WEBVTT

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with the House Foreign Affairs

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subcommittee on Asia , the Pacific and

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Non Proliferation and the House Armed

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Services subcommittee on Intelligence

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and Emerging Threats and capabilities

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will come to order without objection .

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The chair is authorized to declare a

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recess of the committee at any point ,

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and all members will have five days to

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submit statements , extraneous

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materials and questions for the record

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subject to the length limitation in the

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rules . To insert something into the

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record , please have your staff email

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either . Subcommittee clerk as a

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reminder to members , please keep your

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video function on at all times , even

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when you're not recognized by the chair .

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Members are responsible for meeting and

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UN meeting themselves . And please

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remember to mute yourself after you

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finished speaking consistent with H rez

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965 and the accompanying regulations .

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Staff will only members and witnesses

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as appropriate when they are not under

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recognition . Thio eliminate background

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noise . See , we have a quorum and will

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now recognize myself for opening

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remarks . I will then be followed by

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the acting ranking member , Mr Perry Um ,

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Chairman Langevin and then ranking

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member Stefanik Um , I will then

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recognized members in order of

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seniority , alternating between

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Democrats and Republicans and foreign

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affairs and armed services members .

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You know , I before we get started ,

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before I do my opening statement , I

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think it would be remiss for us , not .

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Thio mentioned the president and the

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first lady . And , you know , you know

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that they're in our thoughts and

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prayers and , you know , hope for a

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speedy recovery and also the tens of

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thousands of Americans that test

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positive every day for this virus . You

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know , there there are thoughts and ,

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you know , does underscore that this is

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a virus that's a bio threat that

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doesn't know for Democrat or Republican .

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Doesn't know what God we worship , what

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our country of origin is . It's a virus .

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And it does underscore , you know , the

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the importance of this topic that we're

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talking about today . But it does

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underscore that this is a naturally

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occurring , um , events . But what bad

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actors may see as they see a threat

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like this that really has brought the

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entire world to its knees and certainly

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has wreaked economic havoc both here

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domestically but internationally . I

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want to thank the witnesses for being

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here today and you know , both having

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the Department of Defense and the State

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Department again underscores the

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importance of this in my focus as

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subcommittee chairman under the guise

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of nonproliferation . We spend a lot of

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time talking about nuclear threats .

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But what we're seeing right now is the

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rial vulnerability toe biologic threats .

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And just to put that into context , you

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know , we've not had an aircraft

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carrier brought to its knees by a

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kinetic force , the missile or anything

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like that . But we just saw in this

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past year an aircraft carrier , um ,

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brought to port because of the virus .

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And that really does underscore what I

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worry about . Andi . When I think about

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this , I think about it in a you know ,

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a couple of different ways . It's very

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difficult to obtain nuclear

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capabilities in nuclear technology .

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What way we dedicate hundreds of ,

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you know , personnel and international

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organizations like the I E . A . And

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others toe reduce that nuclear threat .

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That's totally appropriate . You know ,

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we wanna make sure nuclear technology

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and weaponry doesn't end up in the

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hands of bad actors . But if I put my

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doctor , scientists had on the

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availability of technologies , toe all

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ultra viruses and do genetic editing ,

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the know how and the capabilities are

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rapidly increasing . And that is

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something that keeps me awake at night

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and again . We know they're bad actors

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out there , you know , certainly . Post

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9 11 . You know , many of us prepared ,

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you know , we saw anthrax . We saw ,

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you know , other threats . We worried

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about smallpox and and so forth . And

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that is something that I think in a

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bipartisan way . Um , you know ,

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Congress , working with the

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administration , should really think

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about you know , what are the things

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that way have to do Thio to move ahead .

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I look forward to the witness testimony

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and , you know , there's several areas

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that I think about and you know , I'm

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gonna be curious about from the

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witnesses , you know , as we defeat

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Cove in 19 and spend the billions of

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dollars and build the infrastructure to

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defeat this virus . I also think we

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should strategically be thinking about

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how we use those . Resource is also

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prepare for bio surveillance toe . Be

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ready for the next , whether it's a

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naturally occurring virus or biologic

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threat , but also think about how we

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have those dual use capabilities as we

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build that infrastructure . Thio do bio

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surveillance for man made threats . Um ,

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I also as we move forward , Yeah , we

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don't . We've got the biological ,

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the BWC . Um but I think

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we need stronger multilateral

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organizations with like minded allies

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that we can work with and again and be

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curious how d o . D and state or

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thinking about creating those

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multilateral institutions . And then

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lastly , you know , when I think about

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you know , the ethics of gene editing

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and where that's going in the

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technology , we really haven't created

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the standards and norms that say , you

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know , this is appropriate for

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advancing of science , but this really

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is a little bit dangerous , and you

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probably ought not to be playing around

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with genes in this particular way and

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and creating those standards and norms

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and what that would look like . And

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again , I think that's an appropriate

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place where you know , the scientific

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community . Congress , again working

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with the administration , ought to put

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those standards in place not just for

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the United States but for the

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international community . So , you know ,

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again , you know , our thoughts and

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prayers were with the president and

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first lady and those thousands of

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Americans , and I'd be remiss if I

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didn't just put my doctor had on for a

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second As we enter the fallen winter .

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Let's do what we can to keep everyone

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safe . Let's wear face coverings .

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Let's need to practice physical

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distancing , continue to wash our hands

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and practice good hygiene . Let's avoid

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large indoor gatherings that we have

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seen really do act of super spreading

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events . And the most important thing

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that we can do right now is we enter

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the fall is everyone go out there and

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get your flu shot . Please get your flu

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shot . So with that , let me recognize

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the ranking member of Mr Perry for five

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minutes of opening statements .

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Thank you , Chairman Baron , and thank

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you to our distinguished panel for

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offering your council today . The

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coronavirus pandemic has highlighted

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the potential for increased bio bio

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security threats and what can happen

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when irresponsible actors disregard

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international agreements for the sake

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of self prevention . Strong

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international by security regime Onley

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works when its constituent members

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agree to make it work . We need to

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assess the shortcomings of US

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multilateral engagements and determine

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where improvements need to be made .

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The 2000 and five International health

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regulations went into force in 2000 and

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seven and called on all nations to be

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compliant by 2000 and 12 . However , by

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2000 and 12 only about 20% of all

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countries were compliant . And even

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today , most countries have still not

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complied with the 2005 regulations .

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This administration has taken a

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significant amount of criticism for

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questioning US engagement in

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institutions like the World Health

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Organization . Let me be clear about

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this . The World Health Organization's

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complicity and spreading the

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coronavirus should not be rewarded with

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United States indifference to its

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failures . The W H O strong affiliation

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with the global health security agenda

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also raises significant questions about

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GH essays . Long term efficacy .

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There is an obvious issue of a lack of

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enforcement in the international

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community . Different levels of

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investment and biosecurity lends itself

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to a permanent condition of moral

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hazard where select communities like

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the United States or compensating for

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the lack of investment from other

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states . Despite our best efforts to

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stymie the spread of bio threat ,

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there's only so much we can do alone .

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Key programs like the State

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Department's Biosecurity Engagement

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program cannot use funds in countries

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like China , Cuba , Iran , North Korea ,

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Sudan , or Syria . Despite the fact

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that several of these countries have

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experimented with biological weapons

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and are likely candidates for future

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offenses , countries like North Korea

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have a clearly offensive biological

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weapons weapons program with no end in

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sight . How do we confront the fact

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that we have an unreliable ,

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international biolab biological weapons

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control regime , most of arm or

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importantly , in measuring success

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against the spread of bio threats ?

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What exactly does success look like

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when China dominates several key

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institutions ? As it stands , China has

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provided a gift to non state actors

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that wish us harm . They have shown us

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and the world the impact of the

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potential bioweapon can have on the

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American economy as well as our society .

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Threats to our way of life have

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multiplied exponentially as a result of

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the coronavirus , and this time the

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hearing will be confronting that

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uncomfortable truth . I am also

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Grateful Toe have our witnesses before

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us today as they speak Maura about

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synthetic biology and gene manipulation .

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We need to find out more about the

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national security implications that

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synthetic biology can pose to the

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United States , especially in light of

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the fact that several countries air

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working with extremely hazardous

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pathogens and suit correction , subpar

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laboratory settings . Well , that being

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said , I do also offer my prayers and

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best wishes to the first family to hope

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Hicks . And to anybody that's been

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affected by the virus , whether they've

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contract id it or whether it has

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occurred in their family members ,

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loved ones or community , we're all

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dealing with it one way or the other .

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I shortly thank the chairman for the

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time , and I yield the balance . Thank

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you , Mr Perry . Um , let me now

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recognize the chairman of the

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intelligence and Emerging threats and

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Capabilities Subcommittee of the Armed

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Services Committee , Chairman Langevin .

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Thank you , Kevin . Barry , Uh , and I

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want to begin by also

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acknowledging and , uh , saying

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that the president and the first lady

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and the first family are in my thoughts

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and prayers . I know they're all in our

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thoughts and prayers right now , and

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the people around the President's

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administration who may also be

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experienced effects of the virus . Uh ,

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we prayed that they all have a quick

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and a full recovery . Um , Mr Chairman ,

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I want to thank my colleagues , uh ,

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the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee

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on the Asia the Pacific and non

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proliferation , and particularly you ,

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Chairman Barrow and ranking member Yoho .

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And I know Mr Perry is standing in for

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the ranking member right now . I want

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to thank you all for hosting this

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things time we're joined . Hearing on

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biosecurity . I recognize , uh ,

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ranking member Stefanik as well as my

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colleagues on , uh , subcommittee

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intelligence , emerging threats and

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capabilities . Uh , this is a topic

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which , as we have seen of late , is

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vital to our nation's security . And

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I'm very pleased that we're holding

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this very important joint hearing . Um ,

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emerging biological techniques such as

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gene sequencing , gene editing and

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synthetic biology are rapidly changing .

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The scope and scale of biological

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threats on could lead to an increase in

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biological weapons . Adding to the

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challenge , biological threats are

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easier to create than other weapons of

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mass destruction used in concert cyber

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weapons and biological weapons . Enable

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a rogue act or to inflict major damage

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on a military power . Just last month ,

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the Republic of George's Health

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Ministry suffered a cyber attack from

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abroad , the database that stores

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medical documents and national Kobe 19

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pandemic uh , management information .

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But we know Russian hackers . I've

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targeted organizations involved in

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covert 19 research and vaccine

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development , including those in the US ,

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the UK on Canada . Um ,

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okay , um so these attacks and the

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current global pandemic underscored the

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import of collective scientific

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research , preparedness and security

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across the inter agency and with our

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allies and for national and economic

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security . In a time when the United

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States is struggling to respond to the

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spread of a novel , highly infectious

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pathogen , we must ensure the inter

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agency is working together to respond

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to the current pandemic on advanced the

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collective effort to strengthen

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biological security across the range of

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threats . The Defense Threat Reduction

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Agency , through its execution of the

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Department of Defense , is Cooperative

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threat Reduction , Biological Threat

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Reduction Program and its technical

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reach Back analysis . So has been

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receiving foreign partner request for

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preparedness and detection , uh ,

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including providing biosafety ,

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biosecurity and bio surveillance ,

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support in aid , Thio , aid detection ,

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diagnosis reporting and modeling

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related to the Kobe 19 outbreak . Their

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event Many good examples of the B t R P

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trained local professionals in

14:09.020 --> 14:12.030
countries like Guinea . Liberia gave

14:12.030 --> 14:15.280
Bird , Jordan and Thailand the

14:15.280 --> 14:17.502
diagnosed and confirmed the first cases

14:17.502 --> 14:20.710
of Kobe 19 in their countries . Yet in

14:20.710 --> 14:22.432
the face of known and emerging

14:22.432 --> 14:25.150
biological threats and the impact they

14:25.150 --> 14:27.372
could have on our national security and

14:27.372 --> 14:30.090
economy and as a pandemic that could

14:30.100 --> 14:32.420
arguably present single biggest threat

14:32.420 --> 14:34.880
to our country was starting to spread

14:34.890 --> 14:37.250
across the globe . The president's

14:37.250 --> 14:39.250
budget request was delivered to the

14:39.250 --> 14:43.230
Hill in February with a 36% cut to

14:43.230 --> 14:45.063
the cooperative threat reduction

14:45.063 --> 14:47.230
programs . Funding from last year's an

14:47.230 --> 14:49.670
active level at a time when the United

14:49.670 --> 14:53.110
States is struggling to respond to

14:53.110 --> 14:55.500
the spread of our highly infectious new

14:55.500 --> 14:57.840
virus , were alarmed by the department

14:57.840 --> 14:59.840
significant reduction in the budget

14:59.840 --> 15:02.780
request for a mission of

15:02.780 --> 15:05.970
detecting and confronting biological

15:05.970 --> 15:08.050
threats to the United States .

15:08.440 --> 15:10.700
Thankfully , the houses acted , and our

15:10.700 --> 15:12.730
fiscal year 2021 National Defense

15:12.730 --> 15:16.580
Authorization Act H R 63 95 added back

15:16.590 --> 15:20.170
$135 million to the CTR program .

15:20.740 --> 15:22.870
$89 million of that was additional

15:22.870 --> 15:25.050
funding for the cooperative biological

15:25.050 --> 15:27.320
engagement program . Additionally , the

15:27.320 --> 15:29.431
Department of Defense is chemical and

15:29.431 --> 15:32.400
biological defense Program was primed

15:32.400 --> 15:34.400
to be a key partner in the fight

15:34.400 --> 15:36.690
against Cove . In 19 it's medical

15:36.690 --> 15:40.670
program funds and managers efforts to

15:40.670 --> 15:42.559
develop medical countermeasures ,

15:42.559 --> 15:45.450
vaccines Therapeutics and pre

15:45.450 --> 15:48.160
treatments is physical program funds

15:48.170 --> 15:50.350
and manages efforts to develop

15:50.360 --> 15:52.693
surveillance and detection technologies ,

15:52.693 --> 15:54.990
diagnostics , personal protective

15:54.990 --> 15:56.720
equipment and deacon can

15:56.730 --> 15:59.450
decontamination systems to prepare

15:59.450 --> 16:02.150
against potential unknown threats . C ,

16:02.150 --> 16:05.220
b D p build expertise and capabilities

16:05.230 --> 16:07.810
to address novel pathogens , making it

16:07.810 --> 16:10.140
an ideal program to deal with the

16:10.140 --> 16:13.180
emergence of novel coronavirus . Were

16:13.190 --> 16:15.301
interesting hearing today whether the

16:15.301 --> 16:17.960
program was quickly and efficiently

16:18.440 --> 16:20.662
directed to participate in the national

16:20.662 --> 16:22.850
response to the Cove in 19 Pandemic .

16:23.540 --> 16:25.300
So , uh , these air obviously

16:25.300 --> 16:28.130
challenging times and we need to double

16:28.130 --> 16:30.450
down on these of these programs and we

16:30.450 --> 16:32.561
need to make sure that we are in fact

16:32.561 --> 16:35.010
prepared for the next biological or

16:35.010 --> 16:38.260
chemical event that could affect the

16:38.270 --> 16:40.437
country and make sure that we have all

16:40.437 --> 16:42.437
the tools and resources in place to

16:42.437 --> 16:44.650
respond effectively keep a country and

16:44.840 --> 16:48.610
Onda indeed grabs the world safe . We

16:48.610 --> 16:50.777
look forward to hearing more about the

16:50.777 --> 16:52.990
many efforts of both departments today

16:53.000 --> 16:56.400
what we can do to help ensure your

16:56.400 --> 16:58.567
organizations have the authorities and

16:58.567 --> 17:00.678
resource is needed to prepare for the

17:00.678 --> 17:02.511
emerging threats about today and

17:02.511 --> 17:04.622
tomorrow , and how we can ensure that

17:04.622 --> 17:06.740
your departments already able to act

17:06.740 --> 17:09.260
swiftly and decides decides away the

17:09.260 --> 17:11.560
next crisis . Eso I joined the host ,

17:11.570 --> 17:14.490
uh , in thanking all of you , uh ,

17:14.500 --> 17:17.360
witnesses for joining us today . And I

17:17.360 --> 17:19.304
know now you're back to checking ,

17:19.304 --> 17:22.080
Baron . Thank you , Chairman Langevin .

