WEBVTT

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frame allied commander , Europe and

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General Lyons commanded the United

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States Transportation Command Transcom .

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Thank you both for the many decades of

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military service and please extend our

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appreciation to the men and women

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serving under your command and General

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Alliance . This is likely your last

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hearing before the committee and on

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behalf of my colleagues , I want to

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thank you and your family for a

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lifetime of dedication and service to

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the nation , which continues with your

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son , who is now a cadet at West

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Point . So tradition goes forward .

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Thank you . The security challenges in

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the Yukon area responsibility grow more

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complex . Each year Russia continues to

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subvert the rules based international

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order , including usually military

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force to intimidate and coerce its

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neighbors and to undermine their

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sovereignty . Russia is also engaged in

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an ongoing hybrid warfare campaign just

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below the threshold of conflict that

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would provoke a military response ,

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including disinformation campaigns

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targeting democratic processes and for

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many discourse extensive cyber

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espionage efforts and the continued use

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of proxy groups to further Russian

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interest in numerous countries around

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the world . Combating the Russian

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hybrid threat requires a whole of

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government effect . And general Walters

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will be interested to hear your views

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on the military means required as part

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of that whole of government effort

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ellis what as well as what support we

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can provide our allies and partners as

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they seek to counter Russian malign

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influence last week , um raised its

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watch condition level in Ukraine from

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possible crisis to potential imminent

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crisis in response to significant

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Russian military activity in Ukraine .

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And of course your the committee will

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benefit from your assessment of the

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current security situation and an

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update on UConn's engagements with

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partners and allies in response to the

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Ukrainian situation consistent with the

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2018 National Defense Strategy um

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continues to refine the operational

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concepts , plans and programmes

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necessary to counter Russia and the

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strategic competition that defines his

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theater . The US must ensure a combat

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credible military deterrent against

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Russia's ambitions to threaten the

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sovereignty of our allies and partners

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general Walters . The committee would

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like to hear your views on the posture

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and investments necessary to attain and

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maintain deterrence , turning to

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Transcom . The men and women of

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Transcom performed duties that sustain

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the whole of the Department of Defense

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in protecting our nation's security

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with a competitive edge and its ability

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to deploy and sustain America's armed

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forces . Transcom provides duty with

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unique capabilities that we have come

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to expect and perhaps too frequently

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take for granted . Transcom forces are

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busy supporting all of the combat

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commanders every day and without them ,

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the United States would be at a

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significant disadvantage almost

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everywhere in the world . General lines

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last year you were adamant about

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retaining air fueling capability

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because you felt that France com was at

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the minimum acceptable levels for

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meeting piece on demand for tanker

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capacity This year , I understand that

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the air mobility command believes that

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trance come can rely on some

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contribution of the KC 46 tankers .

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Even though the KC 46 is not able to

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conduct unrestricted operations , I

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would be interested in any information

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you could share on this situation . Our

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global transportation capability ,

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owned or managed by Transcom has one

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been one of our asymmetric advantages

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for many years now . However , we

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cannot assume that potential

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adversaries will allow us free rein in

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this area in the future . Two years ago ,

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the committee decided that the

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department needed to continue the

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analytical effort to identify

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requirements because the study

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presented at that time did not reflect

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implementation of the National Defense

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Strategy General Lions Perhaps you

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could give us an update on where

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Transcom stands in updating this

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analysis . General Alliance , you have

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initiated a program to contract out

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management of the defense personal

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property program , DP three that

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handles the movement of household goods

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for D . O . D . Under this plan , a

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contractor team would be responsible

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for issuing contracts , the individual

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movers and carriers rather than the U .

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S . Government . After a competition .

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Last year transcriptome Transcom

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awarded the contract . But the losing

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bidders protested the award and G . A .

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O . Upheld the protest . General Lyons ,

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I would be interested in hearing about

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the status of this program . Finally ,

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Transcom also faces a unique set of

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cyber threats because of the commands

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extensive work with private sector

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entities and the Transportation and

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Shipping Industries General Alliance .

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The committee would appreciate an

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update on transcripts effort to improve

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its cyber cyber security posture .

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Again , thank you both for being here

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this morning . And I look forward to

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your testimony . Uh and before I turn

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it over to send in what I would just

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note from my colleagues that there will

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be uh an informal classified briefing

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immediately following this session in

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the Senate security building office in

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the capital senator . And hopefully

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thank you mr Chairman and I just would

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acknowledge both of our witnesses as

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very good friends . And I would say to

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General Lyons is not too late to change

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your mind . Has stated many times

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before this committee is top priority

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is to ensure the effective

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implementation of the NDS national

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Defense Strategy , which focuses on

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china and Russia is a primary threats

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to our national security . It means

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we've got to it's sure that our

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combatant commands have what they need

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to address the challenge of this

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strategic competition . And we're gonna

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be talking about that with both of our

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witnesses and you've got to be real and

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I'm sure you will be very

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straightforward and with some of the

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reductions that as I see them are not

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going to be desirable . I want to

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highlight that Russia's recent

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activities regarding Ukraine are very

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concerning . At the same time , Russia

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and chinese threats are converging in

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europe with an ever more aggressive

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china seeking influence and threatening

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security through the economic coercion .

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These growing threats , there are three

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that highlight the highlight the value

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of our of our 2000 and 18 NDS . And

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uh secondly , they illustrate why we

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should not be reducing defense spending .

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And thirdly demonstrate the critical

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need for more advanced capabilities

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like the F 35 to deter Russia ,

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particularly since there has been some

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controversy over that from some of the

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leadership of this administration .

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Transcom is focused on full spectrum

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mobility operations to meet

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requirements needed to combat both

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Russia and china as well as supporting

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other global engagements , from

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training to force projection to forward

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deployed forces . I'm encouraged to

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hear the administration's voice ,

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strong support for NATO . But you know ,

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the rhetoric is easy . We want to make

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sure we have the resources to support

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that . Those statements that are being

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made general Walters . I look forward

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to hearing about the priorities for the

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european , the current initiative and

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where else we need to boast our

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defenses to address threats . You see

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growing everyday journal lines , I

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would like to know the status of our

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refueling capability that the chairman

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has already addressed as well as he has

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addressed the global household goods

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contacts . We have some specific

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questions about that . And finally

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whether this morning or in our

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classified session , I would like to

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hear from both of you as to how this

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contested environment impact , mobility

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operations . General Lyons . It's uh

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you've been a friend for a long time

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and as I said , it's not too late . Mr .

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Chairman thank you very much then . And

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off now let me recognize general

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Walters through opening statement . Mhm

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German read ranking member Inhofe ,

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Distinguished members of the committee

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on behalf of the men , women and

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families who serve the nation in the

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atlantic . We want to thank you one

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more time for your steadfast support .

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It remains a privilege to serve

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alongside these patriots and our like

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minded allies and partners . It's great

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to be line abreast with our

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distinguished US Transcom commander ,

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General steve Lyons . He has led with

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distinction for the last 2.5 years in

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his capacity and over the last year

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he's been pivotal in not allowing the

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pandemic to transform into a security

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crisis . And we thank him for his blood ,

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sweat and tears to the nation . We'd

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also like to pass our condolences to

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those impacted by COVID-19 . The battle

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against the virus continues and we must

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remain vigilant . We're fully aligned

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with Secretary Austin's priorities to

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defend the nation , take care of our

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people and succeed through teamwork via

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NATO . We work closely with our allies

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and partners to address the evolving

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challenges posed by our adversaries to

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secure peace and protect our interests

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abroad . NATO remains the strategic

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center of gravity and the foundation of

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deterrence and assurance in europe .

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Everything we do is about generating

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peace . We compete to win , we

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deter and if deterrence fails , were

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prepared to respond to aggression with

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the full weight of the transatlantic

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alliance , the United States

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relationships with european allies and

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partners remains a key strategic

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advantage and we must defend it . We

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live in an increasingly complex and

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contested world political uncertainty ,

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energy competition and diffusion of

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disruptive technology are stressing the

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established rules based international

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order , threats and challenges seek to

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take advantage of these conditions

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through aggressive action using all

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instruments of national power and

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they're backed by increasingly capable

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military forces , adversaries amplify

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these malign activities and foster

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instability with this information .

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Success in 21st century warfare demands

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that we embrace competition and all of

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its associated activities below the

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level of armed conflict . This is

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actually as critical as our preparation

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for crisis or conflict themselves .

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We're in an era of strategic

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competition and winning in this era is

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all about ensuring that strategic

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competition does not morph in to a

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global conflict . One notable example

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of operations activities and

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investments , contributing to

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competition and deterrence is our

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robust exercise program this summer

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when we execute our defender series

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exercise is composed of us . You calms

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defender europe at NATO's steadfast

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defender 30,000 U . S . Service members ,

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Allies and partners from all warfare

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domains will demonstrate their ability

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to lift and shift massive forces over

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large swaths of territory at speed and

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at scale from the atlantic to the

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eastern periphery of the european

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continent . And once our troopers are

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on station , they'll sharpen their

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responsiveness , resiliency and

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lethality . Our current security

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posture is strong yet challenged as

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evidenced by actions in the vicinity of

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Ukraine . We possess combat credible

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capability across all domains , air ,

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land , sea , space and cyber . We will

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maintain and work to home this

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capability to deter adversaries and

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defensive partners and our interest the

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soldiers , sailors , airmen , marines ,

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guardians , coast guardsmen and

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civilians of us eucom appreciate your

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support to defend the homeland forward

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and preserve peace for the one billion

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citizens living in the Euro atlantic

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Chairman Read ranking member Imhoff ,

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Thank you again for this opportunity

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and I look forward to fielding your

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questions . Thank you very much walt .

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Has not let me recognize an alliance .

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Chairman . Can you hear me okay . Great .

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Yes sir . Chairman Read . Ranking

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member Inhofe and distinguished members

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of the committee . It is my distinct

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pleasure once again to represent the

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members of the United States

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Transportation Command that are

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operating around the globe Every day ,

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24 hours a day , seven days a week . Uh

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I have the privilege today to be joined

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by our new senior listed leader , Fleet

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Master Sergeant Mirek and it's great to

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have him on board . Let me just say

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again . That are enduring purpose of

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Transcom is to project and sustain

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military forces globally at a time and

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place of choosing , providing our

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national leadership with the strategic

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comparative advantage in a wide range

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of options to enable the advancement of

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us national interest , assure allies

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and partners and if necessary , respond

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with a decisive force to win . Given

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the unprecedented challenges amid the

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COVID-19 global pandemic , I could not

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be more proud of the men and women of

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Transcom who have continued their

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impressive support to the joint force

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and support the whole of government

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efforts to help american citizens at

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home . I'd particularly like to

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highlight our air components rapid

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fielding of capability to move highly

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infectious payment patients , which was

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nation prior to the pandemic .

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I appreciate the committees continued

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support on important global mobility

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issues including Sheila , free

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capitalization , aerial refueling ,

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defense , personal property , As well

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as your acknowledgement of the future

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challenges . Religious six operations

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under all domain persistent attack

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today I'm absolutely honored to join

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General Todd Walters and pleased to

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play a supporting role in his wide

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ranging european defence initiatives .

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Thank you for your leadership and

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support for impressive Transcom

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teammates . And I look forward to your

14:28.320 --> 14:31.520
questions . Thank you very much .

14:31.530 --> 14:33.752
General Lions . And before we begin the

14:33.752 --> 14:35.752
questioning , let me just remind my

14:35.752 --> 14:37.752
colleagues due to the nature of the

14:37.752 --> 14:41.230
hybrid format we're using today . We

14:41.230 --> 14:43.341
will handle the order of questions by

14:43.341 --> 14:45.490
seniority , alternating sides until

14:45.490 --> 14:48.400
we're going through everyone . Uh And

14:48.400 --> 14:50.567
if there's anyone we missed , we'll go

14:50.567 --> 14:53.620
back and we will use the standard five

14:53.620 --> 14:55.950
minute rounds and I ask my colleagues

14:55.950 --> 14:58.030
to keep watching the clock . And

14:58.030 --> 15:00.390
finally , if you're not engaged ,

15:00.400 --> 15:02.567
please keep your microphone commuted .

15:02.567 --> 15:05.670
Thank you very very much . Uh General

15:05.670 --> 15:09.590
Walters Today . Uh it was

15:09.590 --> 15:11.790
reported that Secretary of Austin

15:11.800 --> 15:14.710
announced an additional 500 troops

15:14.710 --> 15:18.130
going into Europe , which seems to be

15:18.130 --> 15:20.500
a reversal of the trump

15:20.500 --> 15:23.350
administration's proposals to reduce

15:23.350 --> 15:25.590
forces in europe . Can you comment on

15:25.590 --> 15:27.050
this increase in forces ?

15:29.540 --> 15:31.700
I can Chairman . We're very excited .

15:31.700 --> 15:34.870
They're part of the previous traunch of

15:34.870 --> 15:38.670
forces that were nested underneath DP

15:38.670 --> 15:42.470
two decision program to and its focus

15:42.470 --> 15:45.060
is to deliver a multi domain task force

15:45.070 --> 15:47.360
in a joint theaters fired organization

15:47.740 --> 15:49.907
To the spot in Germany . And that will

15:49.907 --> 15:52.470
be approximately 500 soldiers . And

15:52.470 --> 15:54.526
that will approve our ability in all

15:54.526 --> 15:56.910
domains uh to bring fires from the

15:56.910 --> 15:59.300
surface to surface dimension uh to

15:59.300 --> 16:03.110
increase our ability to deter uh

16:03.120 --> 16:06.390
from your uh first review of the

16:06.390 --> 16:08.557
proposed budget . Do you feel you will

16:08.557 --> 16:11.480
have adequate resources to meet all

16:11.480 --> 16:14.460
your obligations ?

16:17.140 --> 16:19.290
We we do chairman . But as you will

16:19.290 --> 16:21.270
know , we're always interested in

16:21.280 --> 16:23.280
working to increase our competitive

16:23.280 --> 16:25.502
advantage . But we do have the adequate

16:25.502 --> 16:27.391
resources . Thank you very much ,

16:27.391 --> 16:29.610
General Lyons . Uh , as I indicated my

16:29.610 --> 16:32.560
opening remarks , we've asked the

16:32.560 --> 16:34.504
mobility requirements study . It's

16:34.504 --> 16:38.160
still in the works . Yeah . When will

16:38.160 --> 16:41.350
we see that report ? And can you give

16:41.350 --> 16:44.620
us some initial reactions uh , to date

16:44.620 --> 16:47.520
as to what you're Prognostication is

16:47.520 --> 16:50.830
about the report ? Yeah , Chairman .

16:50.830 --> 16:52.830
Let me first say thank you for your

16:52.830 --> 16:54.719
continued advocacy and support as

16:54.719 --> 16:56.608
you've directed multiple mobility

16:56.608 --> 16:59.010
capabilities requirements study and the

16:59.020 --> 17:03.020
2020 study is due to be delivered

17:03.030 --> 17:06.980
in june mid june . I can

17:06.980 --> 17:09.202
tell you , you know , as a task for the

17:09.202 --> 17:11.258
study , it was to assess the program

17:11.258 --> 17:13.369
force we're looking at in the context

17:13.369 --> 17:15.536
of our of our current demands in terms

17:15.536 --> 17:17.424
of war plans , but also in future

17:17.424 --> 17:20.060
concepts . As we look at that there are

17:20.060 --> 17:23.420
some areas which we see will require

17:23.420 --> 17:25.309
some work in , some in some areas

17:25.309 --> 17:27.364
elevated risk . I would just ask for

17:27.364 --> 17:29.531
your continued support , for example ,

17:29.531 --> 17:31.870
for sealift modernization , which this

17:31.870 --> 17:33.981
committee has been very supportive of

17:33.981 --> 17:36.950
our efforts to do so such far and so

17:36.960 --> 17:39.016
without getting too far ahead of the

17:39.016 --> 17:41.238
analysis because I want the analysis to

17:41.238 --> 17:43.293
drive the conclusions that report is

17:43.293 --> 17:45.627
due to you soon , Sir . Thank you , sir .

17:45.627 --> 17:49.360
One of the issues uh and represents

17:50.040 --> 17:53.390
the transition from benign

17:53.400 --> 17:56.080
areas of operation , particularly for

17:56.090 --> 17:58.860
logistics to contested operations , is

17:58.860 --> 18:01.280
the problem of potential attrition

18:01.280 --> 18:03.700
during wartime . And you feel that will

18:03.700 --> 18:05.960
be adequately addressed in the study ,

18:06.840 --> 18:09.640
Senator , the uh we certainly are

18:09.640 --> 18:11.807
looking at contested environments . Uh

18:11.807 --> 18:13.973
There's no question that we can assume

18:13.973 --> 18:16.084
that we can deploy when we want , how

18:16.084 --> 18:18.029
we want , where we want perhaps as

18:18.029 --> 18:20.084
we've been able to do uh in the last

18:20.084 --> 18:22.610
several decades . But as we look to a

18:22.620 --> 18:24.650
attrition per se in terms of force

18:24.650 --> 18:27.290
sizing as a departmental policy , we

18:27.290 --> 18:29.840
don't uh we don't include nutrition in

18:29.840 --> 18:32.760
the force sizing construct but we do

18:32.760 --> 18:35.310
understand the implications for

18:35.310 --> 18:37.421
contested environments on our ability

18:37.421 --> 18:40.480
to support a particular cocom or the or

18:40.480 --> 18:43.160
the department's priorities . Uh And so

18:43.160 --> 18:45.620
we will see that an elevated risk I

18:45.620 --> 18:47.890
would just offer though that often is

18:47.890 --> 18:50.940
the case . Uh the solution may not be

18:50.940 --> 18:53.250
in more capacity and mobility capacity

18:53.250 --> 18:56.160
but may come and better integration of

18:56.160 --> 18:57.882
our warfighting functions like

18:57.882 --> 18:59.882
protection , fires , intelligence ,

18:59.882 --> 19:02.049
sustainment , etcetera . So as we look

19:02.049 --> 19:04.271
to the future , we know we have to move

19:04.271 --> 19:06.438
in that direction and I'm very pleased

19:06.438 --> 19:08.660
to see the chairman of the department ,

19:08.660 --> 19:10.827
you know , identifying that as a major

19:10.827 --> 19:10.290
line of effort in our joint warfighting

19:10.290 --> 19:12.550
concepts . Well , thank you gentlemen ,

19:12.560 --> 19:14.610
General Walters and also generalize

19:14.610 --> 19:17.640
this goes to a point of our effective

19:17.640 --> 19:20.390
connectivity that that every part of

19:20.390 --> 19:23.650
the operation can talk uninterruptedly

19:23.660 --> 19:27.450
and hopefully encrypted . Is

19:27.450 --> 19:30.950
that something that you and Jenna neck

19:30.950 --> 19:33.080
a Sony are working on with others ?

19:33.090 --> 19:36.530
General Walters . We are chairman . One

19:36.530 --> 19:38.650
of our key pillars and our overall

19:38.650 --> 19:40.372
campaign to effectively win in

19:40.372 --> 19:42.483
competition is to continually improve

19:42.483 --> 19:44.420
our command and control and

19:44.420 --> 19:46.680
communications and to do so in all

19:46.680 --> 19:48.791
domains . And we're really pleased to

19:48.791 --> 19:50.736
report that with General naka Sony

19:50.736 --> 19:53.240
being the sole military commander in U .

19:53.240 --> 19:56.100
S . Military cyber domain , the

19:56.110 --> 19:58.166
direction and guidance has been much

19:58.166 --> 20:00.221
clear over the course of the last 24

20:00.221 --> 20:02.166
months and we've been able to make

20:02.166 --> 20:04.332
improvements in europe with respect to

20:04.332 --> 20:06.388
our ability to command and control .

20:06.388 --> 20:08.499
Thank you . And general lines , quick

20:08.499 --> 20:10.499
comments please . Yes sir . I would

20:10.499 --> 20:12.277
just reinforce cyber resiliency

20:12.277 --> 20:14.443
continues to make the top priority for

20:14.443 --> 20:16.554
the command . Shona Gussoni , the NSA

20:16.554 --> 20:18.610
cyber comma has been extraordinarily

20:18.610 --> 20:20.832
supportive , in fact , were his testbed

20:20.832 --> 20:23.060
for zero trust principles and we've

20:23.060 --> 20:25.060
taken many other initiatives to buy

20:25.060 --> 20:27.171
down cyber risk . Thank you very much

20:27.171 --> 20:29.450
for your son Ryan Hall . Please . Thank

20:29.450 --> 20:32.360
you Mr Chairman in walter's . I

20:33.640 --> 20:35.418
just like to ask , I have three

20:35.418 --> 20:37.307
questions I'm going to try to get

20:37.307 --> 20:40.490
around in this short period of time uh

20:40.500 --> 20:42.720
in the book and we've all been talking

20:42.720 --> 20:46.110
about this now ever since 2018 when

20:46.120 --> 20:49.260
this came out The recommendations that

20:49.260 --> 20:51.660
it's going to take 3-5 real annual

20:51.670 --> 20:54.970
defense spending growth to implement

20:54.980 --> 20:58.290
the NDS and I really believe that is

20:58.290 --> 21:01.160
true now the current budget doesn't

21:01.160 --> 21:03.950
even keep even keep up with inflation .

21:04.340 --> 21:06.800
Now this is kind of an if question

21:06.800 --> 21:09.870
general voters , if the defense budget

21:09.880 --> 21:12.880
shrinks and the the european deterrence

21:12.880 --> 21:16.150
initiative gets cut , what would be the

21:16.160 --> 21:19.060
impact to your efforts in europe ?

21:19.070 --> 21:21.050
Just of the job ?

21:23.340 --> 21:26.610
If that happens , senator , it would it

21:26.610 --> 21:29.500
would slow down our campaign momentum

21:29.510 --> 21:31.732
that we've been able to sustain for the

21:31.732 --> 21:33.640
last four years in improving our

21:33.640 --> 21:35.696
indications and warnings are command

21:35.696 --> 21:38.790
and control and our readiness . Okay ,

21:38.790 --> 21:41.012
thank you very much . General Walters .

21:41.012 --> 21:44.720
I also mentioned You and I talked about

21:44.720 --> 21:47.250
this in my office . It's unfortunate ,

21:47.250 --> 21:48.806
but a lot of people in this

21:48.806 --> 21:50.972
administration are talking about the F

21:50.972 --> 21:53.139
35 and some don't think it's worth the

21:53.240 --> 21:55.560
the resources that is detracting from

21:55.560 --> 21:59.430
other areas and I am so Thankful that I

21:59.430 --> 22:01.652
have the memory of what happened back .

22:01.652 --> 22:03.708
I actually started out when I was in

22:03.708 --> 22:05.708
the House of Representatives on the

22:05.708 --> 22:07.930
House Armed Services Committee on the F

22:07.930 --> 22:10.152
22 . They have 22 , they have 35 of the

22:10.152 --> 22:12.097
only two vehicles out there in the

22:12.097 --> 22:14.770
fifth generation . So the F 22 was the

22:14.770 --> 22:17.850
first one We started out with , the

22:17.860 --> 22:20.330
goal was 700 copies where you were

22:20.330 --> 22:22.130
going to come and they started

22:22.130 --> 22:24.680
whittling down . This happened , It

22:24.680 --> 22:26.736
started actually when I was still in

22:26.736 --> 22:28.958
the house side and it went down to from

22:28.958 --> 22:32.240
700 to incrementally reduced to uh

22:32.250 --> 22:34.472
ultimately it got down to what was it ?

22:34.472 --> 22:38.250
Uh , one 1 87 F 20 twos and we

22:38.250 --> 22:40.417
knew that was a mistake at that time .

22:40.417 --> 22:42.583
And the reason I bring that up is that

22:42.583 --> 22:44.639
right now , we have Russia and china

22:44.639 --> 22:46.639
pursuing their own fifth generation

22:46.639 --> 22:48.806
programs like the J 20 and the and the

22:48.806 --> 22:51.240
S U 57 . How concerned are you about

22:51.250 --> 22:53.250
our great power competitors ? Fifth

22:53.250 --> 22:55.139
generation capabilities ? And how

22:55.139 --> 22:58.810
important is F 35 uh , to

22:58.810 --> 23:00.588
deter these threats In europe .

23:04.540 --> 23:06.640
The center of the F 35 is very

23:06.640 --> 23:08.473
important . As I mentioned in my

23:08.473 --> 23:11.100
opening comments are disposition from a

23:11.100 --> 23:13.267
military perspective , is strong , get

23:13.267 --> 23:15.433
challenged and part of that challenges

23:15.540 --> 23:17.910
the the evolution of the SU 37 5th

23:17.910 --> 23:19.966
generation aircraft on behalf of the

23:19.966 --> 23:22.480
Russians . And and we in the US need F

23:22.480 --> 23:24.610
30 fives in europe , which will begin

23:24.610 --> 23:27.530
to show up in the fall of 21 to ensure

23:27.530 --> 23:29.697
that we have the competitive advantage

23:29.697 --> 23:31.641
necessary to protect our sovereign

23:31.641 --> 23:35.450
territory . All right , that's that's

23:35.450 --> 23:37.050
good . And during the

23:39.340 --> 23:42.190
last year's posture hearing in General ,

23:42.190 --> 23:45.440
Lyons testified that the Air Force's

23:45.440 --> 23:48.400
divestment of the KC 1 35 in the KC 10

23:48.740 --> 23:51.860
would put transfer from below its

23:51.870 --> 23:54.800
minimum Requirements . And that's in

23:54.810 --> 23:57.920
light of the fact that the KC 46 didn't

23:57.920 --> 24:00.250
come out with the way we wanted it to

24:00.260 --> 24:04.190
and and yet it took action

24:04.190 --> 24:07.940
from the The . n d a

24:07.940 --> 24:10.600
from 2021 to reverse the number of

24:10.600 --> 24:12.433
those divestments to ensure that

24:12.433 --> 24:14.530
Transcom has the necessary refueling

24:14.530 --> 24:17.260
capacity to meet the requirements . Now ,

24:17.270 --> 24:19.500
I would have to say , and you may want

24:19.500 --> 24:23.480
to elaborate on this , uh , maybe uh ,

24:23.490 --> 24:25.850
for the record . But I look at this and

24:25.850 --> 24:28.017
say what's wrong with our requirements

24:28.440 --> 24:31.640
A process when Congress has to step in

24:31.650 --> 24:33.660
to ensure they have enough tanker

24:34.700 --> 24:37.310
aircraft to stay the mission ready . I

24:37.310 --> 24:39.421
mean , you did . Your observation was

24:39.421 --> 24:43.290
right but it took us action to make

24:43.290 --> 24:46.670
sure that happens in our fiscal year

24:47.140 --> 24:50.840
21 n . d . A . Anything come to

24:50.840 --> 24:53.910
mind as in terms of the why it's

24:53.910 --> 24:55.910
necessary for us to do this and why

24:55.910 --> 24:57.920
this couldn't have been done before

24:57.930 --> 25:01.620
that our action was necessary . Well

25:01.620 --> 25:03.842
senator first , I want to thank you for

25:03.842 --> 25:06.009
your support on the uh on the issue of

25:06.009 --> 25:07.787
aerial refuel , which is such a

25:07.787 --> 25:09.842
critical force element and basically

25:09.842 --> 25:12.370
the lifeblood for the Joint Force . In

25:12.370 --> 25:14.600
terms of our weapons systems . Last

25:14.600 --> 25:16.656
year , you asked the question , what

25:16.656 --> 25:18.767
was the implications operationally to

25:18.767 --> 25:20.933
the delay of the Boeing KC 46 delivery

25:20.933 --> 25:23.520
and based on the retirement profile ,

25:23.520 --> 25:25.631
there were implications in the active

25:25.631 --> 25:27.853
duty component to respond to day to day

25:27.853 --> 25:29.742
crisis . I'm happy and pleased to

25:29.742 --> 25:31.964
report to you this year that we're in a

25:31.964 --> 25:33.964
much better position . We have very

25:33.964 --> 25:36.076
good alignment between the Department

25:36.076 --> 25:38.020
between Air Force and Transcom Air

25:38.020 --> 25:39.798
forces step forward within term

25:39.798 --> 25:41.964
capability with the KC 46 years to get

25:41.964 --> 25:44.187
a long way to go . But I am very , very

25:44.187 --> 25:46.353
comfortable with where we are with the

25:46.353 --> 25:48.298
Air Force and Air Force has really

25:48.298 --> 25:50.520
stepped in . Do you think that that has

25:50.520 --> 25:52.687
been corrected ? I do , sir . It has .

