WEBVTT

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Okay , good afternoon . Uh today I'm

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very honored and privileged to be

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joined by general frank McKenzie

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Commander , U . S . Central Command .

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The general's got some opening comments

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for you um Uh , that that were

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related to uh , the August 29 air

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strike that was taken in Kabul . Uh and

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then he'll stick around for some

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questions . I will moderate those

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questions as we've done before . Uh and

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since we got pretty much a full house

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here and he's had limited time , I'd

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ask you to keep your follow ups to an

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absolute minimum . So that we can be as

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fair as we can to to everybody when the

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generals done . Uh I'll come back up

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and uh and brief on some other topics

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as well . So with that , General

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Mackenzie , can you hear and see me ?

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Okay , john , I can hear and see it

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fine . How many of them ? All ? Good

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here sir . I'll turn the floor over to

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you . Thanks john , Good afternoon .

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I'm here to brief the results of the

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investigation . I directed following

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the report of civilian casualties from

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our strike in Kabul on 29 August .

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Having thoroughly reviewed the findings

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of the investigation and the supporting

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analysis by interagency partners , I am

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now convinced that as many as 10

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civilians , including up to seven

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Children were tragically killed in that

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strike . Moreover , we now assess that

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it is unlikely that the vehicle and

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those who died were associated with

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ISIS K or were a direct threat to U . S .

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Forces . I offer my profound

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condolences to the family and friends

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of those who were killed . This strike

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was taken in the earnest belief that it

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would prevent an imminent threat to our

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forces and the evacuees at the airport .

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But it was a mistake and I offer my

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sincere apology as the combatant

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commander . I am fully responsible for

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this strike in this tragic outcome .

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Well , I have begun with the most

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important findings of our investigation .

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I do want to provide the background

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leading up to the strike and include an

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explanation as to why we felt

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reasonably certain that this was a

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legitimate strike on an imminent ISIS K

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threat . With no indication that the

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strike would result in civilian

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casualties . As we asserted in our

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initial statements , the strike on 29

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august must be considered in the

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context of the situation on the ground

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in Kabul at Hamid Karzai International

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Airport following the ISIS K . Attack

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that resulted in the deaths of 13

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soldiers , sailors and marines And more

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than 100 civilians at Abbey gate on 26

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August and also with a substantial body

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of intelligence indicating the

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imminence of another attack In the 48

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hours prior to the strike Sensitive

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intelligence indicated that the

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compound at Point # one on the map .

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And let's bring the map up now please .

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And we're just gonna bring this up .

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Hopefully you have an opportunity to

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see it here as we go forward . Thanks

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john , can you see the map there ?

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I have disabled .

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Hey john , can you , can you hear me

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now ? The press have hard copies .

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Okay . Roger then . I'm just gonna ,

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I'm gonna continue based on that . Then

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john . In the 48 hours prior to the

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strike sensitive intelligence indicated

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that the compound at point number one

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on the map was being used by ISIS K .

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Planners used to facilitate future

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attacks . We were also receiving a

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significant number of reports

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indicating multiple avenues of attack

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which were being planned simultaneously

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through which ISIS K would attempt to

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harm our forces , including with

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rockets , suicide explosive vests and

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vehicle borne improvised explosive

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devices . In fact , in the 36 hours

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preceding the strike , our leaders on

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the ground at the airport and in the

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strike cell received more than 60

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different pieces of intelligence

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related to imminent threats . With some

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intelligence corroborating and some

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conflicting with events observed from

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our waves which were flying above Kabul

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throughout the day . One of the most

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recurring aspects of the intelligence

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was that ISIS K would utilize a White

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Toyota Corolla as a key element in the

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next attack . Because the compound at

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point number one was our strongest lead

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for this series of imminent attacks ,

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we initiated an intense surveillance of

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the compound with as many as six mq

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nine reapers on the morning of 29

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august At 8:52 AM . Local time . On

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29 August White Toyota Corolla arrived

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at Point # one . The compound we

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believed to be a key area of interest

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associated with imminent threats to the

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airport . two adult males exited the

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vehicle met with an adult male in the

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compound and received a bag from him .

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The Corolla then departed the compound

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heading south and we followed the

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vehicle at 905 A . M . The Toyota

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Corolla picked up a third adult male

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carrying a bag at point number two and

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then continued south . At 9 35 the

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Corolla arrived at the compound at

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point number three , which we now know

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to include an office of nutrition and

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education international and all three

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adult males in the vehicle entered the

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building on the compound At

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11:19 AM . Three adult males unloaded

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bags and jugs from the trunk of the

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vehicle before departing the compound

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at 1122 am heading south . At

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approximately this time , U . S .

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Forces were notified of a sensitive

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intelligence collection indicating that

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an ISIS case cell leader in Kabul was

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dropping off supplies . At 12 11 PM ,

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the Corolla arrived at point number

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four and at least two adult male

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occupants exited the vehicle in front

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of an office building before returning

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to their vehicle and departing at 1 27

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PM heading west and then south two

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o'clock P . M . The Corolla returned to

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the compound at point number three .

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Subsequently multiple adult males were

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observed loading the truck of the

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vehicle , the trunk of the vehicle with

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items assessed at the time to be

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explosives Before departing at 3:47 p .

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m . with four adult males heading north

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at 4 11 PM , the Corolla returned to

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point number two and dropped off one

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adult male carrying a bag , then

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continued knowing after driving near

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point number one , the Corolla dropped

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off one adult male on the road at point

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number five , Which is roughly several

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100 m north of Point # one . At

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4:39 PM , the Corolla dropped off its

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last passenger on the road at Point #

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six . At 4:51 pm ,

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The Corolla arrived at point # seven

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and backed into a compound that was

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approximately three km from the airport ,

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which was the closest it came to the

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airport all day . We were very

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concerned that the vehicle could move

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quickly and be at the airport boundary

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in a matter of moments . By this time ,

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we observed the vehicle for about eight

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hours . While in the compound , the

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vehicle was observed being approached

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by a single adult male assessed at the

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time to be a co conspirator . The

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strike was executed at this time

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because the vehicle was stationary and

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to reduce the potential for civilian

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casualties , the single hellfire

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hellfire missile was fused to detonate

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inside the vehicle . To further

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minimize the chance for civilian

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casualties , It struck the vehicle

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vehicle at 4:53 pm , which produced an

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explosive event and follow on flames

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significantly larger than a hellfire

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missile would have been expected to

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produce . It is my assessment that

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leaders on the ground and the Strike

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Cell had achieved a reasonable

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certainty at the time of the strike to

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designate the vehicle as an imminent

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threat to U . S . Forces at the airport

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and that they made this self defense

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strike . In accordance with established

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rules of engagement . That assessment

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is based upon interviews with leaders

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on the ground and members of the strike

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cell own a review of the intelligence

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available to the team at the time of

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the strike and on the team's

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interpretation of how this vehicle and

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its occupants actions were confirming

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the intelligence that they were seeing .

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It is further my assessment that the

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strike team were convinced at the time

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of the strike , that the area was clear

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civilians and that they had taken

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prudent steps in regards to weapons

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during the strike , to minimize the

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potential for civilian casualties .

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Finally , it is my assessment that they

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did believe as reported that there was

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a secondary explosion . Our

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investigation now concludes that the

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strike was a tragic mistake . First , I

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will stress this was not a rush strike .

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The strike sell deliberately followed

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and observed this vehicle and its

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occupants for eight hours while cross

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checking what they were seeing all

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available intelligence to develop a

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reasonable certainty of the imminent

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threat that this vehicle posed to our

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forces . Second , while the initial

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reports indicated a secondary explosion ,

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the initial investigation could only

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conclude that it was a possible to

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probable presence of external

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accelerants that could include either

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explosive material in the vehicle or an

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ignition of the gas tank of the vehicle .

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Subsequent analysis could not rule out

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the presence of a small amount of

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explosive material but determined that

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the most likely cause was the ignition

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of gas from a propane tank located

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immediately behind the car . Such an

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ignition would have created a brief but

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massive fireball oriented directly up

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and out of the compound that was

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observed in the video and displayed in

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this photo . If we could get that next

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photo up , please , They have me

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disabled , sir .

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Mhm . Finally , while the strikes are

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reported , john can hear me . Okay . I

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got you , sir . Rogers . Finally ,

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while the strikes , l reported the

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presence of two adult males , one

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inside the vehicle , and went outside

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the vehicle at the time of the strike .

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The sale initiated a review of their

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footage immediately following the

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report of civilian casualties and

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determined that a few , a few partially

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obscured forms were briefly visible

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moving in the compound . This led to my

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initiation of an investigation within

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24 hours of the strike . A

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comprehensive review of all the

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available footage and reporting on the

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matter led us to a final conclusion

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That as many as 10 civilians were

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killed in the strike , including up to

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seven Children at the time of the

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strike based upon all the intelligence

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and what was being reported , I was

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confident that the strike had averted

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an imminent threat to our forces at the

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airport . Based upon that assessment .

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I and other leaders in the department

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repeatedly asserted the validity of

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this strike . I'm here today to set the

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record straight and acknowledge our

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mistakes . I will end my remarks with

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the same note of sincere and profound

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condolences to the family and friends

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of those who died in this tragic strike .

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We are exploring the possibility of ex

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gratia payments and I'll finish by

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saying

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preventing an imminent attack on our

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forces and civilian evacuees . We now

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understand that to be incorrect with

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that . I'm ready to take your questions .

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Thank you , general . Um tom general .

