WEBVTT 00:00.040 --> 00:02.040 Past two years have been incredibly 00:02.040 --> 00:05.980 exciting space and hopefully with 00:05.990 --> 00:08.157 the broader sense of national security 00:08.157 --> 00:10.379 space , our great partner Nasa has been 00:10.379 --> 00:12.157 back to MARS and they're flying 00:12.157 --> 00:14.046 helicopters on MARS now we're now 00:14.046 --> 00:15.990 launching american astronauts from 00:15.990 --> 00:18.323 american soil on american rockets again , 00:18.323 --> 00:20.212 which I think is a huge return to 00:20.212 --> 00:22.157 capability as well as in two weeks 00:22.157 --> 00:24.323 about the time we celebrate our second 00:24.323 --> 00:26.268 birthday , they're going to launch 00:26.268 --> 00:28.434 hopefully perhaps the most significant 00:28.434 --> 00:30.379 space observatory since the Hubble 00:30.379 --> 00:32.490 telescope was launched decades ago on 00:32.490 --> 00:34.712 the civil side . And we deal with civil 00:34.712 --> 00:37.250 as well over the past two years . Um , 00:37.260 --> 00:40.010 they have expanded rapidly . You know , 00:40.010 --> 00:41.954 the number of active satellites in 00:41.954 --> 00:44.121 orbit has has basically doubled in two 00:44.121 --> 00:46.232 years . We're approaching 5000 active 00:46.232 --> 00:48.399 satellites most of that as a result of 00:48.399 --> 00:50.288 convert commercial innovation and 00:50.288 --> 00:52.621 investment . And uh the idea , you know , 00:52.621 --> 00:54.732 satellites are increasing in number . 00:54.732 --> 00:56.788 They're getting smaller than getting 00:56.788 --> 00:58.954 more capable . So that's a key element 00:58.954 --> 01:01.177 of national security as well . And then 01:01.177 --> 01:03.399 of course there's the space , the space 01:03.399 --> 01:03.360 force and the creation of the Space 01:03.360 --> 01:05.304 force and and the impetus for that 01:05.304 --> 01:07.120 creation you really see in the 01:07.120 --> 01:09.176 competition . It's had over the last 01:09.176 --> 01:11.590 couple of years In the fall of 01:11.600 --> 01:14.910 2019 the Russians launched and on or 01:14.910 --> 01:16.799 about what they call an inspector 01:16.799 --> 01:19.560 satellite . And in early 2020 that 01:19.570 --> 01:22.200 satellite maneuvered in dangerous and 01:22.200 --> 01:24.256 unprofessional manner next to one of 01:24.256 --> 01:26.367 our national security satellites . It 01:26.367 --> 01:28.589 then backed off and conducted a weapons 01:28.589 --> 01:30.756 test released a target and then shot a 01:30.756 --> 01:32.756 project . Um , and of course we all 01:32.756 --> 01:34.644 know what they did on the 15th of 01:34.644 --> 01:37.060 november incredibly irresponsible and 01:37.060 --> 01:39.282 dangerous anti satellite missile test . 01:39.940 --> 01:42.162 And of course we've got the chinese and 01:42.162 --> 01:44.630 the recent hypersonic test they 01:44.630 --> 01:46.574 conducted here in july and so that 01:46.574 --> 01:49.770 competitions base has evolved rapidly 01:49.770 --> 01:51.992 as well . And really that's the impetus 01:51.992 --> 01:54.159 for the creation of the Space force to 01:54.159 --> 01:56.530 deal with those issues . To create the 01:56.530 --> 01:58.586 professionals that we need guardians 01:58.586 --> 02:00.752 who understand the domain , understand 02:00.752 --> 02:02.697 the challenges , understand how to 02:02.697 --> 02:04.697 operate and deal with them , create 02:04.697 --> 02:04.650 that professional environment , that 02:04.660 --> 02:06.549 professional set of organizations 02:06.549 --> 02:09.130 required to address those threats , but 02:09.130 --> 02:11.186 also to partner effectively with the 02:11.186 --> 02:13.241 commercial side in the civil side to 02:13.241 --> 02:15.519 really make space power for the nation . 02:15.519 --> 02:17.519 What it needs to another big change 02:17.519 --> 02:19.630 since the last time this forum met in 02:19.630 --> 02:21.650 person , A new congress , a new 02:21.650 --> 02:23.761 administration . And space has really 02:23.761 --> 02:25.761 proven to be one of those few areas 02:25.761 --> 02:27.983 where there has been uh some continuity 02:27.983 --> 02:30.039 between the trump administration and 02:30.039 --> 02:32.094 the biden administration . The biden 02:32.094 --> 02:34.261 administration has of course supported 02:34.261 --> 02:36.317 the Space force and supported Nasa's 02:36.317 --> 02:38.317 Artemis program and it retained the 02:38.317 --> 02:40.372 National Space Council which met for 02:40.372 --> 02:42.317 the first time just this week . So 02:42.480 --> 02:44.702 congressman jim cooper on the political 02:44.702 --> 02:48.010 side . How important is this continuity 02:48.010 --> 02:50.560 of purpose and policy in this domain ? 02:50.560 --> 02:53.340 And and were you surprised by it ? It's 02:53.340 --> 02:55.830 extremely important . Anyone who has 02:55.830 --> 02:58.120 been briefed on the threat is aware of 02:58.120 --> 03:01.340 the risk of a space pearl harbor . So 03:01.340 --> 03:04.410 the first vote in committee was 60 - 1 03:04.420 --> 03:06.740 to set up the space force . And this 03:06.740 --> 03:08.851 was before President trump , had even 03:08.851 --> 03:10.930 paid any attention to this . His 03:10.930 --> 03:12.763 support helped , especially with 03:12.763 --> 03:14.652 certain Republican senators . But 03:15.240 --> 03:17.780 remember the armed services committees 03:17.780 --> 03:19.447 are about the last bastion of 03:19.447 --> 03:21.336 bipartisanship that's left in the 03:21.336 --> 03:23.840 entire congress . So if we can't agree 03:23.840 --> 03:25.729 as americans on the importance of 03:25.729 --> 03:27.784 national defense , then what sort of 03:27.784 --> 03:30.110 nation are we ? We won't be a nation 03:30.110 --> 03:32.332 for long unless we can come together on 03:32.332 --> 03:35.440 these vital issues . So that 03:35.450 --> 03:37.561 bipartisanship is continuing its very 03:37.561 --> 03:39.450 strong with the Space Force . I'm 03:39.450 --> 03:41.561 delighted to see that . I'm delighted 03:41.561 --> 03:41.490 to see the hard work that general 03:41.490 --> 03:43.712 Thompson and General Raymond and others 03:43.712 --> 03:45.990 have put into standing up . As you say , 03:45.990 --> 03:47.990 the first news service since 1947 . 03:48.040 --> 03:50.310 We're out of the habit of that and we 03:50.310 --> 03:52.088 need new and innovative ways of 03:52.088 --> 03:54.143 thinking so we can meet and beat the 03:54.143 --> 03:56.700 thread . So , good things are happening , 03:56.850 --> 03:59.400 but we got a long way to go chris the 03:59.400 --> 04:01.511 last time this forum happened , the L 04:01.511 --> 04:03.456 three Harris merger was only a few 04:03.456 --> 04:06.040 months old . You were not even the Ceo 04:06.040 --> 04:09.140 yet . So over the last two years , from 04:09.150 --> 04:11.440 industry's perspective , how would you 04:11.440 --> 04:13.440 say the Space Force is changing the 04:13.440 --> 04:15.440 game . Yeah , well , first of all , 04:15.440 --> 04:17.607 it's good to see you again and honored 04:17.607 --> 04:19.884 to be on stage with these uh gentlemen . 04:19.884 --> 04:22.051 You know , when we uh , formed L three 04:22.051 --> 04:24.162 Harris . We were trying to create 1/6 04:24.162 --> 04:26.240 Prime give alternatives to our 04:26.240 --> 04:29.710 customers and disrupt the market a 04:29.710 --> 04:32.043 little bit by bringing more competition , 04:32.043 --> 04:34.210 I'd say . Since then , in the last two 04:34.210 --> 04:36.210 years , it continues to be more and 04:36.210 --> 04:38.377 more consolidation and acquisition . I 04:38.377 --> 04:40.321 think we're all looking with great 04:40.321 --> 04:42.377 interest to see what gets approved , 04:42.377 --> 04:42.170 what doesn't get approved relative to 04:42.170 --> 04:45.080 the regulatory environment . And just 04:45.090 --> 04:47.201 two years ago when I was here , I was 04:47.201 --> 04:49.146 last night looking at that sponsor 04:49.146 --> 04:51.830 banner . And today there's so many new 04:51.830 --> 04:53.886 entrants , there's all these Silicon 04:53.886 --> 04:55.997 Valley companies , there's commercial 04:55.997 --> 04:58.108 companies and there seemed to be more 04:58.108 --> 05:00.330 and more new entrants coming into the , 05:00.330 --> 05:02.386 into this domain . So I think that's 05:02.386 --> 05:04.441 exciting for everybody and , and for 05:04.441 --> 05:06.663 our , our customers , I'll say with the 05:06.663 --> 05:08.608 Space Force being a relatively new 05:08.608 --> 05:10.774 organization , I gotta give a call out 05:10.774 --> 05:12.997 to general Thompson and Raymond because 05:12.997 --> 05:12.200 they've been reaching out to industry , 05:12.200 --> 05:15.350 they recently hosted a a swag business 05:15.350 --> 05:18.160 fair to try to get industry involved , 05:18.640 --> 05:20.862 make us aware of the challenges and the 05:20.862 --> 05:23.029 problems and bring us in to help , you 05:23.029 --> 05:24.918 know , try to solve some of these 05:24.918 --> 05:26.973 problems . So I think it's , I think 05:26.973 --> 05:26.430 it's working and I think it's going 05:26.430 --> 05:29.300 well . So thank you for that . I 05:29.300 --> 05:31.356 actually would like to spend quite a 05:31.356 --> 05:33.522 bit of time talking about acquisitions 05:33.522 --> 05:35.578 and I know it doesn't sound like the 05:35.578 --> 05:35.400 most exciting thing that we're going to 05:35.400 --> 05:37.456 be talking about here today . But it 05:37.456 --> 05:39.567 really is so important and so central 05:39.567 --> 05:41.622 to the reason of why the Space force 05:41.622 --> 05:43.890 was created . So bear with me here , 05:43.890 --> 05:46.057 we're gonna do a round of questions on 05:46.057 --> 05:49.100 this . Um general , I'd like to touch a 05:49.100 --> 05:51.267 little bit more on what chris was just 05:51.267 --> 05:53.600 talking about for those that don't know . 