WEBVTT 00:00.140 --> 00:02.670 Thank you . Thank you , Senator Ron . 00:02.670 --> 00:05.600 Oh , no . Via WebEx 00:06.000 --> 00:09.090 Searcher Tillis . Thank you , Mr 00:09.090 --> 00:12.040 Chairman and Dr Hicks . Thank you for 00:12.050 --> 00:14.217 being there . I want to also thank you 00:14.217 --> 00:16.439 for being so generous with your time on 00:16.439 --> 00:18.661 the phone call last week . We covered a 00:18.661 --> 00:20.772 number of different topics . I didn't 00:20.772 --> 00:22.550 want to get back to some of the 00:22.550 --> 00:24.217 discussion we had last week , 00:24.217 --> 00:27.660 particularly around the On the one 00:27.660 --> 00:30.120 hand , I like all the responses you've 00:30.120 --> 00:32.342 given to my colleagues on commitment of 00:32.342 --> 00:35.390 modernization and our defense strategy . 00:35.400 --> 00:37.622 On the other hand , I think we're going 00:37.622 --> 00:40.260 to come up with funding issues and 00:40.640 --> 00:43.050 challenges to keep those programs on 00:43.050 --> 00:46.400 track . So how do we when you go into 00:46.400 --> 00:48.567 this role and I intend to support your 00:48.567 --> 00:51.700 confirmation ? How do you look at 00:51.700 --> 00:54.050 getting more productivity out of the 00:54.050 --> 00:57.880 dollars we already have in the face off 00:57.890 --> 01:00.160 the economic challenges that we have 01:00.170 --> 01:02.130 and maybe an administration that 01:02.130 --> 01:04.130 wouldn't place the same priority on 01:04.130 --> 01:06.297 funding that you've seen over the last 01:06.297 --> 01:08.130 four years . How do you get more 01:08.130 --> 01:10.352 productivity ? What kind of , uh , wide 01:10.352 --> 01:12.770 programs think are appropriate to drive 01:12.770 --> 01:14.992 more productivity for the dollars being 01:14.992 --> 01:18.530 spent for a Senator , Thank you so much 01:18.530 --> 01:21.500 for your statement of support , and I 01:21.500 --> 01:24.270 enjoyed our conversation as well . Um , 01:24.280 --> 01:27.140 let me let me tackle a few aspects of 01:27.150 --> 01:29.320 that because it's a very it's not an 01:29.320 --> 01:31.390 easy answer . I think some of the 01:31.400 --> 01:34.270 elements are about tying the 01:34.270 --> 01:35.992 capabilities , the programs to 01:35.992 --> 01:37.937 capabilities , to concepts to what 01:37.937 --> 01:39.881 we're trying to achieve . And that 01:39.881 --> 01:42.370 concept to capability link has been 01:42.370 --> 01:44.690 weak in the department for some time . 01:44.700 --> 01:46.756 Again , the department has some work 01:46.756 --> 01:48.978 underway . If confirmed , I'd wanna get 01:48.978 --> 01:51.220 in . Um , in particular , talked to the 01:51.220 --> 01:53.276 vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 01:53.276 --> 01:55.498 Staff about the status of that effort . 01:55.540 --> 01:58.620 Andi , try to understand where the 01:58.620 --> 02:01.170 concept are driving us to ideas about 02:01.180 --> 02:03.950 how we perform in the field against 02:03.950 --> 02:07.180 challengers . That helps us really 02:07.180 --> 02:09.490 focus the mind on the priorities We 02:09.490 --> 02:12.140 need to have , um , in terms of what 02:12.150 --> 02:14.150 teachers effectively , what creates 02:14.150 --> 02:17.820 credible capability . Andi also 02:17.830 --> 02:20.052 you know , where are there ? Areas that 02:20.052 --> 02:22.690 are lower risk ? There's never ah lack 02:22.700 --> 02:25.420 of risk . The question is how to 02:25.420 --> 02:27.410 prioritize effectively and be 02:27.410 --> 02:30.730 transparent about where we have decided 02:30.730 --> 02:33.410 to take risk so that Congress , among 02:33.410 --> 02:35.110 others , can can make its own 02:35.110 --> 02:38.560 determinations about those judgments . 02:38.940 --> 02:40.996 I think the other thing I would just 02:40.996 --> 02:43.218 point to is the business operation side 02:43.218 --> 02:45.273 of d o d . I mentioned in my opening 02:45.273 --> 02:47.162 statement that that's an area the 02:47.162 --> 02:49.384 deputy secretary off course needs to be 02:49.384 --> 02:51.550 involved directly in . And it's in 02:51.550 --> 02:53.883 large part for the reason you point out , 02:53.883 --> 02:55.994 which is we have to make every dollar 02:55.994 --> 02:58.760 that the taxpayer puts in have a return , 02:58.940 --> 03:01.051 and that return should be measured in 03:01.051 --> 03:03.051 terms of joint capability . So that 03:03.051 --> 03:05.710 means we need to squeeze out , um , 03:05.720 --> 03:08.340 obviously abuse . But much more 03:08.340 --> 03:11.540 frequently we see waste Onda . That 03:11.540 --> 03:13.460 will be a priority for me . 03:14.940 --> 03:16.810 Thank you , Dr Hicks . I think I 03:16.810 --> 03:18.866 mentioned to you on the call that we 03:18.866 --> 03:20.921 had that if I were there in person , 03:20.921 --> 03:24.260 I'll be bringing my 600 page plus RFP 03:24.260 --> 03:27.120 for the next generation handgun . I 03:27.130 --> 03:29.840 think that that's a case study and Anak 03:29.840 --> 03:32.760 Wiz Ishan process going wrong . So I 03:32.940 --> 03:35.051 have the bias that what we have to do 03:35.051 --> 03:36.940 is go in and stratify something's 03:36.940 --> 03:38.773 acquisition processes that air , 03:38.773 --> 03:40.607 literally preventing some viable 03:40.607 --> 03:42.496 suppliers from even participating 03:42.496 --> 03:45.140 because they're so costly and so time 03:45.140 --> 03:48.100 consuming that we could get a richer 03:48.100 --> 03:50.433 supply base . I think if we get smarter , 03:50.433 --> 03:52.322 uncertain systems clearly on more 03:52.322 --> 03:54.190 complex , uh , leading edge 03:54.190 --> 03:56.412 technologies , that may take time . But 03:56.412 --> 03:58.579 I think all of them have to have an up 03:58.579 --> 04:01.140 and down review . Um , after hex also 04:01.140 --> 04:03.084 just want to go back and associate 04:03.084 --> 04:05.196 myself with some of the comments made 04:05.196 --> 04:07.251 by Senator Blumenthal and sell Jello 04:07.251 --> 04:09.370 brand on military sexual assault . I 04:09.370 --> 04:11.703 suspect that that's gonna be a priority , 04:11.703 --> 04:13.537 and her position is chair of the 04:13.537 --> 04:15.592 personal subcommittee . And I'm very 04:15.592 --> 04:18.900 frustrated with some of the confidence 04:18.900 --> 04:21.980 that I'm placed and the department to 04:21.980 --> 04:24.091 make progress and not seeing the kind 04:24.091 --> 04:27.290 of progress . And And I think the foot 04:27.300 --> 04:29.980 Fort Hood Review says a lot needs to be 04:29.980 --> 04:33.090 acted on . The final question I have 04:33.090 --> 04:36.590 for you is just your assessment of our 04:36.600 --> 04:39.540 NATO relationship at our partners . 04:39.550 --> 04:41.750 What challenges , or what could we 04:41.750 --> 04:43.960 build on based on the prior 04:43.960 --> 04:44.960 administration ? 04:47.140 --> 04:50.120 Senator , I think the US transatlantic 04:50.120 --> 04:52.950 relationship , manifested most fully in 04:52.960 --> 04:56.590 in NATO in the military sphere 04:56.600 --> 04:59.650 is absolutely vital to any of the 04:59.650 --> 05:01.817 challenges we think of in the future . 05:02.040 --> 05:04.620 Even when we think about China as the 05:04.630 --> 05:06.741 pacing challenge , our relations with 05:06.741 --> 05:10.090 our European allies is critical to our 05:10.090 --> 05:12.146 effectiveness , our ability to build 05:12.146 --> 05:14.910 out a community of democracies that can 05:14.910 --> 05:18.630 counter authoritarian approaches . So 05:18.640 --> 05:22.520 I see NATO is a zey centerpiece of 05:22.530 --> 05:24.870 our alliance networks throughout 05:24.880 --> 05:27.350 throughout the world . Um , I I have 05:27.360 --> 05:30.470 been concerned . I have written on my 05:30.470 --> 05:32.870 concern that the focus on burden 05:32.870 --> 05:35.092 sharing and we should always be focused 05:35.092 --> 05:37.037 on burden sharing and sharing that 05:37.037 --> 05:39.760 allies fulfill their commitments but 05:39.760 --> 05:42.040 that when it becomes that tactical 05:42.040 --> 05:44.600 issue , the overrides the strategic 05:44.610 --> 05:48.430 value of the alliances alliances that 05:48.430 --> 05:50.430 the Chinese and Russians could only 05:50.430 --> 05:54.330 hope to match we have been . If we 05:54.330 --> 05:56.386 get to that point , we have become a 05:56.386 --> 05:58.497 strategic . And I'm very hopeful that 05:58.497 --> 06:00.330 President Biden , who has spoken 06:00.330 --> 06:02.780 eloquently on this issue , will make 06:02.790 --> 06:05.240 good progress and returning strategy to 06:05.240 --> 06:07.407 the center of our alliance relations . 06:08.140 --> 06:10.251 Thank you , Alex , for I look forward 06:10.251 --> 06:12.307 to working with you . Thank you , Mr 06:12.307 --> 06:14.418 Chair . Thank you , Senator . Tell us 06:14.418 --> 06:17.760 Senator Kane . Thank you , Mr Chair and 06:17.760 --> 06:19.704 Dr Hicks . Congratulations on your 06:19.704 --> 06:21.927 nomination . A couple of topics . First 06:21.927 --> 06:23.704 on , uh , sexual assault in the 06:23.704 --> 06:25.780 military when we grappled with this 06:25.780 --> 06:28.650 issue in a major way in 2013 and we've 06:28.650 --> 06:30.872 sort of been building upon that sense . 06:30.872 --> 06:33.020 There were basically three categories 06:33.020 --> 06:35.870 of SASK members . There were those who 06:35.870 --> 06:38.570 felt this problem was so serious that 06:38.570 --> 06:40.681 the only solution to it was to remove 06:40.681 --> 06:42.737 it from the chain of command . There 06:42.737 --> 06:44.792 were those who felt that the problem 06:44.792 --> 06:46.792 was deeply serious and we needed to 06:46.792 --> 06:49.014 make the chain of command work to solve 06:49.014 --> 06:51.490 it . Aan den . There was a third group 06:51.500 --> 06:53.780 into which I center King . Some others 06:53.780 --> 06:55.891 around the table were in this group . 06:55.891 --> 06:58.002 We knew it was serious . We wanted to 06:58.002 --> 06:59.830 give the chain of command an 06:59.830 --> 07:02.220 opportunity to solve it . But if we 07:02.220 --> 07:04.220 were unhappy with results , we were 07:04.220 --> 07:06.331 very willing to go the path of taking 07:06.331 --> 07:08.387 out of the chain of command . I just 07:08.387 --> 07:10.553 sort of want to put on the record that 07:10.553 --> 07:12.553 that third group of members of this 07:12.553 --> 07:14.442 committee virtually all of us are 07:14.442 --> 07:16.609 really unhappy with the progress since 07:16.609 --> 07:18.553 2013 . We're now getting toe eight 07:18.553 --> 07:20.810 years from them and we were willing to 07:20.810 --> 07:22.921 give the chain of command new tools . 07:22.921 --> 07:24.866 New resource is new accountability 07:24.866 --> 07:26.810 mechanisms , etcetera , etcetera , 07:26.810 --> 07:28.921 etcetera and we're not happy with the 07:28.921 --> 07:30.866 outcome . And so I think It's just 07:30.866 --> 07:33.088 important for the Pentagon community to 07:33.088 --> 07:35.310 know that that was sort of a swing bloc 07:35.310 --> 07:37.143 in 2013 that led us to go down a 07:37.143 --> 07:39.330 particular path . But many of us who 07:39.340 --> 07:42.570 were supporting those , um , within the 07:42.570 --> 07:45.100 chain of command improvements have been 07:45.100 --> 07:47.156 very dissatisfied with the results , 07:47.156 --> 07:50.180 and we're now very open toe pursuing a 07:50.180 --> 07:52.402 different path , as we said we would at 07:52.402 --> 07:54.513 the time . That's number one . Number 07:54.513 --> 07:56.680 two . Here's an accomplishment that is 07:56.680 --> 07:58.910 a Obama and Trump era accomplishment . 07:58.910 --> 08:01.030 That's also an accomplishment of this 08:01.030 --> 08:03.710 committee and the Pentagon . Pressure 08:03.710 --> 08:05.710 for the Pentagon finally , to do an 08:05.710 --> 08:07.960 audit like every other federal agency 08:07.960 --> 08:09.910 and to have every function of the 08:09.910 --> 08:12.132 Pentagon and every part of the Pentagon 08:12.132 --> 08:15.740 audited . We did that because 08:15.750 --> 08:17.917 unaudited is a good oversight tool for 08:17.917 --> 08:20.500 this committee . Unaudited is a good 08:20.500 --> 08:23.850 accounting tool for the numbers folks 08:23.850 --> 08:25.906 at the Pentagon . But we also did it 08:25.906 --> 08:27.794 because an audit should be a good 08:27.794 --> 08:29.850 management tool for folks like you . 08:29.850 --> 08:31.906 Tell this committee how you will use 08:31.906 --> 08:33.961 the audit in your rule should you be 08:33.961 --> 08:37.650 confirmed . Thank you , Senator . My 08:37.650 --> 08:41.210 understanding from the 08:41.220 --> 08:43.480 team that's in the Defense Department , 08:43.480 --> 08:45.760 based on my work on transition is that 08:45.760 --> 08:47.871 the audit , in fact , has been useful 08:47.871 --> 08:50.420 as a tool of transparency , getting the 08:50.420 --> 08:54.260 data , um up and shared and known 08:54.640 --> 08:57.180 first of all , points directions to 08:57.180 --> 08:58.980 some of these business process 08:58.980 --> 09:00.980 improvements that we can have . But 09:00.980 --> 09:03.036 then , even operationally , it's had 09:03.036 --> 09:05.950 the effect of revealing inventory 09:05.960 --> 09:08.350 excess inventory things of that sort . 