WEBVTT

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Hello . I'm Dr Brendan Mulvaney , the

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director of the china Aerospace Studies

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Institute . Welcome back to our video

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series on the competition with china .

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In some of our other videos we've

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discussed in detail the various parts

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of the People's Liberation Army , their

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mission organization equipment as well

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as other detailed topics . Today we're

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gonna be taking a much broader overview

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and a historical perspective of chinese

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military strategy . Dr Joel . What now

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is the senior research fellow at the

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Center for Study of Chinese Military

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Affairs at National Defense University ?

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Doctor What now is gonna walk us

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through the evolution of the PRC's

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military strategy and talk about how

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it's evolved and where it stands today .

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China is preparing for a future

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conflict of that . There is no doubt

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china's Communist Party has a formal

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military strategy that answers some

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pretty fundamental questions about the

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use of military power who where and

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over what should the People's

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Liberation Army be prepared to fight

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and what kind of operations does it

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need to be able to conduct in this

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lecture ? I'll offer a historical

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perspective on how chinese military

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strategy has evolved over time and

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focus on what their strategy looks like

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today . The takeaway is that the P . L .

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A . Is mostly focused on high intensity

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combat operations within Asia focusing

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on Taiwan though a key task is keeping

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the US out of the fight . They are also

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giving a lot of thought to what the

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character of war might look like in the

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future and are already shifting some

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key resources in new directions . The

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historical context can extend all the

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way back to ancient china . There was a

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strong real politique tradition

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emphasizing the utility of military

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power all the way back to the 5th

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century BC . This strain of thought

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held that violent conflict is

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unavoidable . Offensive strategies are

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favorable and flexibility should be

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used in unfavorable circumstances .

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Senza , the ancient chinese general who

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is credited with writing the famous art

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of war , provided his thoughts on how

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weaker forces can defeat the strong

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through deception and cunning and how

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the strong can win without fighting by

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amassing and displaying far superior

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forces . His maxims , written

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2500 years ago became one of the seven

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military classics of ancient china and

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survived into the modern day Malta

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Dong , who led a conventionally weaker

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army through much of the 1930s and 40s

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quoted sons and developed his own

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military philosophy based on the actual

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conditions he was facing , Mao proposed

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a strategy of luring the enemy deep

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into territory controlled by his red

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army and weakening them through

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unconventional strikes and raids .

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Meanwhile , mobilizing the population

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and slowly building conventional night .

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These principles allowed him to defeat

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both the Japanese invasion of china and

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the kmt in the chinese civil war .

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Mao wrote favorably about what he

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called an active defense at the

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strategic level . He thought that wars

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should be defensive Protecting 1's own

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territory and key interests rather than

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offensive for the purpose of seizing

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foreign territory or colonizing foreign

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populations . But he also opposed what

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he called a passive defense . In other

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words , a World War One style strategy

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of digging into trenches and waiting

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passively for the enemy to strike first .

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He said , a strategic defense should be

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combined with a strong offense at the

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tactical and campaign levels ,

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harassing striking and attacking the

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enemy to weaken his resolve and deplete

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his resources . After the People's

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Republic of China was established in

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1949 , active defense became the core

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principle of china's military strategy .

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Mao was not at all hesitant to use

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force under his watch , China

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intervened against the United States in

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the korean war supported the North

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Vietnamese and various insurgencies in

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southeast Asia struck deep into Indian

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territory during a border conflict in

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1962 And skirmished with Soviet troops

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along the contested border in 1969 .

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Yet , all of these actions , even those

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that involved striking across borders

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were framed politically as defensive ,

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punishing adversaries that had dared to

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cross china's red lines . The

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1979 border conflict with Vietnam

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fought under Mao's successor , Deng

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Xiaoping was also framed as a

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strategically defensive campaign

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designed to teach a Vietnam a lesson

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after they had attacked the china

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backed Khmer Rouge in cambodia . China

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has not fought a war since 1979 . But

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chinese military theorists continue to

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update the theory of active defense in

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a hypothetical future conflict Chinese

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writers suggest that the P . L . A .

