WEBVTT 00:00.140 --> 00:03.550 water . Uh huh . Before I begin my 00:03.550 --> 00:05.383 formal remarks , I would like to 00:05.383 --> 00:06.994 recognize the passing of two 00:06.994 --> 00:09.250 extraordinary soldiers . General Colin 00:09.250 --> 00:11.760 Powell and General Raymond Odierno . 00:12.440 --> 00:14.607 Their selfless service in the nation , 00:14.607 --> 00:16.620 remarkable courage and remarkable 00:16.630 --> 00:18.797 commitment to the men and women of our 00:18.797 --> 00:21.000 armed services has sustained and 00:21.000 --> 00:23.930 inspired us all . They have left the 00:23.930 --> 00:26.020 legacy of honor and commitment that 00:26.020 --> 00:28.187 will be a beacon future generations of 00:28.187 --> 00:30.540 americans to their families . I express 00:30.540 --> 00:33.520 our profound sympathy . Thank you very 00:33.520 --> 00:36.370 much . The committee meets this morning 00:36.370 --> 00:38.750 to consider nominations of Mr Nicholas 00:38.750 --> 00:40.970 curtain to be Director of Operational 00:40.970 --> 00:44.050 Test and evaluation . Miss Alexandra 00:44.060 --> 00:46.330 baker to be Deputy Under Secretary of 00:46.330 --> 00:49.070 Defense for Policy . Mr john Coffee to 00:49.070 --> 00:51.292 be general Counsel of the Department of 00:51.292 --> 00:53.290 the Navy and mr Douglas push to be 00:53.290 --> 00:55.290 Assistant secretary of the Army for 00:55.290 --> 00:57.660 acquisition , logistics and technology . 00:58.040 --> 01:00.040 I thank the nominees for their long 01:00.040 --> 01:02.262 careers of service in the United States 01:02.262 --> 01:04.373 and their willingness to assume these 01:04.373 --> 01:06.540 important roles . I would also like to 01:06.540 --> 01:08.762 welcome the family members who are with 01:08.762 --> 01:10.873 us today . Mr Girton . I welcome your 01:10.873 --> 01:12.929 wife , Maria son Enrico and daughter 01:12.929 --> 01:14.984 Isabella Miss baker . I welcome your 01:14.984 --> 01:17.151 husband Sam Mr Coffee . I welcome your 01:17.151 --> 01:19.480 wife and son Connor and mr Bush . I 01:19.480 --> 01:22.030 welcome your wife Patricia Mr Gert . 01:22.030 --> 01:24.252 You are nominated to be the Director of 01:24.252 --> 01:26.470 Operational Test and Evaluation or bot 01:26.470 --> 01:29.090 any this position is responsible . All 01:29.100 --> 01:31.240 operational and live fire , review 01:31.250 --> 01:33.460 testing and evaluation activities . 01:33.940 --> 01:35.884 Your long career of technology and 01:35.884 --> 01:38.107 weapons Development , Military industry 01:38.107 --> 01:40.107 and academic roles should serve you 01:40.107 --> 01:42.329 well . There are a number of challenges 01:42.329 --> 01:44.551 that will require your attention within 01:44.551 --> 01:46.273 the Department of note . It is 01:46.273 --> 01:48.273 important for D . O . T . Any to be 01:48.273 --> 01:50.329 independent and resist pressure from 01:50.329 --> 01:52.329 the services and industry to deploy 01:52.329 --> 01:54.496 systems that are not yet operationally 01:54.496 --> 01:56.718 effective . You will be responsible for 01:56.718 --> 01:58.607 oversight of a number of programs 01:58.607 --> 02:00.530 Including the F- 35 , the Army 02:00.540 --> 02:02.762 Integrated Visual augmentation system , 02:03.000 --> 02:05.160 the Navy Ford , class carrier , space 02:05.160 --> 02:07.271 satellite systems and missile defense 02:07.271 --> 02:09.160 programs . While there's always a 02:09.160 --> 02:10.882 demand to move more rapidly in 02:10.882 --> 02:13.500 acquisition is critical that you ensure 02:13.510 --> 02:16.090 we do so prudently indeed , we must 02:16.090 --> 02:18.680 move both rapidly and prudently in 02:18.680 --> 02:20.902 acquisition . Another challenge will be 02:20.902 --> 02:23.720 developing , developing ways to test 02:23.720 --> 02:25.760 new information technology programs 02:26.140 --> 02:28.196 including commercial cloud computing 02:28.196 --> 02:30.300 services as well as ensuring robust 02:30.520 --> 02:32.760 cybersecurity testing on all systems . 02:33.340 --> 02:35.562 In addition , concerns have been raised 02:35.562 --> 02:37.784 about prudential reductions in the work 02:37.784 --> 02:40.007 force that supports live fire testing . 02:40.007 --> 02:42.229 I would ask that you share your plan on 02:42.229 --> 02:44.173 addressing these challenges . Miss 02:44.173 --> 02:46.284 baker . You are nominated to serve as 02:46.284 --> 02:48.340 deputy undersecretary of Defense for 02:48.340 --> 02:50.396 Policy . Your current role as Senior 02:50.396 --> 02:52.562 Director for Strategic Planning on the 02:52.562 --> 02:54.729 National Security Council and previous 02:54.729 --> 02:56.784 experience in Congress . The D O . D 02:56.784 --> 02:58.840 and O and B will be valuable in this 02:58.840 --> 03:01.007 new position . If confirmed , you will 03:01.007 --> 03:03.062 have a broad scope of responsibility 03:03.062 --> 03:04.784 and advising and assisting the 03:04.784 --> 03:06.840 undersecretary of Defense for policy 03:06.840 --> 03:08.951 and the sector defense and a range of 03:08.951 --> 03:11.118 issues including strategic competition 03:11.118 --> 03:13.062 with a rising china . The covid 19 03:13.062 --> 03:15.220 pandemic cyber threats and climate 03:15.220 --> 03:18.130 change In the immediate term , the 03:18.130 --> 03:21.310 policy offices revising the 2022 03:21.490 --> 03:24.290 National Defense Strategy . The NDS 03:24.290 --> 03:26.401 will play a critical role in defining 03:26.401 --> 03:28.401 the United States national security 03:28.401 --> 03:30.623 priorities . But coordinated across the 03:30.623 --> 03:32.734 department and the federal government 03:32.734 --> 03:34.846 will be a challenge . I hope you will 03:34.846 --> 03:37.068 share how you plan to integrate the NDS 03:37.068 --> 03:36.850 with the administration's whole of 03:36.850 --> 03:39.040 government approach . In the coming 03:39.040 --> 03:40.929 months , the department will also 03:40.929 --> 03:42.984 publish the nuclear posture review . 03:42.984 --> 03:45.096 I'm interested in your testimony on a 03:45.096 --> 03:47.151 number of issues were leading to the 03:47.151 --> 03:49.096 nuclear posture review , including 03:49.096 --> 03:51.262 modernization of all three legs of the 03:51.262 --> 03:53.540 triad , updating on nuclear facilities , 03:53.540 --> 03:55.596 the role of arms control and ongoing 03:55.596 --> 03:58.490 strategic stability talks . Mr Coffee , 03:58.490 --> 04:00.546 your nominee to be general counsel , 04:00.546 --> 04:02.712 Department of the Navy . This position 04:02.712 --> 04:04.823 is responsible writing legal services 04:04.823 --> 04:06.879 throughout the department and a vast 04:06.879 --> 04:08.657 array of fields , including the 04:08.657 --> 04:10.934 acquisition related law , arms control , 04:10.934 --> 04:12.823 business and commercial law , and 04:12.823 --> 04:15.046 national security rate law , among many 04:15.046 --> 04:16.934 others . The general counsel also 04:16.934 --> 04:18.768 assists in ethics intelligence , 04:18.768 --> 04:20.601 criminal investigation , and law 04:20.601 --> 04:22.712 enforcement activities . I would note 04:22.712 --> 04:24.712 your extensive career in the Navy , 04:24.712 --> 04:27.650 your extensive legal career and you 04:27.650 --> 04:30.170 should be well prepared for this . Very 04:30.170 --> 04:32.490 responsible job . One of Secretary 04:32.490 --> 04:34.990 Austin's priorities is to eradicate 04:34.990 --> 04:37.290 extremism within the ranks . While we 04:37.290 --> 04:39.457 continue to believe that the number of 04:39.457 --> 04:41.790 extremists and ranks remains very small . 04:41.790 --> 04:43.901 Even one is too many . And I hope you 04:43.901 --> 04:45.790 will share your views and how you 04:45.790 --> 04:48.012 approach this issue , especially as the 04:48.012 --> 04:50.179 line between action thought and speech 04:50.179 --> 04:52.290 becomes much more difficult to find . 04:52.290 --> 04:54.179 Mr Bush . You are nominated to be 04:54.179 --> 04:56.179 Assistant secretary of the Army for 04:56.179 --> 04:58.457 acquisition , logistics and technology . 04:58.457 --> 05:00.512 If confirmed , you will oversee Army 05:00.512 --> 05:02.568 research , development , acquisition 05:02.568 --> 05:04.623 programs , sustainment and logistics 05:04.623 --> 05:06.734 activities as the army isn't taking , 05:06.770 --> 05:08.492 undertaking its most expansive 05:08.492 --> 05:10.780 modernization effort in decades . You 05:10.780 --> 05:12.947 will be well served by your experience 05:12.947 --> 05:15.002 which includes nearly two decades of 05:15.002 --> 05:16.724 congressional legislative work 05:16.724 --> 05:18.947 including with the House Armed Services 05:18.947 --> 05:21.169 Committee . You will be responsible for 05:21.169 --> 05:23.224 balancing the need for rigorous cost 05:23.224 --> 05:25.058 management with the need to move 05:25.058 --> 05:27.113 quickly and use tailored acquisition 05:27.113 --> 05:29.336 approaches to achieve this . It will be 05:29.336 --> 05:31.280 necessary to strengthen the armies 05:31.280 --> 05:33.447 workforce and capacity while improving 05:33.447 --> 05:35.613 data available to the army and D . O . 05:35.613 --> 05:37.613 D . To more effectively acquire and 05:37.613 --> 05:39.280 sustain army welcomes systems 05:39.600 --> 05:41.640 importantly , you will also be 05:41.640 --> 05:43.529 responsible for overcoming the so 05:43.529 --> 05:45.730 called Valley of Death , ensuring that 05:45.730 --> 05:47.619 the Army is able to turn research 05:47.619 --> 05:49.620 innovations into real operational 05:49.620 --> 05:51.690 capabilities . This will require 05:51.690 --> 05:53.579 strengthening connections between 05:53.579 --> 05:55.801 research and engineering activities and 05:55.801 --> 05:57.801 the Army's acquisition programs and 05:57.801 --> 05:59.746 defense contractors . It will also 05:59.746 --> 06:01.968 include investing in and protecting the 06:01.968 --> 06:03.690 people and infrastructure that 06:03.690 --> 06:05.857 organizations like the Army's labs and 06:05.857 --> 06:08.079 test ranges . I look forward to hearing 06:08.079 --> 06:10.023 how you address these challenges . 06:10.023 --> 06:11.912 Thank you again to the nominees . 06:11.912 --> 06:15.400 Senator Inhofe is not able to join us 06:15.400 --> 06:17.178 this morning but I will request 06:17.178 --> 06:19.370 unanimous consent to include his 06:19.370 --> 06:21.720 opening statement and record without 06:21.730 --> 06:24.530 objection . So ordered and now Mr 06:24.530 --> 06:26.474 Burton could you please give you a 06:26.474 --> 06:29.860 statement ? Chairman read ranking 06:29.860 --> 06:31.693 member in half and distinguished 06:31.693 --> 06:33.916 members of the committee is a privilege 06:33.916 --> 06:35.749 to be with you here today . I am 06:35.749 --> 06:37.804 humbled to be considered to serve as 06:37.804 --> 06:39.916 the director for operational test and 06:39.916 --> 06:41.638 evaluation . I'd like to thank 06:41.638 --> 06:43.804 President biden . Secretary Austin and 06:43.804 --> 06:45.916 Deputy secretary Hicks for entrusting 06:45.916 --> 06:47.971 me with this nomination . Would also 06:47.971 --> 06:47.630 like to thank my family who see behind 06:47.630 --> 06:49.741 me for the support Maria , my wife of 06:49.741 --> 06:51.852 almost 20 years and are twin Children 06:51.852 --> 06:53.852 in recon Isabella of whom were both 06:53.852 --> 06:56.310 immensely proud . The greatest asset of 06:56.310 --> 06:57.921 the Department of Defense is 06:57.921 --> 06:59.866 undoubtedly its people are men and 06:59.866 --> 07:01.977 women in uniform and our civilian and 07:01.977 --> 07:04.143 contractor workforce make the american 07:04.143 --> 07:05.977 military the best in the world . 07:05.977 --> 07:05.880 However , our ability to defend the 07:05.880 --> 07:08.102 nation also depends on the capabilities 07:08.102 --> 07:10.190 of our technologies which must be 07:10.190 --> 07:12.760 tested as they would be used in combat . 07:13.340 --> 07:15.229 Injecting operationally realistic 07:15.229 --> 07:17.007 testing early into the programs 07:17.007 --> 07:19.062 development allows the department to 07:19.062 --> 07:21.118 implement affordable , comprehensive 07:21.118 --> 07:23.062 changes , making the best the most 07:23.062 --> 07:25.500 efficient use of taxpayer resources and 07:25.500 --> 07:27.389 ultimately achieving the greatest 07:27.389 --> 07:29.540 possible performance transparency on 07:29.540 --> 07:31.762 the results of those tests are critical 07:31.762 --> 07:33.596 to ensuring the most effective , 07:33.596 --> 07:35.818 suitable survivable and where necessary 07:35.818 --> 07:38.040 lethal performance . If confirmed . I'm 07:38.040 --> 07:40.151 committed to ensuring that the office 07:40.151 --> 07:42.373 of the Director of operational test and 07:42.373 --> 07:44.540 evaluation will deliver an independent 07:44.540 --> 07:46.707 objective and authoritative evaluation 07:46.707 --> 07:48.540 of system performance to you and 07:48.540 --> 07:50.540 Secretary Austin testing the way we 07:50.540 --> 07:52.373 fight in the future will require 07:52.373 --> 07:54.880 evolutionary and revolutionary changes . 07:54.890 --> 07:56.850 Ones that cannot be successfully 07:56.850 --> 07:59.183 planned or implemented without teamwork . 07:59.740 --> 08:01.851 It will require increased reliance on 08:01.851 --> 08:04.073 state of the art testing infrastructure 08:04.073 --> 08:06.184 and tools and a well trained test and 08:06.184 --> 08:08.270 evaluation workforce . In order to 08:08.270 --> 08:10.370 support faster and more efficient 08:10.380 --> 08:12.860 evaluation of complex interconnected 08:12.860 --> 08:14.830 systems in a joint multi domain 08:14.840 --> 08:16.840 operational environment . Hillary 08:16.850 --> 08:19.290 require reliance on innovative methods 08:19.290 --> 08:21.590 like credible virtual environments and 08:21.590 --> 08:23.423 modeling and simulation tools to 08:23.423 --> 08:25.380 complement on range and laboratory 08:25.380 --> 08:27.390 testing . Have confirmed . I'm 08:27.390 --> 08:29.501 committed to working closely with our 08:29.501 --> 08:31.446 research and engineering community 08:31.446 --> 08:33.557 acquisition programs and the services 08:33.557 --> 08:35.168 so that together we can most 08:35.168 --> 08:37.279 effectively deliver capability to the 08:37.279 --> 08:39.390 joint force . I think this commitment 08:39.390 --> 08:41.612 on national security seriously . Having 08:41.612 --> 08:43.779 spent the past four decades working on 08:43.779 --> 08:45.668 developing testing , fielding and 08:45.668 --> 08:47.890 researching the acquisition of military 08:47.890 --> 08:49.890 systems . I started my career as an 08:49.890 --> 08:52.001 enlisted nuclear power plant operator 08:52.001 --> 08:51.550 at the submarines . I later 08:51.550 --> 08:53.717 transitioned to the reserves and after 08:53.717 --> 08:55.772 graduating college landed a job as a 08:55.772 --> 08:57.606 Navy civilian engineer . Shortly 08:57.606 --> 08:59.828 afterwards , I was also commissioned as 08:59.828 --> 09:02.161 a Navy Reserve Engineering duty officer . 09:02.161 --> 09:04.383 This citizen sailor pairing would serve 09:04.383 --> 09:06.606 me well the following decade by keeping 09:06.606 --> 09:08.550 me grounded and what it took to do 09:08.550 --> 09:10.717 maintenance operations and testing the 09:10.717 --> 09:13.050 fleet while also developing new systems . 09:13.050 --> 09:15.217 Testing has long been central 10ant to 09:15.217 --> 09:17.106 this experience . From developing 09:17.106 --> 09:19.161 automated test equipment for weapons 09:19.161 --> 09:21.328 systems , to testing and deploying new 09:21.328 --> 09:23.439 sensors and combat management systems 09:23.439 --> 09:25.550 that were built to change and improve 09:25.550 --> 09:27.328 over time improving acquisition 09:27.328 --> 09:29.106 practices for national national 09:29.106 --> 09:30.939 security systems has long been a 09:30.939 --> 09:33.161 passion of mine . It started when I was 09:33.161 --> 09:35.383 fortunate enough to be on the team that 09:35.383 --> 09:37.606 pioneered the use of open architectures 09:37.606 --> 09:39.772 for solar systems . In the mid 1990s , 09:39.772 --> 09:41.439 I've been on the forefront of 09:41.439 --> 09:43.606 developing and applying the wide array 09:43.606 --> 09:45.717 of improved acquisition practices and 09:45.717 --> 09:45.550 helping others do the same ever since . 09:46.040 --> 09:47.929 More recently , while at Carnegie 09:47.929 --> 09:49.540 Mellon University's Software 09:49.540 --> 09:51.540 Engineering Institute , I learned a 09:51.540 --> 09:53.262 great deal more about evolving 09:53.262 --> 09:55.373 practices of software alliance system 09:55.373 --> 09:57.262 architectures , test automation , 09:57.540 --> 09:59.540 artificial intelligence and machine 09:59.540 --> 10:02.380 learning , to name a few . Well at the 10:02.380 --> 10:04.650 sc II also extended the research I 10:04.650 --> 10:06.483 performed while in government on 10:06.483 --> 10:08.706 advanced system development methods for 10:08.706 --> 10:10.872 improving D . O . D . Acquisition . As 10:10.872 --> 10:12.940 Secretary Austin has testified , we 10:12.940 --> 10:14.884 have the greatest equipment in the 10:14.884 --> 10:17.107 world if confirmed . It is my objective 10:17.107 --> 10:19.273 to ensure that assessment continues to 10:19.273 --> 10:21.218 hold true , providing for the best 10:21.218 --> 10:23.051 trained , best equipped and most 10:23.051 --> 10:25.162 capable fighting force in the world . 10:25.162 --> 10:27.273 It would be an honor to contribute to 10:27.273 --> 10:27.210 that mission and to serve as the 10:27.210 --> 10:29.266 director of for operational test and 10:29.266 --> 10:31.800 evaluation . Thank you . Yeah , thank 10:31.800 --> 10:34.078 you very much . Mr Burton . Miss baker , 10:34.078 --> 10:33.960 please . 10:39.940 --> 10:42.740 Uh Thank you mr Chairman . Thank you 10:42.740 --> 10:44.907 also to the ranking member and members 10:44.907 --> 10:47.129 of this committee . It's an honor to be 10:47.129 --> 10:50.000 before you today as president biden's 10:50.000 --> 10:51.944 nominee for the position of Deputy 10:51.944 --> 10:54.111 undersecretary of Defense for policy . 10:54.340 --> 10:56.118 I'm grateful to the President . 10:56.118 --> 10:58.173 Secretary Austin and under secretary 10:58.173 --> 11:00.340 call for their trust and competence in 11:00.340 --> 11:02.451 me . I want to thank my husband Sam , 11:02.451 --> 11:04.340 who is here with me today and who 11:04.340 --> 11:06.562 shares my deep commitment to the values 11:06.562 --> 11:08.729 that this country was founded upon . I 11:08.729 --> 11:10.896 also want to acknowledge my mother who 11:10.896 --> 11:12.896 is watching at home and who came to 11:12.896 --> 11:15.118 this country as a refugee and taught me 11:15.118 --> 11:17.340 the importance of giving back My father 11:17.340 --> 11:20.310 who enlisted in the army in 1969 and 11:20.310 --> 11:22.640 who always considered his military 11:22.640 --> 11:24.930 service to be the formative experience 11:24.930 --> 11:27.340 of his life . He passed away earlier 11:27.340 --> 11:29.300 this year , but it's my honor to 11:29.310 --> 11:31.143 continue the family tradition of 11:31.143 --> 11:34.040 service . The job of the Department of 11:34.040 --> 11:36.440 Defense is to deter adversaries and to 11:36.440 --> 11:38.329 fight and win the nation's wars . 11:38.329 --> 11:40.770 Should deterrence fail in short to keep 11:40.770 --> 11:43.100 americans safe . There is no more 11:43.100 --> 11:46.030 sacred mission today . We have entered 11:46.030 --> 11:48.740 a new era of strategic competition and 11:48.740 --> 11:50.700 we must update our policies , our 11:50.710 --> 11:52.880 operations , our capabilities and our 11:52.880 --> 11:54.950 workforce to meet the moment . I 11:54.950 --> 11:57.117 believe that there is no time to waste 11:57.540 --> 11:59.651 china is the pacing challenge for the 11:59.651 --> 12:01.920 department . As the president's interim 12:01.920 --> 12:04.190 national security guidance states , it 12:04.190 --> 12:06.590 is the only competitor that is capable 12:06.600 --> 12:09.400 of combining its economic diplomatic , 12:09.410 --> 12:12.340 military and technological power to 12:12.340 --> 12:14.780 mount a sustained challenge to a stable 12:14.780 --> 12:17.830 and open international system . To meet 12:17.830 --> 12:20.052 this challenge , we will need to invest 12:20.052 --> 12:22.163 in capabilities that are relevant not 12:22.163 --> 12:24.219 only to the last fight but to future 12:24.219 --> 12:26.800 ones . We will need creative and agile 12:26.800 --> 12:29.140 operational concepts and plans that 12:29.150 --> 12:31.290 rapidly assimilate and take advantage 12:31.290 --> 12:33.520 of technological advances . We will 12:33.520 --> 12:35.950 need a high end and combat capable 12:35.950 --> 12:38.228 ready force that is forward positioned , 12:38.340 --> 12:40.520 distributed and resilient . We will 12:40.520 --> 12:42.740 need to operate seamlessly across all 12:42.740 --> 12:45.140 domains and we will need increased 12:45.140 --> 12:47.140 interoperability with strong and 12:47.140 --> 12:49.330 capable partners and allies who are 12:49.330 --> 12:51.608 proficient in their war fighting roles . 12:51.740 --> 12:53.518 If I am confirmed , I will work 12:53.518 --> 12:55.796 tirelessly to support those priorities . 