09:08.540 --> 09:10.940 Um that that not only again is 09:10.940 --> 09:13.690 efficient but gets really capability 09:13.700 --> 09:16.270 out to the field spare parts that exist 09:16.270 --> 09:18.270 in inventory that are needed in the 09:18.270 --> 09:20.560 field . But we didn't know we have , um 09:20.840 --> 09:23.330 eso The audit has revealed some of 09:23.330 --> 09:26.350 those very basic approaches , as you 09:26.350 --> 09:29.440 say that that every every business has 09:29.440 --> 09:33.430 thio abide by and is advantaged by . I 09:33.430 --> 09:35.652 think it is also pointed more generally 09:35.652 --> 09:39.050 to the value of data . And as we move 09:39.050 --> 09:42.270 into an era of data , the department 09:42.270 --> 09:44.450 needs to move there , too . And the 09:44.450 --> 09:47.440 audit is showing the way to how data 09:47.440 --> 09:50.420 can be leverage to make mawr sound 09:50.420 --> 09:53.200 analytic decisions . I hope you will 09:53.200 --> 09:55.650 continue that focus any any dollar or 09:55.660 --> 09:57.271 energy we spend on something 09:57.271 --> 10:00.090 unnecessary and ineffective is a dollar 10:00.090 --> 10:02.340 that we're not spending on these really 10:02.350 --> 10:04.461 challenges . We have before us . Last 10:04.461 --> 10:07.200 question is this . Um , there are 10:07.210 --> 10:09.590 positions still to be named in the by 10:09.590 --> 10:11.701 administration , under secretaries of 10:11.701 --> 10:14.034 defense for acquisition and sustainment , 10:14.040 --> 10:16.980 and research and engineering . Many of 10:16.980 --> 10:19.202 the nominees and appointments for D O D 10:19.202 --> 10:21.147 spots thus far are veterans of the 10:21.147 --> 10:23.091 Obama administration , local think 10:23.091 --> 10:25.258 tanks , advocacy groups . All of which 10:25.258 --> 10:27.490 is important , but none thus far have 10:27.500 --> 10:29.880 extensive acquisition or industry 10:29.880 --> 10:31.936 experience . Uh , the department was 10:31.936 --> 10:34.047 well served , in my opinion , by some 10:34.047 --> 10:36.158 previous officials , like secretaries 10:36.158 --> 10:39.590 Lord Gertz McCarthy , who had sizable 10:39.600 --> 10:41.640 acquisition experience before their 10:41.650 --> 10:44.400 appointments . Um , if confirmed , you 10:44.400 --> 10:46.580 have any sense of where the department 10:46.590 --> 10:49.540 will look to fill up the ranks of the 10:49.550 --> 10:52.740 SNR any portfolios so that will have 10:52.750 --> 10:55.390 acquisition and research expertise in a 10:55.390 --> 10:58.720 Biden Pentagon Senator 10:58.730 --> 11:00.930 Secretary Austin When he was nominee , 11:00.930 --> 11:02.940 Austin , I spoke quite a bit about 11:02.940 --> 11:05.162 those particular positions . And then , 11:05.162 --> 11:06.996 of course , you have the service 11:06.996 --> 11:08.884 acquisition executives who having 11:08.884 --> 11:11.270 increased responsibilities in the in 11:11.270 --> 11:14.540 these areas . Um , and I know from 11:14.540 --> 11:16.830 Secretary Austin this is among his 11:16.830 --> 11:19.200 highest priorities in terms of 11:19.210 --> 11:21.890 positions to fill in the near term . 11:21.900 --> 11:25.340 I can't speak on his behalf about the 11:25.340 --> 11:27.900 particulars of individuals . But I can 11:27.900 --> 11:31.420 tell you that the attributes I know 11:31.430 --> 11:34.100 that the department needs is that 11:34.100 --> 11:37.320 acquisition expertise is a familiar a 11:37.330 --> 11:40.940 familiarity with the hardware and 11:40.940 --> 11:44.160 software ends of where the department's 11:44.160 --> 11:47.700 capabilities are coming from and a 11:47.710 --> 11:50.380 really fine tuned a sense of how toe 11:50.380 --> 11:53.140 work in new ways with industry to some 11:53.140 --> 11:55.196 of the issues that have already been 11:55.196 --> 11:57.200 raised . There are significant 11:57.200 --> 11:59.260 challenges to nontraditional defense 11:59.260 --> 12:01.482 players getting into the market place . 12:01.482 --> 12:03.593 We need to lower those if we're going 12:03.593 --> 12:05.704 to compete successfully . Thank you , 12:05.704 --> 12:08.450 Dr Hicks . Thank you , Mr Chair . Mhm . 12:08.940 --> 12:12.120 Yeah . Thank you . Senator Kaine . 12:12.740 --> 12:14.900 Senator Sullivan . Thank you , Mr 12:14.900 --> 12:16.344 Chairman . And Dr Hicks . 12:16.344 --> 12:18.511 Congratulations on your nomination and 12:18.511 --> 12:21.570 appreciated the opportunity chat Thea 12:21.570 --> 12:24.570 other day . And really , 12:26.680 --> 12:30.620 I'm looking at my my time 12:30.620 --> 12:33.990 here . Um appreciate . Appreciate 12:35.440 --> 12:37.960 your background and , um , 12:38.840 --> 12:41.560 our discussion . I'm gonna follow up on 12:41.560 --> 12:43.560 that on a number of the topics . Of 12:43.560 --> 12:45.580 course . I raised the issue of the 12:45.580 --> 12:49.280 Arctic and Alaska's place as , uh were 12:49.280 --> 12:51.336 in Arctic Nation because of my great 12:51.336 --> 12:53.690 state . Can I get your commitment ? If 12:53.690 --> 12:55.857 confirmed that you'll get up to Alaska 12:55.857 --> 12:58.300 and see the importance of the Arctic 12:58.300 --> 13:00.250 and our strategic location there . 13:00.260 --> 13:02.740 Senator would welcome coming to Alaska . 13:02.740 --> 13:05.073 Good . Well , you know , Billy Mitchell , 13:05.073 --> 13:07.018 the father of U S Air Force called 13:07.018 --> 13:09.184 Alaska the most strategic place in the 13:09.184 --> 13:12.490 world . But I have a new quote . I'm 13:12.490 --> 13:14.960 gonna start using the now Secretary of 13:14.960 --> 13:17.620 Defense . In his confirmation hearing , 13:17.620 --> 13:20.230 Senate Secretary Austin said I 13:20.230 --> 13:22.340 absolutely agree that Alaska is a 13:22.350 --> 13:25.810 national treasure and it holds some of 13:25.810 --> 13:27.900 the most important military assets . 13:27.900 --> 13:30.200 And resource is , would you agree with 13:30.200 --> 13:33.950 the your future boss , I do that . Okay . 13:33.960 --> 13:36.530 Good . Um , one of things that he did 13:36.530 --> 13:39.410 say , as we have been pressing the 13:39.410 --> 13:41.632 Pentagon , which , as I've told you and 13:41.840 --> 13:44.300 firmly believe the Pentagon has been 13:44.300 --> 13:46.411 asleep at the switch on the strategic 13:46.411 --> 13:48.411 nature of the Arctic , the national 13:48.411 --> 13:50.710 defense , um , strategy , the great 13:50.710 --> 13:52.821 power competition is literally taking 13:52.821 --> 13:55.190 place , er as we speak . Russia , China , 13:55.200 --> 13:58.290 others . Because of this committee's 13:58.300 --> 14:00.560 leadership . No offense . Not really . 14:00.560 --> 14:03.040 The Pentagon's . The services have now 14:03.040 --> 14:05.830 gotten serious about service strategies . 14:06.110 --> 14:09.820 Um , Secretary Austin 14:09.830 --> 14:12.750 committed to fully re sourcing these 14:12.750 --> 14:14.861 service strategies . A zit relates to 14:14.861 --> 14:17.028 the Arctic . Can I get your commitment 14:17.028 --> 14:19.194 on that ? As well center and certainly 14:19.194 --> 14:21.250 committed to making sure we have the 14:21.250 --> 14:23.306 capabilities we need in the Arctic . 14:23.306 --> 14:25.600 Great . Thank you . Um , let me turn to 14:25.600 --> 14:28.060 a what I think is a real simple 14:28.060 --> 14:29.949 question . But to be honest , I'm 14:29.949 --> 14:31.949 having a hard time with some of the 14:31.949 --> 14:33.949 incoming Biden Cabinet officials to 14:33.949 --> 14:36.930 commit to this . Um , in your personal 14:36.930 --> 14:40.440 opinion , the United States , I want I 14:40.440 --> 14:42.384 want your personal opinions from a 14:42.384 --> 14:44.440 national security and foreign policy 14:44.440 --> 14:46.662 perspective . We have once again become 14:46.662 --> 14:48.884 the world's energy superpower . Because 14:48.884 --> 14:50.829 a states like New Mexico and North 14:50.829 --> 14:52.940 Dakota and Alaska , where the largest 14:52.940 --> 14:54.773 producer prior to the pandemic , 14:54.773 --> 14:56.884 largest producer of oil , natural gas 14:56.884 --> 14:59.480 and renewables in the world is that 14:59.490 --> 15:01.434 good for our national security and 15:01.434 --> 15:04.550 foreign policy . It is , Senator , and 15:04.560 --> 15:06.449 on the other hand , becoming more 15:06.449 --> 15:08.449 reliant on countries like Russia or 15:08.449 --> 15:11.060 Venezuela for our oil and gas needs . 15:11.540 --> 15:13.707 Is that good for our national security 15:13.707 --> 15:15.818 or is that bad ? Generally speaking , 15:15.818 --> 15:17.929 it's bad . So here's what I would ask 15:17.929 --> 15:20.151 is a commitment . I can't seem to get a 15:20.151 --> 15:22.540 commitment from any Cabinet official in 15:22.540 --> 15:24.762 the Biden administration to be a strong 15:24.762 --> 15:27.870 proponent of all of the above strategy . 15:27.880 --> 15:30.330 To the contrary , some of the executive 15:30.330 --> 15:31.886 orders that came out of the 15:31.886 --> 15:34.108 administration last week are focused on 15:34.108 --> 15:36.219 curtailing the production of American 15:36.219 --> 15:38.219 energy . Do you think that's in the 15:38.219 --> 15:40.163 national security interests of our 15:40.163 --> 15:42.219 nation ? Senator , I have to say . I 15:42.219 --> 15:44.219 think what's in the interest of the 15:44.219 --> 15:46.274 United States is to ensure it is not 15:46.274 --> 15:48.970 dependent on outside , um , 15:48.980 --> 15:51.940 capabilities . But I also believe that 15:51.940 --> 15:54.530 growing out alternative uses for 15:54.530 --> 15:56.980 alternative energy sources is vital if 15:56.980 --> 15:59.202 we're going to manage the challenges of 15:59.202 --> 16:01.369 the future . I agree that , you know , 16:01.369 --> 16:04.050 fully focused on renewables , and 16:04.050 --> 16:06.270 building that out is critical . I 16:06.270 --> 16:08.381 couldn't agree with you more , but we 16:08.381 --> 16:10.714 need to do that is we're also producing , 16:10.714 --> 16:12.881 say , natural gas . Or we could be the 16:12.881 --> 16:15.460 leader for the next 50 to 100 years low , 16:16.240 --> 16:18.700 low emitting clean burning Alaska 16:18.700 --> 16:21.250 natural gas or others Soap . I 16:21.250 --> 16:23.139 appreciate your focus on that . I 16:23.139 --> 16:26.230 appreciate your honesty on that , and I 16:26.230 --> 16:30.140 appreciate you being voice about the 16:30.140 --> 16:32.350 importance of this issue energy 16:32.740 --> 16:35.740 security , energy , independence . When 16:35.740 --> 16:37.907 you're discussing these topics , which 16:37.907 --> 16:40.129 in my view are clearly within the realm 16:40.340 --> 16:43.100 of , um , the Pentagon's 16:43.100 --> 16:45.250 responsibilities as well as other 16:45.260 --> 16:49.160 agencies , let me turn to China . I was 16:49.160 --> 16:51.400 on the Senate floor kind of saying , 16:51.400 --> 16:53.740 Look , we're given advice and consent . 16:53.750 --> 16:55.972 That's what we're doing right now . The 16:55.972 --> 16:58.194 consent , of course , is confirmation . 16:58.194 --> 17:00.770 The advice is just advice . I saw the 17:01.340 --> 17:03.451 White House press secretary last week 17:03.451 --> 17:06.260 talk about China and our strategy . She 17:06.260 --> 17:08.850 used the phrase that kind of Senate 17:09.440 --> 17:12.720 shivered on my back strategic 17:12.720 --> 17:16.190 patience . That was the failed 17:16.190 --> 17:19.340 strategy approach under the Obama 17:19.340 --> 17:21.850 administration involving North Korea . 17:22.640 --> 17:24.862 Do you think that's a good term that we 17:24.862 --> 17:27.550 should be using ? When the challenge 17:27.550 --> 17:29.606 and threat from China is immediate ? 17:31.440 --> 17:33.551 Senator , I think our approach toward 17:33.551 --> 17:36.450 China's 1st 1st to recognize that they 17:36.450 --> 17:38.890 are the pacing challenge for the 17:38.890 --> 17:41.112 defense community and that they present 17:41.112 --> 17:43.960 a serious alternative model to be 17:43.960 --> 17:46.260 rejected with regard to how they govern 17:46.260 --> 17:48.260 their society , their authoritarian 17:48.260 --> 17:50.850 approaches in their economic status , 17:50.860 --> 17:53.280 economic approaches . That's where I 17:53.280 --> 17:55.570 would center my my view . I do think 17:55.570 --> 17:57.737 there are opportunities for the United 17:57.737 --> 17:59.737 States and China to work together . 17:59.737 --> 18:01.959 Those , generally speaking , are not in 18:01.959 --> 18:03.959 the defense realm , but even in the 18:03.959 --> 18:06.014 defense realm , there are confidence 18:06.014 --> 18:08.237 building measures we should be pursuing 18:08.237 --> 18:10.459 so that we can prevent , as I said , so 18:10.459 --> 18:12.514 that we can prevent conflict between 18:12.514 --> 18:14.792 the two nations . Thank you , Dr Hicks . 18:14.792 --> 18:17.126 I'll have more questions for the record , 18:17.126 --> 18:19.237 but I appreciate your service , and I 18:19.237 --> 18:21.292 think I'm certainly going to support 18:21.292 --> 18:23.514 your nomination . Thank you , Senator . 18:23.540 --> 18:25.920 Thank you . Senator Sullivan . Now VF 18:25.930 --> 18:28.460 WebEx Senator King . 18:34.140 --> 18:37.180 Good . Uh , there we go . 18:37.190 --> 18:40.070 Thank you , Mr Chairman . First , I 18:40.080 --> 18:42.413 wanna correct the record geographically , 18:42.413 --> 18:44.670 my dear friend and colleague , Senator 18:44.670 --> 18:47.350 Shaheen , I think , uh , slipped . And 18:47.350 --> 18:49.406 I didn't want to leave any confusion 18:49.406 --> 18:51.350 she characterized . The Portsmouth 18:51.350 --> 18:53.461 Naval Shipyard is being between Maine 18:53.461 --> 18:55.572 and New Hampshire . If you do come to 18:55.572 --> 18:58.520 see us , uh , Dr Hicks , it's in Maine . 18:58.520 --> 19:02.100 I just wanna clarify that not between 19:02.100 --> 19:04.410 Maine and New Hampshire . Um , more 19:04.410 --> 19:06.550 seriously , I want to associate my 19:06.940 --> 19:09.680 myself with Senator McCain's comments 19:09.680 --> 19:11.990 on the issue of sexual harassment . I 19:11.990 --> 19:14.240 was one of those that opposed taking 19:14.240 --> 19:16.540 this out of the chain of command of 19:16.540 --> 19:19.590 supported multiple reforms starting in 19:19.590 --> 19:22.680 2013 . That don't seem to have born 19:22.680 --> 19:26.440 results . So I'm also in the camp of 19:26.440 --> 19:28.960 being receptive to more significant 19:28.960 --> 19:31.820 change . We simply have to confront 19:31.820 --> 19:34.730 this problem , Uh , in a structural way . 19:34.730 --> 19:38.400 I think that hair has some hope of some 19:38.400 --> 19:40.520 solution . I also should mention that 19:40.520 --> 19:42.409 one of the changes we made was to 19:42.409 --> 19:46.380 criminalize , uh , retaliation . 19:46.390 --> 19:48.990 That does not seem to have been used , 19:49.000 --> 19:51.800 at least not very effectively , uh , in 19:51.800 --> 19:55.170 the military justice system . And I 19:55.170 --> 19:57.226 think that's one of the more serious 19:57.226 --> 19:59.530 problems to move on to just two or 19:59.530 --> 20:02.620 three questions . One is the National 20:02.620 --> 20:04.620 Defense Act . Last year essentially 20:04.620 --> 20:06.410 abolished the role of the chief 20:06.410 --> 20:10.030 management officer . Uh , how do you 20:10.030 --> 20:13.950 see replacing that function if not 20:13.960 --> 20:16.790 replacing the individual ? We have to 20:16.790 --> 20:20.340 be sure that this enormous entity of 20:20.350 --> 20:22.690 the Defense Department is effectively 20:22.700 --> 20:24.910 managed . Give me some thoughts on 20:24.920 --> 20:26.920 replacing the function of the chief 20:26.920 --> 20:29.760 management office . Senator . First of 20:29.760 --> 20:32.080 all , I have been to Kittery , Maine s 20:32.080 --> 20:35.500 O . I look forward to the engaging in 20:35.500 --> 20:38.320 the New Hampshire Maine debate over 20:38.330 --> 20:42.260 over shipyard . Um , the 20:43.040 --> 20:45.060 deputy Secretary . Defense is often 20:45.060 --> 20:46.949 thought of as the chief operating 20:46.949 --> 20:49.004 officer of the Pentagon . My view is 20:49.004 --> 20:51.990 that that is an appropriate way , Thio . 