05:53.600 --> 05:56.120 In october the Space Force held um 05:56.130 --> 05:58.650 slack . The Space Warfighting Analysis 05:58.650 --> 06:00.480 Center held a first of its kind 06:00.490 --> 06:02.640 business fair , an effort to really 06:02.640 --> 06:04.584 bring in the defense industry very 06:04.584 --> 06:06.751 early on and try to really give them a 06:06.751 --> 06:08.918 chance to help shape the future of the 06:08.918 --> 06:10.918 space force . And as you just heard 06:10.918 --> 06:13.590 chris say , uh folks in the industry by 06:13.590 --> 06:15.950 and large , really like that . And so 06:15.950 --> 06:18.061 I'm curious . General , did you think 06:18.061 --> 06:20.172 that that business fair was a success 06:20.172 --> 06:22.880 And can industry expect more of those 06:22.880 --> 06:24.760 kinds of things in the future ? 06:24.940 --> 06:27.650 Absolutely . Let me add , let me talk a 06:27.650 --> 06:29.706 little more more about that industry 06:29.706 --> 06:32.060 fair , if I can . Um well , I'll tell 06:32.060 --> 06:34.710 you in an engineering and very specific 06:34.720 --> 06:37.000 systems designed sense . Obviously the 06:37.000 --> 06:39.390 space sector , our industry partners 06:39.390 --> 06:41.501 and the government for years have had 06:41.501 --> 06:43.390 very sophisticated capabilities . 06:43.390 --> 06:45.570 However , when it comes to performance 06:45.570 --> 06:47.181 modeling , threat modeling , 06:47.181 --> 06:48.980 survivability modeling and cost 06:48.980 --> 06:51.147 modeling and the ability to do that on 06:51.147 --> 06:53.258 a very large scale , on a broad scale 06:53.258 --> 06:55.410 with a large set of concepts . We've 06:55.410 --> 06:57.577 never really developed that capability 06:57.577 --> 06:59.521 inside the , what I call the space 06:59.521 --> 07:01.688 community and a lot of that is because 07:01.688 --> 07:03.854 we haven't had been driven by the need 07:03.854 --> 07:05.966 to do campaign modeling analysis that 07:05.966 --> 07:08.077 the other domains have done to assess 07:08.077 --> 07:10.243 the effectiveness of their systems and 07:10.243 --> 07:12.299 forces . And we're really able to do 07:12.299 --> 07:14.077 that for the first time in this 07:14.077 --> 07:16.243 industry fair . Um , the leadership of 07:16.243 --> 07:18.466 our Space warfighting Analysis center , 07:18.466 --> 07:20.354 Mr Andrew cox and others provided 07:20.354 --> 07:22.480 digital models for threats , provided 07:22.480 --> 07:24.202 the requirements . We have the 07:24.202 --> 07:26.036 performance expectations , there 07:26.036 --> 07:27.702 elements of cost analysis and 07:27.702 --> 07:29.960 assessment said , here are the models 07:29.960 --> 07:32.071 here , here's the digital models that 07:32.071 --> 07:34.560 we're using gave them to industry as 07:34.560 --> 07:36.727 noted over 100 participants and said , 07:36.727 --> 07:38.949 here's what we're thinking , here's the 07:38.949 --> 07:41.420 work we've done so far . Go off , do 07:41.420 --> 07:43.420 some analysis of your own , do some 07:43.420 --> 07:45.420 innovation and design , thinking of 07:45.420 --> 07:47.642 your own and come back and show you how 07:47.642 --> 07:49.753 you would provide us solutions to our 07:49.753 --> 07:51.976 problems and solutions to our needs and 07:51.976 --> 07:54.198 challenges rather than what's also been 07:54.198 --> 07:54.080 typical in the past of the government . 07:54.080 --> 07:56.136 We think we know what we need and we 07:56.136 --> 07:58.247 want and here's how we're going to do 07:58.247 --> 08:00.469 it . And so that element of here's what 08:00.469 --> 08:02.691 we're thinking , here's the models were 08:02.691 --> 08:04.913 using , go out and do your own thoughts 08:04.913 --> 08:07.024 and come back is a little bit new and 08:07.024 --> 08:09.136 different . And the second element of 08:09.136 --> 08:08.530 that really is , in fact , it's our new 08:08.530 --> 08:10.474 service secretary who's famous for 08:10.474 --> 08:13.180 having saying , having said in God , we 08:13.180 --> 08:15.291 trust all others must bring data . We 08:15.291 --> 08:17.402 finally have the kind of data that we 08:17.402 --> 08:19.569 need to do that mission analysis . And 08:19.569 --> 08:22.040 we've already um , done a prototype of 08:22.040 --> 08:24.370 that with a new missile warning , 08:24.380 --> 08:26.324 missile tracking , missile defense 08:26.324 --> 08:28.436 architecture that we need to shift to 08:28.436 --> 08:30.547 as a result of , among other things , 08:30.547 --> 08:32.769 the hyper sonic challenges we face . So 08:32.769 --> 08:34.936 we've already prototype prototype that 08:34.936 --> 08:37.047 approach and we expect to do this for 08:37.047 --> 08:38.936 missionary after missionary after 08:38.936 --> 08:41.047 missionary here in in in the future . 08:41.047 --> 08:42.880 And so all of this , of course , 08:42.880 --> 08:44.991 correct me if I'm wrong , but this is 08:44.991 --> 08:47.213 all part of the Space Force's effort to 08:47.213 --> 08:49.380 really uh speed up the development and 08:49.380 --> 08:51.547 acquisition of cutting edge technology 08:51.547 --> 08:53.213 to keep us the US ahead of of 08:53.213 --> 08:55.491 adversaries in space . But congressman , 08:55.491 --> 08:57.850 you know , you were one of the first , 08:57.850 --> 09:00.017 you were a very early advocate for the 09:00.017 --> 09:01.794 Space Force and yet you've also 09:01.794 --> 09:04.030 simultaneously been quite critical of 09:04.030 --> 09:06.590 it recently . Back in october , you 09:06.590 --> 09:08.812 said that the Space Force is not moving 09:08.812 --> 09:11.034 fast enough . You said that it needs to 09:11.034 --> 09:13.260 step up its game . Uh , that was in 09:13.270 --> 09:15.437 october , do you still feel that way ? 09:15.437 --> 09:18.100 Now , General Thompson has said that 09:18.100 --> 09:20.322 I'm the Space Force's biggest supporter 09:20.322 --> 09:22.489 along with my friend Mike Rogers , but 09:22.489 --> 09:24.322 also we're sometimes the biggest 09:24.322 --> 09:27.550 critics because we can't afford to fail 09:27.560 --> 09:31.280 here and think about it , it's great 09:31.290 --> 09:33.512 that the private sector is so much more 09:33.512 --> 09:36.550 innovative than our Air Force was . And 09:36.560 --> 09:38.616 we need to get the Space Force to be 09:38.616 --> 09:40.838 much more innovative and try to keep up 09:40.838 --> 09:44.020 with the private sector . But is it 09:44.030 --> 09:47.200 enough to shop from a catalog and put 09:47.210 --> 09:49.377 things that are commercially available 09:49.377 --> 09:51.599 out there ? Will that meet and beat the 09:51.599 --> 09:53.654 threat ? And some other areas of our 09:53.654 --> 09:55.766 national defense . We pride ourselves 09:55.766 --> 09:57.543 on being 10 or 20 years ahead . 09:58.140 --> 10:00.040 Anything that's in any catalog 10:01.940 --> 10:05.750 and to really be superior , we've got 10:05.750 --> 10:08.670 to go beyond Elon musk's imagination , 10:08.670 --> 10:10.770 Jeff Bezos imagination beyond their 10:10.770 --> 10:13.620 pocketbooks budget right now , $17 10:13.620 --> 10:15.731 billion . And that's a lot of money . 10:15.731 --> 10:19.400 But considering how crucial spaces are 10:19.400 --> 10:21.511 we doing enough , I'm excited because 10:21.511 --> 10:23.733 we're able to attract a lot of exciting 10:23.733 --> 10:25.956 talent to the space for us . It's got a 10:25.956 --> 10:28.500 lot of buzz . But are the best minds in 10:28.500 --> 10:30.611 America leaving investment banking to 10:30.611 --> 10:32.889 go into the Space Force ? Probably not . 10:33.140 --> 10:35.310 This is already a half a trillion 10:35.310 --> 10:38.060 dollar industry . They're almost 2000 10:38.060 --> 10:40.420 companies . It's an amazingly exciting 10:40.730 --> 10:44.350 area . And we've got to make sure that 10:44.360 --> 10:47.150 our Space Force and Space Command are 10:47.840 --> 10:50.062 at , as you say , at the cutting edge . 10:50.200 --> 10:51.990 And that means beyond what is 10:51.990 --> 10:54.300 commercially available . And I just 10:54.300 --> 10:56.467 hope we're getting there fast enough . 10:56.467 --> 10:58.180 And so congressman , just how 10:58.180 --> 11:00.570 specifically would you want the Space 11:00.570 --> 11:02.626 Force and Space Command to do that ? 11:02.626 --> 11:04.848 How what specifically would you like to 11:04.848 --> 11:06.830 see them due to be moving faster , 11:06.830 --> 11:08.830 bolder bigger . In your words , The 11:08.830 --> 11:11.052 simplest way to put it is , and I think 11:11.052 --> 11:13.163 mike Rogers and I felt this way for a 11:13.163 --> 11:14.941 long time . The N . R . O . Has 11:14.941 --> 11:16.997 actually done a pretty amazing job . 11:16.997 --> 11:19.219 They're not as well known as some other 11:19.219 --> 11:21.386 agencies , the National Reconnaissance 11:21.386 --> 11:23.386 Office , but I had a recent side by 11:23.386 --> 11:25.552 side briefing with the N . R . O . And 11:25.552 --> 11:27.719 Space Force . My conclusion after that 11:27.719 --> 11:30.140 briefing was thank God for the N . R . 11:30.140 --> 11:34.070 O . I anxiously await the day that I 11:34.070 --> 11:36.237 can say the same about the Space force 11:37.040 --> 11:38.929 general . I'd like to give you an 11:38.929 --> 11:40.596 opportunity to respond to the 11:40.596 --> 11:44.020 congressman's comments . Um as a as a 11:44.030 --> 11:46.141 congressman , cooper noted every time 11:46.141 --> 11:49.750 we meet , um uh congressman cooper 11:49.750 --> 11:51.972 asks what he can continue to do to help 11:51.972 --> 11:53.972 and my request of him is always the 11:53.972 --> 11:56.790 same , continue to be our strongest 11:56.790 --> 11:59.012 supporter and our toughest critic . And 11:59.012 --> 12:01.123 I can say this morning , he continues 12:01.123 --> 12:02.790 to form effectively in both . 12:06.740 --> 12:09.930 Um chris let's let's bring , bring you 12:09.930 --> 12:13.300 into the , into the conversation . Well , 12:13.300 --> 12:15.189 you should just keep this going . 