17:22.090 --> 17:24.340
Let me now recognize the ranking member

17:24.340 --> 17:26.173
of the intelligence and emerging

17:26.173 --> 17:28.396
threats and capabilities said Committee

17:28.396 --> 17:30.618
of the Armed Services Committee Ranking

17:30.618 --> 17:32.840
member Stefanick . Thank you , Chairman

17:32.840 --> 17:34.507
Bera . I also want to echo my

17:34.507 --> 17:36.562
colleagues and send on behalf of New

17:36.562 --> 17:38.729
York's 21st Congressional District Our

17:38.729 --> 17:40.951
thoughts and our prayers with the first

17:40.951 --> 17:40.700
family , the White House staff and the

17:40.710 --> 17:42.821
all the American people who have been

17:42.821 --> 17:45.043
impacted by the covert virus . I'd like

17:45.043 --> 17:47.043
to express my appreciation to you ,

17:47.043 --> 17:49.321
Chairman Beira and ranking member Yoho ,

17:49.321 --> 17:51.321
as well as Chairman Langevin and my

17:51.321 --> 17:53.432
colleague Mr Perry , for hosting this

17:53.432 --> 17:55.543
hearing and thank you for the members

17:55.543 --> 17:57.599
of the two subcommittees . Thanks to

17:57.599 --> 17:59.654
the witnesses from the Department of

17:59.654 --> 18:01.932
Defense and State for being here today ,

18:01.932 --> 18:03.877
the issue of biosecurity is one of

18:03.877 --> 18:05.932
national importance , as I've stated

18:05.932 --> 18:07.988
previously . While the Department of

18:07.988 --> 18:10.210
Defense faces urgent challenges daily ,

18:10.210 --> 18:12.266
we can never afford to lose sight of

18:12.266 --> 18:14.266
the critically important mission of

18:14.266 --> 18:16.432
countering weapons of mass destruction

18:16.432 --> 18:18.266
and , in particular , biological

18:18.266 --> 18:20.377
threats . The unpredictable nature of

18:20.377 --> 18:22.599
these threats requires that we continue

18:22.599 --> 18:24.710
to adapt our approach and iterate our

18:24.710 --> 18:26.599
response . We must learn from the

18:26.599 --> 18:28.766
current crisis and adjust our strategy

18:28.766 --> 18:30.766
to more effectively and proactively

18:30.766 --> 18:32.932
detect and respond to the next event .

18:33.040 --> 18:34.960
This will surely not be the last

18:34.960 --> 18:37.120
biological crisis this nation in this

18:37.120 --> 18:39.420
world faces . I'm particularly

18:39.420 --> 18:41.476
interested in how your organizations

18:41.476 --> 18:43.800
and the federal government writ large

18:43.800 --> 18:46.200
Kenmore effectively use new data sets

18:46.200 --> 18:48.256
and artificial intelligence to truly

18:48.256 --> 18:50.533
modernize our bio surveillance efforts .

18:50.533 --> 18:52.830
We must mature our capacity to

18:52.830 --> 18:55.680
anticipate and monitor when and where a

18:55.680 --> 18:58.400
biological event may occur and model

18:58.400 --> 19:00.410
how a pathogen either naturally

19:00.410 --> 19:02.430
occurring or man made is likely to

19:02.430 --> 19:04.730
spread . This obviously must be a

19:04.730 --> 19:06.786
global effort , and the partnerships

19:06.786 --> 19:08.730
that the Department of Defense and

19:08.730 --> 19:10.952
Department of State have developed will

19:10.952 --> 19:13.008
be critical early warning beacons to

19:13.008 --> 19:15.230
inform our collective domestic response

19:15.230 --> 19:17.286
Programs like the Cooperative threat

19:17.286 --> 19:19.008
reduction and specifically the

19:19.008 --> 19:21.230
Biological Threat Reduction Program are

19:21.230 --> 19:23.230
essential to maintaining our global

19:23.230 --> 19:25.119
footprint and the building of the

19:25.119 --> 19:27.286
relationships that protect our forward

19:27.286 --> 19:29.397
deployed service members and national

19:29.397 --> 19:31.508
interests . The current covert crisis

19:31.508 --> 19:33.397
has served as an affirmation that

19:33.397 --> 19:35.508
biological threats require a whole of

19:35.508 --> 19:37.674
government response , not just the two

19:37.674 --> 19:39.730
departments represented here today ,

19:39.730 --> 19:41.619
but inclusive of health and human

19:41.619 --> 19:43.674
services , homeland security and our

19:43.674 --> 19:45.780
state and local officials . The

19:45.780 --> 19:47.780
strength of the partnership between

19:47.780 --> 19:49.891
your organizations and the quality of

19:49.891 --> 19:51.947
these relationships you develop with

19:51.947 --> 19:53.836
our foreign partners and domestic

19:53.836 --> 19:55.336
agencies will underpin the

19:55.336 --> 19:57.558
effectiveness of our future biosecurity

19:57.558 --> 19:59.391
efforts . Thank you again to our

19:59.391 --> 20:01.391
witnesses , and I yield back to the

20:01.391 --> 20:03.224
chair . Thank you ranking member

20:03.224 --> 20:05.860
Stefanik on before I introduce the

20:05.870 --> 20:08.330
witnesses . Um , I ask unanimous

20:08.340 --> 20:10.562
consent that non committee members , if

20:10.562 --> 20:12.507
any , be allowed to participate in

20:12.507 --> 20:14.729
today's hearing . After all , committee

20:14.729 --> 20:16.896
members have had an opportunity to ask

20:16.896 --> 20:19.062
questions . Is there objection without

20:19.062 --> 20:21.229
objection ? Non committee members will

20:21.229 --> 20:23.451
be recognized at the appropriate time .

20:23.451 --> 20:25.562
Let me . Now , go ahead and introduce

20:25.562 --> 20:28.310
our witnesses First is deputy assistant

20:28.310 --> 20:30.310
secretary of defense for countering

20:30.310 --> 20:32.477
weapons of mass destruction . Mr David

20:32.477 --> 20:35.220
Lassiter . Mr Lassiter oversees all see

20:35.220 --> 20:38.420
WMD policy issues at the department .

20:38.610 --> 20:40.221
This includes preventing the

20:40.221 --> 20:42.520
proliferation of WMD related materials ,

20:42.610 --> 20:44.666
the Defense Department's Cooperative

20:44.666 --> 20:46.888
Threat Reduction Program and chemical ,

20:46.888 --> 20:48.999
biological , radiological and nuclear

20:48.999 --> 20:51.166
defense . Next , we will hear from the

20:51.166 --> 20:53.221
Director of Defense Threat Reduction

20:53.221 --> 20:55.400
Agency , Mr Val Oxford , Mr Oxford

20:55.400 --> 20:58.140
Leeds D Tiaras Mission . To safeguard

20:58.450 --> 21:00.561
the U . S and its allies from weapons

21:00.561 --> 21:02.450
of mass destruction , De Chiara

21:02.450 --> 21:04.450
spearheads the Defense Department's

21:04.450 --> 21:06.450
biological threat reduction program

21:06.840 --> 21:08.840
from the State Department . We will

21:08.840 --> 21:10.673
first hear from acting assistant

21:10.673 --> 21:12.784
secretary in the Bureau of Oceans and

21:12.784 --> 21:14.562
International Environmental and

21:14.562 --> 21:16.784
Scientific Affairs , Mr Jonathan more .

21:16.784 --> 21:18.784
And finally , we will hear from the

21:18.784 --> 21:20.507
deputy assistant secretary for

21:20.507 --> 21:22.729
nonproliferation programs at the Bureau

21:22.729 --> 21:24.396
of International Security and

21:24.396 --> 21:26.850
Nonproliferation , Mr Philip dollars .

21:27.040 --> 21:29.207
He currently oversees a range of State

21:29.207 --> 21:31.373
Department nonproliferation programs ,

21:31.373 --> 21:33.540
including cooperative threat reduction

21:33.540 --> 21:35.540
and export control programs , which

21:35.540 --> 21:37.373
work to reduce non proliferation

21:37.373 --> 21:39.096
threats worldwide . I will now

21:39.096 --> 21:41.318
recognize each witness for five minutes

21:41.318 --> 21:43.429
and without objection , your prepared

21:43.429 --> 21:45.651
written statements will be made part of

21:45.651 --> 21:45.650
the record . I will first call on Mr

21:45.650 --> 21:49.490
Lassiter for his test surrounding Good

21:49.490 --> 21:51.546
Morning Chairman Langevin , Embera ,

21:51.640 --> 21:53.529
ranking members Stefanik , acting

21:53.529 --> 21:55.820
ranking member Perry and all committee

21:55.820 --> 21:57.931
members . I , too , want to extend my

21:57.931 --> 22:00.153
thoughts and prayers to the president .

22:00.153 --> 22:01.820
First lady . Mr Lasser's your

22:01.820 --> 22:04.070
microphone on . Yes , sir . Okay , it's

22:04.070 --> 22:07.180
on . Hear me better now . First one , I

22:07.190 --> 22:09.470
also extend my thoughts and prayers to

22:09.470 --> 22:11.414
the president , first lady and all

22:11.414 --> 22:13.680
those impacted by Kobe 19 . Thank you

22:13.680 --> 22:15.736
for the opportunity , opportunity to

22:15.736 --> 22:17.902
present on behalf of the Department of

22:17.902 --> 22:19.791
Defense and highlight some of the

22:19.791 --> 22:21.847
critical work we're doing to counter

22:21.847 --> 22:23.847
biological threats . I also want to

22:23.847 --> 22:26.013
acknowledge deity sincere appreciation

22:26.013 --> 22:28.236
for the continued support that Congress

22:28.236 --> 22:30.291
lens our threat reduction mission as

22:30.291 --> 22:32.180
the deputy assistant secretary of

22:32.180 --> 22:34.347
defense for countering weapons of mass

22:34.347 --> 22:36.458
destruction , I have the privilege to

22:36.458 --> 22:38.680
work alongside My colleagues here today

22:38.680 --> 22:40.624
are strong partnership enables the

22:40.624 --> 22:42.569
broad U . S . Government effort to

22:42.569 --> 22:44.291
reduce WMD threats , including

22:44.291 --> 22:46.458
biological threats worldwide . D . O .

22:46.458 --> 22:48.624
D s bio threat mission aligns with the

22:48.624 --> 22:50.847
objectives in the national security and

22:50.847 --> 22:53.069
defense strategies as well as Secretary

22:53.069 --> 22:55.291
s Spurs priorities , namely to increase

22:55.291 --> 22:57.458
the legality of the U . S . Military ,

22:57.458 --> 22:59.790
build alliances and improve D . O . D s

22:59.790 --> 23:02.420
efficiency . We also draw guidance from

23:02.420 --> 23:04.198
strategies such as the National

23:04.198 --> 23:06.210
Biodefense Strategy and the global

23:06.210 --> 23:08.860
health security strategy , D . O . D s

23:08.860 --> 23:10.804
focus on protecting the health and

23:10.804 --> 23:12.971
readiness of U . S forces , countering

23:12.971 --> 23:15.138
the destabilizing effects of outbreaks

23:15.138 --> 23:17.416
on US interest and ensuring that D . O .

23:17.416 --> 23:19.527
D remains focused on priority defense

23:19.527 --> 23:21.500
objectives to meet emergency needs

23:21.940 --> 23:23.750
during an outbreak makes us a

23:23.750 --> 23:25.639
complimentary tool in the U . S .

23:25.639 --> 23:28.260
Threat reduction arsenal . We work

23:28.270 --> 23:30.930
daily to ensure diode is positioned to

23:30.930 --> 23:33.280
address the full range of WMD threats

23:33.740 --> 23:35.750
to include the constantly changing

23:35.830 --> 23:38.040
biological threat landscape . This

23:38.040 --> 23:40.040
shifting dynamic includes naturally

23:40.040 --> 23:42.320
occurring outbreaks and accidental or

23:42.320 --> 23:44.890
deliberate release of biological agents ,

23:45.540 --> 23:47.596
threats posed by state and non state

23:47.596 --> 23:50.060
actors , international and domestic

23:50.060 --> 23:52.130
incidents and concerns with existing

23:52.130 --> 23:54.370
and emerging technologies . Kobe

23:54.370 --> 23:55.981
Nineteens , global reach and

23:55.981 --> 23:58.190
destabilizing influence has further

23:58.190 --> 23:59.912
altered the threat landscape ,

23:59.912 --> 24:02.530
potentially inspiring nefarious actors .

24:02.530 --> 24:04.641
To replicate COVITZ impacts through a

24:04.641 --> 24:06.808
deliberate use of a biological agent ,

24:07.440 --> 24:09.496
my team developed strategic guidance

24:09.496 --> 24:11.990
for see WMD activities spanning the

24:11.990 --> 24:14.840
prevent , detect and respond continuum

24:14.850 --> 24:17.183
to mitigate the impacts of such threats ,

24:17.183 --> 24:19.970
regardless of origin , we work closely

24:19.970 --> 24:22.440
with other D O D stakeholders and

24:22.440 --> 24:24.440
coordinate their groups such as our

24:24.440 --> 24:26.662
Unity of Effort Council and the Cove in

24:26.662 --> 24:29.540
19 Task Force . D . O . D also works

24:29.540 --> 24:31.820
with key interagency and international

24:31.820 --> 24:34.460
partners . As we develop priorities for

24:34.460 --> 24:36.980
countering biological threats , these

24:36.980 --> 24:39.202
partnerships allow us toe leverage each

24:39.202 --> 24:41.202
other's capabilities and lessen the

24:41.202 --> 24:44.030
security burden on D o . D . Pooling

24:44.030 --> 24:46.197
resource is and working towards common

24:46.197 --> 24:48.197
objectives is vital to ensuring the

24:48.197 --> 24:50.308
greatest threat reduction impacts are

24:50.308 --> 24:53.280
achieved . Since 2004 C . T . R's

24:53.280 --> 24:55.610
Biological Threat Reduction Program has

24:55.610 --> 24:57.832
provided equipment and training to over

24:57.832 --> 25:00.160
30 countries to improve their ability

25:00.170 --> 25:02.430
to detect , diagnosis and report

25:02.440 --> 25:04.870
biological incidents . In the current

25:04.870 --> 25:06.814
environment , we know that partner

25:06.814 --> 25:09.140
nations have leverage previously

25:09.180 --> 25:12.370
provided CTR capabilities to bolster

25:12.370 --> 25:14.670
their abilities to detect and diagnose

25:14.670 --> 25:16.990
Kobe . 19 to close . I wanna thank the

25:16.990 --> 25:18.879
subcommittee's again , and I look

25:18.879 --> 25:21.550
forward to your questions . Thank you ,

25:21.550 --> 25:24.280
Mr Lester . I'll now recognize Mr

25:24.280 --> 25:26.224
Oxford for his opening statement .

25:27.140 --> 25:29.251
Chairman Lederman , chairman , bearer

25:29.251 --> 25:31.418
ranking member Stefanik ranking member

25:31.418 --> 25:33.418
Yo Ho and Mr Perry standing in this

25:33.418 --> 25:35.529
morning and the distinguished members

25:35.529 --> 25:35.180
of the subcommittee is Thank you for

25:35.180 --> 25:37.460
your continued support to D T . R A .

25:38.040 --> 25:40.151
I'm proud to appear to you today with

25:40.151 --> 25:42.318
my colleagues from both D . O . D . As

25:42.318 --> 25:44.540
well as the State Department update you

25:44.540 --> 25:46.596
on our collective efforts to protect

25:46.596 --> 25:48.540
the U . S . National interest in a

25:48.540 --> 25:50.596
rapidly evolving globalized threat .

25:50.596 --> 25:52.651
Environment is an honor to represent

25:52.651 --> 25:54.818
the Detroit workforce whose commitment

25:54.818 --> 25:57.040
to our mission and strong relationships

25:57.040 --> 25:59.207
with our partners here today makes our

25:59.207 --> 26:01.207
organizations successful . Today we

26:01.207 --> 26:03.318
find ourselves in unprecedented times

26:03.318 --> 26:05.484
as we respond to the global pandemic .

26:05.484 --> 26:07.373
As we reflect on the loss of over

26:07.373 --> 26:09.540
200,000 of our fellow citizens , we

26:09.540 --> 26:11.484
must think about the future threat

26:11.484 --> 26:13.429
landscape where gene editing , DNA

26:13.429 --> 26:15.630
sequencing and synthetic biology offer

26:15.630 --> 26:17.686
our adversaries the opportunities to

26:17.686 --> 26:19.630
capitalize on the observed lessons

26:19.630 --> 26:21.960
learned from our response . And they

26:21.960 --> 26:24.182
potentially could launch future attacks

26:24.182 --> 26:26.700
with little warning or attribution As

26:26.700 --> 26:28.700
we capture our lessons learned from

26:28.700 --> 26:30.811
Kobe 19 event , we have to accept the

26:30.811 --> 26:32.978
fact that others will also be learning

26:32.978 --> 26:34.756
and that the very nature of the

26:34.756 --> 26:36.978
biological threat landscape has changed

26:36.978 --> 26:39.033
forever . One of the lessons we have

26:39.033 --> 26:41.256
learned over the course of the last six

26:41.256 --> 26:43.256
months is that partner nations have

26:43.256 --> 26:45.367
benefited greatly by the training and

26:45.367 --> 26:47.589
equipping they received through the D .

