WEBVTT 00:00.040 --> 00:03.440 make it so turbulent . Yeah , thank you . 00:03.440 --> 00:05.800 Chairman and Director Hanes . Director 00:05.800 --> 00:08.590 Burns and general barrier . I think 00:08.590 --> 00:10.812 this is the first time the three of you 00:10.812 --> 00:12.646 have appeared at this particular 00:12.646 --> 00:14.701 hearing and certainly we're glad and 00:14.701 --> 00:18.060 grateful to have all of you here . Um 00:18.440 --> 00:20.496 Director Hanes , let's talk a little 00:20.496 --> 00:22.384 bit you and I've talked about the 00:22.384 --> 00:26.280 overhead architecture issues . The part 00:26.280 --> 00:30.150 of the development of how you use AI is , 00:30.160 --> 00:32.030 how much information you have to 00:32.030 --> 00:34.510 continually train on . We may talk 00:34.510 --> 00:36.880 about that later this afternoon , but 00:36.880 --> 00:39.650 for right now the Chinese have 00:39.660 --> 00:42.460 announced public plans for 138 00:42.940 --> 00:46.010 satellite commercial constellations 00:46.540 --> 00:50.440 um that can image around the globe 00:50.440 --> 00:54.060 every 10 minutes . How big a 00:54.060 --> 00:57.030 risk is that for us and what we do to 00:57.030 --> 01:00.250 enhance our own diversity of by 01:00.250 --> 01:02.540 expanding the number and the diversity 01:02.540 --> 01:05.000 of the satellites we have up there 01:05.000 --> 01:06.850 providing constant information , 01:06.850 --> 01:09.360 commercial and non commercial . 01:12.640 --> 01:15.040 Thank you senator . I think uh , it may 01:15.040 --> 01:17.207 be useful to have a further discussion 01:17.207 --> 01:19.429 about this uh , in closed session , but 01:19.429 --> 01:21.540 I think there's just no question as a 01:21.540 --> 01:24.250 general matter that china is focused on 01:24.640 --> 01:28.430 achieving leadership in space in effect , 01:28.440 --> 01:30.620 as compared to the United States and 01:30.620 --> 01:32.731 has been working hard on a variety of 01:32.731 --> 01:35.040 different , uh , you know , efforts in 01:35.040 --> 01:38.780 this area to try to contest what has 01:38.780 --> 01:40.891 been presumed our leadership in these 01:40.891 --> 01:43.002 areas . And I think for the details , 01:43.002 --> 01:45.280 let's discuss in closed session . Well , 01:45.280 --> 01:47.502 I think we want to , I think we want to 01:47.502 --> 01:49.669 do that and look at both the diversity 01:49.669 --> 01:51.669 of what we have up there and how it 01:51.669 --> 01:53.724 competes with what they'll have on a 01:53.724 --> 01:55.780 really different question . Director 01:55.780 --> 01:58.850 Burns , you have extensive personal 01:58.860 --> 02:01.980 knowledge and experience with , with 02:01.980 --> 02:04.990 Putin . How do you assess what he's 02:04.990 --> 02:08.580 doing right now , uh , near and in the 02:08.580 --> 02:11.880 eastern Ukraine and the impact that 02:11.890 --> 02:14.280 that may have ? Is this an actual 02:14.280 --> 02:16.740 movement ? Do we think it's a bluff to 02:16.750 --> 02:19.300 try to get concessions ? A little of 02:19.300 --> 02:21.540 both ? What what do you think about the 02:21.540 --> 02:24.000 Putin actions right now as it relates 02:24.000 --> 02:27.060 to Ukraine ? Well , senator , thanks 02:27.060 --> 02:29.282 for the question . I think as I said in 02:29.282 --> 02:31.338 my confirmation hearing , most of my 02:31.338 --> 02:33.504 white hair came from serving in Russia 02:33.504 --> 02:35.560 and dealing with Putin's Russia over 02:35.560 --> 02:37.671 the years . So one thing I've learned 02:37.671 --> 02:40.004 is not to underestimate , um , you know , 02:40.004 --> 02:42.116 the ways in which President Putin and 02:42.116 --> 02:44.393 the Russian leadership , um , you know , 02:44.393 --> 02:46.560 can throw its weight around . Um , I I 02:46.560 --> 02:48.393 think , and I'll turn to general 02:48.393 --> 02:50.616 barrier about this in in a moment . But 02:50.616 --> 02:52.449 you know , I think obviously the 02:52.449 --> 02:54.671 Russian military build up in Crimea and 02:54.671 --> 02:56.782 um alongside the border of the Donbas 02:56.782 --> 03:00.720 is a serious concern . I think it could 03:00.720 --> 03:02.942 be a combination of the things that you 03:02.942 --> 03:05.410 mentioned , signaling a way of trying 03:05.410 --> 03:07.577 to intimidate the Ukrainian leadership 03:07.577 --> 03:09.799 signals to the United States . But also 03:09.799 --> 03:12.590 that build up has has reached the point 03:12.590 --> 03:14.423 where , you know , we also could 03:14.423 --> 03:16.640 provide the basis for limited military 03:16.640 --> 03:18.473 incursions as well . And so it's 03:18.473 --> 03:20.529 something not only the United States 03:20.529 --> 03:22.584 but also our allies has to take very 03:22.584 --> 03:24.696 seriously . And I know Director Hanes 03:24.696 --> 03:26.973 and I and others have been involved in , 03:26.973 --> 03:29.029 you know , a number of briefings and 03:29.029 --> 03:31.251 conversations with our allies as well , 03:31.251 --> 03:33.362 so that we're sharing information and 03:33.362 --> 03:35.529 they share that same concern . I think 03:35.529 --> 03:37.529 that we have as well . And that was 03:37.529 --> 03:39.696 part of the purpose of the President's 03:39.696 --> 03:41.807 call yesterday to President Putin was 03:41.807 --> 03:43.418 to register very clearly the 03:43.418 --> 03:45.610 seriousness of our concern . But we'll 03:45.620 --> 03:47.787 probably talk about that more later to 03:47.787 --> 03:49.953 general barrier . What's your sense of 03:49.953 --> 03:51.953 of what's happening there ? And the 03:51.953 --> 03:53.898 concerns we should have about it . 03:53.898 --> 03:55.953 Senator working with our partners in 03:55.953 --> 03:58.176 joint staff J two european command NATO 03:58.176 --> 04:00.470 and our key five eyes partners , the 04:00.470 --> 04:02.960 Russians have positioned themselves to 04:02.970 --> 04:05.081 give themselves options . So as we've 04:05.081 --> 04:07.900 watched that build up of forces , they 04:07.900 --> 04:10.011 could actually be going into a series 04:10.011 --> 04:12.850 of exercises starting at any time . Or 04:12.850 --> 04:14.961 they could , if they chose to perhaps 04:14.961 --> 04:17.072 do a limited objective attacks , they 04:17.072 --> 04:19.183 may they may take that option . We we 04:19.183 --> 04:21.517 don't know what the intent is right now . 04:21.517 --> 04:23.517 I agree with Director Burns and his 04:23.517 --> 04:25.628 assessment of that and we can go into 04:25.628 --> 04:25.300 more detail in closed session . Let me 04:25.300 --> 04:27.189 see if I get one more question in 04:27.189 --> 04:29.189 general barry , We we know that our 04:29.189 --> 04:31.730 adversaries and no matter what level of 04:31.740 --> 04:34.070 involvement they had in the pandemic , 04:34.080 --> 04:37.320 can see now the impact that has on a 04:37.320 --> 04:39.790 big open free society like ours , but 04:39.790 --> 04:43.070 they also can see the impact it has on 04:43.080 --> 04:45.136 the military . Look what happened on 04:45.136 --> 04:48.000 the USs , Theodore Roosevelt and in 04:48.010 --> 04:50.420 other places . What are we thinking 04:50.420 --> 04:53.510 about as a potential way we'd we'd 04:53.520 --> 04:56.460 respond to similar circumstances . 04:56.940 --> 04:59.051 Certainly the point of view , Senator 04:59.051 --> 05:01.218 the pandemic has has given us insights 05:01.218 --> 05:03.740 on how we can do our jobs better should 05:03.740 --> 05:05.740 this happen again in terms of uh 05:05.750 --> 05:08.850 readiness of our key uh adversaries 05:08.850 --> 05:10.906 that we watch . I think initially it 05:10.906 --> 05:13.017 did have an impact on the writings of 05:13.017 --> 05:15.072 those forces , although they seem to 05:15.072 --> 05:17.072 have overcome that as an example of 05:17.072 --> 05:19.239 what we're seeing with the Russians in 05:19.239 --> 05:18.470 the Ukraine and Crimea right now does 05:18.470 --> 05:20.820 not appear to be impacted by Covid . 05:20.820 --> 05:22.931 And so we continue to watch that very 05:22.931 --> 05:25.410 carefully across across the spectrum of 05:25.420 --> 05:27.531 Foreign military intelligence . Thank 05:27.531 --> 05:29.698 you . Thank you . Chairman . I think a 05:29.698 --> 05:31.698 number of us are very interested in 05:31.698 --> 05:31.530 Senator bunch questions about Ukraine . 05:31.530 --> 05:33.808 We look forward to that this afternoon . 05:33.808 --> 05:36.260 Senator Bennett , thank you Mr Chairman 05:36.260 --> 05:38.538 and thank you all for being here today . 