25:52.687 --> 25:54.890
Thank you very much . Thank you very

25:54.890 --> 25:57.001
much centred and off center Shaheen ,

25:57.001 --> 25:59.760
please thank you and thank you to both

26:00.140 --> 26:02.196
have you general Walters and General

26:02.196 --> 26:04.251
Lions for your service and for being

26:04.251 --> 26:06.473
here this morning . General Walters . I

26:06.473 --> 26:08.696
especially appreciated our conversation

26:08.696 --> 26:10.807
yesterday . And one of the things you

26:10.807 --> 26:12.973
mentioned in your opening remarks that

26:12.973 --> 26:15.196
we discussed briefly is the build up of

26:15.196 --> 26:17.529
Russian forces on the border of Ukraine .

26:17.740 --> 26:21.410
Do you have any um view about what

26:21.410 --> 26:23.466
Russia is doing ? Are they preparing

26:23.466 --> 26:25.466
for a potential offensive ? Is this

26:25.466 --> 26:27.743
consistent with past Russian posturing ?

26:27.743 --> 26:31.580
What are they doing ? Uh

26:31.590 --> 26:33.812
Senator . We've we've categorized their

26:33.812 --> 26:35.923
actions into four separate categories

26:35.923 --> 26:38.280
and I would enjoy the opportunity in a

26:38.290 --> 26:40.346
different security environment to be

26:40.346 --> 26:42.457
able to address that . But what I can

26:42.457 --> 26:45.070
say is is number one that there's been

26:45.070 --> 26:48.040
an inject of a of a very sizable ground

26:48.040 --> 26:50.318
domain force on behalf of the Russians ,

26:50.540 --> 26:54.230
a notable uh air

26:54.230 --> 26:57.020
Force injection and a notable maritime

26:57.020 --> 27:00.410
force injection . And it is of the size

27:00.410 --> 27:02.466
and scale and scope that is of great

27:02.466 --> 27:04.490
concern and it mirrors the size and

27:04.490 --> 27:06.960
scope and scale of the infiltration of

27:06.960 --> 27:09.460
forces that occurred back in 2014 . So

27:09.460 --> 27:11.950
we are we are remaining very , very

27:11.960 --> 27:14.850
vigilant , keeping as many options open

27:14.850 --> 27:16.940
as possible and obviously very

27:16.940 --> 27:19.800
concerned . Thank you . I look forward

27:19.860 --> 27:22.082
to hearing your comments and classified

27:22.082 --> 27:24.590
session as the administration considers

27:24.590 --> 27:27.060
the best way forward in Afghanistan .

27:27.440 --> 27:30.520
Can you tell us what you think would be

27:30.520 --> 27:34.250
the most significant impact of the

27:34.250 --> 27:38.190
withdrawal of american troops by May

27:38.190 --> 27:40.490
1st or shortly thereafter ? How would

27:40.490 --> 27:44.080
that influence both NATO's role and

27:44.090 --> 27:46.201
what we might expect on the ground in

27:46.201 --> 27:49.990
Afghanistan Senator . Our

27:49.990 --> 27:52.830
number one concern at us , EUCOM and my

27:52.830 --> 27:55.052
number one concern with my NATO had his

27:55.052 --> 27:57.300
Sakhir is the force protection

27:57.300 --> 27:59.411
considerations for all of our U . S .

27:59.411 --> 28:01.411
Service members and all of our NATO

28:01.411 --> 28:03.660
service members in whatever transaction

28:03.660 --> 28:06.270
that we engage in . Thank you . I would

28:06.270 --> 28:09.740
again urge um NATO

28:09.740 --> 28:12.480
and everyone who's part of our mission

28:12.490 --> 28:14.540
to include women at the negotiating

28:14.540 --> 28:16.380
table because we know that has a

28:16.380 --> 28:19.620
positive impact on um the stability of

28:19.620 --> 28:23.110
negotiations . General Lions last

28:23.110 --> 28:25.740
spring . This is really to follow up on

28:25.740 --> 28:27.920
Senator Inhofe's comments about the KC

28:27.920 --> 28:31.550
46 because last spring you express real

28:31.550 --> 28:34.900
concerns about the retirement of legacy

28:34.910 --> 28:37.700
refueling tankers um due to the delays

28:37.700 --> 28:39.900
with the KC 46 . And you had a brief

28:39.900 --> 28:43.350
exchange just now about that , but it

28:43.350 --> 28:46.450
sounds like You may begin to assign KC

28:46.450 --> 28:49.130
46 aircrews to operational missions as

28:49.130 --> 28:51.930
early as this summer . So what has

28:51.930 --> 28:54.700
changed and why do you feel like we

28:54.700 --> 28:56.980
should begin doing that as early as

28:56.980 --> 28:59.750
this summer ? Um , A couple things have

28:59.750 --> 29:01.972
changed since we talked about this last

29:01.972 --> 29:03.917
year . The first and probably most

29:03.917 --> 29:06.028
important is that Boeing acknowledged

29:06.028 --> 29:07.694
and agreed that they have the

29:07.694 --> 29:09.583
responsibility to fix the cat one

29:09.583 --> 29:11.750
deficiencies on the jet on the weapons

29:11.750 --> 29:13.861
system . And so in that context , the

29:13.861 --> 29:15.972
Air Force has gone to work to deliver

29:15.972 --> 29:18.194
interim capability . It may not be , it

29:18.194 --> 29:20.417
won't be fully operational , but it can

29:20.417 --> 29:22.417
certainly conduct missions and they

29:22.417 --> 29:24.694
presented that capability uh over time .

29:24.694 --> 29:27.640
So that's , that's important . Uh Plus

29:27.640 --> 29:29.751
with an additional plus up of Reserve

29:29.751 --> 29:33.040
guard augmentation and a slight

29:33.040 --> 29:36.190
adjustment in the in the in the

29:36.190 --> 29:38.380
retirement profile against the KC 10 ,

29:38.390 --> 29:40.501
I am comfortable that we're in a good

29:40.501 --> 29:42.446
position based on the work the Air

29:42.446 --> 29:44.668
Force has done to support day to day in

29:44.668 --> 29:46.612
crisis operations today . Well , I

29:46.612 --> 29:48.668
think that's very good news . That's

29:48.668 --> 29:50.890
obviously welcome news to all of the KC

29:50.890 --> 29:53.440
46 crews including those at the fees

29:53.450 --> 29:55.561
National Guard Base where we were the

29:55.561 --> 29:59.320
first recipients of the KC 46 . But I

29:59.320 --> 30:02.040
want to ask you because I understand

30:02.050 --> 30:04.161
there's an issue that I had not heard

30:04.161 --> 30:06.670
about with the respect to the trans

30:07.540 --> 30:10.130
transportable gallery lavatory system ,

30:10.390 --> 30:12.670
essentially the bathrooms that make

30:13.040 --> 30:16.740
missions problematic . Is this a new

30:16.740 --> 30:19.870
problem or have we known about this and

30:19.880 --> 30:22.940
what's the prospect to fix it ? Man ,

30:22.940 --> 30:25.051
my nose kind of issues . I don't want

30:25.051 --> 30:27.273
to get in front of the Air Force . I'll

30:27.273 --> 30:29.496
defer the program manager there . There

30:29.496 --> 30:31.496
is a range of category deficiencies

30:31.496 --> 30:33.607
that are being worked by both the Air

30:33.607 --> 30:35.829
Force and Boeing . I don't want to have

30:35.829 --> 30:37.940
to comment on that particular issue .

30:38.140 --> 30:41.190
Will it impact our ability to fly

30:41.190 --> 30:43.440
missions with the KC 46 as early as

30:43.440 --> 30:46.030
this summer as you're hoping ? I'm not

30:46.030 --> 30:48.210
aware of any impact on initial

30:48.210 --> 30:50.480
capability release , but that doesn't

30:50.480 --> 30:54.200
mean a wide range of deficiencies that

30:54.200 --> 30:56.970
still need to be remedied . Uh , you

30:56.970 --> 30:58.914
know , by bowing before the jet is

30:58.914 --> 31:01.137
fully operational capable . Thank you .

31:01.137 --> 31:03.359
Thank you . Mr . Chairman , thank you .

31:03.359 --> 31:05.637
Senator jean . Senator Wicker , please .

31:05.637 --> 31:07.637
Thank you very much . MR Chairman ,

31:07.637 --> 31:10.530
General Walters . In a question uh ,

31:10.540 --> 31:14.390
from Senator Shaheen about Russia , you

31:14.390 --> 31:17.380
mentioned they were increasing their

31:17.390 --> 31:20.660
ground air and maritime efforts .

31:21.140 --> 31:23.400
Um , in in light of that , you continue

31:23.400 --> 31:25.067
to support the additional two

31:25.067 --> 31:27.050
destroyers based in row to

31:30.640 --> 31:32.751
I do senator . And as you will know ,

31:32.751 --> 31:35.360
for the last 12 months , the activity

31:35.360 --> 31:37.440
of of the four destroyers that we've

31:37.440 --> 31:39.880
had access to have been pivotal in

31:39.880 --> 31:43.000
securing deterrence . Uh we also see

31:43.010 --> 31:45.040
increased maritime activity in the

31:45.040 --> 31:47.290
arctic , in the Barents , uh , to the

31:47.290 --> 31:49.512
central portion of the Atlantic Ocean .

31:49.512 --> 31:51.290
And the need for two additional

31:51.290 --> 31:53.401
structures in the area of indications

31:53.401 --> 31:55.623
and warnings and command and control as

31:55.623 --> 31:57.734
well as the lethality that they bring

31:57.734 --> 32:00.390
is is what we need to continue to work

32:00.390 --> 32:02.570
for to have that competitive edge to

32:02.570 --> 32:04.630
ensure that we can continue to to to

32:04.630 --> 32:07.460
effectively let's expand on the arctic .

32:07.940 --> 32:11.830
Um , but china is an issue for us .

32:11.830 --> 32:13.719
There , is it not ? And could you

32:13.719 --> 32:17.110
elaborate on that ? They are senator .

32:17.110 --> 32:19.800
Their investments in ports is

32:19.800 --> 32:21.540
significant . Do we have the

32:21.540 --> 32:23.920
capabilities we need to deter Russia

32:23.920 --> 32:27.090
and china and the arctic . Presently we

32:27.090 --> 32:28.979
do , and they're adequate but our

32:28.979 --> 32:31.280
growth isn't matching . There's , I

32:31.290 --> 32:34.970
heard you say adequate in response to

32:34.970 --> 32:38.780
Senator Inhofe's question also . And

32:38.790 --> 32:41.380
uh and you mentioned that the , an

32:41.380 --> 32:44.110
answer to a question that the recent

32:44.110 --> 32:45.832
budget numbers would slow down

32:45.832 --> 32:48.230
readiness . Uh Let me just emphasize

32:48.230 --> 32:50.990
that we have in front of us the leading

32:50.990 --> 32:54.490
expert in this area of the world . And

32:54.500 --> 32:57.980
uh and that sort of uh merely

32:57.990 --> 33:01.620
adequate um response and slowdown

33:01.620 --> 33:04.500
readiness is of concern . I think two

33:04.500 --> 33:07.190
members on both sides of uh of the

33:07.190 --> 33:10.860
diocese here . One more thing , uh uh

33:11.440 --> 33:14.110
general Walters uh with regard to the

33:14.110 --> 33:17.080
Coast Guard . They have they have a

33:17.090 --> 33:19.940
statutory mission but also their very

33:19.950 --> 33:23.310
vital uh in assisting you with our

33:23.310 --> 33:26.450
national defense requirements . Is that

33:26.450 --> 33:30.300
correct ? It is Senator . And as you

33:30.300 --> 33:32.078
know , the Coast Guard actually

33:32.078 --> 33:34.133
recently produced an arctic strategy

33:34.133 --> 33:36.300
and I will tell you , is the commander

33:36.300 --> 33:38.411
of U . S . You come , there were many

33:38.411 --> 33:38.180
identifications in that strategy that

33:38.180 --> 33:40.340
were very , very helpful for future

33:40.340 --> 33:42.600
security in the arctic region . Uh ,

33:42.610 --> 33:46.570
Thank you very much . And uh then then

33:46.580 --> 33:50.150
let me less than shift General Lions

33:50.160 --> 33:54.090
to uh military sealift . And

33:54.100 --> 33:57.940
let you elaborate on an answer that you

33:57.940 --> 34:00.960
gave to Senator read um

34:02.340 --> 34:06.070
the G . E . O .

34:06.070 --> 34:09.260
Reported last year that quote the U . S .

34:09.260 --> 34:13.070
Flag fleet shipyards and workforce have

34:13.070 --> 34:15.440
been in decline in the industry as a

34:15.440 --> 34:17.273
whole faces significant economic

34:17.273 --> 34:20.260
sustainability challenges , unquote .

34:20.640 --> 34:24.090
Um do you uh do you agree with this

34:24.090 --> 34:26.310
assessment ? And can you discuss how a

34:26.310 --> 34:28.760
diminished maritime industry impacts

34:29.240 --> 34:32.270
see left during both peacetime and

34:32.280 --> 34:35.060
conflict ? Senator , thanks for the

34:35.060 --> 34:36.949
question . And more importantly ,

34:36.949 --> 34:39.116
thanks for being a strong advocate for

34:39.116 --> 34:40.838
the left modernization and the

34:40.838 --> 34:42.671
acknowledgement of how important

34:42.671 --> 34:45.250
sealift is to deliver a decisive force .

34:46.140 --> 34:49.570
Um , I think , you know that 33 of 50

34:49.570 --> 34:51.690
of our roll on roll off ships will

34:51.700 --> 34:53.978
reach into life over the next 10 years .

34:54.540 --> 34:56.484
Uh , industrial base is absolutely

34:56.484 --> 34:58.318
critical , important . Critic of

34:58.318 --> 35:00.651
critical importance . And uh , you know ,

35:00.651 --> 35:02.690
we have advocated for acquired use

35:02.690 --> 35:05.710
strategy largely based on cost , the

35:05.710 --> 35:07.432
significant difference in cost

35:07.432 --> 35:09.488
differential , but there's also work

35:09.488 --> 35:12.480
required in conversion . So we work

35:12.480 --> 35:14.480
closely with the Navy . I think the

35:14.480 --> 35:16.424
navy has got the best pulse on the

35:16.424 --> 35:18.758
industrial base with regard to see lift .

35:18.758 --> 35:21.590
How helpful in your judgment are the

35:21.590 --> 35:24.560
maritime security programs , die pens

35:25.040 --> 35:28.340
and cargo preference laws in supporting

35:28.340 --> 35:30.770
the maritime industry ? Senator , I

35:30.770 --> 35:33.110
think they're critically important . We

35:33.110 --> 35:35.630
must maintain a U . S . Flag that's

35:35.630 --> 35:37.797
reliable and accessible to support the

35:37.797 --> 35:40.019
Defense Department needs . So those are

35:40.019 --> 35:42.352
critical programs . Thank you gentlemen .

35:42.352 --> 35:44.550
And Mr Chair , I yield back 23 7 .

35:45.440 --> 35:47.850
Thank you very much . Senator worker .

35:47.860 --> 35:50.082
Uh , it will put that on your account .

35:50.240 --> 35:53.430
Uh , and now via Webex , Senator

35:53.430 --> 35:54.430
Gillibrand ,

35:58.340 --> 36:01.560
um those extra seconds um for general

36:01.570 --> 36:05.230
Walters , um I want to just

36:05.230 --> 36:07.730
continue along the questions that

36:07.740 --> 36:09.684
Senator Wicker and Senator Shaheen

36:09.684 --> 36:13.230
asked about Ukraine . Um the us began

36:13.230 --> 36:15.630
providing lethal aid to Ukraine based

36:15.630 --> 36:18.820
on a 2014 authorization , support for

36:18.820 --> 36:20.931
sovereignty , integrity , democracy ,

36:20.931 --> 36:22.987
economic stability of Ukraine Act of

36:22.987 --> 36:25.240
2014 . Do you believe that this lethal

36:25.240 --> 36:27.770
aid has helped Ukraine to deter Russia

36:27.770 --> 36:30.470
aggression ? And what changes would you

36:30.470 --> 36:32.414
make to our current lethal and non

36:32.414 --> 36:34.470
lethal assistance to Ukraine to help

36:34.470 --> 36:37.800
further deterrence Senator ? I think

36:37.800 --> 36:39.744
those contributions have been very

36:39.744 --> 36:43.290
helpful . The other very notable

36:43.290 --> 36:44.957
change that's occurred in the

36:44.957 --> 36:47.012
environment was the establishment of

36:47.012 --> 36:49.123
the multinational Joint Commission uh

36:49.123 --> 36:51.346
which provided us an architecture to be

36:51.346 --> 36:53.460
able to take a all domain whole of

36:53.460 --> 36:55.404
government approach to some of the

36:55.404 --> 36:57.404
challenge sets that occurred in the

36:57.404 --> 36:59.627
Ukraine . And from that we were able to

36:59.627 --> 37:01.738
establish the joint military training

37:01.738 --> 37:03.793
group Ukraine that has afforded that

37:03.793 --> 37:06.240
the nations that are signatures to the

37:06.240 --> 37:08.700
multinational joint Commission and many

37:08.700 --> 37:10.867
NATO allies and partners to contribute

37:10.867 --> 37:13.680
military training teams to episodically

37:13.690 --> 37:16.030
enter Ukraine and and helped train some

37:16.030 --> 37:18.300
of their forces uh to better defend

37:18.300 --> 37:22.000
their sovereign soil . Thank you .

37:22.080 --> 37:24.450
In the um domain and in many other

37:24.450 --> 37:27.520
places we've seen over the last decade

37:27.520 --> 37:29.900
an increase in the strength and

37:29.910 --> 37:32.380
engagement with a liberal political

37:32.380 --> 37:34.310
forces , including the rise of

37:34.310 --> 37:37.030
totalitarian ISM authoritarians ,

37:37.040 --> 37:39.300
increasing popularity of far right

37:39.300 --> 37:41.630
political groups and leaders . And

37:41.630 --> 37:43.670
we've seen significant democratic

37:43.680 --> 37:47.670
backsliding um how do you see these

37:47.670 --> 37:50.360
forces Effecting our efforts to

37:50.360 --> 37:52.850
effectively deter Russia , strengthen

37:52.850 --> 37:55.200
our allies and protect the values we've

37:55.200 --> 37:57.490
shared with our european allies for

37:57.490 --> 38:01.310
decades . They are an impact

38:01.310 --> 38:03.450
senator and I think we have to take a

38:03.460 --> 38:05.793
whole of government , whole of alliance ,

38:05.793 --> 38:07.960
whole of nation approach . And I think

38:07.960 --> 38:09.849
inside of NATO we've we've done a

38:09.849 --> 38:11.849
better job with that . Number one .

38:11.849 --> 38:13.960
We're responsible , given our support

38:13.960 --> 38:16.127
to democratic values to tell the truth

38:16.127 --> 38:18.071
and and we continue to profess the

38:18.071 --> 38:20.293
truth and the information environment .

38:20.293 --> 38:22.349
And we are gaining campaign momentum

38:22.349 --> 38:24.404
with nations that want to be part of

38:24.404 --> 38:27.750
the alliance of NATO . For example ,

38:30.120 --> 38:32.342
precisely what is going on today in the

38:32.342 --> 38:35.810
Ukraine with President Smolinski's uh

38:35.820 --> 38:37.709
open comments with respect to his

38:37.709 --> 38:40.200
desire to look westward and assess

38:40.200 --> 38:44.150
towards NATO . Thank you . Um General

38:44.150 --> 38:47.250
Lions . Um , I want to ask a question

38:47.250 --> 38:50.290
about Covid uh , in the early stages of

38:50.290 --> 38:52.250
the pandemic . Some of the early

38:52.250 --> 38:54.380
problems that we faced were supply

38:54.380 --> 38:58.030
chain issues , um including getting PPE

38:58.030 --> 39:00.340
distribution early stage vaccine

39:00.350 --> 39:03.580
distribution based off your testimony .

39:03.590 --> 39:06.380
Transcom has been instrumental in

39:06.380 --> 39:08.590
ensuring vaccine distribution was able

39:08.590 --> 39:10.812
to ramp up through a functioning supply

39:10.812 --> 39:12.960
chain as we continue vaccine

39:12.960 --> 39:15.016
distribution . What are some lessons

39:15.016 --> 39:17.880
learned that we can apply to improve

39:17.890 --> 39:20.170
our success to prepare for another

39:20.180 --> 39:23.150
pandemic or other world emergency ,

39:25.420 --> 39:27.420
ma'am . Thanks for the question . I

39:27.420 --> 39:29.900
have to say . Uh large portion of the

39:29.900 --> 39:32.280
credit goes to general Purna and the

39:32.280 --> 39:34.224
lead at warp speed and the federal

39:34.224 --> 39:36.720
government effort . They worked through

39:36.720 --> 39:38.442
most of those issues . We were

39:38.442 --> 39:40.442
supporting effort where they needed

39:40.442 --> 39:42.609
additional support . I think there's a

39:42.609 --> 39:44.776
task force now looking from a national

39:44.776 --> 39:46.831
security perspective at supply chain

39:46.831 --> 39:48.609
and implications too , National

39:48.609 --> 39:50.720
security and national defense . And I

39:50.720 --> 39:52.776
think that's a worthy effort just to

39:52.776 --> 39:54.831
understand the source of many of the

39:54.831 --> 39:57.350
critical manufacturing and supplies and

39:57.350 --> 39:59.350
where they come from and where that

39:59.350 --> 40:01.294
supply chain might be vulnerable .

40:01.710 --> 40:05.580
Thank you Another question on supply

40:05.580 --> 40:09.410
chain Transcom is the largest

40:09.410 --> 40:11.750
user of oil for the federal government

40:11.760 --> 40:14.130
and President Biden's interim national

40:14.130 --> 40:16.680
security strategic guidance lists the

40:16.680 --> 40:18.870
climate crisis as one of our primary

40:18.870 --> 40:21.420
national security threats from

40:21.420 --> 40:23.320
increased major weather events to

40:23.320 --> 40:26.330
migration crises due to climate change ,

40:26.610 --> 40:28.777
fossil fuels should be at the front of

40:28.777 --> 40:31.460
our minds for strategic planning . What

40:31.460 --> 40:34.180
is Transcom doing to mitigate these

40:34.180 --> 40:36.820
massive expenditures of fossil fuels ?

40:38.610 --> 40:40.832
Well , ma'am , I first say that to your

40:40.832 --> 40:42.999
point , I think the department clearly

40:42.999 --> 40:44.943
understands we all understand that

40:44.943 --> 40:47.850
climate is a driver of instability and

40:47.850 --> 40:49.850
where there's instability , there's

40:49.850 --> 40:52.017
there's potential implications for the

40:52.017 --> 40:53.906
Department of Defense and for for

40:53.906 --> 40:57.200
Transcom . The secretary has been clear ,

40:57.210 --> 40:59.760
uh , he's focused on the climate as a

40:59.760 --> 41:03.130
priority . And as I stood stood up a

41:03.140 --> 41:06.500
lead in that area , I think most of the

41:06.500 --> 41:08.556
efforts to date , you know , you can

41:08.556 --> 41:10.111
appreciate the level at the

41:10.111 --> 41:13.050
installation base level . I think in

41:13.050 --> 41:15.280
the operational energy realm , the

41:15.280 --> 41:18.210
sheer consumption of liquid energy is

41:18.210 --> 41:20.266
going to be a challenge for us . But

41:20.266 --> 41:22.377
it's something we have to take a look

41:22.377 --> 41:24.266
at . Thank you . Thank you . Mr .

41:24.266 --> 41:25.988
Chairman . Thank you . Senator

41:25.988 --> 41:27.877
Gillibrand . Now let me recognize

41:27.877 --> 41:30.290
Senator Fisher via Webex . Thank you .

41:30.290 --> 41:32.512
MR . Chairman . And thank you gentlemen

41:32.512 --> 41:34.623
for being here today . General Walter

41:34.623 --> 41:36.780
Is , as you know , the 55th Wing is

41:36.780 --> 41:40.710
headquartered in my state and 1 35 and

41:40.710 --> 41:42.630
their crews provide a valuable

41:42.630 --> 41:44.910
contribution to um s mission from their

41:44.910 --> 41:47.770
base in Mendenhall . These planes

41:47.770 --> 41:50.050
provide a unique capability , but I'm

41:50.050 --> 41:52.910
concerned that our overall demand for S .

41:52.910 --> 41:55.140
R . is greater than the capability that

41:55.140 --> 41:57.810
we currently possess . For that reason ,

41:57.810 --> 41:59.921
I believe it is essential that we not

41:59.921 --> 42:02.210
only continue investing in new I . S .

42:02.210 --> 42:04.400
R . Networks , but also that we

42:04.400 --> 42:06.460
maintain and modernize the high end

42:06.460 --> 42:09.040
capabilities that we currently have in

42:09.040 --> 42:12.020
the R . C . 1 35 fleet . In light of

42:12.020 --> 42:15.960
that , how does the R 1 31 35 fit

42:15.970 --> 42:19.230
into your current need for I . S . R .

42:19.240 --> 42:21.770
And if you could tell me overall what

42:21.770 --> 42:23.960
the percentage of UConn CSR

42:23.960 --> 42:27.230
requirements are currently being met .

42:30.700 --> 42:33.180
Senator , the R . C . 1 35 is pivotal

42:33.190 --> 42:35.080
in our campaign with respect to

42:35.080 --> 42:37.310
indications and warnings and what it

42:37.310 --> 42:39.230
does from an intelligence ,

42:39.230 --> 42:41.008
surveillance and reconnaissance

42:41.008 --> 42:43.710
standpoint to see the environment . And

42:43.710 --> 42:45.650
as you pointed out , uh and we

42:45.650 --> 42:48.680
discussed yesterday , I think the that

42:48.680 --> 42:50.940
the concern we all have is when legacy

42:50.940 --> 42:53.107
systems go out and new systems come on

42:53.107 --> 42:55.620
board , it has the potential to create

42:55.620 --> 42:57.453
a vacuum that that the enemy can

42:57.453 --> 42:59.780
exploit and we have to be rock solid

42:59.780 --> 43:01.891
and that transition to ensure that we

43:01.891 --> 43:03.947
have the requisite I . S . Are to be

43:03.947 --> 43:06.169
successful at us . You come we've we've

43:06.169 --> 43:08.336
been very very pleased over the course

43:08.336 --> 43:10.280
of the last several years with the

43:10.280 --> 43:12.113
improvement of the percentage of

43:12.113 --> 43:14.224
bizarre that we've received and a lot

43:14.224 --> 43:16.280
of that is due to this committee And

43:16.280 --> 43:18.447
the support through the EU . I . Right

43:18.447 --> 43:20.710
now we're hovering at about 33-35 of

43:20.710 --> 43:23.030
our requirements being supported and

43:23.030 --> 43:25.400
compared to my my brothers and sisters

43:25.400 --> 43:27.622
and other geographical co comes . We're

43:27.622 --> 43:30.800
in good shape . Thank you . General

43:30.800 --> 43:33.470
Lions . In prior testimony , you said

43:33.470 --> 43:36.360
quote , we expect power projection will

43:36.360 --> 43:39.610
be contested in all domains . End quote .

43:40.000 --> 43:42.222
Your mission is uniquely challenging to

43:42.222 --> 43:45.060
perform in contested spaces . Given

43:45.060 --> 43:47.171
that fact , what steps are you taking

43:47.171 --> 43:49.250
to make Transcom more resilient to

43:49.250 --> 43:52.810
these threats ? Senator ? Thanks for

43:52.810 --> 43:55.370
the question . We fully acknowledge

43:55.370 --> 43:57.426
that the way we deployed in the past

43:57.426 --> 43:59.370
isn't the way that will deploy and

43:59.370 --> 44:01.370
sustain the force in the future and

44:01.370 --> 44:03.370
that we must be prepared to operate

44:03.370 --> 44:05.970
under all domain persisted attack in

44:05.970 --> 44:08.950
that realm . We looked at a wide range ,

44:08.960 --> 44:11.990
uh , as we look at the global mobility

44:11.990 --> 44:14.650
enterprise and look at our potential

44:14.660 --> 44:16.770
vulnerabilities and how to buy down

44:16.770 --> 44:20.160
that risk . One such area of course is

44:20.370 --> 44:22.900
cyber but there's a full range of areas

44:22.900 --> 44:24.789
and to my point earlier about the

44:24.789 --> 44:27.270
integration of protection and fires and

44:27.270 --> 44:29.159
intelligence with the sustainment

44:29.159 --> 44:31.381
warfighting function will be critical .