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This is a complete and utter failure .

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Can you explain how this possibly could

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have happened ? So this particular

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strike ? We certainly was a terrible

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mistake and we and we certainly regret

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that and I've been very clear that we

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take full responsibility for it . At

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the same time . We were carrying on a

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number of complex operations designed

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to defend ourselves . We conducted a

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strike a couple of days before the

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Nangarhar that was very successful , we

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conducted other operations across the

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battle space to to defend ourselves

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during this very difficult 48 hour

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period when so many imminent threats

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were manifest . So while I agree with

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it , this , this strike certainly did

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not come up to our standards and I

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profoundly regret it . I would not

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qualify the entire operation in those

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terms . And will anybody be held

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responsible from ? We are in the

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process right now of continuing that

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continuing that line of investigation .

12:44.862 --> 12:47.029
And I have nothing for you now because

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that involves personnel issues . Please

12:49.251 --> 12:51.251
identify yourself and your outlet .

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When you ask your question , David ,

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more cBS news . So you said that

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the uh you started following this car

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after it showed up at a place

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associated with ISIS

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in retrospect ? Is that was that place

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associated with ISIS ? And this was

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described as and over the horizon

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strike , which is what the U . S . Is

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going to be relying on from now on in

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Afghanistan . So what is what is this

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incident say about the reliability of

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future strikes against terrorist

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threats in Afghanistan ? Sure . David .

13:37.450 --> 13:39.450
So I'll take the first part of your

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question and begin with that . So , 0.1

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on the map , we do assess , very

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definitely associated with ISIS cave .

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In fact , a little less than 24 hours

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later , rockets will be launched from

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that point against the airfield . So we

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had very good intelligence to make us

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think 240.0.1 on the map was in fact

13:56.298 --> 13:58.298
area where ISIS was centered . So I

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think that that was that was a very

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good intelligence supported that . That

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uh that belief now is the second part

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of your question about whether this

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isn't this will affect future . Oh , th

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operations . Let me be clear . This was

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a self defense strike taken under self

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defense rules of engagement based on an

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imminent threat to attack us . That is

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not the way that we would strike and

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over . And o th mission going into

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Afghanistan against ISIS K targets ,

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for one thing that will not be a self

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defense strike , it'll be done under

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different , it'll be different done

14:31.717 --> 14:33.828
under different rules of engagement .

14:33.828 --> 14:33.470
So , and we would have a lot more

14:33.470 --> 14:35.450
opportunity , probably than we had

14:35.460 --> 14:37.620
under this extreme time pressure to

14:37.620 --> 14:40.060
take a look at the target to do use a

14:40.060 --> 14:42.227
phrase that you'll be familiar with to

14:42.227 --> 14:44.560
soak the target with multiple platforms ,

14:44.560 --> 14:46.449
to have an opportunity to develop

14:46.449 --> 14:48.393
extended pattern of life . None of

14:48.393 --> 14:50.616
these things were available to us given

14:50.616 --> 14:52.727
the urgent and pressing nature of the

14:52.727 --> 14:55.800
imminent threat to our forces Phil are

14:55.800 --> 14:57.800
you considering reparations for the

14:57.800 --> 14:59.578
victims here ? And what is what

14:59.578 --> 15:01.744
happened with the strikes ? Say to you

15:01.744 --> 15:03.744
about the over horizon capability ?

15:03.744 --> 15:05.856
We've been hearing so much about what

15:05.856 --> 15:05.170
are the risks involved with carrying

15:05.170 --> 15:07.337
out strikes when you don't have people

15:07.337 --> 15:09.281
on the ground in Afghanistan going

15:09.281 --> 15:11.390
forward ? Sure . So as I said in my

15:11.390 --> 15:14.180
statement , we are considering X gracia

15:14.190 --> 15:16.220
or reparations for this and that

15:16.220 --> 15:18.498
ultimately be a matter for policy . So ,

15:18.498 --> 15:20.609
we're in consultation with the Office

15:20.609 --> 15:22.331
of the Secretary of Defense to

15:22.331 --> 15:24.387
determine the way forward there . As

15:24.387 --> 15:23.640
you will also understand , it's very

15:23.640 --> 15:25.862
difficult to reach out on the ground in

15:25.862 --> 15:27.918
Afghanistan , you know , to actually

15:27.918 --> 15:29.640
reach people . But we are very

15:29.640 --> 15:31.807
interested in doing that and we'll and

15:31.807 --> 15:34.029
we'll and we'll move on it based on our

15:34.029 --> 15:36.251
ability to do that . So , your question

15:36.251 --> 15:38.251
about this . And so th I'll sort of

15:38.251 --> 15:38.190
echo When I said that to David , I

15:38.190 --> 15:40.246
would reject a parallel between this

15:40.246 --> 15:42.579
operation and a and an over the horizon .

15:42.579 --> 15:45.170
Strike against an ISIS K . Target again .

15:45.170 --> 15:47.337
Because we will have an opportunity to

15:47.337 --> 15:50.010
further develop the target in time to

15:50.010 --> 15:52.232
look at pattern of life . That time was

15:52.232 --> 15:54.288
not available to us because this was

15:54.288 --> 15:56.343
imminent threat to our forces . It's

15:56.343 --> 15:58.510
important that I emphasize that we did

15:58.510 --> 16:00.677
not have the luxury of time to develop

16:00.677 --> 16:02.788
pattern of life and to do a number of

16:02.788 --> 16:04.732
other things . We struck under the

16:04.732 --> 16:06.954
theory of reasonable certainty probably

16:06.954 --> 16:08.788
are strikes in Afghanistan going

16:08.788 --> 16:11.121
forward will be under a higher standard .

16:11.121 --> 16:13.232
That's a policy matter , not a purely

16:13.232 --> 16:15.454
military matter . But I don't think you

16:15.454 --> 16:14.950
should draw any conclusions about our

16:14.950 --> 16:16.783
ability to strike in Afghanistan

16:16.783 --> 16:18.672
against IsIS . K . Targets in the

16:18.672 --> 16:20.950
future based on this particular strike .

16:21.040 --> 16:24.970
So , you know , Sylvie , not from a

16:24.970 --> 16:27.490
F . P . Uh You said that you had the

16:27.490 --> 16:30.810
intelligence about a threat emanating

16:30.810 --> 16:34.300
from a White Toyota . So , was it

16:34.310 --> 16:38.160
this intelligence was not good

16:38.170 --> 16:40.960
or there was another White Toyota ,

16:40.970 --> 16:43.680
which was dangerous . And nothing

16:43.680 --> 16:46.270
happened from another White Toyota .

16:47.540 --> 16:50.540
So so I would tell you this clearly ,

16:50.550 --> 16:52.494
our intelligence was wrong on this

16:52.494 --> 16:55.440
particular White Toyota Corolla uh at

16:55.440 --> 16:57.790
the same time , we undertook a variety

16:57.790 --> 17:00.380
of things to make it hard for them to

17:00.390 --> 17:02.557
get at us during this period of time .

17:02.557 --> 17:04.501
We close the gates , uh , which we

17:04.501 --> 17:06.668
didn't want to do at H chi during this

17:06.668 --> 17:09.001
period of time as , as force protection .

17:09.001 --> 17:11.001
Uh , you know , we were very active

17:11.001 --> 17:13.112
with our I . S . Are overhead , which

17:13.112 --> 17:15.334
we know is very often has a suppressive

17:15.334 --> 17:17.390
effect on their activities . Uh , we

17:17.390 --> 17:19.446
still took rockets the next day , as

17:19.446 --> 17:21.668
you know , and they fired those rockets

17:21.668 --> 17:21.650
from near .1 and from other places

17:21.650 --> 17:23.983
actually near the route of this vehicle .

17:23.983 --> 17:26.094
But I would tell you unequivocally in

17:26.094 --> 17:28.150
this case , clearly the intelligence

17:28.150 --> 17:29.983
was wrong on this vehicle and we

17:29.983 --> 17:32.206
certainly regret that as I've been very

17:32.206 --> 17:34.094
clear , let me go to the phones ,

17:34.094 --> 17:36.150
jennifer steinhauer new york times ,

17:40.040 --> 17:44.010
jennifer you there ? My

17:44.230 --> 17:46.452
question is a different matter john for

17:46.452 --> 17:48.580
after this . All right , okay . Louis

17:48.580 --> 17:49.660
Martinez abc .

17:55.840 --> 17:56.840
You there , louis

17:59.540 --> 18:01.707
okay , nothing heard nancy . Youssef ,

18:03.040 --> 18:05.096
thank you general . Please clarify a

18:05.096 --> 18:06.818
couple of points for me if I'm

18:06.818 --> 18:08.707
understanding these frankly , you

18:08.707 --> 18:10.762
follow the wrong photo full from the

18:10.762 --> 18:12.651
beginning and that is you weren't

18:12.651 --> 18:14.762
following one vehicle and mistaken it

18:14.762 --> 18:16.707
for another one . And also in your

18:16.707 --> 18:18.929
initial statement , you said that there

18:18.929 --> 18:18.200
was no initial reports of civilian

18:18.200 --> 18:20.478
casualties . It appears to the release .

18:20.478 --> 18:22.644
Some concern about civilian casualties

18:22.644 --> 18:24.700
very early on . So on what basis did

18:24.700 --> 18:26.922
you make that statement . And finally ,

18:26.922 --> 18:28.867
was any intelligence that you were

18:28.867 --> 18:31.500
using gathered from the taliban ? Thank

18:31.500 --> 18:33.580
you . So let me begin with the last

18:33.580 --> 18:35.747
question . Nothing we did was gathered

18:35.747 --> 18:37.970
from the taliban . Um , and I should be

18:37.980 --> 18:40.202
and I should be very clear about that .