05:38.538 --> 05:40.600 I really appreciate it in the annual 05:40.600 --> 05:43.360 threat assessment . Director Hanes you 05:43.360 --> 05:45.700 wrote that Beijing is working to match 05:45.700 --> 05:48.020 or exceed U . S . Capabilities in space 05:48.020 --> 05:50.360 to gain the military economic and 05:50.360 --> 05:52.740 prestige benefits that Washington has 05:52.740 --> 05:54.940 accrued from space leadership . You 05:54.940 --> 05:57.590 also wrote that china has counter space 05:57.590 --> 05:59.850 weapons capabilities intended to target 05:59.850 --> 06:02.710 us and allied um satellites . In 06:02.710 --> 06:04.590 december of 2020 . U . S . Space 06:04.590 --> 06:06.790 Command said that Russia conducted a 06:06.790 --> 06:09.600 test of a direct anti satellite missile 06:09.600 --> 06:12.030 which if tested on actual satellite or 06:12.030 --> 06:14.410 used operationally would cause a large 06:14.410 --> 06:17.050 debris field that could endanger a 06:17.060 --> 06:19.171 commercial satellites and pollute the 06:19.171 --> 06:21.116 space . To me . Could you tell the 06:21.116 --> 06:23.171 american people what we are doing to 06:23.171 --> 06:26.150 maintain our superiority in space and 06:26.150 --> 06:28.317 what the role of the private sector is 06:28.317 --> 06:29.317 in doing that ? 06:32.640 --> 06:35.430 Thank you senator . I would say that 06:35.440 --> 06:37.107 obviously will have a further 06:37.107 --> 06:40.300 discussion in closed session , but the 06:40.300 --> 06:42.022 private sector has just become 06:42.022 --> 06:44.530 increasingly important in our efforts 06:44.530 --> 06:47.960 to contest and and to work essentially 06:47.960 --> 06:51.410 against um uh consultations to our 06:51.410 --> 06:54.350 leadership in space . Excuse me . Mm . 06:57.640 --> 06:59.890 But what I can say is that we have been 06:59.900 --> 07:02.050 working very hard to ensure that the 07:02.050 --> 07:04.420 policy community understands and that 07:04.420 --> 07:06.660 obviously we support space force in its 07:06.660 --> 07:09.920 work to promote in effect us leadership 07:09.920 --> 07:12.120 in space . And it's been an area where 07:12.120 --> 07:14.270 we benefit , as we've indicated 07:14.280 --> 07:16.200 economically , from a security 07:16.200 --> 07:18.560 perspective , from a communications 07:18.560 --> 07:21.320 perspective and from the perspective of 07:21.320 --> 07:23.320 just understanding and intelligence 07:23.320 --> 07:25.542 perspective and all of those things are 07:25.542 --> 07:27.653 areas where we want to ensure that we 07:27.653 --> 07:29.876 continue us leadership in this area And 07:29.876 --> 07:31.820 we'll get into further detail look 07:31.820 --> 07:33.820 forward to our conversation later , 07:33.820 --> 07:35.653 Director Burns , uh According to 07:35.653 --> 07:37.709 Freedom House , democracy around the 07:37.709 --> 07:39.876 world has been in retreat for 15 years 07:39.940 --> 07:42.420 Against authoritarianism , and we know 07:42.420 --> 07:44.476 that countries like China and Russia 07:44.476 --> 07:46.642 want nothing more to continue that for 07:46.642 --> 07:48.698 another 15 years or maybe another 50 07:48.698 --> 07:51.320 years . How do you assess the primary 07:51.320 --> 07:53.487 that's threats to democracy around the 07:53.487 --> 07:56.030 world ? In which regions have we seen 07:56.030 --> 07:58.410 the most significant democratic 07:58.420 --> 08:00.810 retreats ? Which regions do you 08:00.810 --> 08:02.880 consider most at risk ? And how our 08:02.880 --> 08:05.320 adversaries thinking about this . 08:05.740 --> 08:08.120 Thanks . I probably should have called 08:08.120 --> 08:10.176 you Secretary Burns when I asked you 08:10.176 --> 08:12.398 this question , but I couldn't resist . 08:12.840 --> 08:15.130 Thanks Senator very much . Um well , I 08:15.130 --> 08:18.490 think the problem of erosion of 08:18.500 --> 08:20.611 democracies , as Freedom House points 08:20.611 --> 08:22.890 out is a very real one in many parts of 08:22.890 --> 08:25.112 the world . Those that have established 08:25.112 --> 08:27.390 democracies and those where , you know , 08:27.390 --> 08:29.668 democratic governance is quite fragile . 08:29.668 --> 08:31.557 That has partly to do . I think , 08:31.557 --> 08:33.650 across the board with , you know , 08:33.660 --> 08:35.600 questions about the ability of 08:35.600 --> 08:37.880 democratic governance to deliver . I 08:37.880 --> 08:39.991 think you've seen some of that in our 08:39.991 --> 08:41.824 own country in recent years , we 08:41.824 --> 08:43.991 haven't been immune from that at all . 08:43.991 --> 08:46.047 So the challenge , and I think , you 08:46.047 --> 08:48.158 know , President biden has emphasized 08:48.158 --> 08:50.102 this is um you know , working with 08:50.102 --> 08:52.158 other democracies , and I say this , 08:52.158 --> 08:54.380 you know , as an analytical judgment to 08:54.380 --> 08:56.547 help restore that faith in the ability 08:56.547 --> 08:58.769 of democratic governance to deliver for 08:58.769 --> 09:01.670 people that deprives authoritarian 09:01.670 --> 09:03.781 leadership , whether it's the chinese 09:03.781 --> 09:07.280 Communist Party were Vladimir Putin's 09:07.280 --> 09:09.600 Russia of an argument that they use 09:09.600 --> 09:12.150 that somehow authoritarian systems are 09:12.150 --> 09:15.200 better able to deliver . Um the reality 09:15.200 --> 09:16.978 is that there's a great deal of 09:16.978 --> 09:19.200 resilience and democratic systems , but 09:19.200 --> 09:21.610 it's important for all of us that have 09:21.620 --> 09:23.731 democratic governments to demonstrate 09:23.731 --> 09:25.620 that to renew ourselves . I think 09:25.620 --> 09:28.100 that's always found in in many years in 09:28.100 --> 09:29.930 my previous incarnation serving 09:29.930 --> 09:32.400 overseas , that we get a lot further 09:32.400 --> 09:34.511 through the power of our example than 09:34.511 --> 09:36.233 we do through the power of our 09:36.233 --> 09:38.456 preaching . And I think that's true for 09:38.456 --> 09:38.410 any democratic government around the 09:38.410 --> 09:40.790 world . The last thing I'd say is , you 09:40.790 --> 09:42.790 know , we've talked earlier in this 09:42.790 --> 09:45.012 discussion about the role of technology 09:45.012 --> 09:47.234 and I think that's also something to be 09:47.234 --> 09:48.790 very mindful of because the 09:48.790 --> 09:50.457 proliferation of surveillance 09:50.457 --> 09:52.512 technologies , for example , are one 09:52.512 --> 09:54.600 tool that authoritarians use to 09:54.600 --> 09:56.767 strengthen their grip and make it more 09:56.767 --> 09:59.170 difficult for democratic governance to 09:59.170 --> 10:01.337 emerge . And lots of fragile societies 10:01.337 --> 10:03.670 around the world . And in that context , 10:03.680 --> 10:07.600 Director Ray , uh fragile societies 10:07.600 --> 10:11.060 and and the risk as opposed to 10:11.060 --> 10:14.270 democracy . Um I wonder if you could 10:14.280 --> 10:16.570 share with the american people what you 10:16.570 --> 10:19.790 have learned about the intersection of 10:19.800 --> 10:23.150 social media platforms and domestic 10:23.150 --> 10:25.930 violent extremists and what the 10:25.930 --> 10:29.360 american people can do to be um 10:30.040 --> 10:33.390 to be more um canny 10:33.400 --> 10:35.980 users of those platforms , what what 10:35.980 --> 10:37.980 should they be on the lookout for ? 10:39.740 --> 10:43.690 So certainly social media has become in 10:43.690 --> 10:47.530 many ways the key amplifier to domestic 10:47.530 --> 10:49.752 violence extremism , just as it has for 10:49.752 --> 10:51.919 malign foreign influence , which we've 10:51.919 --> 10:53.919 discussed at great length with this 10:53.919 --> 10:56.140 committee as well . Uh It provides a 10:56.150 --> 10:58.261 level of the same things that attract 10:58.261 --> 11:00.780 people to it for good reasons are also 11:00.780 --> 11:03.670 capable of causing all kinds of harms 11:03.670 --> 11:05.614 that were entrusted with trying to 11:05.614 --> 11:08.400 protect american people against . So it 11:08.400 --> 11:10.178 creates speed , dissemination , 11:10.178 --> 11:12.710 efficiency . Accessibility referred to 11:12.710 --> 11:14.520 before a level of decentralized 11:14.520 --> 11:18.250 connectivity . Um I think I would say 11:18.260 --> 11:20.427 that both with respect to mind foreign 11:20.427 --> 11:23.280 influence and with respect to domestic 11:23.280 --> 11:26.400 violent extremism , uh people need to 11:26.400 --> 11:29.610 understand um better what the 11:29.610 --> 11:31.721 information is that they're reading a 11:31.721 --> 11:34.510 greater level of um discerning 11:34.510 --> 11:38.240 skepticism is a crucial 11:38.240 --> 11:40.240 ingredient not just to protect from 11:40.240 --> 11:42.129 foreign misinformation , but also 11:42.129 --> 11:44.690 violent extremism . There's all sorts 11:44.690 --> 11:47.350 of of stuff out there on the internet 11:47.940 --> 11:51.910 uh that poses as fact , which just 11:51.910 --> 11:54.120 isn't , and there is all kinds of 11:54.120 --> 11:55.953 connectivity between like minded 11:55.953 --> 11:57.898 individuals which blocks out other 11:57.898 --> 12:00.370 voices , which creates a sort of echo 12:00.370 --> 12:02.426 chamber effect . And then especially 12:02.426 --> 12:04.440 with the isolation caused by Covid 12:04.450 --> 12:08.080 increases our public susceptibility to 12:08.080 --> 12:10.080 some of the same kinds of ills that 12:10.080 --> 12:12.330 we've talked about at great length , so 12:12.330 --> 12:14.386 social media can bring great good to 12:14.386 --> 12:17.130 society , but it is also a platform for 12:17.130 --> 12:20.670 all kinds of security challenges that 12:20.670 --> 12:23.720 we're trying to counter . Thank you . 