44:31.381 --> 44:33.548
As we , you know , understand that the

44:33.548 --> 44:35.548
homeland is no longer a sanctuary .

44:35.548 --> 44:37.714
I've been very , very pleased with the

44:37.714 --> 44:39.381
joint staff work on the joint

44:39.381 --> 44:41.492
warfighting concepts that includes an

44:41.492 --> 44:43.560
entire line of effort to elevate the

44:43.560 --> 44:46.060
importance of joint contested a joint

44:46.060 --> 44:47.893
concept on contested logistics .

44:49.790 --> 44:53.480
You think it's vital that we start to

44:53.480 --> 44:56.210
rethink or continue to rethink some of

44:56.210 --> 44:59.170
the fundamentals that are out there on

44:59.170 --> 45:01.720
how we operate , logistic support .

45:04.240 --> 45:06.960
And really , and if I if you could

45:06.960 --> 45:10.020
continue on with that train on um

45:10.030 --> 45:12.990
examining the existing platforms and

45:12.990 --> 45:15.046
methods that we that we're currently

45:15.046 --> 45:17.157
using and looking at what's needed in

45:17.157 --> 45:20.720
the future . Yes , ma'am , I think

45:20.720 --> 45:22.942
what's critical as we look to the joint

45:22.942 --> 45:25.164
warfighting concepts , so the character

45:25.164 --> 45:27.650
of warfare as it changes as we continue

45:27.650 --> 45:30.160
to evolve , will drive changes in the

45:30.160 --> 45:33.240
character of logistics in the way that

45:33.240 --> 45:35.440
we are able to deploy and sustain the

45:35.440 --> 45:38.580
force on a global scale . And so we've

45:38.580 --> 45:42.210
got to continuously adapt um as we look

45:42.210 --> 45:43.988
at that and we understand those

45:43.988 --> 45:46.043
implications , we may find ourselves

45:46.043 --> 45:48.230
changing the way we fight . Uh and I

45:48.230 --> 45:50.563
think , you know , in an all domain set ,

45:50.563 --> 45:52.563
we we will and that will change the

45:52.563 --> 45:54.619
character logistics . But we must be

45:54.619 --> 45:56.619
able to as an imperative be able to

45:56.619 --> 45:58.563
project and sustain the force over

45:58.563 --> 46:00.230
global distances as strategic

46:00.230 --> 46:02.490
comparative advantage . Thank you . Uh

46:02.500 --> 46:06.500
general Walters . Um One of one aspect

46:06.500 --> 46:08.278
of the previous administrations

46:08.278 --> 46:10.333
realignment plan announced last year

46:10.333 --> 46:12.389
was an increase in forces around the

46:12.389 --> 46:14.590
Black Sea . I know the broader plan is

46:14.590 --> 46:16.760
currently under review . But can you

46:16.760 --> 46:18.927
talk about the importance of the Black

46:18.927 --> 46:21.040
Sea region and the rationale for

46:21.040 --> 46:24.210
increasing our presence there ?

46:26.180 --> 46:28.680
Yes , senator . We we produced a NATO

46:28.680 --> 46:30.690
military strategy that stress

46:30.690 --> 46:32.523
comprehensive defense and shared

46:32.523 --> 46:35.550
response in all geographical regions in

46:35.550 --> 46:38.420
all domains and seeking assistance from

46:38.420 --> 46:40.642
a whole of government , whole of nation

46:40.642 --> 46:42.753
and in europe . What we discovered is

46:42.753 --> 46:44.920
we we've , over the course of the last

46:44.920 --> 46:46.642
three years had had had placed

46:46.642 --> 46:48.864
appropriate interest in the vicinity of

46:48.864 --> 46:50.864
the Baltics . And we needed to make

46:50.864 --> 46:52.920
sure that we were giving the same do

46:52.920 --> 46:55.031
interest in the vicinity of the Black

46:55.031 --> 46:57.320
Sea because we had to shore up in all

46:57.320 --> 47:00.570
geographical areas . So that has been

47:00.570 --> 47:03.580
our approach . It's been successful and

47:03.580 --> 47:05.802
will continue to comprehensively defend

47:05.802 --> 47:08.750
with shared response . Thank you sir .

47:08.750 --> 47:10.861
Thank you . Mr . Chairman . Thank you

47:10.861 --> 47:12.972
Senator Fisher . And let me recognize

47:12.972 --> 47:15.083
Senator Blumenthal . Thank you . Mr .

47:15.083 --> 47:16.972
Chairman . Thank you all for your

47:16.972 --> 47:19.200
service . Uh , and thank you for being

47:19.200 --> 47:22.770
here today . Uh , let me ask

47:22.780 --> 47:25.000
first on the topic of

47:26.680 --> 47:29.500
vaccines . I want to follow up on uh ,

47:30.380 --> 47:32.547
couple of the questions that have been

47:32.547 --> 47:34.769
asked most recently , Senator Gilbert ,

47:34.980 --> 47:37.370
you know how many of the men and women

47:37.370 --> 47:39.360
under your man general have been

47:39.360 --> 47:40.100
vaccinated ?

47:44.180 --> 47:47.570
I do senator . Uh , we we have a tier

47:47.570 --> 47:50.320
one vaccination plan for for for tier

47:50.320 --> 47:52.209
one constitutes those in military

47:52.209 --> 47:55.190
uniform . Uh , we're at about 46% of

47:55.190 --> 47:57.468
that force being completely vaccinated ,

47:57.468 --> 47:59.970
Those that needed two shots And were

47:59.970 --> 48:02.220
forecast based on the arrival of future

48:02.220 --> 48:05.650
vaccines to have the entire tier one

48:05.650 --> 48:07.594
force those in military and Europe

48:07.594 --> 48:09.539
vaccinated by the middle of July .

48:11.370 --> 48:14.200
Thank you . Um and

48:15.170 --> 48:18.380
have you encountered resistance or

48:18.390 --> 48:19.190
residency ?

48:25.370 --> 48:27.481
I'm sorry Senator . I didn't I didn't

48:27.481 --> 48:29.810
get catch all your question . Uh , have

48:29.810 --> 48:31.940
you , have you encountered resistance

48:31.950 --> 48:34.172
or hesitancy among the men and women in

48:34.172 --> 48:37.830
your math to being vaccinated ? We have

48:37.830 --> 48:39.941
not . We've we've got the traditional

48:39.941 --> 48:43.080
deferral rate that we've seen across

48:43.090 --> 48:46.110
all of D . O . D . But our percentages

48:46.110 --> 48:47.999
are within the norms and actually

48:47.999 --> 48:51.180
slightly less . Uh let me ask both of

48:51.180 --> 48:55.100
you , um as you well know the

48:55.110 --> 48:58.990
Secretary of Defense uh order that

48:59.000 --> 49:02.820
there be a review internally

49:02.820 --> 49:05.900
of white supremacists and

49:07.370 --> 49:10.490
extremist ideology , Could you give

49:11.170 --> 49:15.040
us your assessment of whether there is

49:15.040 --> 49:18.090
evidence of bad

49:18.570 --> 49:22.210
impact or influence or adherence among

49:22.210 --> 49:24.410
the men and women under your command ,

49:32.170 --> 49:35.470
Senator ? I'll take that . Um , and I

49:35.470 --> 49:37.692
appreciate the question because I think

49:37.692 --> 49:39.859
this is a critically important issue ,

49:39.859 --> 49:42.026
um , not not just for today , but into

49:42.026 --> 49:44.140
the future . Anything I think right

49:44.150 --> 49:46.760
that the grades or violates our oath to

49:46.760 --> 49:50.000
the constitution is incompatible with

49:50.000 --> 49:52.400
good order and discipline and military

49:52.400 --> 49:54.630
service . I think these first steps

49:54.630 --> 49:56.797
that the secretary has taken regarding

49:56.797 --> 49:59.680
to stand out . It may represent a small ,

49:59.690 --> 50:02.300
a very small percentage and I guarantee

50:02.300 --> 50:04.540
it is a very small percentage , but

50:04.540 --> 50:06.540
it's something that we must contend

50:06.540 --> 50:08.596
with . And I think the leadership of

50:08.596 --> 50:10.818
the department's uh concerted and focus

50:10.818 --> 50:12.873
to deal with it , uh long term we're

50:12.873 --> 50:14.929
taking early steps now , but I think

50:14.929 --> 50:17.262
we'll continue to persist on this issue .

50:18.560 --> 50:20.990
How widespread do you think it is ? You

50:20.990 --> 50:23.810
say it's a small percentage . What's

50:23.810 --> 50:25.830
your evidence ,

50:27.760 --> 50:30.380
Sen ? My uh , my evidence is just 38

50:30.380 --> 50:32.480
years in uniform . Uh , no , in the

50:32.480 --> 50:36.040
force . I am not at all dismissive of

50:36.040 --> 50:38.270
the problem and I acknowledge the does

50:38.270 --> 50:40.790
exist , but I would not characterize it

50:40.790 --> 50:43.610
as prevalent . We've got an incredibly

50:43.610 --> 50:46.640
talented force of volunteers . The best

50:46.640 --> 50:49.730
America has to offer . And so , but

50:49.740 --> 50:51.970
even with a small percentage is worthy

50:51.970 --> 50:54.026
of our leader effort to eliminate it

50:54.026 --> 50:56.570
from the force . What steps do you

50:56.570 --> 51:00.240
think should be taken ? Well , senator ,

51:00.240 --> 51:02.184
as I mentioned , to stand down , I

51:02.184 --> 51:04.240
think is the first step . But out of

51:04.240 --> 51:06.240
that , I know the secretary briefed

51:06.240 --> 51:08.184
just this past week on some of the

51:08.184 --> 51:10.240
insights from the services . I think

51:10.240 --> 51:12.296
there's other activities in terms of

51:12.296 --> 51:14.407
how we do selection and recruitment ,

51:14.407 --> 51:16.573
how we transition military members out

51:16.573 --> 51:18.296
of the military so they're not

51:18.296 --> 51:20.240
susceptible to being recruited . I

51:20.240 --> 51:21.907
think there's a wide range of

51:21.907 --> 51:24.073
activities like that that will develop

51:24.073 --> 51:23.990
over time as concerted lines of effort .

51:24.660 --> 51:28.570
Do you think recruits or in lucy should

51:28.570 --> 51:32.440
be uh taken if

51:32.450 --> 51:35.990
they are members of organizations that

51:36.000 --> 51:39.530
espouse views associated with white

51:39.530 --> 51:41.690
supremacy or violent extremism ?

51:43.160 --> 51:45.382
Uh , Senator , I would say , you know ,

51:45.382 --> 51:47.382
when you get into some of the finer

51:47.382 --> 51:49.493
policy issues , there's a lot there ,

51:49.493 --> 51:51.660
there's a lot packed in and I'll defer

51:51.660 --> 51:53.827
to the to the policy experts on that .

51:53.827 --> 51:55.882
Well , I do know clearly though , as

51:55.882 --> 51:57.993
you know , a commander in the force ,

51:58.260 --> 52:00.093
it is not consistent . Extremist

52:00.093 --> 52:02.204
behavior , activity is not consistent

52:02.350 --> 52:04.461
with the values of the good order and

52:04.461 --> 52:06.461
discipline of what we need is a war

52:06.461 --> 52:09.920
fighting organization . I agree that it

52:09.920 --> 52:13.390
may be a small percentage Under

52:13.390 --> 52:16.140
10% , but that's a large percentage in

52:16.140 --> 52:19.430
terms of its potential impact on the

52:19.430 --> 52:21.208
readiness and capability of our

52:21.208 --> 52:23.900
military and public support for our

52:23.900 --> 52:27.800
military . And I welcome your focus on

52:27.800 --> 52:30.790
it and your characterization of it as a

52:30.800 --> 52:34.180
very important issue of policy .

52:34.650 --> 52:36.761
So thank you for being here today and

52:36.761 --> 52:39.330
thank you for you're continuing work on

52:39.330 --> 52:41.497
this issue as well as so many others .

52:41.497 --> 52:45.460
Thank you . Thank you . Thank you .

52:45.460 --> 52:47.349
Sidney Blumenthal set of rounds ,

52:47.349 --> 52:50.610
please . Thank . Thank you . Mr .

52:50.610 --> 52:53.360
Chairman . Gentlemen . Let me begin by

52:53.360 --> 52:55.560
thanking both of you for your service

52:55.560 --> 52:57.690
to our country as well as your family

52:57.690 --> 53:01.450
sacrifices . You dedicate your time to

53:01.450 --> 53:04.850
our country . I'd like to begin by

53:04.860 --> 53:08.030
just talking a little bit about the

53:08.040 --> 53:10.207
challenge that we see right now or the

53:10.207 --> 53:12.370
possible challenges with regard to

53:12.370 --> 53:14.481
regional conflicts that could occur .

53:15.050 --> 53:17.161
And and let me begin by just pointing

53:17.161 --> 53:19.328
out that most recently we've seen some

53:19.328 --> 53:21.661
very aggressive posturing by both china ,

53:22.060 --> 53:24.960
their incursions within Taiwan's

53:24.960 --> 53:27.630
airspace with larger and larger air

53:27.630 --> 53:30.770
groups and second of all , within the

53:30.770 --> 53:32.740
european theater and Russia's

53:32.750 --> 53:35.270
aggression that we've been talking

53:35.270 --> 53:37.103
about here earlier in the in the

53:37.103 --> 53:39.830
committee meeting . Can you describe

53:39.840 --> 53:42.770
briefly the impact on the ability of

53:42.770 --> 53:45.370
your command in your professional

53:45.370 --> 53:48.660
military judgment to execute its

53:48.670 --> 53:51.240
missions if the United States became

53:51.240 --> 53:54.770
engaged in to conflicts and was forced

53:54.770 --> 53:56.810
to defend friends and allies in the

53:56.810 --> 54:00.050
pacific and in europe simultaneously ,

54:02.140 --> 54:05.890
general Walters , I can

54:05.890 --> 54:09.130
senator and it it starts with the

54:09.130 --> 54:11.260
appropriate approach and we've been

54:11.260 --> 54:13.820
very aggressive in europe in making

54:13.820 --> 54:16.200
sure that we understand the importance

54:16.210 --> 54:19.100
of allies and partners in the process

54:19.540 --> 54:22.040
and the importance of a comprehensive

54:22.040 --> 54:25.020
approach to regions and and the

54:25.020 --> 54:27.510
importance of of not getting myopic in

54:27.510 --> 54:29.454
one region , in forgetting what is

54:29.454 --> 54:31.677
happening in another region and today ,

54:31.677 --> 54:33.788
when you ask most military members in

54:33.788 --> 54:35.899
europe , if they have a concern , for

54:35.899 --> 54:38.010
example , about Russia , it will take

54:38.010 --> 54:39.954
at least five seconds to where the

54:39.954 --> 54:42.066
follow on question is . Do you have a

54:42.066 --> 54:43.843
concern about china ? So in the

54:43.843 --> 54:46.066
military and in our nation's we have to

54:46.066 --> 54:48.130
continue to think big and we have to

54:48.130 --> 54:50.241
take a whole of government , whole of

54:50.241 --> 54:52.463
nation hold of alliance approach to the

54:52.463 --> 54:54.630
security challenges that we face . And

54:54.630 --> 54:56.686
we have to be willing to look up and

54:56.686 --> 54:58.463
out of each one of our areas of

54:58.463 --> 55:01.560
responsibility . General Lyons .

55:04.540 --> 55:07.490
Sure , right . I think there should be

55:07.500 --> 55:10.390
uh no question to our commitment as

55:10.390 --> 55:12.223
general Walters mentioned to our

55:12.223 --> 55:14.446
longstanding values based international

55:14.446 --> 55:16.800
order , whether that's in the east or

55:16.800 --> 55:18.840
the west . From a transparent

55:18.840 --> 55:21.820
perspective , we we assess continuously

55:21.820 --> 55:24.220
a full range of plans and contingencies

55:24.220 --> 55:26.630
that we might have to respond to . We

55:26.630 --> 55:28.463
look within the construct of the

55:28.463 --> 55:30.241
planning guidance and the plans

55:30.241 --> 55:32.352
themselves . I'll be happy to discuss

55:32.352 --> 55:34.408
any of those kinds of questions in a

55:34.408 --> 55:36.630
closed hearing . If he likes her , both

55:36.630 --> 55:38.797
of you would agree that prior planning

55:38.797 --> 55:42.530
for the appropriate uh concerns or the

55:42.530 --> 55:45.620
different situations is critical . Fair

55:45.620 --> 55:47.960
enough . Yes , sir . Absolutely . Yes ,

55:47.960 --> 55:50.230
sir . Let's talk a little bit about

55:50.230 --> 55:52.230
what happens if we actually do have

55:52.230 --> 55:54.850
conflicts with either Russia or china ,

55:55.540 --> 55:57.930
they would almost certainly attack the

55:57.930 --> 56:00.890
ports and the airfields where we would

56:00.890 --> 56:03.160
load and unload troops and equipment .

56:04.030 --> 56:06.060
General Lyons . What are the

56:06.060 --> 56:08.282
implications of a contested environment

56:08.282 --> 56:10.560
on bulk fuel , capacity , distribution

56:10.560 --> 56:13.170
and storage as well as traditional

56:13.170 --> 56:14.948
lines of communication ? Are we

56:14.948 --> 56:17.520
effectively working contested logistics

56:17.530 --> 56:21.200
in our planning , uh uh taking into

56:21.200 --> 56:23.144
account the attrition into our war

56:23.144 --> 56:26.060
games . Yet , senator , we we have

56:26.060 --> 56:28.360
begun that journey uh , and I

56:28.360 --> 56:30.082
appreciate the support of this

56:30.082 --> 56:32.740
committee on that effort . Um , Again ,

56:32.740 --> 56:34.907
I'm pleased with the joint staffs work

56:34.907 --> 56:37.110
particularly as a concept of joint

56:37.110 --> 56:39.332
concept for contestant logistics , that

56:39.332 --> 56:41.332
that's under development to address

56:41.332 --> 56:43.388
these kinds of issues that will then

56:43.388 --> 56:45.590
subsequently , uh , you know , shape

56:45.590 --> 56:48.020
force design and force capability work

56:48.030 --> 56:51.890
down the road . We know that we must be

56:51.890 --> 56:54.940
able to sustain and project a force

56:54.950 --> 56:56.894
under all domain persistent attack

56:56.894 --> 56:59.117
that's fundamentally different than the

56:59.117 --> 57:00.894
way we have operated integrated

57:00.894 --> 57:03.006
logistics in the past . Generally the

57:03.006 --> 57:05.228
way that you answered my question . And

57:05.228 --> 57:07.740
I appreciate the the way that you

57:08.230 --> 57:10.640
position your answer saying that we

57:10.640 --> 57:14.340
have begun to look at it . I presume

57:14.340 --> 57:17.000
that would suggest there is a concern

57:17.000 --> 57:19.167
about the way that we have either done

57:19.167 --> 57:21.389
it in the past or that we are improving

57:21.430 --> 57:23.420
on our planning for that type of a

57:23.420 --> 57:27.210
contested environment , Senator I

57:27.210 --> 57:29.700
think that's accurate I think , and you

57:29.700 --> 57:31.644
know , as the character of warfare

57:31.644 --> 57:33.700
changes . So should the character of

57:33.700 --> 57:35.756
logistics and we have to adapt to be

57:35.756 --> 57:37.978
able to continue to be successful . And

57:37.978 --> 57:39.922
what made us successful previously

57:39.922 --> 57:42.144
won't necessarily make uh successful in

57:42.144 --> 57:44.200
the future . So we have work to do .

57:44.200 --> 57:46.422
Thank you . My time has expired . Thank

57:46.422 --> 57:48.478
you . Mr . Chairman , thank you very

57:48.478 --> 57:50.589
much centered around let me recognize

57:50.589 --> 57:54.560
Senator King via Webex general

57:54.560 --> 57:57.120
Walters within the last hour . Since

57:57.120 --> 58:00.640
this hearing has been going on a a

58:00.640 --> 58:02.830
story broke about a leading

58:02.840 --> 58:06.600
spokesperson for the Russians who is

58:06.600 --> 58:08.489
also known as an advisor to Putin

58:08.489 --> 58:10.156
saying that war in Ukraine is

58:10.156 --> 58:12.490
inevitable , that it will start with a

58:12.490 --> 58:15.130
major cyberattack that could extend to

58:15.130 --> 58:18.190
this country of and that they have

58:18.190 --> 58:20.360
overwhelming conventional forces and

58:20.360 --> 58:23.330
that there is no way they could be

58:23.340 --> 58:27.230
repelled from taking over the don bus ,

58:27.230 --> 58:30.640
if not , if not the entire country . Um ,

58:31.120 --> 58:33.940
I view this situation is extremely

58:34.420 --> 58:36.309
concerning . And I guess my first

58:36.309 --> 58:38.850
question is , what's your reaction to

58:38.850 --> 58:41.500
the assertion that a

58:41.510 --> 58:44.950
a Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine

58:44.950 --> 58:47.070
would be unstoppable ? Do the

58:47.070 --> 58:50.620
Ukrainians have the , the weapons , the

58:50.630 --> 58:53.620
manpower , the training , the where

58:53.620 --> 58:57.520
with all to stop such a , such an

58:57.530 --> 59:01.110
attempted annexation ? Uh , I got to

59:01.110 --> 59:05.070
say , I'm I'm mightily reminded of 1938

59:05.070 --> 59:07.200
and the Sudan land and the German

59:07.200 --> 59:09.520
claims of liberating the german

59:09.520 --> 59:11.890
speaking people and very similar things .

59:11.890 --> 59:15.060
We're hearing from Russia . Um talk to

59:15.060 --> 59:17.310
me about the preparation and the

59:17.320 --> 59:19.950
readiness of the Ukrainians and our

59:20.320 --> 59:22.150
readiness to assist them ?

59:24.920 --> 59:27.350
Senator . As we discussed yesterday in

59:27.350 --> 59:30.920
our in our phone conversation , we are

59:30.920 --> 59:34.170
very concerned and in Ukraine and their

59:34.170 --> 59:36.226
partners in the region are doing all

59:36.226 --> 59:38.560
that they can to improve their posture

59:38.570 --> 59:40.570
with each and every second as we go

59:40.570 --> 59:42.900
forward . So if in fact , uh , an

59:42.900 --> 59:45.122
incursion does occur , their their best

59:45.122 --> 59:47.122
position for success , not not only

59:47.122 --> 59:49.390
within their forces but within their

59:49.390 --> 59:51.001
partners within the region .

59:52.820 --> 59:56.570
And you , but I do believe they

59:56.570 --> 59:59.230
could repel an invasion that started

59:59.240 --> 01:00:03.140
next week . I certainly do over time ,

01:00:03.140 --> 01:00:06.940
Senator . Well , I I think

01:00:06.940 --> 01:00:09.400
the uh , let me let me follow up a

01:00:09.410 --> 01:00:11.720
moment about the political situation in

01:00:11.730 --> 01:00:14.060
in eastern Ukraine . There are many

01:00:14.060 --> 01:00:16.820
Russian speaking people there . What's

01:00:16.820 --> 01:00:20.050
the what's the political mood in terms

01:00:20.050 --> 01:00:23.070
of loyalty to the country of Ukraine

01:00:23.070 --> 01:00:26.020
versus loyalty to Russia ?

01:00:28.510 --> 01:00:30.843
Senator , I would categorize it as high ,

01:00:30.843 --> 01:00:33.010
loyal , high loyalty to the country of

01:00:33.010 --> 01:00:36.800
Ukraine . So the the

01:00:36.810 --> 01:00:39.340
claim that Russia would be liberating

01:00:39.340 --> 01:00:42.270
these people from Ukrainian control

01:00:42.270 --> 01:00:45.210
would not would not resonate in that in

01:00:45.210 --> 01:00:48.130
that region . I agree . Center .

01:00:49.410 --> 01:00:52.210
And have we communicated to the

01:00:52.210 --> 01:00:56.170
Russians the fact that this is an

01:00:56.170 --> 01:00:59.300
invasion of this type would be met with

01:00:59.300 --> 01:01:02.450
a with a response that would be would

01:01:02.450 --> 01:01:04.561
serve as a deterrent . It seems to me

01:01:04.561 --> 01:01:06.561
the only thing we have right now is

01:01:06.561 --> 01:01:09.230
deterrence senator . I know that our

01:01:09.230 --> 01:01:11.230
senior civilian leadership have had

01:01:11.230 --> 01:01:13.397
conversations with their colleagues in

01:01:13.397 --> 01:01:15.990
Ukraine and and at the senior level

01:01:15.990 --> 01:01:19.120
with Russia and I'm not privy to all of

01:01:19.120 --> 01:01:21.231
the words that were exchanged . But I

01:01:21.231 --> 01:01:23.398
know that our senior leaders expressed

01:01:23.398 --> 01:01:25.890
deep concern about the robust

01:01:25.890 --> 01:01:28.001
activities in the Donbas and Crimea .

01:01:29.510 --> 01:01:32.120
Thank you . Let me uh let me turn for a

01:01:32.120 --> 01:01:34.920
moment . We mentioned china and Russia

01:01:34.920 --> 01:01:37.142
numerous times in this hearing . Do you

01:01:37.142 --> 01:01:39.930
see evidence in your A . O . R . Of

01:01:40.410 --> 01:01:43.530
increasing relationship cooperation

01:01:44.010 --> 01:01:47.030
if you will between Russia and china .

01:01:47.410 --> 01:01:49.466
Traditionally at least in the recent

01:01:49.466 --> 01:01:53.160
past , they've been uh adversaries or

01:01:53.160 --> 01:01:56.770
at least um suspicious of one

01:01:56.770 --> 01:01:59.260
another . Do you see a developing

01:01:59.260 --> 01:02:02.000
cooperation which would be inimical to

01:02:02.000 --> 01:02:05.380
our interests , Senator ? I I see

01:02:05.380 --> 01:02:08.400
cooperation that's superficial at best .

01:02:08.410 --> 01:02:10.570
I I think it's higher at the tactical

01:02:10.570 --> 01:02:13.160
level soldier to soldier and I think

01:02:13.160 --> 01:02:15.530
it's uh pretty close to phony at the

01:02:15.530 --> 01:02:18.960
strategic level . Well that's

01:02:18.970 --> 01:02:21.660
that's reassuring . I hope that's

01:02:21.660 --> 01:02:23.716
that's correct . General Lyons , you

01:02:23.716 --> 01:02:25.827
and I had an exchange last year about

01:02:25.827 --> 01:02:29.440
the potential gap in coverage

01:02:29.440 --> 01:02:32.000
for refueling . You've testified this

01:02:32.000 --> 01:02:34.167
morning that you feel that that that's

01:02:34.167 --> 01:02:36.167
resolved . I just wanted to sort of

01:02:36.167 --> 01:02:40.020
nail that down that if called upon

01:02:40.030 --> 01:02:43.040
whether it's in the next two years or

01:02:43.040 --> 01:02:45.970
the next 5-7 years , which is where as

01:02:45.970 --> 01:02:49.390
I recall , the potential gap identified

01:02:49.400 --> 01:02:51.760
was identified that we will have

01:02:51.760 --> 01:02:54.760
sufficient refueling resources to

01:02:54.760 --> 01:02:55.760
project power .

01:02:58.800 --> 01:03:01.580
Senator I uh I am comfortable and

01:03:01.580 --> 01:03:03.691
aligned with the Air Force's position

01:03:03.691 --> 01:03:05.913
on this . I think that uh we have to be

01:03:05.913 --> 01:03:08.080
clear that Boeing has a long way to go

01:03:08.080 --> 01:03:10.080
to deliver full operational capable

01:03:10.080 --> 01:03:12.302
weapon system . But in the interim I am

01:03:12.302 --> 01:03:14.247
confident with the capability that

01:03:14.247 --> 01:03:16.413
exists to be day to day competition in

01:03:16.413 --> 01:03:19.440
crisis . I'm just about out of time .