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Could throw the first punch to knock

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out an enemy such as Taiwan . Modern

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warfare benefits from speed and

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surprise which give the first mover and

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advantage even if the moved first .

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However , such operations would still

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be framed as defensive needed to

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respond to the threats created by

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others against china's interests in

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this case responding to the activities

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and perceived provocations of the

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Taiwan independence movement don't . In

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other words expect the P . L . A . Not

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to strike first simply because they use

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the language of defense . So if

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active defense is the principle of

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chinese military strategy , what is its

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actual contents ? Formally

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speaking China's Central Military

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Commission which is the highest

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decision making body for the Pla

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periodically updates an assessment

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called the military strategic

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guidelines . This is roughly analogous

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to the U . S . National Military

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Strategy or defense planning guidance .

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The guidelines take into account two

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major considerations . First are

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threats in china's security environment

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that require the P . O . A . To prepare

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for specific contingencies . Second ,

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our changes in the character of war

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based on chinese perceptions of foreign

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technological advances and operations .

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So if the guidelines blend what we

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would call contingency based planning

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with capabilities based planning .

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The guidelines contain answers to those

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key strategic questions who where and

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over what should the P . L . A . Be

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prepared to fight and what kinds of

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operations does it need to be able to

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conduct these judgments . In turn

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influence key decisions including

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operational doctrine , acquisition ,

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force posture , training and budgeting

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Since 1949 . The guidelines have been

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updated 10 times during the Cold War .

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China's strategy was focused heavily on

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threats posed by the United States and

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the soviet Union . Mao anticipated a

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possible US invasion after the korean

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war . Though , the us threat diminished

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after China and the us moved towards

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more normal political relations . In

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the early 1970s , the soviet threat

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grew gradually after the rupture of the

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Sino soviet alliance in 1960 P . L . A .

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Planning focused on a possible soviet

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invasion along China's northern

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frontier in the 19 seventies and 19

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eighties . During the height of the

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Brezhnev build up during these years ,

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China's military strategy focused on

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Mao's principle of warfare , lure the

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enemy in deep and then fight campaigns

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based on mobility and unconventional

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operations . The threat of a superpower

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war also led Mao to focus heavily on

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developing a credible nuclear deterrent

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which kicked off with China's first

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nuclear test . In 1964

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Things began to change in the late

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1980s , China by this time had already

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established diplomatic relations with

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the United States and had moved towards

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a rapprochement with the soviet Union

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under Gorbachev . Deng Xiaoping

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instructed the P . L . A . To focus

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less on superpower conflict , which he

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saw as unlikely and more on what he

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called local wars . Small scale

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conventional conflicts involving

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china's neighbors . The border conflict

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with Vietnam was an example of a local

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war . The real pivot in China's

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military strategy however , came in

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1993 that year , the Central Military

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Commission under Deng's successor ,

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Jiang Zemin adopted a fundamentally

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different strategy . Both the

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geographic focus of operations and the

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nature of the operations that would

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need to be able to conduct shifted .

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The 1993 strategy clearly identified

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Taiwan as the Pla's major opponent and

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focused developments and operations

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along the southeast coast . The reason

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was the Chinese leaders were

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increasingly concerned about political

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trends on Taiwan , including the rise

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of a new generation of leaders who were

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born in Taiwan and saw no future with

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the mainland and the loosening of

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political restrictions that allowed the

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Taiwan independence movement to

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flourish . They were also concerned

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about an uptick in US arms sales to

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Taiwan that followed us sanctions on

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China after the 1989 Tiananmen

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crackdown . So the P . L . A . Needed

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to be able to first and foremost deter

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Taiwan independence . This meant a

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large increase in China's short range

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ballistic missile arsenal based close

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to the Taiwan strait as well as more

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attention to amphibious training . This

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judgment was confirmed by the 1995 to

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1996 Taiwan Strait crisis . During that

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episode , Taiwan's president made a

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provocative visit to the United States

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and following missile tests near Taiwan ,

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The US sailed two carrier battle groups

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into the region . This prompted the to

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put more attention on how they could

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deter US intervention in a future

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Taiwan street conflict . We saw after

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this incident . Much larger budgets

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that went among other things into the

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development of long range conventional

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missile forces . Counter intervention

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or what we would call a two a . d .