20:52.000 --> 20:54.770 Generally speaking , think of the role 20:55.240 --> 20:58.060 in order to bring business process 20:58.060 --> 21:00.260 efficiency and business transformation 21:00.260 --> 21:02.930 to the department . Um , you need 21:02.940 --> 21:05.860 components and leaders at every level 21:06.040 --> 21:09.160 dedicated to making sure the return to 21:09.160 --> 21:11.360 taxpayers appropriate and again that 21:11.360 --> 21:13.582 the focus is on the joint warfighter in 21:13.582 --> 21:15.638 providing what that warfighter needs 21:15.638 --> 21:17.693 today and in the future . So I think 21:17.693 --> 21:19.971 there are some shared responsibilities . 21:19.971 --> 21:22.193 But to the extent that the deputies the 21:22.193 --> 21:24.416 chief operating officer , that position 21:24.416 --> 21:26.527 bears the brunt of the responsibility 21:26.527 --> 21:28.310 and focus , the current deputy 21:28.310 --> 21:30.790 secretary of defense has put forward a 21:30.790 --> 21:34.040 memo with the abolishment of the CMO 21:34.040 --> 21:37.730 position that lays out the disposition 21:37.740 --> 21:39.573 of the responsibilities formally 21:39.573 --> 21:42.410 assigned to the CMO . If confirmed , I 21:42.410 --> 21:44.640 would want to look at the decision 21:44.640 --> 21:48.190 making behind that memo , understand 21:48.200 --> 21:51.740 why he made those decisions , um , and 21:51.750 --> 21:53.806 make my own assessment about whether 21:53.806 --> 21:56.120 those are the right places to put those 21:56.120 --> 21:58.120 responsibilities . And I would look 21:58.120 --> 22:00.120 forward to an opportunity to coming 22:00.120 --> 22:02.176 back and speaking with you , Senator 22:02.176 --> 22:04.287 King and others who are interested in 22:04.287 --> 22:06.287 this space , uh , to make sure that 22:06.287 --> 22:08.064 we're set up for success on the 22:08.064 --> 22:10.231 functions . As you point out that need 22:10.231 --> 22:12.231 to carry forward . My my concern is 22:12.231 --> 22:13.842 that if you have many people 22:13.842 --> 22:15.898 responsible , no one's responsible , 22:15.898 --> 22:17.564 and one of my philosophies of 22:17.564 --> 22:19.509 management is I'd like to have one 22:19.509 --> 22:21.620 throat to choke . That is someone who 22:21.620 --> 22:23.453 is accountable . I hope you will 22:23.453 --> 22:25.676 consider having in your office a person 22:25.676 --> 22:28.110 who's especially assigned to this 22:28.110 --> 22:30.380 function . Moving on to the question of 22:30.380 --> 22:32.547 cyber senator rounds addressed it very 22:32.547 --> 22:35.930 effectively . You talked about way 22:35.930 --> 22:38.041 spend billions and where most of this 22:38.041 --> 22:40.097 hearing is about all the money we're 22:40.097 --> 22:42.152 spending to defend ourselves against 22:42.152 --> 22:44.850 potential attacks , I don't believe 22:44.850 --> 22:46.850 were adequately defending ourselves 22:46.850 --> 22:48.961 against actual attacks , attacks that 22:48.961 --> 22:51.630 are taking place at this very moment on 22:51.630 --> 22:54.250 DSO . I hope that the issue of cyber 22:54.260 --> 22:56.090 and you use the term deter our 22:56.090 --> 22:59.770 adversaries . The the problem of 22:59.770 --> 23:02.380 cyber and deterrence is something that 23:02.380 --> 23:04.436 we really haven't wrestled with very 23:04.436 --> 23:06.491 well . So I hope that's an area that 23:06.491 --> 23:09.450 you will pay some special attention to 23:09.460 --> 23:12.650 because , as I say , we're spending 23:12.650 --> 23:16.080 billions to defer to deter potential 23:16.080 --> 23:18.080 attacks . And I don't think there's 23:18.080 --> 23:19.969 enough attention is being paid to 23:20.340 --> 23:23.190 deterring and managing actual attacks 23:23.190 --> 23:25.301 that air under Web right at this very 23:25.301 --> 23:27.860 moment , Senator , I will commit Thio 23:27.870 --> 23:30.092 looking into that space , and I want to 23:30.092 --> 23:32.314 thank you for the work you've done as a 23:32.314 --> 23:34.648 leader on the Cyber Solarium Commission . 23:34.648 --> 23:36.814 I know the department already has been 23:36.814 --> 23:38.592 directed to adopt many of those 23:38.592 --> 23:41.830 recommendations . 11 specific I would 23:41.830 --> 23:44.910 recommend would be to facilitate threat 23:44.910 --> 23:47.200 hunting on the defense industrial base . 23:47.210 --> 23:49.550 Solar winds tells us that that 23:49.560 --> 23:51.790 sometimes the easiest path into secure 23:51.790 --> 23:55.230 systems is through subs and , 23:55.240 --> 23:58.230 uh , supply chain . And I think that's 23:58.230 --> 24:01.800 an area where would be very fruitful in 24:01.800 --> 24:04.780 terms of defense . Also , the policy of 24:04.780 --> 24:06.947 deterrence , which we can talk about a 24:06.947 --> 24:09.490 greater length . Finally , uh , Senator 24:09.490 --> 24:12.030 Tillis talked about procurement . We've 24:12.030 --> 24:14.030 had testimony before this committee 24:14.030 --> 24:15.697 that many smaller companies , 24:15.697 --> 24:17.880 particularly in in Silicon Valley and 24:17.880 --> 24:19.880 in the technology field , generally 24:19.880 --> 24:21.936 have given up on the Pentagon . It's 24:21.936 --> 24:24.158 too complicated , is too lengthy . It's 24:24.158 --> 24:26.269 too expensive , even toe fill out the 24:26.269 --> 24:29.850 forms . I commend procurement reform 24:30.140 --> 24:32.160 to you in that regard , because if 24:32.160 --> 24:34.380 we're not taking advantage of the 24:34.380 --> 24:37.440 newest ideas , the newest technologies 24:37.450 --> 24:40.940 we're gonna be we're gonna lose our 24:40.950 --> 24:43.160 qualitative edge , which you have to 24:43.160 --> 24:45.160 find this important . So I hope you 24:45.160 --> 24:48.420 will consider the procurement program 24:48.420 --> 24:51.180 from the point of view of a 12 person I 24:51.180 --> 24:54.680 T firm in Seattle or Portland , Maine , 24:54.680 --> 24:57.700 or Austin , Texas , and how we can make 24:57.710 --> 25:00.350 the procurement system , uh , 25:00.940 --> 25:03.850 manageable for that kind of operation . 25:04.940 --> 25:07.051 Senator , I completely agree with you 25:07.051 --> 25:09.340 in this ties into several elements of 25:09.340 --> 25:11.480 conversation . It's that have come up 25:11.480 --> 25:15.120 this morning . The department has begun 25:15.120 --> 25:17.009 to pursue an adaptive acquisition 25:17.009 --> 25:19.390 pathways approach . I think that's 25:19.400 --> 25:21.733 generally moving in the right direction . 25:21.733 --> 25:23.844 If confirmed , I would want to get in 25:23.844 --> 25:25.956 and understand to your point how well 25:25.956 --> 25:28.950 that's serving the full range of 25:28.950 --> 25:31.080 particularly nontraditional . Those 25:31.080 --> 25:33.160 alternative pathways can serve the 25:33.160 --> 25:36.420 nontraditional suppliers . The data 25:36.420 --> 25:38.642 that I've seen from the outside is that 25:38.642 --> 25:40.870 we are with a pickup on Nontraditional 25:40.880 --> 25:43.950 is very low . We are not attracting , 25:43.960 --> 25:47.160 um , uh , development , 25:47.540 --> 25:50.960 uh , expertise into the supply chain 25:50.960 --> 25:53.420 for D o . D from outside the normal 25:53.430 --> 25:55.660 traditional base . And that's a real 25:55.660 --> 25:57.850 concern . I think greater use of other 25:57.850 --> 25:59.739 transactional authority and other 25:59.739 --> 26:01.770 pathways has helped , at least on 26:01.770 --> 26:04.110 pieces of this . But jumping over the 26:04.110 --> 26:06.332 Valley of Death in getting those , um , 26:06.332 --> 26:08.554 those efforts into procurement . That's 26:08.554 --> 26:10.390 the life blood for these small 26:10.390 --> 26:13.320 companies that cannot survive just on R 26:13.320 --> 26:15.630 and D dollars . Thank you , Senator . 26:15.630 --> 26:17.741 Thank you . I look forward to working 26:17.741 --> 26:19.741 with you on that . Thank you , Mr . 26:19.741 --> 26:21.630 Chairman . Senator King . Senator 26:21.630 --> 26:23.574 Kramer . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 26:23.574 --> 26:25.797 Thank you . Dr Hicks , Um , for running 26:25.797 --> 26:28.130 the gauntlet , you're almost through it . 26:28.130 --> 26:30.352 Really ? It's not that much more . Um , 26:30.352 --> 26:30.070 you've been very generous with your 26:30.070 --> 26:32.292 time . And obviously , you've talked to 26:32.292 --> 26:33.903 a lot of us on the phone . I 26:33.903 --> 26:36.181 appreciated our conversation last week . 26:36.181 --> 26:38.403 It appreciated drilling down on some of 26:38.403 --> 26:40.626 these issues . And I also appreciated , 26:40.626 --> 26:40.220 frankly , listening to your answers 26:40.220 --> 26:42.620 today . Aziz . Senator Inhofe , Senator 26:42.620 --> 26:45.160 Fisher . Senator Cotton , I'll have 26:45.170 --> 26:47.281 said , is a high priority of the same 26:47.281 --> 26:49.614 thing that Unite talked about last week . 26:49.614 --> 26:51.781 That is the theme modernization of the 26:51.781 --> 26:54.114 triad . Um , and not just modernization . 26:54.114 --> 26:53.920 Not just extension , but the 26:53.920 --> 26:56.031 replacement of key components of it , 26:56.031 --> 26:58.530 particularly airborne and the and the 26:58.530 --> 27:00.752 land based peace . And so I'm gonna I'm 27:00.752 --> 27:02.586 gonna skip some of the questions 27:02.586 --> 27:04.752 they're gonna ask you and maybe , um , 27:04.752 --> 27:06.752 focus on a couple things . I didn't 27:06.752 --> 27:08.919 hear a lot about one of the areas that 27:08.919 --> 27:10.863 Senator Cotton asked you about . I 27:10.863 --> 27:13.086 think even sort of bifurcated the issue 27:13.086 --> 27:16.340 of policy . And you know the product 27:16.340 --> 27:18.284 over here from the cost peace over 27:18.284 --> 27:20.284 there . I want to ask you about the 27:20.284 --> 27:22.507 Cosbys as particularly as it relates to 27:22.507 --> 27:24.562 the ground based strategic deterrent 27:24.562 --> 27:26.618 we've talked a lot about it . You've 27:26.618 --> 27:28.784 talked a lot about it today . Um , any 27:28.784 --> 27:31.400 delay in that would have a It seems 27:31.400 --> 27:33.980 that time value of money , part of it , 27:33.980 --> 27:36.147 that that would be detrimental . Could 27:36.147 --> 27:38.202 you speak a little bit to the to the 27:38.202 --> 27:41.690 economics of a delay , Senator ? First 27:41.690 --> 27:43.246 of all , I also enjoyed our 27:43.246 --> 27:45.246 conversation . So So thank you very 27:45.246 --> 27:48.660 much for your time with May the 27:49.340 --> 27:51.520 the challenge I face not being in the 27:51.520 --> 27:53.520 administration and not being in the 27:53.520 --> 27:55.631 department is I don't know the answer 27:55.631 --> 27:57.687 to that question . What I can assure 27:57.687 --> 27:59.900 you is that if I am confirmed the way 27:59.900 --> 28:01.956 you phrase that question is does the 28:01.956 --> 28:03.900 time value of money matter ? I can 28:03.900 --> 28:07.850 answer that . Which is yes , we have 28:07.860 --> 28:10.770 a various points . Of course , we have 28:10.770 --> 28:12.492 had this in my experience , we 28:12.492 --> 28:14.270 certainly seem to have today a 28:14.270 --> 28:16.870 challenge with regard to making some 28:16.870 --> 28:18.870 investment decisions that have been 28:18.870 --> 28:21.092 delayed and delayed and delayed . And I 28:21.092 --> 28:23.550 understand that there comes a point in 28:23.550 --> 28:25.860 which one needs to make the decision . 28:26.240 --> 28:30.080 Andi , I am not daunted by 28:30.090 --> 28:32.500 that reality , but I don't today until 28:32.500 --> 28:35.520 I can get in if confirmed and get a 28:35.520 --> 28:37.880 team in place and start to really look 28:37.890 --> 28:40.400 at the analysis that's there . I don't 28:40.400 --> 28:42.622 have a firm understanding today of what 28:42.622 --> 28:45.240 the consequences are going one way or 28:45.240 --> 28:47.351 another . Well , I would look forward 28:47.351 --> 28:49.518 to hosting you and mine it on your way 28:49.518 --> 28:51.770 to Alaska s so you could take a good 28:51.770 --> 28:55.170 look at the cost of delay . Um , 28:56.040 --> 28:58.050 but the other issue that we haven't 28:58.050 --> 28:59.994 heard a lot about yet , but you've 28:59.994 --> 29:02.161 written about which I appreciated that 29:02.161 --> 29:04.130 is the the the impact of 29:04.130 --> 29:06.241 nonproliferation , that the impact of 29:06.241 --> 29:08.460 delay and maybe uncertainty from our 29:08.470 --> 29:10.470 allies , whether it's Japan , South 29:10.470 --> 29:12.760 Korea , others , um , that rely on our 29:13.340 --> 29:16.150 triad umbrella . Maybe you could expand 29:16.150 --> 29:18.150 a little bit on that because I have 29:18.150 --> 29:20.206 appreciated some of your writings on 29:20.206 --> 29:22.428 that topic . Well , thank you , Senator 29:22.428 --> 29:24.428 Aziz . You may be able to tell from 29:24.428 --> 29:26.650 some of my answers . I believe that the 29:26.650 --> 29:28.872 Alliance network that the United States 29:28.872 --> 29:31.039 maintains is a significant comparative 29:31.039 --> 29:32.983 advantage over competitors . And I 29:32.983 --> 29:34.983 think we should be pretty strategic 29:34.983 --> 29:37.490 about how we consider theology 29:37.500 --> 29:41.000 perspective , eso that we advanced that 29:41.000 --> 29:43.560 advantage and one of the areas where 29:43.560 --> 29:47.100 the US has built up credibility with 29:47.100 --> 29:49.690 allies is through its extended 29:49.690 --> 29:52.730 deterrent . That extended deterrent has 29:52.730 --> 29:55.630 a nuclear component . Their allies , 29:55.630 --> 29:57.963 who very much rely on the United States , 29:57.963 --> 30:00.820 is a nuclear assurances on . But that 30:00.830 --> 30:04.220 helps dissuade their own internal 30:04.220 --> 30:07.470 dynamics that might look Thio develop 30:07.470 --> 30:09.581 nuclear weapons themselves . It helps 30:09.581 --> 30:11.770 to swayed that viewpoint . So I think 30:11.770 --> 30:13.770 it has a non significant 30:13.770 --> 30:17.500 nonproliferation Um , uh , benefit to 30:17.500 --> 30:21.150 the United States by keeping countries 30:21.150 --> 30:23.150 that might otherwise pursue nuclear 30:23.150 --> 30:25.310 weapons from doing so . Thank you for 30:25.310 --> 30:27.720 that . Their whole host of other issues . 