12:23.720 --> 12:25.331 Mr Chairman Senator Carney , 12:30.440 --> 12:32.660 General Doctor Sony in the recent 12:32.660 --> 12:34.740 hearing we had on the solar winds , 12:34.740 --> 12:38.380 hack . The issue of note 12:38.390 --> 12:41.590 of notification by victims of hacking 12:41.590 --> 12:44.130 was raised . And indeed , I believe 12:44.130 --> 12:47.050 Senator Collins has had as advocated 12:47.060 --> 12:48.782 for a long time and a piece of 12:48.782 --> 12:52.630 legislation that victims of 12:52.630 --> 12:56.500 cyber attack tax notified the federal 12:56.500 --> 12:58.600 government in some manner to provide 12:58.600 --> 13:00.490 context and complete knowledge of 13:00.560 --> 13:02.727 what's out there . It seems to me that 13:02.727 --> 13:04.727 otherwise , we're looking through a 13:04.727 --> 13:06.920 soda straw at some of the threats . Do 13:06.920 --> 13:09.500 you think requiring victims of cyber 13:09.500 --> 13:11.390 attacks in the United States , 13:11.400 --> 13:13.890 requiring them to notify the federal 13:13.890 --> 13:15.612 government in some way , maybe 13:15.612 --> 13:18.060 confidentially is a good idea , 13:20.040 --> 13:22.151 Senators , as we were discussing this 13:22.151 --> 13:24.470 morning , I think , to understand the 13:24.470 --> 13:26.581 depth and breadth of any intrusion in 13:26.581 --> 13:28.803 the United States , we're going to have 13:28.803 --> 13:30.637 to have some means upon which we 13:30.637 --> 13:32.748 understand what has taken place . And 13:32.748 --> 13:34.748 so obviously , the policymakers and 13:34.748 --> 13:36.970 yourselves , legislators will determine 13:36.970 --> 13:38.748 that . But I think that's a key 13:38.748 --> 13:40.803 component of it as well . That would 13:40.803 --> 13:42.914 help you in the cyber command and S a 13:42.914 --> 13:45.070 do a better job . Well , certainly 13:45.080 --> 13:47.302 within the United States responsibility 13:47.302 --> 13:49.136 obviously rests with the federal 13:49.136 --> 13:51.080 investigation . Right . I beg your 13:51.080 --> 13:53.413 pardon , Director Ray , what do you say ? 13:53.413 --> 13:56.410 So we were very , I think enthusiastic 13:56.410 --> 13:58.632 about the recommendation from the cyber 13:58.632 --> 14:00.854 Solarium Commission that speaks to this 14:00.854 --> 14:02.854 issue , as I mentioned before , the 14:02.854 --> 14:05.021 private sector controls so many of the 14:05.021 --> 14:08.180 dots on all manner of cyber threats . 14:08.190 --> 14:10.134 And it's important to think of the 14:10.134 --> 14:12.301 private sector , not just in one broad 14:12.301 --> 14:14.468 category , there's two big groups that 14:14.468 --> 14:16.690 are relevant to this issue and why they 14:16.690 --> 14:18.523 go straight to the heart of your 14:18.523 --> 14:20.690 question . I put them in two buckets , 14:20.690 --> 14:22.746 one , there's the providers , so the 14:22.746 --> 14:24.801 cybersecurity industry , the I . T . 14:24.801 --> 14:26.857 Industry etcetera . They have unique 14:26.857 --> 14:28.634 visibility into how adversaries 14:28.634 --> 14:30.950 traverse us networks and so making sure 14:30.950 --> 14:33.080 the glue is , there is critical . But 14:33.080 --> 14:35.080 then there's also the victims . The 14:35.080 --> 14:39.020 reality is that most offenders 14:39.020 --> 14:41.353 are going to come back to victims again . 14:41.353 --> 14:43.409 So most cyber actors are coming back 14:43.409 --> 14:45.520 and most victims are coming are going 14:45.520 --> 14:47.742 to be popping up again . You got repeat 14:47.742 --> 14:49.853 offenders and repeat victims . And so 14:49.853 --> 14:52.020 their hard drives , their logs , their 14:52.020 --> 14:55.140 servers provide key technical dots to 14:55.150 --> 14:57.261 whose compromising them , how they're 14:57.261 --> 14:59.317 being compromised . And then this is 14:59.317 --> 15:01.410 the key who might be targeted next . 15:01.420 --> 15:03.420 And that gets back to my point from 15:03.420 --> 15:05.920 before about why the private sector 15:05.930 --> 15:08.960 outreach is so important . One company 15:09.340 --> 15:12.170 reaching out to us promptly after 15:12.170 --> 15:15.210 they've been compromised means that all 15:15.210 --> 15:17.154 the rest of the companies that are 15:17.154 --> 15:19.154 likely to be the next ones hit , we 15:19.154 --> 15:21.266 might be able to get in front of it . 15:21.266 --> 15:23.432 And so if you think about the scale of 15:23.432 --> 15:25.766 the dots that are in the private sector , 15:25.766 --> 15:27.932 that's why I think that's the piece of 15:27.932 --> 15:27.860 this . It doesn't mean that there 15:27.860 --> 15:29.971 aren't other tweaks here and there in 15:29.971 --> 15:32.193 terms of authorities , administrative , 15:32.193 --> 15:34.416 subpoena authority , things like that . 15:34.416 --> 15:36.693 But ultimately , for the United States , 15:36.693 --> 15:38.416 which doesn't have state owned 15:38.416 --> 15:40.304 enterprises all over the place to 15:40.304 --> 15:42.193 protect against this problem , we 15:42.193 --> 15:44.027 really have to solve this public 15:44.027 --> 15:46.082 private partnership issue . Director 15:46.082 --> 15:48.770 Hanes the issue of supply chain 15:48.770 --> 15:51.010 vulnerability is high on Congress's 15:51.020 --> 15:53.380 agenda and certainly on everybody's 15:53.380 --> 15:56.880 mind . But I don't really have a clear 15:56.880 --> 16:00.060 understanding of how good a handle the 16:00.060 --> 16:02.580 intelligence community has on what 16:02.580 --> 16:04.691 those supply chains that are critical 16:04.691 --> 16:06.747 to our national security look like . 16:06.747 --> 16:09.560 And we clearly need the help of the , 16:11.040 --> 16:12.984 of the intelligence community help 16:12.984 --> 16:14.984 Congress , the policymakers sort of 16:14.984 --> 16:17.207 rack and stack what are the most urgent 16:17.207 --> 16:18.929 priorities . Semiconductors is 16:18.929 --> 16:20.929 certainly one that's on everybody's 16:20.929 --> 16:24.210 mind . But other do you think the 16:24.210 --> 16:26.099 Intelligence committee has a good 16:26.099 --> 16:28.220 handle on those ? So you could prior 16:28.230 --> 16:31.100 help Congress prioritize those so we 16:31.100 --> 16:32.767 can attack them from a policy 16:32.767 --> 16:35.910 perspective ? Yeah , I think frankly 16:35.910 --> 16:38.132 this is an area where we're doing a lot 16:38.132 --> 16:40.299 of work and as you indicate , I mean , 16:40.299 --> 16:40.040 semiconductors are the obvious one , 16:40.040 --> 16:42.207 but there are a lot of others . And as 16:42.207 --> 16:44.040 we've been working through , for 16:44.040 --> 16:46.207 example , rare earth elements or other 16:46.207 --> 16:48.520 key areas where , uh , you know , there 16:48.520 --> 16:51.210 may be a contestation in particular 16:51.220 --> 16:53.970 from other countries such as china to 16:53.980 --> 16:55.980 our ability to get access to things 16:55.980 --> 16:57.869 that are critical to our national 16:57.869 --> 16:59.980 security and where we need to promote 16:59.980 --> 17:01.869 an effort , in a sense , from the 17:01.869 --> 17:04.091 policy community to pay attention to it 17:04.091 --> 17:06.147 and to recognize where there are the 17:06.147 --> 17:08.369 vulnerabilities and how to address them 17:08.369 --> 17:10.900 for time . This is um , the piece that 17:10.900 --> 17:13.011 I find particularly interesting is to 17:13.011 --> 17:15.067 your point , how do you prioritize ? 