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challenges in the Pacific increased

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greatly in the following years . 1993

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also saw a major change in the type of

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operations the P . L . A . would need

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to conduct during the Cold War . The

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prepared mainly for land operations .

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The ground forces were historically the

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largest and most important of the

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services and were critical to the kinds

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of mobile and guerilla operations that

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would need to conduct to counter an

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invasion by one of the superpowers By

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the early 1990s . However , leaders

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understood that future battlefield

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success would require joint operations .

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This was essential to modern campaigns

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that they had witnessed , including the

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British success in the 1982 . Falkland

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Island Wars and the us success in the

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Gulf War . Joint operations would be

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especially important in a Taiwan

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conflict . Island landings are of

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course inherently joint . The

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implications of this were greater

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attention to joint doctrine and

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training as well as a series of force

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reductions that reduced the army and

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increase the size and influence of the

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other services . 1993 set the

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fundamental direction for the P . L . A .

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A path they continued on for the next

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30 years . Later changes to the

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military strategic guidelines sought to

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deepen and improve the strategy . An

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update in 2000 and four made under Hu

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Jintao focused the P . L . A . On what

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he called local wars under conditions

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of information Ization . The heavy

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emphasis on the information domain

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during these years followed the

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observation of the us leveraging its

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superiority in intelligence ,

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surveillance and reconnaissance in the

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Gulf War and in later operations in the

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Balkans . And the early days of the

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post-9-11 conflicts , Chinese theorists

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paid special attention to us debates

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about net centric warfare in the 1990s

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that sought to apply advances in

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information technology into military

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operations and doctrine , Chinese

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leaders saw information technology as a

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comparative weakness for the P . L . A .

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And decided that the next stage of

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modernization needed to concentrate on

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what they called information Ization .

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This saw an emphasis on information

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centric domains such as space , cyber

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and the electro magnetic spectrum . It

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also saw them improving command control

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and communication systems . This also

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had implications for P . L . A .

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Personnel increasingly in demand were

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computer literate and college educated

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officers and Ncos . Along with this

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attention to I . T . Improvements was

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new . Thinking about joint operations .

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In the 1990s , the focus on what they

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called coordinated joint operations .

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This referred to a very superficial

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cooperation . Hu Jintao talked more

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about integrated joint operations .

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This required much more in depth

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cooperation between the services and

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branches of the sort that would be

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needed if the were ever to conduct an

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island landing against Taiwan , Hu

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Jintao's focus was not only on cross

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strait operations . However , he also

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stressed the importance of the maritime

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domain in general , China was

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increasingly reliant on the sea in

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terms of trade and access to raw

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materials and it had unresolved

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territorial disputes in the south and

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east china sea . What this meant in

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practice was the expansion of a blue

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water navy including new destroyers and

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the beginnings of a fleet of aircraft

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carriers , as well as the rapid growth

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of the other maritime services ,

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especially the Coast Guard and the

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Maritime Militia . Late in the who era

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china became much more assertive in

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dealing with maritime disputes using

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these maritime capabilities to

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intimidate opponents Beginning in 2008

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also sent its Navy more regularly

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overseas in the context of anti piracy

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operations . In the Gulf of Aden ,

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which offered experiencing experience

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managing a far sees Navy . This

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experience would be vital in laying the

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groundwork for protecting sea lanes and

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resolving what who referred to as the

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malacca dilemma . Referring to

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overreliance on energy shipments

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through the strait of Malacca and other

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vulnerable maritime chokepoints .

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She Jinping came to the scene in

15:33.673 --> 15:35.860
November 2012 as the new chairman of

15:35.860 --> 15:39.610
the Central Military Commission In 2014 ,

15:39.620 --> 15:41.710
the CMC approved a new update to the

15:41.710 --> 15:44.290
military strategic guidelines . These

15:44.290 --> 15:46.950
kept the focus on Taiwan integrated

15:46.950 --> 15:48.990
joint operations and maritime

15:48.990 --> 15:51.190
operations But also kicked off an

15:51.190 --> 15:53.357
important structural reform to the P .