30:27.720 --> 30:29.887 But maybe I'll try Mondo one , and you 30:29.887 --> 30:31.998 can just respond to all of them . You 30:31.998 --> 30:34.109 We've talked a lot about transparency 30:34.109 --> 30:36.220 today . You and I talked about budget 30:36.220 --> 30:38.910 transparency . I raised a concern about 30:38.920 --> 30:41.660 how some entities have had their 30:41.660 --> 30:44.130 budgets hidden from the American people 30:44.130 --> 30:46.186 for quite a while . And I worry that 30:46.186 --> 30:48.241 some of the secrecy might be more to 30:48.241 --> 30:50.186 avoid scrutiny , frankly , than to 30:50.186 --> 30:52.241 protect capability . I'm gonna avoid 30:52.241 --> 30:54.352 some of the specific stuffs and stuff 30:54.352 --> 30:56.408 in this , um , setting . But can you 30:56.408 --> 30:58.130 promise to look at some of the 30:58.130 --> 31:00.241 organizations and programs within the 31:00.241 --> 31:02.408 Department of Defense to make sure the 31:02.408 --> 31:04.463 public knows , or even frankly , the 31:04.463 --> 31:06.463 Congress nose to the maximum extent 31:06.463 --> 31:08.574 possible where the money is going and 31:08.574 --> 31:10.741 talking about passed through budgets , 31:10.741 --> 31:12.797 Um , that give a false sense of that 31:12.797 --> 31:15.019 budget level . The other thing is again 31:15.019 --> 31:17.130 on your way to , um , mine it on your 31:17.130 --> 31:19.186 way to Alaska . I'd love to have you 31:19.186 --> 31:21.297 come to Grand Forks as well . And you 31:21.297 --> 31:23.352 know , there are only two bases left 31:23.352 --> 31:25.519 between Michigan and Montana along the 31:25.519 --> 31:27.686 northern tier . That Arctic mission is 31:27.686 --> 31:27.630 very important , obviously mine . It 31:27.630 --> 31:29.741 plays an important role in that . The 31:29.741 --> 31:31.741 other one being , um , grande porch 31:31.741 --> 31:33.741 with its ISS , our missions and and 31:33.741 --> 31:35.797 I'll just throw ice are out there as 31:35.797 --> 31:37.686 well . You and I talked about the 31:37.686 --> 31:39.797 importance of I s are particularly in 31:39.797 --> 31:41.963 the Middle East after other places and 31:41.963 --> 31:44.130 the some of the cannibalization , as I 31:44.130 --> 31:46.186 see it taking place to make room for 31:46.186 --> 31:48.460 these more modern systems . Just a 31:48.460 --> 31:51.340 sense of as the CEO . I appreciate that 31:51.350 --> 31:54.630 illustration . Um uh , you know what 31:54.630 --> 31:56.463 your thoughts might be on how we 31:56.463 --> 31:58.241 balance some of those budgets , 31:58.241 --> 32:00.820 stresses and strategic needs ? Sure , 32:00.820 --> 32:02.931 Senator , let me first comment on the 32:02.931 --> 32:05.050 transparency point . I I will commit 32:05.060 --> 32:08.020 Thio looking into the questions around 32:08.020 --> 32:10.450 particular the past , through budget 32:10.460 --> 32:12.293 with the Air Force but also more 32:12.293 --> 32:14.404 generally looking at the transparency 32:14.404 --> 32:17.230 questions to ensure we're telling 32:17.230 --> 32:19.286 taxpayers and of course , members of 32:19.286 --> 32:22.210 Congress the maximum that we can do 32:22.210 --> 32:24.266 operation that is operationally safe 32:24.266 --> 32:27.260 and wise . Um , the challenge of 32:27.260 --> 32:30.420 balancing ready today and ready 32:30.420 --> 32:33.570 tomorrow , um , is sort of at the heart 32:33.580 --> 32:36.020 of how the Department of Defense is 32:36.020 --> 32:39.080 constantly working through its budget 32:39.080 --> 32:42.270 and program alignment . I think that 32:42.270 --> 32:44.330 tension will exist in any resource 32:44.330 --> 32:47.580 level , and I would anticipate that 32:47.590 --> 32:50.070 being a major issue that I would face 32:50.070 --> 32:53.590 if I were confirmed , I do think that 32:53.590 --> 32:56.530 the imperative to be ready tomorrow is 32:56.540 --> 32:59.290 very significant Right now . I think 32:59.290 --> 33:01.512 the resource is can be will always , As 33:01.512 --> 33:03.734 I said , be tight and can be especially 33:03.734 --> 33:05.568 tight right now . So we're gonna 33:05.568 --> 33:07.512 probably have to think about doing 33:07.512 --> 33:09.623 things differently . And that's where 33:09.623 --> 33:11.790 concepts become so important to figure 33:11.790 --> 33:13.846 out how we connect . The resource is 33:13.846 --> 33:15.957 that we the aims , we it's really the 33:15.957 --> 33:19.030 aims we have to the capabilities we 33:19.030 --> 33:21.460 want in a fiscally responsible way . 33:21.840 --> 33:24.007 Thank you very much . I appreciate all 33:24.007 --> 33:26.173 of that . I look forward to supporting 33:26.173 --> 33:28.062 your Thank you . Senator Kramer . 33:28.062 --> 33:30.396 Senator Heinrich . Thank you , Chairman . 33:30.396 --> 33:32.600 Dr Hicks . Welcome . Um , I was 33:32.610 --> 33:34.443 actually quite encouraged by the 33:34.443 --> 33:36.499 previous administration's efforts to 33:36.499 --> 33:39.670 increase D o d investments in critical 33:39.670 --> 33:42.730 R and D priorities like directed energy . 33:42.730 --> 33:44.897 Hyper sonics . I believe you mentioned 33:44.897 --> 33:47.610 artificial intelligence . I know , 33:47.610 --> 33:49.721 however , that these technologies air 33:49.721 --> 33:51.721 really of little use unless they're 33:51.721 --> 33:53.832 transitioned out of our labs and into 33:53.832 --> 33:56.230 the hands of actual service members 33:56.240 --> 33:58.970 around the world . Um , if confirmed , 33:58.980 --> 34:01.210 how would you use your role overseeing 34:01.210 --> 34:03.690 the department's internal management 34:03.690 --> 34:07.020 processes to speed and improve that 34:07.020 --> 34:10.370 tech transition process ? Thank you , 34:10.370 --> 34:12.592 Senator . First , I agree with you that 34:12.592 --> 34:14.910 there has been , uh , some positive 34:14.910 --> 34:18.040 momentum in key areas of R and D , and 34:18.040 --> 34:20.610 I do think a sustained level of R and D 34:20.610 --> 34:23.380 investment is vital . But also to your 34:23.380 --> 34:25.270 point , we actually have to field 34:25.280 --> 34:27.620 capabilities , and that's a place where 34:27.620 --> 34:30.010 duty is really struggled . Some of the 34:30.010 --> 34:32.420 tools that the deputy could have 34:32.430 --> 34:34.374 working , especially with the vice 34:34.374 --> 34:36.597 chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , 34:36.597 --> 34:38.819 is to develop some incentive approaches 34:38.819 --> 34:41.340 to get experiments field experiments 34:41.340 --> 34:44.390 underway even beyond experiments up to 34:44.400 --> 34:46.960 exercise that major exercise level use 34:46.960 --> 34:49.410 of capabilities and prototypes that can 34:49.410 --> 34:52.390 start to demonstrate the value of some 34:52.390 --> 34:55.160 of these new approaches . And when we 34:55.160 --> 34:57.382 can demonstrate value , then we're in a 34:57.382 --> 34:59.604 much better position to have a dialogue 34:59.604 --> 35:01.716 with Congress and with industry about 35:01.716 --> 35:05.120 where that where those capabilities can 35:05.120 --> 35:07.930 take us and that can help us overcome 35:07.930 --> 35:10.160 that Valley of Death . I also think 35:10.160 --> 35:12.271 that , frankly , we should be looking 35:12.271 --> 35:14.540 at how we think about new starts so 35:14.540 --> 35:16.830 that we can manage the appropriation 35:16.830 --> 35:19.650 cycle more effectively . Um , if I were 35:19.650 --> 35:21.594 confirmed , I'd want to get in and 35:21.594 --> 35:23.817 understand what makes sense both from a 35:23.817 --> 35:26.039 congressional oversight perspective and 35:26.039 --> 35:28.039 from the department's perspective , 35:28.039 --> 35:30.039 especially in areas like software , 35:30.039 --> 35:32.206 where the cycle time is so much faster 35:32.206 --> 35:34.372 than the typical appropriation cycle . 35:34.372 --> 35:36.428 Thank you . I would really encourage 35:36.428 --> 35:38.650 your your focus on this issue and in 35:38.650 --> 35:40.761 particular with , you know , directed 35:40.761 --> 35:43.420 energy . I've watched as the , uh , the 35:43.430 --> 35:45.374 experiments have been , you know , 35:45.374 --> 35:47.652 proving themselves over and over again . 35:47.652 --> 35:49.763 But the desire within the Pentagon to 35:49.763 --> 35:52.360 sort of chase the perfect application 35:52.540 --> 35:54.540 when there are so many applications 35:54.540 --> 35:57.400 where it can provide riel value to a 35:57.400 --> 36:00.780 war fighter now eyes a real tension and 36:00.780 --> 36:03.210 I think it is , in many cases , doing 36:03.220 --> 36:06.450 us a disservice . You helped lead the 36:06.450 --> 36:09.210 Biden team teams transition of the 36:09.210 --> 36:11.210 Department of Defense over the last 36:11.210 --> 36:13.321 several months . Uh , you know , I've 36:13.321 --> 36:15.321 read with great concern a number of 36:15.321 --> 36:17.154 public reports that the previous 36:17.154 --> 36:19.370 administration worked to block key 36:19.370 --> 36:21.370 transition officials from accessing 36:21.370 --> 36:23.640 critical information related to 36:23.640 --> 36:25.860 worldwide operations . What's your 36:25.860 --> 36:28.360 assessment of how those obstructions 36:28.360 --> 36:30.990 impacted important D O . D programs and 36:30.990 --> 36:33.290 operations ? And what can we do on this 36:33.290 --> 36:35.340 committee to give you and Secretary 36:35.340 --> 36:37.780 Austin ? The resource is you need as 36:37.780 --> 36:41.550 you stand up this new team , Senator , 36:41.550 --> 36:44.150 I did have the privilege of leading the , 36:44.530 --> 36:47.980 um , Defense Agency review team and let 36:47.980 --> 36:51.160 me first say that the vast majority 36:51.730 --> 36:53.730 of folks that we worked with in the 36:53.730 --> 36:55.810 Pentagon were incredibly helpful . 36:55.820 --> 36:58.750 Knowledgeable , forthcoming . 36:59.330 --> 37:01.620 Andi . It's impressive every day , 37:01.620 --> 37:03.980 frankly , to have gone in and seeing 37:03.980 --> 37:05.570 those military and civilian 37:05.570 --> 37:07.960 professionals doing their job . So the 37:07.960 --> 37:10.182 challenges we faced for really around a 37:10.182 --> 37:13.950 handful of of folks , um , that may 37:13.960 --> 37:15.960 made things difficult . I think the 37:15.960 --> 37:18.940 biggest challenge that I will face , if 37:18.940 --> 37:21.340 confirmed because of this , is around 37:21.340 --> 37:23.650 budget transparency . The Trump 37:23.650 --> 37:25.730 administration worked on an F Y 22 37:25.730 --> 37:28.260 budget . Uh , tip it . That's not 37:28.270 --> 37:29.900 unusual . But typically that 37:29.900 --> 37:31.622 information is shared with the 37:31.622 --> 37:33.930 transition team because the 37:33.940 --> 37:36.840 administration willow to Congress . Ah , 37:36.850 --> 37:38.990 president's budget submission in the 37:38.990 --> 37:42.890 spring . So the inability toe Look at 37:42.890 --> 37:45.250 that information . Um , the team , I 37:45.250 --> 37:47.417 think after I was confirmed , so I was 37:47.417 --> 37:49.583 not a part of it did have some ability 37:49.583 --> 37:51.890 to look at the information late in 37:51.890 --> 37:54.190 January , But I think it will cause 37:54.190 --> 37:56.410 some delay in the timeline by which we 37:56.410 --> 37:59.510 can give budget quality information 37:59.510 --> 38:01.850 back to Congress . So that would be the 38:01.850 --> 38:04.240 area I would I would ask for . Ah , 38:04.250 --> 38:07.320 little relief on understanding , You 38:07.320 --> 38:09.431 know , a Dr Hicks . Two weeks ago , I 38:09.431 --> 38:11.320 asked Secretary Austin during his 38:11.320 --> 38:13.542 confirmation hearing about this plan to 38:13.542 --> 38:15.650 prioritize P fast cleanup in 38:15.650 --> 38:17.872 remediation . And I have to be honest , 38:17.872 --> 38:19.710 I was . I was discouraged when 38:19.710 --> 38:22.040 Secretary Austin sort of deflected d . 38:22.040 --> 38:24.680 O D s responsibility for P fast 38:24.680 --> 38:27.220 contamination in communities around the 38:27.220 --> 38:29.400 country , including one of the hardest 38:29.400 --> 38:31.622 hit communities around Cannon Air Force 38:31.622 --> 38:34.130 Base in New Mexico . Despite 38:34.140 --> 38:36.220 overwhelming evidence that D o . D . 38:36.220 --> 38:38.440 Activities there were the sole source 38:38.450 --> 38:41.060 of the contamination And that is the 38:41.060 --> 38:43.740 case in many of these instances . Um , 38:43.750 --> 38:45.750 if confirmed , how will you work to 38:45.750 --> 38:48.670 prioritize D o D s efforts ? Thio stand 38:48.670 --> 38:51.180 up and address p fast cleanup and and 38:51.180 --> 38:53.780 work with these communities . Senator 38:53.780 --> 38:55.780 First , I think it's important that 38:55.780 --> 38:57.947 senior leadership in the Pentagon meet 38:57.947 --> 39:00.002 with the families themselves and the 39:00.002 --> 39:02.400 community members and understand what 39:02.400 --> 39:05.000 exactly has has occurred and what the 39:05.000 --> 39:07.111 consequences have been . I also think 39:07.111 --> 39:09.550 it's imperative , as Secretary Austin 39:09.550 --> 39:11.661 has done to make it clear that it's a 39:11.661 --> 39:14.450 priority for the department both to 39:14.450 --> 39:16.672 ensure its not putting contaminants out 39:16.672 --> 39:20.080 into its military families , military 39:20.080 --> 39:22.191 service members and , of course , the 39:22.191 --> 39:24.413 communities that surround them and that 39:24.413 --> 39:26.524 when we see instances , we're working 39:26.524 --> 39:28.691 with EPA . I know there's now circular 39:28.691 --> 39:31.650 authority , um , that we can access 39:31.660 --> 39:34.090 with regard to pee fast that we're 39:34.090 --> 39:37.780 working on solutions Thio 39:37.790 --> 39:40.070 do cleanup . And frankly , to meet the 39:40.070 --> 39:42.014 timeline , Congress has given us a 39:42.014 --> 39:44.750 clear timeline , um , for removing p 39:44.750 --> 39:47.620 fast out of our firefighting approaches . 39:47.620 --> 39:50.700 And , uh , if confirmed , I'm committed 39:50.700 --> 39:54.320 to meeting that timeline . Thank you , 39:54.320 --> 39:58.010 Senator Heinrich . Uh , now via WebEx 39:58.020 --> 40:01.570 Senator Warren . Thank you very much , 40:01.570 --> 40:04.680 Mr Chairman . And Congratulations on 40:04.680 --> 40:07.040 your nomination , Dr Hicks . I 40:07.050 --> 40:09.800 appreciated the opportunity to speak 40:09.800 --> 40:11.990 with you last week and enjoyed hearing 40:11.990 --> 40:14.310 your views on a range of topics . You 40:14.310 --> 40:17.190 know , I have been very critical about 40:17.190 --> 40:19.960 the size of the defense budget . It's 40:19.960 --> 40:22.410 long been a concern of mine . But after 40:22.410 --> 40:25.010 the past year watching more than 40:25.010 --> 40:28.980 400,000 fellow Americans die , tens of 40:28.980 --> 40:32.680 million's unemployed due to Covic , 19 40:32.700 --> 40:35.050 millions more who are lined up at food 40:35.050 --> 40:38.620 banks and even millions more who are on 40:38.620 --> 40:40.842 the threshold of losing their homes and 40:40.842 --> 40:43.100 being put out on the street . Spending 40:43.100 --> 40:47.100 $740 billion a year on this one 40:47.100 --> 40:49.350 piece of the federal budget is 40:49.360 --> 40:52.060 unconscionable . Ah , budget is about 40:52.060 --> 40:55.160 priorities , and we continue to over 40:55.160 --> 40:58.540 invest in defense while under investing 40:58.550 --> 41:01.590 in public health and so much more that 41:01.590 --> 41:03.590 would keep us safe . And that would 41:03.590 --> 41:06.650 save lives . So let me ask the question 41:06.660 --> 41:09.630 this way , Dr Hicks , do you believe 41:09.640 --> 41:13.110 that we can find ways , toe lower the 41:13.110 --> 41:16.810 top line budget number and then spend 41:16.810 --> 41:20.370 that money mawr effectively 41:20.370 --> 41:23.730 without sacrificing our security ? 