18:40.202 --> 18:42.960
Uh , we selected this car based on its

18:42.970 --> 18:45.790
movement , a targeted area of interest

18:45.790 --> 18:47.630
to us . A known targeted area of

18:47.630 --> 18:49.408
interest to us . And we held it

18:49.408 --> 18:51.630
throughout the day clearly based on the

18:51.630 --> 18:53.960
end result . That was a mistake . And I

18:53.960 --> 18:57.530
have acknowledged that from

18:57.530 --> 18:59.697
military times during this time , Were

18:59.697 --> 19:01.586
you tracking any other suspicious

19:01.586 --> 19:03.752
activity in Kabul that might have also

19:03.752 --> 19:05.863
been part of this threat ? And do you

19:05.863 --> 19:07.974
have any intelligence from after this

19:07.974 --> 19:09.752
drone strike that suggests what

19:09.752 --> 19:11.530
happened to the imminent threat

19:11.530 --> 19:14.570
afterward . sure . So as I noted in my

19:14.570 --> 19:18.530
comments , we had over 60 , uh very ,

19:18.540 --> 19:21.400
very high caliber uh , reports of

19:21.410 --> 19:23.466
imminent threat to our forces in and

19:23.466 --> 19:25.466
around and around Kabul . Typically

19:25.466 --> 19:27.610
those are signals based . Uh , but

19:27.610 --> 19:29.610
there are also some human and other

19:29.610 --> 19:31.832
human intelligence as well . So we have

19:31.832 --> 19:34.054
a variety of sources for the , for that

19:34.054 --> 19:35.999
intelligence . We believe that the

19:35.999 --> 19:38.110
strike we took a couple of days prior

19:38.110 --> 19:39.999
of the Nangarhar actually have an

19:39.999 --> 19:42.166
effect on quieting down because we got

19:42.166 --> 19:44.277
a key attack planner in that strike .

19:44.277 --> 19:46.499
We believe that disrupted some of their

19:46.499 --> 19:48.721
plans . Additionally , we did things to

19:48.721 --> 19:50.888
make it harder for them to get to us .

19:50.888 --> 19:53.110
For example , we closed the gates , the

19:53.110 --> 19:55.054
gates as we know , or a particular

19:55.054 --> 19:57.110
point where we're vulnerable . So we

19:57.110 --> 19:59.166
decided not to process people and we

19:59.166 --> 20:01.221
hunker down for a little bit of time

20:01.221 --> 20:01.180
while this threat was still there . So

20:01.180 --> 20:04.250
there were over 60 clear threat

20:04.250 --> 20:06.300
vectors that we were dealing with

20:06.300 --> 20:08.467
during this period of time , including

20:08.467 --> 20:10.356
as I've noted before , the rocket

20:10.356 --> 20:12.411
attacks that occurred . You know , a

20:12.411 --> 20:14.467
little bit after this from locations

20:14.467 --> 20:16.633
that are displayed on the graphic that

20:16.633 --> 20:18.856
you have a really quick follow up . Not

20:18.856 --> 20:21.078
in terms of the number of threats , but

20:21.078 --> 20:23.189
the number of other cars or groups of

20:23.189 --> 20:23.070
people that you were following that day .

20:23.070 --> 20:24.903
Were you tracking anybody else's

20:24.903 --> 20:27.260
closely ? We tracked a lot of other

20:27.260 --> 20:29.371
people . Uh , we didn't track anybody

20:29.371 --> 20:31.427
as well as as closely as we did this

20:31.427 --> 20:33.316
because of the limitations on our

20:33.316 --> 20:35.538
resources . And frankly , you know , we

20:35.538 --> 20:37.593
we thought this was a good lead . We

20:37.593 --> 20:39.760
were wrong . Thanks Alex . Thanks john

20:39.760 --> 20:41.593
General Mackenzie , this is Alex

20:41.593 --> 20:43.704
Marquardt from CNN Uh , you mentioned

20:43.704 --> 20:45.927
that immediately following the attack .

20:45.927 --> 20:47.982
You saw shapes in the video that led

20:47.982 --> 20:50.093
you to believe that this necessitated

20:50.093 --> 20:52.093
investigation that there could have

20:52.093 --> 20:54.260
been more civilians there on September

20:54.260 --> 20:56.427
one . We heard from General Milley who

20:56.427 --> 20:56.320
called this a righteous strike . And

20:56.320 --> 20:58.500
this was several days later . Did you

20:58.500 --> 21:00.722
at the time , several days later , also

21:00.722 --> 21:02.722
believed that this was the right to

21:02.722 --> 21:04.778
strike and could you talk about your

21:04.778 --> 21:06.500
erosion of confidence over the

21:06.500 --> 21:08.722
following the next subsequent two weeks

21:08.722 --> 21:10.667
of the investigation ? Sure . So I

21:10.667 --> 21:12.667
think we issued a statement from us

21:12.667 --> 21:14.778
Central Command about six hours after

21:14.778 --> 21:16.389
the strike acknowledging the

21:16.389 --> 21:18.611
possibility civilian casualties . So we

21:18.611 --> 21:18.320
knew from the very beginning there was

21:18.320 --> 21:20.880
a possibility civilian casualties . Uh ,

21:20.890 --> 21:22.946
I think we still thought we had good

21:22.946 --> 21:25.168
reason to have taken that strike and it

21:25.168 --> 21:27.380
took us gathering the facts to change

21:27.380 --> 21:29.950
that we took we didn't think as you

21:29.950 --> 21:31.839
will understand and appreciate we

21:31.839 --> 21:33.728
didn't take the strike because we

21:33.728 --> 21:35.728
thought we were wrong . We took the

21:35.728 --> 21:37.950
strike because we thought we had a good

21:37.950 --> 21:39.950
target . It takes a little while to

21:39.950 --> 21:39.880
uncover some of those things . We moved

21:39.880 --> 21:42.102
and worked as rapidly as we could . And

21:42.102 --> 21:44.269
actually , I think we worked extremely

21:44.269 --> 21:46.491
rapidly to get this information out and

21:46.491 --> 21:48.491
make it public . Fine , thank you .

21:48.491 --> 21:50.640
Thank you . General . So on . Despite

21:50.650 --> 21:52.539
numerous intelligence reports and

21:52.539 --> 21:55.520
warnings On the 26th , we had that

21:55.520 --> 21:58.750
tragic attack on on the airport . 13 US

21:58.760 --> 22:01.220
service members were killed in addition

22:01.220 --> 22:04.290
to tens of Afghan civilians again on

22:04.290 --> 22:07.050
the 29th in this strike . Another

22:07.050 --> 22:09.161
tragedy took place . As you said , 10

22:09.161 --> 22:11.690
civilians were killed among them seven

22:11.700 --> 22:14.630
Children . Is that a failure of

22:14.640 --> 22:16.830
intelligence or leadership in

22:16.830 --> 22:19.052
Afghanistan . And what do you intend to

22:19.052 --> 22:21.340
do about that ? Thank you . Well , I

22:21.340 --> 22:23.562
will tell you . So , we had to events ,

22:23.562 --> 22:25.729
we have the attacker navigate , we had

22:25.729 --> 22:27.784
this uh , and we had this strike the

22:27.784 --> 22:29.951
aggregate attack , you're you're in uh

22:29.951 --> 22:32.007
in combat with an enemy who is alive

22:32.007 --> 22:34.229
and has his own will and sometimes that

22:34.229 --> 22:36.451
enemy is gonna is gonna , his plans are

22:36.451 --> 22:38.507
just going to work . You can't cover

22:38.507 --> 22:40.673
every eventuality all the time despite

22:40.673 --> 22:42.840
our very best efforts to do that . And

22:42.840 --> 22:44.896
we took every precaution we could at

22:44.896 --> 22:47.007
Abbey gate . In fact when we had when

22:47.007 --> 22:48.951
we had threats develop over the 48

22:48.951 --> 22:51.062
hours that followed . As I've noted ,

22:51.062 --> 22:52.840
we closed the gates in order to

22:52.840 --> 22:55.062
recognizing it would reduce our ability

22:55.062 --> 22:54.680
to bring people in . But at the same

22:54.680 --> 22:56.902
time we thought that was the best thing

22:56.902 --> 22:58.847
we could do to actually reduce our

22:58.847 --> 23:00.958
attack surface if you will to protect

23:00.958 --> 23:03.180
our forces . There are also a number of

23:03.180 --> 23:05.347
attacks that were thwarted . These are

23:05.347 --> 23:07.569
two that you know about because they're

23:07.569 --> 23:09.791
high visibility and we're talking about

23:09.791 --> 23:12.069
others were thwarted and did not occur .

23:12.069 --> 23:11.870
So the silence of those attacks should

23:11.870 --> 23:14.037
mean something to unfortunately , it's

23:14.037 --> 23:17.200
very difficult to prove a negative Tony

23:17.640 --> 23:19.584
Tony capacity with Bloomberg . Two

23:19.584 --> 23:21.418
quick questions are you going to

23:21.418 --> 23:23.529
release the report of investigation ?

23:24.440 --> 23:27.050
Two in your fact gathering to what

23:27.050 --> 23:29.106
extent that you will rely on the new

23:29.106 --> 23:30.772
york times is extensive video

23:30.772 --> 23:34.200
investigation and then talks with N . G .