12:15.189 --> 12:17.356 You're good down there . Um You know , 12:17.356 --> 12:19.910 there's been more than 100 acquisition 12:19.920 --> 12:22.440 reform panels over the year . You sat 12:22.440 --> 12:24.990 on a very notable one Back in 2009 , 12:24.990 --> 12:27.680 but that was that was 12 years ago . Um 12:27.680 --> 12:29.680 And the U . S . Is still having the 12:29.680 --> 12:31.736 same conversations were Space forces 12:31.736 --> 12:34.040 new , but we're still having the same 12:34.040 --> 12:36.540 conversation . So from industry's 12:36.540 --> 12:38.762 perspective , how can we move faster to 12:38.762 --> 12:40.929 outpace our adversaries and what needs 12:41.240 --> 12:43.351 what needs to happen for something to 12:43.351 --> 12:45.518 to finally really change . Okay , well 12:45.518 --> 12:47.684 clearly you've done your research here 12:47.684 --> 12:49.629 but it was actually the Ronn CADIZ 12:49.629 --> 12:51.740 panel which you know , General Kadish 12:51.740 --> 12:53.851 was the first head of the M . D . A . 12:53.851 --> 12:53.710 So it's kind of interesting that we 12:53.710 --> 12:55.932 bring his name up name up here 12 years 12:55.932 --> 12:57.710 later . You know , like all the 12:57.710 --> 12:59.766 acquisition reform studies which has 12:59.766 --> 13:01.821 been 100 I think we came up with the 13:01.821 --> 13:03.877 same exact recommendations that Jack 13:03.877 --> 13:05.988 Gambler did in oh seven . So the last 13:05.988 --> 13:07.766 thing we need , there's another 13:07.766 --> 13:09.766 acquisition study , I think there's 13:09.766 --> 13:11.599 been hundreds . So you know , as 13:11.599 --> 13:13.654 someone I respect once told me , you 13:13.654 --> 13:15.654 take a big problem and you break it 13:15.654 --> 13:17.821 into small problems . So I thought I'd 13:17.821 --> 13:17.540 start at the beginning here which is is 13:17.540 --> 13:19.596 the funding process . And this might 13:19.596 --> 13:22.130 get an interesting reaction but I think 13:22.130 --> 13:24.186 if we all agree there's a legitimate 13:24.186 --> 13:26.352 threat out there which we do , we have 13:26.352 --> 13:28.352 to go faster . We have to have more 13:28.352 --> 13:30.019 flexibility . I would suggest 13:30.019 --> 13:32.590 potentially we look at funding missions 13:32.630 --> 13:35.310 versus funding programs . So if I take 13:35.310 --> 13:37.510 missile tracking as an example when I 13:37.510 --> 13:39.732 was looking through some data , there's 13:39.732 --> 13:42.420 345 siloed programs depending how you 13:42.420 --> 13:45.140 count them call it 67 billion in the fy 13:45.140 --> 13:48.120 22 budget . So I would propose , let's 13:48.120 --> 13:51.560 get congress to fund this mission se at 13:51.560 --> 13:53.393 seven billion give it to general 13:53.393 --> 13:55.449 Raymond , General Thompson give them 13:55.449 --> 13:57.600 the ability to be flexible as the 13:57.600 --> 13:59.950 threat evolves as development evolves . 13:59.950 --> 14:02.006 Maybe they want more satellites of a 14:02.006 --> 14:04.228 certain constellation , maybe they want 14:04.228 --> 14:06.172 to truncate and other programs add 14:06.172 --> 14:08.339 capability . You know , it's all about 14:08.339 --> 14:10.339 speed and I think that's the way to 14:10.339 --> 14:12.561 potentially speed the process . So I'll 14:12.561 --> 14:14.783 throw that out for consideration and if 14:14.783 --> 14:16.894 and actually add both to a little bit 14:16.894 --> 14:19.006 more to both . What Carson cooper and 14:19.006 --> 14:21.730 chris said is Um as Congressman Cooper 14:21.730 --> 14:23.730 said , we were $17 billion , that's 14:23.730 --> 14:25.952 2.4% of the budget . And when you think 14:25.952 --> 14:28.174 about the , what is required and how we 14:28.174 --> 14:30.119 underpin every aspect of the joint 14:30.119 --> 14:32.230 force , you know , perhaps there is a 14:32.230 --> 14:34.563 discussion of whether that's , you know , 14:34.563 --> 14:36.841 imbalance efficient , but but when you , 14:36.841 --> 14:38.841 you know , Carl Cooper mentioned uh 14:38.841 --> 14:40.952 there are areas where we shouldn't be 14:40.952 --> 14:43.174 relying on commercial services and he's 14:43.174 --> 14:45.286 exactly right . There's areas we need 14:45.286 --> 14:47.174 to move where we cannot depend on 14:47.174 --> 14:49.341 commercial services . They are the the 14:49.341 --> 14:51.452 the area of expertise and requirement 14:51.452 --> 14:53.674 for military operations . But but a lot 14:53.674 --> 14:55.730 of what we have done in the past and 14:55.730 --> 14:55.510 some of what we do today , we did 14:55.520 --> 14:57.687 because nobody else in the world could 14:57.687 --> 14:59.798 and we had to do it for ourselves and 14:59.798 --> 15:01.798 increasing with with the , with the 15:01.798 --> 15:03.742 commercial sector and I'm thinking 15:03.742 --> 15:05.798 transportation and logistics and and 15:05.798 --> 15:08.020 perhaps some of the more basic services 15:08.020 --> 15:10.590 we should be and are looking at relying 15:10.590 --> 15:13.070 on that evolving commercial sector to 15:13.070 --> 15:15.237 provide some of those what I will call 15:15.237 --> 15:16.959 routine and basic services and 15:16.959 --> 15:19.470 capabilities we can use so that we can 15:19.470 --> 15:21.980 focus on as as congressman cooper noted 15:21.990 --> 15:24.580 some of the very sophisticated advanced 15:24.590 --> 15:27.450 um requirements and activities and 15:27.450 --> 15:29.506 missionaries that we need to do as a 15:29.506 --> 15:31.117 space force to deal with the 15:31.117 --> 15:33.117 competition and the threats that we 15:33.117 --> 15:35.283 face . At this point , I'd really like 15:35.283 --> 15:38.010 to get into two of the most aggressive 15:38.020 --> 15:40.260 acts that we have seen recently in 15:40.260 --> 15:43.260 space . China's test of a hypersonic 15:43.270 --> 15:45.760 vehicle and Russia's test of an 15:45.760 --> 15:48.010 antisatellite weapon . But first I want 15:48.010 --> 15:49.843 to just remind all of you in the 15:49.843 --> 15:52.066 audience and anybody watching from your 15:52.066 --> 15:54.190 computer or phone or however you're 15:54.190 --> 15:56.510 viewing it these days that you can ask 15:56.520 --> 15:59.190 all of our panelists of questions via 15:59.200 --> 16:01.490 the app , the Reagan National Defense 16:01.490 --> 16:03.323 Forum app or on twitter with the 16:03.323 --> 16:06.260 hashtag R . N . D . F . And with that . 16:06.740 --> 16:10.740 Um , let's start with China's test 16:10.740 --> 16:13.030 of a hypersonic weapon in october . 16:13.030 --> 16:15.141 General Heighten said that hypersonic 16:15.141 --> 16:17.250 technology is a perfect example of 16:17.250 --> 16:20.470 America's acquisitions problems , which 16:20.480 --> 16:22.647 obviously is what we've just spent the 16:22.647 --> 16:24.924 first part of this panel talking about . 16:24.924 --> 16:26.980 And he said that China has performed 16:26.980 --> 16:29.202 hundreds of tests on hypersonic weapons 16:29.202 --> 16:31.258 while the U . S . Has only conducted 16:31.258 --> 16:34.750 five . So uh general why is that ? And 16:34.750 --> 16:38.680 can the us catch up ? So at 16:38.680 --> 16:40.791 first I'd say absolutely we can we've 16:40.791 --> 16:42.902 been faced with challenges and crises 16:42.902 --> 16:45.013 in the past and we've dealt with them 16:45.013 --> 16:47.069 on the hypersonic side . What I will 16:47.069 --> 16:49.291 say is it's the United States Air Force 16:49.291 --> 16:51.458 in the United States Navy and the army 16:51.458 --> 16:53.069 that are pursuing hypersonic 16:53.069 --> 16:55.124 capabilities for the nation . On the 16:55.124 --> 16:57.180 Space force side our our requirement 16:57.180 --> 16:59.347 and our challenge is to deal with it . 16:59.347 --> 17:01.513 On the other side , hypersonic weapons 17:01.513 --> 17:03.624 especially at intercontinental ranges 17:03.624 --> 17:05.530 greatly complicate the strategic 17:05.540 --> 17:08.280 warning problem . Uh You know while 17:08.290 --> 17:09.901 while the techniques and the 17:09.901 --> 17:11.846 technologies are sophisticated for 17:11.846 --> 17:13.901 missile warning , the principles are 17:13.901 --> 17:16.012 actually fundamentally pretty easy to 17:16.012 --> 17:17.790 understand just like throwing a 17:17.790 --> 17:20.350 baseball or a football once that ball 17:20.350 --> 17:22.517 leaves your hand . You we all consents 17:22.517 --> 17:24.683 very quickly where it's going . That's 17:24.683 --> 17:26.739 in essence the same thing that works 17:26.739 --> 17:28.906 with ballistic missiles . However with 17:28.906 --> 17:30.572 hypersonic you no longer have 17:30.572 --> 17:32.739 confidence . Once a hypersonic missile 17:32.739 --> 17:34.739 launched hypersonic weapon has been 17:34.739 --> 17:36.739 delivered on a trajectory . Now the 17:36.739 --> 17:38.961 ability to maneuver means you no longer 17:38.961 --> 17:41.730 know with confidence where it's going 17:41.740 --> 17:43.907 and cannot be prepared to deal with it 17:44.140 --> 17:46.550 unless you keep track of it throughout 17:46.550 --> 17:48.661 its flight throughout it's trajectory 17:48.661 --> 17:50.772 and understand what's happening . And 17:50.772 --> 17:52.772 that's the sophisticated or the the 17:52.772 --> 17:54.772 challenge associated with the space 17:54.772 --> 17:56.606 force and space based aspects of 17:56.606 --> 17:58.772 hypersonic weapons . And so we have to 17:58.772 --> 18:00.828 deal with that challenge for warning 18:00.828 --> 18:02.883 for tracking for defense . While the 18:02.883 --> 18:04.930 other services deal with developing 18:04.930 --> 18:07.040 hypersonic hypersonic technology for 18:07.040 --> 18:09.207 our use general . Do you think the U . 18:09.207 --> 18:11.207 S . Is losing an arms race in space 18:11.207 --> 18:15.170 with china . Um ah So there 18:15.180 --> 18:17.236 as I said before I think we've got a 18:17.236 --> 18:19.402 competition here that we've had in the 18:19.402 --> 18:21.624 past . I think we've faced competitions 18:21.624 --> 18:23.847 like this in the past . Uh , and I have 18:23.847 --> 18:26.069 no question that we're fully capable of 18:26.069 --> 18:28.291 succeeding and in this competition like 18:28.291 --> 18:30.291 we have enough congressman . Do you 18:30.291 --> 18:32.291 think the U . S . Is losing an arms 18:32.291 --> 18:34.236 race in space with china ? I would 18:34.236 --> 18:36.347 encourage everyone in the audience to 18:36.347 --> 18:38.970 read the new novel called 2034 by 18:38.970 --> 18:41.670 retired Admiral James Stavridis and 18:41.670 --> 18:44.960 Elliot Ackerman and then ask yourself 18:44.960 --> 18:47.280 the question , Do they have to wait 18:47.280 --> 18:51.240 until 2034 ? Uh , it lays out 18:51.250 --> 18:54.470 pretty clearly how for example , on 18:54.470 --> 18:56.840 hypersonic , We lead the world with 18:56.840 --> 18:59.020 that in the 70s and then took our eye 18:59.020 --> 19:01.250 off the ball . So it's not just a 19:01.250 --> 19:03.361 question of acquisition . It's also a 19:03.361 --> 19:05.528 question of national will and intent . 