12:56.740 --> 12:58.573 As the NsC's Senior Director for 12:58.573 --> 13:00.684 Strategic Planning . I've been tasked 13:00.684 --> 13:02.851 with drafting the President's National 13:02.851 --> 13:04.962 Security Strategy and coordinating it 13:04.962 --> 13:07.300 with our departments and agencies and 13:07.300 --> 13:09.300 as well with our closest allies and 13:09.300 --> 13:11.480 partners . At the same time , the 13:11.480 --> 13:13.313 department has been updating the 13:13.313 --> 13:15.424 National Defense strategy building on 13:15.424 --> 13:17.536 the strong foundation provided in the 13:17.536 --> 13:20.610 2018 nds to reflect new developments in 13:20.610 --> 13:22.499 the strategic environment and new 13:22.499 --> 13:24.610 insights about the intentions and the 13:24.610 --> 13:27.070 capabilities of our adversaries . If 13:27.070 --> 13:29.181 confirmed , my first priority will be 13:29.181 --> 13:31.920 to help implement the NDS with a focus 13:31.920 --> 13:34.031 on better integrating policies , work 13:34.031 --> 13:36.198 with other D . O . D . Components with 13:36.198 --> 13:38.309 our interagency partners and with our 13:38.309 --> 13:41.430 allies Beyond implementing the NFS . If 13:41.430 --> 13:43.652 confirmed . I will also seek to support 13:43.652 --> 13:45.652 the undersecretary in executing his 13:45.652 --> 13:47.708 priorities . These include rising to 13:47.708 --> 13:50.290 the challenge . China poses uh includes 13:50.290 --> 13:52.860 defeating the COVID-19 pandemic which 13:52.860 --> 13:55.390 remains the most immediate threat to us 13:55.390 --> 13:57.612 national security and to the health and 13:57.612 --> 13:59.612 safety and readiness of our men and 13:59.612 --> 14:01.970 women in uniform . We also continue to 14:01.970 --> 14:04.081 face a growing cyber threat from both 14:04.081 --> 14:06.248 state and non state actors , including 14:06.248 --> 14:08.303 to our critical infrastructure . The 14:08.303 --> 14:10.303 department will need to continue to 14:10.303 --> 14:12.470 defend forward to protect its networks 14:12.470 --> 14:14.692 while building the resilience necessary 14:14.692 --> 14:16.637 to deny our adversary's ability to 14:16.637 --> 14:18.692 threaten our nation in this domain . 14:18.692 --> 14:20.581 Climate change represents another 14:20.581 --> 14:22.359 department wide focus given its 14:22.359 --> 14:24.420 potential to drastically change the 14:24.420 --> 14:26.780 operational environment and its current 14:26.780 --> 14:28.724 impact on our bases and facilities 14:28.724 --> 14:31.180 around the world . If confirmed , I'm 14:31.180 --> 14:33.236 committed to ensuring that policy is 14:33.236 --> 14:34.958 best position to advance these 14:34.958 --> 14:37.250 priorities . We have the greatest 14:37.250 --> 14:39.417 military in the world , but at the end 14:39.417 --> 14:41.639 of the day it's about people , both our 14:41.639 --> 14:43.472 service members and our civilian 14:43.472 --> 14:45.680 workforce . I believe that policy is 14:45.690 --> 14:47.468 the beating heart of the office 14:47.468 --> 14:49.634 Secretary of defense . It is the place 14:49.634 --> 14:52.400 where deep expertise , long standing 14:52.400 --> 14:54.480 regional relationships meet next 14:54.480 --> 14:56.850 generation approaches that integrate 14:56.850 --> 14:58.840 new concepts , new ideas , new war 14:58.840 --> 15:01.790 fighting capabilities . The policy 15:01.790 --> 15:03.790 organization has been challenged in 15:03.790 --> 15:05.901 recent years and if confirmed in this 15:05.901 --> 15:07.734 role , I will seek to assist the 15:07.734 --> 15:09.901 undersecretary in leading and renewing 15:09.901 --> 15:12.230 the organization , breaking down silos , 15:12.380 --> 15:14.102 facilitating communication and 15:14.102 --> 15:16.158 cooperative approaches and improving 15:16.158 --> 15:18.360 effectiveness . My commitment to the 15:18.360 --> 15:19.970 work force will be to focus 15:19.980 --> 15:22.160 relentlessly on organizational health 15:22.160 --> 15:24.610 and morale so that policy is postured 15:24.610 --> 15:26.666 to provide a strong and constructive 15:26.666 --> 15:28.721 civilian voice in the department for 15:28.721 --> 15:31.310 years to come . As a former Senate 15:31.310 --> 15:33.690 staffer , I have a deep appreciation 15:33.690 --> 15:35.468 for the critical role that this 15:35.468 --> 15:37.634 committee and this body plays . I want 15:37.634 --> 15:39.740 to express my gratitude to the 15:39.740 --> 15:41.950 committee for its many decades of 15:41.960 --> 15:44.380 bipartisan cooperative focus on the 15:44.380 --> 15:46.340 defense of our nation and for your 15:46.340 --> 15:48.507 thoughtful oversight of our military . 15:48.640 --> 15:50.473 If confirmed , I look forward to 15:50.473 --> 15:52.251 working with you in a spirit of 15:52.251 --> 15:54.529 partnership to continue that tradition . 15:54.840 --> 15:57.007 Thank you for your consideration and I 15:57.007 --> 15:59.173 look forward to your questions . Thank 15:59.173 --> 16:01.173 you Miss baker Mr . Coffee , please 16:01.840 --> 16:03.820 Thank you Chairman Reed and other 16:03.820 --> 16:06.098 distinguished members of the committee . 16:06.098 --> 16:08.264 I want to begin by thanking my wife of 16:08.264 --> 16:10.580 over 32 years and and our Children , 16:10.580 --> 16:13.150 kate , Cameron and Connor . I cannot 16:13.150 --> 16:15.372 say enough about what their support and 16:15.372 --> 16:17.630 patience has meant . As I pursued 16:17.630 --> 16:19.797 parallel careers in the law and in the 16:19.797 --> 16:21.980 Navy and I'm so pleased that an and 16:21.980 --> 16:24.880 Connor could be here today . I'm very 16:24.880 --> 16:26.880 grateful to President biden for his 16:26.880 --> 16:29.000 trust and confidence in nominating me 16:29.000 --> 16:30.944 to serve as general counsel of the 16:30.944 --> 16:33.200 Department of the Navy . I think the 16:33.200 --> 16:35.650 committee ended staff for making time 16:35.650 --> 16:37.761 over the past few weeks to discuss my 16:37.761 --> 16:40.260 nomination . I am eager to return to 16:40.260 --> 16:42.316 public service and hope to earn your 16:42.316 --> 16:45.080 support . I would like to address 16:45.080 --> 16:47.760 briefly why I believe that if confirmed , 16:47.770 --> 16:49.770 I would bring a number of pertinent 16:49.770 --> 16:51.881 strengths to the role of Navy general 16:51.881 --> 16:55.180 counsel . First , I have for over 30 16:55.180 --> 16:57.458 years , led a varied career in the law , 16:57.458 --> 16:59.513 including several years as a federal 16:59.513 --> 17:01.680 prosecutor in the southern district of 17:01.680 --> 17:03.569 New York and as a civil litigator 17:03.569 --> 17:05.513 handling some of the nation's most 17:05.513 --> 17:08.180 challenging and impactful cases . I 17:08.180 --> 17:10.220 have experienced solving difficult 17:10.220 --> 17:12.640 problems , building effective teams 17:12.740 --> 17:15.880 providing candid timely council and 17:15.880 --> 17:18.047 advocating for my client's interests . 17:18.340 --> 17:21.090 Second , I served in the United States 17:21.090 --> 17:23.700 Navy for over 30 years as a midshipman 17:23.700 --> 17:26.360 at the Naval Academy On active duty for 17:26.360 --> 17:28.970 eight years and after graduating from 17:28.970 --> 17:31.137 Georgetown Law's night program while I 17:31.137 --> 17:33.248 was stationed here in Washington as a 17:33.248 --> 17:36.120 reservist . For another 18 years , I 17:36.120 --> 17:38.120 served in several operational roles 17:38.120 --> 17:40.470 including as a P three Orion mission 17:40.470 --> 17:42.960 commander , tracking soviet submarines 17:43.440 --> 17:45.440 and I was privileged to be selected 17:45.440 --> 17:48.860 twice for command in Washington I had 17:48.860 --> 17:50.971 the opportunity to serve his personal 17:50.971 --> 17:53.082 aide to Vice president George H . W . 17:53.082 --> 17:55.950 Bush and to serve in various pentagon 17:55.950 --> 17:59.940 policy and planning roles . Third , I 17:59.940 --> 18:01.900 bring to perspective as a child of 18:01.900 --> 18:04.100 immigrants , I am humbled by the 18:04.100 --> 18:06.650 opportunity that if confirmed I could 18:06.650 --> 18:08.650 once again serve the country . That 18:08.650 --> 18:10.872 drew my parents here from Ireland seven 18:10.872 --> 18:13.600 decades ago . I grew up in a home where 18:13.600 --> 18:15.822 my six younger siblings and I were told 18:15.822 --> 18:18.070 on a near daily basis that if we did 18:18.070 --> 18:20.930 our homework , applied ourselves and 18:20.930 --> 18:23.090 went to mass , there was no limit to 18:23.090 --> 18:25.201 what we could accomplish in America . 18:26.040 --> 18:27.984 Our family went through some tough 18:27.984 --> 18:29.873 times . My dad was a construction 18:29.873 --> 18:31.873 worker who was out of work when the 18:31.873 --> 18:33.873 economy went sour . But our parents 18:33.873 --> 18:35.984 always reminded us that we were lucky 18:35.984 --> 18:37.929 because we were americans and that 18:37.929 --> 18:40.040 because we have been given this great 18:40.040 --> 18:42.930 gift , much was expected of us . These 18:42.930 --> 18:44.930 principles have animated much of my 18:44.930 --> 18:47.041 life , leading me to take the oath of 18:47.041 --> 18:49.530 office to defect , defend our 18:49.530 --> 18:51.960 constitution as a 17 year old 18:51.960 --> 18:54.360 midshipman in Annapolis and after 18:54.360 --> 18:56.304 completing my obligated service to 18:56.304 --> 18:58.360 continue to serve in the reserve for 18:58.360 --> 19:00.360 almost two decades while juggling a 19:00.360 --> 19:03.140 family and a career in new york and 19:03.140 --> 19:05.307 senators is why I sit here today ready 19:05.307 --> 19:07.110 if confirmed to bring all of my 19:07.110 --> 19:09.800 experience , energy and love of country 19:09.810 --> 19:11.960 to the role of Navy General Counsel . 19:13.200 --> 19:15.540 If confirmed , my top priority would be 19:15.540 --> 19:17.373 to ensure that the office of the 19:17.373 --> 19:19.484 General counsel robustly supports the 19:19.484 --> 19:21.707 mission of the Navy and Marine Corps by 19:21.707 --> 19:23.800 providing the timely , candid and 19:23.800 --> 19:25.970 accurate legal advice they need to 19:25.970 --> 19:28.137 carry out their mission successfully . 19:28.840 --> 19:30.980 If confirmed , I would also focus on 19:30.980 --> 19:33.840 taking care of our sailors , marines , 19:33.850 --> 19:36.183 department civilians and their families , 19:36.540 --> 19:38.651 which I know firsthand from my torque 19:38.651 --> 19:41.320 as commanding officers enables mission 19:41.320 --> 19:44.510 success . And if confirmed , I would 19:44.510 --> 19:46.732 seek to promote a culture where ethical 19:46.732 --> 19:48.954 decision making is paramount throughout 19:48.954 --> 19:51.410 the Department of the Navy related li I 19:51.410 --> 19:53.577 would work hard to leverage the office 19:53.577 --> 19:55.840 to ensure that every taxpayer dollar 19:55.840 --> 19:58.730 that the navy is given is spent wisely 19:58.740 --> 20:01.490 fully accounted for and subject to 20:01.500 --> 20:04.210 effective oversight and full parents . 20:04.210 --> 20:06.043 See to this committee and to the 20:06.043 --> 20:09.400 american public . If confirmed , I look 20:09.400 --> 20:11.567 forward to working with Navy Secretary 20:11.567 --> 20:13.789 del Toro , the senior leadership of the 20:13.789 --> 20:16.850 pentagon and this committee . Doing so 20:16.850 --> 20:19.072 in the bipartisan tradition . That is a 20:19.072 --> 20:21.072 prized hallmark of this committee . 20:21.840 --> 20:24.007 Thank you for your consideration of my 20:24.007 --> 20:25.729 nomination . I look forward to 20:25.729 --> 20:27.896 answering your questions . Thank you . 20:27.896 --> 20:31.050 Mr Coffee Mr Bush , Please chairman , 20:31.050 --> 20:33.510 read ranking member Inhofe and members 20:33.520 --> 20:35.420 of the committee . I'm honored to 20:35.420 --> 20:37.476 appear before you today as President 20:37.476 --> 20:39.253 Biden's nominee to be Assistant 20:39.253 --> 20:41.476 secretary of the Army for acquisition , 20:41.476 --> 20:43.642 logistics and technology . I'm humbled 20:43.642 --> 20:45.364 by the faith President Biden , 20:45.364 --> 20:47.476 Secretary Austin and Secretary of war 20:47.476 --> 20:49.698 Meth have placed in me by nominating me 20:49.698 --> 20:51.642 to fill this critical role for the 20:51.642 --> 20:53.587 United States Army . I'm also also 20:53.587 --> 20:55.809 humbled to sit before you Leaders of an 20:55.809 --> 20:57.642 institution in the United States 20:57.642 --> 20:59.753 Congress , that where it was my honor 20:59.753 --> 21:01.642 and privilege to serve as a staff 21:01.642 --> 21:04.000 member for almost 19 years . I would 21:04.000 --> 21:05.944 like to start by thanking the many 21:05.944 --> 21:08.111 people who have supported me during my 21:08.111 --> 21:10.222 28 years of public service , starting 21:10.222 --> 21:12.444 with my wife , Tricia , who has been by 21:12.444 --> 21:14.389 my side for 24 of those years . My 21:14.389 --> 21:16.389 father and mother Donald and Sandra 21:16.389 --> 21:19.430 Bush who sacrificed greatly to give me 21:19.430 --> 21:21.486 every opportunity in life to succeed 21:22.340 --> 21:24.580 and the many superb army officers and 21:24.580 --> 21:26.802 non commissioned officers who taught me 21:26.802 --> 21:28.913 what it means to serve my country and 21:28.913 --> 21:31.230 to lead soldiers , both at West Point 21:31.240 --> 21:33.351 and during my time as a young officer 21:33.640 --> 21:35.751 here in Congress , I was fortunate to 21:35.751 --> 21:37.862 work for many members on both sides . 21:37.862 --> 21:39.640 But I owe my chance to serve in 21:39.640 --> 21:41.751 Congress , especially to Senator Bill 21:41.751 --> 21:43.640 NElson , Congressman Jim cooper , 21:43.640 --> 21:45.362 congressman Neil Abercrombie , 21:45.362 --> 21:47.690 congressman Ike Skelton and House Armed 21:47.690 --> 21:49.968 Services Committee chairman adam smith . 21:50.540 --> 21:52.207 Finally , I want to thank the 21:52.207 --> 21:54.429 outstanding army officers and civilians 21:54.429 --> 21:56.484 I was honored to work with during my 21:56.484 --> 21:58.373 six months as an acting assistant 21:58.373 --> 22:00.707 secretary of the army earlier this year . 22:00.740 --> 22:02.796 If confirmed , I am eager to take on 22:02.796 --> 22:04.796 the challenge of leading the armies 22:04.796 --> 22:06.684 acquisition enterprise . During a 22:06.684 --> 22:08.907 period of dramatic change , The army is 22:08.907 --> 22:11.073 in the early years of what promises to 22:11.073 --> 22:12.962 be its most significant equipment 22:12.962 --> 22:15.520 modernization in nearly 40 years . If 22:15.520 --> 22:17.640 confirmed , I will be responsible for 22:17.640 --> 22:20.340 bringing to fruition many efforts that 22:20.340 --> 22:22.670 a talented and dedicated group of army , 22:22.670 --> 22:24.837 military and civilian leaders who came 22:24.837 --> 22:27.790 before me set in motion . Having 22:27.790 --> 22:29.846 supported congressional oversight of 22:29.846 --> 22:31.679 army programs for many years and 22:31.679 --> 22:33.568 serving in the role . I have been 22:33.568 --> 22:35.790 nominated for in an acting capacity for 22:35.790 --> 22:37.940 six months . I'm confident I know how 22:37.940 --> 22:40.500 to achieve this goal . It confirmed . I 22:40.500 --> 22:42.389 would work diligently to meet the 22:42.389 --> 22:44.611 objectives of Secretary Warm with other 22:44.611 --> 22:46.444 departments . Senior leaders and 22:46.444 --> 22:48.611 Congress . My priorities would include 22:48.611 --> 22:50.950 the following . First I would place a 22:50.950 --> 22:53.160 laser like focus on program execution 22:53.160 --> 22:55.140 and performance to ensure rapid 22:55.140 --> 22:57.251 delivery of improved equipment to our 22:57.251 --> 22:59.418 soldiers for many years , Congress has 22:59.418 --> 23:01.196 directed acquisition reforms on 23:01.196 --> 23:03.307 accelerating the pace of delivery . I 23:03.307 --> 23:05.529 will orient my decisions towards taking 23:05.529 --> 23:07.696 action to advance programs and deliver 23:07.696 --> 23:09.640 effective equipment while ensuring 23:09.640 --> 23:11.862 appropriate oversight of program , cost 23:11.862 --> 23:13.918 and performance . Second , I believe 23:13.918 --> 23:16.029 the army must get better at acquiring 23:16.029 --> 23:18.307 software using all the available tools . 23:18.307 --> 23:20.473 Congress has provided many efforts are 23:20.473 --> 23:23.140 underway to shift software acquisition 23:23.140 --> 23:24.751 from an industrial age to an 23:24.751 --> 23:27.350 information age approach . If confirmed , 23:27.360 --> 23:29.416 I intend to further accelerate those 23:29.416 --> 23:32.100 efforts . Third , the army must return 23:32.100 --> 23:33.900 to a focus on security in its 23:33.900 --> 23:35.678 acquisition efforts , including 23:35.678 --> 23:38.260 cybersecurity and supply chain security . 23:38.640 --> 23:40.500 Both are necessary to deliver 23:40.500 --> 23:42.670 capabilities uncompromised by the 23:42.670 --> 23:44.837 aggressive efforts of china Russia and 23:44.837 --> 23:47.400 other countries . 4th , I believe that 23:47.400 --> 23:49.910 realistic operational testing is an aid 23:50.000 --> 23:52.260 rather than a hindrance to effective , 23:52.270 --> 23:54.381 delivering effective equipment to the 23:54.381 --> 23:56.870 army , taking a little extra time and 23:56.870 --> 23:59.050 effort to fully test systems up front 23:59.520 --> 24:01.550 ensures that contractors are held 24:01.550 --> 24:03.772 accountable and problems are identified 24:03.772 --> 24:05.939 on test ranges rather than in combat . 24:06.540 --> 24:08.762 Finally , and most critically will work 24:08.762 --> 24:10.984 to ensure army modernization is closely 24:10.984 --> 24:13.040 coordinated with Congress . The army 24:13.040 --> 24:15.262 cannot achieve any of its modernization 24:15.262 --> 24:17.040 goals without the support of in 24:17.040 --> 24:19.318 partnership with Congress . In closing , 24:19.318 --> 24:21.540 I want to assure members that while the 24:21.540 --> 24:23.707 position I've been nominated for deals 24:23.707 --> 24:25.707 principally with the acquisition of 24:25.707 --> 24:27.651 equipment , I am also aware of the 24:27.651 --> 24:29.762 larger context our army faces are the 24:29.762 --> 24:31.873 potential threats to our military are 24:31.873 --> 24:34.330 many , we are tested by our adversaries 24:34.330 --> 24:37.280 on a seemingly daily basis . While army 24:37.280 --> 24:39.280 acquisition is only a small part of 24:39.280 --> 24:41.113 confronting these challenges , I 24:41.113 --> 24:43.169 believe it is also a vital one . Our 24:43.169 --> 24:45.224 soldiers are the best in the world . 24:45.224 --> 24:47.558 They represent the very best of America . 24:47.558 --> 24:49.613 They deserve the very best equipment 24:49.613 --> 24:51.780 the country can provide . Our soldiers 24:51.780 --> 24:53.724 stand on the front line of freedom 24:53.724 --> 24:55.891 around the world , providing them with 24:55.891 --> 24:58.113 what they need to deter our enemies and 24:58.113 --> 25:00.336 if necessary , fight and defeat them is 25:00.336 --> 25:02.502 an enormous responsibility . It is one 25:02.502 --> 25:04.558 that if confirmed , I will take very 25:04.558 --> 25:06.780 seriously every moment of every day . I 25:06.780 --> 25:08.836 look forward to your questions today 25:08.836 --> 25:10.891 and have confirmed working with this 25:10.891 --> 25:13.058 committee to support the United States 25:13.058 --> 25:15.280 Army . Thank you . Mr Bush . Now I have 25:15.280 --> 25:17.447 a certain positions which are directed 25:17.447 --> 25:19.391 to all civilian nominees . You may 25:19.391 --> 25:21.447 answer together . Have you adhere to 25:21.447 --> 25:23.224 applicable laws and regulations 25:23.224 --> 25:25.447 governing conflicts of interest ? Yes . 25:25.740 --> 25:27.796 Have you assumed any duties or taken 25:27.796 --> 25:29.629 any actions that would appear to 25:29.629 --> 25:31.851 presume the outcome of the confirmation 25:31.851 --> 25:34.620 process , exercising our legislative 25:34.620 --> 25:37.330 and oversight responsibility ? Makes it 25:37.330 --> 25:39.330 important that this committee , its 25:39.330 --> 25:41.330 subcommittees and other appropriate 25:41.330 --> 25:43.108 committees of Congress received 25:43.108 --> 25:45.441 testimony briefings , reports , records , 25:45.441 --> 25:47.163 and other information from the 25:47.163 --> 25:49.470 executive branch on a timely basis . Do 25:49.470 --> 25:51.850 you agree if confirmed to appear and 25:51.850 --> 25:53.794 testify before this committee when 25:53.794 --> 25:56.720 requested ? Yes . Do you agree to 25:56.720 --> 25:58.498 provide records , documents and 25:58.498 --> 26:00.609 electronic communications in a timely 26:00.609 --> 26:03.290 manner when requested by this committee ? 26:03.300 --> 26:05.570 Its subcommittees or other appropriate 26:05.570 --> 26:07.681 committees of Congress and to consult 26:07.681 --> 26:09.848 with the requester regarding the basis 26:09.848 --> 26:12.020 for any good faith delay or denial in 26:12.020 --> 26:14.830 providing such records . Yes . Yes . 26:14.840 --> 26:17.062 Well , you and shut your staff complies 26:17.062 --> 26:19.007 with deadlines established by this 26:19.007 --> 26:21.340 committee for the production of reports , 26:21.340 --> 26:23.118 records and other information , 26:23.118 --> 26:25.284 including timely responding to hearing 26:25.284 --> 26:27.396 questions for the record . Yes . Will 26:27.396 --> 26:29.451 you cooperate in providing witnesses 26:29.451 --> 26:28.780 and briefings in response to 26:28.780 --> 26:32.090 congressional request ? Yes . Will 26:32.090 --> 26:33.923 those witnesses and briefings be 26:33.923 --> 26:35.979 protected from Reprisal before their 26:35.979 --> 26:39.340 testimony before this committee or any 26:39.340 --> 26:41.610 briefings ? They may go ? Yes . Yes . 