17:15.067 --> 17:17.289 Because there's just an enormous amount 17:17.289 --> 17:19.511 of things that you could look at to say 17:19.511 --> 17:19.400 we need to have a resilient supply 17:19.400 --> 17:21.456 chain on and take action in order to 17:21.456 --> 17:23.567 promote . And we have been working to 17:23.567 --> 17:25.567 try to provide the policy community 17:25.567 --> 17:27.622 with as much information as possible 17:27.622 --> 17:29.733 about what the possibilities are in a 17:29.733 --> 17:31.844 sense , but ultimately there are some 17:31.844 --> 17:31.600 decisions to be made from the policy 17:31.600 --> 17:33.450 community about what are you 17:33.450 --> 17:35.450 prioritizing ? Where do you want to 17:35.450 --> 17:38.770 focus in a sense ? And we have been 17:38.770 --> 17:40.714 building up an infrastructure that 17:40.714 --> 17:42.937 allows us to then focus to sort of make 17:42.937 --> 17:45.159 sure that we can both track it but also 17:45.159 --> 17:47.820 provide kind of options for where you 17:47.820 --> 17:50.230 might be able to pull essentially , 17:50.240 --> 17:52.650 supplies from . That are not the ones 17:52.650 --> 17:54.761 that you are pulling in order to have 17:54.761 --> 17:56.706 that kind of resilience built in . 17:57.040 --> 17:59.360 Thank you Casey . Thank you . Mr . 17:59.360 --> 18:02.530 Chairman . I want to thank the all 18:02.530 --> 18:04.586 three directors and the two generals 18:04.586 --> 18:06.808 who are with us today and I commend you 18:06.808 --> 18:08.919 for your public service . I wanted to 18:08.919 --> 18:11.970 start with Director Hanes . Um , and 18:11.980 --> 18:14.050 probably most of my question or two 18:14.050 --> 18:16.770 would be directed at um 18:17.440 --> 18:20.450 Director Hanes , but certainly others 18:20.450 --> 18:23.240 may may have a view on the issues I'm 18:23.240 --> 18:25.407 raising . I want to talk in particular 18:25.407 --> 18:27.629 about supply chains , which we've heard 18:27.629 --> 18:30.900 a lot of this a lot about this year and 18:30.910 --> 18:33.900 this idea of outbound versus inbound 18:33.900 --> 18:36.700 investment by US companies in that 18:36.700 --> 18:40.620 context . We know that on March 19th 18:40.620 --> 18:43.190 the U . S . China Economic and Security 18:43.190 --> 18:45.740 Review Commission held a hearing to 18:45.740 --> 18:48.750 examine how U . S . Capital investment 18:48.750 --> 18:52.180 props up the chinese 18:52.180 --> 18:55.750 government's military civil fusion 18:55.750 --> 18:58.760 strategy and ultimately compromises U . 18:58.760 --> 19:01.790 S . National security . Some witnesses 19:01.790 --> 19:05.690 made reference to the the 19:05.690 --> 19:08.200 committee known by the acronym Sifi 19:08.200 --> 19:10.770 assess the Committee on Foreign 19:10.770 --> 19:14.250 Investment which for decades now has 19:14.250 --> 19:17.190 reviewed inbound investment , but 19:17.190 --> 19:19.670 there's nothing comparable for outbound 19:19.670 --> 19:22.950 investment in terms of review as to the 19:22.950 --> 19:24.950 national security implications of 19:25.440 --> 19:29.000 foreign investments um that are made 19:29.000 --> 19:31.260 overseas . So because we don't have 19:31.260 --> 19:34.570 that parallel mechanism in place to 19:34.570 --> 19:37.950 assess outsourcing by U . S . Companies , 19:38.340 --> 19:40.340 two countries of concern . We could 19:40.340 --> 19:42.560 have national security implications . 19:43.440 --> 19:45.607 I've been engaging with Senator Cornyn 19:45.607 --> 19:48.170 on this issue , on developing a similar 19:48.900 --> 19:51.290 inter agency committee to review 19:51.290 --> 19:54.840 outbound investment of what we call in 19:54.840 --> 19:56.673 the legislation . I'm working on 19:56.673 --> 20:00.080 critical capabilities , two foreign 20:00.330 --> 20:03.900 adversaries or um non market economies 20:03.900 --> 20:07.540 like china . So director hans maybe two 20:07.540 --> 20:09.400 initial questions . How does the 20:09.410 --> 20:12.260 currently , how does the uh the I . C . 20:12.260 --> 20:15.180 Work with its partners to assess and 20:15.180 --> 20:17.600 mitigate the activities of foreign 20:17.600 --> 20:19.770 intelligence services and other 20:19.770 --> 20:23.490 adversaries attempting to compromise US 20:23.490 --> 20:27.010 supply chains . Thank you , senator . 20:27.020 --> 20:30.910 So it's a very , really important 20:30.910 --> 20:33.110 and an interesting question , and I 20:33.110 --> 20:36.270 think , um just to maybe take them in 20:36.270 --> 20:39.030 parts so on the issue of outbound and 20:39.030 --> 20:41.252 outsourcing , how are we positioned ? I 20:41.252 --> 20:45.090 think , from my perspective , I've had , 20:45.100 --> 20:47.211 you know , a number of calls now with 20:47.211 --> 20:49.433 my counterparts and kind of coming into 20:49.433 --> 20:51.156 the job . I think you would be 20:51.156 --> 20:53.378 surprised by how many of them in allies 20:53.378 --> 20:55.044 and partnership countries are 20:55.044 --> 20:57.322 interested in talking about this issue . 20:57.322 --> 20:59.544 And one of the things that we are doing 20:59.544 --> 20:59.210 and throughout the intelligence 20:59.210 --> 21:01.377 community , and I think Director Burns 21:01.377 --> 21:03.654 may have some thoughts on this as well , 21:03.654 --> 21:06.070 is promoting conversations between our 21:06.070 --> 21:08.000 intelligence services in order to 21:08.000 --> 21:10.167 understand what they're seeing in this 21:10.167 --> 21:12.056 space as well , and being able to 21:12.056 --> 21:13.833 provide that therefore , to our 21:13.833 --> 21:16.056 policymakers here is what we are seeing 21:16.056 --> 21:18.278 with respect to these particular issues 21:18.278 --> 21:18.260 that we know are critical for supply 21:18.260 --> 21:20.260 chain issues and here's where we're 21:20.260 --> 21:22.038 seeing outsourcing and outbound 21:22.038 --> 21:23.982 investments and so on . The second 21:23.982 --> 21:26.093 thing that I think is interesting and 21:26.093 --> 21:28.093 you may already know this , but but 21:28.093 --> 21:31.170 we're certainly uh lifting it up in a 21:31.170 --> 21:33.281 sense is how many other countries are 21:33.281 --> 21:35.580 starting to do serious like processes . 21:35.580 --> 21:37.580 You'll see Canada has now got a law 21:37.580 --> 21:39.747 that effectively allows them to review 21:39.747 --> 21:41.636 investments or a variety of other 21:41.636 --> 21:43.913 countries that are starting to do this . 21:43.913 --> 21:46.136 And it's another reason for why I think 21:46.136 --> 21:45.910 our counterparts are talking to us 21:45.910 --> 21:47.743 about this issue because they're 21:47.743 --> 21:49.688 looking to figure out how does the 21:49.688 --> 21:51.910 intelligence community support RC peace 21:51.910 --> 21:54.077 process ? Are there ways in which they 21:54.077 --> 21:53.510 can do the same ? And I think that 21:53.510 --> 21:55.510 exchange of information can get too 21:55.510 --> 21:57.232 many of the issues that you're 21:57.232 --> 21:59.343 describing in the supply chain area , 21:59.343 --> 22:01.454 both on the inbound and outbound side 22:01.454 --> 22:03.621 of things . But let me see if director 22:03.621 --> 22:05.788 says anything . No , no , I absolutely 22:05.788 --> 22:05.700 agree . And I think there , you know , 22:05.700 --> 22:07.589 there are plenty of models on the 22:07.589 --> 22:09.478 outbound side that have worked in 22:09.478 --> 22:11.367 decades past as well where we can 22:11.367 --> 22:13.700 deepen our partnerships , um , you know , 22:13.700 --> 22:15.700 with other governments who not only 22:15.700 --> 22:17.644 have insights but also have a real 22:17.644 --> 22:19.811 stake in taking a very careful look at 22:19.811 --> 22:21.978 some of those outbound matters . Thank 22:21.978 --> 22:24.311 you . That's helpful . And just finally , 22:24.311 --> 22:26.367 the last question on this would be , 22:26.640 --> 22:30.000 does the I see view the chinese 22:30.000 --> 22:32.056 government chinese communist parties 22:32.410 --> 22:35.270 civil military fusion agenda as a risk 22:35.640 --> 22:37.770 currently to us supply chains 22:40.540 --> 22:43.000 senator . I mean , I think it is , 22:44.040 --> 22:46.151 there is no question that the chinese 22:46.151 --> 22:48.096 have an advantage in some respects 22:48.096 --> 22:50.096 through their civil military fusion 22:50.096 --> 22:52.318 approach to things they're capable as a 22:52.318 --> 22:54.318 consequence of directing and affect 22:54.318 --> 22:56.373 their private sector in ways that we 22:56.373 --> 22:58.596 simply do not do . And uh , and I think 22:58.596 --> 23:00.762 that provides a short term advantage , 23:00.762 --> 23:02.984 but I think it might be not a long term 23:02.984 --> 23:02.390 advantage in the sense that I think 23:02.390 --> 23:04.390 that the way we structure ourselves 23:04.390 --> 23:06.390 actually makes us capable of having 23:06.390 --> 23:08.168 some flexibility that over time 23:08.168 --> 23:10.168 sustains our private market in ways 23:10.168 --> 23:12.660 that the chinese don't have . Thank you . 