41:26.010 --> 41:28.510 Senator ? First , let me say , I agree 41:28.510 --> 41:30.770 with you that the nation has seen in 41:30.770 --> 41:33.460 this past year , a crisis that is 41:33.460 --> 41:36.630 generational in this magnitude . And 41:37.010 --> 41:40.050 I certainly understand how it calls 41:40.050 --> 41:42.370 into question how what the priorities 41:42.370 --> 41:45.550 are across our government . I also , 41:45.550 --> 41:47.960 though , believe that we're a nation 41:47.960 --> 41:50.250 that can't afford the defense , um , 41:50.260 --> 41:52.650 that it needs to have and the focus . 41:52.660 --> 41:55.240 Sometimes it's about spending mawr , 41:55.240 --> 41:57.462 sometimes about spending less . But the 41:57.462 --> 42:00.620 focus on the top line number can really 42:00.630 --> 42:03.360 obscure um , or important conversation 42:03.360 --> 42:05.249 around . What is it ? We want our 42:05.249 --> 42:07.360 military ? In the case of the Defense 42:07.360 --> 42:09.193 Department to dio on DWhite hard 42:09.193 --> 42:11.230 choices , Air involved , um , in 42:11.230 --> 42:13.820 getting it in a place to be capable of 42:13.830 --> 42:15.886 doing that , being transparent about 42:15.886 --> 42:19.220 the risk . Eso My view to your direct 42:19.220 --> 42:21.860 question is , I do think there are ways 42:21.870 --> 42:23.981 for the Defense Department to be more 42:23.981 --> 42:26.530 efficient to be more effective . I 42:26.530 --> 42:28.420 think some of those tools , as I 42:28.430 --> 42:30.760 suggested , involved things like 42:30.760 --> 42:34.010 operational concept advancement , um , 42:34.020 --> 42:36.410 making the right kinds of investments , 42:36.410 --> 42:38.299 making sure we have a competitive 42:38.299 --> 42:40.521 industrial base . But frankly , some of 42:40.521 --> 42:42.800 the things some of the levers that are 42:42.800 --> 42:44.800 available take a lot of partnership 42:44.800 --> 42:47.120 between Congress , the executive branch 42:47.130 --> 42:49.890 industry and others to make some hard 42:49.890 --> 42:52.800 choices . It would be hard . Thio 42:52.810 --> 42:54.780 significantly squeeze the defense 42:54.780 --> 42:56.947 budget in light of the threats that we 42:56.947 --> 43:00.860 face without that kind of , uh , effort 43:00.860 --> 43:02.804 together . Thio , get to some hard 43:02.804 --> 43:05.730 choices . You understand your answer 43:05.730 --> 43:08.990 here ? Are you saying that ? Yes , we 43:08.990 --> 43:12.360 can reduce the top line number without 43:12.360 --> 43:16.170 sacrificing our security . So long as 43:16.170 --> 43:18.710 we work together on this . Is that what 43:18.710 --> 43:21.410 I'm hearing ? You say yes . And so long 43:21.410 --> 43:24.870 as we're willing to make some decisions 43:24.870 --> 43:27.940 that may incur risk themselves , Yeah , 43:27.950 --> 43:31.120 they're not S 01 of your key task is 43:31.120 --> 43:33.400 going to be linking the military budget 43:33.410 --> 43:36.180 to our strategy and to the presidents 43:36.190 --> 43:39.030 and Secretary Austin's priorities . So 43:39.030 --> 43:41.960 if President Biden direct Secretary 43:41.970 --> 43:44.820 Austin toe lower the top line and I 43:44.820 --> 43:47.490 hope he does what will be the biggest 43:47.490 --> 43:49.530 challenges that you will have to 43:49.540 --> 43:53.460 overcome , I think the 43:53.470 --> 43:55.760 biggest challenges . The balancing of 43:55.760 --> 43:58.520 the readiness for challenges of today , 43:58.530 --> 44:00.770 threats of today and preparing for the 44:00.770 --> 44:02.992 future . That's sort of the overarching 44:02.992 --> 44:05.560 piece . But I think mawr to the , um , 44:05.570 --> 44:09.120 mechanics of how we do that will be 44:09.130 --> 44:12.050 getting buy in and a constructive 44:12.050 --> 44:14.870 approach with again Congress working 44:14.870 --> 44:16.926 together with the administration and 44:16.926 --> 44:19.980 vice versa . Um , in a dialogue and 44:19.980 --> 44:22.320 having industry and other stakeholders 44:22.330 --> 44:24.386 willing to come to the table for the 44:24.386 --> 44:26.497 greater good . Thio , get that done . 44:26.990 --> 44:29.690 Okay . You know , if confirmed , one of 44:29.690 --> 44:31.801 the first things you're going to need 44:31.801 --> 44:33.801 to do is review our nuclear weapons 44:33.801 --> 44:35.912 program . And I know that you believe 44:35.912 --> 44:37.801 in a safe and secure and reliable 44:37.801 --> 44:40.390 nuclear deterrent , But we're going to 44:40.390 --> 44:43.940 spend $44.5 44:43.940 --> 44:46.410 billion on nuclear weapons this year , 44:46.420 --> 44:49.090 which is more than the entire budget 44:49.100 --> 44:51.330 for the State Department and foreign 44:51.340 --> 44:54.930 operations accounts . Will you commit 44:54.940 --> 44:57.610 that your review will not simply be a 44:57.620 --> 44:59.840 rubber stamp of our current nuclear 44:59.840 --> 45:02.730 strategy , but that you really will 45:02.740 --> 45:06.400 examine and requestion the core 45:06.410 --> 45:08.300 assumptions that underpin it ? 45:08.990 --> 45:11.630 Absolutely , Senator . Good . I really 45:11.630 --> 45:13.530 appreciate that . I want a strong 45:13.530 --> 45:15.420 defense , but I want one that is 45:15.420 --> 45:17.587 tailored to meet the rial threats that 45:17.587 --> 45:19.809 we face . And more importantly , I want 45:19.809 --> 45:21.864 that defense to be built on a strong 45:21.864 --> 45:24.610 economic foundation here , a home . But 45:24.610 --> 45:27.130 that's not what we have today . We face 45:27.130 --> 45:29.610 staggering economic inequality that's 45:29.620 --> 45:32.080 Onley getting worse as a consequence 45:32.090 --> 45:34.790 off this crisis , and yet the military 45:34.790 --> 45:37.350 continues to chug along , disconnected 45:37.350 --> 45:40.310 from this reality , plowing billions of 45:40.310 --> 45:43.110 dollars into the same big , expensive 45:43.110 --> 45:45.520 weapons systems that we've been buying 45:45.520 --> 45:48.070 for more than 20 years . We've got to 45:48.080 --> 45:50.240 fix this by fundamentally rethinking 45:50.250 --> 45:52.870 how we spend our money to protect our 45:52.870 --> 45:54.880 nation . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 45:55.190 --> 45:57.246 Thank you . Senator Warren . Senator 45:57.246 --> 46:00.850 Peters . Thank 46:00.850 --> 46:03.880 you , Mr Chairman and Dr Hicks . Good 46:03.880 --> 46:05.880 to see you . And thank you for your 46:05.880 --> 46:07.436 willingness to take on this 46:07.436 --> 46:09.602 responsibility . It is a It is a large 46:09.602 --> 46:11.658 one . Uh , Dr Hicks . So listening . 46:11.658 --> 46:13.880 Thio . Secretary Gates introduction . I 46:13.880 --> 46:16.350 was reminded of ah of a recent book 46:16.360 --> 46:19.120 that he wrote cautioning us too . Be 46:19.120 --> 46:21.050 wary of over militarizing foreign 46:21.050 --> 46:24.270 policy in favor of non military 46:24.270 --> 46:27.410 instruments of power , particularly as 46:27.410 --> 46:29.600 we enter into a number of gray zone 46:29.600 --> 46:31.600 conflict . Something that you and I 46:31.600 --> 46:33.970 were ableto speak about it great length 46:33.980 --> 46:36.400 earlier , which I appreciate that time . 46:36.780 --> 46:40.040 But in the 2020 n . D . A . We required 46:40.040 --> 46:42.262 the department to designate a principal 46:42.262 --> 46:44.910 information operations adviser . 46:45.610 --> 46:48.180 This responsibility was given to the 46:48.190 --> 46:51.210 Undersecretary of defense for policy . 46:51.780 --> 46:53.950 But based on your experience as a 46:53.960 --> 46:56.350 principal deputy , toe that position , 46:56.360 --> 46:58.416 you certainly I think , would have a 46:58.416 --> 47:00.471 better appreciation for the scope of 47:00.471 --> 47:02.693 the responsibilities , what's necessary 47:02.693 --> 47:04.860 than than most . And so , with that in 47:04.860 --> 47:08.400 mind , uh , the 47:08.880 --> 47:11.040 and then the challenges related to 47:11.040 --> 47:13.770 dealing with , uh , warfare in the gray 47:13.770 --> 47:17.000 zone , would you have advised assigning 47:17.000 --> 47:19.900 it to the undersecretary of policy ? Or 47:19.900 --> 47:22.067 would you have preferred to have it in 47:22.067 --> 47:24.320 a war direct and principal position by 47:24.320 --> 47:27.750 itself ? Senator , First of all , 47:27.760 --> 47:29.704 thank you for the conversation the 47:29.704 --> 47:32.100 other day . I do agree with you . 47:32.100 --> 47:34.267 Overall , of course , that information 47:34.267 --> 47:36.660 is a critical element of the way in 47:36.660 --> 47:38.716 which we have to think about threats 47:38.716 --> 47:40.882 and challenges of the future . We live 47:40.882 --> 47:43.049 that frankly , every day . Of course , 47:43.049 --> 47:45.560 I'm not familiar with the principle 47:45.560 --> 47:47.690 information advisor . I think I got 47:47.690 --> 47:50.100 that name slightly wrong position . So 47:50.110 --> 47:52.500 if confirmed , I would be happy to look 47:52.510 --> 47:55.230 at that position , the legislation 47:55.240 --> 47:57.150 developing it and the disposition 47:57.150 --> 47:59.206 whether policy is the right place to 47:59.206 --> 48:01.110 put that well , I appreciate that 48:01.110 --> 48:03.090 because we obviously I think it's 48:03.090 --> 48:05.146 important we put it in the end . A . 48:05.146 --> 48:07.312 It's a areas that you've written about 48:07.312 --> 48:09.312 is you have a chance to do a deeper 48:09.312 --> 48:11.479 dive into what will be associated with 48:11.479 --> 48:11.380 that and I would hope that you would 48:11.390 --> 48:13.680 give us advice is to how we properly 48:13.680 --> 48:15.902 resource that position and to make sure 48:15.902 --> 48:18.700 that it gets the attention that it 48:18.700 --> 48:21.040 deserves . You have written and fought 48:21.040 --> 48:22.707 a great deal about Gray's own 48:22.707 --> 48:25.020 activities and the challenges that that 48:25.030 --> 48:27.350 will present . How do you view the 48:27.360 --> 48:29.990 department contributing meaningful to a 48:29.990 --> 48:32.046 whole of government approach , which 48:32.046 --> 48:34.101 you have written about extensively , 48:47.070 --> 48:49.810 Always in a supporting role ? Um , they 48:49.810 --> 48:52.890 bring a depth of doctrinal development 48:52.900 --> 48:54.789 on how to think about things like 48:54.789 --> 48:56.956 political warfare , as we used to call 48:56.956 --> 49:00.080 it in the Cold War on DSO , I think in 49:00.080 --> 49:02.000 a supporting way , D . O . D can 49:02.000 --> 49:04.550 provide helpful insights and how we 49:04.550 --> 49:06.690 think about the information domain 49:08.870 --> 49:10.830 part of dealing with grace . As I 49:10.830 --> 49:12.830 mentioned the questions we have toe 49:12.830 --> 49:14.886 coordinate a lot of activities Cyber 49:14.886 --> 49:17.108 and I know you've addressed a number of 49:17.108 --> 49:19.330 questions related to cyber already here 49:19.330 --> 49:21.108 today . But we have appointed a 49:21.108 --> 49:23.163 national cyber director , which will 49:23.163 --> 49:25.163 face pretty much a daunting task of 49:25.163 --> 49:27.052 trying to coordinate all of these 49:27.052 --> 49:29.052 operations , and the resource is of 49:29.052 --> 49:31.120 agencies . Which director doesn't 49:31.130 --> 49:33.352 really exercise any direct control over 49:33.352 --> 49:35.019 so it makes the job even more 49:35.019 --> 49:38.480 complicated . What is your sense on the 49:38.480 --> 49:40.591 role of the national cyber director ? 49:40.591 --> 49:42.369 And if confirmed , what is your 49:42.369 --> 49:44.202 commitment ? Thio work with that 49:44.202 --> 49:46.424 director to coordinate these activities 49:46.424 --> 49:48.560 so that we can be more effective in 49:48.570 --> 49:50.626 addressing this significant threat . 49:51.370 --> 49:54.600 Senator , I I applaud this committee in 49:54.600 --> 49:56.544 particular and and others who were 49:56.544 --> 49:58.560 central to putting in the national 49:58.560 --> 50:01.490 cyber , um , director position into the 50:01.490 --> 50:05.400 n D . A . Cyber is , ah challenge set 50:05.400 --> 50:08.050 that we have learned , you know , over 50:08.060 --> 50:11.760 a decade . Plus , eyes just constantly 50:11.760 --> 50:13.720 challenged us in terms of working 50:13.720 --> 50:16.110 across , um , different elements of 50:16.110 --> 50:18.110 government from the even inside the 50:18.110 --> 50:20.277 intelligence community , let alone d o 50:20.277 --> 50:22.870 d again DHs , which has response a 50:22.870 --> 50:25.037 significant responsibilities and other 50:25.037 --> 50:27.092 actors . So I think the advantage of 50:27.092 --> 50:29.560 having that director is pulling a lot 50:29.560 --> 50:32.030 of those threads together and creating 50:32.030 --> 50:34.320 some unity of vision . Um , if 50:34.320 --> 50:36.520 confirmed , it is my anticipation that 50:36.520 --> 50:39.500 I would work alongside other key 50:39.500 --> 50:41.556 elements in the department with that 50:41.556 --> 50:43.611 national cyber director to make sure 50:43.611 --> 50:45.722 that the D o . D . Components off the 50:45.722 --> 50:48.340 solution set on cyber are moving in the 50:48.340 --> 50:50.600 right direction and supportive of the 50:50.610 --> 50:53.240 National approach . Thank you , Dr 50:53.240 --> 50:54.240 Hicks . 50:58.560 --> 51:01.500 Thank you . Senator . Uh , Senator 51:01.500 --> 51:05.480 Black Burn via WebEx . Yes . 