26:41.620 --> 26:43.910 Thank you . And now let me begin my 26:43.910 --> 26:46.050 round of questions . Mr . Garton . Uh 26:46.060 --> 26:48.490 as I alluded to in my opening statement 26:48.500 --> 26:50.611 that one of the tensions we have , if 26:50.611 --> 26:52.722 we have been trying to accelerate the 26:52.722 --> 26:54.944 acquisition process , trying to keep it 26:54.944 --> 26:57.111 within course outlines . And frankly , 26:57.111 --> 26:59.430 there's been some really an examples of 26:59.440 --> 27:03.270 delay and cost overruns that are uh , 27:03.280 --> 27:06.310 difficult to accept . And your job is 27:06.310 --> 27:08.532 to be a sort of in a way the cop on the 27:08.532 --> 27:10.754 street to not let anything through that 27:10.754 --> 27:14.130 isn't of great quality and capable of 27:14.130 --> 27:17.030 doing its job . Uh , so how do you 27:17.030 --> 27:19.141 intend to balance that need of people 27:19.141 --> 27:22.820 yelling for speed and uh , you 27:22.820 --> 27:25.260 saying stop this is not ready for prime 27:25.260 --> 27:28.660 time . One of the hallmarks of my 27:28.660 --> 27:31.540 career has been to be involved early in 27:31.550 --> 27:33.328 the development of products and 27:33.328 --> 27:35.494 thinking about how they're architected 27:35.494 --> 27:37.328 before it's too late setting the 27:37.328 --> 27:39.328 conditions for success early in the 27:39.328 --> 27:41.750 development program is especially 27:41.750 --> 27:43.861 important to making sure that you get 27:43.861 --> 27:45.972 to the place you want to in the end . 27:45.972 --> 27:48.028 So one of the things I would like to 27:48.028 --> 27:50.250 bring to the operational test community 27:50.250 --> 27:52.417 is a shift left mindset , getting more 27:52.417 --> 27:54.583 involved in some of the early decision 27:54.583 --> 27:54.410 making and setting up those 27:54.410 --> 27:57.100 architectures in understanding how 27:57.100 --> 27:59.100 those systems are going to interact 27:59.100 --> 28:01.044 with the other things around it uh 28:01.044 --> 28:03.400 before the program to get so far down 28:03.400 --> 28:05.289 the road that they're gonna be in 28:05.289 --> 28:07.233 trouble later . I've been involved 28:07.233 --> 28:09.344 enough acquisitions and seeing enough 28:09.344 --> 28:11.456 of these examples to fully appreciate 28:11.456 --> 28:13.456 where you're coming from and all if 28:13.456 --> 28:15.678 confirmed . I will do my utmost to make 28:15.678 --> 28:17.456 sure we minimize those kinds of 28:17.456 --> 28:19.780 outcomes . Thank you . Uh Miss baker , 28:19.790 --> 28:22.060 you indicated in your testimony that 28:22.070 --> 28:24.970 part of your task will be to integrate 28:24.970 --> 28:26.803 a whole of government strategy , 28:26.803 --> 28:28.803 including elements of Department of 28:28.803 --> 28:30.803 Defense as well as State as well as 28:30.803 --> 28:32.803 other nations . Can you just give a 28:32.803 --> 28:35.430 brief sort of snapshot of how you 28:35.430 --> 28:39.130 intend to do this ? Sure , Senator uh 28:39.140 --> 28:41.980 as I said in my opening statement , I 28:41.990 --> 28:45.730 believe that china is uh the only 28:45.730 --> 28:49.050 adversary that is capable of combining 28:49.060 --> 28:51.940 economic , diplomatic militarily and 28:51.950 --> 28:54.760 technological might depose a challenge 28:54.760 --> 28:56.871 to the United States . I believe that 28:56.871 --> 28:58.760 they are proceeding in a whole of 28:58.760 --> 29:00.816 government approach and our response 29:00.816 --> 29:03.149 needs to be whole of government as well . 29:03.149 --> 29:05.260 So if I'm confirmed , I would seek to 29:05.260 --> 29:06.871 work closely and support the 29:06.871 --> 29:09.093 undersecretary and working closely with 29:09.093 --> 29:11.204 our interagency partners at the State 29:11.204 --> 29:13.427 Department and elsewhere to ensure that 29:13.427 --> 29:15.980 our approach is integrated uh not only 29:15.980 --> 29:18.147 across military domains but across the 29:18.147 --> 29:20.660 inter agency . Thank you very much . Mr 29:20.660 --> 29:24.500 Coffee the NDS commission in 2018 29:24.500 --> 29:27.360 report which has been very valuable to 29:27.360 --> 29:30.730 all of us indicated that there's a 29:30.740 --> 29:32.629 concern about the balance between 29:32.629 --> 29:34.629 civilian officials and the military 29:34.629 --> 29:36.573 with the D . O . D . That civilian 29:36.573 --> 29:38.684 control , which is the essence of our 29:38.684 --> 29:41.590 government is not as uh robust as it 29:41.590 --> 29:43.701 should be . Are there any actions you 29:43.701 --> 29:45.757 believe that need to be taken auburn 29:45.757 --> 29:48.610 Navy to ensure that civilian control is 29:48.620 --> 29:52.240 foremost ? Well , senator , I agree . 29:52.250 --> 29:54.080 Mr Chairman . I agree that the 29:54.080 --> 29:55.969 principle of civilian control and 29:55.969 --> 29:58.110 military is paramount . Um I believe 29:58.110 --> 30:00.490 that with Secretary Austin at the helm 30:00.490 --> 30:02.657 of the pentagon and with Secretary Del 30:02.657 --> 30:05.530 Toro at the helm of the Navy Department 30:05.530 --> 30:08.780 that they are asserting the primacy of 30:08.780 --> 30:11.680 civilian control ? Um I am unaware of 30:11.680 --> 30:13.736 any specific action that needs to be 30:13.736 --> 30:16.850 taken to to uh emphasize that if 30:16.850 --> 30:19.017 confirmed . I will certainly work with 30:19.017 --> 30:21.183 the secretary uh Del Toro to see if he 30:21.183 --> 30:23.600 views that and if need be take whatever 30:23.600 --> 30:26.760 actions he directs to try and reinforce 30:26.760 --> 30:28.860 principle that you just spoke to . 30:29.340 --> 30:31.451 Thank you very much . Mr Finally , Mr 30:31.451 --> 30:34.730 Bush cybersecurity is a ubiquitous 30:34.730 --> 30:38.040 problem . Uh So my question is , do you 30:38.040 --> 30:40.590 think the army at this juncture uh with 30:40.590 --> 30:43.250 your experiences correctly ? Partial uh 30:43.260 --> 30:46.170 to address the full spectrum of cyber 30:46.940 --> 30:50.870 uh Mr Chairman . I think the tools 30:50.870 --> 30:53.092 are in place and we have all the talent 30:53.092 --> 30:55.203 we need . I think now it's a question 30:55.203 --> 30:58.070 of coordination and activity within the 30:58.070 --> 30:59.930 acquisition world . We have many 30:59.930 --> 31:02.790 efforts underway . The army does to 31:02.800 --> 31:05.170 design cyber in up front to do more 31:05.170 --> 31:07.630 cyber testing earlier to work more 31:07.630 --> 31:10.550 closely with army cyber and army 31:10.550 --> 31:12.710 intelligence to maintain awareness of 31:12.710 --> 31:15.990 the threat as it evolves . I believe 31:15.990 --> 31:18.212 over time though it will need to become 31:18.212 --> 31:19.934 something that is just part of 31:19.934 --> 31:21.879 everything we do rather than being 31:21.879 --> 31:24.101 viewed as an additional duty . There is 31:24.101 --> 31:26.520 much work to be made to be done over 31:26.520 --> 31:28.576 time to ensure that full integration 31:28.576 --> 31:30.798 takes place . Thank you very much . And 31:30.798 --> 31:33.020 I want to thank the witnesses for their 31:33.020 --> 31:35.131 statements and for their response and 31:35.131 --> 31:37.242 let me now recognize Senator Wicker , 31:37.242 --> 31:39.464 Thank you very much . Mr Chairman and I 31:39.464 --> 31:41.409 do want to thank the witnesses for 31:41.409 --> 31:43.520 their statements and um it seems that 31:43.520 --> 31:46.350 I've been gone . Yeah , well , Miss 31:46.350 --> 31:49.670 baker , can you hear me continue sir ? 31:49.680 --> 31:51.902 Yes , Senator , I can hear you okay . I 31:51.902 --> 31:53.680 want those 15 seconds back . Mr 31:53.680 --> 31:55.930 Chairman . Um now the lights came on . 31:55.940 --> 31:59.890 Here we go . Uh you've got a Miss baker , 31:59.900 --> 32:02.233 thank you for your willingness to serve . 32:02.233 --> 32:04.460 Um you said in your opening statement 32:04.460 --> 32:08.320 that that china is the pacing 32:08.320 --> 32:12.200 challenge um that are uh 32:12.210 --> 32:14.432 the job of the Department of Defense is 32:14.432 --> 32:16.860 to deter adversaries that there's no 32:16.860 --> 32:20.670 time to waste . I agree with you on all 32:20.670 --> 32:22.559 of that . And then an answer to a 32:22.559 --> 32:25.740 question by the chair . Uh you referred 32:25.740 --> 32:29.210 to china as an adversary and I agree 32:29.210 --> 32:32.050 with that . Uh Let me ask you about 32:32.050 --> 32:34.050 shipbuilding . I know it's going to 32:34.050 --> 32:36.272 come as a shock to my colleagues on the 32:36.272 --> 32:38.870 committee , but in 2010 China 32:38.870 --> 32:42.470 commissioned four warships And the US 32:42.470 --> 32:45.020 Commission to that was 2010 . 5 years 32:45.020 --> 32:48.940 later , China commissioned um 12 32:48.950 --> 32:51.540 warships the United States commissioned 32:51.600 --> 32:55.450 to And in 2020 32:56.040 --> 32:59.550 China commissioned 26 new warships 33:00.140 --> 33:03.890 and the U . S . Only three China 33:03.900 --> 33:07.210 is now has the largest navy in the 33:07.210 --> 33:10.110 world . Um Are you concerned about the 33:10.110 --> 33:12.280 priority china has placed on naval 33:12.290 --> 33:15.470 shipbuilding . And will you commit to 33:15.470 --> 33:18.350 supporting the statutory congressional 33:18.350 --> 33:22.150 medal for a 355 ship Navy ? Uh 33:22.160 --> 33:25.360 Senator . Yes , I am concerned about 33:25.360 --> 33:28.530 the emphasis uh that china has put on 33:28.540 --> 33:30.762 building its fleet . I think that china 33:30.762 --> 33:34.680 has pursued a strategy of seeking to 33:34.690 --> 33:37.620 uh thwart us advantages across the 33:37.620 --> 33:39.620 board . And and certainly naval sea 33:39.620 --> 33:42.600 power is one area . Uh If I'm confirmed , 33:42.610 --> 33:45.850 I will support the plan of record . I 33:45.850 --> 33:48.072 just say in addition to everything else 33:48.240 --> 33:50.407 That we need to be focused not only on 33:50.407 --> 33:52.573 the number of ships which I agree it's 33:52.573 --> 33:54.462 critically important but also the 33:54.462 --> 33:56.629 capabilities that those ships bring to 33:56.629 --> 33:56.580 bear . True . But there is a 33:56.580 --> 33:59.340 congressional mandate signed into law 33:59.350 --> 34:01.572 passed by the Congress House and Senate 34:01.572 --> 34:03.740 and signed by the President for 355 34:03.740 --> 34:06.480 ships . Is that the plan of record that 34:06.490 --> 34:09.690 you support ? Yes , Senator . It is ok . 34:09.700 --> 34:13.530 Let me switch to Taiwan um 34:13.540 --> 34:17.160 The Republic of China own the 34:17.160 --> 34:20.390 island . Uh for most of the Taiwanese 34:20.390 --> 34:23.610 government Um it consists of 34:23.610 --> 34:27.360 23 million Citizens . They are the 34:27.370 --> 34:30.880 21st largest economy in the 34:30.880 --> 34:33.670 world . They operate under a 34:33.670 --> 34:36.450 constitution that next year will be 34:36.460 --> 34:40.190 three quarters of a century old . Do 34:40.190 --> 34:42.860 you believe that the 34:43.540 --> 34:47.270 people of the republic of China on 34:47.280 --> 34:48.947 Taiwan have the right to self 34:48.947 --> 34:51.670 determination ? Yes , Senator , I do . 34:52.340 --> 34:55.850 And do you believe that preventing 34:56.240 --> 34:58.420 an invasion of Taiwan is in the 34:58.420 --> 35:00.440 national security interest of the 35:00.440 --> 35:02.620 United States of America . Yes , 35:02.620 --> 35:04.842 Senator I do . And do you believe it is 35:04.842 --> 35:07.780 in the national security interests of 35:07.790 --> 35:10.620 our friends and allies in the pacific 35:10.630 --> 35:13.730 rim Yes . Senator . Do you believe that 35:13.730 --> 35:17.060 they are currently capable 35:17.540 --> 35:21.320 um of preventing an invasion by the 35:21.320 --> 35:24.570 people's Republic of china ? Uh Senator , 35:24.580 --> 35:27.990 I would just say that our 35:27.990 --> 35:31.200 commitment to supporting Taiwan's self 35:31.200 --> 35:34.100 defense is a longstanding , it's 35:34.100 --> 35:36.267 bipartisan and it's something that I'm 35:36.267 --> 35:38.710 prepared to support moving forward and 35:38.720 --> 35:41.050 uh in my judgment , 35:42.540 --> 35:45.410 the best way to prevent military 35:45.420 --> 35:47.870 conflict between the people's republic 35:47.880 --> 35:50.580 and the Republic of China is for us to 35:50.580 --> 35:53.530 have an adequate navy in the pacific 35:53.540 --> 35:56.950 realm and for us to 35:57.010 --> 36:00.680 for the United States to assist 36:00.690 --> 36:03.150 Taiwan in building up its defenses . Do 36:03.150 --> 36:05.790 you agree with that ? Yes , Senator , I 36:05.790 --> 36:07.957 do . Okay , well thank you very much . 36:07.957 --> 36:11.660 We're I'm concerned uh , that as a 36:11.660 --> 36:15.280 matter of policy , the money 36:15.280 --> 36:17.820 that this current administration is 36:17.820 --> 36:20.750 requesting for military strength , 36:20.750 --> 36:22.800 particularly naval strength in the 36:22.800 --> 36:25.520 pacific is inadequate . And I do 36:25.520 --> 36:27.631 believe we're going to we're going to 36:27.631 --> 36:29.798 find support for that position on both 36:29.798 --> 36:31.909 sides of the diocese . You're on this 36:31.909 --> 36:33.742 committee . So I look forward to 36:33.742 --> 36:35.853 working with you . But we I will tell 36:35.853 --> 36:39.050 you we need to to change the trend 36:39.430 --> 36:41.890 and and reverse the curve that we're 36:41.890 --> 36:44.057 currently facing . Thank you , ma'am . 36:44.057 --> 36:45.946 Thank you Mr Chairman . Thank you 36:45.946 --> 36:47.834 Senator Worker . Let me recognize 36:47.834 --> 36:49.946 Senator Shaheen . Please thank you Mr 36:49.946 --> 36:52.480 Chairman and congratulations to all of 36:52.480 --> 36:55.340 our nominees this morning and we very 36:55.340 --> 36:57.340 much appreciate your willingness to 36:57.340 --> 36:59.490 continue to serve this country . Miss 36:59.490 --> 37:01.323 baker . I want to start with you 37:01.323 --> 37:03.101 following up on some of Senator 37:03.101 --> 37:06.000 Wicker's questions about china and the 37:06.000 --> 37:08.390 importance of responding to the great 37:08.390 --> 37:10.970 power competition that we are now in . 37:10.980 --> 37:14.630 We heard over the weekend , the reports 37:14.630 --> 37:16.550 that china had fired a hypersonic 37:16.550 --> 37:18.820 weapon . They walked that back . But 37:18.830 --> 37:21.052 it's very clear that they're working on 37:21.052 --> 37:23.274 that . And then we've also heard in the 37:23.274 --> 37:25.770 last day that North Korea has just 37:25.770 --> 37:28.980 fired two ballistic missiles . How high 37:28.980 --> 37:31.980 up on our priority list for our both 37:31.980 --> 37:35.350 our national Defense strategy and um 37:38.330 --> 37:41.660 for the department should a response 37:41.860 --> 37:45.110 to both the hypersonic weapons and to 37:45.110 --> 37:47.420 what North Korea is currently doing be 37:47.430 --> 37:49.750 and how should we be approaching that ? 37:50.930 --> 37:53.720 Thank you senator . Uh as the secretary 37:53.720 --> 37:56.960 has said , China is the pacing threat 37:56.970 --> 37:58.970 for the Department of Defense . And 37:58.970 --> 38:01.120 that means that we uh I believe if 38:01.120 --> 38:03.287 confirmed will need to have a sense of 38:03.287 --> 38:05.398 urgency about developing not only the 38:05.398 --> 38:07.231 capabilities but the concepts of 38:07.231 --> 38:10.710 operation that will allow us to counter 38:10.710 --> 38:12.710 some of the developments that we're 38:12.710 --> 38:16.050 seeing the P . R . C . Put forward . Um 38:16.060 --> 38:17.893 I think that they have pursued a 38:17.893 --> 38:21.820 strategy of seeking to blunt us 38:21.820 --> 38:24.390 advantages over a number of years . So 38:24.400 --> 38:26.910 not only in terms of hyper sonics but 38:26.920 --> 38:30.870 space and encounter space cyber all 38:30.870 --> 38:33.790 of these are areas that if confirmed , 38:33.800 --> 38:37.160 I would I would seek to prioritize 38:37.170 --> 38:39.800 as it relates to North Korea . 38:39.810 --> 38:42.460 Certainly , uh there continued 38:42.470 --> 38:45.830 unwillingness to abide by their 38:45.840 --> 38:49.510 international obligations uh the 38:49.520 --> 38:51.631 rapid pace of missile testing that we 38:51.631 --> 38:53.800 have seen in recent weeks , all of all 38:53.800 --> 38:55.911 of those things are concerning . Uh I 38:55.911 --> 38:57.800 believe that the department has a 38:57.800 --> 39:00.260 responsibility to maintain a robust 39:00.270 --> 39:03.640 deterrent uh to ensure that we have 39:03.640 --> 39:05.473 forces positioned ready to fight 39:05.473 --> 39:07.529 tonight on the peninsula in order to 39:07.529 --> 39:09.696 provide that credible deterrent to kim 39:09.696 --> 39:12.470 jong un . Thank you . You mentioned in 39:12.470 --> 39:14.581 your opening statement the importance 39:14.581 --> 39:16.692 of personnel and that needs to be our 39:16.692 --> 39:18.970 first priority . I was pleased to see 39:18.970 --> 39:21.400 Secretary Austin issue some guidance 39:21.410 --> 39:24.330 around um our personnel who might be 39:24.330 --> 39:26.520 affected by Havana syndrome or the 39:26.520 --> 39:28.830 anomalous health incidents . But 39:29.320 --> 39:31.390 obviously there's a lot more that we 39:31.390 --> 39:33.501 need to be doing to respond to that . 39:33.501 --> 39:35.590 We need to get the to the bottom of 39:35.590 --> 39:37.910 who's responsible and how they're 39:37.920 --> 39:40.830 orchestrating these attacks . So if 39:40.830 --> 39:42.941 confirmed , do I have your commitment 39:42.941 --> 39:45.163 to work closely with this committee and 39:45.163 --> 39:47.052 provide timely updates on matters 39:47.052 --> 39:49.470 pertaining to these attacks ? Yes . 39:49.470 --> 39:51.660 Senator . Absolutely . I have friends 39:51.660 --> 39:54.400 and colleagues who have been affected 39:54.400 --> 39:56.567 by anomalous health incidents . I take 39:56.567 --> 39:58.733 that very personally and I will commit 39:58.733 --> 40:00.956 to work with you on this . Good . Thank 40:00.956 --> 40:04.340 you . Mr Garton . Uh huh . I had the 40:04.340 --> 40:07.800 opportunity to um go up on a K . C . 40:07.800 --> 40:10.490 46 air refueling mission with a crew 40:10.490 --> 40:14.010 from the 157th refueling wing at peace 40:14.020 --> 40:17.240 in New Hampshire , We were the first 40:17.240 --> 40:20.600 guard base to get those KC 46 tankers 40:20.600 --> 40:22.600 but as you know , they're still not 40:22.600 --> 40:24.711 operating the way they're supposed to 40:24.711 --> 40:26.880 operate . So if confirmed , do I have 40:26.880 --> 40:29.240 you your commitment to ensure that 40:29.240 --> 40:31.351 testing and evaluation for the remote 40:31.351 --> 40:33.407 vision system ? Two point remains on 40:33.407 --> 40:35.750 schedule . Yes , Senator . It's 40:35.750 --> 40:38.530 especially important that the systems 40:38.540 --> 40:40.840 operate the way they will be our tested 40:40.840 --> 40:42.396 the way they'll be operated 40:42.396 --> 40:44.710 operationally and uh to have those 40:44.710 --> 40:47.370 things come out as a part of fielding 40:47.370 --> 40:49.259 them is not the time . We want to 40:49.259 --> 40:51.426 discover those problems . And will you 40:51.426 --> 40:53.259 ensure that the committee , this 40:53.259 --> 40:55.314 committee is notified of any further 40:55.314 --> 40:57.860 delays or problems with that remote 40:57.860 --> 41:01.320 vision system ? Senator , thank you Mr 41:01.320 --> 41:04.730 Coffee , One of the big challenges that 41:05.110 --> 41:07.166 we have seen across our military and 41:07.166 --> 41:09.277 the Native Navy unfortunately has not 41:09.277 --> 41:12.940 been exempt over the last decade . That 41:12.940 --> 41:15.107 has gotten a lot of attention has been 41:15.107 --> 41:17.500 sexual assault . And obviously there 41:17.500 --> 41:19.750 have been concerns about how to respond 41:19.750 --> 41:22.520 to that and the culture of the military 41:22.520 --> 41:26.420 and how um that seems to if 41:26.420 --> 41:28.920 not promote at least condone sexual 41:28.920 --> 41:31.140 assault and sexual harassment . So , 41:31.140 --> 41:33.440 can you talk about what role you can 41:33.440 --> 41:35.940 have as legal counsel to addressing 41:35.940 --> 41:39.900 this issue ? Thank you . 41:39.900 --> 41:41.940 Senator . There is no place in the 41:41.940 --> 41:44.107 Department of the Navy or anywhere and 41:44.107 --> 41:45.940 we're in the military for sexual 41:45.940 --> 41:48.051 harassment , sexual assault or any of 41:48.051 --> 41:50.300 those destructive behaviors . No , no 41:50.300 --> 41:52.522 room whatsoever . I was very distressed 41:52.522 --> 41:55.200 when I read the uh the IRC report to 41:55.200 --> 41:58.630 see that something that I saw in my own 41:58.630 --> 42:00.797 active duty days and reserve duty days 42:00.797 --> 42:02.852 when we were first integrating women 42:02.852 --> 42:04.797 into combat units was not only not 42:04.797 --> 42:06.908 solved , it was worse . And it's very 42:06.908 --> 42:09.130 distressing to me . I'm very pleased to 42:09.130 --> 42:11.530 see that the IRC gave specific 42:11.530 --> 42:13.670 recommendations and that Secretary 42:13.670 --> 42:15.892 Austin has directed that the department 42:15.892 --> 42:17.781 will carry out every one of those 42:17.781 --> 42:19.837 recommendations will be of some with 42:19.837 --> 42:21.614 some modifications . Uh if I am 42:21.614 --> 42:24.620 confirmed , I would vigorously support 42:24.630 --> 42:26.960 uh implementing those changes on the 42:26.960 --> 42:29.127 road map that the Secretary of Defense 42:29.127 --> 42:31.293 is laid out . This is personal to me . 