23:34.200 --> 23:36.730
O . S or civilian eyewitnesses at the

23:36.730 --> 23:40.360
scene . Okay . Mhm . So

23:40.370 --> 23:42.481
repeat the first question again . For

23:42.481 --> 23:44.426
me , you'll be releasing the final

23:44.426 --> 23:46.570
report of investigation , The final

23:46.570 --> 23:48.514
report that the report is a highly

23:48.514 --> 23:50.514
classified document . There will be

23:50.514 --> 23:52.348
procedures that would have to be

23:52.348 --> 23:54.570
followed to declassify elements of that

23:54.570 --> 23:56.626
document . If it were to be released

23:56.626 --> 23:56.070
and I'll just leave that . I'll just

23:56.070 --> 23:58.292
leave that question there as we in fact

23:58.292 --> 24:00.403
worked our investigation , we use all

24:00.403 --> 24:02.403
available sources of information to

24:02.403 --> 24:04.126
inform us as we went forward .

24:04.126 --> 24:06.126
Certainly that included some of the

24:06.126 --> 24:08.292
stuff the new york times did . It also

24:08.292 --> 24:10.514
included our own extensive resources in

24:10.514 --> 24:12.570
this area which we looked at . So we

24:12.570 --> 24:12.320
tried to go everywhere we could and not

24:12.320 --> 24:14.487
overlook anything as we sort of try to

24:14.487 --> 24:16.780
build a picture Alabama at all in the

24:16.780 --> 24:18.891
investigation or the fact gathering .

24:19.540 --> 24:23.150
No thanks Lucas . General Mackenzie ,

24:23.150 --> 24:25.206
Lucas , tomlinson Fox news . Did you

24:25.206 --> 24:27.317
have forces on the ground that helped

24:27.317 --> 24:28.761
you conduct this strike ?

24:31.640 --> 24:35.190
No , we did not . As you know , no time

24:35.200 --> 24:38.400
where our forces really away from uh

24:38.400 --> 24:40.511
Hamid Karzai International airfield .

24:40.511 --> 24:42.678
So there was nobody there nobody there

24:42.678 --> 24:45.200
on the ground to have to play that role .

24:45.210 --> 24:47.266
I think you can see from the graphic

24:47.266 --> 24:49.266
that the position of the strike was

24:49.266 --> 24:51.432
about 3 to 4 kilometers to the west of

24:51.432 --> 24:53.488
Hk area . So no there was there were

24:53.488 --> 24:55.654
there were there was nobody either bus

24:55.654 --> 24:55.650
or a proxy of virus that was involved

24:55.650 --> 24:57.317
in this that includes special

24:57.317 --> 25:00.770
Operations forces explicitly . Can you

25:00.770 --> 25:02.826
talk about the challenges conducting

25:02.826 --> 25:05.048
these drone strikes without any U . S .

25:05.048 --> 25:07.600
Troops on the ground . So we conducted

25:07.600 --> 25:09.822
a very successful drone strike two days

25:09.822 --> 25:12.560
earlier up in Nangarhar province and we

25:12.560 --> 25:14.671
got the target and I think that had a

25:14.671 --> 25:16.840
significant event on dislocating and

25:16.840 --> 25:19.460
suppressing ISIS K's ability to attack

25:19.460 --> 25:22.040
us during this period of time . So we

25:22.040 --> 25:24.800
actually had success with that this one

25:24.800 --> 25:26.856
we did not have success with success

25:26.856 --> 25:28.911
with and we've been very clear about

25:28.911 --> 25:31.078
owning up to our responsibility . This

25:31.078 --> 25:33.022
we're going Lucas you've had three

25:33.022 --> 25:35.133
questions . We've got time for just a

25:35.133 --> 25:38.420
couple more Tara cop . Thank you .

25:38.430 --> 25:40.320
General Mackenzie . Tara cop with

25:40.320 --> 25:42.870
defense one . Since there are no more U .

25:42.870 --> 25:44.926
S . Forces on the ground , how would

25:44.926 --> 25:47.230
the ex gratia payments be provided to

25:47.230 --> 25:49.286
surviving family members if they are

25:49.286 --> 25:51.750
provided ? And then I know you walked

25:51.750 --> 25:53.472
us through the timeline at the

25:53.472 --> 25:55.694
beginning of this , but can you give us

25:55.694 --> 25:58.180
the overall amount of time spent

25:58.190 --> 26:00.290
actually identifying and confirming

26:00.290 --> 26:02.860
this target before the strike was taken ?

26:04.140 --> 26:06.500
Sure . So as for the ex gratia payments

26:06.510 --> 26:08.732
were working that right now and it will

26:08.732 --> 26:10.677
be difficult . As as I noted in my

26:10.677 --> 26:12.621
remarks , I think one of the first

26:12.621 --> 26:14.677
questions it will be difficult to do

26:14.677 --> 26:16.788
that without a presence on the ground

26:16.788 --> 26:15.910
and that's just something we're gonna

26:15.910 --> 26:18.021
have to work through . I don't have a

26:18.021 --> 26:20.132
better answer for you right now other

26:20.132 --> 26:22.188
than we recognize the obligation and

26:22.188 --> 26:24.410
we'll continue to work . We'll continue

26:24.410 --> 26:26.132
to work that problem . So in a

26:26.132 --> 26:28.354
situation like this to go to the second

26:28.354 --> 26:30.466
part of your question As you continue

26:30.466 --> 26:30.060
to look at the target over the course

26:30.060 --> 26:32.171
of the day , you know , you you begin

26:32.171 --> 26:34.393
to build probabilities , you begin to ,

26:34.393 --> 26:36.650
you begin to uh you begin to weigh what

26:36.660 --> 26:38.882
are we going to take a strike ? Why why

26:38.882 --> 26:40.938
are we going to take the strike when

26:40.938 --> 26:43.104
the vehicle came up to the final point

26:43.104 --> 26:45.216
at .7 on your map ? Which is actually

26:45.216 --> 26:47.327
as I've noted as close the closest to

26:47.327 --> 26:49.438
the airfield it had been all day . We

26:49.438 --> 26:49.360
are very concerned about a white

26:49.360 --> 26:51.490
Corolla being involved in a in an

26:51.490 --> 26:53.712
attack . So the cumulative force of all

26:53.712 --> 26:56.530
those uh all those , the intelligence

26:56.530 --> 26:58.641
that we gathered throughout the day .

26:58.641 --> 27:00.530
The position of the vehicle , its

27:00.530 --> 27:02.752
nearness to the airport , the imminence

27:02.752 --> 27:04.919
of the threat and the other uh segment

27:04.919 --> 27:07.030
that we're getting throughout the day

27:07.030 --> 27:09.141
all lead us to the moment of deciding

27:09.141 --> 27:11.141
to take the strike and and one last

27:11.141 --> 27:13.086
follow up who actually ordered the

27:13.086 --> 27:15.308
strike , who had the final authority to

27:15.308 --> 27:18.110
say fire . So in this case the target

27:18.110 --> 27:20.260
engagement authority is held by the

27:20.270 --> 27:22.570
over the horizon commander whose

27:22.570 --> 27:26.070
florida in the theater , the over the

27:26.070 --> 27:28.070
horizon . Strike sale commander , I

27:28.070 --> 27:30.126
should say , okay , we have time for

27:30.126 --> 27:32.237
one more and then we're gonna have to

27:32.237 --> 27:34.403
let the general go Jeff . Selden via a

27:34.640 --> 27:36.696
Jeff seldom from the L a thanks very

27:36.696 --> 27:39.210
much for doing this general . Um given

27:39.210 --> 27:41.432
how this over the horizon strike went ,

27:41.640 --> 27:43.700
where do things stand in terms of

27:43.700 --> 27:45.756
getting at least closer presence . A

27:45.756 --> 27:48.080
closer basing agreement for future over

27:48.080 --> 27:50.136
the horizon strikes . And we've been

27:50.136 --> 27:52.358
told that the Taliban have made various

27:52.358 --> 27:54.358
commitments to counterterrorism . I

27:54.358 --> 27:56.524
know you said that they didn't provide

27:56.524 --> 27:58.636
any information for this strike , but

27:58.636 --> 28:00.691
did they provide any sort of help in

28:00.691 --> 28:02.913
the closing days in terms of preventing

28:02.913 --> 28:05.080
the threat against uh from IsIS K ? Or

28:05.080 --> 28:07.136
have they been helpful since then in

28:07.136 --> 28:08.913
cracking down on ISIS K as they

28:08.913 --> 28:11.420
continue to plot against us western

28:11.420 --> 28:14.730
targets . So I think the best I can

28:14.730 --> 28:16.952
answer your question is to sort of take

28:16.952 --> 28:19.119
the middle part of the question in the

28:19.119 --> 28:21.230
final days . And really in the second

28:21.230 --> 28:23.397
half of our of our time at h chi as we

28:23.397 --> 28:25.563
continued our evacuation , the taliban

28:25.563 --> 28:27.674
were helpful in establishing an outer

28:27.674 --> 28:29.841
security perimeter , which actually we

28:29.841 --> 28:31.841
believe prevented some attacks from

28:31.841 --> 28:33.841
developing . Now , look , there's a

28:33.841 --> 28:36.008
downside to that too . It also allowed

28:36.008 --> 28:35.940
them to screen people that might

28:35.950 --> 28:38.300
otherwise have gotten to the airfield .