23:13.040 --> 23:15.151 The voters started , but we are going 23:15.151 --> 23:16.873 to try to get Senator Sasse in 23:16.873 --> 23:19.040 Centerville Random Webex in before the 23:19.040 --> 23:21.262 end of the first . Center Sas thank you 23:21.262 --> 23:23.429 chairman thanks to the five of you for 23:23.429 --> 23:25.610 being here as well . Um the american 23:25.610 --> 23:27.860 people are blessed to have and I see 23:27.860 --> 23:30.040 that's as serious as ours is . We have 23:30.040 --> 23:33.410 a lot of uh gazillion patriots and some 23:33.420 --> 23:35.587 actual heroes in the community and the 23:35.587 --> 23:37.660 five of you care deeply about the 23:37.660 --> 23:39.771 mission and about leading those folks 23:39.771 --> 23:41.882 and celebrating them . So I just want 23:41.882 --> 23:43.882 to say um since most of our time in 23:43.882 --> 23:45.604 this committee has spent in an 23:45.604 --> 23:47.882 oversight capacity which is in private , 23:47.882 --> 23:50.104 we don't get the chance to say in front 23:50.104 --> 23:52.216 of the american people enough . Thank 23:52.216 --> 23:51.900 you to the entire intelligence 23:51.900 --> 23:54.067 community and particularly the five of 23:54.067 --> 23:56.233 you who are leaders , Director Hanes . 23:56.233 --> 23:58.400 I also want to praise your statement . 23:58.400 --> 24:00.567 I think that your opening statement on 24:00.567 --> 24:00.150 behalf of the whole community today was 24:00.150 --> 24:01.983 incredibly strong . Uh I want to 24:01.983 --> 24:04.039 highlight a couple of pieces , but I 24:04.039 --> 24:06.094 would admit that in a way , I'm just 24:06.094 --> 24:08.317 riffing on where chairman Warner opened 24:08.317 --> 24:10.206 that when you're doing around the 24:10.206 --> 24:12.372 world's threat around the world threat 24:12.372 --> 24:14.483 assessment of what the challenges are 24:14.483 --> 24:16.650 that we face . And I think marco , the 24:16.650 --> 24:18.706 vice chairman uh said something very 24:18.706 --> 24:20.817 similar when I think his his riff was 24:20.817 --> 24:22.928 more than 90% of all the intelligence 24:22.928 --> 24:25.094 and national security challenges . The 24:25.094 --> 24:27.261 american people and our troops uh face 24:27.261 --> 24:29.483 around the world . More than 90 of them 24:29.483 --> 24:31.650 originate in the five bad guy category 24:31.650 --> 24:34.250 of long term tech race with the Chinese 24:34.250 --> 24:36.930 Communist Party . Uh Russia sowing 24:36.930 --> 24:39.490 disinformation and corruption and cyber 24:39.490 --> 24:43.330 attacks abroad , uh Iranian nukes and 24:43.340 --> 24:45.562 sponsorship of terrorism abroad . North 24:45.562 --> 24:47.840 korean nukes and a grab bag of jihadis . 24:47.840 --> 24:49.890 Those five things are the five big 24:49.890 --> 24:51.946 threats we face there . There aren't 24:51.946 --> 24:53.946 too and there aren't really 20 that 24:53.946 --> 24:55.890 need to be on that top tier list . 24:55.890 --> 24:58.057 There are five . But one of the things 24:58.057 --> 25:00.112 that's new , I think in the last 4-6 25:00.112 --> 25:02.890 years it's a real consensus in your 25:02.890 --> 25:05.057 community and on this committee . In a 25:05.057 --> 25:06.834 bipartisan way that there is an 25:06.834 --> 25:08.890 unparalleled number one threat . The 25:08.890 --> 25:10.946 five things are not equal . The long 25:10.946 --> 25:13.168 term technology race we face with china 25:13.168 --> 25:15.320 is the biggest existential national 25:15.320 --> 25:17.431 security threat we face . And I think 25:17.431 --> 25:19.376 Chairman Warner did a great job of 25:19.376 --> 25:21.487 distinguishing between Chairman she's 25:21.540 --> 25:24.610 command and control tyrannical system 25:24.610 --> 25:26.910 and his party . But that's not the same 25:26.910 --> 25:29.077 as the chinese people . That's not the 25:29.077 --> 25:31.580 same as chinese expats . That's not the 25:31.580 --> 25:33.802 same as asian americans abroad . And we 25:33.802 --> 25:35.969 have two together the I . C . And this 25:35.969 --> 25:38.024 committee in a bipartisan way has to 25:38.024 --> 25:39.969 make sure we communicate again and 25:39.969 --> 25:42.191 again to the american people that there 25:42.191 --> 25:44.247 is one overarching national security 25:44.247 --> 25:46.310 threat we face . And it is not race 25:46.310 --> 25:49.380 based . Uh It is not chinese americans , 25:49.390 --> 25:52.130 it is Chairman Xi and his cronies and 25:52.130 --> 25:54.680 what they want to do to try to dominate 25:54.680 --> 25:58.190 the world and oppress people . Uh most 25:58.200 --> 26:00.550 acutely the wickers but lots and lots 26:00.550 --> 26:02.494 of people in their own country and 26:02.494 --> 26:04.661 abroad . And so I think it's important 26:04.661 --> 26:06.772 just to underscore some of the things 26:06.772 --> 26:08.828 Director Hanes you said on behalf of 26:08.828 --> 26:11.050 the entire community , you said uh that 26:11.050 --> 26:10.140 the threat we face from china is 26:10.140 --> 26:12.920 unparalleled . It's not the same as 26:12.930 --> 26:15.650 north Korea as as big a deal as that is . 26:15.650 --> 26:18.050 It's not the same as Russian uh , 26:18.060 --> 26:20.090 nefarious actions abroad . China is 26:20.090 --> 26:22.257 increasingly in your peer competitor . 26:22.257 --> 26:23.923 China will maintain its major 26:23.923 --> 26:25.868 innovation and industrial policies 26:25.868 --> 26:27.701 because chinese leaders see this 26:27.701 --> 26:29.646 strategy as necessary to reproduce 26:29.646 --> 26:31.701 dependence on foreign technologies , 26:31.701 --> 26:33.757 enable military advances and sustain 26:33.757 --> 26:35.757 economic growth and thus ensure the 26:35.757 --> 26:37.920 CCPS survival . Chairman , she is not 26:37.920 --> 26:40.142 about the good of his people , he's not 26:40.142 --> 26:42.253 about the good of 1.4 billion Chinese 26:42.253 --> 26:44.253 people . He's about the good of his 26:44.253 --> 26:46.309 party and the way they oppress their 26:46.309 --> 26:48.364 people . You also said that China is 26:48.364 --> 26:48.210 trying to promote new international 26:48.210 --> 26:50.432 norms for technology and human rights , 26:50.432 --> 26:52.099 emphasizing emphasizing state 26:52.099 --> 26:54.099 sovereignty and political stability 26:54.099 --> 26:56.266 over individual rights . You said that 26:56.266 --> 26:58.432 china will remain the top threat to us 26:58.432 --> 27:00.488 technological competitiveness as the 27:00.488 --> 27:02.432 CCP continues to target technology 27:02.432 --> 27:04.599 sectors , etcetera . So I think it was 27:04.599 --> 27:06.710 a very strong statement and as a part 27:06.710 --> 27:08.821 of what happens , the majority of not 27:08.821 --> 27:11.043 just our our committee's work , but the 27:11.043 --> 27:10.840 majority of this hearing is in private 27:10.840 --> 27:13.007 today , but as far as something we put 27:13.007 --> 27:15.173 before the american people , that's an 27:15.173 --> 27:17.340 incredibly strong opening statements I 27:17.340 --> 27:19.229 want to commend you and the whole 27:19.229 --> 27:19.060 interagency process that got it there . 27:19.240 --> 27:21.407 I'd like to follow up on your response 27:21.407 --> 27:23.640 though To Senator Casey's comment about 27:23.640 --> 27:25.696 the fact that in I'm putting a finer 27:25.696 --> 27:28.700 point on it . But in 2018 , Congress 27:28.700 --> 27:31.780 passed a new law about export controls . 27:31.790 --> 27:33.734 And the goal is to be sure that we 27:33.734 --> 27:35.870 update what emerging and foundational 27:35.870 --> 27:38.690 technologies we regard as needing to be 27:38.690 --> 27:41.410 restricted to the CCP . Obviously the 27:41.410 --> 27:44.640 CCP is also involved in a massive uh 27:44.650 --> 27:47.530 technology theft I . P . Theft project , 27:47.540 --> 27:49.318 but just at the level of export 27:49.318 --> 27:52.400 controls , A law was passed in 2018 and 27:52.410 --> 27:54.980 it's largely unimplemented and I think 27:54.990 --> 27:57.050 former Chairman Burr made the good 27:57.050 --> 27:59.330 point that in five G we should view the 27:59.330 --> 28:03.200 five eyes as allies that we would use 28:03.200 --> 28:05.367 to build the technology base , whether 28:05.367 --> 28:07.478 it's a D 10 or a D 12 or whatever the 28:07.478 --> 28:09.533 strategy is . We need something like 28:09.533 --> 28:12.300 the T . T . T . P . P . Again that says 28:12.300 --> 28:14.467 freedom loving nations that believe in 28:14.467 --> 28:16.578 open navigation of the seaways , free 28:16.578 --> 28:18.689 trade , the rule of law , transparent 28:18.689 --> 28:20.856 contracts , human rights , et cetera . 