01:03:19.440 --> 01:03:22.740
But does Boeing have do we have a date

01:03:22.740 --> 01:03:25.080
for final delivery and deployment of

01:03:25.080 --> 01:03:29.080
the K . c 46 ? Senator Anatomy of

01:03:29.080 --> 01:03:30.691
the for the Air Force from a

01:03:30.691 --> 01:03:33.460
programmatic perspective ? Uh The the

01:03:33.460 --> 01:03:35.627
latest estimate was an anticipation of

01:03:35.627 --> 01:03:37.849
at least a remedy for the remote visual

01:03:37.849 --> 01:03:40.940
system . Uh Next which is a two dato

01:03:40.950 --> 01:03:44.130
sometime in the 23 time frame . At the

01:03:44.130 --> 01:03:47.040
earliest . It would take some time to

01:03:47.040 --> 01:03:49.373
feel the feel the capability after that .

01:03:50.300 --> 01:03:52.300
Thank you gentlemen , both for your

01:03:52.300 --> 01:03:54.633
testimony . You're back . Mr . Chairman ,

01:03:54.633 --> 01:03:56.411
thank you Senator King . Let me

01:03:56.411 --> 01:03:58.578
recognize . Senator arched . Thank you

01:03:58.578 --> 01:04:00.633
Mr . Chair and gentlemen , thank you

01:04:00.633 --> 01:04:00.510
very much for being here today . We

01:04:00.510 --> 01:04:02.566
certainly appreciate appreciate your

01:04:02.566 --> 01:04:04.570
commitment not only to the men and

01:04:04.570 --> 01:04:06.790
women within your commands but to the

01:04:06.790 --> 01:04:09.570
furtherance of our objectives . So um

01:04:09.580 --> 01:04:12.330
I'll start with you . General Walters .

01:04:12.330 --> 01:04:14.880
Thank you very much . Um let's talk a

01:04:14.880 --> 01:04:17.530
little bit more about our force posture

01:04:17.540 --> 01:04:20.160
in europe and Senator King had just

01:04:20.170 --> 01:04:22.760
mentioned Russia and the conventional

01:04:22.760 --> 01:04:25.680
forces that they have available . Um

01:04:25.680 --> 01:04:28.760
but beyond just their human resources ,

01:04:28.770 --> 01:04:30.770
they have other capabilities . They

01:04:30.770 --> 01:04:32.937
continue to modernize their military .

01:04:32.940 --> 01:04:34.662
They have a number of advanced

01:04:34.662 --> 01:04:36.829
capabilities like ballistic and cruise

01:04:36.829 --> 01:04:39.700
missiles , um certainly sophisticated

01:04:39.710 --> 01:04:42.700
air defenses as we know , um anti

01:04:42.700 --> 01:04:44.960
satellite weapons , electromagnetic and

01:04:44.960 --> 01:04:47.330
cyber attacks . I could go on and on

01:04:47.330 --> 01:04:49.160
and on in this area . But these

01:04:49.160 --> 01:04:51.960
capabilities do pose a challenge to the

01:04:51.960 --> 01:04:54.440
United States as well as our allies in

01:04:54.440 --> 01:04:57.070
that region and certainly our our

01:04:57.070 --> 01:04:59.420
partners in the U . K . U . M . A . R .

01:05:00.090 --> 01:05:03.350
They also continue with their

01:05:03.350 --> 01:05:06.040
operations short of open conflict so

01:05:06.040 --> 01:05:09.160
they're operating in that gray zone

01:05:09.170 --> 01:05:12.800
area . So how are we adapting our

01:05:12.800 --> 01:05:15.800
forces to those capabilities to those

01:05:15.800 --> 01:05:19.410
challenges to push back on Russia

01:05:19.490 --> 01:05:21.970
and what they might be able to do in

01:05:21.970 --> 01:05:22.720
the future ?

01:05:26.490 --> 01:05:29.410
Thanks senator , we're maximizing our

01:05:29.410 --> 01:05:32.230
focus to win in the competition face .

01:05:32.250 --> 01:05:34.139
And we're doing it through a very

01:05:34.139 --> 01:05:36.028
deliberate fashion to continue to

01:05:36.028 --> 01:05:38.030
improve our ability to see the

01:05:38.030 --> 01:05:39.863
environment with indications and

01:05:39.863 --> 01:05:42.030
warnings . Our ability to respond with

01:05:42.030 --> 01:05:44.650
solid command and control in our

01:05:44.650 --> 01:05:46.761
mission command , which characterizes

01:05:46.761 --> 01:05:48.761
the readiness of our forces forward

01:05:48.761 --> 01:05:50.594
being able to conduct all domain

01:05:50.594 --> 01:05:53.350
operations that that take into account

01:05:53.350 --> 01:05:55.470
the desired effect at the appropriate

01:05:55.470 --> 01:05:57.490
time and place of our choosing . To

01:05:57.490 --> 01:05:59.546
ensure that we can be most effective

01:05:59.546 --> 01:06:01.820
and and and that approach affords us

01:06:01.820 --> 01:06:03.987
the opportunity to counter many of the

01:06:03.987 --> 01:06:06.042
issues that you just mentioned . And

01:06:06.042 --> 01:06:07.931
we're also in accordance with the

01:06:07.931 --> 01:06:09.960
National Defense Strategy , working

01:06:09.960 --> 01:06:13.070
very hard , very , very diligently to

01:06:13.080 --> 01:06:15.420
increase our competitive edge in the

01:06:15.420 --> 01:06:17.420
areas of indications and warnings ,

01:06:17.420 --> 01:06:19.698
command and control in mission command .

01:06:19.698 --> 01:06:22.170
And so with that deliberative approach ,

01:06:22.180 --> 01:06:25.590
you are working with our allied forces

01:06:25.590 --> 01:06:27.757
as well . Make sure that we are nested

01:06:27.757 --> 01:06:30.830
and each able to lean on one another .

01:06:30.830 --> 01:06:32.497
Our strengths and and through

01:06:32.497 --> 01:06:34.500
weaknesses to provide pushback .

01:06:35.380 --> 01:06:37.490
Absolutely . Senator , the strategic

01:06:37.490 --> 01:06:39.379
alignment that's required is also

01:06:39.379 --> 01:06:41.546
outside of the military dimension . So

01:06:41.546 --> 01:06:43.657
from a whole of government , whole of

01:06:43.657 --> 01:06:45.934
nation approach whole of ally approach .

01:06:45.934 --> 01:06:47.879
We're doing the same great And one

01:06:47.879 --> 01:06:49.823
thing of course , being a National

01:06:49.823 --> 01:06:52.460
Guard member and being , of course very

01:06:52.460 --> 01:06:54.349
aware and supportive of our state

01:06:54.349 --> 01:06:56.630
partnership program , you've mentioned

01:06:56.640 --> 01:06:58.980
uh the Baltics , but I was heavily

01:06:58.980 --> 01:07:01.720
involved in the Balkans um with our

01:07:01.720 --> 01:07:04.710
state partnership program with Kosovo .

01:07:04.880 --> 01:07:08.430
And so I would just like to hear about

01:07:08.440 --> 01:07:12.210
how this program has been beneficial uh

01:07:12.220 --> 01:07:16.000
through your area of responsibility and

01:07:16.000 --> 01:07:18.000
how we can maybe further strengthen

01:07:18.000 --> 01:07:21.670
those partnership programs . Senator ,

01:07:21.670 --> 01:07:23.337
we're very proud of the state

01:07:23.337 --> 01:07:25.503
partnership program , especially yours

01:07:25.503 --> 01:07:28.280
in Kosovo . And as you will know , the

01:07:28.290 --> 01:07:30.970
632 members of the United States that

01:07:30.970 --> 01:07:33.410
we rotate into K for many come from

01:07:33.420 --> 01:07:36.210
from your state . It is a success area

01:07:36.280 --> 01:07:38.900
uh in NATO , the NATO secretary general

01:07:38.900 --> 01:07:41.067
is very , very fond to ensure that the

01:07:41.067 --> 01:07:44.130
laser focus On the Balkans that the

01:07:44.130 --> 01:07:46.297
biggest challenge we face and one that

01:07:46.297 --> 01:07:48.297
we have achieved success with is to

01:07:48.297 --> 01:07:50.352
make sure that the lanes in the road

01:07:50.352 --> 01:07:52.574
are perfectly understood between K4 and

01:07:52.574 --> 01:07:54.630
the evolving Kosovo security force .

01:07:54.630 --> 01:07:56.741
And the existence of our Kosovo force

01:07:56.741 --> 01:07:58.908
has been instrumental in ensuring that

01:07:58.908 --> 01:08:00.963
we each understand our lanes . Yes ,

01:08:00.963 --> 01:08:03.360
very good . And just very briefly and

01:08:03.370 --> 01:08:05.900
thank you sir , General Lyons , I'm

01:08:05.900 --> 01:08:08.780
gonna push on the KC 46 is as well , I

01:08:08.780 --> 01:08:10.502
was able to go out on a flight

01:08:10.502 --> 01:08:13.400
yesterday in a K . C 46 with a number

01:08:13.400 --> 01:08:16.240
of others um in a delegation and it was

01:08:16.240 --> 01:08:19.240
a great opportunity to really see this

01:08:19.250 --> 01:08:22.140
aircraft in motion in work . We ? Re

01:08:22.140 --> 01:08:24.520
fueled some F fifteens , got some great

01:08:24.520 --> 01:08:26.850
boom operators that are our training ,

01:08:26.850 --> 01:08:28.906
a lot of really wonderful airman out

01:08:28.906 --> 01:08:31.940
there . Um , This is very important to

01:08:31.940 --> 01:08:33.996
the Iowa National Guard as well . We

01:08:33.996 --> 01:08:35.884
still have the KC 1 30 fives were

01:08:35.884 --> 01:08:38.270
anxious to move into the K C 46 as soon

01:08:38.270 --> 01:08:41.350
as Boeing does a little more work . Um ,

01:08:41.360 --> 01:08:43.620
how important are you're , you're

01:08:43.620 --> 01:08:46.840
planning moves , Um , involving the

01:08:46.840 --> 01:08:49.820
National Guard . Are you considering

01:08:49.830 --> 01:08:51.840
the rotation for the reserves , the

01:08:51.840 --> 01:08:54.062
national guards , their deployments and

01:08:54.062 --> 01:08:56.350
so forth as we move those 46 is into

01:08:56.350 --> 01:08:59.670
those areas , ma'am . First of all ,

01:08:59.670 --> 01:09:01.781
thanks for taking time out of andrews

01:09:01.781 --> 01:09:04.200
yesterday on the ramp there really , it

01:09:04.200 --> 01:09:06.200
just acknowledges what an important

01:09:06.200 --> 01:09:08.970
capability aerial refueling is . I I

01:09:08.970 --> 01:09:11.360
would just say it's largely

01:09:11.360 --> 01:09:13.527
misunderstood or under appreciated how

01:09:13.527 --> 01:09:15.650
much the guard and reserve , but

01:09:15.650 --> 01:09:17.706
especially the Air Guard contributes

01:09:17.706 --> 01:09:20.270
every single day to the output of the

01:09:20.270 --> 01:09:22.290
aerial refueling force element ,

01:09:22.670 --> 01:09:24.892
whether that be overseas or here in the

01:09:24.892 --> 01:09:26.870
United States on the , on short on

01:09:26.870 --> 01:09:29.240
short strip alert day in and day out .

01:09:29.250 --> 01:09:31.470
I think my own opinion is that the Air

01:09:31.470 --> 01:09:33.720
Force does this best in terms of Total

01:09:33.720 --> 01:09:36.060
force integration completely integrated

01:09:36.060 --> 01:09:38.227
today . It's absolutely seamless to me

01:09:38.370 --> 01:09:40.703
when I see units out there in the field ,

01:09:40.703 --> 01:09:42.592
I can't tell the difference which

01:09:42.592 --> 01:09:44.648
component they belong to . Fantastic

01:09:44.648 --> 01:09:46.648
Gentlemen . Again , I appreciate it

01:09:46.648 --> 01:09:48.870
very much . And mr Kerry a yield beck .

01:09:48.870 --> 01:09:51.037
Thank you . Thank you Senator . Let me

01:09:51.037 --> 01:09:52.926
recognize the via webex . Senator

01:09:52.926 --> 01:09:55.610
Manchin . Thank you . Thank you

01:09:55.620 --> 01:09:58.790
Chairman . And to thank both of you for

01:09:58.790 --> 01:10:00.512
your service and your family's

01:10:00.512 --> 01:10:03.230
commitment and service To allow you to

01:10:03.230 --> 01:10:05.174
have the opportunities you have to

01:10:05.174 --> 01:10:07.286
serve our country . General walter is

01:10:07.286 --> 01:10:09.452
the european union and Russia to build

01:10:09.452 --> 01:10:11.397
a strategic partnership in trade ,

01:10:11.397 --> 01:10:13.452
energy , climate change , Research ,

01:10:13.452 --> 01:10:15.860
Education , culture and security . The

01:10:15.860 --> 01:10:18.620
crisis in Ukraine and Crimea increased

01:10:18.620 --> 01:10:21.000
sanctions from both the US and EU for

01:10:21.000 --> 01:10:23.111
various violations , but they seem to

01:10:23.111 --> 01:10:26.500
have limiting effects . So my question

01:10:26.500 --> 01:10:28.930
would be understanding that the EU is

01:10:28.930 --> 01:10:31.210
Russia's biggest trading partner , and

01:10:31.210 --> 01:10:34.010
Russia is the EU's fourth largest our

01:10:34.010 --> 01:10:36.010
sanctions in their current forms of

01:10:36.010 --> 01:10:38.380
viable solution to shaping Russia's

01:10:38.380 --> 01:10:42.320
actions , Senator , I certainly

01:10:42.320 --> 01:10:45.270
agree that they contribute in shaping

01:10:45.280 --> 01:10:48.380
Russia's actions . I will also say

01:10:48.390 --> 01:10:51.240
living in europe , that there is a high

01:10:51.240 --> 01:10:53.407
degree of convergence at the strategic

01:10:53.407 --> 01:10:55.820
level between what the EU does and what

01:10:55.820 --> 01:10:58.680
NATO does and for a military member in

01:10:58.680 --> 01:11:01.080
charge of military operations , I will

01:11:01.080 --> 01:11:03.191
tell you that the EU contributions in

01:11:03.191 --> 01:11:05.024
the area of transportation are a

01:11:05.024 --> 01:11:07.080
significant boost and our ability to

01:11:07.080 --> 01:11:10.280
effectively deter a threat . I've been

01:11:10.280 --> 01:11:12.336
especially concerned with continuing

01:11:12.336 --> 01:11:14.113
development of the North Stream

01:11:14.113 --> 01:11:16.280
pipelines . Uh not only do they create

01:11:16.280 --> 01:11:18.570
a further dependence in europe on

01:11:18.570 --> 01:11:20.681
Russia gas and oil , but they also by

01:11:20.681 --> 01:11:23.830
bypass transit countries like Ukraine

01:11:23.830 --> 01:11:26.000
or former soviet NATO members which

01:11:26.000 --> 01:11:28.530
could hold them hostage . And your

01:11:28.530 --> 01:11:31.860
thoughts on that ? I I share your

01:11:31.860 --> 01:11:34.460
concerns , senator . It's uh It's

01:11:34.460 --> 01:11:37.690
disconcerting uh to see what happens

01:11:37.690 --> 01:11:39.920
with the North Stream two pipeline and

01:11:39.920 --> 01:11:42.253
to the countries that it reaches out to .

01:11:42.253 --> 01:11:44.198
And the fact that several of those

01:11:44.198 --> 01:11:46.364
countries are are going to potentially

01:11:46.364 --> 01:11:48.364
be put in a position to where their

01:11:48.364 --> 01:11:50.309
reliance on Russian fuel is is far

01:11:50.309 --> 01:11:52.309
higher than it should be . It is of

01:11:52.309 --> 01:11:54.420
great concern to me . Do you have any

01:11:54.420 --> 01:11:56.198
thoughts on how you would see a

01:11:56.198 --> 01:11:58.253
potential armed conflict playing out

01:11:58.253 --> 01:12:00.640
with our allies , whose whose economies

01:12:00.640 --> 01:12:02.870
are closely tied to Russia ?

01:12:05.250 --> 01:12:07.472
Well , I would promote those nations to

01:12:07.472 --> 01:12:09.528
do what we do in the United States ,

01:12:09.528 --> 01:12:11.861
which is to to store fuel appropriately .

01:12:11.861 --> 01:12:13.861
And we do with other nations within

01:12:13.861 --> 01:12:15.750
europe to ensure that we have the

01:12:15.750 --> 01:12:17.917
resources within to be able to execute

01:12:17.917 --> 01:12:19.694
whatever it is we need to do to

01:12:19.694 --> 01:12:21.861
effectively deter and defend . You are

01:12:21.861 --> 01:12:24.139
you are coordinating with them on that .

01:12:24.150 --> 01:12:26.650
We are senator . Thank you general

01:12:26.650 --> 01:12:28.650
lines , the level of coordination ,

01:12:28.650 --> 01:12:30.817
fleet readiness and response to combat

01:12:30.850 --> 01:12:32.794
commanders . In light of the covid

01:12:32.794 --> 01:12:34.850
pandemic that Transcom provided is

01:12:34.850 --> 01:12:36.683
nothing short of amazing , of an

01:12:36.683 --> 01:12:38.739
unbelievable job . The global threat

01:12:38.739 --> 01:12:41.050
from rational , irrational states and

01:12:41.060 --> 01:12:42.949
actors is ongoing and the rise of

01:12:42.949 --> 01:12:44.838
humanitarian support and cries of

01:12:44.838 --> 01:12:48.270
crisis mitigation is enduring . Uh huh

01:12:49.150 --> 01:12:51.094
What are your concerns have called

01:12:51.094 --> 01:12:53.040
today to support an armed conflict

01:12:53.200 --> 01:12:55.360
force projection , sustainment and

01:12:55.360 --> 01:12:57.970
redeployment in a contested environment

01:12:58.350 --> 01:13:00.517
while also potentially call to support

01:13:00.517 --> 01:13:02.739
humanitarian missions on opposite sides

01:13:02.739 --> 01:13:03.739
of the world .

01:13:08.850 --> 01:13:10.628
Senator , thanks thanks for the

01:13:10.628 --> 01:13:13.800
question . Um we know that the security

01:13:13.800 --> 01:13:16.022
environment is changing quite rapidly .

01:13:16.022 --> 01:13:17.911
We know that the character war is

01:13:17.911 --> 01:13:19.967
changing quite rapidly and so should

01:13:19.967 --> 01:13:22.050
the character of logistics . So our

01:13:22.050 --> 01:13:24.420
ability to project the force and

01:13:24.420 --> 01:13:26.960
sustain the force over global distances

01:13:26.970 --> 01:13:29.130
uh is a key strategic comparative

01:13:29.130 --> 01:13:31.300
advantage that we all understand we

01:13:31.300 --> 01:13:33.870
must maintain and as we look at that

01:13:33.870 --> 01:13:36.092
ability and we look at it from the lens

01:13:36.092 --> 01:13:38.037
of a potential adversary and where

01:13:38.037 --> 01:13:40.037
there might be vulnerabilities , uh

01:13:40.037 --> 01:13:41.814
particularly vulnerabilities of

01:13:41.814 --> 01:13:44.037
consequence , we are in fact addressing

01:13:44.037 --> 01:13:45.759
those and buying down the risk

01:13:45.759 --> 01:13:49.320
associated with those . I am confident

01:13:49.320 --> 01:13:51.320
in our ability today to continue to

01:13:51.320 --> 01:13:53.690
project the force and support the force

01:13:53.700 --> 01:13:56.090
at our time and place of choosing . But

01:13:56.090 --> 01:13:58.201
I do acknowledge that we have work to

01:13:58.201 --> 01:14:00.360
do to an anticipation of a of a more

01:14:00.360 --> 01:14:02.750
sophisticated adversary . Let me follow

01:14:02.750 --> 01:14:05.083
up on my final question . General lines ,

01:14:05.083 --> 01:14:07.250
you spoke about the success of the D .

01:14:07.250 --> 01:14:08.861
O . D . S . Power projection

01:14:08.861 --> 01:14:11.028
capabilities being contingent on three

01:14:11.028 --> 01:14:12.917
critical elements global mobility

01:14:12.917 --> 01:14:15.350
posture , Global transport capacity and

01:14:15.350 --> 01:14:17.628
global command and control integration .

01:14:17.628 --> 01:14:19.628
So what allied shortfalls currently

01:14:19.628 --> 01:14:21.406
exist to support these critical

01:14:21.406 --> 01:14:23.572
requirements if called to surge forces

01:14:23.572 --> 01:14:25.370
in support of the EU

01:14:27.840 --> 01:14:29.940
senator . I have to say I'm very

01:14:29.950 --> 01:14:33.560
pleased with the enormous constellation

01:14:33.570 --> 01:14:36.250
of like minded allies and partners that

01:14:36.250 --> 01:14:38.194
support the United States security

01:14:38.194 --> 01:14:41.070
interests abroad . We could not operate

01:14:41.080 --> 01:14:42.802
the global mobility enterprise

01:14:42.802 --> 01:14:45.520
successfully without the access basing

01:14:45.520 --> 01:14:47.680
and overflight that they provide and

01:14:47.680 --> 01:14:50.040
the extension of our broad and far

01:14:50.040 --> 01:14:52.780
reaching logistics network . So I'm

01:14:52.780 --> 01:14:54.613
very pleased with our allies and

01:14:54.613 --> 01:14:56.669
partners and very grateful for their

01:14:56.669 --> 01:14:58.613
continued support . And I know you

01:14:58.613 --> 01:15:01.920
spoke about Russia is moving on Ukraine

01:15:01.920 --> 01:15:05.260
and Crimea again and everything and we

01:15:05.260 --> 01:15:08.960
wish all of our allies and under your

01:15:09.010 --> 01:15:11.320
leadership the most success because

01:15:11.320 --> 01:15:14.150
that would be severely critical for all

01:15:14.150 --> 01:15:16.230
of us that they continue to do what

01:15:16.230 --> 01:15:18.397
they are doing right now . But again ,

01:15:18.397 --> 01:15:20.740
thank you both for your service . Thank

01:15:20.740 --> 01:15:23.190
you sir . Thank you . Senator mentioned

01:15:23.190 --> 01:15:25.523
now , let me recognize Senator Sullivan .

01:15:25.840 --> 01:15:28.300
Thank you . Mr Chairman gentlemen .

01:15:28.300 --> 01:15:31.890
Welcome . Thanks for your service . I

01:15:31.890 --> 01:15:33.668
wasn't planning on raising this

01:15:33.668 --> 01:15:35.723
question , but since it came up from

01:15:35.723 --> 01:15:37.890
Senator Blumenthal , you know , I just

01:15:37.890 --> 01:15:39.946
got back from a week of Marine Corps

01:15:39.946 --> 01:15:42.530
Reserve training . It's uh , great to

01:15:42.530 --> 01:15:44.586
serve with such fine men and women .

01:15:45.240 --> 01:15:47.570
But this notion of extremism and the

01:15:47.570 --> 01:15:51.370
military , which is thrown about as if

01:15:52.240 --> 01:15:55.450
We know numbers Senator Blumenthal 10% .

01:15:55.840 --> 01:15:58.120
Uh , I think that's irresponsible .

01:15:58.130 --> 01:16:00.590
I've asked from the military data , I

01:16:00.590 --> 01:16:04.140
want data before we besmirch the

01:16:04.140 --> 01:16:07.930
entire military . The

01:16:07.940 --> 01:16:10.020
Under secretary nominee came before

01:16:10.020 --> 01:16:12.242
this hearing said he was going to quote

01:16:12.242 --> 01:16:14.298
stamp out systemic racism within the

01:16:14.298 --> 01:16:16.298
ranks of the military , asked him ,

01:16:16.298 --> 01:16:18.576
have you ever served in the ranks ? No ,

01:16:18.830 --> 01:16:21.310
sir , We need to be careful with this .

01:16:21.310 --> 01:16:24.690
I'm just going to ask you two generals

01:16:24.700 --> 01:16:26.922
served your whole career . Do you think

01:16:26.922 --> 01:16:28.756
that we have this giant group of

01:16:28.756 --> 01:16:30.811
extremists in the military ? I think

01:16:30.811 --> 01:16:32.870
it's one of the most best group of

01:16:32.870 --> 01:16:36.550
americans who aren't Racists . You got

01:16:36.550 --> 01:16:38.670
knuckleheads in every organization in

01:16:38.670 --> 01:16:40.726
the world , including the Congress ,

01:16:40.726 --> 01:16:43.210
the United States , by the way . But

01:16:43.210 --> 01:16:47.060
there's just narrative now that

01:16:47.830 --> 01:16:49.820
We got all these extremists in the

01:16:49.820 --> 01:16:51.987
military . I think it's ridiculous and

01:16:51.987 --> 01:16:53.987
we need to see data before we start

01:16:53.987 --> 01:16:56.153
throwing out issues like 10% . How the

01:16:56.153 --> 01:16:59.400
hell does he know ? It's 10% . What do

01:16:59.400 --> 01:17:01.540
you think , gentlemen ? Do you think

01:17:01.540 --> 01:17:03.707
you serve in the military with a bunch

01:17:03.707 --> 01:17:07.620
of extremists ? Senator ? I concur with

01:17:07.620 --> 01:17:11.180
you . I don't see a giant portion of

01:17:11.180 --> 01:17:13.550
the population . Really makes me mad .

01:17:14.130 --> 01:17:16.560
The Washington post U . S . Senators .

01:17:17.230 --> 01:17:19.450
The smooching the whole force

01:17:20.530 --> 01:17:22.610
irresponsibly general . What's your

01:17:22.610 --> 01:17:25.240
experience we have ? We have bad people .

01:17:25.240 --> 01:17:28.350
Of course idiots in any organization .

01:17:29.030 --> 01:17:31.141
But this is getting ridiculous when a

01:17:31.141 --> 01:17:33.270
US . senators saying 10% . Where the

01:17:33.270 --> 01:17:35.970
hell did you get that number one in 10 ?

01:17:35.980 --> 01:17:38.050
Is that your experience ? General

01:17:38.530 --> 01:17:41.230
senator . Let me be perfectly clear . I

01:17:41.230 --> 01:17:45.180
think we have the finest military . Our

01:17:45.180 --> 01:17:48.410
world has known me too . I believe that

01:17:48.420 --> 01:17:50.642
and I served with him . I just got done

01:17:50.642 --> 01:17:52.970
serving with him And sir I appreciate

01:17:52.970 --> 01:17:55.460
that we have the best America has to

01:17:55.460 --> 01:17:58.510
offer . There is no question in my mind

01:17:58.510 --> 01:18:00.880
after 38 years of service . I believe

01:18:00.880 --> 01:18:03.213
that in my heart . I know it to be true .

01:18:03.720 --> 01:18:07.010
Uh a very small very small and

01:18:07.020 --> 01:18:09.440
10% . You think it's 10 center ? I

01:18:09.440 --> 01:18:11.600
don't think it's 10% . Not even close

01:18:11.600 --> 01:18:13.767
is it a matter of fact , I don't think

01:18:13.767 --> 01:18:15.933
there's been any data on the topic . I

01:18:15.933 --> 01:18:17.933
can just tell you from experience .

01:18:17.933 --> 01:18:20.100
It's extremely small . And even though

01:18:20.100 --> 01:18:22.322
it's extremely small and it may be less

01:18:22.322 --> 01:18:24.656
than 1% . I don't want to be dismissive .

01:18:24.656 --> 01:18:26.878
Of course the degradation in Iraq's But

01:18:26.878 --> 01:18:28.890
but it should not characterized the

01:18:28.890 --> 01:18:31.057
joint for do you think it's enormously

01:18:31.057 --> 01:18:33.279
powerful and professional joint ? Thank

01:18:33.279 --> 01:18:35.120
you . Gen . Do you think it's 10

01:18:35.120 --> 01:18:37.490
general . anything in your experience

01:18:37.490 --> 01:18:40.510
and your 30 40 plus years as a general

01:18:40.510 --> 01:18:42.510
officer in the military senator ? I

01:18:42.510 --> 01:18:44.843
certainly agree that number is too high .