28:38.310 --> 28:40.532
And that's just a hard harsh fact . And

28:40.532 --> 28:42.532
you have to balance those two force

28:42.532 --> 28:44.620
protection of our forces which is

28:44.620 --> 28:47.310
supported by taliban uh external

28:47.310 --> 28:49.660
presence against the fact that it may

28:49.660 --> 28:51.882
prevent some people that you would like

28:51.882 --> 28:54.049
to bring out from being able to get to

28:54.049 --> 28:56.271
you unmolested . And that's a difficult

28:56.271 --> 28:58.327
balance . I frankly came down that I

28:58.327 --> 29:00.271
wanted to protect our forces and I

29:00.271 --> 29:02.438
needed that outer boundary and to that

29:02.438 --> 29:04.604
degree we were able to work together .

29:04.604 --> 29:06.604
I have no uh , I have no particular

29:06.604 --> 29:08.716
affection for the taliban and I don't

29:08.716 --> 29:10.938
know that they're doing anything at all

29:10.938 --> 29:13.104
for us right now . But those questions

29:13.104 --> 29:12.910
would probably better go to the

29:12.910 --> 29:14.632
Department of State along with

29:14.632 --> 29:16.632
questions about basing and where we

29:16.632 --> 29:18.854
might be able to get closer basing than

29:18.854 --> 29:21.021
where we are right now . I know all of

29:21.021 --> 29:20.570
those things are actively being worked

29:20.570 --> 29:23.320
by our diplomats as we speak . Thank

29:23.320 --> 29:25.376
you . General , appreciate your time

29:25.376 --> 29:27.487
this afternoon . I'll turn it over to

29:27.487 --> 29:27.430
you for any last closing comments you

29:27.430 --> 29:30.010
might want to make , sir . No , john ,

29:30.010 --> 29:32.232
I I just , I appreciate the opportunity

29:32.232 --> 29:33.899
to come on . I appreciate the

29:33.899 --> 29:36.066
opportunity to take responsibility for

29:36.066 --> 29:38.232
this because I do feel responsible for

29:38.232 --> 29:40.232
it . And I appreciate the questions

29:40.232 --> 29:42.566
from the , from the media . Thanks john ,

29:42.566 --> 29:46.160
thank you very much . Okay . Yeah . Me

29:46.540 --> 29:49.520
referred to a picture which didn't come

29:49.520 --> 29:51.650
up are the are their individual

29:51.650 --> 29:54.670
pictures of these little blocks in here .

29:54.680 --> 29:57.013
I'll have to check with Central Command ,

29:57.013 --> 29:59.124
David . I'm sure if they were able to

29:59.124 --> 30:01.013
make that graphic , there must be

30:01.013 --> 30:02.680
imagery of it . But what what

30:02.680 --> 30:04.847
resolution there in and all that we'll

30:04.847 --> 30:07.069
check , we sent out to the networks for

30:07.069 --> 30:09.180
anybody . I don't believe it was . It

30:09.180 --> 30:11.291
was designed for this briefing and we

30:11.291 --> 30:13.180
wanted to make sure you have hard

30:13.180 --> 30:13.120
copies of it . Uh , but we can check

30:13.120 --> 30:15.850
with Central Command , that's fair . Um

30:16.340 --> 30:19.320
so The secretary was briefed by General

30:19.320 --> 30:21.431
Mackenzie this morning at 8:00 on the

30:21.431 --> 30:24.160
results of his investigation and uh on

30:24.160 --> 30:26.104
behalf of the men and women of the

30:26.104 --> 30:28.160
Department of Defense , uh He offers

30:28.160 --> 30:30.216
his deepest condolences to surviving

30:30.216 --> 30:32.549
family members of those who were killed ,

30:32.549 --> 30:34.771
including Mr Ramadi and to the staff of

30:34.771 --> 30:36.882
nutrition and Education International

30:36.882 --> 30:38.993
Mr Ramadi's employer . And you should

30:38.993 --> 30:41.104
have in your inbox is now a statement

30:41.104 --> 30:43.438
uh that I'm basically paraphrasing from .

30:44.740 --> 30:47.870
Uh as the secretary says in this

30:47.870 --> 30:50.630
statement , we apologize and we will

30:50.630 --> 30:52.686
endeavor to learn from this horrible

30:52.686 --> 30:54.630
mistake . And to that end , he has

30:54.630 --> 30:56.519
directed a thorough review of the

30:56.519 --> 30:58.463
investigation just completed by US

30:58.463 --> 31:01.140
Central Command . And he has asked for

31:01.140 --> 31:03.700
this review to consider the degree to

31:03.700 --> 31:05.867
which the investigation considered all

31:05.867 --> 31:08.089
available context and information , the

31:08.089 --> 31:10.311
degree to which accountability measures

31:10.311 --> 31:12.256
need to be taken at what level and

31:12.256 --> 31:14.144
agree to which strike authorities

31:14.144 --> 31:16.144
procedures and processes need to be

31:16.144 --> 31:18.040
altered going forward . And he

31:18.040 --> 31:20.262
reiterates that of course , no military

31:20.262 --> 31:22.570
works harder than we do to avoid

31:22.570 --> 31:24.514
civilian casualties . When we have

31:24.514 --> 31:26.570
reason to believe that we have taken

31:26.570 --> 31:28.737
innocent life we investigated . And if

31:28.737 --> 31:30.959
it's true , we acknowledge it just like

31:30.959 --> 31:33.630
we did today . But he also notes that

31:33.630 --> 31:35.852
we have to work just as hard to prevent

31:35.852 --> 31:37.352
recurrence , no matter the

31:37.352 --> 31:39.019
circumstances , no matter the

31:39.019 --> 31:41.074
intelligence stream and certainly no

31:41.074 --> 31:42.908
matter the operational pressures

31:42.908 --> 31:46.390
pressures under which we labor On

31:46.390 --> 31:48.501
another matter altogether today ? The

31:48.501 --> 31:50.612
Secretary approved a request from the

31:50.612 --> 31:52.668
Capitol Hill Police Board to provide

31:52.668 --> 31:54.779
100 members of the Washington D . C .

31:54.779 --> 31:57.001
National Guard who will be stationed at

31:57.001 --> 31:58.834
the D . C . Armory as a physical

31:58.834 --> 32:01.280
security task force this weekend to

32:01.290 --> 32:04.800
augment law enforcement . Um uh over

32:04.810 --> 32:06.699
over the weekend uh covering this

32:06.699 --> 32:08.870
September 18 demonstration on Capitol

32:08.870 --> 32:11.210
Hill the D . C . National Guard will

32:11.210 --> 32:13.377
join a number of local law enforcement

32:13.377 --> 32:15.321
agencies in supporting the capitol

32:15.321 --> 32:17.266
police . Should the capitol police

32:17.266 --> 32:19.321
require assistance . They will first

32:19.321 --> 32:21.620
utilize local state and federal law

32:21.620 --> 32:23.398
enforcement capabilities before

32:23.398 --> 32:25.231
requesting the deployment of the

32:25.231 --> 32:27.780
physical security task force . The task

32:27.780 --> 32:29.613
force will only be deployed upon

32:29.613 --> 32:31.724
request of the capitol police to help

32:31.724 --> 32:33.780
protect the U . S . Capitol building

32:33.780 --> 32:35.891
and congressional office buildings by

32:35.891 --> 32:37.780
manning building entry points and

32:37.780 --> 32:39.947
screening individuals that are seeking

32:39.947 --> 32:42.058
access to the building . They will be

32:42.058 --> 32:45.150
unarmed with that I can take some

32:45.150 --> 32:47.890
questions . Yeah Travis I'm I had a

32:47.890 --> 32:50.630
question about that Guard troops going

32:50.630 --> 32:53.540
to the hill obviously back in january

32:53.540 --> 32:56.190
became kind of a big Issue that there

32:56.190 --> 32:58.301
were veterans and I think in a couple

32:58.301 --> 33:00.670
cases active duty troops are involved

33:00.680 --> 33:03.650
in January six incident and I'm just

33:03.650 --> 33:07.650
wondering if there's been any effort uh

33:07.660 --> 33:10.630
two say something to troops ahead of

33:10.630 --> 33:12.686
this about if they're thinking about

33:12.686 --> 33:14.797
going what they should consider first

33:14.797 --> 33:17.900
and if that's too many levels below the

33:17.950 --> 33:20.820
road to speak from the podium , can you

33:20.830 --> 33:23.890
talk at all about what the Secretary

33:23.890 --> 33:25.668
might say to the troops who are

33:25.668 --> 33:27.723
thinking about going to a rally like

33:27.723 --> 33:30.860
this on saturday ? I don't know of any

33:30.870 --> 33:33.160
official communication that's come out

33:33.160 --> 33:35.280
from the department at any level

33:35.280 --> 33:38.320
specifically to uh to troops who might

33:38.330 --> 33:42.170
consider uh being a part of uh of a

33:42.170 --> 33:45.140
protest . Um There are already limits

33:45.140 --> 33:47.600
to what they can do uh in uniform . And

33:47.600 --> 33:49.600
clearly political protest is one of

33:49.600 --> 33:52.410
those things are not allowed to do . Uh

33:52.420 --> 33:55.830
But I don't know of any specific uh you

33:55.830 --> 33:59.340
know , guidance that's been issued . Um

33:59.350 --> 34:02.350
They are american citizens , um and

34:02.360 --> 34:06.070
uh and in their off duty hours . Uh

34:06.080 --> 34:08.850
they're allowed to um

34:09.440 --> 34:12.770
uh to participate in um in social

34:12.770 --> 34:14.770
events like that . Social political

34:14.770 --> 34:17.070
events like that . Uh but they can't do

34:17.070 --> 34:20.460
it in uniform and obviously should

34:20.470 --> 34:22.692
things turn violent , then they will be

34:22.692 --> 34:24.859
held accountable for any violence that

34:24.859 --> 34:26.914
they participate in ? Uh Of course ,

34:26.914 --> 34:29.520
Travis , nobody wants to see it get to

34:29.520 --> 34:33.500
that point here , and I the secretary

34:33.500 --> 34:35.611
has confidence that the men and women

34:35.611 --> 34:38.690
of the department understand the limits

34:38.690 --> 34:41.380
and the constraints on their behavior

34:41.380 --> 34:44.080
in these kinds of circumstances . Is

34:44.080 --> 34:46.247
the Secretary satisfied with the level

34:46.247 --> 34:48.469
of accountability so far following from

34:48.469 --> 34:50.691
this investigation , or is he concerned

34:50.691 --> 34:52.358
that there hasn't been enough

34:52.358 --> 34:54.524
accountability following this strike .