28:20.856 --> 28:22.967 We need an alliance of freedom loving 28:22.967 --> 28:26.560 peoples against the CCPS , nefarious 28:26.560 --> 28:28.727 sponsorship of stuff like surveillance 28:28.727 --> 28:31.310 state tyranny abroad . But to do that 28:31.310 --> 28:33.254 we have to have clarity about what 28:33.254 --> 28:35.421 those critical technologies are . So I 28:35.421 --> 28:37.143 would love to hear some public 28:37.143 --> 28:37.080 explanation for the American people 28:37.080 --> 28:39.250 have . When will we have the 2018 law 28:39.250 --> 28:42.160 implemented and probably more 30,000 ft 28:42.170 --> 28:44.114 view . More importantly , if we're 28:44.114 --> 28:46.226 going to build an alliance of freedom 28:46.226 --> 28:48.503 loving nations in this technology race , 28:48.503 --> 28:50.448 how can we do it ? How can we lead 28:50.448 --> 28:52.448 allies if we don't have clarity for 28:52.448 --> 28:54.448 ourselves about what those critical 28:54.448 --> 28:56.840 technologies are ? Thank you senator . 28:56.840 --> 28:58.951 Maybe I'll just start and and welcome 28:58.951 --> 29:01.173 my colleagues joining on this . I think 29:01.173 --> 29:03.270 just to um focusing on on the 29:03.270 --> 29:04.937 intelligence relationships in 29:04.937 --> 29:06.992 particular and the five I point that 29:06.992 --> 29:08.992 you and and Senator burr making , I 29:08.992 --> 29:12.130 mean , I think um it will not surprise 29:12.130 --> 29:14.400 you that technology is one of the 29:14.400 --> 29:16.511 things that we intend to talk to them 29:16.511 --> 29:18.678 about , that we are already talking to 29:18.678 --> 29:20.900 them about at different levels . Uh and 29:20.900 --> 29:23.720 uh and I think it is entirely right to 29:23.720 --> 29:25.840 be focused on the idea that among the 29:25.840 --> 29:28.500 five eyes , we can actually um do some 29:28.500 --> 29:30.340 good work together in effect in 29:30.350 --> 29:32.461 addressing this issue that we none of 29:32.461 --> 29:34.350 us can do alone in a way and that 29:34.350 --> 29:36.406 that's a a place where we do need to 29:36.406 --> 29:39.850 focus . I think there is also uh it is 29:39.850 --> 29:41.739 true that the policy community is 29:41.739 --> 29:43.850 working and I know the administration 29:43.850 --> 29:45.739 is working on a strategy on these 29:45.739 --> 29:47.961 issues , um that would include partners 29:47.961 --> 29:50.930 and would effectively focus on the kind 29:50.930 --> 29:53.400 of issues that you're describing . In 29:53.400 --> 29:55.622 addition , they are also looking at the 29:55.622 --> 29:57.733 technology sectors and how it is that 29:57.733 --> 29:59.956 you approach each of these to deal with 29:59.956 --> 30:01.956 whether or not de linking in all of 30:01.956 --> 30:03.956 these different spaces is the right 30:03.956 --> 30:03.920 thing to do and how to do it so that 30:03.920 --> 30:05.940 you don't actually have collateral 30:05.940 --> 30:08.162 impact that sometimes can have negative 30:08.162 --> 30:10.273 consequences in those areas . But one 30:10.273 --> 30:12.384 and I leave it to others to comment . 30:16.040 --> 30:18.207 Senator . I would just say from a from 30:18.207 --> 30:20.373 a D . I perspective and the Department 30:20.373 --> 30:22.484 of Defense , our closest partners are 30:22.484 --> 30:24.540 585 teammates . I have deep personal 30:24.540 --> 30:26.429 relationships with everyone of my 30:26.429 --> 30:28.373 counterparts . We talk on a weekly 30:28.373 --> 30:30.540 basis and from a strategic competition 30:30.540 --> 30:32.707 perspective or an intelligence support 30:32.707 --> 30:32.350 aspect to strategic competition , 30:32.350 --> 30:34.128 they're all in And so this this 30:34.128 --> 30:36.072 conversation about identifying the 30:36.072 --> 30:38.239 technology and how we can collectively 30:38.239 --> 30:40.406 get after this threat with the CCP . I 30:40.406 --> 30:42.517 think I think they are ready for that 30:42.517 --> 30:43.739 conversation . Okay . 30:46.640 --> 30:48.751 Yeah . I think senator , I would just 30:48.751 --> 30:50.751 add , you know from our competitive 30:50.751 --> 30:50.700 advantages . Think about what our 30:50.700 --> 30:52.922 competitive advantages for the nation , 30:52.922 --> 30:52.850 for the Intelligence committee , 30:52.850 --> 30:55.017 whether it's artificial intelligence , 30:55.017 --> 30:57.239 big data , machine learning space , all 30:57.239 --> 30:59.461 of these are critical capabilities that 30:59.461 --> 31:01.683 that have far reaching implications not 31:01.683 --> 31:03.739 only for our economy , but obviously 31:03.739 --> 31:05.794 for the security of our nation as we 31:05.794 --> 31:05.640 take a look at where we're going in the 31:05.650 --> 31:08.860 in the future as well . I mean , 31:09.840 --> 31:11.896 I'll just say the chair and the vice 31:11.896 --> 31:13.951 chair wanna compliment Senator Sasse 31:13.951 --> 31:16.007 were agreeing with the chair and the 31:16.007 --> 31:18.284 vice chair . It's always helpful . Yes . 31:18.340 --> 31:21.260 Uh anybody else ? Because we're kind of 31:21.260 --> 31:24.260 clocking down there in uh , in in the 31:24.260 --> 31:26.371 classified session . I want to follow 31:26.371 --> 31:28.482 up on , we're gonna particularly some 31:28.482 --> 31:28.230 of the Taiwanese piece is , we're going 31:28.230 --> 31:30.397 to Senator joe Brandon webb Simpson or 31:30.397 --> 31:33.360 cotton . Thank you . Mr Chairman um 31:33.370 --> 31:35.426 Director Ray . As you are familiar , 31:35.426 --> 31:37.314 the families of the victims , the 31:37.314 --> 31:39.037 families of the victims of the 31:39.037 --> 31:41.148 september 11 attacks have requested a 31:41.148 --> 31:42.814 number of FBI documents to be 31:42.814 --> 31:44.990 declassified As we approach the 20th 31:44.990 --> 31:47.212 anniversary of the attacks . I'm trying 31:47.212 --> 31:49.434 to understand what information in those 31:49.434 --> 31:51.434 reports could still be so sensitive 31:51.434 --> 31:53.323 that it cannot be shared with the 31:53.323 --> 31:55.490 American people for several months . I 31:55.490 --> 31:57.657 have been trying to get FBI to provide 31:57.657 --> 31:59.768 a classified copy of the documents to 31:59.768 --> 32:01.934 this committee so that I can read them 32:01.934 --> 32:04.560 myself . But so far the FBI has refused . 32:05.440 --> 32:07.662 From an oversight perspective , this is 32:07.662 --> 32:10.310 deeply concerning . Why hasn't the FBI 32:10.320 --> 32:12.542 provided the requested documents to the 32:12.542 --> 32:14.487 committee ? And will you commit to 32:14.487 --> 32:16.598 providing that those documents to the 32:16.598 --> 32:19.220 committee now ? Well , Senator I 32:19.220 --> 32:21.387 understand how important this issue is 32:21.387 --> 32:23.930 to you personally and of course also to 32:23.940 --> 32:26.650 uh the victim's families . Uh and as 32:26.650 --> 32:28.910 somebody who grew up in new york and 32:28.910 --> 32:32.010 his family still lives in new york . Uh 32:32.020 --> 32:34.242 that's personal to me as well . And the 32:34.242 --> 32:36.250 meeting and engaging with the 9 11 32:36.260 --> 32:38.440 victim families was a big part of my 32:38.440 --> 32:41.350 own inspiration uh from my last time in 32:41.350 --> 32:43.239 law enforcement to come back into 32:43.239 --> 32:45.460 service . Uh We do have to be a little 32:45.460 --> 32:47.460 bit careful here because of certain 32:47.460 --> 32:49.682 source and method issues and grand jury 32:49.682 --> 32:51.860 issues . But I have instructed our 32:51.860 --> 32:54.490 subject matter experts to to review to 32:54.490 --> 32:56.712 see if there's more that we can share . 32:56.712 --> 32:58.823 And I am happy to report that we have 32:58.823 --> 33:00.879 identified some additional documents 33:00.879 --> 33:03.046 that we will be able to make available 33:03.046 --> 33:05.101 for review very shortly and my staff 33:05.101 --> 33:07.212 will work with the committee staff to 33:07.212 --> 33:09.323 facilitate review . Can we have those 33:09.323 --> 33:11.434 documents within the next two weeks ? 33:12.140 --> 33:14.307 I'll have to get back with my staff on 33:14.307 --> 33:16.529 the exact timing but when my definition 33:16.529 --> 33:18.473 of shortly is consistent with that 33:18.473 --> 33:20.418 rough time for him . Okay . And if 33:20.418 --> 33:22.196 you're not going to provide the 33:22.196 --> 33:23.973 particular document that I have 33:23.973 --> 33:26.140 requested , I need a reason in writing 33:26.140 --> 33:28.362 to the committee since I as a member of 33:28.362 --> 33:30.307 this committee have every right to 33:30.307 --> 33:32.140 review that document . Certainly 33:32.140 --> 33:34.140 senator , I agree that an important 33:34.140 --> 33:36.140 part of our collaboration with this 33:36.140 --> 33:38.196 committee is that even in those rare 33:38.196 --> 33:40.029 instances where we can't provide 33:40.029 --> 33:42.140 information uh we ought to be able to 33:42.140 --> 33:44.029 and have an obligation I think to 33:44.029 --> 33:47.140 explain to you why . Thank you . Um to 33:47.140 --> 33:50.020 director Hanes . Uh and um 33:50.030 --> 33:53.160 uh two 33:54.040 --> 33:57.700 general market Sony . Um I'm very 33:57.700 --> 34:00.320 concerned about these blind spots as 34:00.320 --> 34:03.260 we've already heard testimony today um 34:03.270 --> 34:07.110 that are opponents are using the U . S . 