26:47.589 --> 26:49.756
O . D . C T R program and specifically

26:49.756 --> 26:52.300
be TRP be . TRP facilitates the

26:52.300 --> 26:54.300
detection and reporting of diseases

26:54.300 --> 26:56.522
caused by dangerous pathogens , whether

26:56.522 --> 26:58.467
deliberately released or naturally

26:58.467 --> 27:00.670
occurring , including diseases such as

27:00.670 --> 27:03.760
covert . 19 be TRP works with over 30

27:03.760 --> 27:05.871
foreign partners to reduce biological

27:05.871 --> 27:08.204
threats by enhancing their bio security ,

27:08.204 --> 27:10.316
biosafety and bioscience capabilities

27:10.340 --> 27:12.118
The ongoing covert pandemic has

27:12.118 --> 27:14.173
demonstrated to the global community

27:14.173 --> 27:16.396
that health security is a critical part

27:16.396 --> 27:18.507
of national security . Countries need

27:18.507 --> 27:20.729
an effective bio surveillance system to

27:20.729 --> 27:22.840
detect diagnosis and report outbreaks

27:22.840 --> 27:25.007
of dangerous pathogens . The US relies

27:25.007 --> 27:26.951
on the bio surveillance systems of

27:26.951 --> 27:29.118
other nations to provide early warning

27:29.118 --> 27:31.173
of an outbreak before it reaches the

27:31.173 --> 27:33.396
homeland . Some recent examples of BT r

27:33.396 --> 27:35.770
P success in responding to the pandemic

27:36.340 --> 27:38.770
in partnership with us U . S A . I D .

27:38.780 --> 27:40.770
BTR Peace efforts enabled local

27:40.780 --> 27:43.210
officials in Thailand to detect the

27:43.210 --> 27:45.540
first case of a novel coronavirus

27:45.540 --> 27:48.910
outside of China on 13 January 2020

27:48.920 --> 27:51.170
Onley days after its initial discovery

27:51.180 --> 27:53.500
in Wuhan , China . Within a month of a

27:53.500 --> 27:55.500
request from the U . S . Ambassador

27:55.500 --> 27:57.340
Fisher in Morocco , BT R . P

27:57.340 --> 27:59.450
transferred a supply of PPE to the

27:59.450 --> 28:01.283
National Institute of Health and

28:01.283 --> 28:03.270
Hygiene and Robot Morocco . The

28:03.270 --> 28:05.214
equipment went directly to protect

28:05.214 --> 28:07.381
Morocco's frontline healthcare workers

28:07.381 --> 28:09.710
in the fight against Kobe , Ambassador

28:09.720 --> 28:12.090
Ambassador Ambassador Fisher stated the

28:12.090 --> 28:14.034
equipment transfer is part of over

28:14.034 --> 28:15.868
seven years of close cooperation

28:15.868 --> 28:18.090
between D . T R A and the government of

28:18.090 --> 28:20.480
Morocco . This partnerships focuses on

28:20.480 --> 28:22.720
saving lives and mitigating threats to

28:22.720 --> 28:24.776
ensure the national security of both

28:24.776 --> 28:26.776
countries , I'll report . To date ,

28:26.776 --> 28:28.998
Morocco has reported 126,000 cases with

28:28.998 --> 28:32.490
2200 deaths and Georgia be TRP trained

28:32.490 --> 28:34.657
scientists and the B T R P constructed

28:34.657 --> 28:36.490
Richard Lugar Center developed a

28:36.490 --> 28:38.768
diagnostic testing capability for Kobe .

28:39.140 --> 28:41.029
This enabled Georgia to implement

28:41.029 --> 28:43.084
extensive testing to inform outbreak

28:43.084 --> 28:45.251
control . The center was lauded by the

28:45.251 --> 28:47.362
Georgian government as being integral

28:47.362 --> 28:49.584
in controlling the code outbreak within

28:49.584 --> 28:51.807
Georgia . They have reported 7100 cases

28:51.807 --> 28:54.910
with only 46 deaths . BT R P continues

28:54.910 --> 28:57.132
to receive foreign partner requests for

28:57.132 --> 28:59.220
support related to co vid . As of

28:59.230 --> 29:02.210
September 18th , B T R P had fulfilled

29:02.210 --> 29:04.590
40 requests from 18 countries plus the

29:04.590 --> 29:07.820
African Union for Disease Control in

29:07.820 --> 29:10.153
summary . By building a partner nations ,

29:10.153 --> 29:12.376
capacities and capabilities , it builds

29:12.376 --> 29:14.264
their sense of national pride and

29:14.264 --> 29:15.987
increases . They're willing to

29:15.987 --> 29:18.042
willingness to work with us in other

29:18.042 --> 29:20.209
ways by providing partners with better

29:20.209 --> 29:21.931
self sustaining solutions . US

29:21.931 --> 29:24.153
demonstrates that we are the partner of

29:24.153 --> 29:25.987
choice rather than our strategic

29:25.987 --> 29:28.320
competitors . These partnerships ask us ,

29:28.320 --> 29:30.098
act as force multipliers in the

29:30.098 --> 29:32.520
competition for influence and reinforce

29:32.520 --> 29:34.742
the strategic messaging that the US has

29:34.742 --> 29:37.780
their nation's interest in mind . Thank

29:37.780 --> 29:40.058
you for your time . And I look forward .

29:40.058 --> 29:42.336
Your questions . Thank you , Mr Oxford .

29:42.336 --> 29:44.391
Um , I'll now recognize Mr Moore for

29:44.400 --> 29:45.733
his opening statement .

29:49.840 --> 29:51.618
Good morning . Chairman Berra ,

29:51.618 --> 29:53.618
Chairman Len Jamin , ranking member

29:53.618 --> 29:55.840
Stefanick and other esteemed members of

29:55.840 --> 29:57.951
the House . It is an honor to be here

29:57.951 --> 29:59.673
with you today , together with

29:59.673 --> 30:01.896
distinguished colleagues from the State

30:01.896 --> 30:01.700
Department and the Department of

30:01.700 --> 30:04.120
Defense as well as d t . R . A . I look

30:04.120 --> 30:06.370
forward to discussing how our bureau ,

30:06.370 --> 30:08.426
the Bureau of Oceans , Environment ,

30:08.426 --> 30:10.203
International Environmental and

30:10.203 --> 30:12.426
Scientific Affairs plays a role in this

30:12.426 --> 30:14.537
process are normal . Portfolio ranges

30:14.537 --> 30:16.592
from the depths of the oceans to the

30:16.592 --> 30:18.648
vastness of space . We also host the

30:18.648 --> 30:20.870
State Department's office of Mr Moore .

30:20.870 --> 30:23.037
Could I have you have the microphone a

30:23.037 --> 30:26.900
little closer ? Thio . Thank you . Uh ,

30:26.910 --> 30:28.910
we also host the State Department's

30:28.910 --> 30:31.077
Office of International Health and Bio

30:31.077 --> 30:33.188
Defense , and that is the capacity in

30:33.188 --> 30:36.230
which I'm here today . I will focus my

30:36.240 --> 30:38.240
remarks on our efforts to prevent ,

30:38.240 --> 30:40.073
detect and respond to infectious

30:40.073 --> 30:43.260
disease outbreaks . Covert 19 which ,

30:43.260 --> 30:45.371
as we see , has had an impact even on

30:45.371 --> 30:47.427
the President and the first lady and

30:47.427 --> 30:49.482
millions of Americans highlights the

30:49.482 --> 30:51.649
importance of US leadership to advance

30:51.649 --> 30:53.760
global health , security and pandemic

30:53.760 --> 30:55.649
preparedness . This is crucial to

30:55.649 --> 30:57.830
stopping outbreaks at their source and

30:57.830 --> 30:59.740
protecting US health and safety ,

30:59.750 --> 31:01.720
promoting economic prosperity and

31:01.720 --> 31:03.942
defending national security interests .

31:04.340 --> 31:06.580
Our team at OS is working through and

31:06.580 --> 31:09.520
on covert 19 together with interagency

31:09.520 --> 31:11.742
partners , advancing U . S . Government

31:11.742 --> 31:14.060
priorities through diplomacy . Beyond

31:14.060 --> 31:16.330
covered 19 0 yes , combats a range of

31:16.330 --> 31:18.552
other public health threats , including

31:18.552 --> 31:20.790
Ebola , influenza , dengue , polio and

31:20.790 --> 31:24.050
anti microbial resistance . The covert

31:24.050 --> 31:26.106
19 pandemic is a global challenge in

31:26.106 --> 31:27.883
the Department of State remains

31:27.883 --> 31:29.994
committed to working closely with our

31:29.994 --> 31:32.217
partners as part of a collective global

31:32.217 --> 31:34.439
response , we're using all of our means

31:34.439 --> 31:36.610
to slow and stop the pandemic . US .

31:36.610 --> 31:38.870
Health diplomacy has two primary areas

31:38.870 --> 31:41.420
of effort . Promoting transparent

31:41.420 --> 31:43.198
information sharing and disease

31:43.198 --> 31:45.040
surveillance and encouraging a

31:45.040 --> 31:46.984
multisectoral approach to building

31:46.984 --> 31:48.873
global health security capacity ,

31:48.873 --> 31:50.540
including other nations , non

31:50.540 --> 31:52.151
governmental organizations ,

31:52.151 --> 31:54.151
international organizations and the

31:54.151 --> 31:56.310
private sector . We deeply appreciate

31:56.310 --> 31:58.510
Congress's appropriation of over 1.6

31:58.510 --> 32:02.200
billion US dollars in covert 19

32:02.200 --> 32:04.089
supplemental funding to the State

32:04.089 --> 32:06.144
Department and to the U . S . Agency

32:06.144 --> 32:08.367
for National Development . We have used

32:08.367 --> 32:10.589
these funds to provide a broad range of

32:10.589 --> 32:10.440
assistance specifically aimed at

32:10.440 --> 32:12.440
helping governments , international

32:12.440 --> 32:14.384
organizations and non governmental

32:14.384 --> 32:16.551
organizations fight the pandemic . The

32:16.551 --> 32:18.218
assistance is saving lives by

32:18.218 --> 32:20.440
strengthening public health education ,

32:20.440 --> 32:22.551
improving the quality and cleanliness

32:22.551 --> 32:24.329
of health care facilities , and

32:24.329 --> 32:25.996
increasing laboratory disease

32:25.996 --> 32:27.773
surveillance and rapid response

32:27.773 --> 32:29.884
capacity in more than 120 countries ,

32:29.884 --> 32:31.773
as well as providing humanitarian

32:31.773 --> 32:33.996
economic support to mitigate impacts of

32:33.996 --> 32:35.884
the pandemic . Additionally , the

32:35.884 --> 32:37.940
United States has invested more than

32:37.940 --> 32:40.162
$10 billion to bring safe and effective

32:40.162 --> 32:40.070
vaccines to the global market . Faster .

32:40.740 --> 32:42.962
Oh yes , helps develop State department

32:42.962 --> 32:44.962
messaging , including global public

32:44.962 --> 32:47.129
health , encountering malign influence

32:47.440 --> 32:49.162
as the first to know about the

32:49.162 --> 32:51.162
coronavirus . The Chinese Communist

32:51.162 --> 32:53.273
Party had a special responsibility to

32:53.273 --> 32:55.496
inform the rest of the world about this

32:55.496 --> 32:57.329
threat . Instead , they withheld

32:57.329 --> 32:59.162
information and censored medical

32:59.162 --> 33:00.884
professionals , scientists and

33:00.884 --> 33:02.940
journalists . The CCP has since used

33:02.940 --> 33:04.496
the pandemic to further its

33:04.496 --> 33:06.718
geopolitical agenda by highlighting its

33:06.718 --> 33:08.829
donations of masks and other supplies

33:08.829 --> 33:10.940
to reshape the narrative and distract

33:10.940 --> 33:12.940
from its role in this crisis . Both

33:12.940 --> 33:15.107
Russia and the CCP have made grandiose

33:15.107 --> 33:17.051
and irresponsible claims about the

33:17.051 --> 33:19.218
creation of vaccines , raising serious

33:19.218 --> 33:21.273
questions about quality and efficacy

33:21.273 --> 33:23.329
that we're addressing through active

33:23.329 --> 33:25.051
public diplomacy . An ounce of

33:25.051 --> 33:27.218
prevention is worth a pound of cure is

33:27.218 --> 33:29.329
a proverb that is this familiar as it

33:29.329 --> 33:31.218
is true , If we prioritize health

33:31.218 --> 33:33.329
security investments , we can contain

33:33.329 --> 33:35.496
outbreaks before they become pandemics

33:35.496 --> 33:37.718
and mitigate and prevent 2nd and 3rd or

33:37.718 --> 33:39.940
two impacts . Oh yes , plays a key role

33:39.940 --> 33:41.884
in pandemic prevention , including

33:41.884 --> 33:43.996
through support for the global health

33:43.996 --> 33:46.051
security agenda . G H s A . Which is

33:46.051 --> 33:47.829
still a work in progress , is a

33:47.829 --> 33:49.773
partnership of nearly 70 nations ,

33:49.773 --> 33:51.773
international organizations and non

33:51.773 --> 33:53.884
governmental stakeholders that uses a

33:53.884 --> 33:55.773
whole of government multisectoral

33:55.773 --> 33:58.051
approach to address outbreaks . Oh yes .

33:58.051 --> 33:59.773
Annually coordinates US expert

33:59.773 --> 34:01.607
implementing agencies to provide

34:01.607 --> 34:03.496
carefully targeted programming in

34:03.496 --> 34:05.384
priority countries to make global

34:05.384 --> 34:07.329
health security improvements along

34:07.329 --> 34:09.273
specific metrics . Its approach to

34:09.273 --> 34:11.496
combating outbreaks is reflected in the

34:11.496 --> 34:13.273
United States . 2017 . National

34:13.273 --> 34:15.162
Security Strategy 2018 . National

34:15.162 --> 34:17.329
Biodefense Strategy in the 2019 global

34:17.329 --> 34:19.218
health Security Strategy Oh yes ,

34:19.218 --> 34:21.273
leadership has been fully engaged in

34:21.273 --> 34:23.496
coordinating inter agency investments ,

34:23.496 --> 34:25.829
helping 19 US partner countries prevent ,

34:25.829 --> 34:27.662
detect and respond to a range of

34:27.662 --> 34:29.662
infectious disease threats at their

34:29.662 --> 34:31.884
source . These were just a few examples

34:31.884 --> 34:33.718
of OS is wide ranging engagement

34:33.718 --> 34:35.607
infectious disease risks with her

34:35.607 --> 34:37.440
crucial to countering biological

34:37.440 --> 34:39.496
threats . We greatly appreciate your

34:39.496 --> 34:41.384
interest and look forward to your

34:41.384 --> 34:43.607
questions . Thank you very much . Thank

34:43.607 --> 34:45.829
you , Mr Born . Let me now recognize Mr

34:45.829 --> 34:47.829
Dahl if for his opening statement .

34:50.540 --> 34:52.318
Good morning . Chairman Berra ,

34:52.318 --> 34:54.540
Chairman Langevin , ranking members and

34:54.540 --> 34:56.262
honorable representatives . We

34:56.262 --> 34:58.429
appreciate the leadership you've shown

34:58.429 --> 35:00.540
on these important issues . Thank you

35:00.540 --> 35:02.762
for inviting me here today to share how

35:02.762 --> 35:04.762
the Department of State's Bureau of

35:04.762 --> 35:03.950
International Security and

35:03.950 --> 35:06.710
Nonproliferation or I s N works to

35:06.710 --> 35:08.710
address some of the most urgent and

35:08.710 --> 35:10.766
challenging biological threats to US

35:10.766 --> 35:12.710
national security . I'm honored to

35:12.710 --> 35:14.432
appear before you alongside my

35:14.432 --> 35:16.099
colleague from the Oceans and

35:16.099 --> 35:17.877
International Environmental and

35:17.877 --> 35:20.020
Scientific Affairs Bureau and by my

35:20.020 --> 35:21.853
colleague from the Department of

35:21.853 --> 35:23.909
Defense . Through diplomatic efforts

35:23.910 --> 35:25.799
and foreign assistance programs ,

35:25.799 --> 35:27.577
Theater , National Security and

35:27.577 --> 35:29.410
Nonproliferation Bureau works to

35:29.410 --> 35:31.521
prevent rogue states , terrorists and

35:31.521 --> 35:33.577
other mine actors from obtaining and

35:33.577 --> 35:35.577
using weapons of mass destruction .