34:54.524 --> 34:56.580
I'm not going to characterize it one

34:56.580 --> 34:56.300
way or the other right now . As I said

34:56.310 --> 34:58.532
just a few minutes ago , he's asked for

34:58.532 --> 35:00.588
a review of this investigation . And

35:00.588 --> 35:02.588
one of the things that he wants the

35:02.588 --> 35:04.310
review to do is take a look at

35:04.310 --> 35:06.477
accountability and the degree to which

35:06.477 --> 35:08.660
uh accountability measures need to be

35:08.660 --> 35:11.040
considered and if so at what level . So

35:11.050 --> 35:12.939
I'm not going to get ahead of his

35:12.939 --> 35:15.050
decision making on that has ruled out

35:15.050 --> 35:17.161
firing anybody . I'm not going to get

35:17.161 --> 35:19.050
ahead of the secretary's decision

35:19.050 --> 35:21.106
making . That's why he's asked for a

35:21.106 --> 35:23.161
review so he can get a look . Yeah .

35:23.161 --> 35:25.439
Mike bread for the Washington examiner .

35:25.439 --> 35:24.870
Will there be a review of the first

35:24.870 --> 35:27.870
strike At all ? The one in Nangahar ?

35:27.880 --> 35:31.260
Yeah , I know . Yes .

35:35.020 --> 35:38.340
So today the

35:38.350 --> 35:42.160
Joint Operations comment

35:42.840 --> 35:45.120
announced an agreement security

35:45.120 --> 35:48.750
agreement with the US to reduce the uh

35:48.760 --> 35:52.290
combat troops in a trial asad airbase

35:52.290 --> 35:56.260
and Erbil by

35:56.270 --> 35:59.630
the end of september . The IR statement

35:59.640 --> 36:03.190
didn't mention any reduction of the

36:03.200 --> 36:05.490
troop level . Can you please clarify

36:05.490 --> 36:07.570
what's going on in Iraq now , why

36:07.580 --> 36:09.691
there's like misunderstanding between

36:09.691 --> 36:13.220
the Iraqi part and the coalition And

36:13.230 --> 36:16.400
also can you confirm that their level

36:16.410 --> 36:18.840
of troops will remain the same through

36:18.840 --> 36:21.080
at least september and I I can't

36:21.080 --> 36:23.730
confirm that . And you're gonna have to

36:23.730 --> 36:25.750
let me take your question on the

36:25.760 --> 36:27.927
statements because I just haven't seen

36:27.927 --> 36:30.190
those today and I don't want to venture

36:30.190 --> 36:32.412
a guess right now . So let me take your

36:32.412 --> 36:34.579
question will get you an answer back .

36:34.579 --> 36:36.730
Uh , okay , if you can just explain a

36:36.730 --> 36:39.470
little bit about the capabilities that

36:39.480 --> 36:41.647
the U . S . Forces will maintain after

36:41.647 --> 36:44.650
december and Ira will they be able to

36:44.650 --> 36:48.650
conduct airstrikes targeting ? Uh ,

36:49.030 --> 36:51.660
yeah , we're obviously , we're still in

36:51.660 --> 36:53.771
technical talks with the Iraqis about

36:53.771 --> 36:55.993
the president's going forward . I'm not

36:55.993 --> 36:58.049
going to get ahead of those talks or

36:58.049 --> 37:00.160
what decisions they might make . So I

37:00.160 --> 37:02.327
think it's better for me to just leave

37:02.327 --> 37:04.327
it where we are right now . And the

37:04.327 --> 37:06.438
shift the mission , the nature of the

37:06.438 --> 37:08.604
mission in Iraq will affect in any way

37:08.604 --> 37:10.771
the mission in Syria . Again , I'm not

37:10.771 --> 37:12.827
going to get ahead of decisions that

37:12.827 --> 37:14.771
haven't been made or policies that

37:14.771 --> 37:16.993
haven't been decided upon were in talks

37:16.993 --> 37:19.160
with the Iraqis about what the posture

37:19.160 --> 37:21.271
is going to go forward . Um , uh , we

37:21.271 --> 37:23.493
have a much smaller presence in Syria ,

37:23.493 --> 37:25.549
but it's aligned to the same mission

37:25.549 --> 37:27.690
which is to continue to counter ISIS

37:27.690 --> 37:29.746
and their influence in both Iraq and

37:29.746 --> 37:31.746
Syria . So while they are different

37:31.746 --> 37:33.750
places , different force postures ,

37:34.000 --> 37:36.167
same ultimate goal . But I'm not going

37:36.167 --> 37:39.300
to speak about the policy decisions or

37:39.300 --> 37:41.522
operational decisions that haven't been

37:41.522 --> 37:44.520
made yet , jay . Thank you , dan listen

37:44.520 --> 37:46.631
to the North korean leader , kim jong

37:46.631 --> 37:49.550
un Central victory message to the

37:49.560 --> 37:53.020
Taliban and urging the U . S .

37:53.020 --> 37:56.390
Military to quit . What is your comment

37:56.470 --> 38:00.180
did not see the comment by kim jong un .

38:00.190 --> 38:03.120
Um , so he can speak for his own

38:03.120 --> 38:05.710
communications with the Taliban . Uh

38:05.720 --> 38:09.680
what I can tell you is that uh we we

38:09.680 --> 38:11.902
no longer have a presence on the ground

38:11.902 --> 38:14.070
in Afghanistan . Our involvement in

38:14.070 --> 38:17.960
that war on the ground is over . Uh the

38:17.970 --> 38:20.081
president made clear his intention to

38:20.081 --> 38:22.248
do that . The retrograde withdrawal is

38:22.248 --> 38:24.640
done as well as uh the military part

38:24.650 --> 38:27.590
military element of evacuating

38:27.600 --> 38:30.060
americans and special immigrant visa

38:30.060 --> 38:31.838
holders . That said the U . S .

38:31.838 --> 38:34.350
Government is still very much going to

38:34.350 --> 38:36.310
stay involved . I'm trying to help

38:36.310 --> 38:38.490
people leave who want to leave and and

38:38.490 --> 38:41.930
who qualified to leave . Um and as you

38:41.930 --> 38:44.041
heard , General Mackenzie say , we're

38:44.041 --> 38:46.660
also going to stay focused on the

38:46.670 --> 38:48.670
terrorist threat that could emanate

38:48.670 --> 38:51.440
from Afghanistan . Yeah , Sylvie . Um

38:52.120 --> 38:54.370
Hello , I would like to ask you a few

38:54.380 --> 38:58.020
details about the Aucas agreement

38:58.030 --> 39:00.630
announced yesterday on the military

39:00.630 --> 39:04.320
side , the Australian

39:04.320 --> 39:07.750
defence minister spoke about basing

39:08.120 --> 39:10.880
does it mean that the U . S . Wants to

39:10.890 --> 39:14.050
deploy U . S . Troops on

39:14.060 --> 39:17.180
Australian soil permanently ? Well , we

39:17.180 --> 39:19.440
already have a rotational Marine corps

39:19.440 --> 39:21.560
deployment there , which Australians

39:21.560 --> 39:23.449
have been incredibly gracious and

39:23.449 --> 39:27.340
generous and helping host . Uh and I

39:27.350 --> 39:29.128
don't want to speak for again ,

39:29.128 --> 39:31.294
decisions that haven't been made . But

39:31.294 --> 39:33.350
one of the things that was discussed

39:33.350 --> 39:35.410
was the opportunity to expand that

39:35.410 --> 39:37.299
presence in in Australia and that

39:37.299 --> 39:39.900
access to Australia . But no decisions

39:39.900 --> 39:42.560
came out of yesterday's uh Osman two

39:42.560 --> 39:45.210
plus two . But that is something that I

39:45.220 --> 39:47.331
think you can expect , we're going to

39:47.331 --> 39:49.331
continue to talk to the Australians

39:49.331 --> 39:51.442
about going forward . And in terms of

39:51.442 --> 39:54.460
uh , missiles . Did you did you get any ?