42:31.600 --> 42:34.430 I was in a squadron that suffered a lot 42:34.430 --> 42:37.940 of tension and disruption uh due to 42:37.940 --> 42:41.170 allegations of sexual assault . Uh it 42:41.170 --> 42:43.114 was a priority for me when I was a 42:43.114 --> 42:45.480 commander and it is distressing for me 42:45.480 --> 42:47.536 that many years later . It's still a 42:47.536 --> 42:49.758 problem in the department . But if I am 42:49.758 --> 42:51.869 confirmed , I am absolutely committed 42:51.869 --> 42:53.758 to helping eradicate that scourge 42:53.758 --> 42:55.758 within the Department of the Navy . 42:55.758 --> 42:55.690 Well , thank you very much . I hope you 42:55.690 --> 42:57.801 will make it a priority . Thank you . 42:57.801 --> 42:59.968 Mr Senator . Thank you Senator Shaheen 42:59.968 --> 43:02.520 uh Senator Tuberville , which I think 43:02.520 --> 43:04.409 this sets the record for earliest 43:04.409 --> 43:08.040 recognitions centers . However , thank 43:08.040 --> 43:11.490 you Mr Chairman . Uh thanks for all 43:11.490 --> 43:14.090 being here today . Mr Bush , you've 43:14.090 --> 43:16.180 been a former tanker , you know , 43:16.190 --> 43:19.810 Anderson's army depot and Alabama is uh 43:20.200 --> 43:22.422 the only depot in the US that performed 43:22.422 --> 43:24.644 maintenance on our tanks . Give me your 43:24.644 --> 43:26.756 thoughts about the future of our tank 43:26.756 --> 43:29.120 use in the United States . Military 43:30.200 --> 43:33.690 Senator Anderson is part of the broader 43:33.700 --> 43:35.811 organic industrial base that supports 43:35.811 --> 43:38.480 the whole army and a vital part we have 43:38.480 --> 43:40.660 to have it and it has to be effective 43:40.660 --> 43:42.730 and efficient with a with a good 43:42.730 --> 43:45.770 workforce I believe as long as the army 43:45.770 --> 43:47.992 has heavy armored vehicles , there will 43:47.992 --> 43:50.103 be a major role for anniston anniston 43:50.103 --> 43:52.960 in supporting those efforts . Thank you . 43:52.970 --> 43:56.070 Mr Coffee . We we recently had a young 43:56.070 --> 43:59.930 man arrested court martialed because of 44:00.490 --> 44:04.210 saying something on social media 44:04.990 --> 44:07.101 about the war in Afghanistan . What's 44:07.101 --> 44:08.434 your thoughts on that ? 44:10.690 --> 44:12.310 Well , Senator , 44:14.090 --> 44:17.620 uh vaguely aware of the circumstances 44:17.620 --> 44:19.453 we speak and I understand it was 44:19.453 --> 44:21.398 handled within the uniform code of 44:21.398 --> 44:23.342 military justice system , which of 44:23.342 --> 44:25.509 course falls within the purview of the 44:25.509 --> 44:25.420 uniform lawyers within the department . 44:25.990 --> 44:29.990 Um I understand that that process may 44:29.990 --> 44:32.046 be ongoing and at least one shape or 44:32.046 --> 44:34.212 form . So I'd be reluctant to to offer 44:34.212 --> 44:36.268 any opinion on the specific facts of 44:36.268 --> 44:38.379 that case . But I will say this . I I 44:38.379 --> 44:40.601 firmly believe in the First Amendment . 44:40.601 --> 44:42.823 I believe in the right of every service 44:42.823 --> 44:44.879 member to have the beliefs that they 44:44.879 --> 44:46.879 believe . But there are also if you 44:46.879 --> 44:48.879 pull on a uniform , as I did for 30 44:48.879 --> 44:51.101 years , uh you understand that there is 44:51.101 --> 44:53.290 a time and a place to voice those uh 44:53.290 --> 44:57.280 and that you are first and foremost a 44:57.280 --> 44:59.447 member of the military with a chain of 44:59.447 --> 45:01.613 command and respect for your superiors 45:01.790 --> 45:04.870 and again not tying it to this specific 45:04.870 --> 45:07.530 instance . But if you disobey direct 45:07.530 --> 45:10.620 orders , if your conduct threatens good 45:10.620 --> 45:13.780 order and discipline , then uh under 45:13.780 --> 45:15.947 the UcMJ a you can , in my view should 45:15.947 --> 45:17.836 be held accountable again without 45:17.836 --> 45:19.947 opining on the specific facts of that 45:19.947 --> 45:21.891 matter sir . Sure , thank you . Mr 45:21.891 --> 45:25.490 baker , your thoughts . Uh Senator , 45:25.500 --> 45:29.360 I am not a lawyer . I am not an expert 45:29.360 --> 45:32.780 on U . C . M . J . But uh as mr Coffee 45:32.780 --> 45:35.190 said , I am am but you are in the team 45:35.190 --> 45:38.350 building right . I do believe in 45:38.350 --> 45:40.580 prioritizing team building . I think as 45:40.580 --> 45:43.360 Mr Coffee said , um , everyone is 45:43.360 --> 45:45.249 entitled to their First Amendment 45:45.249 --> 45:47.304 rights , but at the end of the day , 45:47.304 --> 45:49.660 the there is a chain of command and 45:49.670 --> 45:51.781 that's something that will expect our 45:51.781 --> 45:53.892 service members to adhere to . We are 45:53.892 --> 45:57.840 in a business here of 45:57.850 --> 45:59.970 team building , as you said , and we 45:59.970 --> 46:03.250 need a strong and and vibrant military 46:03.260 --> 46:06.300 uh , I want to know what your opinion 46:06.300 --> 46:10.240 is in your definition is of extremism . 46:10.250 --> 46:14.240 Could you tell me that ? Uh , Senator , 46:14.240 --> 46:16.184 I don't know that I can give you a 46:16.184 --> 46:18.351 textbook definition of the term . What 46:18.351 --> 46:20.590 I what I can tell you is that I believe 46:20.590 --> 46:22.701 that the vast majority of our service 46:22.701 --> 46:24.330 members serve with honor and 46:24.330 --> 46:26.420 distinction , as the chairman said 46:26.420 --> 46:28.520 earlier though , to the extent that 46:28.520 --> 46:30.740 there are individuals in the services 46:30.750 --> 46:34.690 who are seeking to uh disrupt that 46:34.690 --> 46:36.746 unity in that team building that you 46:36.746 --> 46:38.968 spoke of . That's something I think the 46:38.968 --> 46:41.079 Secretary has indicated he intends to 46:41.079 --> 46:43.990 prioritize . Thank you . Thank you . Mr 46:43.990 --> 46:46.320 Girton Alabama is a fast growing hub 46:46.330 --> 46:48.552 for commercial engineering and software 46:48.552 --> 46:50.608 companies . Uh , what do you believe 46:50.608 --> 46:52.774 the D O . D should be doing to monitor 46:52.774 --> 46:55.170 the development of these operational , 46:55.400 --> 46:57.511 new commercial systems that we have . 46:58.980 --> 47:01.550 So Senator , the uh the challenges we 47:01.550 --> 47:04.910 face in using new systems that are 47:04.910 --> 47:07.300 based on commercial technologies is has 47:07.310 --> 47:09.477 one thing , as one aspect to it is the 47:09.477 --> 47:11.643 supply chain where those things coming 47:11.643 --> 47:13.866 from . And are they secure and suitable 47:13.866 --> 47:16.130 for military use ? Our use case is not 47:16.130 --> 47:19.490 exactly the same as university or your 47:19.490 --> 47:21.490 home . So we want to make sure that 47:21.490 --> 47:24.370 those products are suitable to the task 47:24.380 --> 47:26.491 but also we want to take advantage of 47:26.980 --> 47:28.980 commercial technologies allow us to 47:28.980 --> 47:30.924 move fast and effectively into the 47:30.924 --> 47:33.320 future . Thank you . Thank you . Mr 47:33.320 --> 47:35.650 Chairman for your generosity . Thank 47:35.650 --> 47:37.930 you . Senator Bill . Uh and now let me 47:37.930 --> 47:39.990 recognize senator rental please . 47:41.880 --> 47:45.780 Oh yeah , thank you . Mr Chairman . I 47:45.780 --> 47:47.558 asked the following two initial 47:47.558 --> 47:49.558 questions of all of the nominees to 47:49.558 --> 47:51.613 come before any of the committees on 47:51.613 --> 47:53.836 which I said , call us the entire panel 47:53.836 --> 47:56.320 in unison since you became a legal 47:56.320 --> 47:58.320 adult . Have you ever made unwanted 47:58.320 --> 48:00.220 requests for sexual favors ? Are 48:00.220 --> 48:02.053 committed any verbal or physical 48:02.053 --> 48:03.942 harassment or assault of a sexual 48:03.942 --> 48:06.570 nature ? No , no . Senator . Have you 48:06.570 --> 48:08.910 ever faced just a plan or entered into 48:08.910 --> 48:10.966 a settlement related to this kind of 48:10.966 --> 48:12.690 conduct ? No , no 48:14.770 --> 48:18.320 miss baker , uh huh . You were asked by 48:18.320 --> 48:20.390 Senator Shaheen about china's 48:20.970 --> 48:23.180 hypersonic missiles and you said that 48:23.190 --> 48:26.010 there would be a robust deterrent . And 48:26.010 --> 48:28.770 so I just wanted to also mention and 48:28.770 --> 48:31.103 take note of the of what china is doing . 48:31.103 --> 48:33.580 And of course as it impacts hawaii 48:34.670 --> 48:36.614 not to mention what north Korea is 48:37.070 --> 48:40.790 missile testing uh is doing in the 48:41.170 --> 48:44.990 uh in the pacific arena . So I just 48:44.990 --> 48:47.212 would like to ask you whether since you 48:47.212 --> 48:49.157 acknowledge that we need to have a 48:49.157 --> 48:51.490 robust deterrent , that the duty 48:51.490 --> 48:55.080 budgets will reflect this kind of , 48:55.870 --> 48:59.410 of robust deterrence in either this 48:59.410 --> 49:03.090 budget or in the following . Yes , sir . 49:03.220 --> 49:05.820 Yes , senator . I believe that the 49:05.830 --> 49:07.997 first responsibility of the Department 49:07.997 --> 49:10.163 of Defense is to defend the homeland . 49:10.163 --> 49:12.670 Of course Hawaii is is uh is part of 49:12.670 --> 49:15.560 that . And so um I would expect that we 49:15.560 --> 49:19.410 would have a robust and credible uh 49:19.420 --> 49:21.390 defense of Hawaii and that that we 49:21.390 --> 49:23.612 would put forward in the end of pacific 49:23.612 --> 49:26.350 a credible deterrent . Thank you Mr 49:26.350 --> 49:28.490 Carl . Earlier this month , the 49:28.490 --> 49:30.712 Washington post reported federal agents 49:30.712 --> 49:32.657 are investigating a new corruption 49:32.657 --> 49:34.970 scandal involving alleged bribery and 49:34.970 --> 49:37.390 fraud related to service contracts when 49:37.770 --> 49:39.780 our ships and submarines pull into 49:39.780 --> 49:41.891 ports in europe and the Middle East . 49:41.970 --> 49:43.914 I'm concerned that these facts are 49:43.914 --> 49:46.248 eerily reminiscent of the gland defense , 49:46.248 --> 49:48.320 Mark Marine Asia , G . D . M . A 49:48.320 --> 49:50.500 contracting scandal . In the end of 49:50.500 --> 49:52.860 pacific , in a congressional hearing 49:52.860 --> 49:55.450 over three years ago , the Vice Chief 49:55.450 --> 49:57.380 of Naval Operations at that time 49:57.390 --> 49:59.650 assured my counterparts in the House 49:59.660 --> 50:01.827 that the Navy had installed new layers 50:01.827 --> 50:03.880 of oversight and it's contracting 50:03.880 --> 50:06.790 process for overseas ports to thwart a 50:06.790 --> 50:08.901 report of the G . D . M . A . Type of 50:08.901 --> 50:11.123 scandal . But that doesn't seem to have 50:11.260 --> 50:13.427 work to have confirmed . What steps do 50:13.427 --> 50:15.427 you plan to take to ensure adequate 50:15.427 --> 50:17.660 controls are in place to prevent fraud 50:17.660 --> 50:20.220 in these , over ship overseas shipping 50:20.220 --> 50:24.010 service contracts . Senator , There , 50:24.010 --> 50:26.010 there's no room in the Navy for any 50:26.020 --> 50:28.131 type of corruption along the lines of 50:28.131 --> 50:29.964 what you described and I too was 50:29.964 --> 50:32.020 distressed to read about the the MLS 50:32.020 --> 50:34.880 case a few weeks ago . Um I thought 50:34.880 --> 50:36.880 there were encouraging signs in the 50:36.880 --> 50:39.190 wake of the glenn glenn defense uh 50:39.560 --> 50:43.110 marine uh scandal , 50:43.120 --> 50:45.430 uh specifically the comprehensive 50:45.430 --> 50:48.880 review uh relating to the uniformed 50:48.890 --> 50:51.030 lawyers in the department and some of 50:51.030 --> 50:53.252 the recommendations they had made which 50:53.252 --> 50:55.474 which are being carried out and which I 50:55.474 --> 50:57.641 look forward to reviewing more closely 50:57.641 --> 51:00.510 if confirmed . But it's clear that 51:00.520 --> 51:02.770 there are still problems and if I am 51:02.770 --> 51:06.770 confirmed , I would look to see 51:07.260 --> 51:10.290 how we can address those . I'm from my 51:10.290 --> 51:13.110 time as a federal prosecutor and as a 51:13.110 --> 51:14.999 plaintiff's lawyer , I believe in 51:14.999 --> 51:17.490 personal accountability . So I think 51:17.490 --> 51:19.657 this is a problem that's going to need 51:19.657 --> 51:21.920 continuing focus of leadership , focus 51:21.920 --> 51:24.240 on personal accountability and 51:24.240 --> 51:26.780 reviewing what continues to go wrong . 51:26.780 --> 51:28.770 I hope it's isolated . But if I'm 51:28.770 --> 51:30.881 confirmed , I'm gonna , I'm gonna try 51:30.881 --> 51:34.330 and get to the bottom of it . Really . 51:34.340 --> 51:36.620 I think we need your commitment that 51:36.620 --> 51:39.190 you will review whatever oversight 51:39.190 --> 51:41.880 procedures already in place because 51:42.560 --> 51:44.730 uh , the Navy hardly needs these kinds 51:44.730 --> 51:48.070 of scandals . Mr Gordon 51:48.560 --> 51:50.338 the navy specific missile range 51:50.338 --> 51:52.504 facility , barking sands . P . M . R . 51:52.504 --> 51:54.504 F . And kuai is the world's largest 51:54.504 --> 51:56.180 instrumental instrumented 51:56.180 --> 51:58.291 multidimensional testing and training 51:58.291 --> 52:01.000 range , continuing to integrate an 52:01.000 --> 52:03.030 upgrade P . M . R . F . Along with 52:03.040 --> 52:05.950 other ranges in the pacific is critical 52:05.950 --> 52:08.560 to our national security and why that 52:08.560 --> 52:11.050 task is included as a line of effort 52:11.050 --> 52:12.717 within the pacific deterrence 52:12.717 --> 52:14.950 initiative . Have you ever visited P . 52:14.950 --> 52:18.230 M . R . F . Not yet . Senator , I hope 52:18.230 --> 52:21.770 you will . And uh 52:22.850 --> 52:25.570 you know I'd like to ask you , you know 52:26.250 --> 52:29.640 what is the importance of this kind 52:29.650 --> 52:33.390 of a facility and the importance of 52:33.390 --> 52:36.150 this type of initiative that I just 52:36.150 --> 52:39.370 mentioned . Test ranges of the kinds 52:39.370 --> 52:41.870 that we have , especially the one in 52:41.870 --> 52:45.400 why is critical to our ability to test 52:45.400 --> 52:47.511 weapons systems as they would be used 52:47.511 --> 52:50.250 in combat . Uh all of our facilities 52:50.250 --> 52:52.417 need to be examined for how they might 52:52.417 --> 52:54.639 be modernized in the future . There's a 52:54.639 --> 52:56.861 great report turned out recently by the 52:56.861 --> 52:58.861 national academies that highlighted 52:58.861 --> 53:01.028 some of the changes we need to make if 53:01.028 --> 53:02.972 confirmed . I'm looking forward to 53:02.972 --> 53:05.028 getting into the details of that and 53:05.028 --> 53:04.630 working with the rest of the D . O . T . 53:04.630 --> 53:06.797 Any team to figure out how to not just 53:06.797 --> 53:08.797 modernize but also positioned these 53:08.797 --> 53:10.963 ranges so that they can keep pace with 53:10.963 --> 53:12.963 the evolving needs for for the long 53:12.963 --> 53:15.720 haul . Thank you Mr Chairman . I just 53:15.720 --> 53:18.170 want to note for Miss baker that I do 53:18.170 --> 53:20.392 appreciate your mentioning that climate 53:20.392 --> 53:22.710 change considerations are an important 53:22.710 --> 53:24.877 part of what you will be focusing on . 53:24.877 --> 53:28.050 And so uh climate change considerations 53:28.050 --> 53:29.828 and the operations planning and 53:29.828 --> 53:31.994 resource allocation decisions are very 53:31.994 --> 53:34.980 important . So I wanted to know you . 53:35.050 --> 53:37.272 Yes senator and I would look forward if 53:37.272 --> 53:39.494 confirmed to working with you on that . 53:39.494 --> 53:41.717 Thank you . Thank you Mr Chairman thank 53:41.717 --> 53:43.772 you . Senator Hirono . Senator Kaine 53:43.772 --> 53:47.570 please . Thank you . Mr Chairman 53:47.570 --> 53:50.000 and Mr Gert and I want to ask you some 53:50.000 --> 53:53.200 questions um you are nominated for a 53:53.200 --> 53:55.460 very important position . One of your 53:55.460 --> 53:58.790 predecessors in the earlier this year 53:58.800 --> 54:02.180 DR radio tool I think was the acting in 54:02.180 --> 54:04.580 your position came before our readiness 54:04.580 --> 54:07.690 subcommittee and gave the following 54:07.700 --> 54:11.140 testimony which troubled Senator 54:11.140 --> 54:13.362 Sullivan I the chair and ranking of the 54:13.362 --> 54:15.640 readiness subcommittee . And I quote D . 54:15.640 --> 54:17.418 O . D . S . Acquisition and TNE 54:17.418 --> 54:18.973 communities need to address 54:18.973 --> 54:21.170 cybersecurity more comprehensively . 54:21.640 --> 54:23.584 Unfortunately some programs do not 54:23.584 --> 54:25.520 properly plan for cyber security 54:25.520 --> 54:27.910 assessments more critically due to poor 54:27.910 --> 54:30.530 system hardening against dynamic cyber 54:30.530 --> 54:33.020 threats driven by lack of workforce 54:33.020 --> 54:35.660 cyber capacity talent and tools within 54:35.660 --> 54:38.640 the program offices . Virtually none of 54:38.640 --> 54:42.090 the programs assessed in fy 20 were 54:42.090 --> 54:45.060 survivable against relevant cyber 54:45.060 --> 54:47.690 threats That testimony was offered in 54:47.690 --> 54:49.857 an open hearing . Senator Sullivan , I 54:49.857 --> 54:51.968 both looked at each other and said is 54:51.968 --> 54:54.134 this an open hearing ? And the witness 54:54.134 --> 54:56.134 dr tool said I got this cleared for 54:56.134 --> 54:57.968 delivery of testimony in an open 54:57.968 --> 55:00.190 hearing but it troubled us greatly that 55:00.190 --> 55:02.890 in the programs that were tested by 55:02.900 --> 55:05.130 your Office . Should you be confirmed 55:05.130 --> 55:07.990 in Fy 20 none of virtually none of the 55:07.990 --> 55:09.990 programs were survivable against 55:09.990 --> 55:12.590 relevant cyber threats . Do you think 55:12.590 --> 55:16.260 the survivability failures are due to 55:16.260 --> 55:18.870 poor acquisition policy or is there a 55:18.870 --> 55:21.930 larger cultural problem within the D . 55:21.930 --> 55:23.874 O . D . That we need to address to 55:23.874 --> 55:27.350 solve this shocking weakness . 55:27.840 --> 55:29.920 So senator getting our cybersecurity 55:29.920 --> 55:31.698 right on our weapons systems is 55:31.698 --> 55:33.809 critically important to them actually 55:33.809 --> 55:36.350 being useful in the field . Um It's 55:36.360 --> 55:39.390 very affordable to attack our systems 55:39.400 --> 55:41.940 before they actually make it to the 55:41.940 --> 55:43.996 field to get to the kinetic stage of 55:43.996 --> 55:46.218 the fight . So we got to get this right 55:46.218 --> 55:49.960 uh uh work and I get a ship mentioned 55:49.960 --> 55:52.390 earlier , shifting left the view of the 55:52.390 --> 55:54.557 operational test community to get into 55:54.557 --> 55:57.460 those early stage decisions before 55:57.470 --> 55:59.970 people start on the path to developing 55:59.970 --> 56:01.914 their products that they get those 56:01.914 --> 56:03.859 cyber security principles right up 56:03.859 --> 56:06.026 front so that when they get out toward 56:06.026 --> 56:08.137 the end , when we're doing the actual 56:08.137 --> 56:09.970 operational test side of it that 56:09.970 --> 56:12.081 they've positioned themselves well to 56:12.081 --> 56:14.137 be able to respond to the continuous 56:14.137 --> 56:14.070 evolving threat . It wouldn't be a big 56:14.070 --> 56:16.181 deal if we weren't being being it all 56:16.181 --> 56:18.014 the time . And we are we need to 56:18.014 --> 56:20.181 position ourselves well for that . You 56:20.181 --> 56:22.070 have experienced both in software 56:22.070 --> 56:23.810 development and navy weapons 56:23.810 --> 56:25.866 development . So I think you're in a 56:25.866 --> 56:28.032 unique posture to make sure when we're 56:28.032 --> 56:30.660 doing acquisition and early stage work 56:30.670 --> 56:32.614 on these programs that we build in 56:32.930 --> 56:35.740 cyber protections . Um , the second 56:35.750 --> 56:37.639 issue that's come up recently , a 56:37.639 --> 56:40.050 family in Annapolis was caught by the 56:40.060 --> 56:41.930 FBI offering to sell classified 56:41.930 --> 56:45.100 information on a submarine reactor and 56:45.100 --> 56:47.900 propulsion designed to another country . 56:47.910 --> 56:50.480 And that demonstrates just how damaging 56:50.480 --> 56:52.950 insider threats can be . The news 56:52.950 --> 56:55.061 report indicated that this particular 56:55.061 --> 56:56.950 individual was storing classified 56:56.950 --> 56:59.061 information on an SD card , hopefully 56:59.061 --> 57:01.117 to then transfer that information to 57:01.117 --> 57:03.117 another country from your time with 57:03.117 --> 57:05.420 Naval Surface Warfare Center . You 57:05.420 --> 57:07.680 think we do enough monitoring or have 57:07.680 --> 57:10.310 enough monitoring systems in place to 57:10.310 --> 57:12.380 flag potentially harmful activity . 57:12.380 --> 57:14.410 Like folks storing classified 57:14.410 --> 57:16.299 information on private SD cards . 