51:05.490 --> 51:09.020 Thank you so much , Mr Chairman . And 51:09.030 --> 51:12.790 I want to say thank you ever so 51:12.790 --> 51:16.430 much . Um , miss , thanks for your time 51:16.440 --> 51:19.790 last week . I appreciate the 51:19.800 --> 51:23.160 conversation that we had and , uh , 51:23.170 --> 51:26.280 your thoughtful consideration of the 51:26.280 --> 51:28.350 topic we started within that 51:28.350 --> 51:30.410 conversation , which is civilian 51:30.410 --> 51:34.140 military relations . And you 51:34.140 --> 51:36.560 know that this is important to me , the 51:36.560 --> 51:39.670 theorist concern over the erosion of 51:39.670 --> 51:42.280 civilian voices in the Pentagon . This 51:42.280 --> 51:46.050 goes back as we discussed into the 51:46.060 --> 51:49.770 Obama era budget cuts , which we 51:49.770 --> 51:53.540 saw that lead to a diminishment 51:53.550 --> 51:56.560 of morale and really a breakdown of 51:56.560 --> 52:00.310 structure in the Pentagon . So moving 52:00.310 --> 52:04.000 forward , we must have a very healthy 52:04.000 --> 52:07.260 cadre of career civilians in key 52:07.260 --> 52:10.260 oversight areas for an efficient and 52:10.260 --> 52:13.270 effective pentagon . Uh , that really 52:13.280 --> 52:15.980 fights are wars and serves the needs of 52:15.980 --> 52:18.300 our service members . And I appreciate 52:18.310 --> 52:20.530 your perspective in your comments on 52:20.530 --> 52:23.760 that . We also talked about China 52:24.250 --> 52:28.030 and cyber and space and the 52:28.030 --> 52:30.850 vital importance of public private 52:30.860 --> 52:32.916 partnerships . And as I told you , I 52:32.916 --> 52:35.840 discussed this with General Austin . So 52:35.840 --> 52:37.896 for the record , I'd like for you to 52:37.896 --> 52:41.510 touch on how you will view these public 52:41.510 --> 52:43.560 private partnerships with companies 52:43.560 --> 52:46.620 with universities , our national labs , 52:46.620 --> 52:49.650 which we also discussed to make certain 52:49.660 --> 52:52.890 that we are standing strong against 52:52.900 --> 52:55.940 great power competition and that we're 52:55.940 --> 52:58.162 ready for the challenges that will come 52:58.162 --> 53:02.070 to us . Senator , Thanks s o 53:02.070 --> 53:04.292 much for raising both of these issues . 53:04.292 --> 53:07.530 Let me start with the first . Um , I , 53:07.530 --> 53:09.419 of course , think we should be as 53:09.419 --> 53:11.720 efficient as possible in the delivery 53:11.720 --> 53:14.053 of capability in the Defense Department . 53:14.053 --> 53:17.530 But it is my view that we have in the 53:17.530 --> 53:20.280 efforts to gain efficiency we have cut 53:20.280 --> 53:23.520 to the bone on civilian oversight in 53:23.520 --> 53:26.870 some key areas . Um , if you look just 53:26.870 --> 53:29.480 at the prior conversation for Peter's 53:29.480 --> 53:32.580 on civilian oversight of 53:32.580 --> 53:35.060 policy , that's an area very near and 53:35.060 --> 53:37.171 dear to my heart where I know we have 53:37.171 --> 53:39.320 really cut out a lot of capacity and 53:39.320 --> 53:41.990 capability , and it's hard for the 53:41.990 --> 53:44.450 civilians , um , to provide the 53:44.450 --> 53:46.750 necessary oversight if they aren't 53:46.750 --> 53:48.917 resourced appropriately for doing so . 53:48.917 --> 53:51.560 So I do believe , if confirmed , making 53:51.560 --> 53:55.170 sure that we can act on and execute on 53:55.550 --> 53:57.490 the responsibility for civilian 53:57.490 --> 53:59.650 oversight to create healthy civil 53:59.650 --> 54:02.620 military relations is vital on your 54:02.620 --> 54:05.820 second point about some of the 54:05.820 --> 54:08.710 challenges we face with regard to China 54:08.710 --> 54:11.870 and in many different domains . Onda 54:11.870 --> 54:14.037 need for public private partnerships . 54:14.037 --> 54:16.400 It is my strong view that the United 54:16.400 --> 54:19.000 States , if it leverages public private 54:19.000 --> 54:21.620 partnerships , effectively can out 54:21.620 --> 54:23.700 compete the Chinese civil military 54:23.700 --> 54:27.020 fusion model . That model is status . 54:27.030 --> 54:30.980 It is it is not taking full advantage 54:30.990 --> 54:33.720 of a vibrant private sector , and the 54:33.720 --> 54:36.180 United States has that advantage if it 54:36.180 --> 54:39.230 can tap into it . Tapping into it means 54:39.240 --> 54:42.760 exactly as you say . Working with our 54:42.770 --> 54:45.210 world class academic community are 54:45.210 --> 54:48.450 world class national labs and , um , 54:48.460 --> 54:50.293 the sectors of the economy , the 54:50.293 --> 54:52.130 private sector elements that are 54:52.130 --> 54:54.760 working on some of the hardest problems 54:54.790 --> 54:57.220 that we face . If we can leverage those 54:57.220 --> 55:00.860 successfully reducing barriers , as we 55:00.860 --> 55:03.150 have discussed throughout the morning , 55:03.150 --> 55:05.372 I think that will put the United States 55:05.372 --> 55:07.500 in a much better competitive position 55:07.510 --> 55:11.410 than a China or Russia . Alright , 55:11.420 --> 55:13.550 I am going to end with that . You've 55:13.550 --> 55:15.690 been generous with your time this 55:15.690 --> 55:17.830 morning . I have a couple of other 55:17.830 --> 55:21.500 questions , um , one on nuclear 55:21.500 --> 55:24.680 deterrent one on cost savings at D o d . 55:24.680 --> 55:28.550 I will send those to you as Q FRS 55:28.560 --> 55:31.850 and , uh , we also touched on 55:31.860 --> 55:33.890 workforce development in our phone 55:33.890 --> 55:37.450 conversation , and I want to get 55:37.460 --> 55:39.950 a couple of answers from you on that . 55:39.950 --> 55:42.160 But in the interest of time , I will 55:42.160 --> 55:45.390 yield back my 25 seconds . Thank you . 55:45.390 --> 55:48.570 Senator Blackburn . Uh , Senator Mitch . 55:48.580 --> 55:50.913 Thank you , Mr Chairman . And thank you , 55:50.913 --> 55:53.136 Dr Hicks , for being here . I know it's 55:53.136 --> 55:55.080 been a long mourning for you , but 55:55.080 --> 55:57.191 appreciate very much and also wanting 55:57.191 --> 55:57.000 to serve at the level you're you will 55:57.000 --> 55:58.889 be serving at not look forward to 55:58.889 --> 56:00.944 supporting you . I would like to ask 56:00.944 --> 56:03.056 you something that we've been working 56:03.056 --> 56:05.111 on and which is the chief management 56:05.111 --> 56:06.889 officer . And it's been kind of 56:06.889 --> 56:09.056 shuffled around and not paid attention 56:09.056 --> 56:11.278 to . And it's just such a vital , vital 56:11.278 --> 56:11.170 position , I believe , to try to get 56:11.170 --> 56:13.180 our financial house in order . So I 56:13.180 --> 56:15.347 wasn't sure how your feelings would be 56:15.347 --> 56:18.130 about that . And , you know , it's when 56:18.130 --> 56:21.320 you look back , the social , the 56:21.330 --> 56:23.740 cultural resistance from the Defense 56:23.740 --> 56:26.640 Business board , J O . And all of them 56:26.640 --> 56:29.040 have been unbelievable . And there's 56:29.040 --> 56:31.207 some critical information . I think it 56:31.207 --> 56:33.429 could really help us . So I didn't know 56:33.429 --> 56:33.200 what your commitment would be to that 56:33.200 --> 56:35.422 for the national defense strategy . And 56:35.422 --> 56:37.478 if you believe we have the bandwidth 56:37.478 --> 56:39.533 thio , I mean Necessary champion for 56:39.533 --> 56:42.020 the business reform , Senator , I think 56:42.020 --> 56:44.820 business reform is a vital element of 56:44.830 --> 56:47.950 the job jar for the deputy secretary of 56:47.950 --> 56:50.117 defense , and , if confirmed , I would 56:50.117 --> 56:52.228 put serious time and energy into that 56:52.228 --> 56:56.110 portfolio . The recent end 56:56.110 --> 56:59.490 of the CMO role was followed by the 56:59.490 --> 57:01.323 current deputy secretary defense 57:01.323 --> 57:04.160 putting forth a memo that , uh 57:04.170 --> 57:06.490 explained the disposition of those 57:06.490 --> 57:09.710 responsibilities . Andi , if I'm 57:09.710 --> 57:11.766 confirmed , I would want to get into 57:11.766 --> 57:13.988 place , get my team in place , and look 57:13.988 --> 57:16.950 at that memo and the plan that's put in 57:16.950 --> 57:18.950 place to make sure it's effective . 57:18.950 --> 57:21.117 Sure to follow up on that . You know , 57:21.117 --> 57:23.283 the whole cultural spend it or lose it 57:23.283 --> 57:25.740 suspended or losing culture that's 57:25.740 --> 57:27.796 within government across the board , 57:27.796 --> 57:29.851 especially in the defense , which is 57:29.851 --> 57:32.760 the biggest purchasing e . I think we 57:32.760 --> 57:34.910 have to change the incentives around 57:34.920 --> 57:37.031 how you promote business reform , and 57:37.031 --> 57:38.890 exactly if the if the incentive 57:38.890 --> 57:41.320 structure is you only get your money . 57:41.320 --> 57:43.209 If you spend it inefficiently and 57:43.209 --> 57:45.209 couldn't hold on to it and hide the 57:45.209 --> 57:47.376 ball , that's we're never going to get 57:47.376 --> 57:49.376 the business reform we need . So we 57:49.376 --> 57:51.542 need to change the incentives we found 57:51.542 --> 57:50.490 out in the state when I was governor of 57:50.490 --> 57:52.268 state level . Basically , if we 57:52.268 --> 57:54.490 rewarded the agencies that didn't spend 57:54.490 --> 57:56.712 it all when rather than wasting it gave 57:56.712 --> 57:56.200 him a little bit of bump the next year 57:56.200 --> 57:58.256 because of the savings they had , it 57:58.256 --> 58:00.422 made them be more prudent because they 58:00.422 --> 58:02.478 weren't penalized . It might be some 58:02.478 --> 58:04.589 things we could talk to you about , I 58:04.589 --> 58:06.700 think would be really great . Doesn't 58:06.700 --> 58:06.230 take a whole lot . The other thing is 58:06.230 --> 58:09.430 on on holding the prime 58:09.430 --> 58:11.830 contractor that does business with us . 58:11.830 --> 58:14.052 The big boys , the Boeings and all them 58:14.052 --> 58:16.274 hold them accountable for basically the 58:16.274 --> 58:18.510 security of their networks down into 58:18.510 --> 58:20.510 their subcontractors . That's where 58:20.510 --> 58:22.732 we're getting picked off . That's where 58:22.732 --> 58:24.788 basically the hacking , that's where 58:24.788 --> 58:24.720 all the information is being stolen 58:24.720 --> 58:27.490 from that has to be secured and it has 58:27.490 --> 58:29.157 not everybody . I think we've 58:29.157 --> 58:31.046 identified it . They just haven't 58:31.046 --> 58:33.157 secured it . We're not holding that . 58:33.157 --> 58:35.212 There's no penalty for the big prime 58:35.212 --> 58:37.310 contractor to basically secure their 58:37.310 --> 58:40.090 subs , so they just rely on the subs , 58:40.090 --> 58:42.257 Whatever . And you wonder how they get 58:42.257 --> 58:42.230 in the back door . That's where they 58:42.230 --> 58:44.740 come from and anything we're asking for 58:44.740 --> 58:47.930 is hold those prime accountable 58:47.940 --> 58:51.060 financially and also basically being 58:51.060 --> 58:53.282 able to continue to be in good standing 58:53.282 --> 58:55.360 to do business . I didn't know if 58:55.360 --> 58:57.693 that's brought to your attention or not , 58:57.693 --> 58:59.582 Senator . I would look forward to 58:59.582 --> 59:01.471 working with you and your team on 59:01.471 --> 59:03.582 exactly these kind of ideas . We have 59:03.582 --> 59:05.749 to change the accountability we have . 59:05.749 --> 59:07.638 Thio improve the accountability , 59:07.638 --> 59:09.804 change the incentives . The hard thing 59:09.804 --> 59:09.090 is you have people that basically he 59:09.160 --> 59:11.271 asked the question . How can we spend 59:11.271 --> 59:12.938 more money than all the other 59:12.938 --> 59:14.882 challenges that we have around the 59:14.882 --> 59:16.993 world and we don't get the efficiency 59:16.993 --> 59:19.049 from it ? And I think it's basically 59:19.049 --> 59:21.160 we're not afraid to spend the money . 59:21.160 --> 59:23.382 We just want to get results from it . I 59:23.382 --> 59:22.870 think there's a lot of waste of 59:22.870 --> 59:25.203 redundancy that we could really work on . 59:25.203 --> 59:27.259 My final question would be basically 59:27.259 --> 59:29.426 how do you rate The threats we have as 59:29.426 --> 59:31.648 a country are international threats and 59:31.648 --> 59:33.870 if you'd rate would be China , Russia , 59:33.870 --> 59:36.148 Iran , this net what you see the world , 59:36.148 --> 59:38.370 we have to basically be on our game and 59:38.370 --> 59:41.430 step up our our game , if not greatest 59:41.430 --> 59:44.100 threats . Yes , Senator , the United 59:44.100 --> 59:47.180 States has regretfully not been able to 59:47.180 --> 59:49.640 have just one threat that focuses . Its 59:49.640 --> 59:51.362 attention in this period is no 59:51.362 --> 59:53.750 different from a Defense Department 59:53.750 --> 59:55.972 perspective . China is the clear pacing 59:55.972 --> 59:57.972 challenge and almost all capability 59:57.972 --> 01:00:00.194 areas . There are a few areas where the 01:00:00.194 --> 01:00:03.440 Russians still are , um , pacing that 01:00:03.450 --> 01:00:05.672 pacing the United States , particularly 01:00:05.672 --> 01:00:07.894 in the strategic realm . Andi . I think 01:00:07.894 --> 01:00:10.890 that that's the key element of how we 01:00:10.890 --> 01:00:12.730 need to think about changing and 01:00:12.730 --> 01:00:14.841 shifting the force about with cyber . 01:00:15.110 --> 01:00:17.221 Who's the big hitters inside with the 01:00:17.221 --> 01:00:19.440 same ? Yes , Senator , I would rank 01:00:19.440 --> 01:00:22.150 them the same . I will say I look 01:00:22.150 --> 01:00:24.206 forward if confirmed to getting more 01:00:24.206 --> 01:00:27.110 briefings than I have had recently on 01:00:27.120 --> 01:00:29.231 exactly what improvements the Chinese 01:00:29.231 --> 01:00:31.453 and Russians are putting in place . But 01:00:31.453 --> 01:00:33.398 my my view is that the Chinese air 01:00:33.398 --> 01:00:35.398 probably still the pacing challenge 01:00:35.398 --> 01:00:37.287 there . The only thing I would be 01:00:37.287 --> 01:00:39.453 cautioned on is basically a lot of the 01:00:39.453 --> 01:00:41.287 smaller whether be the Iran's or 01:00:41.287 --> 01:00:43.342 whether it be , you know , different 01:00:43.342 --> 01:00:45.564 small players . They become big players 01:00:45.564 --> 01:00:47.676 in the realm of cyber what they could 01:00:47.676 --> 01:00:49.731 do to us or what they try to do . It 01:00:49.731 --> 01:00:51.842 was very important . But look forward 01:00:51.842 --> 01:00:50.870 to working with you . Especially the 01:00:50.870 --> 01:00:53.092 business reforms that need to be made . 01:00:53.092 --> 01:00:55.148 Thank you . Thank you . Dr . Hicks . 01:00:55.148 --> 01:00:57.314 Look forward to supporting you . Thank 01:00:57.314 --> 01:00:59.314 you . Thank you . Senator Manchin . 01:00:59.314 --> 01:01:02.240 Senator Scott . Thank you , Chairman . 01:01:02.810 --> 01:01:04.610 Um , dark tricks . We have nice 01:01:04.610 --> 01:01:06.777 conversation the other day . Thank you 01:01:06.777 --> 01:01:09.680 for your background and and your 01:01:09.690 --> 01:01:11.857 beliefs . What do you when you're just 01:01:11.857 --> 01:01:13.801 talking with Senator Manchin about 01:01:13.801 --> 01:01:15.968 pacing Challenge ? What do you mean by 01:01:15.968 --> 01:01:18.560 that ? Yeah , uh , the term means the 01:01:18.560 --> 01:01:21.750 challenge that focuses us on where the 01:01:21.750 --> 01:01:24.610 bar is , where the measure is on DSO . 