39:54.680 --> 39:56.740
I think you heard both the Secretary

39:56.740 --> 39:58.907
and the Minister Minister doesn't talk

39:58.907 --> 40:01.129
about this yesterday , that there was a

40:01.129 --> 40:03.240
range of capabilities uh , that we're

40:03.240 --> 40:05.480
going to continue to explore with our

40:05.490 --> 40:08.050
Australian allies . Um , no decisions

40:08.050 --> 40:09.994
have been made . The only decision

40:09.994 --> 40:12.161
really , uh , in terms of capabilities

40:12.161 --> 40:14.050
that came out of yesterday was of

40:14.050 --> 40:16.490
course the decision to help the

40:16.490 --> 40:19.060
Australian Navy acquire nuclear

40:19.060 --> 40:21.500
submarines . But as part of the meeting

40:21.500 --> 40:23.611
yesterday , they talked about a range

40:23.611 --> 40:25.778
of other types of capabilities that we

40:25.778 --> 40:27.889
might want to continue to pursue with

40:27.889 --> 40:30.056
Australia . But um , those discussions

40:30.056 --> 40:32.167
are , are really just starting . Uh ,

40:32.167 --> 40:34.333
and again , these are going to be uh ,

40:34.333 --> 40:37.210
bilateral decisions made by both the

40:37.210 --> 40:39.099
United States and Australia going

40:39.099 --> 40:41.154
forward outside of Aucas . Of course

40:41.154 --> 40:43.266
the great Britain will be involved in

40:43.266 --> 40:45.432
in august related things as well . But

40:45.432 --> 40:47.321
my point is , these are sovereign

40:47.321 --> 40:49.543
decisions that these nation states have

40:49.543 --> 40:51.432
to make and and I just don't have

40:51.432 --> 40:51.100
anything additional to to read out

40:51.100 --> 40:53.100
today , Tony , thank you , john , I

40:53.100 --> 40:55.156
have two separate questions . So the

40:55.156 --> 40:58.690
first one is on the 26th 29th attack .

40:58.710 --> 41:01.630
As General Mackenzie upset the

41:01.640 --> 41:04.860
statement from centcom on that day . At

41:04.860 --> 41:07.027
the end , it mentioned the possibility

41:07.027 --> 41:09.310
of civilian casualties . So I'm still

41:09.320 --> 41:13.060
wondering why General Milley on

41:13.060 --> 41:16.870
september 1st , still called this , uh ,

41:16.880 --> 41:19.102
this strike graduate righteous attack .

41:19.102 --> 41:21.324
I think General Mackenzie answered that

41:21.324 --> 41:23.436
question quite well Freddie , I'm not

41:23.436 --> 41:25.570
sure that I can add to that . I'm not

41:25.570 --> 41:27.626
going to speak for Chairman Millie .

41:27.626 --> 41:31.250
But As you saw from General

41:31.250 --> 41:33.280
Mackenzie within 24 hours of an

41:33.280 --> 41:35.391
indication that there could have been

41:35.391 --> 41:37.447
civilian casualties . He launched an

41:37.447 --> 41:39.613
investigation as is his responsibility

41:39.613 --> 41:41.830
And he just completed it and they did

41:41.830 --> 41:44.800
it fairly quickly . But I think they

41:44.800 --> 41:46.750
wanted to take the time to be as

41:46.750 --> 41:48.917
contextual as possible . So I think he

41:48.917 --> 41:50.972
already spoke to that . But you said

41:50.972 --> 41:53.570
within 24 hours , but general nearly

41:53.580 --> 41:56.060
came on September one . That's more

41:56.060 --> 41:59.120
than 24 hours . Again , again , I'm not

41:59.120 --> 42:02.160
gonna I'm not gonna relitigate the past

42:02.160 --> 42:05.770
statements here . Uh as General

42:05.770 --> 42:08.900
Mackenzie mentioned every leader in the

42:08.900 --> 42:11.080
department that spoke to this in the

42:11.080 --> 42:13.970
moment that it was spoken to was

42:13.980 --> 42:16.250
speaking to you in good faith based on

42:16.250 --> 42:18.360
the information that we had and that

42:18.360 --> 42:20.527
includes me , by the way , things that

42:20.527 --> 42:22.749
I said obviously have not turned out to

42:22.749 --> 42:26.740
be correct , but it was done uh

42:26.750 --> 42:28.972
in as good faith and effort as possible

42:28.972 --> 42:31.083
to be as transparent as we could with

42:31.083 --> 42:33.306
what we knew at the time . Obviously we

42:33.306 --> 42:35.450
now know more things and different

42:35.450 --> 42:37.617
things that has completely changed the

42:37.617 --> 42:40.020
character of the strike . And again ,

42:40.500 --> 42:42.222
we're trying to be as open and

42:42.222 --> 42:44.167
transparent as we can when we know

42:44.167 --> 42:46.167
things on august which seems France

42:46.167 --> 42:48.389
just recalled its ambassador to the U .

42:48.389 --> 42:51.530
S . Um And this is the fallout from the

42:51.540 --> 42:54.700
submarine issue . So when you're in the

42:54.700 --> 42:56.422
department , you know that the

42:56.422 --> 42:58.930
government effort to bolster uh

42:59.400 --> 43:01.456
Australia's defenses and the and the

43:01.456 --> 43:04.810
pacific strategy to counter china .

43:05.200 --> 43:07.920
Um It seems you're having growing issue

43:07.920 --> 43:10.090
with France . How concerned are you

43:10.100 --> 43:12.260
first about the future of defense

43:12.260 --> 43:14.470
cooperation with France ? And was the

43:14.470 --> 43:17.660
french government notified ahead of

43:17.660 --> 43:20.970
time of this movie ? Senior Minister uh

43:20.980 --> 43:22.702
Straight senior administration

43:22.702 --> 43:24.924
officials have been in touch with their

43:24.924 --> 43:27.580
french counterparts to discuss uh this

43:27.580 --> 43:29.620
arrangement uh including before the

43:29.620 --> 43:32.360
announcement . Um The secretary spoke

43:32.360 --> 43:34.590
with the french Minister Defense this

43:34.590 --> 43:38.010
morning . Um and uh and

43:38.500 --> 43:41.220
I won't characterize the french side of

43:41.220 --> 43:44.460
course , but uh it was clear from the

43:44.460 --> 43:46.460
discussion that there is still much

43:46.460 --> 43:48.404
work to do in terms of our defence

43:48.404 --> 43:50.900
relationship with with France . I mean

43:50.910 --> 43:53.800
more things to work on uh that there

43:53.800 --> 43:56.550
are uh that there are opportunities um

43:56.550 --> 43:58.383
and shared challenges and shared

43:58.383 --> 44:01.110
interests that both ministers uh

44:01.120 --> 44:04.390
committed to continue to explore . Um

44:04.400 --> 44:08.080
And there's as the President said ,

44:08.080 --> 44:10.560
there's no regional divide that uh

44:10.570 --> 44:12.792
separates the interests of our atlantic

44:12.792 --> 44:15.220
and pacific partners um ensuring a free

44:15.220 --> 44:17.280
and open indo pacific is a shared

44:17.280 --> 44:19.447
interest between the United States and

44:19.447 --> 44:21.558
europe and we will continue our close

44:21.558 --> 44:23.613
cooperation with NATO and the EU and

44:23.613 --> 44:25.780
other partners uh that that kind of an

44:25.780 --> 44:29.310
endeavor . Okay , um the Australia . I

44:29.310 --> 44:31.366
want to have a follow up there going

44:31.366 --> 44:33.310
forward . Now . What role with the

44:33.310 --> 44:35.088
pentagon and the Navy play with

44:35.088 --> 44:37.440
Australia in terms of smoothing the way

44:37.440 --> 44:39.218
for the introduction of nuclear

44:39.218 --> 44:41.329
submarines . You know , they're gonna

44:41.329 --> 44:43.551
buy diesel subs now . They're gonna buy

44:43.551 --> 44:45.662
nukes over the next 10 months or so .

44:45.662 --> 44:45.630
What's going to happen ? What's the

44:45.630 --> 44:47.963
role of the Defense Department and Navy ?

44:47.963 --> 44:50.074
Yeah , Tony . Obviously we're still ,

44:50.074 --> 44:52.074
we're gonna be putting together the

44:52.074 --> 44:54.130
framework of what this is gonna look

44:54.130 --> 44:53.870
like this process going forward . But I

44:53.870 --> 44:56.092
think you can obviously expect that the

44:56.092 --> 44:58.670
United States Navy uh and Navy nuclear

44:58.670 --> 45:01.530
reactors will be very much involved in

45:01.530 --> 45:03.700
helping with the acquisition of this

45:03.700 --> 45:05.811
capability . Are there any particular

45:05.811 --> 45:07.922
questions that need to be answered to

45:07.922 --> 45:10.144
the Navy satisfaction ? But Australia's

45:10.144 --> 45:12.311
capability to build nuclear submarines

45:12.311 --> 45:14.590
are having contractors ? Yeah , I don't

45:14.590 --> 45:16.757
think all that's been worked out right

45:16.757 --> 45:18.979
now , Tony . But yes , there's a lot of

45:18.979 --> 45:18.960
questions that have to be answered here

45:18.960 --> 45:21.230
then this is uh , this is a significant

45:21.230 --> 45:23.470
undertaking and it will add significant

45:23.470 --> 45:25.970
capability to the Australian Navy uh as

45:25.970 --> 45:28.270
well as reach . Uh and there's gonna be

45:28.270 --> 45:30.103
a lot of questions and technical

45:30.103 --> 45:32.159
details that have to be worked out .