57:17.530 --> 57:19.590 Senator . I'm not familiar currently 57:19.590 --> 57:21.757 with the protection systems that going 57:21.757 --> 57:24.120 on and and say specifically naval 57:24.130 --> 57:26.810 surface or undersea warfare center . I 57:26.810 --> 57:28.866 do not having been an employee at at 57:28.866 --> 57:30.977 those kinds of facilities in the past 57:30.977 --> 57:33.032 that they actually do have very good 57:33.032 --> 57:35.410 protections . Uh , we did find this uh 57:35.420 --> 57:37.531 problem that thought out of hand , so 57:37.531 --> 57:39.809 chalked it up is a little bit of a win , 57:39.809 --> 57:41.753 but it's also dangerously close to 57:41.753 --> 57:44.110 getting it too far out of hand before 57:44.110 --> 57:46.054 it would be a real problem . So if 57:46.054 --> 57:47.832 confirmed to make sure that the 57:47.832 --> 57:49.777 operational test community and the 57:49.777 --> 57:51.999 systems that we use are well positioned 57:51.999 --> 57:53.943 to be able to capture those things 57:53.943 --> 57:56.110 before they get out of hand and just , 57:56.110 --> 57:58.221 you know , to a to a non expert . I'm 57:58.221 --> 58:00.054 not an expert are their software 58:00.054 --> 58:02.166 systems or Ai programs that you think 58:02.320 --> 58:04.890 are sufficient to identify potentially 58:04.900 --> 58:06.789 harmful activity of the kind that 58:06.789 --> 58:08.733 you're right . We did catch it and 58:08.733 --> 58:10.789 stopped the family from transferring 58:10.789 --> 58:13.011 the information . But do you think that 58:13.011 --> 58:15.011 their software ai programs that can 58:15.011 --> 58:17.980 help us ensure the this kind of data 58:17.980 --> 58:20.690 and activity is protected . Senator . I 58:20.690 --> 58:22.960 couldn't make a definitive statement 58:22.960 --> 58:25.800 about the specific use of machine 58:25.800 --> 58:27.800 learning artificial intelligence to 58:27.800 --> 58:29.967 capture that thing , that that sort of 58:29.967 --> 58:32.189 activity . I do know that there is some 58:32.189 --> 58:34.356 research going on in that area from my 58:34.356 --> 58:34.280 time at the Software Engineering 58:34.280 --> 58:36.510 Institute . So if confirmed to be a 58:36.510 --> 58:39.150 pleasure to look into that and find out 58:39.150 --> 58:41.206 how we can be more effective in that 58:41.206 --> 58:43.483 area . Right , thank you appreciate it . 58:43.483 --> 58:45.830 Mr Chair , thank you . Senator King 58:46.720 --> 58:48.980 Senator Howley . If you're ready , you 58:48.980 --> 58:50.980 may begin . Thank you . Mr Chairman 58:50.980 --> 58:53.258 thanks to the witnesses for being here . 58:53.258 --> 58:55.313 Mr Bush . If I could just start with 58:55.313 --> 58:57.147 you , I want to talk first about 58:57.147 --> 58:59.258 something that's very important to my 58:59.258 --> 59:01.258 state . Uh and that's the Lake City 59:01.258 --> 59:03.480 ammunition plant also important for the 59:03.480 --> 59:05.591 next generation squad weapon . As you 59:05.591 --> 59:07.813 know that the Lake City Army ammunition 59:07.813 --> 59:07.750 plant does vital work ensuring that our 59:07.750 --> 59:09.972 war fighters are prepared and armed for 59:09.972 --> 59:11.694 any future conflict and and in 59:11.694 --> 59:13.430 particular that plant provides 59:13.430 --> 59:15.486 ammunition , produces ammunition for 59:15.486 --> 59:17.430 the next generation squad weapon . 59:17.430 --> 59:19.430 Here's my question . Do I have your 59:19.430 --> 59:21.430 commitment to ensure that Lake City 59:21.430 --> 59:23.660 will receive the facility upgrades that 59:23.660 --> 59:25.493 it needs in order to continue to 59:25.493 --> 59:27.660 produce ammunition at the rate that we 59:27.660 --> 59:30.730 needed to Sen . 1st , let me say , I 59:30.730 --> 59:33.063 was recently able to visit the facility . 59:33.063 --> 59:35.230 So I saw firsthand the great work down 59:35.230 --> 59:37.286 there and the great people that work 59:37.286 --> 59:39.430 there . Um assuming the army stays on 59:39.430 --> 59:41.597 its current plan for that program , it 59:41.597 --> 59:43.708 will need to build that ammunition at 59:43.708 --> 59:45.486 Lake City . Preliminary work is 59:45.486 --> 59:47.652 underway . And should the program stay 59:47.652 --> 59:49.763 on schedule , I would expect the army 59:49.763 --> 59:51.986 to fund uh production efforts as well . 59:51.986 --> 59:53.986 Very good . Thank you for that miss 59:53.986 --> 59:56.041 baker . Let me come to you and let's 59:56.041 --> 59:58.152 talk a little bit about china . If we 59:58.152 --> 01:00:00.041 could . Secretary Austin , Deputy 01:00:00.041 --> 01:00:02.041 secretary Hicks and under secretary 01:00:02.041 --> 01:00:04.319 call have all testified that the U . S . 01:00:04.319 --> 01:00:06.374 Has to maintain a debate to defeat a 01:00:06.374 --> 01:00:08.263 chinese fate . Accompli vis a vis 01:00:08.263 --> 01:00:10.760 Taiwan . I have made it my habit in 01:00:10.760 --> 01:00:13.390 this committee to ask every witness 01:00:13.390 --> 01:00:15.557 practically from D . O . D . Certainly 01:00:15.557 --> 01:00:17.668 those in policy making role about the 01:00:17.668 --> 01:00:19.779 scenario which I think is is not only 01:00:19.779 --> 01:00:21.946 the pacing china only being the pacing 01:00:21.946 --> 01:00:24.001 threat but the Taiwan challenged the 01:00:24.001 --> 01:00:26.057 pacing scenario . So if I could just 01:00:26.057 --> 01:00:28.168 ask for a yes or no from you , do you 01:00:28.168 --> 01:00:30.223 agree with their testimony that it's 01:00:30.223 --> 01:00:32.334 vital that the U . S . Maintained the 01:00:32.334 --> 01:00:34.279 ability to defeat a potential fate 01:00:34.279 --> 01:00:36.612 Accompli against Taiwan ? Yes . Senator . 01:00:36.612 --> 01:00:38.779 I do very good . And do you agree that 01:00:38.779 --> 01:00:40.890 the department should be prioritizing 01:00:40.890 --> 01:00:43.168 this scenario ? Is that develops plans , 01:00:43.168 --> 01:00:45.057 concepts and capabilities for the 01:00:45.057 --> 01:00:47.279 future ? Yes . Senator . I do . I think 01:00:47.279 --> 01:00:49.501 a Taiwan contingency is certainly among 01:00:49.501 --> 01:00:51.557 the most stressing scenarios that we 01:00:51.557 --> 01:00:53.501 can be planning for . And for that 01:00:53.501 --> 01:00:55.723 reason it's critical that we prioritize 01:00:55.723 --> 01:00:57.779 it . Great . I'm glad to hear that . 01:00:57.779 --> 01:00:59.946 Let me ask you about another aspect of 01:00:59.946 --> 01:00:59.450 this . Admiral Davidson and Admiral 01:00:59.450 --> 01:01:01.506 Aquilino have both testified to this 01:01:01.506 --> 01:01:03.790 committee That China may attempt a 01:01:03.790 --> 01:01:06.380 accompli in Taiwan before the end of 01:01:06.380 --> 01:01:08.980 this decade and it's widely thought 01:01:08.980 --> 01:01:11.147 that that this is possible for 2030s . 01:01:11.147 --> 01:01:13.258 But what caught my attention for both 01:01:13.258 --> 01:01:15.369 of them was their testimony that this 01:01:15.369 --> 01:01:17.536 is something we should be planning for 01:01:17.536 --> 01:01:19.591 looking at in the 20 twenties at the 01:01:19.591 --> 01:01:19.370 commandant of the Marine Corps and the 01:01:19.370 --> 01:01:21.370 Chief of Naval Operations have both 01:01:21.370 --> 01:01:23.092 said that they agree with that 01:01:23.092 --> 01:01:25.340 assessment and Transcom Transcom 01:01:25.340 --> 01:01:27.451 command and other officials have said 01:01:27.451 --> 01:01:29.673 the same . Do you agree That the threat 01:01:29.673 --> 01:01:31.673 of a Chinese stated company against 01:01:31.673 --> 01:01:33.562 Taiwan is something we need to be 01:01:33.562 --> 01:01:35.562 concerned about and planning for in 01:01:35.562 --> 01:01:37.896 this decade and not just in the 20s 30s ? 01:01:37.896 --> 01:01:41.040 Yes , Senator , I do very good . Um Let 01:01:41.040 --> 01:01:43.096 me ask you something adjacent to the 01:01:43.096 --> 01:01:45.096 Secretary Austin wrote earlier this 01:01:45.096 --> 01:01:47.207 year in response to a question for me 01:01:47.207 --> 01:01:49.318 and I'm going to quote him now that a 01:01:49.318 --> 01:01:51.207 combat credible forward deterrent 01:01:51.207 --> 01:01:53.373 posture is instrumental to the U . S . 01:01:53.373 --> 01:01:55.318 Military's ability to deter and if 01:01:55.318 --> 01:01:57.380 necessary , to deny a fait accompli 01:01:57.380 --> 01:01:59.800 scenario . The Deputy secretary , the 01:01:59.800 --> 01:02:02.140 undersecretary and multiple commanders 01:02:02.140 --> 01:02:04.240 of end up a calm have reaffirmed the 01:02:04.240 --> 01:02:07.960 secretary's emphasis on denial . Do you 01:02:07.960 --> 01:02:10.040 agree that a strategy of denial is 01:02:10.040 --> 01:02:12.130 essential for deterring chinese 01:02:12.130 --> 01:02:14.620 aggression . Yes . Senator , I do . 01:02:15.100 --> 01:02:17.990 Very good . Let me shift gears just a 01:02:17.990 --> 01:02:20.160 little bit and ask you about some of 01:02:20.160 --> 01:02:22.216 the recent disturbing testimony that 01:02:22.216 --> 01:02:24.438 this committee has heard with regard to 01:02:24.438 --> 01:02:26.549 the situation in Afghanistan , do you 01:02:26.549 --> 01:02:28.771 think it was appropriate for the United 01:02:28.771 --> 01:02:28.770 States to draw down nearly all of its 01:02:28.770 --> 01:02:31.940 forces in Afghanistan before we 01:02:31.940 --> 01:02:33.940 finished the evacuation of american 01:02:33.940 --> 01:02:35.496 citizens . And I'm thinking 01:02:35.496 --> 01:02:37.496 particularly given General Miller's 01:02:37.496 --> 01:02:39.718 warning that the Afghan security forces 01:02:39.718 --> 01:02:41.940 and government could collapse quickly . 01:02:42.200 --> 01:02:44.950 Uh Senator uh not being at the 01:02:44.950 --> 01:02:47.117 department right now , I I am familiar 01:02:47.117 --> 01:02:49.150 with the testimony that you are 01:02:49.150 --> 01:02:51.150 referencing . I understand that the 01:02:51.150 --> 01:02:53.490 department planned for a range of 01:02:53.490 --> 01:02:56.390 contingencies including different 01:02:56.400 --> 01:02:59.710 levels of troops on the ground . I'm 01:02:59.710 --> 01:03:03.180 not in a position I think to assess the 01:03:03.190 --> 01:03:05.780 details of that planning Secretary 01:03:05.790 --> 01:03:08.770 Austin testified both to this committee 01:03:08.770 --> 01:03:10.992 and then more pointedly actually to the 01:03:10.992 --> 01:03:13.214 House Armed Services Committee that the 01:03:13.214 --> 01:03:15.270 non combatant evacuation he believes 01:03:15.270 --> 01:03:17.103 should have begun earlier . It's 01:03:17.103 --> 01:03:19.610 reported that General Milley reported 01:03:19.610 --> 01:03:21.721 in the press that General Milley said 01:03:21.721 --> 01:03:23.721 the same thing that again even more 01:03:23.721 --> 01:03:26.160 pointedly that that D . O . D . Warned 01:03:26.160 --> 01:03:28.327 the White House and state that the non 01:03:28.327 --> 01:03:30.216 combatant evacuation had to begin 01:03:30.216 --> 01:03:32.382 earlier ? It didn't of course . And as 01:03:32.382 --> 01:03:34.382 a consequence hundreds of civilians 01:03:34.382 --> 01:03:36.382 were killed , hundreds of americans 01:03:36.382 --> 01:03:38.604 left behind 13 service members killed . 01:03:38.604 --> 01:03:40.604 Do you agree with them that the non 01:03:40.604 --> 01:03:42.771 combatant evacuation should have begun 01:03:42.771 --> 01:03:44.882 earlier in Afghanistan ? Uh Senator . 01:03:44.882 --> 01:03:44.760 My understanding is that there was a 01:03:44.760 --> 01:03:47.810 robust interagency discussion about the 01:03:47.810 --> 01:03:50.530 timing of the neo operations . I'm 01:03:50.530 --> 01:03:53.070 simply uh not currently in a position 01:03:53.070 --> 01:03:55.181 where I have the details that I would 01:03:55.181 --> 01:03:57.403 need to be able to really assess that . 01:03:57.403 --> 01:03:59.626 I've got another question for you about 01:03:59.626 --> 01:04:01.626 the force planning construct in the 01:04:01.626 --> 01:04:03.570 2018 NFS and and a couple of other 01:04:03.570 --> 01:04:05.459 things related also Russia . I'll 01:04:05.459 --> 01:04:05.100 submit those for the record because my 01:04:05.100 --> 01:04:07.156 time has expired . Thanks so much to 01:04:07.156 --> 01:04:09.100 all the witnesses And thank you Mr 01:04:09.100 --> 01:04:11.211 Chairman , thank you Senator Hawley . 01:04:11.211 --> 01:04:13.044 Uh No , let me recognize Senator 01:04:13.044 --> 01:04:14.989 Blumenthal , please thank you . Mr 01:04:14.989 --> 01:04:18.390 Chairman . I want to follow Senator 01:04:18.390 --> 01:04:21.980 Haleigh's questions about the 01:04:21.980 --> 01:04:23.900 impact of our withdrawal from 01:04:23.900 --> 01:04:27.420 Afghanistan on both americans 01:04:27.890 --> 01:04:31.450 who were left there and our Afghan 01:04:31.460 --> 01:04:34.280 partners and allies , many of whom are 01:04:34.280 --> 01:04:38.200 still there . You mentioned 01:04:38.200 --> 01:04:41.510 that there was a robust 01:04:41.990 --> 01:04:44.760 interagency discussion and a number of 01:04:44.760 --> 01:04:48.140 us actually visited the White House in 01:04:48.140 --> 01:04:51.690 the spring uh in april and May to 01:04:51.700 --> 01:04:54.810 urge that there be evacuation 01:04:55.890 --> 01:04:57.880 and much more massive efforts at 01:04:57.880 --> 01:05:00.840 evacuation beginning then and not 01:05:00.840 --> 01:05:02.896 waiting Now , you've been working on 01:05:02.896 --> 01:05:05.118 the National Security Council . Are you 01:05:05.118 --> 01:05:07.010 saying that the National Security 01:05:07.010 --> 01:05:09.340 Council was uninvolved in There was 01:05:09.340 --> 01:05:13.110 discussion uh no Senator . Uh 01:05:13.120 --> 01:05:15.240 my role in the National Security 01:05:15.240 --> 01:05:17.810 Council is primarily related to 01:05:17.820 --> 01:05:20.980 drafting the National Security 01:05:20.980 --> 01:05:23.280 strategy . I was not involved in the 01:05:23.280 --> 01:05:25.502 operational planning for the evacuation 01:05:25.502 --> 01:05:27.770 of Afghanistan . So there was no 01:05:27.770 --> 01:05:30.670 preparation in terms of strategy for 01:05:30.670 --> 01:05:33.510 that evacuation . Uh Senator , I 01:05:33.520 --> 01:05:35.687 believe that there was , It simply was 01:05:35.687 --> 01:05:39.470 not in my job jar . Let me ask 01:05:39.470 --> 01:05:42.120 you forward In terms of what we should 01:05:42.120 --> 01:05:44.800 do now , there have been nine planes 01:05:45.790 --> 01:05:48.310 that have continued the evacuation 01:05:48.310 --> 01:05:50.477 effort . They are private planes , not 01:05:50.790 --> 01:05:53.012 United States military planes . We have 01:05:53.012 --> 01:05:55.234 no presence there either diplomatically 01:05:55.234 --> 01:05:57.960 or militarily . Those nine planes have 01:05:57.960 --> 01:06:00.500 evacuated approximately 300 01:06:01.680 --> 01:06:03.900 people each , most of them 01:06:04.980 --> 01:06:07.780 interpreters , translators , guards , 01:06:07.780 --> 01:06:11.470 security personnel who sided with 01:06:11.470 --> 01:06:13.510 us literally put their lives on the 01:06:13.510 --> 01:06:16.120 line , risk their families . But they 01:06:16.120 --> 01:06:19.540 are just a fraction of the total number 01:06:19.540 --> 01:06:22.000 of afghan allies and partners who 01:06:22.000 --> 01:06:24.720 remained there in very severe danger . 01:06:25.100 --> 01:06:27.211 And the reason I'm asking about it is 01:06:27.211 --> 01:06:29.970 because they were of direct service to 01:06:29.970 --> 01:06:33.590 our men and women in uniform , often 01:06:33.600 --> 01:06:36.070 going into harm's way with them and the 01:06:36.070 --> 01:06:38.348 president is committed to get them out . 01:06:38.580 --> 01:06:40.810 Do you agree with me that we ought to 01:06:40.810 --> 01:06:43.710 make as a precondition of any serious 01:06:44.880 --> 01:06:47.780 talks or conversations or discussions 01:06:47.780 --> 01:06:51.700 with the taliban that they permit all 01:06:51.700 --> 01:06:54.680 of those afghan allies who sided with 01:06:54.680 --> 01:06:57.800 us to leave if they want to do so . 01:06:58.380 --> 01:07:02.230 Uh Yes , Senator , I think we have a 01:07:02.240 --> 01:07:04.910 commitment that we make as a military 01:07:04.920 --> 01:07:07.900 to our partners on the ground and that 01:07:07.910 --> 01:07:11.880 we need to abide by that . I think that 01:07:11.890 --> 01:07:14.910 the safe passage of not only american 01:07:14.910 --> 01:07:17.188 citizens and legal permanent residents , 01:07:17.188 --> 01:07:19.640 but also the afghan partners that you 01:07:19.650 --> 01:07:23.530 you describe should be a priority for 01:07:23.530 --> 01:07:25.910 moving forward . My office has been 01:07:25.910 --> 01:07:29.500 directly involved in enabling a 01:07:30.280 --> 01:07:32.640 a number of those planes to leave . It 01:07:32.640 --> 01:07:36.430 has been a tortuous . mhm day and 01:07:36.430 --> 01:07:40.200 night process and my 01:07:40.200 --> 01:07:42.200 feeling often has been that our own 01:07:42.200 --> 01:07:44.190 government is not as robustly 01:07:44.190 --> 01:07:47.500 supportive as it could be . You commit 01:07:47.500 --> 01:07:49.480 that you will be actively engaged 01:07:49.490 --> 01:07:52.150 personally with the Department of State 01:07:52.150 --> 01:07:53.817 in urging that we fulfill our 01:07:53.817 --> 01:07:56.039 commitment to those afghan partners and 01:07:56.039 --> 01:07:58.150 allies as well as the americans . You 01:07:58.150 --> 01:08:00.206 may still be there . Yes , Senator . 01:08:00.206 --> 01:08:02.470 And uh let me thank you for the work 01:08:02.470 --> 01:08:04.526 that I know that you've done on this 01:08:04.526 --> 01:08:06.581 issue and the leadership that you've 01:08:06.581 --> 01:08:06.500 displayed as you mentioned , the 01:08:06.510 --> 01:08:08.677 Department of State does have the lead 01:08:08.677 --> 01:08:10.788 on this for the inter agency . But if 01:08:10.788 --> 01:08:12.788 I'm confirmed , I'll seek to ensure 01:08:12.788 --> 01:08:14.677 that the Department of Defense is 01:08:14.677 --> 01:08:16.843 providing all of the necessary support 01:08:16.843 --> 01:08:19.010 to the State Department . Would you be 01:08:19.010 --> 01:08:21.800 willing to support the use of our 01:08:21.800 --> 01:08:23.980 state's military aircraft in that 01:08:23.980 --> 01:08:26.600 effort ? If the taliban permitted ? Uh 01:08:26.610 --> 01:08:28.666 Senator , that's that's not an issue 01:08:28.666 --> 01:08:31.120 I've looked at directly so I don't know 01:08:31.120 --> 01:08:33.231 that I can give you a direct answer . 01:08:33.231 --> 01:08:35.287 But if confirmed , I certainly would 01:08:35.287 --> 01:08:38.660 seek to uh get the details of what 01:08:38.670 --> 01:08:40.892 something like that could look like and 01:08:40.892 --> 01:08:43.610 have a follow on discussion . Thank you . 01:08:43.620 --> 01:08:45.620 Thank you very much . Mr Chairman . 01:08:45.620 --> 01:08:47.287 Thank you very much . Senator 01:08:47.287 --> 01:08:50.680 Blumenthal Senator King , please Thank 01:08:50.680 --> 01:08:52.847 you . Mr Chairman . Mr Gordon ? I want 01:08:52.847 --> 01:08:55.180 to follow up on Senator canes questions , 01:08:55.180 --> 01:08:57.347 there's no question in my mind that if 01:08:57.347 --> 01:08:59.402 there is some level of conflict that 01:08:59.402 --> 01:09:01.513 will begin with cyber and we can have 01:09:01.513 --> 01:09:00.910 all the ships in the world , in the 01:09:00.910 --> 01:09:03.790 pacific but if they are silenced , if 01:09:03.790 --> 01:09:05.850 they lose their communications 01:09:05.850 --> 01:09:07.930 capability , their navigation 01:09:07.930 --> 01:09:10.350 capability then they're not going to be 01:09:10.360 --> 01:09:12.490 very effective in protecting the 01:09:12.490 --> 01:09:16.240 interests of this country . Will 01:09:16.240 --> 01:09:19.710 you pursue actively and 01:09:19.710 --> 01:09:23.230 aggressively testing for cybersecurity 01:09:23.240 --> 01:09:26.630 of every system that comes under your 01:09:26.640 --> 01:09:29.780 purview in this new position 01:09:31.470 --> 01:09:34.760 the center the operational testing of 01:09:34.770 --> 01:09:36.900 software intensive care or software 01:09:36.910 --> 01:09:40.010 Reliant systems has to include 01:09:40.020 --> 01:09:43.130 cybersecurity testing is a part of its 01:09:43.130 --> 01:09:45.860 suitability for operational use so that 01:09:45.870 --> 01:09:47.870 I believe that policy is already in 01:09:47.870 --> 01:09:50.037 place but I commit to you that we will 01:09:50.037 --> 01:09:52.148 make sure that that uh your knowledge 01:09:52.148 --> 01:09:54.290 does this department this division 01:09:54.290 --> 01:09:57.150 office have the capability to provide 01:09:57.150 --> 01:10:00.110 that kind of cyber security testing . 01:10:00.110 --> 01:10:02.110 This is a specialist field . Do you 01:10:02.110 --> 01:10:04.280 have hackers for hire in that office ? 01:10:04.660 --> 01:10:07.480 So we have red team uh 01:10:08.260 --> 01:10:11.070 uh people that can go in and have a 01:10:11.080 --> 01:10:13.780 high degree of expertise for doing 01:10:13.780 --> 01:10:15.780 penetration testing and finding out 01:10:15.780 --> 01:10:17.947 where the vulnerabilities lie and form 01:10:17.947 --> 01:10:20.169 the programs what they need to do to go 01:10:20.169 --> 01:10:22.002 in and fix it so that you're not 01:10:22.002 --> 01:10:24.370 certain though that we have like all of 01:10:24.370 --> 01:10:26.481 the people in place for testing every 01:10:26.481 --> 01:10:28.703 system . I would have to look into that 01:10:28.703 --> 01:10:30.870 and get back to you confirmed . I view 01:10:30.870 --> 01:10:33.380 this as an absolutely essential and 01:10:33.390 --> 01:10:36.150 urgent part of your responsibility 01:10:36.160 --> 01:10:39.960 uh in terms of supply chain in terms 01:10:39.960 --> 01:10:43.780 of of acquisition of of of equipment , 01:10:44.260 --> 01:10:46.093 nothing is going to work if it's 01:10:46.093 --> 01:10:49.000 subject to a cyberattack , miss baker , 01:10:50.260 --> 01:10:51.816 you're going to one of your 01:10:51.816 --> 01:10:53.871 responsibilities will be to lead and 01:10:53.871 --> 01:10:55.816 develop the nuclear posture review 01:10:55.860 --> 01:10:57.804 without going into a great deal of 01:10:57.804 --> 01:10:59.916 discussion . Do you believe that a no 01:10:59.916 --> 01:11:02.410 first use policy should be part of the 01:11:02.410 --> 01:11:06.250 new nuclear policy ? Uh Senator as 01:11:06.260 --> 01:11:08.860 the deputy secretary testified when she 01:11:08.860 --> 01:11:11.700 was last year uh that's unlikely to be 01:11:11.700 --> 01:11:13.756 part of the nuclear posture review . 