01:18:44.843 --> 01:18:46.732
Yeah . So here's what I think the

01:18:46.732 --> 01:18:48.954
Secretary of defense needs to enough of

01:18:48.954 --> 01:18:51.010
this . We need data . We need data .

01:18:51.010 --> 01:18:53.780
Okay . In besmirching the whole force

01:18:53.860 --> 01:18:56.320
reserve or active duty whether it's a U .

01:18:56.320 --> 01:18:58.542
S . Senator . The Washington post which

01:18:58.542 --> 01:19:00.709
writes historian is once a day with no

01:19:00.709 --> 01:19:03.060
data or the undersecretary who wants to

01:19:03.060 --> 01:19:05.060
be undersecretary . I hope he's not

01:19:05.060 --> 01:19:07.060
going to be under secretary for the

01:19:07.060 --> 01:19:09.227
pentagon . We need to start using data

01:19:09.227 --> 01:19:12.260
and not this B . S .

01:19:13.420 --> 01:19:15.476
That's shameful Because I don't even

01:19:15.476 --> 01:19:17.860
think it's close to 10 and you know

01:19:17.860 --> 01:19:20.180
we're going to do this is gonna make

01:19:20.180 --> 01:19:22.347
people not want to join the military .

01:19:23.720 --> 01:19:25.831
So anyways I was not going to even go

01:19:25.831 --> 01:19:27.664
on this topic but when I hear us

01:19:27.664 --> 01:19:30.140
senator throughout 10 it's ridiculous ,

01:19:30.920 --> 01:19:34.700
ridiculous really pissing me

01:19:34.700 --> 01:19:37.910
off . Sorry . Mr Chairman

01:19:37.920 --> 01:19:41.720
I've had enough of this . Uh General .

01:19:41.720 --> 01:19:43.740
Can I talk about the Russian arctic

01:19:44.120 --> 01:19:46.900
build up and what we need to be doing

01:19:46.900 --> 01:19:48.733
about it ? You know we have this

01:19:48.733 --> 01:19:52.090
strange seems of co

01:19:52.090 --> 01:19:55.340
coms the actions in the arctic which is

01:19:55.340 --> 01:19:59.270
kind of you come but Pay

01:19:59.270 --> 01:20:02.070
com owns a lot of the forces . Stratcom

01:20:02.070 --> 01:20:04.237
has a big responsibility in the arctic

01:20:04.237 --> 01:20:07.220
as well with missile defense . What's

01:20:07.220 --> 01:20:09.331
happening there ? It's even more than

01:20:09.331 --> 01:20:13.000
has happened recently . And what should

01:20:13.000 --> 01:20:15.111
we be doing about it and how to think

01:20:15.111 --> 01:20:16.944
about it , senator . I think the

01:20:16.944 --> 01:20:19.056
campaign momentum's traversing in the

01:20:19.056 --> 01:20:21.222
correct direction with with your great

01:20:21.222 --> 01:20:23.056
work over the course of the last

01:20:23.056 --> 01:20:25.278
several years , all of the services U S

01:20:25.278 --> 01:20:27.056
D O . D . And the NATO military

01:20:27.056 --> 01:20:28.944
strategy and the NATO concept for

01:20:28.944 --> 01:20:31.111
deterrence and defense of the atlantic

01:20:31.111 --> 01:20:33.333
specifically points to the fact that we

01:20:33.333 --> 01:20:35.167
must have an arctic strategy and

01:20:35.167 --> 01:20:37.167
nations militaries are constructing

01:20:37.167 --> 01:20:38.830
strategies that must include

01:20:38.910 --> 01:20:40.966
considerations for activities in the

01:20:40.966 --> 01:20:43.080
arctic . So the focus in the

01:20:43.080 --> 01:20:45.380
architecture , improving the resources

01:20:45.380 --> 01:20:47.547
are growing as you will know , through

01:20:47.547 --> 01:20:49.491
your initiatives , we were able to

01:20:49.491 --> 01:20:51.713
house ph and f 30 fives at keflavik for

01:20:51.713 --> 01:20:53.769
the first time and most of what they

01:20:53.769 --> 01:20:55.824
did was contribute to I N . W in the

01:20:55.824 --> 01:20:57.880
vicinity of the arctic . Getting the

01:20:57.880 --> 01:21:00.102
NATO nations not not just the ones that

01:21:00.102 --> 01:21:02.324
are about the arctic , but all involved

01:21:02.324 --> 01:21:04.547
in the process is occurring through the

01:21:04.547 --> 01:21:06.769
good work of the secretary General . So

01:21:06.769 --> 01:21:08.991
I believe that our campaign momentum is

01:21:08.991 --> 01:21:10.991
going in the correct direction from

01:21:10.991 --> 01:21:10.970
strategy all the way down to

01:21:10.970 --> 01:21:12.914
requirements . Great , thank you .

01:21:12.914 --> 01:21:14.914
Thank you . Mr Chairman . Thank you

01:21:14.914 --> 01:21:17.137
very much . Senator . Sullivan , let me

01:21:17.137 --> 01:21:19.470
recognize via Webex center Rosen . Okay ,

01:21:20.310 --> 01:21:22.610
thank you . Mr Chairman , appreciate

01:21:22.610 --> 01:21:24.880
this hearing and thank you gentlemen

01:21:24.880 --> 01:21:27.102
for your service to lifetime of service

01:21:27.102 --> 01:21:29.213
to this nation . We really appreciate

01:21:29.213 --> 01:21:31.436
everything that you do every day and to

01:21:31.436 --> 01:21:33.760
all the service men and women that are

01:21:33.760 --> 01:21:35.920
under your command . Um I'd like to

01:21:35.920 --> 01:21:37.642
speak a little bit today about

01:21:37.642 --> 01:21:40.100
cybersecurity . Our NATO allies of

01:21:40.100 --> 01:21:42.100
course are essential to ensuring us

01:21:42.100 --> 01:21:44.620
cybersecurity . We rely on our allies

01:21:44.620 --> 01:21:46.540
to harden our collective defences

01:21:46.540 --> 01:21:49.160
against frequent and sophisticated

01:21:49.170 --> 01:21:51.780
cyber threats . Cybersecurity has

01:21:51.780 --> 01:21:53.836
increasingly become an area of focus

01:21:53.836 --> 01:21:55.836
for NATO , from hosting the largest

01:21:55.836 --> 01:21:57.669
cyber exercise in the world , to

01:21:57.669 --> 01:21:59.558
operating a cyber base cyberspace

01:21:59.558 --> 01:22:02.820
operations center in Belgium . And so

01:22:02.820 --> 01:22:04.709
general Walters , one of the most

01:22:04.709 --> 01:22:07.460
significant cyber threats that the NATO

01:22:07.460 --> 01:22:09.293
alliance is facing . And can you

01:22:09.293 --> 01:22:11.810
specifically describe to us the cyber

01:22:11.810 --> 01:22:13.980
threat our european allies are facing

01:22:13.990 --> 01:22:17.800
from Russia . Thanks thanks for the

01:22:17.800 --> 01:22:19.856
question senator . It's it's a great

01:22:19.856 --> 01:22:22.600
topic . I will tell you that I'm

01:22:22.600 --> 01:22:24.711
excited about the fact that from a US

01:22:24.711 --> 01:22:27.580
perspective , our force presentation by

01:22:27.580 --> 01:22:30.530
selecting one military commander to

01:22:30.530 --> 01:22:33.180
lead military cyber as General

01:22:33.180 --> 01:22:36.260
Nicholson has allowed us to deliver

01:22:36.260 --> 01:22:38.270
clear direction and guidance to the

01:22:38.270 --> 01:22:40.500
nations that assist us in the cyber

01:22:40.500 --> 01:22:43.180
arena are manning is much better for

01:22:43.180 --> 01:22:45.160
all of the organizations and the

01:22:45.160 --> 01:22:46.950
organizations have continued to

01:22:46.950 --> 01:22:49.290
perpetuate the nation's the importance

01:22:49.300 --> 01:22:51.860
of improving the nation's cyber hygiene

01:22:51.860 --> 01:22:54.027
in the network . As you will know , we

01:22:54.027 --> 01:22:56.082
still have a long ways to go in that

01:22:56.082 --> 01:22:58.082
area , but but nations have to make

01:22:58.082 --> 01:23:00.304
sure that they understand what it takes

01:23:00.304 --> 01:23:02.360
and how to defend their networks and

01:23:02.360 --> 01:23:04.471
then they can start to get into other

01:23:04.471 --> 01:23:06.710
areas of of of of cyber deliverance of

01:23:06.710 --> 01:23:09.350
forces . And I'm very , very pleased to

01:23:09.350 --> 01:23:11.630
report that the manning across the NATO

01:23:11.630 --> 01:23:13.797
nations with respect to cyber activity

01:23:13.797 --> 01:23:16.370
has improved and the focus on improving

01:23:16.370 --> 01:23:19.250
our cyber hygiene has improved across

01:23:19.250 --> 01:23:22.480
the european nations . Um That's

01:23:22.480 --> 01:23:24.480
terrific because that was one of my

01:23:24.480 --> 01:23:26.647
next question is what are you doing to

01:23:26.647 --> 01:23:28.758
prevent mitigate and recover from the

01:23:28.758 --> 01:23:30.980
cyber attacks ? But how how can we help

01:23:30.980 --> 01:23:33.147
you ? How should we be coordinating or

01:23:33.147 --> 01:23:32.590
what do you think you need to

01:23:32.590 --> 01:23:35.770
coordinate better with our allies in

01:23:35.770 --> 01:23:37.330
this , in this realm

01:23:39.100 --> 01:23:42.320
In Europe , we've had the opportunity

01:23:42.330 --> 01:23:45.100
to lead from the front with respect to

01:23:45.110 --> 01:23:48.380
the US two and cyber uh we we've had

01:23:48.380 --> 01:23:50.047
the opportunity with with the

01:23:50.047 --> 01:23:52.269
assistance of other European nations to

01:23:52.269 --> 01:23:54.690
educate the masses on the appropriate

01:23:54.690 --> 01:23:56.960
steps forward in the cyber domain . And

01:23:56.970 --> 01:23:59.100
and and we are getting great support

01:23:59.100 --> 01:24:01.270
from all nations who want to protect

01:24:01.270 --> 01:24:03.326
their networks . And I think what we

01:24:03.326 --> 01:24:05.103
have to do is just continue the

01:24:05.103 --> 01:24:07.270
campaign momentum that we're currently

01:24:07.270 --> 01:24:09.437
on and continue the advocacy from NATO

01:24:09.437 --> 01:24:11.930
and the EU in the cyber domain . Thank

01:24:11.930 --> 01:24:13.930
you . And General Lyons . I want to

01:24:13.930 --> 01:24:15.930
kind of continue on this and talk a

01:24:15.930 --> 01:24:17.874
little bit about cloud migration .

01:24:17.874 --> 01:24:20.097
Transcom was of course the first Jihadi

01:24:20.097 --> 01:24:21.819
organization to move its cyber

01:24:21.819 --> 01:24:23.874
capabilities and command and control

01:24:23.874 --> 01:24:25.819
applications to a commercial cloud

01:24:25.819 --> 01:24:27.874
environment . So General Lions , can

01:24:27.874 --> 01:24:30.080
you provide us with an update on the

01:24:30.080 --> 01:24:32.800
migration to the services to the cloud ?

01:24:32.890 --> 01:24:35.580
Are you experiencing the benefits ? Um

01:24:35.580 --> 01:24:37.691
and what are you feeling about this ?

01:24:37.691 --> 01:24:39.747
What are your best practices again ?

01:24:39.747 --> 01:24:41.747
What do you , what do you think you

01:24:41.747 --> 01:24:43.469
need going forward as you move

01:24:43.469 --> 01:24:45.524
everything to the cloud and begin to

01:24:45.524 --> 01:24:47.850
work there ? Well , Senator , thanks

01:24:47.850 --> 01:24:50.380
for the question and I appreciate the

01:24:50.390 --> 01:24:52.420
topic here because I think we all

01:24:52.420 --> 01:24:54.420
acknowledge that sybers warfighting

01:24:54.420 --> 01:24:56.680
domain and the adversary does get a

01:24:56.680 --> 01:24:59.080
vote , particularly across the global

01:24:59.080 --> 01:25:01.302
mobility enterprise . We know we have a

01:25:01.302 --> 01:25:03.630
very large and sometimes vulnerable

01:25:03.630 --> 01:25:05.630
attack surface and so we're working

01:25:05.630 --> 01:25:07.741
very diligently for that . One of the

01:25:07.741 --> 01:25:10.050
areas as you mentioned , senator is our

01:25:10.050 --> 01:25:12.161
digital modernization effort and part

01:25:12.161 --> 01:25:14.328
of that is moving to the cloud . We've

01:25:14.328 --> 01:25:16.270
been able to move Uh well over 20

01:25:16.270 --> 01:25:18.680
systems into the cloud . Uh we're still

01:25:18.680 --> 01:25:21.150
working on virtualization in some of

01:25:21.150 --> 01:25:23.400
these areas , but we are making

01:25:23.400 --> 01:25:25.400
progress and I think the cloud does

01:25:25.400 --> 01:25:27.650
offer uh some capability and some

01:25:27.650 --> 01:25:30.780
security uh that we don't have today .

01:25:30.780 --> 01:25:32.669
And so I'm , I'm pleased with the

01:25:32.669 --> 01:25:34.780
progress we've started , but we still

01:25:34.780 --> 01:25:37.680
have a ways to go . Um , thank you . I

01:25:37.680 --> 01:25:40.330
appreciate that . And I'd actually like

01:25:40.330 --> 01:25:43.310
to move on and talk a little bit about

01:25:43.320 --> 01:25:46.850
Transcom Covid 19 operations . And so

01:25:46.860 --> 01:25:49.010
General Lions , can you describe the

01:25:49.010 --> 01:25:51.121
short term and long term impacts that

01:25:51.121 --> 01:25:54.390
Covid 19 has had on Transcom operations

01:25:54.390 --> 01:25:56.920
as you're moving forward ? And uh um

01:25:57.190 --> 01:25:59.301
How have you supported diodes mission

01:25:59.301 --> 01:26:02.850
to respond to COVID-19 . Thanks Senator .

01:26:02.860 --> 01:26:04.804
I have to say . I couldn't be more

01:26:04.804 --> 01:26:07.010
proud of the entire transparent team

01:26:07.020 --> 01:26:08.853
the way they've been continue to

01:26:08.853 --> 01:26:11.380
operate throughout the entire past year

01:26:11.390 --> 01:26:13.112
despite Covid while taking the

01:26:13.112 --> 01:26:15.570
appropriate mitigation measures . You

01:26:15.570 --> 01:26:17.792
know , early on , we really didn't know

01:26:17.792 --> 01:26:19.959
what we didn't know . But I'm so proud

01:26:19.959 --> 01:26:22.014
that the folks were able to continue

01:26:22.014 --> 01:26:24.126
operations . We were able to continue

01:26:24.126 --> 01:26:26.070
to support the force . Things like

01:26:26.070 --> 01:26:28.181
defender europe continued to a lesser

01:26:28.181 --> 01:26:30.348
degree and supported general Walters .

01:26:30.348 --> 01:26:32.403
We were able to support the whole of

01:26:32.403 --> 01:26:34.403
government effort . We were able to

01:26:34.403 --> 01:26:36.237
conduct uh , aerosol testing for

01:26:36.237 --> 01:26:38.403
commercial aircraft , for example , to

01:26:38.403 --> 01:26:38.370
determine that the probability for

01:26:38.370 --> 01:26:40.540
viral spread aboard a commercial

01:26:40.540 --> 01:26:42.720
airliner with HEPA filtration and the

01:26:42.720 --> 01:26:44.387
high velocity air exchange is

01:26:44.387 --> 01:26:46.430
extraordinarily low . So we've been

01:26:46.430 --> 01:26:48.610
able to work a wide range of things to

01:26:48.610 --> 01:26:50.610
include creating capability to move

01:26:50.610 --> 01:26:52.499
highly infectious patients . So I

01:26:52.499 --> 01:26:54.790
really , I am incredibly grateful for

01:26:54.790 --> 01:26:56.957
the team to be able to face that level

01:26:56.957 --> 01:26:59.290
adversity and just continue to drive on .

01:26:59.980 --> 01:27:02.470
Thank you . I look back . Thank you

01:27:02.470 --> 01:27:04.900
Senator Rosen , Senator Cramer ,

01:27:06.480 --> 01:27:09.230
thank you . Thank you Senator . Thank

01:27:09.230 --> 01:27:11.286
you generals both for being here for

01:27:11.286 --> 01:27:13.397
your service of course . And right up

01:27:13.397 --> 01:27:15.452
front . Let me just associate myself

01:27:15.452 --> 01:27:17.563
with the statements and the questions

01:27:17.563 --> 01:27:19.619
from Senator Sullivan and appreciate

01:27:19.619 --> 01:27:21.786
your direct responses . It is time for

01:27:21.786 --> 01:27:23.897
members of this committee and leaders

01:27:23.897 --> 01:27:25.952
throughout our government as well as

01:27:25.952 --> 01:27:28.008
well . We can't expect much from our

01:27:28.008 --> 01:27:30.119
media but to start being accurate and

01:27:30.119 --> 01:27:32.119
representing that you represent the

01:27:32.119 --> 01:27:34.286
best of us , not the worst of us , the

01:27:34.286 --> 01:27:34.200
absolute best of us . And that's my

01:27:34.200 --> 01:27:37.630
observation with the vast , vast

01:27:37.630 --> 01:27:39.797
majority of the military men and women

01:27:39.797 --> 01:27:41.797
that I encounter . So thank you for

01:27:41.797 --> 01:27:43.908
your service . Um I'll pass on asking

01:27:43.908 --> 01:27:46.130
you general Walters about . I'm sorry ,

01:27:46.130 --> 01:27:48.297
I appreciate your previous response uh

01:27:48.297 --> 01:27:50.519
to that . I have some concern about the

01:27:50.519 --> 01:27:52.760
gap being created between legacy and

01:27:52.770 --> 01:27:54.930
new programs . I want to be a part of

01:27:54.930 --> 01:27:56.930
the solution . So I appreciate your

01:27:56.930 --> 01:27:59.097
balanced answer . I will ask you about

01:27:59.097 --> 01:28:01.880
our outstanding nuclear deterrent and

01:28:01.880 --> 01:28:04.540
its role currently and as well as going

01:28:04.550 --> 01:28:07.350
forward , we know that um there are

01:28:07.350 --> 01:28:10.160
credible deterrent is our triad and

01:28:10.160 --> 01:28:12.049
it's the backstop for most of our

01:28:12.049 --> 01:28:14.104
operational plans around the world .

01:28:14.104 --> 01:28:16.160
And so my question for you is if the

01:28:16.160 --> 01:28:18.640
United States didn't have this credible

01:28:18.650 --> 01:28:20.950
nuclear umbrella , would that change

01:28:20.950 --> 01:28:23.300
europe's conventional and its

01:28:23.300 --> 01:28:25.244
conventional and nuclear posture ?

01:28:27.270 --> 01:28:29.492
Yes , senator . I think that it would .

01:28:29.492 --> 01:28:31.659
And what could be the ramifications of

01:28:31.659 --> 01:28:33.437
them not feeling safe under our

01:28:33.437 --> 01:28:36.450
umbrella ? I think that's the precise

01:28:36.450 --> 01:28:38.561
issue . What we're not certain to the

01:28:38.561 --> 01:28:40.617
degree that we would be compromising

01:28:40.617 --> 01:28:42.540
safety and security . And if that

01:28:42.540 --> 01:28:45.160
happens , would we could we see as they

01:28:45.160 --> 01:28:47.850
change their posture ? The the the you

01:28:47.850 --> 01:28:50.820
know , build out among our allies . Of

01:28:50.820 --> 01:28:53.840
course , I guess that's possible .

01:28:53.840 --> 01:28:56.700
Center right then I'm going to shift

01:28:56.710 --> 01:28:59.780
gears to question of energy

01:29:00.570 --> 01:29:02.737
And ask you specifically , what do you

01:29:02.737 --> 01:29:04.959
believe that completion of North Stream

01:29:04.959 --> 01:29:06.903
two would affect the leverage that

01:29:06.903 --> 01:29:09.290
Russia has over our allies into europe .

01:29:11.270 --> 01:29:14.850
Yes , senator . Because one of the one

01:29:14.850 --> 01:29:17.017
of the other peripheral issues that we

01:29:17.017 --> 01:29:19.290
sometimes get into around here besides

01:29:19.870 --> 01:29:23.270
um our military and posture and

01:29:23.280 --> 01:29:27.140
lethal itty uh and readiness is

01:29:27.150 --> 01:29:29.540
climate and and these are important

01:29:29.540 --> 01:29:31.707
issues . I don't want to make the case

01:29:31.707 --> 01:29:33.873
that they are , but I want to give you

01:29:33.873 --> 01:29:35.873
just one example that concerns me a

01:29:35.873 --> 01:29:38.040
little bit and I've asked many of your

01:29:38.040 --> 01:29:39.873
peers about the monitoring , for

01:29:39.873 --> 01:29:43.190
example , of Iran's um tankers and the

01:29:43.190 --> 01:29:46.430
movement of energy , fossil energy uh ,

01:29:46.440 --> 01:29:49.140
in an unsafe parts of the world . But

01:29:49.140 --> 01:29:51.870
in europe and we know the situation a

01:29:51.870 --> 01:29:54.570
few months ago where Angry power in

01:29:54.570 --> 01:29:57.500
France had made a large contract for a

01:29:57.510 --> 01:29:59.454
liquid natural gas from the United

01:29:59.454 --> 01:30:01.177
States . The french government

01:30:01.177 --> 01:30:03.460
intervened in that and uh french

01:30:03.460 --> 01:30:05.820
government used to be a wholly owned uh

01:30:05.830 --> 01:30:08.030
the sole owner of Andy Power . And now

01:30:08.030 --> 01:30:10.570
they're just like a 49% owner . Um but

01:30:10.570 --> 01:30:13.200
they intervened and said , uh no , we

01:30:13.200 --> 01:30:16.430
want to continue buying natural gas

01:30:16.430 --> 01:30:20.380
from Vladimir Putin , and I'm not

01:30:20.380 --> 01:30:23.380
sure that a lot of people around here

01:30:23.960 --> 01:30:26.290
grasp the magnitude of a decision like

01:30:26.290 --> 01:30:28.890
that . Now , your issue , of course ,

01:30:28.890 --> 01:30:30.750
is national security , as is our

01:30:30.760 --> 01:30:32.871
committees . But for those people who

01:30:32.871 --> 01:30:35.038
want to sort of transfer their climate

01:30:35.038 --> 01:30:37.038
guilt to other parts of the world ,

01:30:37.038 --> 01:30:39.250
they should know that Vladimir Putin's

01:30:39.250 --> 01:30:42.390
natural gas sent by pipeline to places

01:30:42.390 --> 01:30:44.112
like France and other european

01:30:44.112 --> 01:30:46.570
countries and allies of ours Emits

01:30:46.570 --> 01:30:49.160
about 40 more greenhouse gases than

01:30:49.160 --> 01:30:51.382
liquid natural gas produced and shipped

01:30:51.382 --> 01:30:54.200
from the United States of America . So ,

01:30:54.210 --> 01:30:58.040
um , I guess I what I would just

01:30:58.040 --> 01:31:00.500
request and you give very good direct

01:31:00.500 --> 01:31:03.120
answers to questions . But um , we need

01:31:03.120 --> 01:31:05.820
to help our public better understand

01:31:05.820 --> 01:31:08.800
the ramifications of climate change

01:31:08.810 --> 01:31:11.580
globally and the ramifications of

01:31:11.960 --> 01:31:15.780
of hurting America's domestic

01:31:16.160 --> 01:31:18.390
production of fossil fuels that are in

01:31:18.390 --> 01:31:20.557
high demand around the world . And not

01:31:20.557 --> 01:31:23.990
let our allies much less adversaries be

01:31:24.000 --> 01:31:27.640
um dependent more on not as

01:31:27.640 --> 01:31:31.030
clean and certainly not as as secure

01:31:31.040 --> 01:31:33.380
energy resources as uh as the

01:31:33.380 --> 01:31:35.950
alternatives . American clean , good

01:31:35.960 --> 01:31:39.860
energy is . So with that I thank you .

01:31:39.870 --> 01:31:42.400
Gilbert . Thank you . Senator Crane .

01:31:42.400 --> 01:31:44.910
Let me recognize via webex center

01:31:44.920 --> 01:31:48.190
kurono . Thank you . Mr Chairman

01:31:48.560 --> 01:31:50.340
generalize . I have a series of

01:31:50.340 --> 01:31:52.340
questions for you regarding sealift

01:31:52.340 --> 01:31:54.950
recapitalization . In your statement to

01:31:54.950 --> 01:31:57.310
the committee , you point out that 33

01:31:57.310 --> 01:32:01.030
of our 50 roll on roll off , see live

01:32:01.030 --> 01:32:03.141
ships are scheduled for retirement in

01:32:03.141 --> 01:32:05.970
the next 10 years and last year's NBA .

01:32:05.970 --> 01:32:08.100
Congress took steps to bolster the

01:32:08.100 --> 01:32:09.980
government's ability to purchase

01:32:09.990 --> 01:32:12.650
additional used foreign vessels

01:32:12.660 --> 01:32:15.090
currently on the market to augment the

01:32:15.090 --> 01:32:17.257
ready Reserve force . First question ,

01:32:17.257 --> 01:32:19.160
how do you assist the progress of

01:32:19.170 --> 01:32:22.170
recapitalizing R . C . Lift flint

01:32:24.850 --> 01:32:27.072
senator . Thanks for that question . We

01:32:27.072 --> 01:32:29.239
spent a lot of time on this issue with

01:32:29.239 --> 01:32:31.406
the Secretary of Defense over the last

01:32:31.406 --> 01:32:33.572
year and in fact , the Cape Issue team

01:32:33.572 --> 01:32:35.794
was formed around this specific issue .

01:32:35.794 --> 01:32:37.683
I think we're headed in the right

01:32:37.683 --> 01:32:39.906
direction . We've got good alignment on

01:32:39.906 --> 01:32:41.906
the strategy . We have good support

01:32:41.906 --> 01:32:43.350
here on the hill with the

01:32:43.350 --> 01:32:45.461
authorizations , we've got some money

01:32:45.461 --> 01:32:47.760
in the program by the Navy . Um , we

01:32:47.760 --> 01:32:49.871
are quite frankly about a year behind

01:32:49.871 --> 01:32:52.390
where I wanted to be . What I wanted to

01:32:52.390 --> 01:32:55.050
be is uh , at the , at the end of last

01:32:55.050 --> 01:32:57.020
fy to be able to buy the first two

01:32:57.020 --> 01:32:59.030
authorised ships . Those ships that

01:32:59.030 --> 01:33:01.252
were authorized by the N . B . A couple

01:33:01.252 --> 01:33:05.250
years ago , so do due to some uh , J .