35:35.577 --> 35:37.521
Three . International Security and

35:37.521 --> 35:39.354
Nonproliferation Bureau has been

35:39.354 --> 35:41.354
working hard for nearly 20 years to

35:41.354 --> 35:43.521
address challenges by the posed by the

35:43.521 --> 35:45.354
full spectrum of these threats .

35:45.354 --> 35:47.466
Whether they're deliberately spread ,

35:47.466 --> 35:49.410
accidentally released or naturally

35:49.410 --> 35:52.050
occurring . The cove in 19 pandemic is

35:52.050 --> 35:54.660
a grim reminder of how much damage a

35:54.660 --> 35:57.430
single pathogen can cause to U . S

35:57.430 --> 35:59.790
national and international security

36:00.530 --> 36:02.641
Through diplomacy . Our International

36:02.641 --> 36:04.697
Security and Nonproliferation Bureau

36:04.697 --> 36:06.930
strengthens multilateral frameworks ,

36:06.940 --> 36:09.050
including the Biological Weapons

36:09.050 --> 36:11.106
Convention and the Australia Group ,

36:11.430 --> 36:13.541
and I note that Chairman made remarks

36:13.541 --> 36:15.750
on this very issue this year . The

36:15.750 --> 36:18.083
Press . As the president of the G seven ,

36:18.083 --> 36:19.917
we are leading the international

36:19.917 --> 36:21.694
community in making significant

36:21.694 --> 36:23.472
progress on biological issues ,

36:23.472 --> 36:26.100
including issuing G seven statements on

36:26.100 --> 36:28.340
the International Cove in 19 pandemic

36:28.730 --> 36:31.180
and response . Similarly , in the

36:31.180 --> 36:33.013
global partnership , we have led

36:33.013 --> 36:34.680
efforts to launch a dedicated

36:34.680 --> 36:36.360
biosecurity capacity building

36:36.360 --> 36:39.270
initiative . For decades , Ison has

36:39.270 --> 36:41.760
invested significant resources into

36:41.760 --> 36:44.750
combating the full range of WMD and

36:44.750 --> 36:46.639
related delivery system threats ,

36:46.640 --> 36:50.360
including over $450 million over the

36:50.360 --> 36:52.500
past 15 years toward mitigating

36:52.500 --> 36:55.910
biological threats . We have a long and

36:55.910 --> 36:58.230
rich history of biosecurity capacity

36:58.230 --> 36:59.952
building where we have trained

36:59.952 --> 37:01.786
thousands of foreign partners on

37:01.786 --> 37:03.730
biosecurity in over 50 countries .

37:04.030 --> 37:06.380
These WMD threat reduction investments

37:06.390 --> 37:09.420
long preceded the the pandemic , yet

37:09.430 --> 37:11.486
they are contributing to slowing its

37:11.486 --> 37:13.700
spread . We recognized early on the

37:13.700 --> 37:15.756
threat that the pandemic pose to our

37:15.756 --> 37:18.130
international security and we began to

37:18.130 --> 37:20.870
quickly incorporate Cove in 19 topics

37:20.940 --> 37:23.290
in our trainings , leveraging remote

37:23.300 --> 37:25.460
and distance learning platforms to

37:25.460 --> 37:27.490
deliver critically needed help in a

37:27.490 --> 37:29.560
timely manner . We're also in the

37:29.560 --> 37:31.616
process of programming an additional

37:31.616 --> 37:34.670
$18 million via our nonproliferation

37:34.670 --> 37:36.540
and disarmament Fund towards

37:36.540 --> 37:38.370
controlling this pandemic and

37:38.370 --> 37:40.092
preventing future catastrophic

37:40.092 --> 37:42.490
biological events , as well as adding

37:42.490 --> 37:44.850
additional experts to our efforts and

37:44.850 --> 37:46.961
expanding the offices we have working

37:46.961 --> 37:49.280
on these issues . Representative Perry

37:49.280 --> 37:51.113
noted moments ago that there are

37:51.113 --> 37:53.280
limitations to our authorities and I

37:53.280 --> 37:56.220
will note that we did propose broader

37:56.220 --> 37:58.498
authority to address these limitations .

37:58.730 --> 38:00.786
Of course , we're not alone , and we

38:00.786 --> 38:02.952
are deeply grateful for the decades of

38:02.952 --> 38:05.008
very close partnership we've enjoyed

38:05.008 --> 38:06.730
with our Department of Defense

38:06.730 --> 38:08.841
colleagues to coordinate our mutually

38:08.841 --> 38:10.952
reinforcing efforts in looking to the

38:10.952 --> 38:13.130
future . We are also working hard to

38:13.130 --> 38:15.470
keep pace with a rapidly evolving

38:15.470 --> 38:17.900
changes in biotechnology , and I note

38:17.900 --> 38:20.140
that several of the members indicated

38:20.140 --> 38:23.140
concern about this very issue . Let me

38:23.140 --> 38:25.800
assure you , the full range of U . S .

38:25.800 --> 38:27.760
National security departments and

38:27.770 --> 38:31.140
agencies are focusing on and analyzing

38:31.140 --> 38:33.290
these efforts . Our International

38:33.290 --> 38:35.530
Security and Nonproliferation Bureau is

38:35.530 --> 38:37.860
using our diplomatic and capacity

38:37.860 --> 38:40.070
building tools to prevent the

38:40.070 --> 38:42.500
application of dual use technologies to

38:42.500 --> 38:44.900
do harm , such as the development of

38:44.900 --> 38:47.380
biological weapons . For example ,

38:47.380 --> 38:49.491
Chairman Barone noted moments ago the

38:49.491 --> 38:51.570
importance of standards and norms to

38:51.570 --> 38:53.860
address this issue , and we are indeed

38:53.860 --> 38:56.060
working in this area and have had

38:56.060 --> 38:58.120
multilateral dialogues on this very

38:58.120 --> 39:01.200
issue . In conclusion , we are very

39:01.200 --> 39:03.300
proud of the work we do to combat

39:03.300 --> 39:05.356
infectious disease threats using our

39:05.356 --> 39:08.040
diplomatic and foreign assistance tools

39:08.050 --> 39:10.272
in support of U . S national security .

39:10.320 --> 39:12.542
We deeply appreciate the support of the

39:12.542 --> 39:14.320
Congress to provide us with the

39:14.320 --> 39:16.487
necessary resource is to carry out our

39:16.487 --> 39:18.376
threat reduction mission . And we

39:18.376 --> 39:20.376
recognize that our work is far from

39:20.376 --> 39:22.320
over . Thank you , Chairman Vera .

39:22.320 --> 39:24.264
Chairman Langevin , Members of the

39:24.264 --> 39:26.209
committee . I look forward to your

39:26.209 --> 39:27.931
questions . Thank you for your

39:27.931 --> 39:30.098
testimony , Mr Dahl . If , um , I will

39:30.098 --> 39:32.264
now recognize members for five minutes

39:32.264 --> 39:34.431
each and pursuant to house rules , all

39:34.431 --> 39:36.431
time yielded is for the purposes of

39:36.431 --> 39:38.598
questioning our witnesses . Because of

39:38.598 --> 39:40.709
the hybrid format of this hearing , I

39:40.709 --> 39:42.709
will recognize members by committee

39:42.709 --> 39:44.931
seniority alternating between Democrats

39:44.931 --> 39:46.709
and Republicans in between both

39:46.709 --> 39:48.931
subcommittees . If you miss your turn ,

39:48.931 --> 39:51.153
please let our staff know , and we will

39:51.153 --> 39:51.140
circle back to you if you seek

39:51.140 --> 39:53.680
recognition , you must your microphone

39:53.680 --> 39:55.920
and address the chair verbally . I will

39:55.920 --> 39:57.980
start by recognizing myself for five

39:57.980 --> 40:01.550
minutes . You know , both Mr

40:01.550 --> 40:03.520
Oxford and Mr Dahl , if you know ,

40:03.910 --> 40:06.520
talked about the advances in technology

40:06.520 --> 40:08.687
and as a doctor . You know , I look at

40:08.687 --> 40:10.520
what we've been able to dio with

40:10.520 --> 40:13.950
biologics , you know , um conditions ,

40:13.960 --> 40:16.182
cancers that , you know , we would have

40:16.182 --> 40:18.071
to create palliative Lee . We now

40:18.071 --> 40:20.330
actually have therapies and and

40:20.330 --> 40:23.320
precision medicine toe often cure some

40:23.320 --> 40:25.830
of these cancers and and other ailments .

40:26.410 --> 40:28.730
And yeah , I think the vast majority of

40:28.730 --> 40:30.970
scientists are pursuing and using this

40:30.970 --> 40:32.920
technology for the advancement of

40:32.920 --> 40:35.230
common good . But I also know that

40:35.240 --> 40:38.590
those same gene editing

40:38.600 --> 40:41.160
techniques and so forth can certainly

40:41.160 --> 40:44.930
be used to cause us harm as well as

40:44.940 --> 40:47.650
inadvertently . A scientist that may be

40:47.650 --> 40:50.190
looking for a cure may inadvertently

40:50.200 --> 40:52.820
create , um , something that , um ,

40:52.830 --> 40:55.500
unintentionally causes harm . Mr . Daul ,

40:55.500 --> 40:58.300
if you touched on as I said in my

40:58.300 --> 41:00.420
opening statement , you know , how do

41:00.420 --> 41:02.920
we create these norms for and standards

41:02.920 --> 41:06.540
for ethical use of this technology ? Um ,

41:06.550 --> 41:09.250
in a multilateral way and then also

41:09.250 --> 41:11.306
working with our corporate sectors .

41:11.306 --> 41:13.417
Well , because obviously , you know ,

41:13.417 --> 41:15.730
our pharmaceutical sector and others

41:15.730 --> 41:18.510
are looking for novel therapies . And ,

41:18.520 --> 41:20.780
you know , right now I get the sense

41:20.780 --> 41:23.200
that there really isn't the standard

41:23.200 --> 41:25.520
norm . And maybe you could start off Mr

41:25.520 --> 41:27.409
Dollop Bond then from the d o d .

41:27.409 --> 41:29.298
Perspective , how we do this in a

41:29.298 --> 41:32.430
multilateral way . So thank you .

41:33.110 --> 41:35.054
So thank you , Chairman Vera , for

41:35.054 --> 41:37.388
raising this important set of questions .

41:37.388 --> 41:39.554
First , I take your point . You know ,

41:39.554 --> 41:41.721
medical technology is indeed Vance ing

41:41.721 --> 41:43.721
very quickly , especially , um , in

41:43.721 --> 41:46.280
some parts of the bio sector . And , um ,

41:46.290 --> 41:48.179
you know , we face this challenge

41:48.179 --> 41:50.234
across the board with technologies .

41:50.234 --> 41:51.846
Almost all technologies have

41:51.846 --> 41:53.846
applications , as you point out for

41:53.846 --> 41:56.068
enormous good and can cause substantial

41:56.068 --> 41:58.012
harm . We have been working on the

41:58.012 --> 42:00.410
issue of norms and standards for over a

42:00.410 --> 42:02.870
decade , and what we have done is tried

42:02.870 --> 42:06.530
to work , um , through amongst other

42:06.530 --> 42:08.490
instrumentalities , the national

42:08.490 --> 42:10.712
academies and cooperation with national

42:10.712 --> 42:12.768
academies in other countries . We've

42:12.768 --> 42:16.510
engaged , uh , uh , other international ,

42:16.520 --> 42:19.340
um , organizations to try to address

42:19.340 --> 42:22.020
this subject . And we've also worked in

42:22.020 --> 42:24.680
partnership with other governments . We

42:24.680 --> 42:26.650
have included working with the

42:26.650 --> 42:30.000
corporate sector . Um , and we , for

42:30.000 --> 42:33.220
example , we work closely with partners

42:33.220 --> 42:37.020
in India and in those , um , outreach

42:37.020 --> 42:39.260
and training do in India . We include

42:39.260 --> 42:41.204
both the government sector and the

42:41.204 --> 42:44.030
corporate sector as well as NGOs . As

42:44.030 --> 42:46.590
we try to build biosecurity , including

42:46.590 --> 42:48.970
through building norms , I will note ,

42:48.970 --> 42:50.970
I think building norms is always

42:50.970 --> 42:53.192
challenging . Um , and it's probably at

42:53.192 --> 42:55.526
least is challenging at the moment , um ,

42:55.526 --> 42:57.692
in the midst of the pandemic . But I I

42:57.692 --> 42:59.859
take the chairman's point that this is

42:59.859 --> 43:01.914
a particularly important area and we

43:01.914 --> 43:04.200
will continue to increase our efforts

43:04.200 --> 43:07.980
in this area . Great . And Mr Moore

43:07.990 --> 43:10.090
touched on the billions that we've

43:10.090 --> 43:12.180
already provided in global health

43:12.180 --> 43:14.402
security funding in some of the cove in

43:14.402 --> 43:18.020
19 supplementals and no doubt as we

43:18.030 --> 43:20.290
look to defeat this virus both here

43:20.290 --> 43:22.770
domestically through vaccine

43:22.770 --> 43:25.150
distribution and development , but also

43:25.150 --> 43:27.880
globally . Um , you know , maybe look

43:27.880 --> 43:30.047
at some of the D . O . D colleagues or

43:30.047 --> 43:32.269
Mr More . If you want to answer this as

43:32.269 --> 43:34.269
we're spending that , how can we do

43:34.269 --> 43:36.158
that in a very strategic way that

43:36.158 --> 43:37.936
allows us to start building the

43:37.936 --> 43:39.880
surveillance tools and what should

43:39.880 --> 43:42.047
those tools look like ? And What's the

43:42.047 --> 43:41.830
best practice ? Maybe Mr Lassiter , if

43:41.830 --> 43:44.050
you want . Yeah . Thank you , Mr

43:44.050 --> 43:46.272
Chairman . Very important . And I would

43:46.272 --> 43:48.383
just add on the biotechnology front ,

43:48.383 --> 43:50.606
uh , that , you know , we we view it as

43:50.606 --> 43:52.439
a promise in peril scenario . So

43:52.439 --> 43:54.772
there's a whole lot of promise in the U .

43:54.772 --> 43:56.772
S . Bio economy is strong . We must

43:56.772 --> 43:58.883
keep it . Number one on bears . A lot

43:58.883 --> 44:00.994
of peril , which , which you and dash

44:00.994 --> 44:03.490
dolls have described from a from a

44:03.500 --> 44:06.400
vaccine , uh , standpoint , is you you

44:06.410 --> 44:08.820
asked it za vitally important that we

44:08.820 --> 44:11.980
continue toe work , Azan Interagency .

44:11.990 --> 44:14.830
Together , we've also got toe provide

44:14.830 --> 44:17.030
information flow information across

44:17.040 --> 44:19.040
international organizations . Those

44:19.040 --> 44:21.151
that have been mentioned previously .

44:21.151 --> 44:23.207
Yeah , but it's incumbent upon us to

44:23.207 --> 44:25.429
share the information . So we work with

44:25.429 --> 44:28.080
our partners and allies and and we

44:28.080 --> 44:30.210
expect , you know , dependable . Uh ,

44:30.590 --> 44:32.646
you know , clear information to come

44:32.646 --> 44:34.701
back . And that's vital if we're not

44:34.701 --> 44:36.868
sharing information . And if we're not

44:36.868 --> 44:38.979
doing it effectively and clearly that

44:38.979 --> 44:41.146
we run the risk of having , you know ,

44:41.146 --> 44:43.090
more severe outbreaks , Aziz , the

44:43.090 --> 44:45.230
technology advances and is globalized

44:45.230 --> 44:48.330
Economy increases the sharks Or do you

44:48.330 --> 44:51.280
want to add ? I think . Thank you , Mr

44:51.280 --> 44:53.002
Chairman . a zone implementing

44:53.002 --> 44:55.002
organization . We're in position to

44:55.002 --> 44:57.169
help train , educate and enforced some

44:57.169 --> 44:59.224
of the norms that would be created .

44:59.224 --> 45:01.002
But I point out that in today's

45:01.002 --> 45:03.113
biological threat world , it's really

45:03.113 --> 45:05.169
hard to distinguish between nation ,

45:05.169 --> 45:07.169
state , non nation states and their

45:07.169 --> 45:09.336
proxies in terms of who is responsible

45:09.336 --> 45:11.558
for these actions . So getting to norms

45:11.558 --> 45:13.780
is a much more complicated issue in the

45:13.780 --> 45:15.669
past , where we had mostly nation

45:15.669 --> 45:17.891
states . Where would worry about this ?