19:06.140 --> 19:08.251 Now we don't get credit with peaceful 19:08.251 --> 19:10.251 nations for having not pursued this 19:10.251 --> 19:13.860 lethal threat . Um , but other nations 19:13.860 --> 19:15.860 are picking up on that . We had the 19:15.860 --> 19:17.971 first acid test but we tried to do it 19:17.971 --> 19:21.230 responsibly . This chinese test years 19:21.230 --> 19:23.670 ago was completely irresponsible . I 19:23.670 --> 19:26.030 was told recently on the scale of space 19:26.030 --> 19:28.450 debris are test was like a one and you 19:28.450 --> 19:31.250 want to be low . The Chinese test was 19:31.260 --> 19:35.060 10,000 And the recent Russian 19:35.060 --> 19:37.440 test was like a 30 . It's a little bit 19:37.440 --> 19:39.570 better but still hopelessly 19:39.570 --> 19:41.626 irresponsible because space debris , 19:41.626 --> 19:43.514 space junk is one of the greatest 19:43.514 --> 19:45.626 threats we face . We can't track this 19:45.626 --> 19:48.310 stuff a paint fleck Can destroy at 19:48.310 --> 19:52.170 17,000 mph . A paint fleck is a bullet . 19:53.120 --> 19:55.460 So we've got to be able to harness the 19:55.460 --> 19:58.530 space and not so pollute key orbits 19:58.660 --> 20:00.660 that they are no longer effectively 20:00.660 --> 20:02.827 usable . We just had to move the space 20:02.827 --> 20:04.993 station after the Russian test . And I 20:04.993 --> 20:07.040 know you with two astronaut parents 20:07.740 --> 20:09.851 that's a pretty sensitive matter when 20:09.851 --> 20:11.629 you can't conduct your peaceful 20:11.629 --> 20:13.351 activities in space due to the 20:13.351 --> 20:15.240 irresponsibility of a nation like 20:15.240 --> 20:17.407 Russia . Well so everybody agrees that 20:17.407 --> 20:19.660 what Russia did is irresponsible but 20:19.660 --> 20:22.630 what can the U . S . Actually do about 20:22.630 --> 20:24.519 it ? How do you think the U . S . 20:24.519 --> 20:26.960 Should respond ? Well everyone agrees 20:26.960 --> 20:30.450 about Russia who did Putin relished it . 20:30.840 --> 20:32.729 These nations get away with their 20:32.729 --> 20:35.050 wrongdoing and we've allowed them more 20:35.050 --> 20:38.040 and more leeway . The first element is 20:38.050 --> 20:40.680 tracking and we have some very exciting 20:40.680 --> 20:42.624 private companies that are doing a 20:42.624 --> 20:44.791 great job of tracking the air force is 20:44.791 --> 20:46.791 still the most trusted voice in the 20:46.791 --> 20:48.847 world of the Space force on alerting 20:48.847 --> 20:50.736 other nations to threats to their 20:50.736 --> 20:52.958 satellites . But right now there's like 20:52.958 --> 20:55.013 what a multi kilometer bubble around 20:55.013 --> 20:57.180 each satellite because we don't really 20:57.180 --> 20:56.580 know how close it's going to be and 20:56.580 --> 20:58.747 it's it's hard , this isn't easy stuff 20:59.090 --> 21:01.480 and thank God especially in low Earth 21:01.490 --> 21:04.760 orbit things gradually degrade . But 21:04.770 --> 21:07.730 this is a monster problem to solve its 21:07.730 --> 21:10.490 computerization . Very few people are 21:10.490 --> 21:12.720 actually up there in person . It's got 21:12.720 --> 21:15.060 to be done remotely by computers and 21:15.070 --> 21:17.181 that's why we need America's best and 21:17.181 --> 21:19.237 brightest to join the Space force to 21:19.237 --> 21:21.580 join Space Command and help us solve 21:21.580 --> 21:25.370 these rocket science problems . I 21:25.370 --> 21:27.750 want to ask chris something about what 21:27.750 --> 21:29.917 you were just talking about how the US 21:29.917 --> 21:32.270 was at one point ahead on hypersonic . 21:32.280 --> 21:35.270 Um part of the reason that SpaceX has 21:35.270 --> 21:37.340 become so successful is because they 21:37.340 --> 21:40.420 have a very how should I put this a 21:40.420 --> 21:43.430 very high pain tolerance for failure ? 21:43.430 --> 21:45.290 They're not afraid to fail . And 21:45.290 --> 21:47.512 General Heighten said in october that a 21:47.512 --> 21:49.734 fear of failure in terms of testing new 21:49.734 --> 21:52.068 technologies really dominates the U . S . 21:52.068 --> 21:54.590 Military . And so I'm curious uh do you 21:54.590 --> 21:57.710 chris uh does L . Three Harris , do you 21:57.710 --> 21:59.543 feel comfortable failing in this 21:59.543 --> 22:02.030 climate ? Yeah that's a great question . 22:02.040 --> 22:04.040 No I and I think this culture , the 22:04.040 --> 22:06.096 culture in this industry has changed 22:06.096 --> 22:08.207 over time where you want to have 100% 22:08.207 --> 22:10.207 perfection but where we are now , I 22:10.207 --> 22:12.318 think we have to take more risks . We 22:12.318 --> 22:14.429 have to do more demos and you have to 22:14.429 --> 22:16.596 fail fast and learn fast . And I think 22:16.596 --> 22:18.540 that's the key in the mindset that 22:18.540 --> 22:20.762 we're all adopting , you know , running 22:20.762 --> 22:20.490 a company . You have to get a culture 22:20.490 --> 22:22.546 where people feel free to take those 22:22.546 --> 22:24.768 risks , speak up , ask for help and and 22:24.768 --> 22:26.546 be transparent with some of the 22:26.546 --> 22:28.601 challenges they have which is easier 22:28.601 --> 22:30.601 said said than done . But clearly I 22:30.601 --> 22:32.712 think that's that's something that we 22:32.712 --> 22:34.768 all need to do now when you get into 22:34.768 --> 22:34.480 the actual production of some of these 22:34.490 --> 22:36.950 systems . I think all the men and women 22:36.950 --> 22:38.950 in the audience here understand how 22:38.950 --> 22:40.950 complicated and challenging some of 22:40.950 --> 22:42.783 these technologies are . And you 22:42.783 --> 22:44.672 contrast that with the commercial 22:44.672 --> 22:46.672 market , It has to work 100% of the 22:46.672 --> 22:48.672 time . And I think that that is the 22:48.672 --> 22:48.320 difference . So I was reading about 22:48.320 --> 22:50.264 some of these great constellations 22:50.264 --> 22:52.320 going up there like starlink and and 22:52.320 --> 22:54.376 piper and they build in , you know , 22:54.376 --> 22:57.110 like a 10% death rate and assumption on 22:57.110 --> 22:59.166 their constellations , which is fine 22:59.166 --> 23:01.332 for that purpose . I think the general 23:01.332 --> 23:03.499 would be quite upset if Industry had a 23:03.499 --> 23:05.721 10% failure rate once we went into full 23:05.721 --> 23:07.888 production and tried to operationalize 23:07.888 --> 23:11.160 these constellations . Uh 23:11.740 --> 23:13.684 I'd like to just talk a little bit 23:13.684 --> 23:16.050 general now about something that you uh 23:16.060 --> 23:18.171 you said in the Washington post , you 23:18.171 --> 23:20.171 said that the Space force's dealing 23:20.171 --> 23:22.520 with reversible attacks on U . S . 23:22.520 --> 23:25.100 Government satellites every single day 23:25.110 --> 23:28.610 from china and Russia . Um I mean 23:28.610 --> 23:31.070 that's just an extraordinary frequency 23:31.080 --> 23:34.420 every single day . Uh Is it becoming 23:34.430 --> 23:37.630 difficult to keep up ? So um let me 23:37.630 --> 23:41.130 clarify what I said . Yeah , what I 23:41.130 --> 23:43.530 said was we deal with reversible 23:43.530 --> 23:45.641 attacks every single day and it's not 23:45.641 --> 23:47.863 just the Space Force , it's this entire 23:47.863 --> 23:49.919 sector and industry , it's us , it's 23:49.919 --> 23:49.710 our allies and partners , it's 23:49.710 --> 23:51.821 commercial companies as well . And by 23:51.821 --> 23:55.640 that , I mean whether it's uh jamming 23:55.640 --> 23:58.100 or or or harmful interference in the R . 23:58.100 --> 24:00.230 F . Spectrum laser dazzling cyber 24:00.230 --> 24:02.286 attacks . You know cyber probing and 24:02.286 --> 24:04.397 cyber attacks . That's just a fact of 24:04.397 --> 24:07.090 life in many cases in dealing in space 24:07.090 --> 24:09.257 every day . And some of its deliberate 24:09.257 --> 24:11.201 some of its purposeful some of its 24:11.201 --> 24:13.312 focus but we do deal with those sorts 24:13.312 --> 24:15.500 of things every day . Um And it you 24:15.500 --> 24:17.500 know , we're not just talking about 24:17.500 --> 24:19.556 Russia and china . There's these are 24:19.556 --> 24:21.278 not particularly sophisticated 24:21.278 --> 24:23.410 technologies or capabilities beyond 24:23.410 --> 24:25.521 what you can find in the state of the 24:25.521 --> 24:27.743 world . And so we do deal with it every 24:27.743 --> 24:29.966 day in our operations . Um In many ways 24:29.966 --> 24:32.021 it's not different than the types of 24:32.021 --> 24:34.290 things that our forces and others deal 24:34.290 --> 24:36.970 with every single day . But as we 24:36.970 --> 24:38.859 understand them today we have the 24:38.859 --> 24:41.081 ability to deal with them . We have the 24:41.081 --> 24:43.081 ability to understand them . Um The 24:43.081 --> 24:45.303 question and the concern really becomes 24:45.303 --> 24:47.359 as they occur at scale . If you find 24:47.359 --> 24:49.692 yourself in conflict and go to conflict , 24:49.740 --> 24:52.110 understanding what those these attacks 24:52.110 --> 24:54.277 would look like at scale , how to deal 24:54.277 --> 24:56.110 with them , how to ensure we can 24:56.110 --> 24:58.332 continue to be effective and add on top 24:58.332 --> 25:00.388 of that potentially irreversible and 25:00.388 --> 25:02.540 destructive attacks . And so I would 25:02.540 --> 25:04.651 say can we deal with them every day . 25:04.651 --> 25:06.984 Do we manage them everyday ? Absolutely . 