34:07.110 --> 34:10.430 Infrastructure and loopholes 34:10.440 --> 34:14.050 to penetrate our 34:14.840 --> 34:17.710 infrastructure , our companies our 34:17.720 --> 34:21.550 data in a way that really 34:21.550 --> 34:23.880 prohibits us from following through on 34:23.880 --> 34:26.250 our investigations and terrorist groups 34:26.250 --> 34:30.050 and other international risks . Uh 34:30.060 --> 34:32.116 I understand there are legal reasons 34:32.116 --> 34:34.171 and I've heard the testimony that we 34:34.171 --> 34:36.660 want to talk about how we can ask the 34:36.660 --> 34:39.490 private sector to perhaps consider 34:39.490 --> 34:42.360 having a required reporting um 34:42.840 --> 34:46.380 uh Law passed . And I think that's a 34:46.380 --> 34:49.870 reasonable approach . But I'd like a 34:49.870 --> 34:53.530 little more context and information for 34:53.530 --> 34:57.170 both of you on how you see these gaps 34:57.170 --> 35:00.400 and these blind spots . And in fact um 35:00.410 --> 35:02.720 when we do have foreign terrorist 35:02.730 --> 35:05.680 attacks and um undermining of our 35:05.680 --> 35:07.760 democracy such as such as what um 35:08.440 --> 35:10.900 Russia tried to do with the election um 35:10.900 --> 35:13.122 and undermined public confidence in our 35:13.122 --> 35:15.344 electoral process and exacerbated socio 35:15.344 --> 35:17.289 political divisions in the U . S . 35:17.289 --> 35:19.500 These are serious , serious issues and 35:19.510 --> 35:21.732 I don't like hearing that we have blind 35:21.732 --> 35:23.820 spots . So I'd like a little more 35:23.830 --> 35:27.350 analysis about um if there 35:27.360 --> 35:29.582 are other authorities that are needed . 35:29.582 --> 35:31.638 And I've heard you all say you don't 35:31.638 --> 35:33.693 need other authorities . But I guess 35:33.693 --> 35:35.804 I'm not willing to accept that we are 35:35.804 --> 35:37.804 going to have blind spots . I think 35:37.804 --> 35:40.290 there has to be inappropriate way to 35:40.290 --> 35:43.550 give the tools that our intelligence 35:43.550 --> 35:45.217 community needs to be able to 35:45.217 --> 35:47.210 constantly protect against cyber 35:47.210 --> 35:49.210 threats , cyber terrorism and cyber 35:49.210 --> 35:53.180 attack . Thank you . Senator . I'll 35:53.180 --> 35:55.402 just start and obviously I'll leave the 35:55.402 --> 35:57.680 book of the answer to general Nakatani . 35:57.680 --> 35:59.847 He'll have more views on the specifics 35:59.847 --> 36:02.124 uh in this area . But I would say that , 36:02.124 --> 36:04.180 I mean I think um really support the 36:04.180 --> 36:06.458 law that is currently being considered , 36:06.458 --> 36:08.680 which is basically something that would 36:08.680 --> 36:10.902 create as I understand it an obligation 36:10.902 --> 36:12.902 on companies to provide information 36:12.902 --> 36:15.470 when there are attacks much like fire I 36:15.470 --> 36:18.250 did in the context of solar winds . Um , 36:18.260 --> 36:20.204 and that is something that I think 36:20.204 --> 36:22.316 would be useful . It is obviously one 36:22.316 --> 36:24.538 piece of the puzzle and I think General 36:24.538 --> 36:26.371 Akrasanee can speak with greater 36:26.371 --> 36:28.316 authority on what specifically the 36:28.316 --> 36:30.316 other issues are and answering your 36:30.316 --> 36:32.790 further questions . Senator , I share 36:32.800 --> 36:35.860 your concern with these blind spots and 36:35.860 --> 36:38.082 this is something we shouldn't accept . 36:38.082 --> 36:40.400 Let me be a little bit more specific in 36:40.400 --> 36:42.780 terms of the blind spots when an 36:42.780 --> 36:45.140 adversary decides that they're going to 36:45.150 --> 36:47.950 conduct an intrusion into a U . S . 36:47.950 --> 36:50.710 Company , a US government agency . One 36:50.710 --> 36:52.877 of the things that they realize is the 36:52.877 --> 36:54.988 fact if they can come into the United 36:54.988 --> 36:56.932 States and use an Internet service 36:56.932 --> 36:59.300 provider in a period of time , uh they 36:59.300 --> 37:01.411 can quickly do that and conduct their 37:01.411 --> 37:03.740 operations and virtually not have any 37:03.740 --> 37:06.070 coverage , uh , in a timely manner , 37:06.070 --> 37:09.110 from our ability to do surveillance in 37:09.110 --> 37:10.832 the United States . And that's 37:10.832 --> 37:13.054 obviously through a warrant , uh , most 37:13.054 --> 37:14.943 likely done by the Federal Bureau 37:14.943 --> 37:16.943 investigation . They understand the 37:16.943 --> 37:19.054 timelines that it takes for a warrant 37:19.054 --> 37:21.580 to be done . And so they are being able 37:21.580 --> 37:24.550 to expose this gap . This is one of the 37:24.550 --> 37:26.760 areas that we have to understand our 37:26.760 --> 37:30.360 adversaries are using today . It's it's 37:30.360 --> 37:32.260 the it's the way that they have 37:32.450 --> 37:34.672 structured their activities and it's in 37:34.672 --> 37:36.780 a way that we , as we go forward , I 37:36.790 --> 37:39.012 need to be able to address again . It's 37:39.012 --> 37:40.790 not that we are looking forward 37:41.230 --> 37:43.341 authorities for the National Security 37:43.341 --> 37:45.563 Agency . It's it's let's make sure that 37:45.563 --> 37:47.730 we identify what's taking place so the 37:47.730 --> 37:50.008 appropriate measures can be undertaken . 37:50.008 --> 37:52.300 Senator Cotton , thank you all for your 37:52.300 --> 37:54.467 appearance here today . These hearings 37:54.467 --> 37:56.467 are always a welcome opportunity to 37:56.467 --> 37:58.633 highlight the work that you and all of 37:58.633 --> 38:00.522 the men and women you do and your 38:00.522 --> 38:02.744 agencies and organizations to help keep 38:02.744 --> 38:04.522 our country safe . Most of this 38:04.522 --> 38:06.578 committee's work , like most of your 38:06.578 --> 38:08.689 work happens behind closed doors in a 38:08.689 --> 38:08.250 classified settings of the american . 38:08.250 --> 38:10.730 People don't appreciate the great work 38:10.730 --> 38:12.952 that you and the men and women you lied 38:13.120 --> 38:15.231 do for our country . So I'm glad that 38:15.231 --> 38:17.453 we have a chance to highlight this once 38:17.453 --> 38:19.398 a year or so . Um , I also want to 38:19.398 --> 38:21.620 stress the importance of protecting all 38:21.620 --> 38:23.453 the information that your people 38:23.453 --> 38:25.810 collect . And uh and director , a part 38:25.810 --> 38:28.760 of the FBI's responsibility is to 38:28.760 --> 38:30.871 ensure that classified information is 38:30.871 --> 38:32.770 handled correctly . That's not 38:32.770 --> 38:34.826 disclosed in a way that could pose a 38:34.826 --> 38:36.714 risk towards americans , national 38:36.714 --> 38:38.770 security or intelligence or military 38:38.770 --> 38:40.826 operations . Is that correct ? Yes , 38:40.826 --> 38:42.937 that's correct . And and that applies 38:42.937 --> 38:44.992 to all persons to to include persons 38:44.992 --> 38:46.937 especially who are clear to handle 38:46.937 --> 38:49.870 classified information as well . Well , 38:49.870 --> 38:51.870 it's a responsibility that we share 38:51.870 --> 38:53.981 with other agencies in that respect . 38:53.981 --> 38:55.703 But yes . And so you do you do 38:55.703 --> 38:57.830 investigate uh instances of alleged 38:57.830 --> 38:59.960 disclosure of classified information 38:59.970 --> 39:03.020 that was done wrongly ? Absolutely . We 39:03.020 --> 39:05.242 have quite a number of such . So I just 39:05.242 --> 39:07.076 want to I just want to take this 39:07.076 --> 39:06.720 opportunity to call your attention a 39:06.720 --> 39:08.887 letter that Senator saturday and I and 39:08.887 --> 39:10.942 16 other Republican senators sent to 39:10.942 --> 39:12.942 you yesterday about what appears to 39:12.942 --> 39:15.109 have been a potentially serious breach 39:15.109 --> 39:17.220 of handling classified information by 39:17.220 --> 39:19.650 DR Colin call uh the nominee to be the 39:19.660 --> 39:21.827 undersecretary of defense for policy . 