45:17.891 --> 45:20.113
Now we have a much bigger playing field

45:20.113 --> 45:22.113
to try toe . Try to figure out that

45:22.113 --> 45:21.380
complicates not only norms and

45:21.380 --> 45:23.547
standards . It complicates attribution

45:23.547 --> 45:25.602
and accountability for these kind of

45:25.602 --> 45:27.769
things . So I think it's It's a It's a

45:27.769 --> 45:29.547
noble goal , but it's much more

45:29.547 --> 45:31.547
complicated and the kind of diverse

45:31.547 --> 45:33.824
world we're facing , right . Thank you .

45:33.824 --> 45:35.658
Um , I see my time's up . Let me

45:35.658 --> 45:37.658
recognize the ranking member acting

45:37.658 --> 45:39.824
ranking member . Mr . Perry . Thanks .

45:39.824 --> 45:42.047
Thanks again , Mr Chairman . And to our

45:42.047 --> 45:45.700
panel . Thank you . My questions , Mr

45:45.700 --> 45:48.740
Oxford . Just I mentioned some of the

45:48.740 --> 45:50.851
non state actors , and I'm gonna talk

45:50.851 --> 45:52.962
about some of the non state and state

45:52.962 --> 45:54.962
actors . So , as you know , in 2018

45:54.962 --> 45:57.490
Russia , Russian agents used the Soviet

45:57.490 --> 45:59.760
developed Nova chock class nerve agent

45:59.770 --> 46:01.659
and an attempted assassination of

46:01.659 --> 46:03.770
former Russian spy Sergei Scrip , all

46:03.770 --> 46:05.937
in the United Kingdom . And early this

46:05.937 --> 46:08.103
year it was used against again against

46:08.103 --> 46:11.810
opposition figure Alexei Navalny . Um ,

46:12.280 --> 46:14.447
I wonder what we can , you know . It's

46:14.447 --> 46:16.724
hard , Thio . It's hard to prove right .

46:16.724 --> 46:18.780
We're pretty sure , but it's hard to

46:18.780 --> 46:20.947
prove kind of like the coronavirus and

46:20.947 --> 46:23.002
the Wuhan Institute of Virology . We

46:23.002 --> 46:26.500
got some pretty strong , um , opinions

46:26.500 --> 46:28.778
about it , but it's hard to prove them .

46:28.778 --> 46:30.333
How can we ? Or how can the

46:30.333 --> 46:32.222
international community and force

46:32.222 --> 46:35.650
accountability for state actors , um ,

46:35.660 --> 46:37.310
who do such things ?

46:39.380 --> 46:41.547
So , Mr Perry , that's that's a really

46:41.547 --> 46:43.658
tough question . As you know , I mean

46:43.658 --> 46:45.769
just getting to the accountability in

46:45.769 --> 46:45.590
this case . That's why I mentioned

46:45.590 --> 46:47.812
accountability in my previous comment .

46:47.812 --> 46:51.190
A lot of this is could be denied , uh ,

46:51.200 --> 46:53.256
the actual scientific evidence , you

46:53.256 --> 46:55.256
know , it wasn't necessarily shared

46:55.256 --> 46:57.311
immediately with us . We do now have

46:57.311 --> 46:56.960
people in this country that have been

46:56.960 --> 46:59.127
provided some of the samples that were

46:59.127 --> 47:01.182
able to get in there and actually do

47:01.182 --> 47:03.071
some of the assessment . So as Mr

47:03.071 --> 47:05.127
Lester said , a lot of this is about

47:05.127 --> 47:07.293
agreements on information sharing . So

47:07.293 --> 47:09.349
we were actually come together as as

47:09.349 --> 47:11.571
allies to people to actually , uh , put

47:11.571 --> 47:10.880
the blame words that where it's

47:10.880 --> 47:13.158
necessary . But it's very hard problem ,

47:13.158 --> 47:15.380
given that we haven't spent enough time

47:15.380 --> 47:17.269
and effort in this country on bio

47:17.269 --> 47:19.491
attribution . We spent years on nuclear

47:19.491 --> 47:21.491
attribution but we've not spent any

47:21.491 --> 47:23.840
time on bio attribution Yeah , watching ,

47:23.840 --> 47:26.280
watching what happened to script , ball

47:26.290 --> 47:28.700
and now Navalny and others Quite

47:28.700 --> 47:32.320
honestly , um , you know , we tend to

47:32.320 --> 47:34.542
think that that happens over there , so

47:34.542 --> 47:36.790
to speak . But the UK is obviously a

47:36.790 --> 47:40.120
close friend and an ally , and I find

47:40.120 --> 47:42.231
that exceptionally concerning . And I

47:42.231 --> 47:44.231
understand . I just I'm sure you're

47:44.231 --> 47:46.342
thinking about it . I just don't know

47:46.342 --> 47:46.290
if you had any answers to important .

47:46.290 --> 47:48.012
Maybe they don't . If you have

47:48.012 --> 47:50.179
something you don't wanna have an open

47:50.179 --> 47:52.346
source . Did you have something to add

47:52.346 --> 47:54.401
there , Mr Lassiter ? Well , sir , I

47:54.401 --> 47:56.234
would just say that you know the

47:56.234 --> 47:58.179
further use , obviously a chemical

47:58.179 --> 48:00.234
weapon . But the further use and and

48:00.234 --> 48:02.179
seemingly acceptability across the

48:02.179 --> 48:04.234
world has to be confronted . Um , as

48:04.234 --> 48:06.346
director , Oxford said there is there

48:06.346 --> 48:08.401
is significant effort being put into

48:08.401 --> 48:10.623
this particular incident across the U .

48:10.623 --> 48:12.770
S . Government , Um , and across the

48:12.770 --> 48:14.920
international community . So , um ,

48:14.930 --> 48:17.760
efforts are underway to at least , uh ,

48:17.770 --> 48:19.937
work on the international norm . Piece

48:19.937 --> 48:22.159
of response . Yeah , I would say that .

48:22.159 --> 48:24.381
You know , you mentioned threats . Um ,

48:24.381 --> 48:26.103
and from the biological threat

48:26.103 --> 48:28.048
perspective , although , um , much

48:28.048 --> 48:29.992
information would be required at a

48:29.992 --> 48:31.770
higher level . We can say at an

48:31.770 --> 48:33.881
unclassified level that Russia , uh ,

48:33.881 --> 48:36.048
at least the State Department has said

48:36.048 --> 48:38.103
that there's no way to confirm their

48:38.103 --> 48:40.103
adherence to the biological weapons

48:40.103 --> 48:42.214
convention . Uh , pretty certain that

48:42.214 --> 48:44.410
China is not adhering to it both from

48:44.410 --> 48:46.132
an Article one and Article two

48:46.132 --> 48:49.180
perspective . So it grows and grows and

48:49.180 --> 48:51.100
concern and and the help with of

48:51.100 --> 48:53.322
Congress and across the inter agency is

48:53.322 --> 48:55.322
vital toe get after these threats .

48:55.322 --> 48:57.544
Okay , so and I appreciate , you know ,

48:57.544 --> 48:59.489
look , I know it's difficult , and

48:59.489 --> 49:01.156
that's why we're here . So we

49:01.156 --> 49:03.433
appreciate your efforts in this regard .

49:03.433 --> 49:05.544
Any help that we can offer on the non

49:05.544 --> 49:07.544
state actor side . You got anything

49:07.544 --> 49:10.630
from a recently arrested Canadian woman ,

49:10.640 --> 49:12.840
Um , crossing into the United States

49:12.840 --> 49:14.784
and mailing the president , United

49:14.784 --> 49:16.729
States and sheriff in Texas . Ah ,

49:16.729 --> 49:18.673
letter containing ricin We've seen

49:18.673 --> 49:20.840
similar things in the past , but we've

49:20.840 --> 49:23.140
also seen the Islamic state procure . I

49:23.150 --> 49:25.372
think there was a mustard gas attack in

49:25.372 --> 49:27.770
northern Iraq in 2015 and 2016 now when

49:27.770 --> 49:29.826
I was in Iraq , you know , the stuff

49:29.826 --> 49:32.048
was quite honestly , fairly prevalent ,

49:32.048 --> 49:34.103
so it's no should be no surprise how

49:34.103 --> 49:36.326
they how they found that . But in those

49:36.326 --> 49:38.548
two instances , I'm just wondering what

49:38.548 --> 49:41.470
the ah , what the status of the illicit

49:41.470 --> 49:44.120
chemical weapons trade or bio weapons

49:44.120 --> 49:46.780
trade or availability of things like

49:46.790 --> 49:50.400
ricin . Andi , how you guys are

49:50.410 --> 49:52.300
working with either overseas

49:52.300 --> 49:54.300
counterparts are among each other .

49:54.300 --> 49:56.411
Thio , you know , mean maybe not even

49:56.411 --> 49:58.467
overseas , right ? Canada across the

49:58.467 --> 50:00.689
border . So what do you guys doing with

50:00.689 --> 50:02.800
those type of things ? And what's the

50:02.800 --> 50:05.133
status of that ? The trade ? Mr . Perry ,

50:05.133 --> 50:07.022
I can tell you in the Middle East

50:07.022 --> 50:09.133
scenario what what we've seen through

50:09.133 --> 50:11.356
the counterterrorism activities , we've

50:11.356 --> 50:10.710
been able to take most of the chemical

50:10.710 --> 50:12.821
expertise off the battlefield , so to

50:12.821 --> 50:14.766
speak , uh , that they've tried to

50:14.766 --> 50:16.932
resurrect periodically , but they have

50:16.932 --> 50:19.099
not been successful , so it's a matter

50:19.099 --> 50:20.988
of the expertise . Ricin has been

50:20.988 --> 50:20.930
attempted multiple times . Usually it's

50:20.930 --> 50:23.390
never gotten a weapons grade , so maybe

50:23.390 --> 50:25.446
we've dodged a bullet . But there is

50:25.446 --> 50:27.668
the need to look across that spectrum .

50:27.668 --> 50:29.834
And the terrorist groups have had this

50:29.834 --> 50:31.946
intention . They just haven't had the

50:31.946 --> 50:31.560
expertise . And we need to make sure

50:31.560 --> 50:33.338
that they don't gain those that

50:33.338 --> 50:37.190
expertise . Mr . Dole ,

50:37.860 --> 50:40.160
if I get if I could add to that a

50:40.160 --> 50:42.327
little bit On the diplomatic side , we

50:42.327 --> 50:43.993
have worked very closely with

50:43.993 --> 50:45.993
international partners against this

50:45.993 --> 50:47.827
particular threat . We also have

50:47.827 --> 50:49.882
programmatic elements working in key

50:49.882 --> 50:51.938
states to address the specific state

50:51.938 --> 50:54.280
this specific set of non state threats .

50:54.460 --> 50:56.700
We have diplomatic efforts . We've

50:56.700 --> 50:59.870
integrated our concerns about WMD and

50:59.870 --> 51:01.870
to broader international diplomatic

51:01.870 --> 51:03.926
discussions about counterterrorism .

51:04.060 --> 51:06.004
With regard to your question about

51:06.004 --> 51:08.290
trade , we do strengthen international

51:08.290 --> 51:11.280
controls on chemical and biological

51:11.280 --> 51:14.060
precursors . Um , but I will say that

51:14.070 --> 51:16.290
in general , I believe the evidence is

51:16.290 --> 51:19.050
that much of these efforts uses

51:19.060 --> 51:21.590
chemical chemicals and precursors that

51:21.600 --> 51:24.470
are procured within a state . Eso we

51:24.470 --> 51:26.470
will continue to tighten up in that

51:26.470 --> 51:28.803
area , but most of it appears homegrown .

51:29.660 --> 51:31.827
Thank you . My time's expired . Deal .

51:31.860 --> 51:33.916
Let me go ahead . Now . Recognize on

51:33.916 --> 51:35.027
Chairman Langevin .

51:37.660 --> 51:39.827
Thank you , Mr Chairman , can you hear

51:39.827 --> 51:42.390
me . Okay ? Yes , we can .

51:43.560 --> 51:45.449
Very good . Well , thank you , Mr

51:45.449 --> 51:47.171
Chairman . I want to thank our

51:47.171 --> 51:49.338
witnesses again for their testimony of

51:49.338 --> 51:51.560
the important work that you're doing in

51:51.560 --> 51:53.727
this area On behalf of the country , I

51:53.727 --> 51:55.504
want to go back . In my opening

51:55.504 --> 51:57.727
statement , I talked about the concerns

51:57.727 --> 52:00.180
I had about , uh , the significant cut

52:00.180 --> 52:02.180
to the cooperative threat reduction

52:02.180 --> 52:04.236
program . So it compared to the 2020

52:04.236 --> 52:06.480
levels cooperation . The Cooperative

52:06.480 --> 52:08.570
Threat Reduction program was cut by

52:08.570 --> 52:11.250
$135 million in the president's budget

52:11.250 --> 52:13.750
request this year . On within that

52:13.750 --> 52:16.140
program , the cooperative threat , the

52:16.140 --> 52:18.029
cooperative biological engagement

52:18.029 --> 52:20.990
effort was cut the most by over $55

52:20.990 --> 52:23.100
million . So , given the pandemic in

52:23.100 --> 52:25.400
which we find ourselves were alarmed by

52:25.400 --> 52:27.011
the Department of Defense is

52:27.011 --> 52:29.380
significant cut , uh , to this mission

52:29.390 --> 52:32.380
of detecting and confronting biological

52:32.450 --> 52:34.672
threat to the United States . So I want

52:34.672 --> 52:36.894
to begin Director Oxford . Uh , this is

52:36.894 --> 52:39.470
a program that Congress clearly

52:39.470 --> 52:42.400
supports . What additional work with

52:42.400 --> 52:44.850
did should be able to perform If

52:44.850 --> 52:46.739
Congress eyes , in fact , able to

52:46.739 --> 52:49.730
restore the funding to the F Y 20

52:49.730 --> 52:52.480
enacted level , and especially , uh ,

52:52.650 --> 52:54.706
other work . Would you be able to do

52:54.750 --> 52:57.310
under the bio Threat Reduction program ,

52:57.310 --> 53:01.130
which was cut the most on Thio .

53:01.140 --> 53:03.196
Mr . Ambassador , I want to know how

53:03.196 --> 53:05.300
the department's perspective of the

53:05.310 --> 53:07.310
importance of the biological Threat

53:07.310 --> 53:09.532
reduction program evolved over the past

53:09.532 --> 53:11.754
six months of the pandemic . And how is

53:11.754 --> 53:13.810
the department surged to support the

53:13.810 --> 53:15.866
Kobe 19 fight ? But let's start with

53:15.866 --> 53:17.940
Director Roxbury . Thank you , Mr

53:17.940 --> 53:20.190
Chairman . Again , based on the house

53:20.190 --> 53:22.301
mark , we've looked at the programs .

53:22.301 --> 53:24.523
Uh , we'd be able to restore activities

53:24.523 --> 53:26.579
in 22 countries with the entire HAST

53:26.579 --> 53:29.450
mark . In addition , 15 of those would

53:29.450 --> 53:32.430
be within the BT R P program . Uh , we

53:32.430 --> 53:34.486
we can provide the committee's withy

53:34.486 --> 53:36.486
specific examples of what countries

53:36.486 --> 53:38.652
would be restored , plus would be able

53:38.652 --> 53:40.652
to restore activities on a regional

53:40.652 --> 53:42.700
basis with EUCOM Centcom as well as

53:42.700 --> 53:45.410
Africom . So we and end up Occam's who

53:45.410 --> 53:47.466
would be able to restore some of the

53:47.466 --> 53:49.632
regional emphasis in this area , which

53:49.632 --> 53:51.799
gives us broader coverage across those

53:51.799 --> 53:53.966
those regions at the in question . But

53:53.966 --> 53:56.132
we would be able to restore activities

53:56.132 --> 53:58.243
for B T R . P in 15 countries as well

53:58.243 --> 54:01.050
as those regions I mentioned Very good .

54:01.060 --> 54:04.270
Uh , was We're going through the after

54:04.270 --> 54:07.370
the conference process Senate . And

54:07.370 --> 54:09.680
also we're dealing with still with

54:09.690 --> 54:11.801
appropriations , but it is our intent

54:11.801 --> 54:14.134
to restore that funding . Uh , Mr Astor ,

54:14.134 --> 54:17.960
on the question of , uh , the

54:18.340 --> 54:20.510
six months of the pandemic and how you

54:20.510 --> 54:22.740
work is evolved . Yes , sir . Mr .