01:11:13.756 --> 01:11:15.756 That's ultimately a decision that's 01:11:15.756 --> 01:11:17.756 made by the President of the United 01:11:17.756 --> 01:11:19.811 States . If I was confirmed though I 01:11:19.811 --> 01:11:21.867 would seek to ensure and I know that 01:11:21.867 --> 01:11:23.867 NPR is already well underway but to 01:11:23.867 --> 01:11:26.650 ensure that the product uh is 01:11:26.650 --> 01:11:29.760 analytically rigorous that it it takes 01:11:29.760 --> 01:11:31.900 into account changes in the strategic 01:11:31.900 --> 01:11:33.900 environment which includes the fact 01:11:33.900 --> 01:11:37.060 that we are facing now two nuclear 01:11:37.060 --> 01:11:40.890 capable pure near Pure adversaries and 01:11:40.890 --> 01:11:43.580 that it reflects uh the input and 01:11:43.580 --> 01:11:45.730 advice of all components of the 01:11:45.730 --> 01:11:47.786 Department of Defense to include our 01:11:47.786 --> 01:11:49.952 combatant commanders . You come into a 01:11:49.952 --> 01:11:51.841 calm and stratcom in particular . 01:11:51.841 --> 01:11:55.080 Ultimately I think our obligation is to 01:11:55.080 --> 01:11:57.860 provide the best analytic product to 01:11:57.860 --> 01:11:59.916 the president in order to inform his 01:11:59.916 --> 01:12:03.780 choices . Thank you . Um we just 01:12:03.780 --> 01:12:05.900 heard about the launch of a chinese 01:12:05.910 --> 01:12:08.550 hypersonic missile from into orbit and 01:12:08.550 --> 01:12:11.120 then out of orbit . Uh we're still 01:12:11.120 --> 01:12:13.342 talking about missile defense hitting a 01:12:13.342 --> 01:12:15.398 bullet with a bullet . I'm concerned 01:12:15.398 --> 01:12:17.620 that for years we've been talking about 01:12:17.620 --> 01:12:19.787 directed energy as a possible solution 01:12:19.787 --> 01:12:21.731 and yet it just doesn't seem to be 01:12:21.731 --> 01:12:23.787 getting the attention , the research 01:12:23.787 --> 01:12:25.898 money uh , that I believe it deserves 01:12:25.898 --> 01:12:27.898 in terms of its future capability , 01:12:27.898 --> 01:12:29.731 we're not going to be able to do 01:12:29.731 --> 01:12:31.787 missile defense against a hypersonic 01:12:31.787 --> 01:12:33.842 missile . I think it's very unlikely 01:12:33.842 --> 01:12:36.890 will you commit to in terms of policy 01:12:36.900 --> 01:12:40.470 looking hard at directed energy as a 01:12:40.950 --> 01:12:44.320 potential asset in the new world of 01:12:44.330 --> 01:12:47.300 missile defense ? Yes , senator . I 01:12:47.300 --> 01:12:49.980 think there are a number of emerging 01:12:49.980 --> 01:12:52.147 and advanced technologies that we need 01:12:52.147 --> 01:12:54.147 to do a better job of incorporating 01:12:54.147 --> 01:12:56.424 into our concepts and our war planning . 01:12:56.424 --> 01:12:58.369 And certainly I would put directed 01:12:58.369 --> 01:13:00.480 energy in that category . Thank you . 01:13:00.480 --> 01:13:02.702 Mr . Coffee . I have to begin by asking 01:13:02.702 --> 01:13:04.869 you you were a P three commander where 01:13:04.869 --> 01:13:06.813 you ever at Brunswick ? Only three 01:13:06.813 --> 01:13:08.869 different squadrons , senator , Only 01:13:08.869 --> 01:13:11.091 three different squadrons . I was there 01:13:11.091 --> 01:13:10.990 for about 10 years of my 30 years 01:13:10.990 --> 01:13:13.157 including command of patrol , squatter 01:13:13.157 --> 01:13:15.379 New Brunswick Naval Air Station . Yes , 01:13:15.379 --> 01:13:17.434 sir . Congratulate Brunswick , thank 01:13:17.434 --> 01:13:21.170 you . Uh you've , in your advanced 01:13:21.170 --> 01:13:23.337 testimony , you mentioned a session to 01:13:23.337 --> 01:13:25.392 the Convention on the Law of the Sea 01:13:25.392 --> 01:13:27.448 would strengthen our global security 01:13:27.448 --> 01:13:29.503 posture as a lawyer . Do you see any 01:13:29.503 --> 01:13:32.810 legal objections to the uh session of 01:13:32.820 --> 01:13:36.060 this country to the Law of the Sea ? Uh 01:13:36.070 --> 01:13:39.630 Convention Senator . Uh the Navy has 01:13:39.630 --> 01:13:42.190 been abiding by the tenants of that . 01:13:42.200 --> 01:13:44.970 Uh we're abiding by . But the problem 01:13:44.970 --> 01:13:47.081 is we're not at the table . We're not 01:13:47.150 --> 01:13:50.210 we're not and and I don't see any legal 01:13:50.210 --> 01:13:53.480 obstacle to us signing on formally to 01:13:53.480 --> 01:13:55.536 that . Do you think it's a strategic 01:13:55.536 --> 01:13:57.536 disadvantage to us to not be at the 01:13:57.536 --> 01:13:59.258 table under the law of the sea 01:13:59.258 --> 01:14:03.150 convention ? I think our voice 01:14:03.150 --> 01:14:05.261 would carry more weight if we were at 01:14:05.261 --> 01:14:07.317 the table . I mean we carry a lot of 01:14:07.317 --> 01:14:09.428 weight regardless . Uh and I know our 01:14:09.428 --> 01:14:11.594 allies are abiding might as well , but 01:14:11.840 --> 01:14:13.729 that is actually something in the 01:14:13.729 --> 01:14:15.840 purview of the General Council of the 01:14:15.840 --> 01:14:18.000 Department of Defense and I certainly 01:14:18.000 --> 01:14:20.250 have confirmed would confer with her to 01:14:20.250 --> 01:14:22.417 see what we can do to advance the ball 01:14:22.417 --> 01:14:24.472 on that . Thank you . Thank you . Mr 01:14:24.472 --> 01:14:26.583 Chairman , Thank you . Senator . King 01:14:26.583 --> 01:14:29.230 Senator scott please . Thank you . 01:14:29.230 --> 01:14:32.480 Chairman read Thank you each of you for 01:14:32.480 --> 01:14:34.536 being here . Congratulations on your 01:14:34.536 --> 01:14:36.536 nominations and your willingness to 01:14:36.536 --> 01:14:38.702 serve just two weeks ago , the Chinese 01:14:38.702 --> 01:14:40.424 military spent sent nearly 150 01:14:40.424 --> 01:14:42.480 warplanes over Taiwanese air space . 01:14:42.480 --> 01:14:44.610 And we've heard the Communist Party 01:14:44.610 --> 01:14:46.554 General Secretary xI expressed his 01:14:46.554 --> 01:14:49.260 intentions for taking over Taiwan . We 01:14:49.260 --> 01:14:51.427 have a long military relationship with 01:14:51.427 --> 01:14:53.593 the Taiwanese people and is one of our 01:14:53.593 --> 01:14:55.816 most strategic partners that region . I 01:14:55.816 --> 01:14:57.927 think we'd all agree they deserve our 01:14:57.927 --> 01:14:59.760 complete support , Miss baker if 01:14:59.760 --> 01:15:01.982 confirmed . Would you support providing 01:15:01.982 --> 01:15:04.038 Taiwan with robust military training 01:15:04.038 --> 01:15:05.927 and expertise to ensure its armed 01:15:05.927 --> 01:15:07.760 forces present a combat credible 01:15:07.760 --> 01:15:10.670 deterrence . Uh Senator , I think that 01:15:10.680 --> 01:15:12.513 our commitments under the Taiwan 01:15:12.513 --> 01:15:15.770 relations act uh to support Taiwan's 01:15:15.770 --> 01:15:19.380 self defense , our our longstanding , 01:15:19.380 --> 01:15:21.380 they are bipartisan and I intend to 01:15:21.380 --> 01:15:23.436 support them have confirmed . So you 01:15:23.436 --> 01:15:25.602 would support robust military training 01:15:25.602 --> 01:15:27.658 and expertise to ensure that they're 01:15:27.658 --> 01:15:29.880 credible threat . Yes , Senator I would 01:15:29.880 --> 01:15:31.991 support meeting our commitments under 01:15:31.991 --> 01:15:33.991 the tiara . Would you consider such 01:15:33.991 --> 01:15:36.158 military support to include individual 01:15:36.158 --> 01:15:36.070 and unit level training as well as 01:15:36.070 --> 01:15:38.292 training for operations that would make 01:15:38.292 --> 01:15:40.181 cooperation with us and our other 01:15:40.181 --> 01:15:42.650 militaries more effective if Taiwan 01:15:42.650 --> 01:15:45.780 required it to defend itself . Uh 01:15:45.790 --> 01:15:47.734 Senator , I haven't looked at that 01:15:47.734 --> 01:15:49.790 question specifically , so I think I 01:15:49.790 --> 01:15:51.846 need to dig into some of the details 01:15:51.846 --> 01:15:53.957 and maybe get back to you with a more 01:15:53.957 --> 01:15:53.830 definitive answer . But certainly I 01:15:53.830 --> 01:15:56.060 think that it's incredibly important 01:15:56.070 --> 01:15:59.720 that we improve the interoperability of 01:15:59.730 --> 01:16:01.897 our military to work with our partners 01:16:01.897 --> 01:16:04.008 and allies in the region particularly 01:16:04.008 --> 01:16:06.341 as it might relate to a Taiwan scenario . 01:16:06.530 --> 01:16:08.808 I realized that primary goal for the U . 01:16:08.808 --> 01:16:10.919 S . Is to enhance Taiwan's ability to 01:16:10.919 --> 01:16:13.330 engage in a some asymmetric warfare 01:16:13.330 --> 01:16:15.840 with a much stronger china . And I 01:16:15.850 --> 01:16:17.906 think we all would agree with that . 01:16:17.906 --> 01:16:20.072 But shouldn't we also consider ways to 01:16:20.072 --> 01:16:22.128 help Taiwan Taiwan defend itself and 01:16:22.128 --> 01:16:24.128 hopefully be a great deterrent from 01:16:24.128 --> 01:16:26.183 whatever comments china my throat it 01:16:26.183 --> 01:16:28.406 such as an enhanced iron dome system or 01:16:28.406 --> 01:16:30.572 greater anti missile defense system to 01:16:30.572 --> 01:16:32.739 make it clear to the General Secretary 01:16:32.739 --> 01:16:34.739 xi that he will not be permitted to 01:16:34.739 --> 01:16:38.030 take Taiwan by force . Senator I again 01:16:38.030 --> 01:16:40.030 have not looked specifically at the 01:16:40.030 --> 01:16:43.560 concept of an iron dome like system . I 01:16:43.570 --> 01:16:45.626 understand that Taiwan is pursuing a 01:16:45.626 --> 01:16:49.320 strategy of building robust , lethal 01:16:49.330 --> 01:16:52.830 uh mobile asymmetric capabilities that 01:16:52.840 --> 01:16:54.951 I think makes a great deal of sense . 01:16:54.951 --> 01:16:57.173 But certainly these are all things that 01:16:57.173 --> 01:16:59.284 I think we can we can look at and and 01:16:59.284 --> 01:17:01.507 should look at carefully . It's clearly 01:17:01.507 --> 01:17:03.840 worked , it's clearly worked for Israel . 01:17:03.840 --> 01:17:06.118 Um and this would be totally different . 01:17:06.118 --> 01:17:08.173 They mean the capabilities of comics 01:17:08.173 --> 01:17:10.007 china totally different but this 01:17:10.007 --> 01:17:12.007 concept of making the time on these 01:17:12.007 --> 01:17:14.580 people comfortable and telling um she 01:17:14.580 --> 01:17:16.910 that he will not be able to take take 01:17:16.910 --> 01:17:19.188 them by force I think would be helpful . 01:17:19.188 --> 01:17:20.910 Don't you agree ? Uh Senator , 01:17:20.910 --> 01:17:23.021 certainly everything I know about the 01:17:23.021 --> 01:17:25.077 operation of the iron dome system in 01:17:25.077 --> 01:17:26.854 Israel indicates that it's been 01:17:26.854 --> 01:17:29.000 remarkably successful . I simply have 01:17:29.000 --> 01:17:31.360 not considered how that might translate 01:17:31.360 --> 01:17:34.480 into the indo pacific Thank you . Mr 01:17:34.480 --> 01:17:36.536 Bush . We're hearing of reports that 01:17:36.536 --> 01:17:38.758 communist china has successfully tested 01:17:38.758 --> 01:17:40.647 a hypersonic weapon is capable of 01:17:40.647 --> 01:17:42.869 carrying a nuclear warhead . We're also 01:17:42.869 --> 01:17:45.091 hearing that these reports surprise our 01:17:45.091 --> 01:17:47.091 intelligence community and pentagon 01:17:47.091 --> 01:17:49.202 leadership . Uh Do you believe that's 01:17:49.202 --> 01:17:51.340 true ? Um And do you if that's and do 01:17:51.340 --> 01:17:53.451 you believe that the United States is 01:17:53.451 --> 01:17:55.562 comfortably ahead of china on nuclear 01:17:55.562 --> 01:17:57.790 warheads ? Or is this launch evidence 01:17:57.790 --> 01:17:59.790 that we have a lot of work to do to 01:17:59.790 --> 01:18:01.957 modernize our our nuclear capability . 01:18:03.220 --> 01:18:04.998 Senator , I have not received a 01:18:04.998 --> 01:18:07.053 specific classified briefing on that 01:18:07.053 --> 01:18:10.250 event yet . I'm sure they're classified 01:18:10.250 --> 01:18:12.360 details I would need to know before 01:18:12.370 --> 01:18:14.660 giving you a good answer sir . More 01:18:14.660 --> 01:18:17.950 broadly speaking . Uh The entire D . O . 01:18:17.950 --> 01:18:20.230 D . Including the army does need to 01:18:20.230 --> 01:18:22.452 continue to work rapidly to improve our 01:18:22.452 --> 01:18:24.619 deterrence capability including in the 01:18:24.619 --> 01:18:27.580 area of hypersonic missiles . All right , 01:18:27.590 --> 01:18:29.820 Mrs baker and Mr and Mr . Gordon ? What 01:18:29.820 --> 01:18:31.987 do you think about these reports about 01:18:31.987 --> 01:18:34.150 the hypersonic ? And were we were we 01:18:34.150 --> 01:18:37.950 surprised And and uh and do you do you 01:18:37.950 --> 01:18:40.061 believe that we need to modernize our 01:18:40.061 --> 01:18:42.117 nuclear arsenal to be able to defend 01:18:42.117 --> 01:18:43.894 ourselves against an aggressive 01:18:44.120 --> 01:18:48.000 communist leadership in china ? Uh 01:18:48.010 --> 01:18:50.780 Senator is Mr Bush that I think uh it's 01:18:50.780 --> 01:18:52.780 difficult to discuss the details in 01:18:52.780 --> 01:18:55.002 this open session but certainly I agree 01:18:55.002 --> 01:18:57.670 a modern incredible nuclear deterrent 01:18:57.680 --> 01:19:00.370 uh is essential to homeland defense 01:19:00.370 --> 01:19:02.930 moving forward . I concur with Miss 01:19:02.930 --> 01:19:05.480 baker on that point . Yeah . Thank you 01:19:05.480 --> 01:19:07.860 Mr German . Thank you Senator scott . 01:19:07.860 --> 01:19:10.340 Senator Warren please . Uh thank you . 01:19:10.340 --> 01:19:12.660 Mr . Chairman , congratulations to each 01:19:12.660 --> 01:19:15.440 of our nominees . Welcome And I want to 01:19:15.440 --> 01:19:17.990 say a special thank you to Miss baker 01:19:17.990 --> 01:19:20.700 for her commitment to serve her 01:19:20.700 --> 01:19:23.150 intellect and her integrity is matched 01:19:23.160 --> 01:19:25.550 only by her deep and abiding commitment 01:19:25.550 --> 01:19:28.520 to public service . And I was fortunate 01:19:28.530 --> 01:19:31.300 to benefit from her advice and counsel . 01:19:31.310 --> 01:19:34.140 She is precisely the kind of person 01:19:34.320 --> 01:19:37.610 that we should all hope agrees to serve 01:19:37.620 --> 01:19:40.880 in our government . Mr curtain . I 01:19:40.880 --> 01:19:43.670 would like to start with you today . Uh 01:19:43.680 --> 01:19:45.791 There's something I'd like to be able 01:19:45.791 --> 01:19:47.902 to ask about and that is the . Annual 01:19:47.902 --> 01:19:49.902 report published by the Director of 01:19:49.902 --> 01:19:52.069 operational Test and Evaluation . This 01:19:52.069 --> 01:19:54.090 is one of the most important report 01:19:54.090 --> 01:19:56.770 cards for determining whether or not 01:19:56.780 --> 01:20:00.630 our weapons are working . The Section 01:20:00.640 --> 01:20:03.240 89 Panel created by Congress to 01:20:03.240 --> 01:20:05.130 streamline and improve defense 01:20:05.140 --> 01:20:07.950 acquisition found that the annual 01:20:07.950 --> 01:20:09.894 report and I'm going to quote here 01:20:09.894 --> 01:20:13.070 assists with both the office's internal 01:20:13.070 --> 01:20:16.640 success and the ability of Congress to 01:20:16.650 --> 01:20:19.230 exercise proper oversight . 01:20:20.110 --> 01:20:22.950 Now this is where it's important to me 01:20:22.950 --> 01:20:24.894 to get some commitments from you . 01:20:24.894 --> 01:20:26.672 There's always pressure to keep 01:20:26.672 --> 01:20:28.783 elements of this report away from the 01:20:28.783 --> 01:20:32.150 public . So Mr Garton , do you agree 01:20:32.150 --> 01:20:34.360 that this report must remain available 01:20:34.360 --> 01:20:37.050 to the public to the maximum extent 01:20:37.060 --> 01:20:40.870 possible . So senator transparency on 01:20:40.870 --> 01:20:42.926 how our weapons systems are doing is 01:20:42.926 --> 01:20:44.981 especially important . So the public 01:20:44.981 --> 01:20:47.148 knows that we're doing a good job with 01:20:47.148 --> 01:20:49.203 the money we have or where we're not 01:20:49.203 --> 01:20:51.470 quite living up to our expectations . I 01:20:51.470 --> 01:20:53.350 commit to you that will have an 01:20:53.350 --> 01:20:55.580 unclassified report . I'll also assert 01:20:55.580 --> 01:20:57.610 that some of the stuff might be a 01:20:57.610 --> 01:21:00.330 little sensitive that perhaps might be 01:21:00.330 --> 01:21:02.440 better suited for like a classified 01:21:02.440 --> 01:21:04.496 appendix of that sort of be happy to 01:21:04.496 --> 01:21:06.496 work with you on one of the balance 01:21:06.496 --> 01:21:08.718 points of those . Good . So I take that 01:21:08.718 --> 01:21:10.551 as a yes , to the maximum extent 01:21:10.551 --> 01:21:12.607 possible , to some extent possible . 01:21:12.607 --> 01:21:14.440 Good . And do you commit to this 01:21:14.440 --> 01:21:16.329 committee that you will make this 01:21:16.329 --> 01:21:18.273 report and other reports from your 01:21:18.273 --> 01:21:20.190 office publicly available to the 01:21:20.190 --> 01:21:22.300 maximum extent possible , to the 01:21:22.300 --> 01:21:24.522 maximum extent possible . Yes , ma'am . 01:21:24.522 --> 01:21:26.856 Thank you . That's very important to me . 01:21:26.856 --> 01:21:29.180 Now . One way to keep information from 01:21:29.180 --> 01:21:30.880 the public is to use Sudo 01:21:30.880 --> 01:21:34.450 classifications like for official use 01:21:34.460 --> 01:21:36.690 only . Which means that the information 01:21:36.690 --> 01:21:39.350 is not deemed to be classified but it's 01:21:39.350 --> 01:21:41.980 still restricted from public view . So 01:21:41.980 --> 01:21:44.313 let me ask you another question on this . 01:21:44.313 --> 01:21:46.620 Do you commit to avoiding the use of 01:21:46.620 --> 01:21:49.150 designations such as for official use 01:21:49.160 --> 01:21:52.720 only for the unclassified portions of 01:21:52.720 --> 01:21:55.040 the operational test and evaluation 01:21:55.040 --> 01:21:58.040 reports , Senator . To the maximum 01:21:58.040 --> 01:22:00.330 extent possible . Yes . But I think 01:22:00.330 --> 01:22:02.386 there might be some policy issues we 01:22:02.386 --> 01:22:04.430 might have to work out with with 01:22:04.430 --> 01:22:06.152 Congress to make sure that the 01:22:06.152 --> 01:22:08.660 information is provided as unclassified 01:22:08.670 --> 01:22:10.950 and public released but also not 01:22:10.950 --> 01:22:12.950 sensitive in some way . All right , 01:22:12.950 --> 01:22:15.006 well , we might have to talk through 01:22:15.006 --> 01:22:17.061 what sensitive means because if it's 01:22:17.061 --> 01:22:19.283 not classifying then I think the public 01:22:19.283 --> 01:22:21.283 generally the presumption should be 01:22:21.283 --> 01:22:23.710 that the public has a right to know and 01:22:23.710 --> 01:22:25.821 that's the commitment I want from you 01:22:25.821 --> 01:22:28.100 to the maximum extent possible . Yes , 01:22:28.100 --> 01:22:30.130 Senator . Okay . And then my final 01:22:30.130 --> 01:22:32.750 question on this , do you commit to 01:22:32.750 --> 01:22:34.639 notifying this committee ? If you 01:22:34.639 --> 01:22:36.540 believe that your work is being 01:22:36.540 --> 01:22:39.940 wrongfully restricted or pseudo 01:22:39.940 --> 01:22:43.320 classified or over classified 01:22:43.900 --> 01:22:46.122 senator . If there are any restrictions 01:22:46.122 --> 01:22:48.122 that don't make sense or not in the 01:22:48.122 --> 01:22:50.122 interest of the country . I'll make 01:22:50.122 --> 01:22:52.344 sure that we communicate that with this 01:22:52.344 --> 01:22:54.067 committee . Good . I very much 01:22:54.067 --> 01:22:56.340 appreciate that . I plan to hold you to 01:22:56.340 --> 01:22:59.070 these commitments and I look forward to 01:22:59.070 --> 01:23:01.650 working with you to ensure maximum 01:23:01.650 --> 01:23:04.540 transparency from your office . I think 01:23:04.540 --> 01:23:07.200 that's how both of us will better serve 01:23:07.200 --> 01:23:10.260 the american people . Thank you . Thank 01:23:10.260 --> 01:23:12.204 you . Mr Chairman Senator Warren . 01:23:12.204 --> 01:23:14.371 Senator Blackburn . Please thank you . 01:23:14.371 --> 01:23:16.427 Mr Chairman and thank you to each of 01:23:16.427 --> 01:23:18.593 you for being here today . Mr Coffee . 