15:53.357 --> 15:55.412
L . A . That began in earnest at the

15:55.412 --> 15:59.130
end of 2015 . She's reforms were about

15:59.130 --> 16:01.019
posturing the P . L . A . To more

16:01.019 --> 16:03.186
effectively conduct joint operations .

16:03.940 --> 16:06.218
The focus was on the command structure .

16:06.940 --> 16:09.300
Despite the downsizing of the 1990s and

16:09.310 --> 16:11.420
2000s , the P . L . A . command

16:11.420 --> 16:13.420
structure was still heavily service

16:13.420 --> 16:15.587
centric and weighted toward the ground

16:15.587 --> 16:17.940
forces . The army held almost all

16:17.940 --> 16:20.051
positions of authority in the L . A .

16:20.840 --> 16:23.010
The reforms created full fledged joint

16:23.010 --> 16:25.490
commands at the national level through

16:25.490 --> 16:28.010
the Joint Staff Department And also at

16:28.010 --> 16:30.232
the regional level through five theatre

16:30.232 --> 16:32.810
commands , the theater commanders would

16:32.810 --> 16:34.866
have at their disposal Air and naval

16:34.866 --> 16:37.550
forces . This would facilitate joint

16:37.550 --> 16:39.780
training in peacetime and a more rapid

16:39.780 --> 16:43.200
transition to wartime operations . She

16:43.200 --> 16:45.610
also oversaw another reduction in force

16:45.960 --> 16:48.127
bringing the size of the ground forces

16:48.127 --> 16:50.500
down by 300,000 personnel while

16:50.500 --> 16:53.980
expanding the Navy and Air Force . What

16:53.980 --> 16:56.070
she was trying to do then was not so

16:56.070 --> 16:58.126
much about changing the direction of

16:58.126 --> 17:00.126
China's military strategy as it was

17:00.126 --> 17:02.237
about more effectively fulfilling the

17:02.237 --> 17:04.126
vision that was outlined 20 years

17:04.126 --> 17:05.670
earlier in 1993 .

17:07.810 --> 17:10.180
This brings us up to the present . But

17:10.180 --> 17:13.290
what can we say about the future for

17:13.290 --> 17:15.401
the time being , The P . L . A . Will

17:15.401 --> 17:17.179
continue to focus on Taiwan and

17:17.179 --> 17:19.401
deterring us intervention in the Taiwan

17:19.401 --> 17:21.880
strait conflict . Xi Jinping has also

17:21.880 --> 17:23.936
been very clear that the P . L . A .

17:23.936 --> 17:25.824
Needs to be prepared for conflict

17:25.824 --> 17:27.713
elsewhere along china's extensive

17:27.713 --> 17:30.570
periphery . Taiwan may be what the P .

17:30.570 --> 17:32.600
L . A . Calls the main strategic

17:32.600 --> 17:35.300
direction or primary theater . But

17:35.300 --> 17:37.133
there is also the possibility of

17:37.133 --> 17:39.244
conflict elsewhere such as the korean

17:39.244 --> 17:41.780
peninsula , the Sino indian border or

17:41.780 --> 17:44.250
the south China sea . And so the P . L .

17:44.250 --> 17:46.250
A . Needs to maintain readiness all

17:46.250 --> 17:49.710
around . She has also been more willing

17:49.710 --> 17:51.988
to escalate other territorial disputes .

17:52.840 --> 17:54.618
It was under his leadership for

17:54.618 --> 17:56.729
instance , that china militarized the

17:56.729 --> 17:58.340
south china sea through land

17:58.340 --> 18:00.118
reclamation in the Spratlys and

18:00.118 --> 18:03.610
military outposts in that region . So

18:03.620 --> 18:05.953
we should anticipate that the P . L . A .