54:22.740 --> 54:24.851
Chairman , if I could add that , um ,

54:24.851 --> 54:26.940
yeah , it is . We do wanna give

54:26.950 --> 54:28.950
appreciation . I know the witnesses

54:28.950 --> 54:31.172
have , you know , for the long standing

54:31.172 --> 54:33.117
support that this committee , uh ,

54:33.117 --> 54:35.283
these committee's pardon me , and then

54:35.283 --> 54:37.339
both sides of the hill both sides of

54:37.339 --> 54:39.394
the aisle have given towards Cropper

54:39.394 --> 54:41.506
threat reduction program , you know ,

54:41.506 --> 54:43.672
And I would say that , um , you know ,

54:43.672 --> 54:46.006
the biological threat reduction program ,

54:46.006 --> 54:45.350
as you know , has been operating for

54:45.350 --> 54:47.550
over 16 years and over 30 countries

54:47.560 --> 54:49.720
doing great work . And , you know ,

54:49.720 --> 54:52.200
it's faras the last 16 months . So the

54:52.200 --> 54:54.690
d o d . Effort . Um , obviously , the

54:54.690 --> 54:56.634
international effort is led by our

54:56.634 --> 54:59.410
colleagues , State Department , US I d .

54:59.410 --> 55:01.632
Yes , sir . And , you know , from a d .

55:01.632 --> 55:03.743
O . D perspective managed through the

55:03.743 --> 55:05.690
Stability and Humanitarian Affairs

55:05.700 --> 55:08.590
office , and so they manage it over the

55:08.590 --> 55:10.757
course of the last six months . Yeah ,

55:10.757 --> 55:12.740
nearly about $100 million in d o d

55:12.740 --> 55:15.400
support toe over 100 countries as it

55:15.400 --> 55:18.110
relates specifically to be TRP . As you

55:18.110 --> 55:19.777
know , most of the support is

55:19.777 --> 55:21.832
historical in nature . So you know a

55:21.832 --> 55:23.999
lot of the training . A lot of the lab

55:23.999 --> 55:25.999
support has been over the course of

55:25.999 --> 55:28.900
this 16 years to these willing partners .

55:28.900 --> 55:31.250
And so that work that information flow

55:31.250 --> 55:33.160
is what's most vital . I can say

55:33.160 --> 55:36.380
specifically , you know , for B t R P

55:36.390 --> 55:39.610
direct funding , uh , to , uh , in

55:39.610 --> 55:41.610
response to CO . It is around seven

55:41.610 --> 55:43.832
million . Much of it is P P . But a lot

55:43.832 --> 55:46.054
of it is training , and it goes back to

55:46.054 --> 55:48.277
the historical relationships with these

55:48.277 --> 55:50.950
countries where we provide robust

55:50.950 --> 55:53.170
training on information flow . And so

55:53.240 --> 55:55.296
so that has been the focus is making

55:55.296 --> 55:57.518
sure that these partner countries , you

55:57.518 --> 55:59.684
know , they have a reach back resource

55:59.684 --> 56:02.020
to and that we can , uh , director .

56:02.020 --> 56:03.880
Oxford's team can provide that

56:03.880 --> 56:06.360
information to those partner nations

56:07.830 --> 56:10.163
Director . Actually , we go back to you .

56:10.163 --> 56:12.410
We all could appreciate auditors

56:12.410 --> 56:14.410
efforts toe to lean forward on this

56:14.410 --> 56:16.577
Kobe fight . Can you tell us about the

56:16.577 --> 56:19.980
work Chitra has been doing to help with

56:19.980 --> 56:22.740
the Kobe R and D effort through cam

56:22.740 --> 56:25.190
biodefense program funding . You know ,

56:25.200 --> 56:28.270
DARPA early on was using its R and D

56:28.270 --> 56:30.650
funding early on to meet the challenge

56:30.650 --> 56:33.300
of crisis . Describe what you've been

56:33.300 --> 56:35.133
able to all or you have you been

56:35.133 --> 56:37.330
hamstrung because of lack of support

56:37.330 --> 56:40.380
authorities . So , Mr Chairman , I

56:40.380 --> 56:42.158
think a lot of people have made

56:42.158 --> 56:44.158
comparisons between our response to

56:44.158 --> 56:47.520
Ebola versus the coded threat . Uh ,

56:47.530 --> 56:50.150
the Ebola pathogen was declared as a

56:50.150 --> 56:52.206
threat pathogen by C . D . C . Which

56:52.206 --> 56:54.372
allowed duty to expand its resource is

56:54.372 --> 56:57.220
against a threat . Uh , cove in 19 as a

56:57.230 --> 56:59.341
considered a pandemic and a disease ,

56:59.341 --> 57:01.174
uh , prevented us from using Kim

57:01.174 --> 57:03.341
biodefense program money . But we have

57:03.341 --> 57:05.286
used our expertise in several ways

57:05.286 --> 57:07.508
using cares act money . We've been able

57:07.508 --> 57:09.674
thio , uh , actually benefit from that

57:09.674 --> 57:11.841
We have a program underway that , uh ,

57:11.841 --> 57:13.730
is looking at rapid assessment of

57:13.730 --> 57:15.674
environments . We call it the rate

57:15.674 --> 57:17.841
Program , in this case , using using a

57:17.841 --> 57:19.952
wearable technologies . We're looking

57:19.952 --> 57:22.100
at identifying the onset of symptoms

57:22.100 --> 57:24.490
and illnesses not specifically Covic ,

57:24.490 --> 57:26.657
but would give us some advanced notice

57:26.657 --> 57:28.601
that illness , maybe on the way 48

57:28.601 --> 57:30.546
hours earlier than projected . The

57:30.546 --> 57:32.712
appropriate testing could take place .

57:32.712 --> 57:34.934
So our expertise has been applied , but

57:34.934 --> 57:36.990
not specifically the came by defense

57:36.990 --> 57:39.560
funding E m . I can't inspire , but

57:40.030 --> 57:42.141
thank you . We have to have some work

57:42.141 --> 57:44.197
to do in these areas and strength in

57:44.197 --> 57:46.419
the area . The authorities . You should

57:46.419 --> 57:48.419
be able to users r and D funds at a

57:48.419 --> 57:50.530
time like this on . We will work with

57:50.530 --> 57:52.697
you to make sure that that , uh , that

57:52.697 --> 57:54.863
happens . Thank you . Chairman of your

57:54.863 --> 57:57.086
back . Thank you , Mr Chairman . Let me

57:57.086 --> 57:59.252
now recognize my good friend gentlemen

57:59.252 --> 57:59.160
from Washington , Mr Larson .

58:04.120 --> 58:06.640
Thank you . Perfect , Mr Chairman .

58:07.320 --> 58:09.760
So first question , I think it's

58:09.760 --> 58:13.710
probably for Mr Oxford . Um , just

58:13.710 --> 58:17.240
wondering if you can help us understand

58:17.920 --> 58:20.950
with regards the biological threat .

58:22.320 --> 58:25.020
Kind of what that role is for detract

58:25.230 --> 58:28.030
from response . And then what That role

58:28.030 --> 58:30.310
is for Detroit in terms of contributing

58:30.310 --> 58:33.060
to the future . Thinking about what to

58:33.060 --> 58:36.550
do . Are you strictly a responding to

58:36.550 --> 58:40.530
requests , or do you have , uh , a role

58:40.530 --> 58:43.390
and planning ahead and proliferating

58:43.400 --> 58:45.567
that information about what to do when

58:45.567 --> 58:47.844
you plan ahead ? Thank you , Mr Larson .

58:47.844 --> 58:49.956
Way actually play two roles in the in

58:49.956 --> 58:52.011
the CTR program . We're actually not

58:52.011 --> 58:54.178
really in a response role , but in the

58:54.178 --> 58:56.344
in the covert environment is Mr Lester

58:56.344 --> 58:58.344
said , the years worth of work that

58:58.344 --> 58:57.950
we've done to prepare some of those

58:57.950 --> 59:00.520
nations , they were able to rapidly

59:00.520 --> 59:02.409
respond they needed . They needed

59:02.409 --> 59:04.409
infusion of some capabilities , for

59:04.409 --> 59:06.409
example , ppd . Test kits and those

59:06.409 --> 59:08.187
kind of things , uh , Morocco .

59:08.187 --> 59:10.298
Specifically , there were 199 trained

59:10.298 --> 59:12.242
laboratory technicians that we had

59:12.242 --> 59:14.298
trained through the CTR program . So

59:14.298 --> 59:16.520
with $100,000 worth of PPE were able to

59:16.520 --> 59:18.464
get them in a situation where they

59:18.464 --> 59:20.464
could start doing the response . So

59:20.464 --> 59:22.631
we're not really a response program in

59:22.631 --> 59:22.440
that regards . But we are able to

59:22.450 --> 59:24.561
benefit from what we've done over the

59:24.561 --> 59:26.617
decades or so of working with them .

59:26.617 --> 59:28.561
And they came by defense program .

59:28.561 --> 59:30.672
We're actually on the cutting edge of

59:30.672 --> 59:32.783
all the research and development , So

59:32.783 --> 59:34.783
we are looking forward . Uh , as as

59:34.783 --> 59:36.950
we've made reference , the things like

59:36.950 --> 59:38.950
synthetic bio we fully understand ,

59:38.950 --> 59:41.172
based on the technical expertise , what

59:41.172 --> 59:43.283
the nefarious ways that synthetic bio

59:43.283 --> 59:45.394
could be used . So on the flip side ,

59:45.394 --> 59:47.450
we're also looking for the offensive

59:47.450 --> 59:48.950
advantage we might gain by

59:48.950 --> 59:51.061
understanding synthetic bio by making

59:51.061 --> 59:53.283
detectors better able to resolve things

59:53.283 --> 59:55.117
faster . So we do have that four

59:55.117 --> 59:57.172
forward look through the science and

59:57.172 --> 59:57.160
technology program that we operate .

59:57.820 --> 01:00:00.120
Yeah , Mr Lassiter . Kind of . On that

01:00:00.120 --> 01:00:02.287
point , it's two approaches . One is I

01:00:02.287 --> 01:00:05.230
noted in your testimony and your

01:00:05.230 --> 01:00:07.370
written testimony talking . You talk

01:00:07.370 --> 01:00:09.370
about how you're organized and your

01:00:09.370 --> 01:00:11.300
role on DCU operation with the

01:00:11.300 --> 01:00:13.078
Department of Defense . Are any

01:00:13.078 --> 01:00:15.022
research and engineering ? Can you

01:00:15.022 --> 01:00:17.300
discuss that a little bit ? And second ,

01:00:17.300 --> 01:00:19.356
I don't know if this would be for Mr

01:00:19.356 --> 01:00:22.250
Last for Mr Oxford . Um , the

01:00:22.770 --> 01:00:26.080
the the combination of where ? Emerging

01:00:26.090 --> 01:00:28.423
technologies meat . I think it was . Mr .

01:00:28.423 --> 01:00:30.257
Lassiter has written testimony ,

01:00:30.257 --> 01:00:32.368
discussion about drone technology and

01:00:32.368 --> 01:00:34.423
dissemination of biological agents .

01:00:34.423 --> 01:00:36.646
Maybe you could touch on that . What we

01:00:36.646 --> 01:00:38.534
ought to be thinking about in the

01:00:38.534 --> 01:00:42.260
future . Thank you ,

01:00:42.260 --> 01:00:44.427
congressman . Appreciate the questions

01:00:44.427 --> 01:00:46.371
very much . Very important . We're

01:00:46.371 --> 01:00:48.427
spending , you know , quite a bit of

01:00:48.427 --> 01:00:50.316
time , and resource is across the

01:00:50.316 --> 01:00:52.316
department s o . I mentioned , uh ,

01:00:52.316 --> 01:00:54.630
research and engineering their vital to

01:00:54.640 --> 01:00:57.330
the efforts to ensure we have going

01:00:57.330 --> 01:00:59.441
forward . What we need , what our war

01:00:59.441 --> 01:01:01.700
fighters need to fight and win a

01:01:01.700 --> 01:01:03.867
contaminated environment . is Director

01:01:03.867 --> 01:01:05.978
Oxford noted at the Cannes biodefense

01:01:05.978 --> 01:01:08.200
program is vital in that , uh , with

01:01:08.200 --> 01:01:10.422
respect to some of these technologies ,

01:01:10.422 --> 01:01:13.080
Um , they are concerning , um the

01:01:13.090 --> 01:01:15.312
department , though , is is right sized

01:01:15.312 --> 01:01:17.980
and fitted to respond to him . So the

01:01:17.980 --> 01:01:20.370
way we are organized lease across the

01:01:20.380 --> 01:01:24.260
sea WMD enterprise , Um , quite robust

01:01:24.270 --> 01:01:26.437
a number of organizations , as you can

01:01:26.437 --> 01:01:28.659
imagine , from the joint staff from our

01:01:28.659 --> 01:01:30.881
policy perspective , Uh , the combatant

01:01:30.881 --> 01:01:32.992
commands the services . So we we come

01:01:32.992 --> 01:01:35.159
together fairly regularly in an effort

01:01:35.159 --> 01:01:37.437
that I think would be , um , highlight .

01:01:37.437 --> 01:01:39.381
And it's important for you to know

01:01:39.381 --> 01:01:41.437
about is the C W m d Unity of Effort

01:01:41.437 --> 01:01:43.700
Council three star level council . Um ,

01:01:43.710 --> 01:01:45.488
Director Oxford and I obviously

01:01:45.488 --> 01:01:48.180
participate in that Andi in that forum

01:01:48.180 --> 01:01:51.200
were able to flow these issues up for

01:01:51.200 --> 01:01:53.870
discussion and decision . Uh , it's a

01:01:53.880 --> 01:01:56.350
It's an area that we can get full

01:01:56.350 --> 01:01:58.550
information across the department and

01:01:58.550 --> 01:02:00.661
make decisions at the highest level .

01:02:00.661 --> 01:02:02.772
And so we think that is vital to some

01:02:02.772 --> 01:02:05.050
of these issues that you highlight now .

01:02:05.050 --> 01:02:07.217
Obviously , you know , in this setting

01:02:07.217 --> 01:02:09.217
a little harder to get into some of

01:02:09.217 --> 01:02:11.217
those issues . I know you recognize

01:02:11.217 --> 01:02:12.994
that , Um , but we are . We are

01:02:12.994 --> 01:02:15.217
resourced properly and we're right size

01:02:15.217 --> 01:02:17.272
to go after those threats are e Just

01:02:17.272 --> 01:02:20.580
follow up on part of that . Um ,

01:02:20.590 --> 01:02:23.280
you obviously you don't run D o d s

01:02:23.280 --> 01:02:25.169
research and engineering . That's

01:02:25.169 --> 01:02:27.224
another division is pretty high up ,

01:02:27.224 --> 01:02:29.336
obviously . And the organ ? The organ

01:02:29.336 --> 01:02:31.391
chart that Pentagon Do you have that

01:02:31.391 --> 01:02:34.020
opportunity ? The opportunity ? Um um ,

01:02:34.600 --> 01:02:38.450
has our any come to recognize

01:02:38.450 --> 01:02:40.617
this is a higher priority now is Or is

01:02:40.617 --> 01:02:42.617
this something you're having ? Thio

01:02:42.617 --> 01:02:45.730
battle out with research engineering in

01:02:45.730 --> 01:02:47.940
their list of priorities that they've

01:02:47.940 --> 01:02:51.690
already had . Well , you know , I

01:02:51.700 --> 01:02:54.090
speak fairly regularly with Dr Michelle

01:02:54.090 --> 01:02:56.700
Rosa who who covers down on this issue

01:02:56.700 --> 01:02:59.350
set as you recognize a lot of

01:02:59.360 --> 01:03:01.360
tremendous talent at the department

01:03:01.360 --> 01:03:03.527
across the intelligence community that

01:03:03.527 --> 01:03:06.000
flows us information on a daily basis ,

01:03:06.000 --> 01:03:09.170
if not hourly basis . So if we need to

01:03:09.170 --> 01:03:12.020
flex , And that's one thing that Mr

01:03:12.020 --> 01:03:14.076
Oxford Director Oxfords organization

01:03:14.076 --> 01:03:16.540
Detroit Uh , they're very agile . Eso

01:03:16.540 --> 01:03:18.900
If we need to adjust to go after a

01:03:18.900 --> 01:03:21.620
threat , we can do it . But way do

01:03:21.620 --> 01:03:23.564
welcome the interest in support of

01:03:23.564 --> 01:03:26.670
Congress and doing so . We welcome

01:03:26.670 --> 01:03:28.670
giving you the support and the more

01:03:28.670 --> 01:03:30.948
importantly , the interest in doing so .

01:03:30.948 --> 01:03:34.410
Thanks so much . Thank you . Thank you .

01:03:34.410 --> 01:03:36.521
Let me recognize a gentleman from the

01:03:36.521 --> 01:03:38.466
Commonwealth of Massachusetts , Mr

01:03:38.466 --> 01:03:41.830
Keating . Thank you , Mr Chairman .