01:01:24.610 --> 01:01:26.832 In most capability areas . China is the 01:01:26.832 --> 01:01:28.943 one who's setting the measuring stick 01:01:28.943 --> 01:01:31.110 for how advanced the capability is and 01:01:31.110 --> 01:01:33.110 how large challenge it is for us to 01:01:33.110 --> 01:01:36.330 overcome . Okay . Do you Do you believe 01:01:36.330 --> 01:01:38.608 we can overcome the challenge of China , 01:01:38.608 --> 01:01:40.941 or do you think it's too late ? Senator , 01:01:40.941 --> 01:01:43.108 I don't think it's too . I don't think 01:01:43.108 --> 01:01:45.163 I would sit here if I thought it was 01:01:45.163 --> 01:01:47.219 too late . I think the United States 01:01:47.219 --> 01:01:48.886 has some inherent comparative 01:01:48.886 --> 01:01:50.941 advantages . If we can tap into them 01:01:50.941 --> 01:01:53.108 effectively , what would be what would 01:01:53.108 --> 01:01:55.330 what would you consider be ? Advantages 01:01:55.330 --> 01:01:57.441 and their advantages . Sure , some of 01:01:57.441 --> 01:01:59.608 the advantages . I think the US Well , 01:01:59.608 --> 01:02:01.608 I'll focus on the U . S . If you if 01:02:01.608 --> 01:02:03.663 that's all right for for operational 01:02:03.663 --> 01:02:05.886 security purposes . But I think the U . 01:02:05.886 --> 01:02:08.108 S major advantages first and foremost , 01:02:08.108 --> 01:02:10.052 it's alliance structure and global 01:02:10.052 --> 01:02:12.108 network its ability to galvanize and 01:02:12.108 --> 01:02:14.163 lead on the world stage . I think we 01:02:14.163 --> 01:02:16.163 need to make sure that we have that 01:02:16.163 --> 01:02:19.610 ability to create mo mentum . Um , I 01:02:19.610 --> 01:02:21.666 think in the operational sense , the 01:02:21.666 --> 01:02:23.832 United States has some advantages that 01:02:23.832 --> 01:02:25.680 generation aircraft , it's one 01:02:25.690 --> 01:02:28.490 obviously are undersea capabilities or 01:02:28.490 --> 01:02:32.040 another . Andi , I think the in the 01:02:32.050 --> 01:02:34.910 economic or the fundamental competition 01:02:34.910 --> 01:02:37.260 space . I think the United States has a 01:02:37.260 --> 01:02:39.730 better model for its economy , and it 01:02:39.730 --> 01:02:41.930 could be more competitive than Chinese 01:02:41.930 --> 01:02:44.410 can and using their sive mil fusion 01:02:44.410 --> 01:02:48.120 status approach versus a U . S dynamic 01:02:48.200 --> 01:02:50.220 approach that brings in the private 01:02:50.220 --> 01:02:53.800 sector . If if if American 01:02:53.800 --> 01:02:56.680 citizens decided to stop buying Chinese 01:02:56.680 --> 01:02:58.791 products , how big of an impact would 01:02:58.791 --> 01:03:00.902 that have on there on China's ability 01:03:00.902 --> 01:03:03.120 to continue to be a threat ? Senator , 01:03:03.120 --> 01:03:05.231 that's something I would have to look 01:03:05.231 --> 01:03:07.342 into . I I regret . I've never looked 01:03:07.342 --> 01:03:09.064 at that assessment of what the 01:03:09.064 --> 01:03:11.009 implications would be , but I'd be 01:03:11.009 --> 01:03:13.009 happy to continue a conversation on 01:03:13.009 --> 01:03:16.460 that . Okay , So are the approach we've 01:03:16.460 --> 01:03:20.050 taken with Taiwan . Looks to me . Seems 01:03:20.060 --> 01:03:22.870 we've been pretty ambiguous about what ? 01:03:22.880 --> 01:03:24.880 What we would do to defend Taiwan . 01:03:25.100 --> 01:03:27.322 What do you think about that position ? 01:03:27.322 --> 01:03:29.530 And it sure appears when you look at 01:03:29.530 --> 01:03:31.474 what China has been doing now with 01:03:31.474 --> 01:03:34.710 infiltrating their airspace , that that 01:03:34.720 --> 01:03:36.831 our position has not done anything to 01:03:36.831 --> 01:03:38.998 deter China . Do you agree with that , 01:03:38.998 --> 01:03:41.220 Do you ? Is there something we ought to 01:03:41.220 --> 01:03:43.442 be doing that , um , that would let she 01:03:43.442 --> 01:03:45.664 know that we're serious about defending 01:03:45.664 --> 01:03:48.130 Taiwan ? Well , first , I think we have 01:03:48.130 --> 01:03:49.797 to be crystal clear about our 01:03:49.797 --> 01:03:51.574 commitments to Taiwan . I think 01:03:51.574 --> 01:03:53.574 President Biden has done that . And 01:03:53.574 --> 01:03:55.741 certainly Congress has had 40 years of 01:03:55.741 --> 01:03:57.908 strong bipartisan support . So I think 01:03:57.908 --> 01:04:00.750 being consistent in making clear that 01:04:00.750 --> 01:04:04.230 we will meet the requirements of the 01:04:04.230 --> 01:04:06.910 Taiwan Relations Act , that we will 01:04:06.920 --> 01:04:10.500 meet the six assurances to Taiwan and 01:04:10.500 --> 01:04:12.722 that we will operate in accordance with 01:04:12.722 --> 01:04:14.611 the three communiques between the 01:04:14.611 --> 01:04:16.833 United States and China . I think those 01:04:16.833 --> 01:04:18.889 air important to keep foremost . But 01:04:18.889 --> 01:04:21.111 those were the words , I think , in the 01:04:21.111 --> 01:04:23.333 action category . two broad areas . One 01:04:23.333 --> 01:04:25.611 is the U S . Zone deterrent capability . 01:04:25.611 --> 01:04:27.778 The Pacific Deterrence Initiative that 01:04:27.778 --> 01:04:29.389 this committee and the House 01:04:29.389 --> 01:04:31.556 counterpart put forward in this latest 01:04:31.556 --> 01:04:33.667 n . D . A . Provides some opportunity 01:04:33.667 --> 01:04:35.611 for us to build out that deterrent 01:04:35.611 --> 01:04:37.278 capability of the US and then 01:04:37.278 --> 01:04:39.570 specifically with regard thio Taiwan . 01:04:39.570 --> 01:04:41.681 I think the United States needs to be 01:04:41.681 --> 01:04:43.792 working closely with Taiwan to ensure 01:04:43.792 --> 01:04:46.460 it has the U . S . Can support its 01:04:46.460 --> 01:04:49.260 approach for its self defense . 01:04:50.190 --> 01:04:52.134 So we're running pretty big budget 01:04:52.134 --> 01:04:54.357 deficits up here , and we have now over 01:04:54.357 --> 01:04:57.200 $27 trillion with the debt eso there's 01:04:57.200 --> 01:04:59.256 gonna be a lot of pressure toe , see 01:04:59.256 --> 01:05:01.478 where we can save money . You know ? Do 01:05:01.478 --> 01:05:03.700 you believe that there's that , that we 01:05:03.700 --> 01:05:05.922 ought to be reducing our defense budget 01:05:05.922 --> 01:05:08.089 when we have the issues with China and 01:05:08.089 --> 01:05:10.033 are Iran and , um , Russia and the 01:05:10.033 --> 01:05:12.180 North Korea Senator , I believe the 01:05:12.180 --> 01:05:14.780 United States can meet the challenges 01:05:14.780 --> 01:05:16.836 it faces in defense . I think it can 01:05:16.836 --> 01:05:19.130 provide a strategy driven approach to 01:05:19.130 --> 01:05:21.074 its defense budget and that it can 01:05:21.074 --> 01:05:22.852 still deliver good value to the 01:05:22.852 --> 01:05:26.830 taxpayer in doing so , um , so that 01:05:26.840 --> 01:05:28.840 that means you're you would be okay 01:05:28.840 --> 01:05:30.784 with budget cuts in defense . That 01:05:30.784 --> 01:05:32.951 means I think that we should be driven 01:05:32.951 --> 01:05:34.784 by strategy and that we have the 01:05:34.784 --> 01:05:37.110 ability Thio afford the defense that we 01:05:37.110 --> 01:05:39.510 believe we need among all the other 01:05:39.520 --> 01:05:41.576 requirements we might have , whether 01:05:41.576 --> 01:05:43.742 that's a slightly higher top line or a 01:05:43.742 --> 01:05:45.909 slightly lower top line . Personally , 01:05:45.909 --> 01:05:47.964 I think is less relevant than are we 01:05:47.964 --> 01:05:50.187 delivering the capabilities we need for 01:05:50.187 --> 01:05:52.690 the defense ? We should have . Thanks , 01:05:52.690 --> 01:05:53.690 Mr Chairman . 01:05:57.590 --> 01:06:00.270 Thank you . Senator Scott . Senator 01:06:00.280 --> 01:06:03.090 Duck Worth via WebEx . 01:06:03.780 --> 01:06:05.700 Yes , Thank you , Mr Chairman . I 01:06:05.700 --> 01:06:08.350 apologize . My Webcam does not seem to 01:06:08.350 --> 01:06:10.406 be working , so I'm just gonna be on 01:06:10.406 --> 01:06:12.690 audio . Dr . Hicks , it's good to see 01:06:12.690 --> 01:06:14.980 you again . I can see you . You can't 01:06:14.980 --> 01:06:17.750 see me . Sorry about that . Um , after 01:06:17.750 --> 01:06:19.694 speaking with you last week , I am 01:06:19.694 --> 01:06:21.750 confident that your leadership would 01:06:21.750 --> 01:06:23.917 help the Department of Defense address 01:06:23.917 --> 01:06:25.750 some of the most urgent national 01:06:25.750 --> 01:06:27.917 security issues facing our country . I 01:06:27.917 --> 01:06:29.806 think you would bring substantial 01:06:29.806 --> 01:06:31.806 expertise to a critically important 01:06:31.806 --> 01:06:33.917 role , and you would bear much of the 01:06:33.917 --> 01:06:33.820 responsibility for day to day decisions 01:06:33.820 --> 01:06:35.987 that could shape the future trajectory 01:06:35.987 --> 01:06:37.720 of D o D . For many years . If 01:06:37.720 --> 01:06:39.776 confirmed is the deputy secretary of 01:06:39.776 --> 01:06:41.942 defense . I would want you to use your 01:06:41.942 --> 01:06:44.190 authority and leadership to address a 01:06:44.190 --> 01:06:46.246 number of systemic issues within the 01:06:46.246 --> 01:06:48.680 department , including re balancing the 01:06:48.680 --> 01:06:50.736 relationship between D . O . D . And 01:06:50.736 --> 01:06:52.847 the State Department , rebuilding the 01:06:52.847 --> 01:06:54.958 team of professional civilian leaders 01:06:54.958 --> 01:06:57.180 and the D . O . D . And returning spoke 01:06:57.180 --> 01:06:59.347 assed . Too underfunded but critically 01:06:59.347 --> 01:07:01.513 important parts of coyotes budget like 01:07:01.513 --> 01:07:03.624 our logistics enterprise and renewing 01:07:03.624 --> 01:07:05.513 efforts to increase diversity and 01:07:05.513 --> 01:07:07.736 inclusion among the senior ranks of our 01:07:07.736 --> 01:07:09.847 military service and broader national 01:07:09.847 --> 01:07:12.069 security community . Today , though , I 01:07:12.069 --> 01:07:14.236 want to focus my questions on the most 01:07:14.236 --> 01:07:16.402 urgent issues facing the Department of 01:07:16.402 --> 01:07:18.402 Defense competing with the People's 01:07:18.402 --> 01:07:20.569 Republic of China . PRC . Dr . Hicks , 01:07:20.569 --> 01:07:22.791 I know that we agree that we must use a 01:07:22.791 --> 01:07:24.958 whole of society approach , and you've 01:07:24.958 --> 01:07:27.069 discussed this at length this morning 01:07:27.069 --> 01:07:28.902 to present ourselves as a viable 01:07:28.902 --> 01:07:30.902 alternative to China for economic , 01:07:30.902 --> 01:07:33.069 military and diplomatic partnerships , 01:07:33.069 --> 01:07:35.291 especially in the Asia Pacific region . 01:07:35.291 --> 01:07:37.124 We've also discussed the need to 01:07:37.124 --> 01:07:39.347 increase our military engagement in the 01:07:39.347 --> 01:07:41.347 region below the threshold of armed 01:07:41.347 --> 01:07:43.410 conflict . If confirmed , what 01:07:43.420 --> 01:07:45.760 immediate steps would you take to help 01:07:45.760 --> 01:07:47.980 d o d build relationships with allies 01:07:47.980 --> 01:07:51.130 and partners in Southeast Asia and 01:07:51.130 --> 01:07:52.963 counter China's rise in the Indo 01:07:52.963 --> 01:07:56.830 Pacific senator , thank you 01:07:56.830 --> 01:07:58.886 very much . I would say It's good to 01:07:58.886 --> 01:08:00.941 see you , but it's certainly good to 01:08:00.941 --> 01:08:03.163 hear you . Um , I think you've laid out 01:08:03.163 --> 01:08:05.330 the challenge that very , very well as 01:08:05.330 --> 01:08:07.800 the deputy secretary . I imagine I will 01:08:07.800 --> 01:08:10.022 be focused internal to the department , 01:08:10.022 --> 01:08:13.010 and the secretary will be in particular 01:08:13.010 --> 01:08:14.990 focused on some of these broader 01:08:14.990 --> 01:08:17.320 questions of the of the Allied 01:08:17.320 --> 01:08:19.890 approaches . But I will say , based on 01:08:19.890 --> 01:08:22.550 my experience , there is opportunity , 01:08:22.550 --> 01:08:24.439 significant opportunity . There's 01:08:24.439 --> 01:08:26.900 openness and interest from partners 01:08:26.900 --> 01:08:29.080 throughout Asia . Um , you and I have 01:08:29.080 --> 01:08:31.280 spoken about Indonesia , Vietnam , for 01:08:31.280 --> 01:08:34.610 instance . I think there is opportunity 01:08:34.610 --> 01:08:36.990 to demonstrate that the United States 01:08:37.070 --> 01:08:40.020 is willing thio exercise freedom of 01:08:40.020 --> 01:08:43.100 navigation , freedom of error as well 01:08:43.370 --> 01:08:45.510 and to help them build out their 01:08:45.510 --> 01:08:47.570 capacity , whether it's in something 01:08:47.580 --> 01:08:50.560 like health security because of co vid 01:08:50.570 --> 01:08:53.750 challenges all the way up to maritime 01:08:53.760 --> 01:08:56.390 domain awareness . Um , in the South 01:08:56.390 --> 01:08:58.501 China Sea , I think there's plenty of 01:08:58.501 --> 01:09:01.030 opportunity . All highlight the Pacific 01:09:01.030 --> 01:09:02.808 Deterrence Initiative that this 01:09:02.808 --> 01:09:04.808 committee and its House counterpart 01:09:04.808 --> 01:09:06.960 have put forward as a venue , an 01:09:06.960 --> 01:09:09.090 opportunity of mechanism for the 01:09:09.090 --> 01:09:11.460 Department of Defense . Thio put some 01:09:11.460 --> 01:09:13.930 good ideas forward to Congress to make 01:09:13.930 --> 01:09:17.000 sure we're fulfilling the direction 01:09:17.000 --> 01:09:19.220 that you have given the department in 01:09:19.220 --> 01:09:21.250 these areas . And if confirmed , I 01:09:21.250 --> 01:09:24.200 would look to be using my role helping 01:09:24.200 --> 01:09:26.650 to pull that budget connective iti to 01:09:26.650 --> 01:09:29.190 the strategy forward to make sure that 01:09:29.190 --> 01:09:31.190 we're filling that basket with some 01:09:31.190 --> 01:09:33.990 good initiatives . Thank you . 01:09:34.000 --> 01:09:37.400 Way . Also discuss Senator Duck Worth . 01:09:37.410 --> 01:09:39.790 Let me interrupt . Just a moment . 01:09:39.800 --> 01:09:42.490 Senator Reid is presiding . Thank you . 