27.725 cutting edge of legal operations in the 46:27.725 --> 46:30.320 Cyber Domain since its inception , CNF 46:30.330 --> 46:32.330 continues to drive the evolution of 46:32.330 --> 46:34.590 cyber operations . There has never been 46:34.600 --> 46:36.600 a better time to join the CNF legal 46:36.600 --> 46:39.020 team . The elevation of the Cyber 46:39.030 --> 46:41.252 National Mission Force to a sub unified 46:41.252 --> 46:43.586 command represents a unique opportunity . 46:43.586 --> 46:45.808 With the elevation of the command , the 46:45.808 --> 46:47.919 command judge advocate became a staff 46:47.919 --> 46:50.086 judge advocate . Currently , the staff 46:50.086 --> 46:52.252 judge advocate conducts the full range 46:52.252 --> 46:54.363 of legal operations primarily focused 46:54.363 --> 46:57.030 on operational law in the future . The 46:57.040 --> 46:59.096 office will assume much of the other 46:59.096 --> 47:01.318 legal support currently provided by the 47:01.318 --> 47:03.373 US Cyber Command office of the Staff 47:03.373 --> 47:05.510 Judge Advocate . As a plank holder in 47:05.520 --> 47:08.750 the CNJ , you will have an opportunity 47:08.760 --> 47:11.169 to advise on unique and novel issues 47:11.179 --> 47:13.290 that have a direct impact on national 47:13.290 --> 47:15.239 events . There are a few other 47:15.250 --> 47:17.361 organizations in the government where 47:17.361 --> 47:19.361 you will be exposed to the types of 47:19.361 --> 47:21.472 issues that we see on a daily basis . 47:21.780 --> 47:23.558 Although we primarily advise on 47:23.558 --> 47:25.669 operational issues . An attorney with 47:25.679 --> 47:27.989 CNF needs to have a broad understanding 47:28.000 --> 47:30.729 across the legal spectrum operations do 47:30.739 --> 47:33.429 not take place in isolation , fiscal 47:33.439 --> 47:35.159 contract , administrative and 47:35.169 --> 47:37.409 international law affect military 47:37.419 --> 47:40.320 operations . The CNF needs attorneys 47:40.330 --> 47:42.386 that are creative enough to link the 47:42.386 --> 47:44.219 various authorities together and 47:44.219 --> 47:46.108 present creative solutions to our 47:46.108 --> 47:47.941 clients . If you are a motivated 47:47.941 --> 47:49.997 attorney that can work independently 47:49.997 --> 47:52.052 with little guidance , we would love 47:52.052 --> 47:54.219 for you to apply to become a member of 47:54.219 --> 47:55.469 the Cyber National Mission Force .