01:03:41.840 --> 01:03:45.760
Thank our witnesses . Uh , I was a ZA

01:03:45.760 --> 01:03:47.649
member of both armed services and

01:03:47.649 --> 01:03:49.760
foreign Affairs . I want to thank you

01:03:49.760 --> 01:03:52.730
both for this joint hearing . Ah , but

01:03:52.730 --> 01:03:55.860
I want to address , uh , you know how

01:03:55.870 --> 01:03:57.981
the sharing that was mentioned by the

01:03:57.981 --> 01:04:00.450
witnesses before of information eyes

01:04:00.450 --> 01:04:03.900
critical . And so I want to ask , uh ,

01:04:03.910 --> 01:04:07.470
as the Kobe 19 pandemic progressed and

01:04:07.470 --> 01:04:10.430
military intelligence followed it , uh ,

01:04:10.890 --> 01:04:13.150
and saw that escalation just from a

01:04:13.150 --> 01:04:16.430
timeframe . What ? What kinds of levels

01:04:16.430 --> 01:04:19.000
of alert occurred in January and

01:04:19.000 --> 01:04:21.680
February during that period , was there

01:04:21.680 --> 01:04:25.470
a change in , uh , the level of alert

01:04:25.480 --> 01:04:27.424
based on our military intelligence

01:04:27.424 --> 01:04:30.560
during that period on , did it occur in

01:04:30.560 --> 01:04:33.910
January and February or or February ?

01:04:37.590 --> 01:04:39.701
Thank you , sir , For that question .

01:04:39.701 --> 01:04:42.034
What I can tell you is that in february ,

01:04:42.034 --> 01:04:44.146
uh , Secretary Esper identified three

01:04:44.146 --> 01:04:46.220
priorities , um , to combat covert .

01:04:46.230 --> 01:04:49.080
First being to protect our people , uh ,

01:04:49.090 --> 01:04:51.700
second , to maintain mission readiness

01:04:51.710 --> 01:04:54.490
on day three to ensure that we're

01:04:54.490 --> 01:04:56.434
supporting the whole of government

01:04:56.434 --> 01:04:58.600
effort . Um um , with that came , you

01:04:58.600 --> 01:05:00.656
know , least internally within D o d

01:05:00.890 --> 01:05:04.090
different health protection levels .

01:05:04.090 --> 01:05:06.620
And so , uh , pretty early Azul

01:05:06.620 --> 01:05:09.530
probably recall in March , Alisa's ast

01:05:09.540 --> 01:05:11.762
relates to the department defense . You

01:05:11.762 --> 01:05:13.596
know , we were put in h B . Khan

01:05:13.596 --> 01:05:16.550
situation that reduced the number of

01:05:16.560 --> 01:05:19.770
folks present at their at their jobs .

01:05:19.780 --> 01:05:23.260
So with that information flow , uh ,

01:05:23.270 --> 01:05:25.330
did happen and does happen . I think

01:05:25.330 --> 01:05:27.820
we've pointed out all of us here today

01:05:27.820 --> 01:05:30.630
that information flow is vital . While

01:05:30.630 --> 01:05:32.797
the intelligence community can collect

01:05:32.797 --> 01:05:35.430
and does collect information , analyze

01:05:35.430 --> 01:05:37.920
and gets it out to policymakers on to

01:05:37.920 --> 01:05:41.290
include Congress . There must be flow

01:05:41.290 --> 01:05:45.030
of information across the entire globe .

01:05:45.030 --> 01:05:47.350
And it must happen from all parties in

01:05:47.350 --> 01:05:49.920
all countries . We can't expect just

01:05:49.930 --> 01:05:52.020
the United States , and yes , sir .

01:05:52.030 --> 01:05:55.590
Sorry . Good . Please . Uh , was there

01:05:55.600 --> 01:05:58.360
a level of alert change there

01:05:58.360 --> 01:06:02.280
Corresponded with that in a zoo

01:06:02.280 --> 01:06:04.420
early as february ? Well , sir , as

01:06:04.420 --> 01:06:07.300
early as February , uh , in in March

01:06:07.300 --> 01:06:09.467
was when , um , I believe I have to go

01:06:09.467 --> 01:06:11.522
back for the exact date , but that's

01:06:11.522 --> 01:06:13.890
when the HP con changed . Obviously ,

01:06:13.900 --> 01:06:16.067
over the course of those months before

01:06:16.067 --> 01:06:18.350
information was continuing to flow on

01:06:18.350 --> 01:06:20.760
the proper um , you know , resource is

01:06:20.760 --> 01:06:22.960
applied to analyzing that important ,

01:06:22.970 --> 01:06:26.890
but here was there a change

01:06:26.890 --> 01:06:29.790
to a Level one alert in February .

01:06:33.480 --> 01:06:35.647
So that would have been the first time

01:06:35.647 --> 01:06:37.910
in our history that a pandemic raised

01:06:37.910 --> 01:06:40.132
itself to that level . Did that occur ?

01:06:40.980 --> 01:06:43.147
E . So I can't tell you the exact date

01:06:43.147 --> 01:06:45.091
I need to go back and get that and

01:06:45.091 --> 01:06:47.258
provide that information to you in the

01:06:47.258 --> 01:06:51.210
committee . Please . Um ,

01:06:52.680 --> 01:06:55.920
let's assume that it might have , uh

01:06:56.480 --> 01:06:58.950
would you transfer that information

01:06:58.950 --> 01:07:02.210
immediately ? Uh , to our state

01:07:02.220 --> 01:07:04.730
agencies and our agencies of state ,

01:07:04.730 --> 01:07:08.110
State department in Congress .

01:07:09.080 --> 01:07:11.080
So , as you know , the intelligence

01:07:11.080 --> 01:07:13.136
community is quite large . Um and so

01:07:13.136 --> 01:07:15.140
all the organizations today have an

01:07:15.140 --> 01:07:17.960
intelligence portion to them on dso

01:07:17.970 --> 01:07:20.081
That information is shared across the

01:07:20.081 --> 01:07:22.192
intelligence community . I say that ,

01:07:22.192 --> 01:07:24.414
but information generally shared across

01:07:24.414 --> 01:07:27.350
the intelligence community on DSO We do

01:07:27.350 --> 01:07:29.350
that on a daily basis , and we flow

01:07:29.350 --> 01:07:33.160
information back and forth . I

01:07:33.160 --> 01:07:36.840
think Well , my concern is that , uh ,

01:07:36.850 --> 01:07:39.840
Congress was not notified in his timely

01:07:39.840 --> 01:07:43.650
A fashion to those changes . Eso if you

01:07:43.650 --> 01:07:45.483
could get back to the respective

01:07:45.483 --> 01:07:48.990
committees , uh , tie down that date .

01:07:49.380 --> 01:07:52.910
Uh , and what the

01:07:52.910 --> 01:07:56.530
significance Waas because , uh , it's

01:07:56.530 --> 01:07:58.752
my understanding and in terms of what's

01:07:58.752 --> 01:08:00.919
publicly accessible , that there was a

01:08:00.919 --> 01:08:03.160
change . It's my understanding that it

01:08:03.160 --> 01:08:06.900
was historic in terms of the first time

01:08:07.270 --> 01:08:10.220
a pandemic was addressed with that

01:08:10.220 --> 01:08:12.780
level of change . And I'm concerned

01:08:12.780 --> 01:08:15.760
about the sharing of information ,

01:08:15.780 --> 01:08:19.540
which was slow to Congress , whether it

01:08:19.540 --> 01:08:21.520
was also slow to our other State

01:08:21.520 --> 01:08:24.240
Department agencies and relevant

01:08:24.240 --> 01:08:26.840
agencies . And the agency's appearing

01:08:26.840 --> 01:08:29.260
before the committee here today because

01:08:29.260 --> 01:08:31.430
indeed , if we are going to do this ,

01:08:31.440 --> 01:08:34.390
what you've said , his witnesses

01:08:34.400 --> 01:08:36.567
placing the importance on sharing that

01:08:36.567 --> 01:08:38.678
information , it's critical . It's my

01:08:38.678 --> 01:08:40.900
concern that that was not being done in

01:08:40.900 --> 01:08:43.011
a timely fashion . So if you get back

01:08:43.011 --> 01:08:45.067
to us , uh , I would appreciate that

01:08:45.067 --> 01:08:48.580
that Mr Chairman , I yield back . Thank

01:08:48.580 --> 01:08:50.747
you , Mr Keating . Let me recognize my

01:08:50.747 --> 01:08:52.413
good friend from the state of

01:08:52.413 --> 01:08:55.910
California , Mr . Sherman . Thank you .

01:08:56.270 --> 01:08:59.050
Uh , there's been discussion , uh , I

01:08:59.050 --> 01:09:01.840
believe by first ranking member to the

01:09:01.840 --> 01:09:05.090
quote complicity of the W h o . The W .

01:09:05.090 --> 01:09:07.320
H O . Is a coordinating organization .

01:09:07.320 --> 01:09:10.970
It's not an Intel organization . It has

01:09:10.970 --> 01:09:13.960
no way to know whether what China is

01:09:13.960 --> 01:09:16.230
saying is complete and true and

01:09:16.230 --> 01:09:19.210
transparent or not , you know , who

01:09:19.220 --> 01:09:22.370
does have an Intel organization ? The

01:09:22.370 --> 01:09:24.750
United States government and our

01:09:24.750 --> 01:09:28.310
intelligence is designed to know when

01:09:28.310 --> 01:09:31.440
China is not telling the truth . In

01:09:31.440 --> 01:09:33.870
fact , the president was informed that

01:09:33.870 --> 01:09:37.510
this was breaking out in Wuhan Far

01:09:37.520 --> 01:09:39.353
Mawr than the Chinese government

01:09:39.353 --> 01:09:42.540
indicated . He chose to ignore

01:09:42.550 --> 01:09:45.640
that that intelligence ,

01:09:46.270 --> 01:09:49.780
just as he seems to have ignored , um

01:09:50.670 --> 01:09:54.440
much to the to the unfortunate

01:09:54.450 --> 01:09:57.350
harm to himself and his wife , uh ,

01:09:57.360 --> 01:09:59.750
ignored the best advice on how to avoid

01:09:59.750 --> 01:10:02.028
getting this disease and unfortunately ,

01:10:02.028 --> 01:10:04.890
misled millions of Americans as well

01:10:05.460 --> 01:10:08.700
into not wearing masks . Um ,

01:10:09.760 --> 01:10:13.720
we spend many hundreds of billions

01:10:13.720 --> 01:10:15.720
of dollars defending ourselves from

01:10:15.720 --> 01:10:18.390
Connecticut threats and very little on

01:10:18.390 --> 01:10:21.870
defending ourselves from anything else .

01:10:22.560 --> 01:10:26.340
Uh , we have did not

01:10:26.340 --> 01:10:29.390
have civil defense designed for either

01:10:29.670 --> 01:10:33.260
a deliberate or naturally

01:10:33.260 --> 01:10:37.050
occurring plague . We did not have

01:10:37.050 --> 01:10:39.810
stockpiles of PPE . We did not have ,

01:10:39.820 --> 01:10:42.430
uh , the education . We did not have

01:10:42.440 --> 01:10:44.551
the ventilators . Although we quickly

01:10:44.551 --> 01:10:47.080
made some on we did not have the

01:10:48.320 --> 01:10:52.300
capacity to do tracing uh , this all

01:10:52.310 --> 01:10:55.200
in spite of the fact that the national

01:10:55.200 --> 01:10:57.520
security strategy recognize that

01:10:57.520 --> 01:10:59.760
biological incidents have the this was

01:10:59.760 --> 01:11:02.160
in 2017 the potential to cause

01:11:02.160 --> 01:11:04.060
catastrophic loss of life and the

01:11:04.060 --> 01:11:06.590
threats air growing . Whether is as a

01:11:06.600 --> 01:11:09.570
result of deliberate attack , accident

01:11:09.760 --> 01:11:12.480
or natural outbreak . Which raises the

01:11:12.480 --> 01:11:15.060
question . Um , and I know we're not in

01:11:15.060 --> 01:11:18.150
a classified setting . What is the

01:11:18.160 --> 01:11:21.080
administration's operating assumptions

01:11:21.080 --> 01:11:24.610
or likelihood ? Or how would we assign

01:11:24.610 --> 01:11:27.620
percentage likelihoods to the four

01:11:27.630 --> 01:11:30.420
possibilities as to how , uh , this

01:11:30.430 --> 01:11:33.950
this plague began ? We're told perhaps

01:11:33.950 --> 01:11:36.390
it came from the wet market .

01:11:37.060 --> 01:11:40.400
And , uh , it may have come from the

01:11:40.400 --> 01:11:42.910
Wuhan lab , uh , which might have been

01:11:42.910 --> 01:11:45.190
engaged entirely peaceful activities

01:11:45.190 --> 01:11:49.170
that had a a tragic release . It

01:11:49.170 --> 01:11:51.281
could have come from a Wuhan lab that

01:11:51.281 --> 01:11:53.448
was engaged in military activities but

01:11:53.448 --> 01:11:55.503
had an unintentional release , and I

01:11:55.503 --> 01:11:57.726
think least likely it all it could have

01:11:57.726 --> 01:12:00.130
come deliberately from Wuhan lab . Do

01:12:00.130 --> 01:12:03.680
we have any operating assumptions or

01:12:03.680 --> 01:12:05.902
all of those ? Uh , possible . Although

01:12:05.902 --> 01:12:08.069
I think the deliberate leases highly ,

01:12:08.069 --> 01:12:10.124
highly unlikely . Uh , what does the

01:12:10.124 --> 01:12:11.902
administration ? Where does the

01:12:11.902 --> 01:12:13.958
administration think is the cause of

01:12:13.958 --> 01:12:12.800
this ?

01:12:18.050 --> 01:12:20.050
Thank you , Congressman Sherman . I

01:12:20.050 --> 01:12:22.730
It's a It's an important question . Um ,

01:12:22.740 --> 01:12:26.180
e I think we are , um , we has a

01:12:26.190 --> 01:12:28.412
international community , but obviously

01:12:28.412 --> 01:12:30.579
the U . S government . Um , you know ,

01:12:30.579 --> 01:12:32.746
we're still , uh , one . We're working

01:12:32.746 --> 01:12:35.870
right now presently to respond to this

01:12:35.870 --> 01:12:37.981
crisis . As you were saying , Any one

01:12:37.981 --> 01:12:40.037
of those possibilities is possible .

01:12:40.037 --> 01:12:42.148
And the U . S government doesn't have

01:12:42.148 --> 01:12:44.310
much of an opinion on on which is the

01:12:44.310 --> 01:12:46.421
cause to the other witnesses agree to

01:12:46.421 --> 01:12:48.480
that , Mr Moore .

01:12:49.750 --> 01:12:51.972
Congressman Sherman , thank you for the

01:12:51.972 --> 01:12:54.130
question you have mentioned for

01:12:54.130 --> 01:12:56.230
possible scenarios and certainly in

01:12:56.230 --> 01:12:59.590
discussions in an open forum . Uh ,

01:12:59.600 --> 01:13:02.760
there's a varying levels of possibility .

01:13:02.770 --> 01:13:05.840
What we do know is that the virus

01:13:05.840 --> 01:13:09.630
described as co vid 19 was described in

01:13:09.640 --> 01:13:12.440
academic research that was published

01:13:12.440 --> 01:13:14.496
several years ago , including in the

01:13:14.496 --> 01:13:16.718
People's Republic of China , identified

01:13:16.718 --> 01:13:20.380
as existing in animals . It is , ah ,

01:13:20.390 --> 01:13:22.660
disease does the virus of zoonotic

01:13:22.660 --> 01:13:25.770
origin . But exactly as you say , sir ,

01:13:25.780 --> 01:13:27.891
there are multiple . The idea that it

01:13:27.891 --> 01:13:30.850
was engineered is probably dismissed by

01:13:30.850 --> 01:13:34.460
that and quickly ask normally ,

01:13:34.470 --> 01:13:36.637
when there's a catastrophe , the first

01:13:36.637 --> 01:13:38.637
thing anybody does is you close the

01:13:38.637 --> 01:13:41.420
barn door . Uh , China has said that

01:13:41.430 --> 01:13:43.319
this has come from a wet market .

01:13:43.319 --> 01:13:45.374
They're wet markets all over China .