01:33:05.250 --> 01:33:07.306
O . Protest issues with the Maritime

01:33:07.306 --> 01:33:09.361
administration that's been delayed a

01:33:09.361 --> 01:33:11.528
little bit , but they are on track for

01:33:11.528 --> 01:33:13.639
the end of this year to deliver those

01:33:13.639 --> 01:33:15.972
first two ships , same question general ,

01:33:15.972 --> 01:33:18.083
do the currency live recapitalization

01:33:18.083 --> 01:33:20.306
plan sufficiently address the potential

01:33:20.306 --> 01:33:22.580
for attrition during a conflict with a

01:33:22.580 --> 01:33:24.850
near pure competitor like china or

01:33:24.850 --> 01:33:28.580
Russia senator as

01:33:28.580 --> 01:33:31.060
we , as we work through the mobility

01:33:31.060 --> 01:33:33.227
capabilities and requirements study as

01:33:33.227 --> 01:33:35.116
directed by Congress . One of the

01:33:35.116 --> 01:33:37.338
things we're doing is we're considering

01:33:37.338 --> 01:33:39.910
the future joint concepts as well as

01:33:39.910 --> 01:33:42.600
the contested environments that we know

01:33:42.600 --> 01:33:45.430
in the future that will face . And uh ,

01:33:45.440 --> 01:33:47.790
we , we were able to assess and do

01:33:47.790 --> 01:33:50.680
assess some level of elevated risk uh

01:33:50.690 --> 01:33:52.857
in terms of our ability to deliver the

01:33:52.857 --> 01:33:54.634
force on the timelines that the

01:33:54.634 --> 01:33:57.300
combatant commanders desire . And so we

01:33:57.300 --> 01:34:00.770
are we are evaluating that now by

01:34:00.770 --> 01:34:03.750
policy , we don't force size based on

01:34:03.750 --> 01:34:05.861
attrition , but we do acknowledge the

01:34:05.861 --> 01:34:07.972
significant implications of attrition

01:34:08.140 --> 01:34:10.500
uh in any environment and the and the

01:34:10.500 --> 01:34:13.280
need to uh to mitigate that largely

01:34:13.280 --> 01:34:15.260
through the integration of or

01:34:15.260 --> 01:34:19.140
warfighting effects . Therefore , is

01:34:19.140 --> 01:34:22.120
your answer that the assessments that

01:34:22.120 --> 01:34:24.270
you're doing currently address the

01:34:24.640 --> 01:34:27.460
nutrition issue ? That I asked you ,

01:34:28.440 --> 01:34:32.270
senator ? We do we we we address losses .

01:34:32.640 --> 01:34:36.120
Uh We do thank you . The last question

01:34:36.120 --> 01:34:39.730
for this series . Section 35 11

01:34:39.730 --> 01:34:42.380
35 11 of last year's NBA provided

01:34:42.380 --> 01:34:44.540
authority to establish a tanker

01:34:44.540 --> 01:34:47.550
security program subject to the results

01:34:47.560 --> 01:34:51.140
of the mobility requirements study . Do

01:34:51.140 --> 01:34:53.196
you have sufficient results from the

01:34:53.196 --> 01:34:55.307
study to determine whether the tanker

01:34:55.307 --> 01:34:56.950
security program needs to be

01:34:56.950 --> 01:35:00.300
implemented ? Ma'am ? We do .

01:35:00.310 --> 01:35:03.110
We've looked at this as again , a

01:35:03.110 --> 01:35:05.332
congressional directed study in concert

01:35:05.332 --> 01:35:09.160
with some other uh agencies we do

01:35:09.160 --> 01:35:11.380
support uh and I appreciate the

01:35:11.380 --> 01:35:13.547
Congressional Interest initiative here

01:35:13.547 --> 01:35:15.658
to create a tanker security program .

01:35:15.658 --> 01:35:17.880
We think there's value in that we think

01:35:17.880 --> 01:35:19.880
it's important that we have assured

01:35:19.880 --> 01:35:21.713
access to U . S . Flagged tanker

01:35:21.713 --> 01:35:23.900
capacity uh In the event we have to

01:35:23.900 --> 01:35:26.330
surge the mobility enterprise and the

01:35:26.340 --> 01:35:27.840
liquid energy enterprise .

01:35:30.340 --> 01:35:32.562
Again , generalized , I have a question

01:35:32.562 --> 01:35:36.390
relating to um the

01:35:36.390 --> 01:35:38.501
fact that Transcom is working closely

01:35:38.501 --> 01:35:40.700
with industry partners like SpaceX on

01:35:40.700 --> 01:35:42.644
the viability of using space based

01:35:42.644 --> 01:35:45.390
vehicles to rapidly deliver time

01:35:45.390 --> 01:35:47.390
sensitive logistics anywhere in the

01:35:47.390 --> 01:35:49.223
world . And this technology is a

01:35:49.223 --> 01:35:51.610
potential game changer , especially in

01:35:51.610 --> 01:35:54.810
the indo pacific or where commanders

01:35:54.820 --> 01:35:57.390
are confronted with the tyranny of

01:35:57.390 --> 01:36:00.040
distance and time when moving people in

01:36:00.040 --> 01:36:02.350
parts from one location to another .

01:36:02.360 --> 01:36:04.527
Generalist . Can you provide me with a

01:36:04.527 --> 01:36:06.693
general overview of the progress being

01:36:06.693 --> 01:36:09.140
made in space , mobility and what

01:36:09.150 --> 01:36:11.206
additional authorities you need from

01:36:11.206 --> 01:36:13.330
Congress to help you accelerate this

01:36:13.330 --> 01:36:16.690
technology . Thank you , ma'am for for

01:36:16.690 --> 01:36:18.634
highlighting this . We are working

01:36:18.634 --> 01:36:20.857
closely with a couple industry partners

01:36:20.857 --> 01:36:22.912
to include SpaceX as well as the Air

01:36:22.912 --> 01:36:24.950
Force in the Space Force on this

01:36:24.950 --> 01:36:27.061
particular issue . If you think about

01:36:27.061 --> 01:36:28.839
the possibility and it's a real

01:36:28.839 --> 01:36:31.830
possibility To be able to take AC-17

01:36:31.830 --> 01:36:34.750
load , let's say 80 short tons And lift

01:36:34.750 --> 01:36:36.861
it off and deliver it anywhere on the

01:36:36.861 --> 01:36:38.990
face of the globe in less than 60

01:36:38.990 --> 01:36:42.000
minutes . That is a real possibility in

01:36:42.000 --> 01:36:44.880
the near term . Well , we can't scale

01:36:44.880 --> 01:36:46.769
that to the entire requirement of

01:36:46.769 --> 01:36:48.769
mobility enterprise . To your point

01:36:48.769 --> 01:36:50.660
senator . It offers us great uh

01:36:50.670 --> 01:36:53.330
flexibility and I think it creates a

01:36:53.340 --> 01:36:55.250
powerful dilemma for potential

01:36:55.250 --> 01:36:57.583
adversaries to move very , very rapidly .

01:36:59.530 --> 01:37:01.363
You will let us know if you need

01:37:01.363 --> 01:37:03.363
further support or authorization to

01:37:03.363 --> 01:37:06.460
move us on this use of this development

01:37:06.460 --> 01:37:08.900
of this technology . I will , ma'am .

01:37:08.910 --> 01:37:11.140
We do not at this time , But thank you

01:37:11.140 --> 01:37:14.120
for that . Thank you . Mr . Chairman .

01:37:14.280 --> 01:37:16.058
Thank you . Senator . Let me to

01:37:16.058 --> 01:37:18.002
recognize Senator scott . Please .

01:37:20.390 --> 01:37:23.070
Thank you . Chairman . Read um , your

01:37:23.070 --> 01:37:25.181
lions and joe Walters . Thank you for

01:37:25.181 --> 01:37:27.070
your service . Thank you for your

01:37:27.070 --> 01:37:29.237
willingness to defend the integrity of

01:37:29.237 --> 01:37:29.070
the men and women . Uh , they put on

01:37:29.070 --> 01:37:31.237
the uniform and defend the freedoms of

01:37:31.237 --> 01:37:33.459
this country , john Walters . Well , my

01:37:33.459 --> 01:37:35.237
primary concerns our military's

01:37:35.237 --> 01:37:37.292
readiness to deal with the threat of

01:37:37.292 --> 01:37:39.348
communist china . I remain of course

01:37:39.348 --> 01:37:41.348
concerned about Russia's attempt to

01:37:41.348 --> 01:37:43.570
destabilize NATO harmer allies , harm

01:37:43.570 --> 01:37:45.960
the US through cyberattacks and catch

01:37:45.960 --> 01:37:47.904
up to us on advanced weaponry like

01:37:47.904 --> 01:37:50.790
hypersonic weapons . I'm also aware of

01:37:50.790 --> 01:37:52.901
the potential for communist china and

01:37:52.901 --> 01:37:55.179
Russia to cooperate to try and harm us .

01:37:55.179 --> 01:37:57.290
How ready do you believe your command

01:37:57.290 --> 01:37:59.457
is to deal with these threats ? And do

01:37:59.457 --> 01:38:01.512
you have all that you need ? And are

01:38:01.512 --> 01:38:03.734
you concerned as I am about a potential

01:38:03.734 --> 01:38:05.512
cut to the defense budget under

01:38:05.512 --> 01:38:07.330
President Biden Senator ? We're

01:38:07.330 --> 01:38:09.860
concerned about all those threats . I I

01:38:09.870 --> 01:38:11.981
certainly agree with every one of the

01:38:11.981 --> 01:38:14.203
categories that you pointed out and and

01:38:14.203 --> 01:38:16.203
as a traditional commander , I will

01:38:16.203 --> 01:38:18.203
tell you that I have a force that's

01:38:18.203 --> 01:38:20.092
getting faster every day and it's

01:38:20.092 --> 01:38:22.092
better postured every day . But I'm

01:38:22.092 --> 01:38:24.037
never satisfied with our speed and

01:38:24.037 --> 01:38:26.092
posture . So in that light , our our

01:38:26.092 --> 01:38:27.981
current resourcing is adequate to

01:38:27.981 --> 01:38:29.981
continue the campaign momentum , to

01:38:29.981 --> 01:38:32.203
improve our indications and warnings or

01:38:32.203 --> 01:38:34.426
command and control and our readiness ,

01:38:34.426 --> 01:38:36.592
uh , with the reduction in in in those

01:38:36.592 --> 01:38:38.814
resources from a monetary perspective ,

01:38:38.814 --> 01:38:40.537
there would be a corresponding

01:38:40.537 --> 01:38:42.481
degradation In our capabilities in

01:38:42.481 --> 01:38:44.592
those areas . But as we speak , it is

01:38:44.592 --> 01:38:46.814
adequate and my suspicion going forward

01:38:46.814 --> 01:38:48.926
is we will have adequate resources to

01:38:48.926 --> 01:38:50.981
effectively when in competition have

01:38:50.981 --> 01:38:52.926
called upon to do so . But we must

01:38:52.926 --> 01:38:54.926
continue to improve our competitive

01:38:54.926 --> 01:38:57.190
advantage in all the areas that you

01:38:57.190 --> 01:38:59.301
point out . And I pointed out from an

01:38:59.301 --> 01:39:02.250
INWNC two perspective . So if you saw a

01:39:02.260 --> 01:39:04.482
cut in the defense budget , where would

01:39:04.482 --> 01:39:07.350
you , what could you cut if you had to

01:39:07.350 --> 01:39:09.572
cut things ? Well , what would you what

01:39:09.572 --> 01:39:12.400
would you reduce ? I would have to take

01:39:12.400 --> 01:39:15.100
an incremental reduction in in S . R .

01:39:15.100 --> 01:39:16.840
That supports I and W and an

01:39:16.850 --> 01:39:19.000
incremental reduction in see to that

01:39:19.010 --> 01:39:21.010
report that supports our ability to

01:39:21.010 --> 01:39:23.400
respond and I would make sure that

01:39:23.400 --> 01:39:25.622
we're adequate resourced in the mission

01:39:25.622 --> 01:39:27.844
command slash readiness area . How long

01:39:27.844 --> 01:39:29.789
would you be able to do that ? And

01:39:29.789 --> 01:39:31.956
before you have to say to yourself , I

01:39:31.956 --> 01:39:34.289
have to say to us that you're not ready .

01:39:34.289 --> 01:39:36.400
It just depends upon the magnitude of

01:39:36.400 --> 01:39:38.344
reduction and and I don't have the

01:39:38.344 --> 01:39:40.678
specifics on what the budget looks like ,

01:39:40.678 --> 01:39:43.011
but based off the evidence I have today ,

01:39:43.011 --> 01:39:45.122
I think from an adequacy standpoint ,

01:39:45.122 --> 01:39:47.233
we're in good shape for the near term

01:39:47.233 --> 01:39:49.344
between now and the next five years .

01:39:49.344 --> 01:39:51.456
Thank you , john Walters . It's clear

01:39:51.456 --> 01:39:53.567
that Turkey under President , Erdogan

01:39:53.567 --> 01:39:55.456
is not our ally and not a helpful

01:39:55.456 --> 01:39:57.800
member of NATO . I met with Erdogan

01:39:57.810 --> 01:39:59.921
during the trump administration along

01:39:59.921 --> 01:40:02.032
with some of my Republican colleagues

01:40:02.032 --> 01:40:04.199
to question him about Turkey's ongoing

01:40:04.199 --> 01:40:06.088
relationship with Russia . I also

01:40:06.088 --> 01:40:08.032
introduced legislation calling for

01:40:08.032 --> 01:40:10.254
sanctions against Turkey for purchasing

01:40:10.254 --> 01:40:12.143
the S 400 air and missile defense

01:40:12.143 --> 01:40:14.254
system for the Russian federation and

01:40:14.254 --> 01:40:17.410
question their membership in NATO . Uh ,

01:40:17.420 --> 01:40:19.420
it seems like only Erdogan's gotten

01:40:19.420 --> 01:40:21.642
worse . So what are your thoughts about

01:40:21.642 --> 01:40:23.864
the value of our relationship ? Do we ?

01:40:23.864 --> 01:40:25.642
Is there any value today in our

01:40:25.642 --> 01:40:27.864
relationship with Turkey ? And where do

01:40:27.864 --> 01:40:30.087
you see it going ? There is senator and

01:40:30.087 --> 01:40:32.087
I must tell you they remain a vital

01:40:32.087 --> 01:40:34.198
NATO partner and I will tell you from

01:40:34.198 --> 01:40:36.198
the military military perspective ,

01:40:36.198 --> 01:40:37.976
Turkey being the second largest

01:40:37.976 --> 01:40:40.140
military and NATO . Uh they do assist

01:40:40.150 --> 01:40:42.580
greatly in the area of of deterrence

01:40:42.580 --> 01:40:44.910
and competition . One of the reasons we

01:40:44.910 --> 01:40:47.760
have such Such trust mil to Mil is the

01:40:47.760 --> 01:40:49.980
fact that the 2300 . U.S . military

01:40:49.980 --> 01:40:52.290
members that live and work each day on

01:40:52.290 --> 01:40:55.710
Turkish soil are appointed And given

01:40:55.720 --> 01:40:57.276
tremendous force protection

01:40:57.276 --> 01:40:59.331
consideration on behalf on behalf of

01:40:59.331 --> 01:41:01.553
the Turkish military . And that trust ,

01:41:01.553 --> 01:41:03.664
from a mil to mil perspective remains

01:41:03.664 --> 01:41:05.790
very , very high . But as you said ,

01:41:05.970 --> 01:41:07.970
they are no longer part of the F 35

01:41:07.970 --> 01:41:09.970
program with the United States . We

01:41:09.970 --> 01:41:12.192
understand the decisions that they made

01:41:12.192 --> 01:41:13.914
with respect to the S 400 . We

01:41:13.914 --> 01:41:16.137
understand that sanctions are working ,

01:41:16.137 --> 01:41:18.026
we will continue to work with our

01:41:18.026 --> 01:41:20.192
military counterparts . But as we move

01:41:20.192 --> 01:41:22.248
forward , mil to mil , they remain a

01:41:22.248 --> 01:41:25.000
very vital NATO military partner . Did

01:41:25.000 --> 01:41:27.167
you ever understand why they did the S

01:41:27.167 --> 01:41:29.440
400 ? Does it make any sense to you ,

01:41:31.210 --> 01:41:33.600
Senator ? It doesn't unless it was for

01:41:33.600 --> 01:41:35.600
the purpose of an easy way out with

01:41:35.600 --> 01:41:36.730
respect to money .

01:41:39.410 --> 01:41:41.577
Thank you . Are you back ? Thank you .

01:41:41.577 --> 01:41:43.799
Senator scott . Senator Peters please .

01:41:43.799 --> 01:41:47.170
Hey you Mr chairman and thank you to

01:41:47.170 --> 01:41:49.392
both of you for your , for your service

01:41:49.392 --> 01:41:51.690
to our country . General Motors . I'd

01:41:51.690 --> 01:41:54.780
like to begin with Nagorno Karabakh and

01:41:54.780 --> 01:41:57.340
what's happened there . Uh in your

01:41:57.340 --> 01:41:59.507
opening statement , you alluded to the

01:41:59.507 --> 01:42:01.350
conflict only in the context of

01:42:01.350 --> 01:42:03.710
Russia's role in broking brokering a

01:42:03.710 --> 01:42:06.150
ceasefire agreement in november . But I

01:42:06.150 --> 01:42:09.320
appreciate your thoughts as the Supreme

01:42:09.330 --> 01:42:11.552
allied commander in europe , on some of

01:42:11.552 --> 01:42:13.440
the broader implications for for

01:42:13.440 --> 01:42:15.890
regional stability . Foremost on my

01:42:15.890 --> 01:42:18.810
mind is the fact that Azerbaijan is

01:42:18.810 --> 01:42:20.921
still reportedly holding an estimated

01:42:20.921 --> 01:42:23.420
200 Armenian prisoners of war and

01:42:23.420 --> 01:42:25.660
civilian captives . Now I understand

01:42:25.660 --> 01:42:28.050
that's a diplomatic endeavour outside

01:42:28.050 --> 01:42:31.770
of your area . But as uh as someone who

01:42:31.770 --> 01:42:34.370
is in charge of watching that area very

01:42:34.370 --> 01:42:36.580
closely , I would like your view on

01:42:36.580 --> 01:42:40.290
this unresolved issue , Nagorno

01:42:40.290 --> 01:42:42.623
Karabakh has remained a frozen conflict .

01:42:42.623 --> 01:42:44.623
Obviously , the activities over the

01:42:44.623 --> 01:42:46.401
course of the last 90 days were

01:42:46.401 --> 01:42:48.512
concerning to all . One of the things

01:42:48.512 --> 01:42:50.734
that I will mention senator , that that

01:42:50.734 --> 01:42:53.120
I was proud to report on was uh the

01:42:53.120 --> 01:42:55.342
active involvement of many NATO nations

01:42:55.342 --> 01:42:57.950
on the periphery to assist in calling

01:42:57.950 --> 01:43:00.300
for reconciliation in calming of

01:43:00.300 --> 01:43:02.411
tensions and when it was all said and

01:43:02.411 --> 01:43:04.600
done , I think most of us believe that

01:43:04.610 --> 01:43:06.721
this was curtailed sooner rather than

01:43:06.721 --> 01:43:08.777
later as a result of the interest of

01:43:08.777 --> 01:43:11.000
nations in the region to be part of the

01:43:11.000 --> 01:43:14.100
solution in in rectifying the situation ,

01:43:14.110 --> 01:43:16.277
that there still is an unfortunate set

01:43:16.277 --> 01:43:18.550
of circumstances that remain with

01:43:18.550 --> 01:43:20.606
result to the territorial disputes .

01:43:20.800 --> 01:43:23.070
That there is goodness in the fact that

01:43:23.070 --> 01:43:25.070
observation posts have been created

01:43:25.070 --> 01:43:27.830
jointly . Uh my nations in the region

01:43:27.840 --> 01:43:30.007
and our ability to see the environment

01:43:30.007 --> 01:43:32.062
is greater than it was in the past .

01:43:32.062 --> 01:43:34.007
And we still have a lot of work in

01:43:34.007 --> 01:43:36.118
front of us to make sure that from an

01:43:36.118 --> 01:43:38.340
observation perspective , nations agree

01:43:38.340 --> 01:43:40.451
to the contracts they signed up to so

01:43:40.451 --> 01:43:42.451
that we can achieve more productive

01:43:42.451 --> 01:43:44.340
campaign momentum with respect to

01:43:44.340 --> 01:43:47.710
achieving peace in the NK . Thank you .

01:43:47.720 --> 01:43:49.580
From a military perspective ,

01:43:49.590 --> 01:43:52.240
Azerbaijan's drone fleet certainly

01:43:52.240 --> 01:43:54.190
highlighted the vulnerabilities of

01:43:54.190 --> 01:43:56.670
sophisticated weapons systems , tanks ,

01:43:56.720 --> 01:43:59.720
radar surface to air missiles that did

01:43:59.720 --> 01:44:02.890
not have specific drone defenses . Has

01:44:02.890 --> 01:44:04.790
that affected how you prioritize

01:44:04.800 --> 01:44:08.050
counter US capabilities uh in your area

01:44:08.050 --> 01:44:10.161
of responsibility and what more do we

01:44:10.161 --> 01:44:13.290
need to do ? I would tell you senator ,

01:44:13.290 --> 01:44:15.410
I wasn't surprised with any of the

01:44:15.410 --> 01:44:17.632
actions that took place in the vicinity

01:44:17.632 --> 01:44:19.632
of Nagorno Karabakh with respect to

01:44:19.632 --> 01:44:21.854
small us and as you know , based off of

01:44:21.854 --> 01:44:24.077
many of your good efforts in the past ,

01:44:24.077 --> 01:44:26.410
we've we've we've got a dedicated D . O .

01:44:26.410 --> 01:44:28.410
D . Lead with respect to countering

01:44:28.410 --> 01:44:30.520
small us . And I think the campaign

01:44:30.520 --> 01:44:32.687
momentum with respect to comprehensive

01:44:32.687 --> 01:44:34.798
missile defenses improving so that we

01:44:34.798 --> 01:44:36.798
can counter that kind of capability

01:44:36.798 --> 01:44:38.798
against us so we're traversing in a

01:44:38.798 --> 01:44:40.853
productive direction with respect to

01:44:40.853 --> 01:44:44.020
countering small us . Well , I I had an

01:44:44.020 --> 01:44:46.076
opportunity to see some of that just

01:44:46.076 --> 01:44:48.131
recently down at Huma proving ground

01:44:48.131 --> 01:44:50.020
where I know you're testing those

01:44:50.020 --> 01:44:52.187
defenses and opening up a process from

01:44:52.187 --> 01:44:54.298
the Department of Army at large . But

01:44:54.298 --> 01:44:56.409
clearly you're weighing in heavily in

01:44:56.409 --> 01:44:58.076
the need for for that type of

01:44:58.076 --> 01:45:00.020
technology to be developed . And I

01:45:00.020 --> 01:45:02.410
appreciate that General Lyons , you're

01:45:02.420 --> 01:45:04.910
up in the opening statement , reported

01:45:04.910 --> 01:45:07.220
a partnership with cyber command to

01:45:07.230 --> 01:45:10.630
implement zero trust on your network

01:45:10.640 --> 01:45:13.150
environment . But Transcom relies

01:45:13.160 --> 01:45:15.310
heavily on commercial shipping . In

01:45:15.310 --> 01:45:17.740
fact , if I look at the numbers 95 for

01:45:17.740 --> 01:45:20.760
steady state sealift operations , 90

01:45:20.760 --> 01:45:22.640
for ground , steady state and

01:45:22.640 --> 01:45:25.110
contingency operations in 90 for air

01:45:25.110 --> 01:45:27.660
passenger . So my question to you is

01:45:27.660 --> 01:45:29.660
how do you ensure that your network

01:45:29.660 --> 01:45:32.150
environments uh , for your commercial

01:45:32.160 --> 01:45:34.710
partners are secure ?

01:45:36.490 --> 01:45:38.490
Yes , Senator . It's a it's a great

01:45:38.490 --> 01:45:40.657
question . We spend a lot of time both

01:45:40.657 --> 01:45:43.080
on the Dodon and off the Dodon non

01:45:43.080 --> 01:45:45.080
didn't activities that were aligned

01:45:45.080 --> 01:45:46.858
upon to understand the the full

01:45:46.858 --> 01:45:49.024
spectrum and potential vulnerabilities

01:45:49.024 --> 01:45:52.800
uh mobility enterprise . We work

01:45:52.810 --> 01:45:54.866
closely with our industry partners .

01:45:54.866 --> 01:45:57.600
We've got consistent cyber hygiene

01:45:57.600 --> 01:45:59.600
language and all of our contractual

01:45:59.600 --> 01:46:01.767
relationships . But more importantly ,

01:46:01.767 --> 01:46:03.933
we're talking to the senior leadership

01:46:03.933 --> 01:46:06.156
of all these companies . Uh They submit

01:46:06.156 --> 01:46:08.156
self assessments on their own cyber

01:46:08.156 --> 01:46:11.400
scorecard . We provide insights on best

01:46:11.400 --> 01:46:13.760
practices . We're developing a proof of

01:46:13.760 --> 01:46:15.704
principle . It's for a third party

01:46:15.704 --> 01:46:17.927
verification . Basically , this will be

01:46:17.927 --> 01:46:20.050
a new adventure for the department to

01:46:20.050 --> 01:46:22.720
be able to confirm or deny cyber

01:46:22.720 --> 01:46:25.390
compliance . So a lot of work going on

01:46:25.390 --> 01:46:27.210
in that area , the the industry

01:46:27.210 --> 01:46:29.980
partners are are coming along . Uh but

01:46:29.980 --> 01:46:31.924
I don't want to mislead anybody to

01:46:31.924 --> 01:46:34.090
think that we have some magic ability

01:46:34.090 --> 01:46:37.360
to protect commercial partners from an

01:46:37.360 --> 01:46:39.590
advanced persistent threat . I would

01:46:39.590 --> 01:46:41.868
say though that it's bigger than cyber ,

01:46:41.868 --> 01:46:43.979
so resiliency is bigger than just the

01:46:43.979 --> 01:46:46.201
networks piece . It's also the physical

01:46:46.201 --> 01:46:48.368
redundancy that we have to ensure that

01:46:48.368 --> 01:46:50.534
we have many readiness providers and I

01:46:50.534 --> 01:46:52.812
am confident with our approach in that .

01:46:52.812 --> 01:46:54.920
And I realize you facilitate annual

01:46:54.920 --> 01:46:56.642
self assessments based on this

01:46:56.642 --> 01:46:58.364
guidelines . Uh Where do those

01:46:58.364 --> 01:47:00.420
assessments lead ? And is there more

01:47:00.420 --> 01:47:02.610
work that we need to do ? Senator ?

01:47:02.610 --> 01:47:04.610
There's always more work to do . Uh

01:47:04.610 --> 01:47:07.750
They come in at an executive level . We

01:47:07.760 --> 01:47:10.650
we share those assessments . Uh You

01:47:10.650 --> 01:47:12.706
know for example , one of one of the

01:47:12.706 --> 01:47:14.372
concerns might be multifactor

01:47:14.372 --> 01:47:16.372
authentication from a cyber hygiene

01:47:16.372 --> 01:47:18.094
perspective . So we have those

01:47:18.094 --> 01:47:19.983
conversations and I find that the

01:47:19.983 --> 01:47:22.039
inside the boardrooms today they are

01:47:22.039 --> 01:47:24.450
very cyber savvy and committed and want

01:47:24.450 --> 01:47:27.740
to improve their cyber posture . So so

01:47:27.740 --> 01:47:29.796
it's we're pushing on an open door .

01:47:29.796 --> 01:47:31.351
Right thank you . Yes sir ,

01:47:33.080 --> 01:47:35.550
thank you very much . Senator Peterson

01:47:35.550 --> 01:47:37.760
now via Webex . Senator Blackburn

01:47:37.760 --> 01:47:41.370
please . Thank you .

01:47:41.370 --> 01:47:43.970
MR . Chairman into each of you . I say

01:47:43.970 --> 01:47:46.390
thank you for your service . We are

01:47:46.400 --> 01:47:49.680
greatly appreciative of the work that

01:47:49.680 --> 01:47:53.500
you do every single day . Um

01:47:54.280 --> 01:47:57.230
General Lyons let me stay with you

01:47:57.230 --> 01:48:00.490
there on the cyber security issue .

01:48:00.870 --> 01:48:04.690
Um trends come does have a high volume

01:48:04.700 --> 01:48:07.850
of strategic mobility mobility missions

01:48:07.850 --> 01:48:11.620
on a daily basis . Um There are varying

01:48:11.630 --> 01:48:15.070
levels of detail and so as we

01:48:15.080 --> 01:48:18.810
move personnel and equipment in and

01:48:18.810 --> 01:48:21.990
out of the different theaters , how

01:48:21.990 --> 01:48:24.340
much of that information is

01:48:24.350 --> 01:48:27.750
communicated across classified versus

01:48:27.760 --> 01:48:30.490
unclassified networks ?