25:06.984 --> 25:09.151 What we have to be able to do is learn 25:09.151 --> 25:11.420 and grow and design and build and field 25:11.430 --> 25:13.710 and operate including tactics the 25:13.710 --> 25:15.932 systems will ensure that will ensure we 25:15.932 --> 25:18.099 can continue to do that in the face of 25:18.099 --> 25:21.910 no getting high end large guilt and so 25:21.910 --> 25:23.854 congressman at what point do these 25:23.854 --> 25:26.077 kinds of attacks happening every single 25:26.077 --> 25:28.530 day . At what point do those cross the 25:28.530 --> 25:32.140 line and become an act of war . We face 25:32.140 --> 25:34.150 the same problem in the cyber world 25:34.160 --> 25:36.327 because you know the pentagon's hacked 25:36.327 --> 25:38.550 every day thousands of times no one is 25:38.550 --> 25:40.980 safe and by the way it's not so much 25:40.980 --> 25:42.647 our prime contractors but our 25:42.647 --> 25:44.647 subcontractors in the defense field 25:44.840 --> 25:47.000 have to really worry about being 25:47.000 --> 25:50.040 permeable because we want to have a U . 25:50.040 --> 25:52.700 S . R . And D . Budget . I'm not here 25:52.700 --> 25:54.922 to fund the chinese or the Russians R . 25:54.922 --> 25:57.650 And D . Budget but so often because we 25:57.650 --> 26:01.110 are porous they get some of our good 26:01.110 --> 26:02.760 stuff . So 26:05.540 --> 26:07.690 no one really knows what these new 26:07.690 --> 26:09.746 technologies exactly what the limits 26:09.746 --> 26:12.560 are but we do know that deterrence 26:12.560 --> 26:15.850 works strength matters 26:16.640 --> 26:19.010 and the ability to be ahead is the 26:19.010 --> 26:22.070 great american genius and we have been 26:22.070 --> 26:24.237 ahead , we are ahead in so many ways , 26:24.237 --> 26:26.292 we just have to continue that streak 26:26.292 --> 26:28.760 but that means us born , young people 26:28.770 --> 26:32.280 getting engineering degrees and not 26:32.280 --> 26:34.391 just majoring in political science or 26:34.391 --> 26:37.250 sports management or something And many 26:37.250 --> 26:39.430 of our graduate schools , 80% of the 26:39.430 --> 26:42.440 students are foreign born and I'm not 26:42.440 --> 26:44.650 against that but like there are kids 26:44.650 --> 26:48.630 like why aren't we good at math now ? 26:48.630 --> 26:50.408 We think we do well in math but 26:50.408 --> 26:52.186 actually we're one of the worst 26:52.186 --> 26:54.241 performing nations the country and I 26:54.241 --> 26:56.074 have a large and rigorous intern 26:56.074 --> 26:58.350 program . We have increasing trouble 26:58.350 --> 27:00.461 getting us kids who know how to write 27:00.461 --> 27:03.320 the english language , much less to 27:03.320 --> 27:05.209 have the foreign language fluency 27:05.209 --> 27:07.431 that's pretty much taken for granted in 27:07.431 --> 27:09.598 every other country in the world . And 27:09.598 --> 27:12.040 the first rule of war is to understand 27:12.040 --> 27:15.110 the nature of the enemy . You have a 27:15.110 --> 27:17.060 big advantage of doing that if you 27:17.060 --> 27:19.830 speak their language , like they can 27:19.830 --> 27:22.230 hack us and they know our memes . 27:23.640 --> 27:25.584 We , we don't know how to find the 27:25.584 --> 27:29.110 bathroom in Russian or chinese . So 27:29.120 --> 27:31.740 we are unilaterally disarming when it 27:31.740 --> 27:35.040 comes to our intellectual skills , but 27:35.040 --> 27:38.390 we're so comfortable and coddled , 80% 27:38.390 --> 27:40.446 of Americans , something like that . 27:40.446 --> 27:42.501 Don't have a passport , don't want a 27:42.501 --> 27:44.723 passport . How can you be a world power 27:44.723 --> 27:46.946 If you refuse to look at and understand 27:46.946 --> 27:49.850 and learn about the world , you know , 27:49.850 --> 27:52.060 we've been cushioned for so long . We 27:52.060 --> 27:54.282 take that for granted and no politician 27:54.282 --> 27:56.338 wants to be critical . You know , we 27:56.338 --> 27:58.227 have to be complimentary of every 27:58.227 --> 28:00.640 audience and like give me a break if 28:00.640 --> 28:02.696 you want to win , you've got to have 28:02.696 --> 28:04.862 the skills like in sports and olympics 28:04.862 --> 28:06.918 to win , You're gonna be the best in 28:06.918 --> 28:09.200 the world , not the best in your state , 28:09.200 --> 28:11.367 not the best in your country , but the 28:11.367 --> 28:13.533 best in the world and there are people 28:13.533 --> 28:16.060 who are pursuing that more rigorously 28:17.050 --> 28:20.970 than we are to win . And you bring 28:20.970 --> 28:23.230 up a sports analogy , uh It takes 28:23.230 --> 28:26.210 offense as well as defense and we sit 28:26.210 --> 28:28.099 up here on this stage and you all 28:28.099 --> 28:30.570 talked quite a bit about uh the 28:30.570 --> 28:32.737 defensive capabilities that we have in 28:32.737 --> 28:34.848 the space domain , but you never hear 28:34.848 --> 28:36.459 anything about the offensive 28:36.459 --> 28:38.681 capabilities and I understand that it's 28:38.681 --> 28:40.737 classified almost all of it . Um but 28:41.040 --> 28:43.207 general , do you think we'll ever come 28:43.207 --> 28:45.262 to a point ever be sitting at one of 28:45.262 --> 28:47.610 these forums uh when we can talk about 28:47.610 --> 28:49.820 what the United States is , offensive 28:49.820 --> 28:51.931 weapons capabilities are in space and 28:51.931 --> 28:54.100 if so , what time , what sort of 28:54.110 --> 28:56.277 timeframe do you see on that horizon ? 28:56.740 --> 28:59.290 Um Yeah , I'm not gonna I'm not gonna 28:59.290 --> 29:02.310 talk about capabilities or things like 29:02.310 --> 29:04.960 that , but I will tell you both in in 29:04.960 --> 29:07.270 law that created the Space force and 29:07.280 --> 29:10.400 and uh you know , in the direction for 29:10.400 --> 29:12.511 what we're supposed to do through the 29:12.511 --> 29:14.678 President's Unified Command Plan . Our 29:14.678 --> 29:17.420 job is in in addition to providing the 29:17.420 --> 29:19.309 capabilities we provide today and 29:19.309 --> 29:21.364 provide so effectively for the Joint 29:21.364 --> 29:23.476 Force for the nation for the world is 29:23.476 --> 29:26.060 to protect american issue interests and 29:26.060 --> 29:29.190 defend and protect our capabilities um 29:29.200 --> 29:31.450 which includes the things that are 29:31.450 --> 29:33.630 necessary to protect them through any 29:33.630 --> 29:36.000 host of ways , any hosted domains , 29:36.000 --> 29:38.830 techniques , tools um that are 29:38.830 --> 29:40.941 necessary to do that . And that means 29:40.941 --> 29:42.886 defending and protecting our space 29:42.886 --> 29:44.886 capabilities and looking at ways to 29:44.886 --> 29:47.960 deny a potential officer in conflict 29:47.960 --> 29:49.849 the way to use their capabilities 29:49.849 --> 29:52.420 across a multitude of fronts . It's our 29:52.420 --> 29:54.642 job as not just a space force , but all 29:54.642 --> 29:56.587 members of the military to develop 29:56.587 --> 29:58.809 those concepts , to develop those ideas 29:58.809 --> 30:01.360 to present potential capabilities to 30:01.840 --> 30:03.610 our national leaders in the 30:03.610 --> 30:05.721 administration and Congress as to the 30:05.721 --> 30:07.888 capabilities we should pursue and then 30:07.888 --> 30:09.999 take their direction in terms of what 30:09.999 --> 30:12.110 we feel , what we use and how we do . 30:12.110 --> 30:14.166 So , um , it's no different in space 30:14.166 --> 30:16.110 and that's the approach that we're 30:16.110 --> 30:18.166 taking today chris I don't think you 30:18.166 --> 30:19.999 want to talk about any offensive 30:19.999 --> 30:22.221 systems in space , but on the defensive 30:22.221 --> 30:24.443 side , what does industry need to do to 30:24.443 --> 30:26.610 make us satellites ? Uh , and what 30:26.630 --> 30:28.297 industry do better to make us 30:28.297 --> 30:31.480 satellites more resilient to non 30:31.480 --> 30:33.536 kinetic attacks . Things like lasers 30:33.536 --> 30:36.750 and whatnot . I think I would say we're , 30:36.760 --> 30:38.982 we have a lot of those capabilities and 30:38.982 --> 30:40.871 we're working on them in a , in a 30:40.871 --> 30:42.982 variety of different constellations , 30:42.982 --> 30:45.038 most of which as you would imagine , 30:45.038 --> 30:47.038 are classified . I think one of the 30:47.038 --> 30:49.093 nice things about this industry , we 30:49.093 --> 30:50.760 kind of refer to ourselves as 30:50.760 --> 30:53.093 competitive , competitive rates . Right ? 30:53.093 --> 30:55.260 So I think just being open to bringing 30:55.260 --> 30:57.316 on new entrants commercial companies 30:57.316 --> 30:59.538 and taking the best of the best and you 30:59.538 --> 31:01.649 know , as I mentioned the beginning , 31:01.649 --> 31:03.760 we've , we've been successful and and 31:03.760 --> 31:05.927 honored to have several of these prime 31:05.927 --> 31:07.982 positions on some new constellations 31:07.982 --> 31:10.204 and part of it is just building a great 31:10.204 --> 31:12.316 team and and not trying to completely 31:12.316 --> 31:14.427 vertically integrate all the time and 31:14.427 --> 31:13.990 get those new ideas and bring them 31:13.990 --> 31:16.157 forward . So that's the approach we've 31:16.157 --> 31:18.157 been taken and I think it's working 31:18.157 --> 31:20.379 well . one more question that I have on 31:20.379 --> 31:22.434 both these china's recent hypersonic 31:22.434 --> 31:25.860 test and the Russian asset test . 31:26.340 --> 31:29.810 There's been a lot reported about what 31:29.820 --> 31:31.820 the US knew what it didn't know the 31:31.820 --> 31:33.598 level of surprise within the US 31:33.598 --> 31:35.598 military and the US government . Um 31:35.598 --> 31:37.764 Could we just kind of go down the line 31:37.764 --> 31:39.876 and chris you can sit this one out if 31:39.876 --> 31:42.153 you don't if you don't want to pipe in . 