01:23:18.593 --> 01:23:20.538 I want to come to you . We saw the 01:23:20.538 --> 01:23:24.190 release of knave admin last week and 01:23:24.190 --> 01:23:27.540 the guidance on how sailors who are not 01:23:27.540 --> 01:23:29.860 fully vaccinated and do not have a 01:23:29.870 --> 01:23:32.960 pending or approved exemption will be 01:23:32.960 --> 01:23:35.540 punished administratively . So I've got 01:23:35.540 --> 01:23:37.960 some questions for you . Is it correct 01:23:37.970 --> 01:23:40.300 to say that sailors who are separated 01:23:40.310 --> 01:23:44.060 only for refusing the vaccine will in 01:23:44.060 --> 01:23:47.240 the least favorable outcome receive a 01:23:47.240 --> 01:23:50.930 discharge no lower than general under 01:23:50.930 --> 01:23:54.860 honorable conditions . Well , senator 01:23:54.870 --> 01:23:56.981 I support the vaccination program . I 01:23:56.981 --> 01:23:59.037 think it's critically important that 01:23:59.037 --> 01:24:01.110 the force be vaccinated . I was 01:24:01.110 --> 01:24:03.277 vaccinated quite frequently when I was 01:24:03.277 --> 01:24:05.443 on active duty and as a reservist . Uh 01:24:05.443 --> 01:24:07.830 I I have not reviewed the the nab 01:24:07.830 --> 01:24:09.386 edmund you're talking about 01:24:09.386 --> 01:24:12.420 specifically . Um So you review it and 01:24:12.420 --> 01:24:14.740 then answer me specifically . I would I 01:24:14.740 --> 01:24:16.796 would be happy to do that . Enlisted 01:24:16.796 --> 01:24:18.851 service members separated under this 01:24:18.851 --> 01:24:21.070 sub paragraph will apparently not be 01:24:21.080 --> 01:24:24.730 eligible for involuntary separation pay 01:24:24.740 --> 01:24:27.860 and will be subject to recruitment of 01:24:27.870 --> 01:24:31.120 any unearned special or incentive pays . 01:24:31.130 --> 01:24:34.470 Can you articulate what the recruitment 01:24:34.480 --> 01:24:37.930 of any unearned special or incentive 01:24:37.930 --> 01:24:40.670 pays means providing me a tangible 01:24:40.680 --> 01:24:43.670 example of this . Well I can speak to 01:24:43.670 --> 01:24:47.660 my own background Senator um as a naval 01:24:47.660 --> 01:24:49.882 aviator , a naval flight officer . If I 01:24:49.882 --> 01:24:52.140 know I'm talking about the specific 01:24:52.140 --> 01:24:54.362 guidance . So why don't you do that one 01:24:54.362 --> 01:24:57.040 in writing ? Since you have not seen 01:24:57.050 --> 01:24:59.217 that ? I can't believe you didn't look 01:24:59.217 --> 01:25:01.410 at that guidance before coming in here 01:25:01.410 --> 01:25:03.930 for this hearing . So look at it and 01:25:03.930 --> 01:25:07.030 then give me a written response with a 01:25:07.030 --> 01:25:10.010 tangible example . A general discharge 01:25:10.010 --> 01:25:12.066 allows the service member to use the 01:25:12.066 --> 01:25:14.200 majority of veterans programs and 01:25:14.200 --> 01:25:16.770 benefits such as hiring preferences for 01:25:16.770 --> 01:25:19.560 federal jobs . V . A medical coverage 01:25:19.560 --> 01:25:22.420 and home long benefits . Please confirm 01:25:22.420 --> 01:25:24.840 the following for the record . Well 01:25:24.840 --> 01:25:27.330 sailors who are separated only for 01:25:27.330 --> 01:25:30.100 refusing the vaccine be deemed 01:25:30.110 --> 01:25:33.250 ineligible from future military service , 01:25:33.250 --> 01:25:36.480 Yes or no . Uh Senator . I have to 01:25:36.580 --> 01:25:38.913 admit that in writing and submit . That . 01:25:38.913 --> 01:25:40.858 Also is the G . I . Bill education 01:25:40.858 --> 01:25:44.580 benefit , the only absolute benefit not 01:25:44.590 --> 01:25:47.150 awarded to service members with a 01:25:47.150 --> 01:25:50.210 general discharge . Yes or no . Same 01:25:50.210 --> 01:25:52.543 answer . Senator . I'll put on my right . 01:25:52.543 --> 01:25:54.432 Is it fair to say that any sailor 01:25:54.432 --> 01:25:56.890 discharge for a vaccination refusal 01:25:56.890 --> 01:25:59.660 will not be entitled to their post 9 11 01:25:59.660 --> 01:26:02.160 GI Bill benefit . Same answer . Senator . 01:26:02.170 --> 01:26:05.520 Okay . What happens to personnel from 01:26:05.520 --> 01:26:07.600 the other military services who are 01:26:07.600 --> 01:26:10.770 assigned to naval commands and refuse 01:26:10.780 --> 01:26:13.770 the vaccine ? We would want to know 01:26:13.770 --> 01:26:17.280 that . So again a ready answer and then 01:26:17.280 --> 01:26:20.880 also what happens to foreign military 01:26:20.880 --> 01:26:23.990 personnel such as those studying us , 01:26:23.990 --> 01:26:26.110 professional , military education 01:26:26.110 --> 01:26:29.590 courses . If they refuse the vaccine 01:26:29.590 --> 01:26:32.720 for religious reasons , I will submit 01:26:32.720 --> 01:26:35.370 that as well . I I want you to know my 01:26:35.370 --> 01:26:39.370 office has been inundated with calls 01:26:39.380 --> 01:26:42.810 trying to get clarity on these issues . 01:26:43.480 --> 01:26:46.630 So I think it is so important that you 01:26:46.630 --> 01:26:49.890 all get these to us one more . Is it 01:26:49.890 --> 01:26:51.650 also correct that separation 01:26:51.650 --> 01:26:54.800 determinations made by the navy will be 01:26:54.800 --> 01:26:57.770 centralized under the C . C . D . A . 01:26:57.780 --> 01:27:00.390 To ensure a fair and consistent process 01:27:00.400 --> 01:27:03.970 is applied across the board . I'll be 01:27:03.970 --> 01:27:06.137 sure to provide the clarity you see in 01:27:06.137 --> 01:27:08.137 my written response and then also a 01:27:08.137 --> 01:27:10.081 statement as to whether or not you 01:27:10.081 --> 01:27:12.830 think a centralized process is the best 01:27:12.840 --> 01:27:14.830 practice . We'll do that as well . 01:27:14.830 --> 01:27:17.460 Senator . Thank you Miss baker . If I 01:27:17.460 --> 01:27:20.570 may come to you uh Senator Warren 01:27:20.580 --> 01:27:23.610 alluded you have advised her on shaping 01:27:23.610 --> 01:27:26.050 her national security agenda which and 01:27:26.050 --> 01:27:29.360 I'm quoting took aim at rising defense 01:27:29.360 --> 01:27:31.471 budgets in the revolving door between 01:27:31.471 --> 01:27:33.740 the pentagon and the defense industry . 01:27:33.750 --> 01:27:36.570 If confirmed . Would these be your 01:27:36.570 --> 01:27:38.270 priorities and the deputy 01:27:38.270 --> 01:27:40.840 undersecretary of Defense for policy 01:27:40.850 --> 01:27:43.400 role . Would it be these rising D . O . 01:27:43.400 --> 01:27:46.440 D . Budgets and the defense industry uh 01:27:46.450 --> 01:27:49.090 Senator uh the secretary has been clear 01:27:49.090 --> 01:27:51.312 that china is the pacing threat for the 01:27:51.312 --> 01:27:53.534 department and should be our priority . 01:27:53.534 --> 01:27:55.534 So if I'm confirmed I would seek to 01:27:55.534 --> 01:27:57.810 prioritize those issues . Okay , well 01:27:57.810 --> 01:28:00.090 we know that flat defense budgets are 01:28:00.100 --> 01:28:03.460 actually shrinking defense budgets . 01:28:03.470 --> 01:28:07.270 How do you reconcile this reality with 01:28:07.270 --> 01:28:10.770 your inherent bias toward and I'm 01:28:10.770 --> 01:28:13.120 quoting you taking aim at rising 01:28:13.120 --> 01:28:16.690 defense budgets because china is a 01:28:16.700 --> 01:28:20.070 priority and we want to make 01:28:20.070 --> 01:28:23.530 certain that we are 01:28:23.540 --> 01:28:27.210 addressing that great power competition . 01:28:27.210 --> 01:28:29.820 So how do you reconcile that Senator ? 01:28:29.820 --> 01:28:32.430 I agree that we need to be prioritizing 01:28:32.440 --> 01:28:35.540 uh issues surrounding great power 01:28:35.540 --> 01:28:38.100 competition particularly with china . 01:28:38.270 --> 01:28:40.159 Where I start on questions of the 01:28:40.159 --> 01:28:42.159 defense budget is to start with the 01:28:42.159 --> 01:28:44.103 strategy 1st . And as you know , I 01:28:44.103 --> 01:28:46.214 think The department is well underway 01:28:46.214 --> 01:28:48.326 in drafting an update to the National 01:28:48.326 --> 01:28:50.270 Defense Strategy that will build I 01:28:50.270 --> 01:28:52.730 believe on the 2018 strategy I think 01:28:52.730 --> 01:28:55.670 from there we look at the capabilities 01:28:55.670 --> 01:28:57.559 and investments that the strategy 01:28:57.559 --> 01:28:59.781 requires and from there build back into 01:28:59.781 --> 01:29:01.892 a budget number and you think you can 01:29:01.892 --> 01:29:03.780 do that with less resources . Uh 01:29:03.790 --> 01:29:05.623 Senator I would be guided by the 01:29:05.623 --> 01:29:08.910 strategy so I don't have an arbitrary 01:29:08.910 --> 01:29:10.990 number in mind . I think we should 01:29:10.990 --> 01:29:12.990 resources . So you're saying you're 01:29:12.990 --> 01:29:14.990 going to leave your opinions at the 01:29:14.990 --> 01:29:18.280 door . Yes . Senator thank you sir . 01:29:18.870 --> 01:29:21.380 Uh thank you Senator Blackburn , let me 01:29:21.380 --> 01:29:24.290 recognize via webex . Senator Peters 01:29:25.970 --> 01:29:28.081 thank you . Thank you mr Chairman and 01:29:28.081 --> 01:29:29.526 to each of the nominees , 01:29:29.526 --> 01:29:31.692 congratulations on your nomination and 01:29:31.692 --> 01:29:33.914 thank you Korea for your willingness to 01:29:33.914 --> 01:29:36.610 serve our country . Mr Coffee . My 01:29:36.610 --> 01:29:39.500 first question is for you and in august 01:29:39.500 --> 01:29:43.190 of 2000 and 19 corporal and process 01:29:43.190 --> 01:29:46.130 of michigan unfortunately took her own 01:29:46.130 --> 01:29:49.430 life at a Marine Corps air station in 01:29:49.520 --> 01:29:52.700 Japan . The Vasquez family was told 01:29:52.700 --> 01:29:54.730 that the command investigation was 01:29:54.730 --> 01:29:56.960 concluded but the release of the final 01:29:56.960 --> 01:30:00.210 requires additional approvals And they 01:30:00.210 --> 01:30:03.370 have been now waiting for two years 01:30:04.060 --> 01:30:07.180 as general counsel . You will may will 01:30:07.180 --> 01:30:09.750 you maintain a close relationship with 01:30:09.750 --> 01:30:11.972 the staff , judge advocate and and have 01:30:11.972 --> 01:30:15.150 a role in oversight of the naval 01:30:15.150 --> 01:30:17.220 criminal investigative service ? If 01:30:17.220 --> 01:30:20.220 confirmed senator , let me begin by 01:30:20.220 --> 01:30:22.553 expressing my condolences to the family . 01:30:22.553 --> 01:30:24.610 Uh And uh it's something I will look 01:30:24.610 --> 01:30:28.190 into if confirmed . Uh Yes senator I I 01:30:28.200 --> 01:30:30.860 uh commit to working closely with the 01:30:30.870 --> 01:30:34.010 uh with the uniformed lawyers of the 01:30:34.010 --> 01:30:36.177 department . Uh I understand there's a 01:30:36.177 --> 01:30:39.180 very good relationship Now a one team , 01:30:39.180 --> 01:30:42.500 1 mission approach that I heartily 01:30:42.500 --> 01:30:44.840 endorse . Uh And I will likewise work 01:30:44.840 --> 01:30:47.280 closely with uh with uh the under 01:30:47.280 --> 01:30:49.391 secretary or the secretary whoever is 01:30:49.391 --> 01:30:52.470 at the present time overseeing N . C . 01:30:52.470 --> 01:30:54.581 I . S . I do think that my background 01:30:54.581 --> 01:30:56.637 is a federal prosecutor working with 01:30:56.637 --> 01:30:58.748 law enforcement will be beneficial if 01:30:58.748 --> 01:31:02.500 if I am confirmed . Well I certainly 01:31:02.510 --> 01:31:05.420 hope that a massive family has achieved 01:31:05.430 --> 01:31:08.030 some degree of closure by the time that 01:31:08.030 --> 01:31:10.252 you have been confirmed . But I'm still 01:31:10.252 --> 01:31:12.474 going to ask for your help in resolving 01:31:12.474 --> 01:31:14.950 this matter for them . And more broadly 01:31:14.950 --> 01:31:16.920 I just want to get a a clear 01:31:16.920 --> 01:31:19.142 confirmation from you that you're going 01:31:19.142 --> 01:31:21.309 to strive to ensure that the legal and 01:31:21.309 --> 01:31:23.087 investigative mechanisms in the 01:31:23.087 --> 01:31:25.660 department are working to ensure timely 01:31:25.820 --> 01:31:28.730 open and regular contact with the next 01:31:28.730 --> 01:31:32.350 of 10 in the event of a tragedy such as 01:31:32.350 --> 01:31:34.461 this Senator , you have my commitment 01:31:34.461 --> 01:31:36.461 that if I am confirmed , I will act 01:31:36.461 --> 01:31:38.572 accordingly . I will do that well . I 01:31:38.572 --> 01:31:41.000 appreciate that Mr Bush as vehicles get 01:31:41.000 --> 01:31:43.930 smarter , automotive cybersecurity is 01:31:43.940 --> 01:31:47.310 clearly becoming an increasing concern . 01:31:47.320 --> 01:31:49.980 The economic loss and and military risk 01:31:49.980 --> 01:31:52.202 that's supposed by cyber attacks on the 01:31:52.202 --> 01:31:54.440 U . S . Vehicle ecosystem is is 01:31:54.440 --> 01:31:57.510 certainly significant as no single firm 01:31:57.510 --> 01:32:00.480 has the expertise . The resources are 01:32:00.550 --> 01:32:02.606 quite frankly the technical depth to 01:32:02.606 --> 01:32:04.550 independently address all of these 01:32:04.550 --> 01:32:06.830 cyber security threats . So my question 01:32:06.830 --> 01:32:08.870 for you , Mr Bush is what is your 01:32:08.870 --> 01:32:12.370 vision for how the army can secure are 01:32:12.370 --> 01:32:14.990 increasingly networked vehicle fleet 01:32:14.990 --> 01:32:16.480 from cyber attacks . 01:32:18.450 --> 01:32:22.070 Senator , I think for new programs we 01:32:22.070 --> 01:32:24.181 can start up front by building in the 01:32:24.181 --> 01:32:26.014 right architecture and the right 01:32:26.014 --> 01:32:28.770 cybersecurity early so that we have 01:32:28.770 --> 01:32:30.881 systems in place that we can test and 01:32:30.881 --> 01:32:33.870 be reliant upon to ensure that our 01:32:33.870 --> 01:32:36.130 vehicles are cyber secure . I believe 01:32:36.130 --> 01:32:38.352 there is a greater challenge working on 01:32:38.352 --> 01:32:40.574 older vehicles where they were designed 01:32:40.574 --> 01:32:42.700 in times when cyber didn't exist and 01:32:42.700 --> 01:32:45.210 they've had systems added to them over 01:32:45.210 --> 01:32:47.980 the years um in a less systematic way , 01:32:47.990 --> 01:32:50.101 I believe that in those cases we will 01:32:50.101 --> 01:32:52.157 need to come up with a better way of 01:32:52.157 --> 01:32:54.440 testing uh those Federated type systems 01:32:54.450 --> 01:32:56.672 in older vehicles to make sure they are 01:32:56.672 --> 01:32:58.672 cyber secure as well . And lastly I 01:32:58.672 --> 01:33:00.490 would add that army vehicles 01:33:00.500 --> 01:33:03.130 historically have been designed to be 01:33:03.130 --> 01:33:05.550 able to continue to fight with degraded 01:33:05.560 --> 01:33:08.640 conditions . So I believe it would be 01:33:08.650 --> 01:33:10.761 incumbent for the army to ensure that 01:33:10.761 --> 01:33:12.780 new systems , even if under cyber 01:33:12.780 --> 01:33:14.660 attacks still retain some combat 01:33:14.660 --> 01:33:16.840 capabilities so our soldiers can 01:33:16.840 --> 01:33:17.951 continue fighting . 01:33:26.250 --> 01:33:28.760 We are having technical difficulties . 01:33:28.770 --> 01:33:31.410 Uh Let us wait a moment to see if we 01:33:31.410 --> 01:33:35.370 can restore . Uh let 01:33:35.370 --> 01:33:39.080 me at this point recognize if we can 01:33:39.950 --> 01:33:42.850 but center peters , are you back with 01:33:42.850 --> 01:33:43.850 us ? 01:33:45.150 --> 01:33:48.610 Your back 01:33:48.620 --> 01:33:51.260 you've reappeared ? Mhm . 01:33:51.750 --> 01:33:55.470 Okay . 35 seconds . 01:33:55.480 --> 01:33:58.760 uh Well Mr Chairman , I'll believe that 01:33:58.760 --> 01:34:01.390 is my last question . Thank you so much . 01:34:01.400 --> 01:34:03.511 Thank you . Senator Peters now let me 01:34:03.511 --> 01:34:05.810 recognize once again via webex if it's 01:34:05.810 --> 01:34:08.088 functioning properly . Senator Manchin . 01:34:09.840 --> 01:34:11.951 Thank you . Mr Chairman and this will 01:34:11.951 --> 01:34:14.190 be the Mr baker . Uh The Iran nuclear 01:34:14.190 --> 01:34:16.412 agreement formerly known as J . C . P . 01:34:16.412 --> 01:34:19.000 O . A Was a great goal that fell 01:34:19.000 --> 01:34:21.222 extremely short and I voted against the 01:34:21.222 --> 01:34:23.700 agreement 2015 because it rewarded . I 01:34:23.700 --> 01:34:25.867 ran before they demonstrate any desire 01:34:25.867 --> 01:34:27.978 to return to good order in the global 01:34:27.978 --> 01:34:29.922 community . And it fell to address 01:34:29.922 --> 01:34:31.533 their terrorism financing or 01:34:31.533 --> 01:34:33.644 conventional weapons development . So 01:34:33.644 --> 01:34:35.867 my question would be with an on and off 01:34:35.867 --> 01:34:38.033 again negotiations taking place . What 01:34:38.033 --> 01:34:38.020 concessions would you hope to see in a 01:34:38.020 --> 01:34:40.131 new version of the Iran deal ? And my 01:34:40.131 --> 01:34:42.242 follow up to that Miss baker would be 01:34:42.242 --> 01:34:44.490 trans Germany and United Kingdom 01:34:44.490 --> 01:34:46.880 launched a barter system known as in 01:34:46.880 --> 01:34:49.550 stick uh to facilitate transactions 01:34:49.550 --> 01:34:51.772 between them and Iran . Can you comment 01:34:51.772 --> 01:34:52.772 on that ? 01:34:55.440 --> 01:34:57.860 Um Senator thank you for the question 01:34:57.870 --> 01:35:00.680 uh to your , to your first point about 01:35:00.680 --> 01:35:03.160 what concessions would we seek ? Uh 01:35:03.170 --> 01:35:05.550 Certainly uh my understanding is that 01:35:05.560 --> 01:35:08.270 the intent of returning to negotiations 01:35:08.440 --> 01:35:10.680 around the J . C . P . O . A . Was to 01:35:10.690 --> 01:35:14.050 use that as a foundation to build 01:35:14.050 --> 01:35:16.270 toward a longer and stronger deal . 01:35:16.340 --> 01:35:18.720 Certainly there are any number of 01:35:18.720 --> 01:35:22.010 Iranian destabilizing activities in the 01:35:22.010 --> 01:35:24.177 region that are not covered by the J . 01:35:24.177 --> 01:35:26.010 C . P . O . A . To include their 01:35:26.010 --> 01:35:28.680 support for terrorist groups , militias , 01:35:28.690 --> 01:35:30.857 the proliferation of ballistic missile 01:35:30.857 --> 01:35:33.680 technology , USB technology , threats 01:35:33.680 --> 01:35:35.847 to freedom of navigation , all of what 01:35:35.847 --> 01:35:38.270 I think we should seek to 01:35:38.340 --> 01:35:42.210 address . I will say anything . 01:35:44.440 --> 01:35:46.773 I'm sorry senator . I couldn't hear you . 01:35:47.140 --> 01:35:49.520 Do you have any information you have 01:35:49.520 --> 01:35:53.250 any thoughts on instead STK 01:35:53.260 --> 01:35:55.316 which is what United Kingdom Germany 01:35:55.316 --> 01:35:58.200 and France have launched Senator . I 01:35:58.210 --> 01:36:00.043 don't have any details on that . 01:36:00.043 --> 01:36:01.821 Certainly it's something I'd be 01:36:01.821 --> 01:36:04.043 prepared if confirmed to look into with 01:36:04.043 --> 01:36:06.266 my inter agency colleagues and get back 01:36:06.266 --> 01:36:08.266 to you for a longer discussion . No 01:36:08.266 --> 01:36:10.432 problem . I understand . And here this 01:36:10.432 --> 01:36:10.070 is to you again ma'am and I don't mean 01:36:10.070 --> 01:36:12.070 this to be personal at all . I just 01:36:12.070 --> 01:36:14.181 wanna make sure I'm stating the facts 01:36:14.181 --> 01:36:16.348 here . You have a total of 10 years of 01:36:16.348 --> 01:36:16.070 seven months of experience working as a 01:36:16.070 --> 01:36:18.014 federal employee With one year and 01:36:18.014 --> 01:36:20.126 seven months inside the Department of 01:36:20.126 --> 01:36:22.730 Defense . Uh What is concerning to me 01:36:22.740 --> 01:36:24.962 is the entirety of your career is based 01:36:24.962 --> 01:36:27.160 on the partisanship . Uh You've never 01:36:27.160 --> 01:36:29.327 worked for a Republican administration 01:36:29.327 --> 01:36:31.382 or a moderate member that we can see 01:36:31.382 --> 01:36:33.493 and as toxic atmosphere that we're in 01:36:33.493 --> 01:36:35.716 right now . It takes working across the 01:36:35.716 --> 01:36:37.827 aisle understanding both sides . Um , 01:36:37.827 --> 01:36:40.049 so my question would be , tell me about 01:36:40.049 --> 01:36:41.882 any tangible experience that you 01:36:41.882 --> 01:36:43.827 believe demonstrates how you could 01:36:43.827 --> 01:36:45.716 approach this position from a non 01:36:45.716 --> 01:36:48.040 partisan stance . Uh Senator 01:36:48.040 --> 01:36:50.690 respectfully . I believe that I have 01:36:50.690 --> 01:36:53.230 demonstrated in my career uh an ability 01:36:53.230 --> 01:36:55.120 to work across the aisle in a 01:36:55.130 --> 01:36:57.241 bipartisan fashion or something I was 01:36:57.241 --> 01:36:59.408 very proud of as a Senate staffer here 01:36:59.408 --> 01:37:01.450 working with this committee . I was 01:37:01.450 --> 01:37:04.780 also a nonpartisan career civil servant 01:37:04.780 --> 01:37:07.320 for a number of years . Uh In addition 01:37:07.320 --> 01:37:09.487 to serving here in the Senate , I have 01:37:09.487 --> 01:37:11.709 worked for national security principles 01:37:11.709 --> 01:37:14.580 that held a variety of views to include 01:37:14.590 --> 01:37:17.430 former Ask Chairman Ike Skeleton , uh 01:37:17.440 --> 01:37:19.750 former Secretary of Defense Ash carter . 01:37:20.030 --> 01:37:21.970 So I do understand senator , I 01:37:21.970 --> 01:37:24.160 understand the concern uh and I think 01:37:24.160 --> 01:37:26.750 it's a valid one . I believe that I 01:37:26.750 --> 01:37:28.972 have a track record that will enable me 01:37:28.972 --> 01:37:31.790 if confirmed to approach this role in a 01:37:31.790 --> 01:37:33.512 nonpartisan fashion and that's 01:37:33.512 --> 01:37:35.734 certainly how I would intend to conduct 01:37:35.734 --> 01:37:37.910 myself . Thank you very much . Mr 01:37:37.910 --> 01:37:40.077 curtain . If you could uh I share your 01:37:40.077 --> 01:37:42.021 vision for renewed approach to the 01:37:42.021 --> 01:37:43.910 evaluation and system performance 01:37:43.910 --> 01:37:46.188 within the program development process , 01:37:46.188 --> 01:37:48.410 one of the areas I believe that we need 01:37:48.410 --> 01:37:50.243 to focus on his direct input and 01:37:50.243 --> 01:37:52.410 effects of war fighter , especially as 01:37:52.410 --> 01:37:54.354 it relates to effectiveness on the 01:37:54.354 --> 01:37:56.243 battlefield . Uh The past week my 01:37:56.243 --> 01:37:55.750 office spent a considerable amount of 01:37:55.750 --> 01:37:58.350 time with the staff from the W . V . U . 