01:09:43.670 --> 01:09:46.070 Thank you . Um , Dr Hicks , we 01:09:46.070 --> 01:09:48.181 discussed some creative approaches to 01:09:48.181 --> 01:09:50.348 improving our military partnerships in 01:09:50.348 --> 01:09:52.890 Southeast Asia . Um , such as sending 01:09:52.890 --> 01:09:55.001 the Army Corps of Engineers to assist 01:09:55.001 --> 01:09:57.168 with flooding in Jakarta , Indonesia , 01:09:57.168 --> 01:09:59.390 or expanding our international military 01:09:59.390 --> 01:10:01.334 education programs so that foreign 01:10:01.334 --> 01:10:03.410 junior officers and senior enlisted 01:10:03.420 --> 01:10:05.642 could study at us civilian institutions 01:10:05.642 --> 01:10:07.910 with ROTC programs such as Northern 01:10:07.910 --> 01:10:10.021 Illinois University or the University 01:10:10.021 --> 01:10:12.960 of Georgia , or any number numerous 01:10:12.970 --> 01:10:15.081 places where there are wonderful ROTC 01:10:15.081 --> 01:10:17.230 programs . If confirmed , would you 01:10:17.230 --> 01:10:19.790 commit to exploring creative ideas such 01:10:19.790 --> 01:10:21.734 as these that could be implemented 01:10:21.734 --> 01:10:23.957 quickly and relatively cheaply to build 01:10:23.957 --> 01:10:26.123 stronger military ties ? A military to 01:10:26.123 --> 01:10:28.068 military ties with Southeast Asian 01:10:28.068 --> 01:10:30.410 nations in the near term ? Yes , 01:10:30.410 --> 01:10:32.577 Senator , I would commit to doing so . 01:10:32.860 --> 01:10:35.330 Thank you . I bet you can guess what my 01:10:35.330 --> 01:10:37.663 next topic is . A logistics , logistics , 01:10:37.663 --> 01:10:40.160 logistics . What is your assessment of 01:10:40.160 --> 01:10:42.382 the most urgent shortfalls that we must 01:10:42.382 --> 01:10:44.500 address at US Transportation Command 01:10:44.510 --> 01:10:46.177 and the rest of our logistics 01:10:46.177 --> 01:10:49.450 enterprise ? Senator , logistics really 01:10:49.450 --> 01:10:51.172 is the lifeblood . And I think 01:10:51.172 --> 01:10:52.840 contested logistics is a key 01:10:52.840 --> 01:10:55.180 operational challenge set for the U . S . 01:10:55.180 --> 01:10:58.070 Military . Um , today and going forward 01:10:58.260 --> 01:11:00.093 cybersecurity is probably at the 01:11:00.093 --> 01:11:02.230 forefront of that challenge set . And 01:11:02.230 --> 01:11:04.780 that's obviously both for the military 01:11:04.780 --> 01:11:06.720 assets , but also the significant 01:11:06.720 --> 01:11:10.210 civilian assets upon which we rely for 01:11:10.210 --> 01:11:13.280 our logistics . Um , I think behind 01:11:13.280 --> 01:11:16.090 that would be the survivability of our 01:11:16.090 --> 01:11:19.470 logistics chain andare fuel 01:11:19.470 --> 01:11:22.030 consumption and ensuring that we can 01:11:22.030 --> 01:11:25.020 have ah , light footprint with regard 01:11:25.020 --> 01:11:27.270 to logistics , maybe even leveraging 01:11:27.280 --> 01:11:31.020 capabilities . Um , that allow us Thio 01:11:31.030 --> 01:11:34.790 create capability in place . Thank you . 01:11:34.790 --> 01:11:37.040 And I have additional questions I would 01:11:37.040 --> 01:11:39.290 like to submit to you for the record 01:11:39.300 --> 01:11:41.620 that have to do with additional follow 01:11:41.620 --> 01:11:43.820 up on logistics and then also on 01:11:43.830 --> 01:11:45.997 diversity and inclusion within the d . 01:11:45.997 --> 01:11:48.810 O d . And Mr Chairman , I'd like to go 01:11:48.810 --> 01:11:50.532 ahead and submit those for the 01:11:50.532 --> 01:11:53.730 questions . For the record . Thank you . 01:11:53.810 --> 01:11:56.143 I'm out of time . Thank you . Thank you . 01:11:56.143 --> 01:11:58.500 Behalf of Chairman in off Senator 01:11:58.500 --> 01:12:00.333 Hawley , please . Thank you , Mr 01:12:00.333 --> 01:12:02.444 Chairman . Dr . Hicks . Thank you for 01:12:02.444 --> 01:12:04.500 being here . Congratulations on your 01:12:04.500 --> 01:12:04.340 nomination . Let me ask you about the 01:12:04.340 --> 01:12:06.507 National Defense Strategy Commission , 01:12:06.507 --> 01:12:08.396 of which you were a member . That 01:12:08.396 --> 01:12:10.507 commission wrote that I'm quoting now 01:12:10.507 --> 01:12:12.562 successfully competing in Europe and 01:12:12.562 --> 01:12:14.618 the end of Pacific region while also 01:12:14.618 --> 01:12:16.729 managing escalation Dynamics requires 01:12:16.729 --> 01:12:18.673 positioning substantial capability 01:12:18.673 --> 01:12:20.830 forward to deter and prevent fate 01:12:20.830 --> 01:12:23.560 accompli by Nigel Opportunistic 01:12:23.570 --> 01:12:25.292 adversary . Now , when I asked 01:12:25.292 --> 01:12:27.126 Secretary Austin about this , he 01:12:27.126 --> 01:12:29.070 responded that he agreed with that 01:12:29.070 --> 01:12:31.181 assessment . Let me just ask you , if 01:12:31.181 --> 01:12:32.848 you stand by the commission's 01:12:32.848 --> 01:12:34.903 assessment that the U . S . Military 01:12:34.903 --> 01:12:36.959 must position substantial capability 01:12:36.959 --> 01:12:39.014 forward , I'm still quoting to deter 01:12:39.014 --> 01:12:41.950 and prevent a fait accompli . Very good . 01:12:42.190 --> 01:12:44.412 Secretary Austin also wrote in response 01:12:44.412 --> 01:12:46.468 to me that a combat credible forward 01:12:46.468 --> 01:12:48.634 deterrent postures instrumental to the 01:12:48.634 --> 01:12:50.857 U . S . Military's ability to deter and 01:12:50.857 --> 01:12:53.480 if necessary , deny a fate a complete 01:12:53.490 --> 01:12:55.323 scenario . Do you agree with the 01:12:55.323 --> 01:12:57.379 secretaries emphasis on the need for 01:12:57.379 --> 01:12:59.546 deterrence by denial , Especially when 01:12:59.546 --> 01:13:01.323 it comes to a fate . A complete 01:13:01.323 --> 01:13:04.540 scenario ? Let me ask you about I'm 01:13:04.540 --> 01:13:06.596 glad to hear that also . Thank you . 01:13:06.596 --> 01:13:08.818 Let me ask you about something that the 01:13:08.818 --> 01:13:11.040 president State Department has recently 01:13:11.040 --> 01:13:13.151 said with regard to Taiwan . You were 01:13:13.151 --> 01:13:15.373 talking with Senator Scott a moment ago 01:13:15.373 --> 01:13:17.429 about Taiwan President Biden , State 01:13:17.429 --> 01:13:17.270 Department has recently described 01:13:17.270 --> 01:13:19.437 America's commitment to Taiwan is rock 01:13:19.437 --> 01:13:21.630 solid . That's their words , which is 01:13:21.630 --> 01:13:23.880 exactly as it should be . With that in 01:13:23.880 --> 01:13:26.290 mind , do you think that China is mawr 01:13:26.290 --> 01:13:28.830 or less likely to attempt to fate 01:13:28.830 --> 01:13:31.230 accompli against Taiwan if it knows 01:13:31.230 --> 01:13:33.452 that we would be able to defeat such an 01:13:33.452 --> 01:13:37.120 attempt less likely ? In that case , 01:13:37.130 --> 01:13:39.241 it wouldn't you agree that we want to 01:13:39.241 --> 01:13:41.460 maintain our ability to defeat a 01:13:41.460 --> 01:13:43.627 Chinese fate accompli against Taiwan , 01:13:43.627 --> 01:13:45.627 and that would help that would help 01:13:45.627 --> 01:13:47.738 strengthen our deterrence . Is that a 01:13:47.738 --> 01:13:49.682 fair assessment ? It is center . I 01:13:49.682 --> 01:13:51.738 would only add that Taiwan primarily 01:13:51.738 --> 01:13:53.571 also needs to be engaged in that 01:13:53.571 --> 01:13:55.682 defense . Absolutely . I think that's 01:13:55.682 --> 01:13:57.682 exactly right . Um , let me ask you 01:13:57.682 --> 01:13:59.793 about your experience . Previously in 01:13:59.793 --> 01:14:02.450 the Pentagon , President Obama tried to 01:14:02.450 --> 01:14:05.110 pivot to Asia famously when you were 01:14:05.110 --> 01:14:07.332 last at the Pentagon . But he and and D 01:14:07.332 --> 01:14:09.499 o . D , in particular ended up getting 01:14:09.499 --> 01:14:11.666 drawn back continually into the Middle 01:14:11.666 --> 01:14:13.888 East due to events there . Can you just 01:14:13.888 --> 01:14:15.832 give us your sense . What does the 01:14:15.832 --> 01:14:17.999 department need to do differently this 01:14:17.999 --> 01:14:20.166 time around to make sure that we avoid 01:14:20.166 --> 01:14:23.060 the same outcome ? Senator the 01:14:23.070 --> 01:14:24.990 rebalance to Asia Pivot to Asia 01:14:24.990 --> 01:14:28.700 approach did precede both Isis and the 01:14:28.710 --> 01:14:32.690 Russian annexation of Crimea . Um , and 01:14:32.690 --> 01:14:34.301 those put serious stresses , 01:14:34.301 --> 01:14:36.468 particularly in a period of the Budget 01:14:36.468 --> 01:14:38.579 Control Act . So I think it's about , 01:14:38.579 --> 01:14:40.801 frankly , a secretary , Austin has said 01:14:40.801 --> 01:14:43.180 matching resource is to strategy to 01:14:43.180 --> 01:14:45.124 policy to the will of the American 01:14:45.124 --> 01:14:47.430 people , and we need to make sure that 01:14:47.440 --> 01:14:50.790 we have our defense assets . And 01:14:50.800 --> 01:14:53.540 resource is focused on the areas where 01:14:53.540 --> 01:14:55.762 the American public expects the Defense 01:14:55.762 --> 01:14:58.280 Department to be very good . Let me 01:14:58.280 --> 01:15:00.447 just ask you further on this subject , 01:15:00.740 --> 01:15:02.962 President Obama's former acting special 01:15:02.962 --> 01:15:04.907 representative for Afghanistan and 01:15:04.907 --> 01:15:07.129 Pakistan recently wrote , quoting . Now 01:15:07.129 --> 01:15:09.240 for the long term , the United States 01:15:09.240 --> 01:15:11.462 will need a counterterrorism capability 01:15:11.462 --> 01:15:13.684 that does not depend on a permanent U . 01:15:13.684 --> 01:15:16.120 S military presence in Afghanistan . 01:15:16.130 --> 01:15:18.241 And she went on to say that the Biden 01:15:18.241 --> 01:15:20.352 administration should work swiftly to 01:15:20.352 --> 01:15:22.352 develop such options , including by 01:15:22.352 --> 01:15:24.019 ensuring US capacity to mount 01:15:24.019 --> 01:15:26.186 operations in Afghanistan from outside 01:15:26.186 --> 01:15:29.180 the country . Do you think the D . O D 01:15:29.180 --> 01:15:31.347 should be working with its interagency 01:15:31.347 --> 01:15:33.180 partners to evaluate and develop 01:15:33.180 --> 01:15:35.430 options along those lines . So , 01:15:35.430 --> 01:15:38.610 Senator , my view is that we have had 01:15:38.610 --> 01:15:41.630 20 years of honorable service by our 01:15:41.640 --> 01:15:43.790 military members in Afghanistan . 01:15:43.790 --> 01:15:46.160 Working alongside allies and partners , 01:15:46.540 --> 01:15:48.850 President Biden is ordered a holistic 01:15:48.860 --> 01:15:51.570 review of where we are in Afghanistan 01:15:51.570 --> 01:15:54.000 policy and , frankly , holistic review 01:15:54.000 --> 01:15:56.222 is the right approach . This isn't just 01:15:56.222 --> 01:15:58.111 about and strength numbers on the 01:15:58.111 --> 01:16:01.620 ground . This is about achieving the 01:16:01.630 --> 01:16:03.840 holistic approach related to counter 01:16:03.840 --> 01:16:06.062 terrorism and a few other areas that is 01:16:06.062 --> 01:16:08.340 important and what it takes to do that . 01:16:08.340 --> 01:16:10.673 So I'm very supportive of that approach , 01:16:10.673 --> 01:16:12.896 and if confirmed as deputy secretary of 01:16:12.896 --> 01:16:14.951 defense , I would work in support of 01:16:14.951 --> 01:16:16.896 trying to determine what the right 01:16:16.896 --> 01:16:19.062 answer to your question is very good . 01:16:19.062 --> 01:16:21.173 And would you also support having the 01:16:21.173 --> 01:16:23.007 department brief Congress on its 01:16:23.007 --> 01:16:25.118 findings as these reviews that you've 01:16:25.118 --> 01:16:27.062 talked about get underway and they 01:16:27.062 --> 01:16:29.284 conclude and reach some deliverables so 01:16:29.284 --> 01:16:31.173 that we hear can have an informed 01:16:31.173 --> 01:16:33.284 debate about the best path forward in 01:16:33.284 --> 01:16:35.451 Afghanistan ? Absolutely . Thank you . 01:16:35.451 --> 01:16:37.507 Finally , I'm almost at a time , but 01:16:37.507 --> 01:16:39.930 let me just ask you about our allies . 01:16:39.940 --> 01:16:43.050 We're spending about 4% of our GDP to 01:16:43.050 --> 01:16:45.161 defend ourselves . It's a big numbers 01:16:45.161 --> 01:16:47.383 you've referenced several times today . 01:16:47.383 --> 01:16:49.494 Shouldn't we insist that our European 01:16:49.494 --> 01:16:51.717 allies , especially wealthier ones like 01:16:51.717 --> 01:16:53.883 Germany's , spend at least the 2% that 01:16:53.883 --> 01:16:55.740 they agreed to back in 2014 ? 01:16:57.130 --> 01:16:59.340 Senator , I regret this is a slightly 01:16:59.340 --> 01:17:01.507 long , uh , answer from me , So let me 01:17:01.507 --> 01:17:03.540 try to do it more briefly than I 01:17:03.540 --> 01:17:05.651 probably would otherwise . I think we 01:17:05.651 --> 01:17:07.762 need to make sure that we're taking a 01:17:07.762 --> 01:17:09.873 strategic approach to what commitment 01:17:09.873 --> 01:17:11.929 means . I think we need to make sure 01:17:11.929 --> 01:17:14.080 that allies are is into the security 01:17:14.080 --> 01:17:16.810 relationship as we are . Sometimes it's 01:17:16.810 --> 01:17:19.060 through . Spending sometimes is through 01:17:19.060 --> 01:17:21.260 defense spending , and sometimes that 01:17:21.260 --> 01:17:23.830 commitment is expressed in other ways . 01:17:23.830 --> 01:17:25.774 And I think we should be strategic 01:17:25.774 --> 01:17:28.108 about how we consider those commitments . 01:17:28.108 --> 01:17:30.219 Can I Just , Mr Chairman , is my last 01:17:30.219 --> 01:17:32.330 question will stop just on that point 01:17:32.330 --> 01:17:34.497 about your your point about strategy , 01:17:34.497 --> 01:17:36.274 Dr Hicks , isn't it a matter of 01:17:36.274 --> 01:17:38.441 strategic importance to us , however , 01:17:38.441 --> 01:17:40.608 that our European allies do as much as 01:17:40.608 --> 01:17:42.830 they possibly can for their own defense 01:17:42.830 --> 01:17:44.997 in Europe ? Precisely because , as you 01:17:44.997 --> 01:17:46.997 said just a moment ago , the pacing 01:17:46.997 --> 01:17:49.108 threat for us is in and opaque . Um , 01:17:49.108 --> 01:17:51.650 we face a challenge there from the 01:17:51.650 --> 01:17:53.872 Chinese government and the and a rising 01:17:53.872 --> 01:17:56.039 China says that we really haven't seen 01:17:56.039 --> 01:17:58.150 a pure competitive the likes of which 01:17:58.150 --> 01:18:00.206 we haven't seen in our lifetimes . I 01:18:00.206 --> 01:18:02.317 mean , isn't it a matter of strategic 01:18:02.317 --> 01:18:04.539 importance to urge our allies to do all 01:18:04.539 --> 01:18:06.706 that they can in partnership with us ? 01:18:06.706 --> 01:18:08.928 But in their own defense , I do believe 01:18:08.928 --> 01:18:08.540 that . I think that's true of every 01:18:08.540 --> 01:18:10.818 ally . Thank you very much . Thank you , 01:18:10.818 --> 01:18:13.300 Mr Chairman . Thank you , Senator . And 01:18:13.310 --> 01:18:15.254 Dr Hicks . Thank you for your very 01:18:15.254 --> 01:18:18.530 impressive testimony . And , uh , I 01:18:18.530 --> 01:18:20.697 don't think I speak for myself , but I 01:18:20.697 --> 01:18:22.919 look forward to working with you . Uh , 01:18:22.919 --> 01:18:26.800 there are no further witnesses or our 01:18:26.810 --> 01:18:29.400 colleagues . The hearings adjourned . 01:18:29.410 --> 01:18:31.410 Thank you , Doc takes . Thank you , 01:18:31.410 --> 01:18:31.250 Senator .