31:42.153 --> 31:44.376 But for the congressman and the general 31:44.376 --> 31:46.320 can I just get you both to kind of 31:46.320 --> 31:48.376 state on the record what you can say 31:48.376 --> 31:50.487 about what the U . S . Government did 31:50.487 --> 31:52.598 know where you did . You have a sense 31:52.598 --> 31:54.709 that these kinds of tests were coming 31:54.709 --> 31:56.542 and what really was the level of 31:56.542 --> 31:58.376 surprise . Please set the record 31:58.376 --> 32:00.320 straight . Uh congressman and then 32:00.320 --> 32:03.080 general , well Russia had tried and 32:03.090 --> 32:05.312 failed a couple of times to do this and 32:05.312 --> 32:07.534 this time they succeeded but we kind of 32:07.534 --> 32:09.590 knew this was part of a pattern . We 32:09.590 --> 32:11.423 have very good information thank 32:11.423 --> 32:13.368 goodness about you know things are 32:13.368 --> 32:15.680 telemetry is very good so we got to 32:15.680 --> 32:17.640 keep it that way and we have to be 32:17.640 --> 32:20.180 prepared to be blinded or jammed or 32:20.180 --> 32:23.130 hacked or spoofed or all these 32:23.140 --> 32:25.084 nefarious techniques that were not 32:25.084 --> 32:28.330 necessarily as good at or we haven't 32:28.330 --> 32:30.552 proliferated those devices the way some 32:30.552 --> 32:32.270 of our partner nations have . 32:34.380 --> 32:36.870 So First of all , let me say , I'm 32:36.870 --> 32:38.960 proud to say the United Space Forces 32:38.970 --> 32:41.137 has recently become the 18th member of 32:41.137 --> 32:43.280 the intelligence community . Um I am 32:43.280 --> 32:45.336 not an intelligence officer nor am I 32:45.336 --> 32:47.558 speaking for the intelligence community 32:47.558 --> 32:50.320 but um these advances and capabilities 32:50.330 --> 32:52.670 are concerning . They are not surprised 32:54.640 --> 32:57.460 um as we , 32:58.740 --> 33:00.950 as we look forward over the next few 33:00.950 --> 33:04.240 years comment that you had had recently 33:04.240 --> 33:07.430 general um I believe you said and I if 33:07.430 --> 33:09.541 you want to correct the record here , 33:09.541 --> 33:12.070 you can . Um but Do you believe that it 33:12.070 --> 33:14.070 is possible that within the next 10 33:14.070 --> 33:15.959 years if the us doesn't make some 33:15.959 --> 33:18.080 changes now that China could overtake 33:18.090 --> 33:19.868 the United States to become the 33:19.868 --> 33:22.034 dominant space power by the end of the 33:22.034 --> 33:23.979 decade . No , no correction of the 33:23.979 --> 33:26.730 record necessary . Um we continue to be 33:26.740 --> 33:28.740 absolutely the best in the world in 33:28.740 --> 33:30.851 space today . That the sophistication 33:30.851 --> 33:32.907 and the quality and the capabilities 33:32.907 --> 33:34.907 that we provide from space . That's 33:34.907 --> 33:36.907 true on a national security front , 33:36.907 --> 33:39.018 both for the intelligence community , 33:39.018 --> 33:38.800 the military side , it's true on the 33:38.800 --> 33:41.022 civil front . It's increasingly true on 33:41.022 --> 33:42.860 the commercial side . Um but the 33:42.860 --> 33:44.971 challenge we face and we talked about 33:44.971 --> 33:47.590 this just briefly earlier is we do this 33:47.590 --> 33:49.800 on too long of the cycle time , the 33:49.810 --> 33:51.866 chinese are not as good but they are 33:51.866 --> 33:54.590 close and the fact that in essence on 33:54.590 --> 33:56.870 average they are building and fielding 33:56.870 --> 33:58.981 and updating their space capabilities 33:58.981 --> 34:01.092 at twice the rate we are , means that 34:01.092 --> 34:03.570 very soon If we don't start 34:03.580 --> 34:05.413 accelerating our development and 34:05.413 --> 34:07.302 delivery capabilities , they will 34:07.302 --> 34:09.524 accede , they will exceed us . And 2030 34:09.524 --> 34:11.691 is not an unreasonable estimate as the 34:11.691 --> 34:13.802 point at which that could occur if we 34:13.802 --> 34:16.350 don't adjust our approach . And do you 34:16.350 --> 34:18.810 feel confident that that everybody on 34:18.810 --> 34:20.921 this panel in this room at this forum 34:20.921 --> 34:23.032 this weekend ? I mean that's a pretty 34:23.032 --> 34:25.430 dire prediction in the sense that to 34:25.430 --> 34:27.486 the best of my understanding , space 34:27.486 --> 34:29.319 superiority is everything else . 34:29.319 --> 34:32.760 Whoever has that upper hand uh wins . 34:33.540 --> 34:36.920 And and I would say that I would say 34:36.920 --> 34:39.087 confidently on this stage and probably 34:39.087 --> 34:41.198 in this room and in a larger national 34:41.198 --> 34:43.198 security space enterprise . I think 34:43.198 --> 34:45.309 everybody agrees on the problem , the 34:45.309 --> 34:47.420 challenges we continue to discuss and 34:47.420 --> 34:49.364 debate and don't agree on the best 34:49.364 --> 34:51.420 solution . That's how they get after 34:51.420 --> 34:53.642 him . I think that's typically what the 34:53.670 --> 34:55.614 let me foot stop this . If I could 34:55.614 --> 34:58.110 please general heighten one of our 34:58.110 --> 35:00.221 great generals just left the pentagon 35:00.740 --> 35:03.300 terribly frustrated that he didn't have 35:03.300 --> 35:05.522 the influence as Vice Chairman of Joint 35:05.522 --> 35:07.940 Chiefs to change our space architecture 35:08.840 --> 35:12.330 like oh my God , and here's the 35:12.330 --> 35:15.510 ultimate insider and see we've gotten 35:15.510 --> 35:19.380 so accustomed to accepting delays and 35:19.420 --> 35:22.980 problems and stuff . You know , let's 35:22.990 --> 35:25.380 be realistic china is the largest 35:25.380 --> 35:27.213 country in the world until India 35:27.213 --> 35:30.280 overtakes them , we congratulate 35:30.280 --> 35:32.280 ourselves when we have a successful 35:32.280 --> 35:34.730 interagency process and then when we 35:34.730 --> 35:36.563 really work hard , it's whole of 35:36.563 --> 35:39.010 government and the chinese are able to 35:39.010 --> 35:42.520 do a whole of society now it's 35:42.520 --> 35:44.687 authoritarian , it's wrong . They have 35:44.687 --> 35:46.631 a million workers in concentration 35:46.631 --> 35:49.350 camps but to some extent it kind of 35:49.350 --> 35:52.260 works when it comes to repeating 35:52.260 --> 35:55.300 testing and sometimes failures , they 35:55.300 --> 35:57.980 are able to push through that . The 35:57.980 --> 35:59.980 playwright Samuel Beckett said fail 35:59.980 --> 36:03.810 again , fail better . That's the 36:03.810 --> 36:06.650 most succinct forward summary that I'm 36:06.650 --> 36:08.340 aware of what basically every 36:08.340 --> 36:09.750 entrepreneur has to do . 36:12.030 --> 36:14.130 But so many people who are in the 36:14.130 --> 36:16.520 bureaucracy don't want any failures at 36:16.520 --> 36:18.780 all . So there too risk averse . We're 36:18.780 --> 36:20.836 not willing to push through and make 36:20.836 --> 36:23.810 great things happen . So we should 36:23.810 --> 36:26.690 never lose our confidence . But we are 36:26.690 --> 36:29.860 facing much dire threat than we faced 36:29.860 --> 36:33.700 with terrorism and this near pier 36:33.700 --> 36:36.680 great powers should get our heads back 36:36.680 --> 36:38.902 in the game . And remember we were good 36:38.902 --> 36:41.930 at this . We had a space come until 36:41.930 --> 36:44.700 Donald Rumsfeld got rid of it in 2002 36:44.910 --> 36:47.430 so he could get focused on the war on 36:47.430 --> 36:50.220 terror . We can do both . We should 36:50.220 --> 36:52.276 have done both . But there's so many 36:52.276 --> 36:55.650 areas of big science and big 36:55.650 --> 36:57.840 defense that we have neglected . 36:59.230 --> 37:02.290 So we've got to get our game on and 37:02.290 --> 37:04.457 that means like look at the panel this 37:04.457 --> 37:06.512 morning , all the polling stuff . Do 37:06.512 --> 37:08.679 you think president , she looks at any 37:08.679 --> 37:12.000 poles see we handicap ourselves from 37:12.000 --> 37:14.410 the start and Karl rove correctly 37:14.410 --> 37:16.410 pointed out foreign affairs are the 37:16.410 --> 37:18.188 issues in which americans thank 37:18.188 --> 37:20.243 goodness realize they know the least 37:20.243 --> 37:22.380 about . So they're willing to give 37:22.380 --> 37:24.490 policymakers some leeway . So 37:24.490 --> 37:26.601 particularly in these areas we should 37:26.601 --> 37:29.220 be more willing to have a long term 37:29.220 --> 37:32.530 strategy that strengthens America , not 37:32.530 --> 37:36.250 look election by election . So how does 37:36.830 --> 37:38.960 a democracy compete with this ? Right 37:38.970 --> 37:41.300 And not just a democracy , but you look 37:41.300 --> 37:43.550 at what happens . Um , you know , when 37:43.550 --> 37:45.494 you have robust competition in the 37:45.494 --> 37:47.610 private sector , when you're dealing 37:47.610 --> 37:50.450 with a government doling out awards and 37:50.450 --> 37:54.100 then companies issue protests 37:54.100 --> 37:56.550 which delay that process even further . 37:56.550 --> 37:59.050 I think chris you can probably uh talk 37:59.050 --> 38:01.510 a little bit about that in terms of 38:01.520 --> 38:03.830 just sort of these these logistical 38:03.840 --> 38:05.920 issues that come with trying to be a 38:05.920 --> 38:08.240 democracy but competing with a country 38:08.240 --> 38:11.690 like china . Let me , let me , I'll get 38:11.690 --> 38:13.746 to that . Let me just pick up on the 38:13.746 --> 38:15.746 prior conversation and I agree with 38:15.746 --> 38:17.690 taking risk and I think we have to 38:17.690 --> 38:19.690 change our thinking from being more 38:19.690 --> 38:21.523 linear to parallel . I'm all for 38:21.523 --> 38:23.746 modeling and sims . I'm all for demos . 38:23.746 --> 38:25.857 We got to do these things in parallel 38:25.857 --> 38:27.857 and get more and more sats up in my 38:27.857 --> 38:30.023 opinion quicker and quicker demo their 38:30.023 --> 38:32.246 capabilities in in that process I think 38:32.246 --> 38:34.468 will help form the space architecture . 38:34.468 --> 38:36.523 We can't sit here and just sketch it 38:36.523 --> 38:38.523 out for years on end . We gotta get 38:38.523 --> 38:40.690 assets in space , see how they perform 38:40.690 --> 38:43.023 and evolve would be relative to protest . 