01:37:58.360 --> 01:38:00.416 West Virginia University Rockefeller 01:38:00.416 --> 01:38:02.416 neuroscience Institute who lead the 01:38:02.416 --> 01:38:04.527 world in advanced neurological care . 01:38:04.527 --> 01:38:06.527 Uh so can you commit to schedule it 01:38:06.527 --> 01:38:08.770 towards the state of the art facility 01:38:08.780 --> 01:38:11.450 with my staff and at Western University 01:38:11.450 --> 01:38:13.640 personnel who already are working with 01:38:13.640 --> 01:38:15.418 the Marine Corps to potentially 01:38:15.418 --> 01:38:17.362 standardized the capability of the 01:38:17.362 --> 01:38:19.473 future test and development efforts . 01:38:19.473 --> 01:38:21.584 We just need you there , senator . It 01:38:21.584 --> 01:38:23.751 sounds great opportunity . I'm looking 01:38:23.751 --> 01:38:25.973 forward to uh meeting you there and and 01:38:25.973 --> 01:38:27.918 learning about those things . It's 01:38:27.918 --> 01:38:30.370 unbelievable . Final question to uh Mr 01:38:30.370 --> 01:38:32.592 Bush , we share a significant amount of 01:38:32.592 --> 01:38:34.481 similarities when it comes to our 01:38:34.481 --> 01:38:36.481 future . Need to transition from an 01:38:36.481 --> 01:38:38.537 industrial age to an information age 01:38:38.537 --> 01:38:40.050 approach to acquisitions , 01:38:40.060 --> 01:38:42.720 cybersecurity and supply chain security . 01:38:42.960 --> 01:38:45.150 My fear though , is that we will leave 01:38:45.150 --> 01:38:47.150 our small businesses further behind 01:38:47.220 --> 01:38:49.387 then where they are currently if we do 01:38:49.387 --> 01:38:51.553 not make a prioritized effort to bring 01:38:51.553 --> 01:38:53.609 them along . So my question is , how 01:38:53.609 --> 01:38:55.442 will you shape future efforts to 01:38:55.442 --> 01:38:57.276 support small businesses against 01:38:57.276 --> 01:38:59.387 growing cyber security requirements . 01:38:59.387 --> 01:39:01.220 How are they going to be able to 01:39:01.220 --> 01:39:03.053 compete and maintain any type of 01:39:03.053 --> 01:39:06.100 viability ? Senator . First of all , 01:39:06.100 --> 01:39:08.322 I'd like to say I'm proud of the army's 01:39:08.322 --> 01:39:10.100 past track record , leading the 01:39:10.100 --> 01:39:12.211 department and overall small business 01:39:12.211 --> 01:39:14.044 contracting . The specific issue 01:39:14.044 --> 01:39:16.300 mentioned is a challenging one . Uh The 01:39:16.300 --> 01:39:18.840 department and the army want more small 01:39:18.840 --> 01:39:21.110 businesses and more diverse businesses 01:39:21.120 --> 01:39:23.950 involved . However , we also have 01:39:23.960 --> 01:39:26.310 cybersecurity concerns . Senator I 01:39:26.310 --> 01:39:28.400 believe like in other aspects of the 01:39:28.400 --> 01:39:30.567 small business program , it's going to 01:39:30.567 --> 01:39:32.733 require partnership and the department 01:39:32.733 --> 01:39:35.430 and the services working with companies 01:39:35.440 --> 01:39:38.210 and developing ways to collaborate so 01:39:38.210 --> 01:39:40.154 that they can achieve the level of 01:39:40.154 --> 01:39:42.540 cybersecurity necessary to participate 01:39:42.540 --> 01:39:44.350 in bigger and bigger programs . 01:39:46.320 --> 01:39:47.987 Thank you . Thank all three , 01:39:47.987 --> 01:39:50.190 appreciate your answers . Thank you 01:39:50.190 --> 01:39:53.550 Senator Mansion now via webex . Uh let 01:39:53.550 --> 01:39:57.530 me recognize Senator Rosen . Well , 01:39:57.530 --> 01:39:59.752 thank you . Chairman Read and of course 01:39:59.752 --> 01:40:01.752 ranking member Inhofe and I want to 01:40:01.752 --> 01:40:03.970 thank all the nominees for being here 01:40:03.970 --> 01:40:06.137 today for your service and willingness 01:40:06.137 --> 01:40:08.026 to serve going forward . And like 01:40:08.026 --> 01:40:10.310 Senator Manchin said , cybersecurity is 01:40:10.310 --> 01:40:12.960 so important . I have a number of bills 01:40:12.960 --> 01:40:15.360 to that effect and uh we're going to 01:40:15.360 --> 01:40:18.530 talk about one of them today because as 01:40:18.530 --> 01:40:20.510 our adversaries actively try to 01:40:20.520 --> 01:40:22.600 undermine our interests via cyber 01:40:22.600 --> 01:40:24.980 attacks , we have to continue to invest 01:40:24.980 --> 01:40:27.290 in cyber talent Two if that's going to 01:40:27.290 --> 01:40:29.440 increase our capabilities allow us to 01:40:29.440 --> 01:40:32.430 defend forward . So this year's Senate 01:40:32.430 --> 01:40:34.280 Mbia , as reported out of this 01:40:34.280 --> 01:40:36.300 committee , it includes my civilian 01:40:36.300 --> 01:40:38.290 cybersecurity reserve , acted as 01:40:38.290 --> 01:40:40.360 bipartisan legislation I introduced 01:40:40.360 --> 01:40:43.030 with Senator Blackburn to create a 01:40:43.030 --> 01:40:45.520 civilian cyber reserves that ensures 01:40:45.520 --> 01:40:47.870 additional cyber capacity at greatest 01:40:47.870 --> 01:40:50.130 times of need . So Miss baker have 01:40:50.130 --> 01:40:52.400 confirmed , what are the steps that you 01:40:52.400 --> 01:40:54.622 would take to improve the cybersecurity 01:40:54.622 --> 01:40:56.740 posture of our most critical systems 01:40:56.740 --> 01:40:58.851 through workforce investments because 01:40:58.851 --> 01:41:01.740 we have a lot out there . Uh this needs 01:41:01.740 --> 01:41:03.796 to be in line with both our National 01:41:03.796 --> 01:41:05.750 Defense Strategy strategy and the 01:41:05.750 --> 01:41:07.861 president budgets request , proposing 01:41:07.861 --> 01:41:10.280 significant growth of the cyber mission 01:41:10.280 --> 01:41:12.820 force and more specifically , how would 01:41:12.820 --> 01:41:14.810 you use existing authorities and 01:41:14.810 --> 01:41:17.360 potentially my act to protect our 01:41:17.360 --> 01:41:20.610 critical assets ? Uh Senator first , 01:41:20.610 --> 01:41:22.332 let me thank you for your your 01:41:22.332 --> 01:41:24.277 leadership on this , this critical 01:41:24.277 --> 01:41:26.550 issue . As we've discussed here today , 01:41:26.550 --> 01:41:28.900 the cybersecurity of the department's 01:41:28.910 --> 01:41:32.220 uh systems is what will allow us 01:41:32.230 --> 01:41:34.880 uh to to fight and prevail in a in a 01:41:34.880 --> 01:41:37.840 high end contingency . Uh as I'm sure 01:41:37.840 --> 01:41:39.951 you know , the department has a cyber 01:41:39.951 --> 01:41:42.007 strategy that has three components , 01:41:42.010 --> 01:41:44.370 requires the department to be able to 01:41:44.370 --> 01:41:46.537 fight and win the nation's wars in the 01:41:46.537 --> 01:41:48.870 cyber domain . Uh to protect the 01:41:48.870 --> 01:41:50.759 Department of Defense Information 01:41:50.759 --> 01:41:52.926 network , the Dodon and then of course 01:41:52.926 --> 01:41:55.530 to protect uh the nation and we do that 01:41:55.530 --> 01:41:57.940 as you said by defending forward . Um 01:41:57.950 --> 01:42:00.770 If I am confirmed , I can commit to you 01:42:00.770 --> 01:42:04.340 that I will make a priority of 01:42:04.340 --> 01:42:06.790 developing new and agile concepts of 01:42:06.790 --> 01:42:08.734 operations in the cyber domain . I 01:42:08.734 --> 01:42:10.846 would work closely with my colleagues 01:42:10.846 --> 01:42:13.370 in the in the services uh and and 01:42:13.370 --> 01:42:15.481 elsewhere in the department to ensure 01:42:15.481 --> 01:42:17.648 that we're appropriately resourced and 01:42:17.648 --> 01:42:19.481 that we have a workforce that is 01:42:19.481 --> 01:42:21.370 capable of operating in the cyber 01:42:21.370 --> 01:42:23.426 domain . Um I have not unfortunately 01:42:23.426 --> 01:42:25.537 yet had an opportunity center to look 01:42:25.537 --> 01:42:27.703 at your legislation specifically . But 01:42:27.703 --> 01:42:31.570 uh certainly I think new and innovative 01:42:31.570 --> 01:42:33.237 ways of approaching the cyber 01:42:33.237 --> 01:42:35.403 challenges exactly what's needed . And 01:42:35.403 --> 01:42:37.348 so if confirmed , I will commit to 01:42:37.348 --> 01:42:39.570 looking into that and and would welcome 01:42:39.570 --> 01:42:41.570 a chance for further conversation . 01:42:41.800 --> 01:42:45.450 Great system . We can talk about the 01:42:45.450 --> 01:42:47.650 civilian cyber Reserve act , but I'm 01:42:47.650 --> 01:42:49.539 glad you're talking about all the 01:42:49.539 --> 01:42:51.650 different postures you have because I 01:42:51.650 --> 01:42:53.539 want to talk about the Zero trust 01:42:53.539 --> 01:42:55.761 security model because you know , cyber 01:42:55.761 --> 01:42:58.270 threats exist both inside and outside 01:42:58.270 --> 01:43:00.330 traditional network boundaries . So 01:43:00.330 --> 01:43:02.163 earlier this year , the National 01:43:02.163 --> 01:43:04.590 Security Agency issued a cyber security 01:43:04.590 --> 01:43:07.340 bulletin entitled embracing a Zero 01:43:07.350 --> 01:43:09.590 trust Security model and strongly 01:43:09.590 --> 01:43:11.470 recommend Zero Trust Security be 01:43:11.470 --> 01:43:13.480 considered for critical networks 01:43:13.490 --> 01:43:15.530 including National Security Systems 01:43:15.530 --> 01:43:17.710 Department of Defense Networks and our 01:43:17.710 --> 01:43:20.630 defense based industrial based systems . 01:43:20.640 --> 01:43:24.150 And so the timeline for implementation 01:43:24.150 --> 01:43:26.680 and uh completion . Not yet known , but 01:43:26.690 --> 01:43:29.370 if confirmed , how would you use your 01:43:29.370 --> 01:43:31.980 position to encourage the D O D wide 01:43:31.990 --> 01:43:34.720 adoption of the Zero Trust security 01:43:34.720 --> 01:43:38.100 model ? Um Senator , if if confirmed in 01:43:38.100 --> 01:43:40.267 this position , I would certainly seek 01:43:40.267 --> 01:43:44.080 to ensure that uh our policies 01:43:44.090 --> 01:43:47.400 were in alignment . Uh certainly 01:43:47.410 --> 01:43:50.990 I take your point that there are cyber 01:43:50.990 --> 01:43:53.610 vulnerabilities that arise both from 01:43:53.610 --> 01:43:55.890 without and from within and we need to 01:43:55.890 --> 01:43:58.250 be prepared to uh to manage both of 01:43:58.250 --> 01:44:00.680 those cases . I'd seek to work closely 01:44:00.680 --> 01:44:02.458 with the D O D C I . O with the 01:44:02.458 --> 01:44:04.569 principal cyber advisor and others to 01:44:04.569 --> 01:44:06.569 ensure that we have the appropriate 01:44:06.569 --> 01:44:08.490 plans in place . Thank you . I 01:44:08.490 --> 01:44:11.080 appreciate that . And speaking of uh 01:44:11.090 --> 01:44:13.460 issues with from without , we want to 01:44:13.460 --> 01:44:16.280 combat Iranian aggression because Iran 01:44:16.280 --> 01:44:18.280 continues to be the world's leading 01:44:18.280 --> 01:44:20.224 state sponsor of terrorism and the 01:44:20.224 --> 01:44:22.058 threat to the U . S . And allied 01:44:22.058 --> 01:44:24.200 interest in its ballistic ballistic 01:44:24.200 --> 01:44:26.089 missile program . And support for 01:44:26.089 --> 01:44:28.290 terrorist proxies like Hezbollah 01:44:28.300 --> 01:44:30.467 including through conventional weapons 01:44:30.467 --> 01:44:32.244 sales . The combination of Iran 01:44:32.244 --> 01:44:34.411 acquiring advanced Russian and chinese 01:44:34.411 --> 01:44:36.750 platforms and its transfer of arms to 01:44:36.750 --> 01:44:39.130 terrorist groups like Hezbollah poses a 01:44:39.130 --> 01:44:41.780 significant conventional threats to the 01:44:41.780 --> 01:44:43.810 U . S . Personnel in the region and 01:44:43.820 --> 01:44:46.690 undermines Israel voluntary military 01:44:46.690 --> 01:44:49.210 edge or Q . And me so miss baker again . 01:44:49.220 --> 01:44:51.553 I guess you can put this off the record . 01:44:51.553 --> 01:44:53.887 I'm just about out of time it confirmed . 01:44:53.887 --> 01:44:55.942 How would you work to combat Iranian 01:44:55.942 --> 01:44:58.050 aggression ? Here are us interests 01:44:58.050 --> 01:45:00.370 against world state actors like Iran 01:45:00.380 --> 01:45:02.930 and maintain our allies , our ally 01:45:02.940 --> 01:45:05.840 Israel . Um me and uh since I'm out of 01:45:05.840 --> 01:45:07.840 time , I'm not sure there's someone 01:45:07.840 --> 01:45:10.007 after me . You can submit that writing 01:45:10.007 --> 01:45:12.800 please . Senator . Yes absolutely . I 01:45:12.800 --> 01:45:14.967 agree with everything you said and I'm 01:45:14.967 --> 01:45:17.390 happy to submit a longer answer uh for 01:45:17.390 --> 01:45:20.040 the record . Thank you . Thank you . 01:45:20.050 --> 01:45:22.470 Thank you Senator Rosen . Let me 01:45:22.470 --> 01:45:24.581 recognize Senator kelly and thank him 01:45:24.581 --> 01:45:26.748 for his patients . Thank you . Senator 01:45:26.748 --> 01:45:28.637 kelly . Thank you mr Chairman and 01:45:28.637 --> 01:45:30.859 congratulations to each of the nominees 01:45:30.859 --> 01:45:33.000 and thanks for your willingness to 01:45:33.010 --> 01:45:36.660 continue to serve our nation . Uh 01:45:36.670 --> 01:45:40.170 My first question is for Mr Girton . 01:45:40.180 --> 01:45:42.270 Um I want to talk about a little bit 01:45:42.270 --> 01:45:46.260 about the F 35 I've had a chance myself 01:45:46.260 --> 01:45:49.120 to fly the simulator and as a former 01:45:49.760 --> 01:45:52.840 test pilot , it's a impressive platform 01:45:52.850 --> 01:45:56.760 and I think it will serve um the Navy , 01:45:56.760 --> 01:45:58.927 the Air Force in the Marine Corps very 01:45:58.927 --> 01:46:01.880 well and I'm very honored uh that 01:46:01.880 --> 01:46:04.047 Arizona is going to continue to host F 01:46:04.047 --> 01:46:08.010 35 squadrons uh at luke and uh at Yuma 01:46:08.020 --> 01:46:10.131 Marine Corps Air station . Uh But I'm 01:46:10.131 --> 01:46:12.730 concerned that delays related to 01:46:12.730 --> 01:46:15.060 testing in the joint simulated 01:46:15.060 --> 01:46:18.040 environment have gotten off track and 01:46:18.040 --> 01:46:21.420 completing uh test and evaluation and 01:46:21.420 --> 01:46:24.210 starting to get us towards closer to 01:46:24.210 --> 01:46:26.780 full rate production , uh leveraging 01:46:26.780 --> 01:46:28.891 digital assets like these and testing 01:46:28.891 --> 01:46:31.002 and design is the way of the future , 01:46:31.002 --> 01:46:32.780 I'm convinced of that , so it's 01:46:32.780 --> 01:46:34.891 important that we get it right Uh and 01:46:34.891 --> 01:46:37.170 apply the lessons we're learning now to 01:46:37.170 --> 01:46:40.640 future upgrades for the F- 35 and the 01:46:40.640 --> 01:46:44.380 next generation fighter aircraft and 01:46:44.380 --> 01:46:47.880 God and anything beyond that . Um So 01:46:47.890 --> 01:46:50.112 could you give us give me an assessment 01:46:50.112 --> 01:46:52.168 of what you think the lessons are so 01:46:52.168 --> 01:46:55.050 far in what we've experienced with the 01:46:55.060 --> 01:46:56.940 testing and the joint simulated 01:46:56.940 --> 01:47:00.320 environment . So , senator , one of the 01:47:00.320 --> 01:47:02.487 things we need to be thinking about as 01:47:02.487 --> 01:47:04.542 we move forward into the future is a 01:47:04.542 --> 01:47:06.650 tighter alignment between modeling 01:47:06.650 --> 01:47:09.360 complex systems like the F- 35 is that 01:47:09.370 --> 01:47:11.648 it's got a lot going on under the hood . 01:47:12.580 --> 01:47:14.636 Some things you're not going to be a 01:47:14.636 --> 01:47:17.000 test operationally all at the same time 01:47:17.000 --> 01:47:19.333 and a threat representative environment . 01:47:19.333 --> 01:47:21.500 So we need to be thinking about how we 01:47:21.500 --> 01:47:23.444 combine modeling and simulation of 01:47:23.444 --> 01:47:25.556 those environments with live physical 01:47:25.556 --> 01:47:27.556 testing . The F 35 has been a great 01:47:27.556 --> 01:47:29.850 object . Listen use case that we need 01:47:29.850 --> 01:47:31.890 to be taking full advantage of the 01:47:31.890 --> 01:47:34.390 lessons , both good and bad and how we 01:47:34.390 --> 01:47:36.446 position ourselves in the future for 01:47:36.446 --> 01:47:38.390 taking advantage of those kinds of 01:47:38.390 --> 01:47:40.612 technologies as we build out these more 01:47:40.612 --> 01:47:42.612 and more complex systems as we move 01:47:42.612 --> 01:47:44.501 further forward into the future , 01:47:44.680 --> 01:47:47.950 you're part of the value of simulated 01:47:47.950 --> 01:47:50.520 testing is that we can examine , you 01:47:50.520 --> 01:47:52.742 know , both aircraft and weapons system 01:47:52.742 --> 01:47:54.909 performance in these complex scenarios 01:47:54.909 --> 01:47:57.076 that better approximate what will face 01:47:57.076 --> 01:47:58.964 in combat with that in mind . How 01:47:58.964 --> 01:48:02.460 important is it to incorporate cyber 01:48:02.490 --> 01:48:06.130 and space domains in these simulated 01:48:06.130 --> 01:48:08.870 tests ? So Senator is critically 01:48:08.870 --> 01:48:11.100 important that the operational tests in 01:48:11.770 --> 01:48:14.200 encompass all of the things that the 01:48:14.200 --> 01:48:16.422 weapons system will see when it's being 01:48:16.422 --> 01:48:18.478 used , which includes cyber . It's a 01:48:18.478 --> 01:48:20.478 big part of the problem because you 01:48:20.478 --> 01:48:22.478 can't use it if you can't if you're 01:48:22.770 --> 01:48:24.881 turned off before you get a chance to 01:48:24.881 --> 01:48:27.048 take advantage of it . The other thing 01:48:27.048 --> 01:48:29.159 you did mention though that I want to 01:48:29.159 --> 01:48:31.080 park on is uh the opportunity to 01:48:31.090 --> 01:48:33.320 iterate on designs and take advantage 01:48:33.320 --> 01:48:35.790 of those kind of digital twins and 01:48:35.790 --> 01:48:37.901 modeling environments so that you can 01:48:37.901 --> 01:48:40.620 explore how that system might be built 01:48:40.630 --> 01:48:44.030 better into the future . And do you 01:48:44.030 --> 01:48:47.500 think this uh needs to also account 01:48:47.500 --> 01:48:50.430 for emergent capabilities ? Like ai as 01:48:50.430 --> 01:48:52.680 well ? Indeed it does , yes . 01:48:54.870 --> 01:48:57.450 Um I just wanna switch drill in the 01:48:57.450 --> 01:48:59.950 remaining time I have here uh Mr Gergen 01:48:59.950 --> 01:49:02.450 with you as well , um You know , in 01:49:02.450 --> 01:49:04.228 modern warfare as we all know , 01:49:04.228 --> 01:49:07.400 software can be important to our 01:49:07.400 --> 01:49:10.500 success . And as important 01:49:10.970 --> 01:49:14.600 as the hardware , the equipment 01:49:15.760 --> 01:49:18.170 and software often advances much more 01:49:18.170 --> 01:49:20.680 quickly . You touched on this theme ? I 01:49:20.680 --> 01:49:23.110 think in your opening remarks we're 01:49:23.110 --> 01:49:25.166 gonna need to improve our ability to 01:49:25.166 --> 01:49:27.590 more effectively integrate rapidly 01:49:27.590 --> 01:49:31.160 changing software . Um And it's also 01:49:31.160 --> 01:49:33.271 one of the most challenging things we 01:49:33.271 --> 01:49:35.327 we deal with , whether it's military 01:49:35.327 --> 01:49:37.660 hardware or space , you know , software , 01:49:37.670 --> 01:49:41.180 um you know , reliability and testing 01:49:41.180 --> 01:49:44.190 and verification . Um what have we 01:49:44.190 --> 01:49:46.870 learned from our efforts to incorporate 01:49:46.880 --> 01:49:49.550 more agile development practices with 01:49:49.560 --> 01:49:53.170 block four upgrades to the F- 35 . The 01:49:53.170 --> 01:49:55.226 center , I not be able to talk about 01:49:55.226 --> 01:49:57.226 Block four specifically , I've been 01:49:57.226 --> 01:49:59.448 briefed on the details of it , but I do 01:49:59.448 --> 01:50:01.503 want to say that some of the systems 01:50:01.503 --> 01:50:03.726 I've worked on in the past , even going 01:50:03.726 --> 01:50:05.892 back to the mid 19 nineties to be , to 01:50:05.892 --> 01:50:08.059 build these things so they can involve 01:50:08.059 --> 01:50:10.680 gracefully over time uh in in those 01:50:10.680 --> 01:50:12.902 early days stages when we're using open 01:50:12.902 --> 01:50:14.791 architectures and submarine sonar 01:50:14.791 --> 01:50:16.680 systems , we thought were totally 01:50:16.680 --> 01:50:18.624 knocking out of the park by having 01:50:18.624 --> 01:50:20.736 annual updates today . That might not 01:50:20.736 --> 01:50:22.958 be fast enough depending on the product 01:50:22.958 --> 01:50:25.069 and certainly isn't fast enough for a 01:50:25.069 --> 01:50:27.124 lot of the things we hold and use in 01:50:27.124 --> 01:50:28.958 everyday life . So we need to be 01:50:28.958 --> 01:50:31.180 thinking about how do we shift left in 01:50:31.180 --> 01:50:33.069 terms of our understanding of how 01:50:33.069 --> 01:50:35.110 things are built , but also be 01:50:35.110 --> 01:50:37.760 responsive and fast on her feet when it 01:50:37.760 --> 01:50:41.540 comes to being responsive to the user's 01:50:41.540 --> 01:50:44.080 needs as they see and would use them in 01:50:44.080 --> 01:50:46.358 operational context in the joint force . 01:50:46.370 --> 01:50:48.537 Well , thank you and I look forward to 01:50:48.537 --> 01:50:50.648 working with you in your office as we 01:50:50.648 --> 01:50:53.300 uh get these new weapons systems , uh , 01:50:53.310 --> 01:50:57.300 fully evaluated and tested in a through 01:50:57.300 --> 01:50:59.930 OT and E and out to the fleet . Thank 01:50:59.930 --> 01:51:02.060 you . Thank you Mr . Chairman . Thank 01:51:02.060 --> 01:51:04.282 you Senator kelly . And I want to thank 01:51:04.282 --> 01:51:06.227 the witnesses for their thoughtful 01:51:06.227 --> 01:51:08.171 testimony and their statements and 01:51:08.171 --> 01:51:10.227 their commitment to public service . 01:51:10.227 --> 01:51:12.171 And with that , I will adjourn the 01:51:12.171 --> 01:51:14.080 hearing . Thank you very much .