45:32.159 --> 45:34.326
But to your first question of course ,

45:34.326 --> 45:33.890
the United States Navy and Navy nuclear

45:33.890 --> 45:37.220
actors will be very much involved . And

45:37.230 --> 45:39.174
it takes you a million questions .

45:39.174 --> 45:40.897
General Milley question of the

45:40.897 --> 45:42.730
controversy with the book is the

45:42.730 --> 45:44.619
department of the defense mulling

45:44.619 --> 45:46.674
reviewing and releasing and redacted

45:46.674 --> 45:50.470
form the transcripts or classified

45:50.470 --> 45:52.960
notes of the mili china conversations

45:52.960 --> 45:55.016
that were leaked to the Woodward for

45:55.016 --> 45:56.960
his book and he thought about just

45:56.960 --> 45:59.182
releasing them like the White House did

45:59.182 --> 46:01.300
last year with the trump president of

46:01.300 --> 46:03.420
Ukraine transcript . I know no such

46:03.420 --> 46:05.531
plans to do that and I'd refer you to

46:05.531 --> 46:08.760
the joint staff to speak to uh whatever

46:08.760 --> 46:11.450
notes they might have on a counterpart

46:11.450 --> 46:13.830
call that the chairman conducted . I

46:13.840 --> 46:16.062
think I got to get to the phones here ,

46:16.062 --> 46:18.284
jennifer , are you still there ? Yeah ,

46:18.284 --> 46:20.451
I am . Thank you about the Afghanistan

46:20.451 --> 46:22.507
refugee situation on bases . Are you

46:22.507 --> 46:24.618
still monitoring and you know of more

46:24.618 --> 46:26.729
measles or other communicable disease

46:26.729 --> 46:28.951
cases . And are you obligated to report

46:28.951 --> 46:31.007
those at least domestically to local

46:31.007 --> 46:33.229
health officials ? Well , we're working

46:33.229 --> 46:35.396
with HHS very closely . So of course ,

46:35.396 --> 46:37.396
uh , if , if we find any additional

46:37.396 --> 46:39.930
cases , we certainly are keeping HHS

46:39.930 --> 46:42.830
informed and we're obviously uh ,

46:42.840 --> 46:45.550
making sure that to the degree there

46:45.550 --> 46:48.870
are any cases on domestic bases that

46:48.880 --> 46:50.936
are based commanders and people that

46:50.936 --> 46:52.936
work in uh , and families that live

46:52.936 --> 46:55.090
there are kept abreast . I don't have

46:55.090 --> 46:57.034
any additional updates in terms of

46:57.034 --> 46:59.870
additional cases to report out to today .

46:59.870 --> 47:02.180
But again we still remain in a pause

47:02.190 --> 47:05.900
for flights uh , coming from any of the

47:05.900 --> 47:07.844
lily pad locations overseas to the

47:07.844 --> 47:09.900
United States as we continue to work

47:09.900 --> 47:12.122
this out with HHS Megan . So all of the

47:12.122 --> 47:14.289
services have released their mandatory

47:14.289 --> 47:16.400
covid vaccination policies . The army

47:16.400 --> 47:18.511
is giving itself at least its reserve

47:18.511 --> 47:20.622
and National Guard components through

47:20.622 --> 47:22.956
the end of june to get fully vaccinated .

47:22.956 --> 47:25.011
Does the secretary have any concerns

47:25.011 --> 47:27.011
about that long of a timeline given

47:27.280 --> 47:29.400
that there's been a surge in the past

47:29.400 --> 47:31.511
month or so of military deaths in the

47:31.511 --> 47:33.567
bulk of military deaths have been in

47:33.567 --> 47:35.844
army reservists and National guardsmen .

47:35.844 --> 47:37.844
Secretary has made it clear that he

47:37.844 --> 47:39.970
expects the services to move out as

47:39.980 --> 47:41.869
energetically as they can on this

47:41.869 --> 47:44.480
because he is concerned about the rise

47:44.490 --> 47:47.310
in deaths and the impact that the delta

47:47.310 --> 47:49.421
variant has had on the force . That's

47:49.421 --> 47:51.588
one of the driving reasons why he went

47:51.588 --> 47:54.320
to a mandatory regimen for in this case

47:54.320 --> 47:57.590
the Pfizer vaccine . He spoke to the

47:57.980 --> 48:00.202
service secretaries just a few days ago

48:00.202 --> 48:02.424
about this very topic and they reported

48:02.424 --> 48:04.369
out to him their progress and what

48:04.369 --> 48:06.536
their implementation guidelines were .

48:06.536 --> 48:08.591
He's satisfied that they are working

48:08.591 --> 48:10.702
hard enough and fast enough to try to

48:10.702 --> 48:12.647
improve the vaccination population

48:12.647 --> 48:14.813
inside each of the services . But it's

48:14.813 --> 48:17.036
not something that he's just gonna lose

48:17.036 --> 48:19.091
focus on . He's going to continue to

48:19.091 --> 48:21.147
engage with the services continue to

48:21.147 --> 48:20.450
get updates . And certainly if the

48:20.450 --> 48:23.130
secretary feels like a change in

48:23.130 --> 48:25.352
implementation needs to occur in anyone

48:25.352 --> 48:27.463
service based on whatever the data is

48:27.463 --> 48:30.180
or what the rate of infection is .

48:30.190 --> 48:32.412
Certainly the rate of deaths . I mean ,

48:32.412 --> 48:34.600
he will absolutely do that . Yeah . Is

48:34.600 --> 48:37.190
the secretary satisfied with the where

48:37.190 --> 48:39.090
the authorities are right now to

48:39.090 --> 48:41.090
conduct any further strikes against

48:41.090 --> 48:43.790
ISIS K . In Afghanistan or given what's

48:43.800 --> 48:46.000
been uncovered here ? Is there some

48:46.000 --> 48:48.111
thought to kind of raise elevating uh

48:48.120 --> 48:50.453
the ability to authorize another strike ?

48:50.470 --> 48:52.526
Well , without getting into specific

48:52.526 --> 48:55.770
decisions on authorities ? Uh I know

48:55.770 --> 48:58.620
that he has had conversations with

48:58.630 --> 49:00.574
General Mackenzie and with General

49:00.574 --> 49:02.519
Milley about the authorities going

49:02.519 --> 49:04.574
forward and I can tell you that with

49:04.574 --> 49:06.408
respect to the authorities going

49:06.408 --> 49:08.630
forward , particularly in Afghanistan .

49:08.630 --> 49:08.290
Yes , the secretary is very comfortable

49:08.290 --> 49:10.880
as what the arrangement is . Secondly ,

49:10.880 --> 49:13.380
as I announced at the top there in this

49:13.380 --> 49:15.324
review that he has ordered on this

49:15.324 --> 49:17.547
particular investigation . He does want

49:17.547 --> 49:20.600
uh the review to factor in any changes

49:20.600 --> 49:22.420
in procedures , processes and

49:22.420 --> 49:24.642
authorities for strikes going forward .

49:24.642 --> 49:26.976
That might be that might be recommended .

49:26.976 --> 49:29.142
So it's going to be part of the review

49:29.142 --> 49:33.110
Yes . On august the submarines , long

49:33.110 --> 49:35.332
range missiles , the rotations of air ,

49:35.332 --> 49:38.090
sea and naval forces . What is it about

49:38.090 --> 49:40.034
the deployment and the rotation of

49:40.034 --> 49:42.257
these forces ? That's going to help the

49:42.257 --> 49:44.368
US achieve its strategic goals in the

49:44.368 --> 49:47.090
end of pacific , it's not about just

49:47.090 --> 49:49.870
achieving U . S . Goals in the indo

49:49.870 --> 49:51.926
pacific , it's about . And you heard

49:51.926 --> 49:53.703
the Secretary talked about this

49:53.703 --> 49:55.703
yesterday . It's about uh improving

49:55.703 --> 49:57.703
what he calls integrated deterrence

49:57.703 --> 50:00.600
which is really about being able to in

50:00.600 --> 50:03.640
a networked way uh improve

50:03.650 --> 50:07.480
the capabilities of not just all the

50:07.480 --> 50:10.160
joint force but our allies and partners

50:10.160 --> 50:13.100
as well . Uh And as he said , this will

50:13.110 --> 50:16.180
improve the Australian Navy's reach and

50:16.180 --> 50:18.370
it will improve their capability . Um

50:18.370 --> 50:20.400
and in a highly contested security

50:20.400 --> 50:22.456
environment , as we have seen in the

50:22.456 --> 50:24.567
indo pacific . The Secretary believes

50:24.567 --> 50:26.789
the United States believes that this is

50:26.789 --> 50:29.820
a worthwhile endeavor . Yeah . Or on

50:29.820 --> 50:32.040
the National Guard was the initial

50:32.040 --> 50:34.151
request that came in from the capitol

50:34.151 --> 50:36.990
police to include arms national

50:36.990 --> 50:39.212
guardsmen . And was that something that

50:39.212 --> 50:41.323
was considered ? Yeah , I've seen the

50:41.323 --> 50:43.379
press reporting on this matter . I'm

50:43.379 --> 50:43.270
not going to get into the sausage

50:43.270 --> 50:45.660
making process . What I can tell you is

50:45.660 --> 50:48.070
that we did approve an official request

50:48.070 --> 50:51.140
for a physical security task force and

50:51.140 --> 50:53.830
they will be at the armory and they

50:53.830 --> 50:56.240
will be unarmed , strictly unarmed .

50:57.260 --> 50:58.990
Okay , thanks everybody appreciate it .