38:43.023 --> 38:45.023 I mean that's , that's , you know , 38:45.023 --> 38:47.023 that's just part of the acquisition 38:47.023 --> 38:49.820 process . Um , you know , and I know 38:49.820 --> 38:52.530 all the acquisition leaders for decades 38:52.530 --> 38:54.586 and they're hard working , honorable 38:54.586 --> 38:56.808 people and guys like me sit up here and 38:56.808 --> 38:58.752 say , I never protest And the , my 38:58.752 --> 39:00.808 colleagues in the audience would say 39:00.808 --> 39:02.974 that , but somehow there's like 1500 a 39:02.974 --> 39:05.030 year . So someone is protesting . So 39:05.030 --> 39:07.030 you know , my , my solution to this 39:07.030 --> 39:09.141 since we're talking sports up here is 39:09.141 --> 39:11.780 give every ceo three red flags and You 39:11.780 --> 39:13.947 throw them over a 12-month period when 39:13.947 --> 39:16.169 you want them . If it's sustained , you 39:16.169 --> 39:18.391 get your flag back . If not you don't . 39:18.391 --> 39:20.558 And when you lose a little contract in 39:20.558 --> 39:22.336 January , you think twice about 39:22.336 --> 39:24.502 protesting because It was 11 months to 39:24.502 --> 39:26.502 go . So that would be my suggestion 39:26.502 --> 39:28.724 pass out the red flag , red flag policy 39:28.890 --> 39:31.001 Congressman . What do you think about 39:31.001 --> 39:34.660 that ? Oh , he's right . We need due 39:34.660 --> 39:37.420 process , but we need to get that on 39:37.420 --> 39:39.610 film . Whoever we're making changes 39:39.610 --> 39:41.777 here today on this panel , we need due 39:41.777 --> 39:45.340 process . But let's not forget success 39:46.820 --> 39:48.876 things have to work and they have to 39:48.876 --> 39:52.510 work fast and other nations are moving 39:52.520 --> 39:56.340 very quickly . So I want to respect all 39:56.340 --> 39:58.507 our companies or other people , but we 39:58.507 --> 40:01.710 are an over lawyered nation and I went 40:01.710 --> 40:04.520 to Harvard law school . Yeah . Some of 40:04.520 --> 40:06.409 the best lawyers in America go to 40:06.409 --> 40:08.490 places like that and their job is to 40:08.490 --> 40:10.657 gum up the works . Their job is to say 40:10.657 --> 40:12.823 no . And there are lots of interesting 40:12.823 --> 40:15.460 reasons to say no but you have to , we 40:15.460 --> 40:17.404 have a phrase in the country . Any 40:17.404 --> 40:19.920 jackass can kick a barn down . It takes 40:19.920 --> 40:23.020 a carpenter to build one . We all got 40:23.020 --> 40:25.580 to be in the carpentry business and 40:25.590 --> 40:27.670 increasingly few of us , they're not 40:27.680 --> 40:29.820 the engineers , they're not the 40:29.820 --> 40:31.876 scientists . There are the folks who 40:31.876 --> 40:34.010 can say no from there . Nice white 40:34.020 --> 40:37.030 collar perch that's not good enough . 40:37.710 --> 40:40.770 So getting that can do get her done 40:40.770 --> 40:44.440 larry the cable attitude works . Let's 40:44.440 --> 40:48.190 have more of that general . Do you want 40:48.190 --> 40:50.246 to weigh in on this ? Do you want to 40:50.246 --> 40:52.468 sit this one out ? I'm going to look to 40:52.468 --> 40:54.579 my left and right and say thank you . 40:54.710 --> 40:58.320 Okay . Um we've got about 10 minutes 40:58.320 --> 41:00.520 left in this panel . So I'd like to do 41:00.530 --> 41:03.370 uh two or three more questions and then 41:03.380 --> 41:05.680 bring some in from from all of you have 41:05.680 --> 41:09.260 been watching this . Um I know that 41:09.260 --> 41:12.800 phrase space race elicits some some 41:12.810 --> 41:14.921 some groans and eye rolls . It's been 41:14.921 --> 41:17.530 overused over the years . Um , but I 41:17.540 --> 41:20.020 think the U . S . Is at the point where 41:20.610 --> 41:23.650 uh with china where the question needs 41:23.650 --> 41:26.150 to be asked of all of these panelists . 41:26.160 --> 41:28.160 So I would just like to go down the 41:28.160 --> 41:30.530 line and just hear it from from all of 41:30.530 --> 41:32.930 you straight . Do you think that the U . 41:32.930 --> 41:36.440 S . Is now in a space race with china 41:37.310 --> 41:41.280 congressman hell yes but put it 41:41.280 --> 41:43.940 in perspective we gave the world 41:43.950 --> 41:46.030 probably the greatest gift in all of 41:46.030 --> 41:48.197 human history . When we gave the world 41:48.197 --> 41:51.910 GPS a mill SAT system . We didn't even 41:51.910 --> 41:54.077 think of opening up to the world until 41:54.077 --> 41:56.680 the korean airliner was . They didn't 41:56.680 --> 41:58.736 know where they were . So we made it 41:58.736 --> 42:00.791 free . That's a trillion dollar year 42:00.791 --> 42:02.902 minimum benefit to the whole planet . 42:02.902 --> 42:05.340 And we didn't think of charging You 42:05.340 --> 42:07.760 know that's greater than 1000 belt and 42:07.760 --> 42:10.330 roads . Let's see our messaging is so 42:10.330 --> 42:12.580 poor . Everybody takes it for granted 42:12.590 --> 42:15.930 like this is a gift to humanity . And 42:15.930 --> 42:17.597 see that was from our Defense 42:17.597 --> 42:20.500 department . So if you put things in 42:20.500 --> 42:22.556 perspective there needs to be a race 42:22.556 --> 42:25.550 for benevolence and a race for defense 42:26.500 --> 42:29.580 and also race to be able to save your 42:29.580 --> 42:33.270 country if defense doesn't work . And 42:33.500 --> 42:35.722 some of these other races were not even 42:35.722 --> 42:38.820 envisioning the competition and it's a 42:38.820 --> 42:40.931 little late now to collect on the GPS 42:40.931 --> 42:43.340 thing . But like that was amazing . And 42:43.340 --> 42:46.040 we should it's completely transformed 42:46.040 --> 42:49.840 society in every country . But 42:49.850 --> 42:51.740 today other nations are building 42:51.740 --> 42:54.680 competitive systems so that that gives 42:54.680 --> 42:56.960 them a possible incentive to take out 42:56.970 --> 43:00.890 our GPS . And sometimes we don't repair 43:00.890 --> 43:03.001 a GPS like we should like we had an M 43:03.001 --> 43:05.190 code problem for years and Our ground 43:05.190 --> 43:07.079 stations were 15 years behind the 43:07.079 --> 43:09.301 satellites that were already launched . 43:09.301 --> 43:12.520 We look like idiots . So what's you saw 43:12.520 --> 43:14.742 the slide their competency of leaders . 43:15.200 --> 43:17.200 We have a problem with that in this 43:17.200 --> 43:19.740 country because sometimes voters aren't 43:19.740 --> 43:21.573 seeking competence . They prefer 43:21.573 --> 43:23.930 amusement . And sometimes 43:24.600 --> 43:26.790 legislators themselves don't focus on 43:26.790 --> 43:29.540 competence . It's more on demagoguery 43:29.540 --> 43:32.470 and vote getting general . Is the U . S . 43:32.470 --> 43:34.192 In the space race with china . 43:34.192 --> 43:35.803 Absolutely . In in strategic 43:35.803 --> 43:38.026 competition with china in many , many , 43:38.026 --> 43:40.710 many areas in space is absolutely I 43:40.710 --> 43:42.766 would say . I hope so . Because last 43:42.766 --> 43:45.170 time we had the the space race , you 43:45.170 --> 43:47.337 know , go back to the Apollo era . Got 43:47.337 --> 43:49.337 everybody excited . We've got a lot 43:49.337 --> 43:51.448 more people interested in engineering 43:51.448 --> 43:53.670 and it really boosted the workforce . I 43:53.670 --> 43:55.726 think we all could use more and more 43:55.726 --> 43:57.948 engineers and more and more talent . So 43:57.948 --> 43:57.810 I'm thinking , you know , we are , we 43:57.810 --> 43:59.866 do a better job with the messaging , 43:59.866 --> 44:02.032 people get excited . They want to come 44:02.032 --> 44:04.143 join the military . They want to come 44:04.143 --> 44:04.110 join companies like mine and those 44:04.110 --> 44:06.332 represented in the audience today . And 44:06.332 --> 44:08.499 I think that's good . I want people to 44:08.499 --> 44:10.721 wake up and say , I don't want to go to 44:10.721 --> 44:10.640 facebook . I mean those guys aren't 44:10.640 --> 44:12.751 what they used to be . I want to come 44:12.751 --> 44:14.973 work for a defense contractor , a space 44:14.973 --> 44:17.140 company , commercial company . And and 44:17.140 --> 44:19.251 I agree with the congressman on GPS , 44:19.251 --> 44:21.251 we've got to continue with the next 44:21.251 --> 44:23.251 generations more resiliency and and 44:23.251 --> 44:25.590 make sure that , you know , we talk 44:25.590 --> 44:27.550 about space as being the next war 44:27.550 --> 44:29.860 fighting domain . I think the economy 44:29.860 --> 44:32.027 is the next war fighting domain and it 44:32.027 --> 44:34.082 is in space . So the two are clearly 44:34.082 --> 44:36.138 linked chris you bring up the Apollo 44:36.138 --> 44:38.193 program and I know this is a defense 44:38.193 --> 44:40.360 forum , but I would like to get in one 44:40.360 --> 44:42.693 question about the civil side of things , 44:42.693 --> 44:44.582 especially given the fact that um 44:44.582 --> 44:47.660 recently Russia's space agency has 44:47.660 --> 44:50.540 announced plans to team up with china 44:50.550 --> 44:53.730 to build a lunar base . And obviously 44:53.730 --> 44:55.786 this would compete with Nasa and the 44:55.786 --> 44:58.008 United States has plans to build a base 44:58.008 --> 45:00.174 on the moon as well . And in the midst 45:00.174 --> 45:02.230 of all this , we're still teaming up 45:02.230 --> 45:04.430 with uh Roskosmos with the 45:04.430 --> 45:06.763 international space station and whatnot . 45:06.763 --> 45:08.890 So what congressman cooper , what do 45:08.890 --> 45:11.310 you think about this ? This plan for 45:11.590 --> 45:13.730 Russia to team up with the chinese to 45:13.730 --> 45:16.870 build a base on the moon ? Um , can we 45:16.870 --> 45:19.560 continue , can the US continue to to 45:19.560 --> 45:22.070 work with them if they go forward with 45:22.070 --> 45:25.910 that ? Oh remember every 45:25.910 --> 45:27.966 forum we've ever had in America says 45:27.966 --> 45:30.132 one of our strategic strengths are our 45:30.132 --> 45:33.540 alliances and we think the other side 45:33.540 --> 45:36.190 isn't gonna try to copy that . And 45:36.190 --> 45:39.130 who's going to ally with him ? Maybe a 45:39.130 --> 45:41.940 vassal state , maybe another 45:41.940 --> 45:44.051 authoritarian state . So we shouldn't 45:44.051 --> 45:46.273 be surprised that they try to mimic our 45:46.273 --> 45:49.010 behavior with the first Iraq war . We 45:49.010 --> 45:51.232 taught the rest of the world more about 45:51.232 --> 45:54.620 war fighting than we knew . We maybe 45:54.620 --> 45:56.620 shouldn't have used all those fancy 45:56.620 --> 45:58.509 weapons or help people understand 45:58.509 --> 46:00.760 missiles going down smokestacks because 46:01.060 --> 46:03.510 that dazzled them but then they copied 46:03.510 --> 46:06.790 us as human beings do . 