18:05.953 --> 18:08.009
Will try to balance its preparations

18:08.009 --> 18:10.009
for a major war with Taiwan against

18:10.009 --> 18:12.064
other requirements in other theaters

18:12.064 --> 18:14.410
and globally . The real innovations

18:14.410 --> 18:16.577
were likely to see in china's military

18:16.577 --> 18:18.688
strategy however , is likely to be in

18:18.688 --> 18:21.430
the realm of technology . The military

18:21.430 --> 18:23.486
strategic guidelines have focused up

18:23.486 --> 18:25.670
until now on the information domain ,

18:26.140 --> 18:27.918
but chinese doctrine is already

18:27.918 --> 18:30.070
anticipating a shift towards the next

18:30.070 --> 18:32.570
stage of modernization . What they call

18:32.580 --> 18:35.550
intelligent ization . This concept

18:35.550 --> 18:37.920
refers to the rise of technologies in

18:37.920 --> 18:40.198
fields such as artificial intelligence ,

18:40.198 --> 18:42.910
hypersonic quantum technology ,

18:43.010 --> 18:45.770
nanotechnology , advanced materials and

18:45.780 --> 18:48.450
unmanned systems . Some of these are

18:48.450 --> 18:50.228
already being incorporated into

18:50.228 --> 18:52.470
militaries worldwide and china itself

18:52.470 --> 18:56.460
has made some advances . The DF- 17

18:56.470 --> 18:58.637
hypersonic fitted long range ballistic

18:58.637 --> 19:01.920
missile is just one example . The task

19:01.920 --> 19:04.350
for chinese military strategists now is

19:04.350 --> 19:06.680
determining how new technology can be

19:06.680 --> 19:08.402
blended into the current force

19:08.402 --> 19:10.347
structure and doctrine . How would

19:10.347 --> 19:12.291
these systems be used in campaigns

19:12.291 --> 19:14.250
against Taiwan . Another regional

19:14.250 --> 19:16.610
antagonists such as Japan or the United

19:16.610 --> 19:19.200
States ? How will they balance near

19:19.200 --> 19:20.990
term readiness with long term

19:20.990 --> 19:23.570
investments in new technology and what

19:23.570 --> 19:25.626
kinds of relationships will appeal a

19:25.626 --> 19:28.100
need with China's silicon valley to

19:28.100 --> 19:30.110
best exploit those technological

19:30.110 --> 19:33.540
advances . She Jinping has also talked

19:33.540 --> 19:35.830
about forging a world class military ,

19:36.090 --> 19:38.250
defined by advanced capabilities and

19:38.250 --> 19:41.240
operational concepts . Building such a

19:41.240 --> 19:43.462
force by the middle of the 21st century

19:43.462 --> 19:46.330
is the formal goal for the set by the

19:46.330 --> 19:49.770
CCP Party Congress in November 2017 .

19:51.040 --> 19:53.151
What this looks like in practice will

19:53.151 --> 19:55.410
be determined by two things . First is

19:55.410 --> 19:57.188
how china's strategic landscape

19:57.188 --> 19:59.243
develops over the next few decades .

19:59.440 --> 20:01.384
Will the P . L . A . Still need to

20:01.384 --> 20:03.690
prepare for a Taiwan contingency or

20:03.690 --> 20:05.579
will the two sides have reached a

20:05.579 --> 20:07.660
political settlement ? What other

20:07.660 --> 20:09.827
regional and global tasks will the P .

20:09.827 --> 20:11.882
L . A . Need to be able to conduct ?

20:12.540 --> 20:14.720
Second is how the participates in the

20:14.720 --> 20:16.942
global revolution in military affairs .

20:17.440 --> 20:19.607
Will they leapfrog ahead of the United

20:19.607 --> 20:21.718
States and acquire truly cutting edge

20:21.718 --> 20:23.690
equipment or will they still feel

20:23.690 --> 20:27.240
themselves to be lagging behind Under

20:27.240 --> 20:29.407
Xi Jinping , the P . L . A . has tried

20:29.407 --> 20:31.950
to perfect the 1993 strategy but

20:31.950 --> 20:34.172
changes around the bend could launch in

20:34.172 --> 20:37.300
a new direction and it is incumbent on

20:37.300 --> 20:39.830
us to figure out what that might be and

20:39.830 --> 20:41.886
what needs to be done to prepare for

20:41.886 --> 20:42.860
such a future