01:48:32.470 --> 01:48:34.940
Senator I I think you're aware that a

01:48:34.940 --> 01:48:37.107
great deal of our information is moved

01:48:37.107 --> 01:48:39.930
across unclassified networks both

01:48:39.930 --> 01:48:42.097
inside the Dodon and of course outside

01:48:42.097 --> 01:48:45.180
the Dodon . Uh that unto itself isn't

01:48:45.180 --> 01:48:47.069
the risk . As long as we take the

01:48:47.069 --> 01:48:48.958
proper procedures and we take the

01:48:48.958 --> 01:48:50.680
proper measures of defense and

01:48:50.680 --> 01:48:52.847
encryption . But a large volume of our

01:48:52.847 --> 01:48:54.458
information does move across

01:48:54.458 --> 01:48:56.990
unclassified networks . Yes , I think

01:48:56.990 --> 01:48:59.620
it would be helpful if we had a

01:48:59.630 --> 01:49:02.460
percentage and kind of a threshold at

01:49:02.460 --> 01:49:04.320
which we need to classify some

01:49:04.320 --> 01:49:06.590
information for force protection

01:49:06.590 --> 01:49:10.010
purposes , but not others for

01:49:10.010 --> 01:49:12.600
communicating pertinent details .

01:49:13.370 --> 01:49:17.140
Two uncleared Personnel . And that is

01:49:17.140 --> 01:49:20.080
an area that in my opinion would

01:49:20.080 --> 01:49:22.840
deserve a little bit of a deeper dive

01:49:22.840 --> 01:49:25.420
and a bit more attention . General

01:49:25.420 --> 01:49:29.410
Walters . Um , the NATO 2030

01:49:29.420 --> 01:49:33.190
report identifies China as a full

01:49:33.190 --> 01:49:36.420
spectrum systemic rival . And that is

01:49:36.420 --> 01:49:39.790
something that I agree with .

01:49:40.370 --> 01:49:44.200
Uh , it is not only china is not only a

01:49:44.200 --> 01:49:47.070
security threat , a national security

01:49:47.070 --> 01:49:50.490
threat . They are an economic threat .

01:49:50.500 --> 01:49:52.611
The way they are pushing the belt and

01:49:52.611 --> 01:49:54.556
road initiative . The way they are

01:49:54.556 --> 01:49:57.410
pushing debt diplomacy is something

01:49:57.410 --> 01:50:00.710
that should give us pause because it

01:50:00.720 --> 01:50:04.720
all feeds in to the civil military

01:50:04.720 --> 01:50:08.160
fusion that they practice and live

01:50:08.170 --> 01:50:12.070
every single day . So , um ,

01:50:12.960 --> 01:50:15.940
and since the last time you were before

01:50:15.940 --> 01:50:18.051
us at this committee and we discussed

01:50:18.051 --> 01:50:21.100
this issue , what has , And I'm quoting

01:50:21.110 --> 01:50:24.330
now your comment , expanding the

01:50:24.330 --> 01:50:27.000
competitive space meant to um ,

01:50:27.010 --> 01:50:30.940
specifically for competition with china .

01:50:30.950 --> 01:50:33.790
And how does this

01:50:34.260 --> 01:50:37.640
affect the work we do ? The mobility ,

01:50:37.640 --> 01:50:40.120
that interoperability with our NATO

01:50:40.120 --> 01:50:44.030
allies . It has a large

01:50:44.030 --> 01:50:46.430
effect , senator . And I think it's an

01:50:46.430 --> 01:50:48.740
imperative as a result of the way that

01:50:48.740 --> 01:50:50.780
china conducts activities for us to

01:50:50.780 --> 01:50:53.320
take a whole of government , whole of

01:50:53.320 --> 01:50:56.110
nation , whole of military , all domain

01:50:56.110 --> 01:50:59.000
approach with the activities of china

01:50:59.010 --> 01:51:01.288
as they bear on the european continent .

01:51:01.288 --> 01:51:03.520
And we're obviously very concerned with

01:51:03.520 --> 01:51:05.520
respect the wall way five G . We're

01:51:05.520 --> 01:51:07.631
obviously very concerned with respect

01:51:07.631 --> 01:51:09.298
to the proliferation of their

01:51:09.298 --> 01:51:11.353
involvement with seaports and aerial

01:51:11.353 --> 01:51:13.409
ports . And we're paying very , very

01:51:13.409 --> 01:51:15.576
close attention to all those areas and

01:51:15.576 --> 01:51:17.742
in the information environment as as a

01:51:17.742 --> 01:51:19.964
nation who supports democratic values ,

01:51:19.964 --> 01:51:22.187
being part of an alliance that supports

01:51:22.187 --> 01:51:24.131
democratic values . We've told the

01:51:24.131 --> 01:51:26.353
truth about some of the sacrifices that

01:51:26.353 --> 01:51:28.520
nations would make if they continue to

01:51:28.520 --> 01:51:30.298
endeavour in five G . And we've

01:51:30.298 --> 01:51:32.187
actually seen a little bit of the

01:51:32.187 --> 01:51:34.187
turning of the tide with respect to

01:51:34.187 --> 01:51:36.242
china china and five G . Huawei uh ,

01:51:36.242 --> 01:51:38.410
nations electing to go in different

01:51:38.410 --> 01:51:40.410
directions . And as you well know ,

01:51:40.410 --> 01:51:42.632
senator China , the United Kingdom made

01:51:42.632 --> 01:51:44.799
that call recently and rent a position

01:51:44.799 --> 01:51:46.743
on the , on the european continent

01:51:46.743 --> 01:51:48.854
where several other nations are doing

01:51:48.854 --> 01:51:50.854
the same . So vigilance remains sky

01:51:50.854 --> 01:51:52.910
high and there must be an all domain

01:51:52.910 --> 01:51:54.966
approach and a whole of government ,

01:51:54.966 --> 01:51:54.760
whole of nation approach to this

01:51:54.760 --> 01:51:58.150
challenge . Well , I agree with you on

01:51:58.150 --> 01:52:01.020
that . And I I fully believe if we look

01:52:01.020 --> 01:52:04.550
at china as a problem set that we need

01:52:04.550 --> 01:52:06.606
to solve that we're going to have to

01:52:06.606 --> 01:52:10.240
have our allies working with us as

01:52:10.240 --> 01:52:14.230
we look at this as a problem set . So

01:52:14.230 --> 01:52:16.730
talk with me for just a couple of

01:52:16.730 --> 01:52:19.980
minutes if you will about any physical

01:52:19.990 --> 01:52:22.410
roadblocks that maybe there are any

01:52:22.410 --> 01:52:26.400
regulatory roadblocks that are , that

01:52:26.400 --> 01:52:29.820
would prohibit uh movement of our

01:52:29.820 --> 01:52:33.590
forces within your A . O . R .

01:52:33.600 --> 01:52:37.220
Or participation with NATO allies

01:52:37.230 --> 01:52:40.890
or they're working with us on the china

01:52:40.890 --> 01:52:44.810
issue . No roadblocks at this time .

01:52:44.810 --> 01:52:48.300
But but what we're anticipating is uh

01:52:48.310 --> 01:52:52.110
an increase in our demand uh , to share

01:52:52.110 --> 01:52:55.570
across uh secret information lines .

01:52:55.580 --> 01:52:57.691
And and as you know , senator , we're

01:52:57.691 --> 01:52:59.691
working very very hard to make sure

01:52:59.691 --> 01:53:01.913
that we can open up the aperture from a

01:53:01.913 --> 01:53:04.136
policy perspective with our NATO allies

01:53:04.136 --> 01:53:05.969
and partners to be able to share

01:53:05.969 --> 01:53:08.136
certain classified information . We we

01:53:08.136 --> 01:53:10.358
are achieving success in that area with

01:53:10.358 --> 01:53:12.524
the assistance of this committee . And

01:53:12.524 --> 01:53:14.247
I would ask for your continued

01:53:14.247 --> 01:53:16.358
endorsement in that area to make sure

01:53:16.358 --> 01:53:15.980
that we can adequately share

01:53:16.450 --> 01:53:18.672
information so that we can make headway

01:53:18.672 --> 01:53:20.880
against malign influence on behalf of

01:53:20.890 --> 01:53:24.760
China . Well , I agree with you on

01:53:24.770 --> 01:53:27.090
that issue . And that goes back to the

01:53:27.100 --> 01:53:30.000
first question for General Lyons about

01:53:30.000 --> 01:53:32.360
the amount of information that we're

01:53:32.360 --> 01:53:35.810
communicating over classified and

01:53:35.810 --> 01:53:39.440
secure versus unclassified and secure

01:53:39.450 --> 01:53:42.890
networks and the danger that that may

01:53:42.900 --> 01:53:45.830
put our men and women who are currently

01:53:45.830 --> 01:53:48.740
deployed in various areas . That that

01:53:48.740 --> 01:53:52.620
may open them too . Again , I we will

01:53:52.620 --> 01:53:54.840
continue to work with you all on these

01:53:54.840 --> 01:53:56.840
issues . I've got a couple of other

01:53:56.840 --> 01:53:59.980
questions that we will submit um

01:54:00.340 --> 01:54:03.340
for the record , but I see Senator Duck

01:54:03.340 --> 01:54:06.610
Worth is there waiting so I will heal

01:54:06.610 --> 01:54:08.840
back my time and allow her to get her

01:54:08.840 --> 01:54:11.540
questions . And also thank you Senator

01:54:11.540 --> 01:54:13.818
Barbara and let me recognize via webex .

01:54:13.818 --> 01:54:16.070
Senator Duck Worth . Thank you Mr

01:54:16.070 --> 01:54:17.959
Chairman and thank you to my good

01:54:17.959 --> 01:54:20.300
friend from Tennessee . Um I have

01:54:20.300 --> 01:54:22.467
discussed the importance of our supply

01:54:22.467 --> 01:54:24.689
chain and logistics enterprise with the

01:54:24.689 --> 01:54:26.800
department's civilian leadership like

01:54:26.800 --> 01:54:28.911
Secretary Austin dep sec of defense ,

01:54:28.911 --> 01:54:31.078
Kathy Hicks and former Under Secretary

01:54:31.078 --> 01:54:33.244
of Defense Ellen Lord , I've discussed

01:54:33.244 --> 01:54:33.110
it with service chiefs like the

01:54:33.110 --> 01:54:35.221
commandant of the Marine corps and we

01:54:35.221 --> 01:54:37.110
combatant commanders like Admiral

01:54:37.110 --> 01:54:39.221
Davidson . I've discussed advancement

01:54:39.221 --> 01:54:41.332
that we need to make in our logistics

01:54:41.332 --> 01:54:43.221
capabilities in order to face the

01:54:43.221 --> 01:54:45.332
unique challenges of the indo pacific

01:54:45.332 --> 01:54:47.499
geography and the threat of real great

01:54:47.499 --> 01:54:49.610
power competitors . I've been dogging

01:54:49.610 --> 01:54:51.666
in my insistence that we will not be

01:54:51.666 --> 01:54:53.610
able to be able to combat credible

01:54:53.610 --> 01:54:55.443
deterrence if we do not have the

01:54:55.443 --> 01:54:57.770
logistics capability and capacity to

01:54:57.770 --> 01:54:59.659
realistically support our complex

01:54:59.659 --> 01:55:02.510
military operation . No plans . And my

01:55:02.510 --> 01:55:04.621
takeaway from all of my conversations

01:55:04.621 --> 01:55:06.788
with these many senior defense leaders

01:55:06.788 --> 01:55:08.899
is that they do recognize the problem

01:55:08.899 --> 01:55:11.410
and they do agree with me . And yet it

01:55:11.410 --> 01:55:13.466
still doesn't seem to me like we are

01:55:13.466 --> 01:55:15.810
adequately investing in transportation

01:55:15.810 --> 01:55:17.990
command and our strategic logistics

01:55:17.990 --> 01:55:20.100
capabilities . General Lyons . It's

01:55:20.110 --> 01:55:22.570
it's good to see you today , um , in

01:55:22.570 --> 01:55:24.626
this setting , as far as much as you

01:55:24.626 --> 01:55:26.848
can in this unclassified setting , um ,

01:55:26.848 --> 01:55:28.930
what are your biggest capability and

01:55:28.930 --> 01:55:32.690
capacity um , challenges shortfalls and

01:55:32.690 --> 01:55:34.560
how can Congress best resource

01:55:34.560 --> 01:55:37.040
Transportation command to provide the

01:55:37.040 --> 01:55:38.873
power projection and sustainment

01:55:38.873 --> 01:55:40.984
necessary for our operational plans ?

01:55:42.230 --> 01:55:44.452
Senator , let me just say thank you for

01:55:44.452 --> 01:55:47.010
your strong , unwavering advocacy and

01:55:47.010 --> 01:55:50.310
understanding the combat credible

01:55:50.310 --> 01:55:53.060
deterrence assurance and really be able

01:55:53.060 --> 01:55:55.740
to respond to win that's so critical in

01:55:55.740 --> 01:55:58.750
our logistics enterprise . So I really

01:55:58.750 --> 01:56:01.410
do appreciate that . I I know you're

01:56:01.410 --> 01:56:03.550
aware of uh of several ongoing

01:56:03.550 --> 01:56:05.717
initiatives that we're getting support

01:56:05.717 --> 01:56:07.717
from the hill on to include sealift

01:56:07.717 --> 01:56:09.939
recapitalisation that we talked about .

01:56:09.939 --> 01:56:12.106
We've alluded uh just from work inside

01:56:12.106 --> 01:56:14.272
the department on the joint uh concept

01:56:14.272 --> 01:56:16.439
for contested logistics . I think this

01:56:16.439 --> 01:56:18.680
begins a very important journey for us

01:56:18.690 --> 01:56:20.357
across the joint forces , the

01:56:20.357 --> 01:56:23.740
department to fully integrate the

01:56:23.750 --> 01:56:25.861
logistics and sustainment warfighting

01:56:25.861 --> 01:56:27.694
function amongst all warfighting

01:56:27.694 --> 01:56:29.960
functions that will be critical as we

01:56:29.960 --> 01:56:32.250
move forward and evolved to support the

01:56:32.630 --> 01:56:34.797
both the changing character of warfare

01:56:34.797 --> 01:56:36.963
and adjusted character of logistics to

01:56:36.963 --> 01:56:38.852
support the changing character of

01:56:38.852 --> 01:56:41.750
warfare . So , uh a lot going on there

01:56:41.760 --> 01:56:43.927
to include some of the discussions you

01:56:43.927 --> 01:56:47.780
just heard on cyber . So we are in fact

01:56:47.790 --> 01:56:49.457
getting good support and good

01:56:49.457 --> 01:56:51.401
collaboration across the combatant

01:56:51.401 --> 01:56:53.623
commands across the services and inside

01:56:53.623 --> 01:56:55.623
the department on the things that I

01:56:55.623 --> 01:56:57.679
think are most important . And we'll

01:56:57.679 --> 01:56:59.623
continue to push on these kinds of

01:56:59.623 --> 01:57:01.734
issues whether they be mobility or or

01:57:01.734 --> 01:57:03.734
liquid energy to ensure that we can

01:57:03.734 --> 01:57:05.734
continue to project and sustain the

01:57:05.734 --> 01:57:08.068
forest well into the future . Thank you .

01:57:08.068 --> 01:57:10.360
Um I want to also follow up on the

01:57:10.360 --> 01:57:12.830
discussion on cyber that you just had

01:57:12.830 --> 01:57:14.719
with my good friend from michigan

01:57:14.719 --> 01:57:17.080
senator Peters . Um I would like to

01:57:17.080 --> 01:57:19.080
take a little bit further and asked

01:57:19.080 --> 01:57:21.191
this transform currently have systems

01:57:21.191 --> 01:57:23.413
in place that will evaluate , that will

01:57:23.413 --> 01:57:26.280
evaluate compliance um uh with you know ,

01:57:26.290 --> 01:57:28.700
the cyber requirements in terms of your

01:57:28.700 --> 01:57:30.644
civilian partners . And how do you

01:57:30.644 --> 01:57:32.890
enforce cyber security measures with

01:57:32.890 --> 01:57:35.740
commercial partners ? Yes , ma'am ,

01:57:35.740 --> 01:57:38.570
thank you for the commercial partners ,

01:57:38.570 --> 01:57:41.680
which we have many and uh good

01:57:41.680 --> 01:57:44.600
partnerships that's currently done

01:57:44.600 --> 01:57:46.544
through a self assessment and self

01:57:46.544 --> 01:57:49.990
reporting . Uh We are working a proof

01:57:49.990 --> 01:57:53.390
of principle uh for a third party to be

01:57:53.390 --> 01:57:56.310
able to validate compliance . That's a

01:57:56.310 --> 01:57:58.421
relatively new initiative . We've got

01:57:58.421 --> 01:58:00.754
to work through the feasibility of that ,

01:58:00.754 --> 01:58:02.866
but we are working in that regard , I

01:58:02.866 --> 01:58:05.100
would say though today we have a very

01:58:05.100 --> 01:58:07.350
transparent and good level of

01:58:07.350 --> 01:58:09.683
coordination with our industry partners .

01:58:09.683 --> 01:58:11.628
And as I mentioned , I think we're

01:58:11.628 --> 01:58:13.739
pushing on an open door when it comes

01:58:13.739 --> 01:58:16.880
to cyber uh cyber risk and and cyber

01:58:16.880 --> 01:58:18.960
coaching . So we are getting good

01:58:18.960 --> 01:58:21.182
cooperation . And at the end of the day

01:58:21.182 --> 01:58:23.230
we ensure we don't have any single

01:58:23.230 --> 01:58:25.008
points of failure inside of our

01:58:25.008 --> 01:58:28.130
industry networks . Thank you general .

01:58:28.130 --> 01:58:29.908
And by the way , I just want to

01:58:29.908 --> 01:58:31.908
congratulate you on your remarkable

01:58:31.908 --> 01:58:34.500
career and I happen to think that uh ,

01:58:34.510 --> 01:58:37.390
leaving from from the Transcom is it's

01:58:37.390 --> 01:58:40.730
a capstone . It's it's uh , my personal ,

01:58:40.740 --> 01:58:43.830
uh , interest , my personal what I

01:58:43.830 --> 01:58:45.997
considered critical to our force . And

01:58:45.997 --> 01:58:48.108
I just want to thank you for how well

01:58:48.108 --> 01:58:50.330
you have done there and how well you've

01:58:50.330 --> 01:58:52.497
moved our capacity , both capacity and

01:58:52.497 --> 01:58:54.497
capability forward when it comes to

01:58:54.497 --> 01:58:56.441
logistics , um , for our , for our

01:58:56.441 --> 01:58:58.497
national security . And I just can't

01:58:58.497 --> 01:59:00.663
thank you enough for your dedication .

01:59:00.663 --> 01:59:02.774
And I hope you have a wonderful early

01:59:02.774 --> 01:59:04.941
part of your retirement where you said

01:59:04.941 --> 01:59:04.590
you're going to go underground and hide

01:59:04.590 --> 01:59:06.701
for a little while , enjoy that . But

01:59:06.701 --> 01:59:08.646
then I'm sure we'll see you around

01:59:08.646 --> 01:59:10.979
again sometime soon . Thank you so much .

01:59:10.979 --> 01:59:13.090
And thank you for your various , uh ,

01:59:13.090 --> 01:59:15.312
thank you Senator dot org now via web .

01:59:15.312 --> 01:59:17.479
Excellently recognize Senator Cotton .

01:59:17.479 --> 01:59:19.590
Thank you . Mr . Chairman , thank you

01:59:19.590 --> 01:59:21.757
gentlemen for appearing in front of us

01:59:21.757 --> 01:59:23.868
general Walters . I want to ask you a

01:59:23.868 --> 01:59:26.440
couple more questions about Ukraine .

01:59:26.450 --> 01:59:29.440
Um an

01:59:29.440 --> 01:59:33.160
alumni of uh your organization ,

01:59:33.170 --> 01:59:35.320
General Ben Hodges recently said in a

01:59:35.320 --> 01:59:37.730
television interview on Ukrainian

01:59:37.730 --> 01:59:40.220
television network that he believes

01:59:40.220 --> 01:59:44.000
Russia's build up uh in the Donbas area

01:59:44.000 --> 01:59:46.056
is not specifically about Donbas for

01:59:46.056 --> 01:59:48.260
more about control of the Black Sea

01:59:48.260 --> 01:59:52.190
coast and in particular trying to take

01:59:52.190 --> 01:59:54.540
control of mary Oppel and maybe the sea

01:59:54.540 --> 01:59:57.380
of Azov uh to stage Russia for further

01:59:57.380 --> 01:59:59.810
incursions onto the Northern Black Sea

01:59:59.810 --> 02:00:02.530
coast . Have you seen that interview ?

02:00:02.530 --> 02:00:04.530
And if so , what do you think about

02:00:04.530 --> 02:00:07.100
General Hodges comments , Senator . I

02:00:07.110 --> 02:00:09.280
haven't seen the interview , but I too

02:00:09.280 --> 02:00:11.680
am concerned about the protection of

02:00:11.690 --> 02:00:13.801
sovereign activity in the vicinity of

02:00:13.801 --> 02:00:17.350
the Black Sea . This is a concern back

02:00:17.350 --> 02:00:20.120
in 2015 , was it not after Ukraine

02:00:20.120 --> 02:00:22.280
first made its incursion uh into the

02:00:22.280 --> 02:00:24.391
Donbas um that they were going to try

02:00:24.391 --> 02:00:26.613
to establish a so called Land Bridge to

02:00:26.613 --> 02:00:29.030
Crimea . It was senator

02:00:30.310 --> 02:00:32.780
and that would be deeply harmful not

02:00:32.780 --> 02:00:34.836
only to Ukraine but also to american

02:00:34.836 --> 02:00:36.947
interests in the Black Sea region and

02:00:36.947 --> 02:00:40.330
europe more broadly concur center .

02:00:40.910 --> 02:00:42.966
Thank you . Um , and I know that you

02:00:42.966 --> 02:00:45.620
asked the question earlier about the

02:00:45.620 --> 02:00:47.787
Javelin missiles that we have provided

02:00:47.787 --> 02:00:51.520
Ukraine , but to be very exact , um ,

02:00:51.530 --> 02:00:53.590
those are in possession of the

02:00:53.590 --> 02:00:56.670
Ukrainian armed forces and they are

02:00:56.670 --> 02:00:58.892
entitled to use those anywhere in their

02:00:58.892 --> 02:01:01.114
country in any manner that they need to

02:01:01.114 --> 02:01:04.400
defend their territory . That is

02:01:04.400 --> 02:01:06.178
correct , senator for defensive

02:01:06.178 --> 02:01:08.122
purposes to defend their sovereign

02:01:08.122 --> 02:01:11.630
territory . Javelin is by definition

02:01:11.630 --> 02:01:13.686
really a defensive weapon , wouldn't

02:01:13.686 --> 02:01:16.540
you say ? I would center ,

02:01:18.510 --> 02:01:21.110
I'll relay one story from the summer of

02:01:21.110 --> 02:01:24.420
2015 . Um , I was with the former

02:01:24.420 --> 02:01:26.420
chairman of the committee , Senator

02:01:26.420 --> 02:01:28.642
McCain uh , in eastern Ukraine about as

02:01:28.642 --> 02:01:30.753
close as they would let us get to the

02:01:30.753 --> 02:01:33.340
Donbas and we met with some troops from

02:01:33.340 --> 02:01:35.910
their uh then irregular militia forces

02:01:35.910 --> 02:01:38.190
that had rallied to come to Ukraine's

02:01:38.190 --> 02:01:40.570
defense . One had been a former tank

02:01:40.580 --> 02:01:42.636
commander , is lieutenant in the Red

02:01:42.636 --> 02:01:44.413
Army and now he was a battalion

02:01:44.413 --> 02:01:46.524
commander of this new unit and he was

02:01:46.524 --> 02:01:48.302
pleading with us at the time to

02:01:48.302 --> 02:01:50.524
convince the Obama biden administration

02:01:50.524 --> 02:01:52.636
tried javelins , which they never did

02:01:52.636 --> 02:01:54.830
and he said to us Mr senators , uh we

02:01:54.830 --> 02:01:57.220
do not need 100 javelins to use against

02:01:57.220 --> 02:01:59.053
Russian tanks . We only need one

02:01:59.053 --> 02:02:01.276
javelin to use against Russian tank and

02:02:01.276 --> 02:02:03.498
then Russian tankers will think twice ,

02:02:03.498 --> 02:02:05.609
Would you agree with that bit of folk

02:02:05.609 --> 02:02:07.720
wisdom from the Battlefield ? General

02:02:07.720 --> 02:02:09.831
Walters , that one Javelin uh used in

02:02:09.831 --> 02:02:11.776
eastern Ukrainians to Russian tank

02:02:11.776 --> 02:02:13.776
would make a lot of Russian tankers

02:02:13.776 --> 02:02:15.776
think twice I would senator . And I

02:02:15.776 --> 02:02:17.942
think you've accurately characteristic

02:02:17.942 --> 02:02:20.109
that the spirit of the Ukrainian armed

02:02:20.109 --> 02:02:22.276
forces . All right , thank you . Let's

02:02:22.276 --> 02:02:24.276
move on to another matter of making

02:02:24.276 --> 02:02:26.387
Russians think twice um , in the wake

02:02:26.387 --> 02:02:28.380
of Russia's development of new

02:02:28.380 --> 02:02:31.200
intermediate range nuclear forces

02:02:31.200 --> 02:02:34.300
capabilities and also are long overdue

02:02:34.300 --> 02:02:36.490
departure from the intermediate range

02:02:36.490 --> 02:02:39.210
nuclear forces treaty . How should NATO

02:02:39.220 --> 02:02:42.370
posture our forces to adapt to Russia's

02:02:42.380 --> 02:02:45.230
missile threat ? Um , and what in

02:02:45.230 --> 02:02:47.520
particular should we do to focus on

02:02:47.900 --> 02:02:50.011
missile defense and long range strike

02:02:50.011 --> 02:02:52.067
capability in the european theater ?

02:02:52.900 --> 02:02:55.011
Senators , we talked before , we have

02:02:55.011 --> 02:02:57.122
to continue to improve in indications

02:02:57.122 --> 02:02:59.344
and warnings and command and control so

02:02:59.344 --> 02:03:01.122
that we can see deeper into the

02:03:01.122 --> 02:03:03.233
environment and respond quicker . And

02:03:03.233 --> 02:03:05.178
if we'll continue to improve those

02:03:05.178 --> 02:03:07.233
areas with respect to the integrated

02:03:07.233 --> 02:03:09.344
air and missile defense programs that

02:03:09.344 --> 02:03:11.456
we have uh in work today , we'll keep

02:03:11.456 --> 02:03:13.567
the campaign momentum traversing in a

02:03:13.567 --> 02:03:15.733
productive direction our NATO partners

02:03:15.733 --> 02:03:17.733
comfortable with the development of

02:03:17.733 --> 02:03:19.511
those kind of long range strike

02:03:19.511 --> 02:03:21.567
capabilities that can hold at risk .

02:03:21.567 --> 02:03:23.678
Russian targets that previously would

02:03:23.678 --> 02:03:25.789
have been within the n . F prohibited

02:03:25.789 --> 02:03:27.900
range of missiles . Senator , I would

02:03:27.900 --> 02:03:29.900
characterize the environment as the

02:03:29.900 --> 02:03:32.067
nation's are becoming more comfortable

02:03:32.067 --> 02:03:34.178
as they gain greater understanding of

02:03:34.178 --> 02:03:37.590
of the operational environment . Um and

02:03:37.590 --> 02:03:39.590
it seems to me like that's a pretty

02:03:39.590 --> 02:03:41.610
strong asymmetric advantage in our

02:03:41.610 --> 02:03:43.850
favor , isn't it ? Unless we think that

02:03:43.850 --> 02:03:45.683
Russia is going to start putting

02:03:45.683 --> 02:03:47.850
intermediate range missiles in cuba or

02:03:47.850 --> 02:03:49.961
the Bahamas or Canada or Mexico since

02:03:49.961 --> 02:03:51.961
we can put them up against Russia's

02:03:51.961 --> 02:03:54.183
border and they have a much harder time

02:03:54.183 --> 02:03:56.072
doing it on our border . I concur

02:03:56.072 --> 02:03:58.239
center , it seems to me like we should

02:03:58.239 --> 02:03:58.130
be a lot more of a man getting deployed

02:03:58.130 --> 02:04:00.510
to Thank you General thank you general

02:04:00.510 --> 02:04:04.090
Lines as well for your service . Thank

02:04:04.090 --> 02:04:05.868
you Senator Cotton . Let me now

02:04:05.868 --> 02:04:08.480
recognize Senator kelly . Thank you Mr .