46:08.680 --> 46:10.640 So we've got to understand there's 46:10.640 --> 46:14.140 action reaction so I hope they're 46:14.390 --> 46:16.612 moon station is for peaceful purposes . 46:16.612 --> 46:18.668 I'm worried that the chinese already 46:18.668 --> 46:20.890 have something on the other side of the 46:20.890 --> 46:20.410 moon that we can't even see or detect 46:20.780 --> 46:23.890 like But see we gave up on the moon 46:23.900 --> 46:27.470 about 30 years ago we stopped caring 46:27.470 --> 46:29.192 about big science . It was too 46:29.192 --> 46:31.248 expensive . We didn't want to do the 46:31.248 --> 46:33.414 Nasa budget or whatever excuse was and 46:33.780 --> 46:37.250 of few casualties in the Apollo program 46:37.540 --> 46:39.596 shouldn't have stopped us from doing 46:39.596 --> 46:41.707 that . But we get so risk averse . So 46:41.707 --> 46:45.320 we've got to be bold and pursue these 46:45.320 --> 46:47.550 things . We have a huge advantage . A 46:47.550 --> 46:49.550 huge head start if we're just smart 46:49.550 --> 46:52.110 enough to keep it . I'd like to ask one 46:52.110 --> 46:54.380 question that was submitted by somebody 46:54.380 --> 46:56.491 who's watching . So thank you for all 46:56.491 --> 46:58.602 these questions . Um And the question 46:58.602 --> 47:00.713 is one of the greatest challenges for 47:00.713 --> 47:02.769 space activity both domestically and 47:02.769 --> 47:04.769 internationally is how we deal with 47:04.769 --> 47:06.880 space traffic management . So what is 47:06.880 --> 47:09.102 the right answer to how we manage space 47:09.102 --> 47:11.990 traffic ? Who would like to feel that ? 47:13.560 --> 47:17.060 So we need to offload the civilian 47:17.070 --> 47:19.880 aspect of it to a neutral or at least 47:19.880 --> 47:21.880 civilian agency . And that's been a 47:21.880 --> 47:24.250 very slow process . Of course we need 47:24.250 --> 47:26.472 to keep the best capability for our own 47:26.472 --> 47:28.780 military but there's got to be a FAA 47:28.780 --> 47:31.300 for the world so they can guide others 47:31.310 --> 47:35.240 to safety . Absolutely . Um um 47:35.240 --> 47:37.880 The space force does this because 47:37.890 --> 47:40.180 nobody in the world today , nobody else 47:40.180 --> 47:42.180 in the world today can and will but 47:42.180 --> 47:44.291 absolutely agree . This is an area of 47:44.291 --> 47:46.291 regulation and we need a regulatory 47:46.291 --> 47:48.860 agency to do it . Um At the same time , 47:48.870 --> 47:50.870 the broader sense of debris and the 47:50.870 --> 47:53.060 issues caused and the proliferation 47:53.060 --> 47:56.930 even of active satellites requires um 47:56.940 --> 48:00.650 some some adjustments to behavior that 48:00.660 --> 48:03.500 uh talk to things like let's not 48:03.570 --> 48:05.737 produce additional debris , especially 48:05.737 --> 48:08.014 not an incredibly irresponsible manner . 48:08.014 --> 48:10.126 Let's talk about how these incredibly 48:10.126 --> 48:12.370 capable of proliferating systems on the 48:12.370 --> 48:14.700 commercial side and others don't just 48:14.700 --> 48:16.830 operate effectively , but how we over 48:16.830 --> 48:18.941 the long term or stewards to let them 48:18.941 --> 48:20.997 in essence clean up after themselves 48:20.997 --> 48:22.886 when they're done a whole host of 48:22.886 --> 48:25.108 regulatory aspects that need to be done 48:25.108 --> 48:27.219 In space traffic management and other 48:27.219 --> 48:28.997 areas . We really do need civil 48:28.997 --> 48:30.997 agencies and regulatory agencies to 48:30.997 --> 48:33.108 weigh in so that we can get about the 48:33.108 --> 48:35.163 business that we need to be well and 48:35.163 --> 48:37.386 also in establishing rules and norms in 48:37.386 --> 48:39.330 space . Um you look back the outer 48:39.330 --> 48:41.330 space treaty 1967 , I mean , it's I 48:41.330 --> 48:43.330 think everybody can agree that it's 48:43.330 --> 48:46.200 well past time that , you know , new 48:46.200 --> 48:48.089 rules and norms are discussed and 48:48.089 --> 48:50.630 adopted , but um we can talk all we 48:50.630 --> 48:52.600 want . But you know generally 48:52.600 --> 48:54.489 absolutely . And the Secretary of 48:54.489 --> 48:56.711 Defense just recently published outline 48:56.711 --> 48:58.878 what we call the principles of tenants 48:58.878 --> 49:00.656 of responsible behavior for our 49:00.656 --> 49:02.822 activities in space and there are five 49:02.822 --> 49:04.767 of them limiting the generation of 49:04.767 --> 49:06.767 along the debris , avoiding harmful 49:06.767 --> 49:08.656 interference , operate safely and 49:08.656 --> 49:10.656 maneuver safely and other spaces be 49:10.656 --> 49:12.322 transparent in what you do be 49:12.322 --> 49:14.544 professional in space . He's identified 49:14.544 --> 49:16.544 those , he's established those , we 49:16.544 --> 49:18.711 have followed them for a long time and 49:18.711 --> 49:20.822 will continue to , it's now incumbent 49:20.822 --> 49:22.989 the space depart uh State Department . 49:22.989 --> 49:24.989 I'm sorry . He's working with other 49:24.989 --> 49:27.211 nations through the U . N . To really , 49:27.211 --> 49:29.322 really drive that forward . It's time 49:29.322 --> 49:31.544 to establish those no kidding norms and 49:31.544 --> 49:33.711 practices and standards of behavior in 49:33.711 --> 49:35.910 space congressman really quickly chris 49:35.910 --> 49:38.021 do you want to just do real quick ? I 49:38.021 --> 49:39.966 would just say it seems I see some 49:39.966 --> 49:39.840 people in the audience that are 49:39.840 --> 49:42.062 investing a lot in space tourism . So I 49:42.062 --> 49:44.340 think that's a new and evolving market . 49:44.340 --> 49:46.173 So I think that just adds to the 49:46.173 --> 49:48.173 complexity . People are going to go 49:48.173 --> 49:50.284 into space and you know , unlike your 49:50.284 --> 49:52.507 parents actually pay money and go there 49:52.507 --> 49:52.210 and have a tour . You know , we've got 49:52.210 --> 49:54.210 to make sure that it's safe and the 49:54.210 --> 49:56.970 traffic is controlled . I'm sorry . Oh 49:56.970 --> 49:58.970 no . Now you're getting into a real 49:58.970 --> 50:01.303 debate who qualifies to be an astronaut . 50:01.303 --> 50:03.359 We only have less than three minutes 50:03.359 --> 50:02.870 left so we're not gonna get into that 50:02.870 --> 50:05.930 one on this panel . Um , I'd like to to 50:05.930 --> 50:07.986 finish the panel by playing a really 50:07.986 --> 50:09.986 fun game that I like to call , what 50:09.986 --> 50:12.240 keeps you up at night . So if we could 50:12.240 --> 50:14.129 just kind of go down the line and 50:14.129 --> 50:16.184 before we go , I'd love to hear from 50:16.184 --> 50:18.351 each of you about what keeps you up at 50:18.351 --> 50:20.462 night other than a dog snoring . That 50:20.462 --> 50:22.629 doesn't count congressman . What keeps 50:22.629 --> 50:25.530 you up at night ? Because adversaries 50:25.530 --> 50:27.863 and would be adversaries are inevitable . 50:28.360 --> 50:31.020 What keeps me up at night is our 50:31.020 --> 50:33.430 bureaucracy and our slowness in 50:33.430 --> 50:35.597 responding to those threats because we 50:35.597 --> 50:38.390 have control over our bureaucracy and 50:38.390 --> 50:40.890 yet we're not making it much better 50:42.760 --> 50:46.280 general . Um , the nation has given us 50:46.290 --> 50:48.540 a tremendous challenge and an 50:48.540 --> 50:51.040 opportunity they've told us to create 50:51.040 --> 50:53.800 what this nation needs to avoid a 50:53.800 --> 50:55.689 crisis or be able to respond to a 50:55.689 --> 50:57.689 crisis in the future . We've gotten 50:57.689 --> 50:59.610 support from both both houses of 50:59.620 --> 51:01.676 Congress , both sides of the aisle , 51:01.676 --> 51:03.676 multiple administrations now . Um , 51:03.676 --> 51:05.731 we've been adequately resourced . We 51:05.731 --> 51:08.064 can always talk about what else we need . 51:08.064 --> 51:10.176 We've been adequately resourced to do 51:10.176 --> 51:12.176 this . What keeps me up at night is 51:12.176 --> 51:14.330 ensuring that we do not fail in the 51:14.330 --> 51:16.600 responsibility that we've been given 51:16.610 --> 51:18.777 and the support we've been given to do 51:18.960 --> 51:21.127 chris what keeps you up at night . I'm 51:21.127 --> 51:23.349 an optimistic guy . So what keeps me up 51:23.349 --> 51:25.238 at night is I'm excited about the 51:25.238 --> 51:27.404 future and I can't wait to wake up and 51:27.404 --> 51:29.404 get back to work because I think we 51:29.404 --> 51:31.571 have so much potential as a nation . I 51:31.571 --> 51:31.140 feel like we're coming together against 51:31.140 --> 51:33.251 the common cause . And I think that's 51:33.251 --> 51:35.473 exciting . And you know , that keeps me 51:35.473 --> 51:37.584 up on the positive side . Well , with 51:37.584 --> 51:39.640 that , I think we'd like to end on a 51:39.640 --> 51:42.220 high note . Thank you chris for for 51:42.220 --> 51:44.170 always being an optimist , general 51:44.170 --> 51:46.600 Thompson for coming in at the last 51:46.600 --> 51:48.489 minute and filling in for General 51:48.489 --> 51:50.656 Raymond . We hope he's doing all right 51:50.656 --> 51:53.190 with that , a potential covid exposure . 51:53.260 --> 51:55.371 And congressman cooper , thank you so 51:55.371 --> 51:57.840 much for all of your insights . Um , 51:57.850 --> 52:00.072 and thanks all of you for listening and 52:00.072 --> 52:02.072 watching . And I hope you enjoy the 52:02.072 --> 52:04.070 rest of your day .