39:22.020 --> 39:24.240 Could I get your commitment to provide 39:24.240 --> 39:27.590 a prompt response to that letter to the 39:27.590 --> 39:29.368 United States Senate since this 39:29.368 --> 39:31.423 nomination could be pending just any 39:31.423 --> 39:34.210 time now ? Uh Senator I'm aware of the 39:34.210 --> 39:36.154 letter . I haven't had a chance to 39:36.154 --> 39:38.266 review it yet , but I'm happy to take 39:38.266 --> 39:40.377 it . Thank you . I I don't expect you 39:40.377 --> 39:39.840 to be fully apprised of the facts or 39:39.840 --> 39:41.840 have a conclusion about whether you 39:41.840 --> 39:43.896 should or should not or will or will 39:43.896 --> 39:46.007 not um start an investigation . But I 39:46.007 --> 39:48.062 believe it's very worrisome . Um And 39:48.062 --> 39:50.062 there are people sitting in federal 39:50.062 --> 39:52.284 prison today for mishandling classified 39:52.284 --> 39:54.396 information . And if a GS employee is 39:54.396 --> 39:56.507 going to be sitting in federal prison 39:56.507 --> 39:58.451 because they mishandled classified 39:58.451 --> 40:00.562 information , we should always insist 40:00.562 --> 40:02.784 that everyone handled it correctly , no 40:02.784 --> 40:04.729 matter how powerful they are , who 40:04.729 --> 40:04.400 they're connected to . So thank you for 40:04.400 --> 40:06.567 that commitment or right Miss Haines , 40:06.567 --> 40:08.456 I want to turn to a line from the 40:08.456 --> 40:10.400 annual threat assessment about the 40:10.400 --> 40:12.622 migration crisis we see on our southern 40:12.622 --> 40:14.789 border . Uh It lists several potential 40:14.789 --> 40:16.567 factors um in terms of seasonal 40:16.567 --> 40:18.344 employment opportunities or the 40:18.344 --> 40:20.456 pandemic or have you . One factor was 40:20.456 --> 40:22.067 perceived changes in U . S . 40:22.067 --> 40:24.290 Immigration policy . Is it possible 40:24.290 --> 40:26.123 that a factor can also be actual 40:26.123 --> 40:28.346 changes to U . S . Immigration policy ? 40:32.110 --> 40:34.110 Thank you senator . I think we were 40:34.110 --> 40:36.990 looking at the degree of folks coming 40:36.990 --> 40:39.212 and so I don't think that there were in 40:39.212 --> 40:41.430 fact changes at the time that would 40:41.430 --> 40:43.780 have accounted for . In other words it 40:43.780 --> 40:45.836 was perceived changes that they were 40:45.836 --> 40:48.002 looking at . So I know that you're not 40:48.002 --> 40:50.113 in charge of immigration policy , not 40:50.113 --> 40:49.880 expected to be . But I'll give you 40:49.880 --> 40:51.991 three changes that actually have been 40:51.991 --> 40:54.102 made by the Bush administration since 40:54.102 --> 40:56.102 the first day one . They created an 40:56.102 --> 40:58.269 exception to the pandemic exclusionary 40:58.269 --> 41:00.980 order for minors . Not shockingly , we 41:00.980 --> 41:03.202 have a surge of minors at the border to 41:03.202 --> 41:05.369 they eliminated the safe third country 41:05.369 --> 41:07.202 agreements with central american 41:07.202 --> 41:09.258 countries , most notably Guatemala , 41:09.258 --> 41:09.200 the geographic chokepoint from central 41:09.200 --> 41:11.500 America . Um and three they eliminated 41:11.500 --> 41:13.810 the remain in Mexico policy as well . 41:13.820 --> 41:16.520 So those are three actual policies on 41:16.520 --> 41:18.687 which word is out in central America . 41:18.900 --> 41:21.122 And finally I just give you this bit of 41:21.122 --> 41:23.233 open source intelligence that you can 41:23.233 --> 41:25.344 go back . Director Burns and Director 41:25.344 --> 41:27.511 Hanes and tell your analysts about . I 41:27.511 --> 41:29.678 was at the border a couple weeks ago I 41:29.678 --> 41:29.190 had a chance to see the heartbreaking 41:29.190 --> 41:31.700 scenes of young mothers and fathers 41:31.700 --> 41:33.867 with their young kids under the bridge 41:33.867 --> 41:35.867 outside Mcallen where they're being 41:35.867 --> 41:38.089 processed in . After having just across 41:38.089 --> 41:40.144 the river with the help of smugglers 41:40.144 --> 41:42.200 and traffickers , I grabbed a border 41:42.200 --> 41:44.367 Patrol officer who spoke spanish so we 41:44.367 --> 41:46.533 can interpret for me as a couple dozen 41:46.533 --> 41:48.644 of them why they made the journey now 41:48.644 --> 41:47.920 where they had come from , how long 41:47.920 --> 41:49.970 they have been there . Um , not a 41:49.970 --> 41:52.192 single one of them made a comment about 41:52.192 --> 41:55.130 asylum in terms of persecution based on 41:55.140 --> 41:58.220 race , ethnicity , , religion , 41:58.230 --> 42:00.700 political views or anything else . The 42:00.710 --> 42:03.760 most common answers were joe biden . I 42:03.760 --> 42:06.730 can get in now and I want a job . 42:08.400 --> 42:10.622 Um , I have some other issues I want to 42:10.622 --> 42:12.789 discuss . But as I said earlier , much 42:12.789 --> 42:12.290 of that we have to do in front of the 42:12.290 --> 42:14.346 class in a classified setting . So I 42:14.346 --> 42:16.401 look forward to talking with you all 42:16.401 --> 42:18.457 again in a few minutes . Thank you . 42:18.457 --> 42:20.679 Thank you Senator Cotton . Um , senator 42:20.679 --> 42:23.012 rubio . Any closing comments ? You know , 42:23.012 --> 42:21.950 I want to thank you guys . I think it's 42:21.950 --> 42:24.006 been important to get a lot of these 42:24.006 --> 42:25.950 things on the record . It's a rare 42:25.950 --> 42:28.117 opportunity for the american public to 42:28.117 --> 42:30.172 hear from each of you individually . 42:30.172 --> 42:32.339 It's uh , I'm glad we're able to do it 42:32.339 --> 42:34.561 again this year . And I look forward to 42:34.561 --> 42:33.810 our , our session this afternoon . 42:33.820 --> 42:35.950 Thank you all for being here . Let me 42:35.950 --> 42:38.228 before I just close three quick things . 42:38.228 --> 42:40.670 One , I think you've heard this from 42:40.670 --> 42:43.290 virtually every member hearty thanks to 42:43.290 --> 42:45.346 not just you , but they're literally 42:45.346 --> 42:47.401 thousands of men and women that work 42:47.401 --> 42:49.623 for you . And I hope you will take that 42:49.623 --> 42:52.020 message back to the workforce and thank 42:52.020 --> 42:54.187 Senator Burr mentioned , we value very 42:54.187 --> 42:56.409 much this relationship we have with the 42:56.409 --> 42:58.409 icy and want to keep it open and we 42:58.409 --> 43:00.760 always want to have your back to . I 43:00.770 --> 43:02.603 think director Hanes you've made 43:02.603 --> 43:05.570 mention of this . Ah I think almost the 43:05.570 --> 43:07.626 majority of members on the committee 43:08.100 --> 43:11.580 are actively working on bipartisan 43:11.580 --> 43:14.900 legislation that would encourage around 43:14.910 --> 43:17.620 this idea of technical alliances , that 43:17.620 --> 43:19.676 we do this not only in a greater way 43:19.676 --> 43:21.787 with the private sector , but we also 43:21.787 --> 43:23.898 do it with our Even beyond our five I 43:23.898 --> 43:25.820 partners and three as as we have 43:25.820 --> 43:28.310 discussed again in a broadly bipartisan 43:28.310 --> 43:30.421 way , we've taken some of the lessons 43:30.421 --> 43:32.366 from our solar winds hearing and I 43:32.366 --> 43:34.810 think we may have at least a partial 43:35.400 --> 43:38.530 response where with appropriate 43:38.540 --> 43:41.320 liability protections , there would be 43:41.320 --> 43:44.830 some level of medicine , mid incident 43:44.840 --> 43:48.670 reporting uh , to a an enterprise that 43:48.670 --> 43:50.503 would include public and private 43:50.503 --> 43:52.614 together so that we could potentially 43:52.614 --> 43:54.448 close some of these gaps that uh 43:54.448 --> 43:56.559 Senator General Brandon , others have 43:56.559 --> 43:58.226 raised in in their , in their 43:58.226 --> 44:00.392 questioning again . We thank you all . 44:00.392 --> 44:02.614 We've got a couple of votes and we will 44:02.614 --> 44:05.710 still reconvene where , pardon me ? 44:07.490 --> 44:11.140 Uh , well we reconvene SK 7 to 17 at 44:11.150 --> 44:13.460 one o'clock , have an enjoyable lunch . 44:13.470 --> 44:14.920 Thank you . Thank you . 44:20.890 --> 44:23.380 In a broadly bipartisan way , we've 44:23.380 --> 44:25.324 taken some of the lessons from our 44:25.324 --> 44:27.491 solar winds hearing and I think we may 44:27.491 --> 44:30.810 have at least a partial response where 44:31.290 --> 44:34.290 with appropriate liability protections , 44:34.600 --> 44:37.780 there would be some level of mid season , 44:37.790 --> 44:41.710 mid incident reporting uh to a 44:41.720 --> 44:43.942 an enterprise that would include public 44:43.942 --> 44:46.053 and private together so that we could 44:46.053 --> 44:48.109 potentially close some of these gaps 44:48.109 --> 44:50.331 that uh Senator Gerald Brandon , others 44:50.331 --> 44:52.164 have raised in in their in their 44:52.164 --> 44:54.331 questioning again . We thank you all . 44:54.331 --> 44:56.553 We've got a couple of votes and we will 44:56.553 --> 44:59.910 still reconvene where , pardon me .