02:04:08.480 --> 02:04:11.010
Chairman and thank you General Walters

02:04:11.010 --> 02:04:13.066
and General Lyons . I want to talk a

02:04:13.066 --> 02:04:16.790
little bit about defender europe 20 .

02:04:16.800 --> 02:04:20.700
Um , we we trained so we're prepared

02:04:21.190 --> 02:04:23.357
prepared to fight and prepare to win .

02:04:23.790 --> 02:04:27.440
And you know , this exercise is one to ,

02:04:27.450 --> 02:04:29.910
you know , test our power projection .

02:04:30.390 --> 02:04:32.840
And I want to hear , you know ,

02:04:32.840 --> 02:04:34.840
directly from the two of you . What

02:04:34.840 --> 02:04:37.570
were the top lessons learned from

02:04:37.580 --> 02:04:41.350
defender Europe 20 ? And then how does

02:04:41.350 --> 02:04:44.050
that translate into changes in the

02:04:44.050 --> 02:04:47.350
exercise in ? Well , coming up in

02:04:47.660 --> 02:04:48.420
this year ,

02:04:51.490 --> 02:04:53.712
Senator , the number one lesson learned

02:04:53.712 --> 02:04:55.601
was the value of army preposition

02:04:55.601 --> 02:04:58.520
stockpiles and deployable air based

02:04:58.520 --> 02:05:01.000
systems . Uh , we've studied this issue

02:05:01.000 --> 02:05:04.350
for a long time and moving at speed

02:05:04.350 --> 02:05:06.183
with large formations across the

02:05:06.183 --> 02:05:08.420
atlantic and and getting to point

02:05:08.430 --> 02:05:10.810
ultimately to the appropriate foxhole

02:05:10.890 --> 02:05:13.250
with the ready force Member is a

02:05:13.250 --> 02:05:15.340
challenge . Having those preposition

02:05:15.340 --> 02:05:17.860
stockpiles in place was was very

02:05:17.860 --> 02:05:20.082
beneficial , more so than we could have

02:05:20.082 --> 02:05:22.410
possibly imagined . And defender Europe

02:05:22.410 --> 02:05:26.260
20 verified that General alliance

02:05:29.090 --> 02:05:31.760
Senator thanks . Uh , it's such a

02:05:31.760 --> 02:05:33.982
critical exercise . We got a lot out of

02:05:33.982 --> 02:05:36.093
it , I would say a couple things . It

02:05:36.093 --> 02:05:38.093
demonstrated clearly in my own view

02:05:38.093 --> 02:05:40.038
that we do as a nation to have the

02:05:40.038 --> 02:05:42.260
ability to move immediately if required

02:05:42.390 --> 02:05:44.168
and as well as follow it with a

02:05:44.168 --> 02:05:46.168
decisive force . And as I looked at

02:05:46.168 --> 02:05:48.168
that operation and I looked at what

02:05:48.168 --> 02:05:50.223
general Walters was trying to do and

02:05:50.223 --> 02:05:52.446
our ability to get the force to him , I

02:05:52.446 --> 02:05:54.390
felt very confident our ability to

02:05:54.390 --> 02:05:56.390
support his efforts and deliver the

02:05:56.390 --> 02:05:58.390
decisive force when needed . So the

02:05:58.390 --> 02:06:00.690
sealift capability was that tested . I

02:06:00.690 --> 02:06:03.980
know that uh , we had more Air force

02:06:03.980 --> 02:06:07.370
and Navy resources . I assume some MSC

02:06:07.380 --> 02:06:09.930
resources involved . Do you feel you

02:06:09.930 --> 02:06:12.152
have the sealift capability you need if

02:06:12.152 --> 02:06:15.010
this was not an exercise , But was if

02:06:15.010 --> 02:06:18.220
we wound up in a real fight , senator ?

02:06:18.220 --> 02:06:20.442
I think you're aware , I mean , we have

02:06:20.442 --> 02:06:22.609
a lot of work to do on sealift and see

02:06:22.609 --> 02:06:22.390
the recapitalisation . We've got an

02:06:22.390 --> 02:06:24.501
aging fleet , a fleet that's got some

02:06:24.501 --> 02:06:26.668
readiness challenges . And we've got a

02:06:26.668 --> 02:06:29.330
plan to , you know , to remedy that

02:06:29.340 --> 02:06:31.570
over the next decade . But in this

02:06:31.570 --> 02:06:34.320
particular exercise with multiple

02:06:34.320 --> 02:06:37.030
vessels under way , uh , some

02:06:37.030 --> 02:06:39.740
commercials , some organic , uh , some

02:06:39.740 --> 02:06:41.850
frankly being integrated uh , in the

02:06:41.850 --> 02:06:44.460
handoff between second fleet and and

02:06:44.460 --> 02:06:46.516
six fleet in europe , it was a great

02:06:46.516 --> 02:06:49.250
test of our ability to coordinate the

02:06:49.260 --> 02:06:51.530
transatlantic crossing and I think very

02:06:51.530 --> 02:06:53.850
successfully . So . But to your point ,

02:06:53.850 --> 02:06:56.200
we have work to do on the broader she

02:06:56.200 --> 02:06:58.850
left a capacity because in a surge

02:06:58.850 --> 02:07:01.270
environment , we're making quite

02:07:01.270 --> 02:07:03.750
literally hundreds of turns as opposed

02:07:03.750 --> 02:07:06.210
to dozens of turns , as in this case

02:07:07.080 --> 02:07:10.440
general Walters in um further in

02:07:10.440 --> 02:07:12.218
eastern europe , we used to the

02:07:12.218 --> 02:07:15.120
infrastructure was designed for Warsaw

02:07:15.130 --> 02:07:19.060
pact nations , Russian tanks , vehicles ,

02:07:19.060 --> 02:07:20.893
troops . That infrastructure was

02:07:20.893 --> 02:07:22.893
designed for things to be traveling

02:07:22.893 --> 02:07:26.040
east to west . Um do

02:07:26.050 --> 02:07:28.760
was did that come up in part of the ,

02:07:28.770 --> 02:07:32.190
the exercise in transporting our

02:07:32.190 --> 02:07:35.130
equipment and troops uh to the east

02:07:35.130 --> 02:07:37.130
through infrastructure that was not

02:07:37.130 --> 02:07:40.630
designed for this . It did senator and

02:07:40.640 --> 02:07:42.529
and with the contributions of the

02:07:42.529 --> 02:07:44.640
european deterrence initiative . Over

02:07:44.640 --> 02:07:46.696
the course of the last three years ,

02:07:46.696 --> 02:07:48.640
we've we've had the opportunity to

02:07:48.640 --> 02:07:50.862
specifically work on road and rail from

02:07:50.862 --> 02:07:52.862
west to east central Germany to the

02:07:52.862 --> 02:07:54.973
Baltics and down to Hungary Romania ,

02:07:54.973 --> 02:07:57.140
Bulgaria . And we've made improvements

02:07:57.140 --> 02:07:59.029
in those areas , but it's still a

02:07:59.029 --> 02:08:00.973
challenge and it's something we'll

02:08:00.973 --> 02:08:00.660
continue to work on . But we're much

02:08:00.660 --> 02:08:02.830
faster then we have been in the past

02:08:02.840 --> 02:08:05.610
and then finally , how in the remaining

02:08:05.610 --> 02:08:07.832
minute , how would you like to see this

02:08:07.832 --> 02:08:11.500
exercise change to make sure we are

02:08:11.510 --> 02:08:15.180
as prepared as possible for ,

02:08:15.670 --> 02:08:17.400
you know , real engagements .

02:08:18.770 --> 02:08:21.260
We're in the process of executing

02:08:21.260 --> 02:08:23.510
defender Europe 21 and one of the

02:08:23.510 --> 02:08:25.670
changes that we're making is a cyber

02:08:25.670 --> 02:08:27.890
red team and we want to improve our

02:08:27.890 --> 02:08:29.910
cyber defensive posture through the

02:08:29.910 --> 02:08:32.770
duration of the exercises involved with

02:08:32.770 --> 02:08:36.690
defender Europe 21 . Thank you .

02:08:36.700 --> 02:08:39.290
And I yield back . Thank you . Senator

02:08:39.290 --> 02:08:41.623
kelly . Let me recognize Senator Hawley .

02:08:41.623 --> 02:08:43.734
Thank you . Mr . Chairman gentlemen ,

02:08:43.734 --> 02:08:45.846
thank you for being here . Thanks for

02:08:45.846 --> 02:08:45.440
your service . General Walters . Let me

02:08:45.440 --> 02:08:47.750
start with you . Secretary Austin has

02:08:47.760 --> 02:08:49.816
reaffirmed the position of the prior

02:08:49.816 --> 02:08:51.760
administration . That china is our

02:08:51.760 --> 02:08:54.470
pacing threat . given that what's your

02:08:54.470 --> 02:08:57.020
view on how you can , what you can do

02:08:57.020 --> 02:08:59.600
in um to free up military resources

02:08:59.830 --> 02:09:01.774
that the department can use at the

02:09:01.774 --> 02:09:05.440
pacing theater , Senator . My my first

02:09:05.440 --> 02:09:07.990
response is what what we do to

02:09:07.990 --> 02:09:10.101
effectively compete and deter against

02:09:10.101 --> 02:09:12.323
the nearest peer competitor in europe .

02:09:12.323 --> 02:09:15.160
Russia is effective in deterring china

02:09:15.170 --> 02:09:17.392
because of the connectivity between the

02:09:17.392 --> 02:09:19.614
two nations and the willingness of both

02:09:19.614 --> 02:09:22.250
nations to engage in malign influence

02:09:22.260 --> 02:09:24.371
against the United States and against

02:09:24.371 --> 02:09:26.830
NATO . So those activities that that

02:09:26.830 --> 02:09:28.941
allow us to continue to be successful

02:09:28.941 --> 02:09:31.163
in the competition phase against Russia

02:09:31.163 --> 02:09:32.997
are also helpful against China .

02:09:33.000 --> 02:09:36.840
Whether it's uh pointing out the

02:09:36.850 --> 02:09:39.072
poor path that a nation could take with

02:09:39.072 --> 02:09:41.072
respect to while away 5G or whether

02:09:41.072 --> 02:09:43.183
it's pointing out what china is doing

02:09:43.183 --> 02:09:45.239
with respect to equities and seaport

02:09:45.239 --> 02:09:47.572
scenario , ports , investment in europe .

02:09:47.572 --> 02:09:49.739
Let me ask you a little bit about NATO

02:09:49.739 --> 02:09:49.710
that there's been a lot of talk about

02:09:49.710 --> 02:09:53.160
NATO's role in helping confront china .

02:09:53.170 --> 02:09:55.170
Would it be helpful if our european

02:09:55.170 --> 02:09:58.030
allies did more to bear the burden of

02:09:58.040 --> 02:10:00.910
confronting Russia so that we can focus

02:10:00.920 --> 02:10:02.864
on what has been identified as our

02:10:02.864 --> 02:10:05.690
pacing threat , the pacing theater . No

02:10:05.690 --> 02:10:07.912
argument here , senator and I'm pleased

02:10:07.912 --> 02:10:10.079
report the nations are uh they're very

02:10:10.079 --> 02:10:11.968
fixated on Russia . Uh there's no

02:10:11.968 --> 02:10:13.968
hesitancy on their part . And I say

02:10:13.968 --> 02:10:16.190
that as a result of producing the first

02:10:16.190 --> 02:10:18.190
NATO military strategy and over six

02:10:18.190 --> 02:10:20.610
decades . Uh Finalizing the concept for

02:10:20.610 --> 02:10:22.777
deterrence and defense of the atlantic

02:10:22.777 --> 02:10:24.510
area . All of those codify the

02:10:24.510 --> 02:10:26.510
challenges that we face against the

02:10:26.510 --> 02:10:28.566
malign Russia . And the nations have

02:10:28.566 --> 02:10:30.677
been very willing to produce national

02:10:30.677 --> 02:10:32.843
plans they take into account Russia as

02:10:32.843 --> 02:10:35.066
a malign influencer in the region . Let

02:10:35.066 --> 02:10:37.177
me just ask you about our NATO allies

02:10:37.177 --> 02:10:39.343
spending in 2014 . I think it was that

02:10:39.343 --> 02:10:41.480
NATO members agreed to spend 2% of

02:10:41.480 --> 02:10:43.591
their GDP respective G . D . P . S on

02:10:43.591 --> 02:10:46.380
defense by 2020 . For now the world has

02:10:46.380 --> 02:10:48.930
changed a lot since 2014 . And

02:10:48.940 --> 02:10:51.162
particularly with our again our our own

02:10:51.162 --> 02:10:53.218
assessment of what is now are pacing

02:10:53.218 --> 02:10:55.329
threat From a military standpoint and

02:10:55.329 --> 02:10:57.607
given the changed security environment ,

02:10:57.607 --> 02:10:59.551
do you think that two is still the

02:10:59.551 --> 02:11:02.690
right target ? I do senator . I will

02:11:02.690 --> 02:11:06.610
tell you that from 2016 to 2020 the

02:11:06.610 --> 02:11:08.870
10 nations today that meet the 2%

02:11:08.870 --> 02:11:11.830
minimum , uh , all the nations involved

02:11:11.840 --> 02:11:14.007
have allowed us the opportunity to get

02:11:14.007 --> 02:11:16.780
her hands on 130 billion extra dollars .

02:11:16.860 --> 02:11:19.160
And that makes a big difference with

02:11:19.160 --> 02:11:21.216
our ability to effectively compete .

02:11:21.960 --> 02:11:25.310
Has you done any analysis as to that

02:11:25.310 --> 02:11:27.532
two number ? Why you think that's still

02:11:27.532 --> 02:11:29.699
the 2% ? That's that's still the right

02:11:29.699 --> 02:11:33.590
number sir . Um has done analysis . OsD

02:11:33.590 --> 02:11:35.312
has done analysis and NATO has

02:11:35.312 --> 02:11:37.630
conducted analysis and and the feedback

02:11:37.630 --> 02:11:41.040
we get is the whales pledge of 2% is

02:11:41.040 --> 02:11:42.873
still viable with respect to our

02:11:42.873 --> 02:11:45.240
ability to build a competitive edge

02:11:45.250 --> 02:11:47.583
against near pier competition in europe .

02:11:47.583 --> 02:11:49.806
What would you be willing to share that

02:11:49.806 --> 02:11:51.750
analysis ? General with the in the

02:11:51.750 --> 02:11:54.083
appropriate setting with this committee ?

02:11:54.083 --> 02:11:56.250
Yes sir . Thank you very much . Let me

02:11:56.250 --> 02:11:58.417
just ask you before I moved to general

02:11:58.417 --> 02:12:00.528
lines about I . S . Are you mentioned

02:12:00.528 --> 02:12:02.639
in your opening statement that timely

02:12:02.639 --> 02:12:04.694
indications and warning would be key

02:12:04.694 --> 02:12:06.806
for deterring or blunting any Russian

02:12:06.806 --> 02:12:09.139
attack in the Baltics ? Of course I . S .

02:12:09.139 --> 02:12:11.083
R . Is very scarce commodity . Our

02:12:11.083 --> 02:12:12.972
forces in the pacific also needed

02:12:12.972 --> 02:12:14.917
timely indications and warnings of

02:12:14.917 --> 02:12:16.750
possible chinese attacks there ,

02:12:16.750 --> 02:12:18.972
particularly with regard to Taiwan . So

02:12:18.972 --> 02:12:21.083
my question is how do we minimize the

02:12:21.083 --> 02:12:23.194
amount of american I . S . R . That's

02:12:23.194 --> 02:12:25.306
needed in your A . O . R . So that we

02:12:25.306 --> 02:12:27.472
can monitor Russian forces effectively

02:12:27.472 --> 02:12:29.306
but also continue to bolster our

02:12:29.306 --> 02:12:31.780
deterrent posture in Peckham , continue

02:12:31.780 --> 02:12:33.613
to communicate to our allies and

02:12:33.613 --> 02:12:35.724
partners that the criticality of VIAS

02:12:35.724 --> 02:12:37.502
are and what it contributes and

02:12:37.502 --> 02:12:39.558
indications and warnings and what it

02:12:39.558 --> 02:12:41.613
affords you the opportunity to do in

02:12:41.613 --> 02:12:43.780
the competition phase . Before you get

02:12:43.780 --> 02:12:45.558
the crisis or before you get to

02:12:45.558 --> 02:12:47.502
conflict and a NATO , we're having

02:12:47.502 --> 02:12:49.613
success with that . Very good . Thank

02:12:49.613 --> 02:12:49.140
you . The general General Lions . In my

02:12:49.150 --> 02:12:51.960
remaining seconds here , let me ask you

02:12:51.970 --> 02:12:54.390
a logistics question . Admiral Davidson

02:12:54.390 --> 02:12:56.600
has recently warned that china might

02:12:56.600 --> 02:12:58.822
attempt to fate accompli with regard to

02:12:58.822 --> 02:13:01.210
Taiwan much sooner than we might

02:13:01.210 --> 02:13:03.432
otherwise previously have anticipated .

02:13:03.432 --> 02:13:05.870
Just from a logistics standpoint . what

02:13:05.870 --> 02:13:07.981
do we need to do ? What do we need to

02:13:07.981 --> 02:13:10.148
have in place in the end of pacific in

02:13:10.148 --> 02:13:12.148
order to blunt such an offensive as

02:13:12.148 --> 02:13:14.481
quickly as possible in your view ? Well ,

02:13:14.481 --> 02:13:16.592
senator , I think uh , you know Apple

02:13:16.592 --> 02:13:18.592
Davidson's done some great work out

02:13:18.592 --> 02:13:20.703
there . It's uh still has to continue

02:13:20.703 --> 02:13:22.814
in terms of the posture , not just in

02:13:22.814 --> 02:13:25.037
the pacific but the global posture . So

02:13:25.037 --> 02:13:26.926
it's so critical that we think of

02:13:26.926 --> 02:13:28.926
things globally and not just in the

02:13:28.926 --> 02:13:30.870
pacific in our global posture that

02:13:30.870 --> 02:13:33.092
offers us a physical , a temporal and a

02:13:33.092 --> 02:13:35.203
psychological advantage to be able to

02:13:35.203 --> 02:13:37.970
come when we're told to come and I have

02:13:37.970 --> 02:13:40.081
a high degree of confidence we can do

02:13:40.081 --> 02:13:42.192
that . I know that there's still work

02:13:42.192 --> 02:13:44.414
to be done as we evolve and look at the

02:13:44.414 --> 02:13:46.581
future character of warfare . But uh I

02:13:46.581 --> 02:13:48.414
think we're on the right path to

02:13:48.414 --> 02:13:50.581
support Apple Davidson's initiatives .

02:13:50.581 --> 02:13:52.748
Very good . My time has expired . I'll

02:13:52.748 --> 02:13:52.300
have another question or two for you

02:13:52.300 --> 02:13:54.300
for the record . Thank you both for

02:13:54.300 --> 02:13:56.467
your service . Thank you . Thank you .

02:13:56.467 --> 02:13:58.578
Senator Hawley . Senator Tuberville ,

02:13:58.578 --> 02:14:02.210
please . Thank you very much . Mr .

02:14:02.210 --> 02:14:04.154
Chairman real quick . I know we're

02:14:04.154 --> 02:14:06.321
running on time , but thanks for being

02:14:06.321 --> 02:14:08.599
here too , guys today and your service .

02:14:08.599 --> 02:14:10.821
Uh , just real quick Redstone arsenal .

02:14:10.821 --> 02:14:12.988
Uh , you know , we have quite a bit of

02:14:12.988 --> 02:14:15.210
things in redstone and done a great job

02:14:15.210 --> 02:14:17.266
for the american people , uh , looks

02:14:17.266 --> 02:14:19.377
like we've got a great chance to have

02:14:19.377 --> 02:14:21.488
the Space command general lines . How

02:14:21.488 --> 02:14:23.710
important is that ? How important is us

02:14:23.710 --> 02:14:25.932
to move up in in uh , Space command ? I

02:14:25.932 --> 02:14:28.154
know we're on the infant ages of that .

02:14:28.154 --> 02:14:30.377
But what do you what do you think about

02:14:30.377 --> 02:14:32.654
Space command ? Uh , Senator , I think ,

02:14:32.654 --> 02:14:34.321
uh , I think space is clearly

02:14:34.321 --> 02:14:36.620
warfighting domain domain . I think the

02:14:36.630 --> 02:14:38.574
creation of space . Com as well as

02:14:38.574 --> 02:14:40.741
space force is critically important to

02:14:40.741 --> 02:14:42.852
the way we're going to operate in the

02:14:42.852 --> 02:14:44.630
future and the , you know , the

02:14:44.630 --> 02:14:46.852
character of warfare as we see it . I I

02:14:46.852 --> 02:14:48.797
really can't comment on the basing

02:14:48.797 --> 02:14:51.019
issue , whether it's Huntsville or some

02:14:51.019 --> 02:14:53.074
other location . I will confirm just

02:14:53.074 --> 02:14:54.963
being an army officer and knowing

02:14:54.963 --> 02:14:56.908
what's at Huntsville critical that

02:14:56.908 --> 02:14:59.074
installation is to army operations and

02:14:59.074 --> 02:15:01.352
other operations of the such thank you .

02:15:01.352 --> 02:15:03.408
General walter . Couldn't agree more

02:15:03.408 --> 02:15:05.519
spaces of warfighting domain . It's ,

02:15:05.519 --> 02:15:07.574
it's pretty large domain compared to

02:15:07.574 --> 02:15:09.574
all the others . And it's important

02:15:09.574 --> 02:15:09.380
that we understand how to effectively

02:15:09.380 --> 02:15:12.170
compete and deter and defend in space .

02:15:12.180 --> 02:15:14.402
What do you think about laser warfare ?

02:15:14.402 --> 02:15:16.291
I've seen some example of that in

02:15:16.291 --> 02:15:18.458
Huntsville and what we're developing ,

02:15:18.458 --> 02:15:21.910
uh , you see a future for that ? I do ,

02:15:21.920 --> 02:15:24.031
Senator . I think we need to continue

02:15:24.031 --> 02:15:26.309
down that path . It's , it's not cheap .

02:15:26.309 --> 02:15:28.309
But the return on investment due to

02:15:28.309 --> 02:15:30.531
accuracy and lethality is very powerful

02:15:30.531 --> 02:15:32.531
and very compelling . General lines

02:15:33.540 --> 02:15:35.762
senator . I would just say , you know ,

02:15:35.762 --> 02:15:37.373
anything that provides us an

02:15:37.373 --> 02:15:39.540
opportunity to bring lethal effects on

02:15:39.540 --> 02:15:41.762
an adversary to compel them to our will

02:15:41.762 --> 02:15:43.929
and our national security aims has has

02:15:43.929 --> 02:15:46.040
to remain on the table . Yeah , thank

02:15:46.040 --> 02:15:47.873
you very much . And just a quick

02:15:47.873 --> 02:15:47.760
comment about earlier about some things

02:15:47.760 --> 02:15:49.871
were said in here . I was disturbed a

02:15:49.871 --> 02:15:51.982
little bit about using the word White

02:15:51.982 --> 02:15:54.093
Supremist . You know , I'm a football

02:15:54.093 --> 02:15:57.330
coach in trade and I built teams and

02:15:57.330 --> 02:15:59.219
that's what you're doing . You're

02:15:59.219 --> 02:16:01.552
building a team . We got people in here .

02:16:01.552 --> 02:16:01.530
There's never been on a team . They

02:16:01.530 --> 02:16:03.641
don't understand . You recruit people

02:16:03.641 --> 02:16:05.808
and you make something out of them and

02:16:05.808 --> 02:16:07.919
you bring them together and you fight

02:16:07.919 --> 02:16:09.863
together . You live , you eat your

02:16:09.863 --> 02:16:12.086
breathe and they come from all economic

02:16:12.086 --> 02:16:14.030
backgrounds , every culture in the

02:16:14.030 --> 02:16:14.020
world . Some people don't understand

02:16:14.020 --> 02:16:16.131
that . They don't understand it . And

02:16:16.131 --> 02:16:18.280
and you will eliminate them as I did

02:16:18.280 --> 02:16:20.391
when when I was coaching . If you had

02:16:20.391 --> 02:16:22.447
somebody that wasn't a team member ,

02:16:22.447 --> 02:16:24.613
they were gone . You do the same thing

02:16:24.613 --> 02:16:26.724
in the military , we need to stay out

02:16:26.724 --> 02:16:28.780
of that . We need to leave it to the

02:16:28.780 --> 02:16:31.113
generals which are to me or the coaches ,

02:16:31.113 --> 02:16:33.336
uh people that do it , get it done that

02:16:33.336 --> 02:16:35.502
No , these young men and women because

02:16:35.502 --> 02:16:37.920
listening to the to our uh people of

02:16:37.920 --> 02:16:40.142
the day that we were interviewing about

02:16:40.142 --> 02:16:42.420
a draft in the future which , you know ,

02:16:42.420 --> 02:16:44.587
we want to draft women . We think they

02:16:44.587 --> 02:16:46.809
serve a great , great purpose and we're

02:16:46.809 --> 02:16:48.809
gonna need it . This is a dangerous

02:16:48.809 --> 02:16:50.753
world , a dangerous world . And we

02:16:50.753 --> 02:16:52.809
can't sit back and and try to tear a

02:16:52.809 --> 02:16:54.920
military down , uh , from people that

02:16:54.920 --> 02:16:57.031
really know , know nothing about it ,

02:16:57.031 --> 02:16:59.087
about building a team . So I want to

02:16:59.087 --> 02:17:01.253
apologize for that . I mean , that was

02:17:01.253 --> 02:17:03.420
not a that was not a good selection of

02:17:03.420 --> 02:17:05.531
of questions . Uh , I don't think for

02:17:05.531 --> 02:17:07.587
this committee because we're here to

02:17:07.587 --> 02:17:09.840
help . We're here to uh give advice if

02:17:09.840 --> 02:17:11.784
you want advice , but not give you

02:17:11.784 --> 02:17:13.930
advice , so you have to have to take

02:17:13.930 --> 02:17:15.763
that . You know , And I was just

02:17:15.763 --> 02:17:17.930
pointed in Secretary Austin , uh , you

02:17:17.930 --> 02:17:19.986
know , he's an auburn guy . Uh , the

02:17:19.986 --> 02:17:22.041
first thing we do is we stand down ,

02:17:22.041 --> 02:17:23.986
stay out of it personally . And in

02:17:23.986 --> 02:17:26.350
terms of publicly , you know , I know

02:17:26.350 --> 02:17:28.572
being a coach , there's a lot of things

02:17:28.572 --> 02:17:30.794
you didn't bring up publicly . You kept

02:17:30.794 --> 02:17:32.906
it within because you've got to build

02:17:32.906 --> 02:17:34.906
because you you divide if you start

02:17:34.906 --> 02:17:37.440
bringing it up publicly . So we need a

02:17:37.450 --> 02:17:39.520
killing machine and we're gonna need

02:17:39.520 --> 02:17:41.710
one , just look at what's coming . So

02:17:41.720 --> 02:17:43.553
thanks for your service and your

02:17:43.553 --> 02:17:45.498
building and hopefully we can keep

02:17:45.498 --> 02:17:47.450
people out of what y'all do and do

02:17:47.450 --> 02:17:49.672
great because you're the defense of the

02:17:49.672 --> 02:17:51.728
world , not just the defense of this

02:17:51.728 --> 02:17:53.839
country . Thank you very much . Thank

02:17:53.839 --> 02:17:56.061
you . Mr . Chairman picture . Thank you

02:17:56.061 --> 02:17:57.894
Senator Tuberville and thank you

02:17:57.894 --> 02:18:00.117
gentlemen for your testimony . It's the

02:18:00.117 --> 02:18:02.283
intention now to adjourn the public uh

02:18:02.283 --> 02:18:05.750
hearing and quickly moved to SPc to 17

02:18:05.750 --> 02:18:08.770
for classified session . Let me yield

02:18:08.770 --> 02:18:11.450
to Senator Inhofe . Well , let me just

02:18:11.450 --> 02:18:13.580
thank the coach for his comments ,

02:18:13.730 --> 02:18:17.450
write on if there's no further

02:18:17.450 --> 02:18:20.150
comments than on the hearing is a joint