01:13:45.374 --> 01:13:48.640
Has there been a massive change in how

01:13:48.650 --> 01:13:50.890
exotic animals air sold for human

01:13:50.890 --> 01:13:53.460
consumption throughout China ? That's

01:13:53.460 --> 01:13:55.571
an extremely important point and also

01:13:55.571 --> 01:13:57.738
something under the purview of the O s

01:13:57.738 --> 01:13:59.960
Bureau of State Wildlife trafficking is

01:13:59.960 --> 01:14:02.127
a huge problem . The People's Republic

01:14:02.127 --> 01:14:04.182
of China continues to be the largest

01:14:04.182 --> 01:14:06.349
market for Has there been a big change

01:14:06.349 --> 01:14:09.750
from early 2019 Thio now late 2020 in

01:14:09.760 --> 01:14:11.871
how these markets are , there has not

01:14:11.871 --> 01:14:14.038
been a fundamental permanent change in

01:14:14.038 --> 01:14:15.927
blocking illegal wildlife trade ,

01:14:15.927 --> 01:14:18.038
including its sale at wet markets and

01:14:18.038 --> 01:14:20.260
the People's Republic of China . It's a

01:14:20.260 --> 01:14:22.204
practice which does exist in other

01:14:22.204 --> 01:14:24.316
countries as well , and we're working

01:14:24.316 --> 01:14:26.970
to end it . Thank you . Let me now

01:14:26.970 --> 01:14:29.610
recognize the gentleman from Michigan ,

01:14:29.610 --> 01:14:30.450
Mr . Levin .

01:14:33.440 --> 01:14:36.360
Thank you so much , Mr . Chairman , for

01:14:36.360 --> 01:14:39.170
convening this super important hearing .

01:14:39.940 --> 01:14:43.010
It's no secret toe breast the world

01:14:43.010 --> 01:14:45.610
that the Providence antique pandemic

01:14:45.620 --> 01:14:48.550
was allowed to spiral out of control

01:14:48.550 --> 01:14:52.460
entry United States to

01:14:52.470 --> 01:14:55.830
the American dive case count were

01:14:55.830 --> 01:14:58.380
falling months ago , but the New York

01:14:58.380 --> 01:15:00.602
Times report this week that case counts

01:15:00.602 --> 01:15:02.920
are climbing at around the same case as

01:15:02.920 --> 01:15:04.587
when New York City cases were

01:15:04.587 --> 01:15:08.390
skyrocketing way back in March . The

01:15:08.390 --> 01:15:10.446
whole world can see this happening ,

01:15:10.446 --> 01:15:12.612
including those who wish to do harm to

01:15:12.612 --> 01:15:14.510
our country , so let me pose this

01:15:14.510 --> 01:15:17.580
question to Mr Oxford and Mr More . Do

01:15:17.580 --> 01:15:19.302
you believe that there will be

01:15:19.302 --> 01:15:21.910
heightened interest on the part of

01:15:21.910 --> 01:15:24.860
state and non state actor and

01:15:24.860 --> 01:15:27.250
developing an employee Biological

01:15:27.250 --> 01:15:29.680
weapons against Americans ? And if yes ,

01:15:29.690 --> 01:15:31.746
how will the Department of State and

01:15:31.746 --> 01:15:33.810
Defense , respectively , prepare for

01:15:33.810 --> 01:15:34.870
that possibility ?

01:15:39.440 --> 01:15:41.218
I apologize , sir . I did . The

01:15:41.218 --> 01:15:43.329
transmission was a little imprecise .

01:15:43.329 --> 01:15:45.440
What exact question would you like me

01:15:45.440 --> 01:15:49.310
to respond to , sir ? Sorry

01:15:49.310 --> 01:15:53.080
about that . Um , my question is , do

01:15:53.080 --> 01:15:55.191
you do you think there will be , ah ,

01:15:55.191 --> 01:15:57.590
heightened interest on the part of

01:15:57.590 --> 01:16:01.460
state and non state actors

01:16:01.930 --> 01:16:04.097
in developing an employment biological

01:16:04.097 --> 01:16:06.374
weapons against Americans ? And if yes ,

01:16:06.530 --> 01:16:08.586
how will the Department of State and

01:16:08.586 --> 01:16:10.760
Defense prepare for that possibility

01:16:13.330 --> 01:16:15.219
with regard to the development of

01:16:15.219 --> 01:16:17.441
biological weapons , I think that would

01:16:17.441 --> 01:16:19.552
be better addressed to my colleague .

01:16:19.552 --> 01:16:21.274
Mr . Dahl is from the bureau .

01:16:24.230 --> 01:16:27.750
Okay , I This is a difficult

01:16:27.750 --> 01:16:30.300
question to address in an unclassified

01:16:30.300 --> 01:16:33.510
context . I guess what I can say is ,

01:16:33.520 --> 01:16:36.490
um , that we continually review these

01:16:36.500 --> 01:16:39.580
issues . Um , we had a discussion , uh ,

01:16:39.590 --> 01:16:41.646
two days ago with our colleagues who

01:16:41.646 --> 01:16:45.420
are experts on these issues . I think I

01:16:45.430 --> 01:16:48.330
take your point that the pandemic . As

01:16:48.330 --> 01:16:52.120
I testified , Thio , uh , poses

01:16:52.130 --> 01:16:55.840
a substantial , enormous challenge to

01:16:55.840 --> 01:16:59.080
international security , and it must

01:16:59.080 --> 01:17:00.920
inherently be the case that our

01:17:00.920 --> 01:17:02.587
adversaries , whether they're

01:17:02.587 --> 01:17:04.960
terrorists or states , we'll take that

01:17:04.960 --> 01:17:07.250
into account in considering how to

01:17:07.250 --> 01:17:08.917
evolve their weapon systems .

01:17:12.830 --> 01:17:15.960
All right , let me other question

01:17:15.970 --> 01:17:19.390
January of 2017 the

01:17:19.390 --> 01:17:22.590
CBC's president presence in China has

01:17:22.590 --> 01:17:25.860
decreased from about 47 personnel to

01:17:25.860 --> 01:17:29.280
14 with epidemiologist professionals

01:17:29.280 --> 01:17:31.650
getting cut the National Science

01:17:31.650 --> 01:17:34.500
Foundation and use A I'd also closed

01:17:34.500 --> 01:17:36.778
their Beijing offices during this time .

01:17:36.778 --> 01:17:38.944
And on top of that , the Department of

01:17:38.944 --> 01:17:41.111
Agriculture transferred the manager of

01:17:41.111 --> 01:17:43.167
an animal disease monitoring program

01:17:43.167 --> 01:17:46.840
out of China in 2018 . So over the past

01:17:46.840 --> 01:17:49.230
four years we've gotten rid of a bunch

01:17:49.230 --> 01:17:51.480
of people who , it seems to me , would

01:17:51.480 --> 01:17:54.260
have been helpful to have in place as

01:17:54.260 --> 01:17:57.130
Covad 19 was emerging . At the very

01:17:57.130 --> 01:18:00.050
least , I think it would be helpful to

01:18:00.050 --> 01:18:02.430
have reliable sources of information

01:18:02.440 --> 01:18:04.607
about what was really happening on the

01:18:04.607 --> 01:18:07.710
ground . Mr Oxford and Mr More in

01:18:07.710 --> 01:18:10.590
general . Why does the US have experts

01:18:10.590 --> 01:18:12.830
like epidemiologists station in other

01:18:12.830 --> 01:18:14.774
countries ? And how does this help

01:18:14.774 --> 01:18:17.450
defend us against biological threats ?

01:18:21.320 --> 01:18:23.542
So so again , from a Defense Department

01:18:23.542 --> 01:18:25.264
perspective , especially as an

01:18:25.264 --> 01:18:27.431
implementing organization , you know ,

01:18:27.431 --> 01:18:29.653
we're not responsible for where CDC and

01:18:29.653 --> 01:18:31.709
others operate overseas . So I would

01:18:31.709 --> 01:18:33.820
have Toldo either State Department or

01:18:33.820 --> 01:18:36.042
go back to those other departments that

01:18:36.042 --> 01:18:37.487
do those kind of things .

01:18:40.320 --> 01:18:42.153
All right , let's hear the state

01:18:42.153 --> 01:18:44.610
perspective . Thank you , sir . We

01:18:44.610 --> 01:18:47.920
would be pleased to offer more detailed

01:18:47.930 --> 01:18:51.340
timeline of who was assigned under the

01:18:51.340 --> 01:18:53.396
authority of the chief of mission in

01:18:53.396 --> 01:18:56.750
Beijing . At what time ? I think the

01:18:56.760 --> 01:19:00.190
context for individual agencies sending

01:19:00.190 --> 01:19:02.230
staff there or reducing their staff

01:19:02.230 --> 01:19:04.452
there has a lot to do with both there .

01:19:04.470 --> 01:19:06.414
There needs their budgets and , of

01:19:06.414 --> 01:19:08.637
course , the viability of the work that

01:19:08.637 --> 01:19:11.190
they can actually do . Uh , the one of

01:19:11.190 --> 01:19:13.412
the constraints we faced with regard to

01:19:13.412 --> 01:19:15.579
the People's Republic of China is that

01:19:15.579 --> 01:19:17.690
we still have not received all of the

01:19:17.690 --> 01:19:19.801
data We would need to receive initial

01:19:19.801 --> 01:19:22.540
samples of the virus that have been

01:19:22.540 --> 01:19:24.429
sought since the beginning of the

01:19:24.429 --> 01:19:26.762
pandemic , even at the end of last year .

01:19:26.920 --> 01:19:30.320
That is extremely problematic , as is

01:19:30.320 --> 01:19:32.376
the work of the People's Republic of

01:19:32.376 --> 01:19:34.264
China to prevent the World Health

01:19:34.264 --> 01:19:36.431
Organization from declaring Cove in 19

01:19:36.431 --> 01:19:38.042
a public health emergency of

01:19:38.042 --> 01:19:40.153
international concern When that topic

01:19:40.153 --> 01:19:42.320
initially came up for discussion a w h

01:19:42.320 --> 01:19:44.600
O in Geneva with regard to the specific

01:19:44.600 --> 01:19:46.920
agencies . Um , with apologies , I'd

01:19:46.920 --> 01:19:48.531
have to take that question .

01:19:52.220 --> 01:19:55.040
All right . Mr . Close By saying that I

01:19:55.040 --> 01:19:58.170
think it's extremely problematic for us

01:19:58.170 --> 01:20:00.910
to talk about what the W h o should do

01:20:00.920 --> 01:20:03.142
when we withdraw from it . I think it's

01:20:03.142 --> 01:20:05.420
extremely problematic for us to reduce

01:20:05.420 --> 01:20:08.030
our capability scientific and

01:20:08.030 --> 01:20:11.380
diplomatic in public health

01:20:11.390 --> 01:20:14.840
expertise . Um , um , in

01:20:14.840 --> 01:20:17.840
China and around the world during , ah ,

01:20:17.840 --> 01:20:19.896
global pandemic . And with that with

01:20:19.896 --> 01:20:21.840
Great thanks . I yield back . Mr .

01:20:21.840 --> 01:20:23.951
Chairman . Very good . Thank you , Mr

01:20:23.951 --> 01:20:27.790
Evan . Uh uh , since there

01:20:27.790 --> 01:20:30.540
are no Republicans room right now , the

01:20:30.550 --> 01:20:33.020
Chennai recognizes span burger for five

01:20:33.020 --> 01:20:34.020
minutes .

01:20:39.410 --> 01:20:42.080
I think Miss Bamberger , uh , is having

01:20:42.080 --> 01:20:45.430
some technical , uh , issues . Um ,

01:20:47.210 --> 01:20:50.870
she either . Okay , well , I'm

01:20:50.880 --> 01:20:52.940
I'm told that there are no other

01:20:52.940 --> 01:20:55.630
members in the room right now . Um ,

01:20:56.410 --> 01:20:59.740
so I would suggest

01:21:00.310 --> 01:21:03.910
is Mr Chairman Barrett ,

01:21:03.920 --> 01:21:06.510
uh , plan to come back after voting ,

01:21:06.720 --> 01:21:08.553
and should we recess right now ?

01:21:09.010 --> 01:21:12.910
Uh , I'm waiting to

01:21:12.910 --> 01:21:16.360
hear back from committee staff . Smoke .

01:21:16.370 --> 01:21:18.537
Mr . Chairman , this is , uh this is ,

01:21:18.537 --> 01:21:20.703
uh , represented Larson . I'm the only

01:21:20.703 --> 01:21:22.537
member in the room right now and

01:21:22.537 --> 01:21:25.040
represent Barra is voting . And , uh ,

01:21:25.050 --> 01:21:27.050
we're trying to get staff to answer

01:21:27.050 --> 01:21:29.161
your question about his return . So ,

01:21:29.161 --> 01:21:31.383
folks who just wanna won't recess right

01:21:31.383 --> 01:21:33.439
now . Perhaps you just give us a few

01:21:33.439 --> 01:21:35.717
minutes . Well , well , I'm gonna What ?

01:21:35.717 --> 01:21:37.939
I'll do that if , uh , I'll ask another

01:21:37.939 --> 01:21:39.994
question that I have I don't know if

01:21:39.994 --> 01:21:39.580
we're gonna get to a second round now ,

01:21:39.580 --> 01:21:42.120
but until we get that clarified on this

01:21:42.120 --> 01:21:44.453
damn burger comes back on , then I will ,

01:21:44.510 --> 01:21:46.566
uh , certainly yield to her . But in

01:21:46.566 --> 01:21:49.780
the meantime , let me go ,

01:21:49.790 --> 01:21:53.720
uh , to Mr Ambassador . So

01:21:53.730 --> 01:21:57.670
we've heard that there might have been

01:21:57.680 --> 01:22:01.430
direction , uh , to not spend Cam bio

01:22:01.480 --> 01:22:04.790
defense program funding on the Copa 19

01:22:04.790 --> 01:22:06.890
fight , which , which troubles me of

01:22:06.890 --> 01:22:08.890
true , Uh , even though the program

01:22:08.890 --> 01:22:10.850
specializes in developing kind of

01:22:10.850 --> 01:22:14.740
measures in vaccine , uh , therapeutics

01:22:14.750 --> 01:22:18.500
and pre treatments . What do you need

01:22:18.500 --> 01:22:20.500
from us to ensure that you have the

01:22:20.500 --> 01:22:22.667
authorities and the resource is needed

01:22:22.667 --> 01:22:24.778
so that the department is , in fact ,

01:22:24.778 --> 01:22:26.833
prepared to rise to the challenge of

01:22:26.833 --> 01:22:29.150
emerging threats both today and

01:22:29.150 --> 01:22:31.880
tomorrow ? And is there work that you

01:22:31.880 --> 01:22:34.990
could be doing now , uh , to help the

01:22:35.000 --> 01:22:37.920
country in the cove in 19 fight that

01:22:37.920 --> 01:22:40.087
you don't currently have the authority

01:22:40.087 --> 01:22:43.990
or permission to do . Thank you , Mr

01:22:43.990 --> 01:22:45.970
Chairman . Uh , for for your first

01:22:45.980 --> 01:22:48.170
question , um , or your statement .

01:22:48.180 --> 01:22:50.450
There is no department prohibition or

01:22:50.450 --> 01:22:52.561
proc luge in , uh , I'll say that the

01:22:52.561 --> 01:22:54.783
came by defense program . Primary focus

01:22:54.783 --> 01:22:57.300
is on statutory requirements to develop

01:22:57.300 --> 01:22:59.570
and deliver capabilities that ensure

01:22:59.570 --> 01:23:01.626
the warfighters ability to fight and

01:23:01.626 --> 01:23:03.420
win in a chemical or biological

01:23:03.420 --> 01:23:05.740
contaminated environment . The cove in

01:23:05.740 --> 01:23:08.440
19 support provided to the services in

01:23:08.440 --> 01:23:11.210
an interagency is a combination of

01:23:11.220 --> 01:23:13.920
subject matter expertise , leveraging

01:23:13.920 --> 01:23:16.040
existing contracts , text , but I

01:23:16.040 --> 01:23:18.700
delivery of capabilities as an example ,

01:23:18.700 --> 01:23:20.811
assisting with testing and evaluation

01:23:21.300 --> 01:23:23.980
from helping to create detection ,

01:23:24.160 --> 01:23:27.230
diagnostics and treatment methods . Toe

01:23:27.240 --> 01:23:29.073
investigating vaccines . The Kim

01:23:29.073 --> 01:23:31.370
biodefense program continues to

01:23:31.370 --> 01:23:33.650
collaborate with the whole of

01:23:33.650 --> 01:23:36.160
government partners , industry and

01:23:36.160 --> 01:23:38.530
academia . It's important to note that

01:23:38.530 --> 01:23:40.410
the Kim biodefense program is a

01:23:40.410 --> 01:23:42.760
research development , um , in

01:23:42.760 --> 01:23:44.982
acquisition program and not necessarily

01:23:44.982 --> 01:23:47.520
a response , uh , capability . But I

01:23:47.520 --> 01:23:49.742
will say to your following questions or

01:23:49.742 --> 01:23:51.840
that , uh , the Congress has been

01:23:51.840 --> 01:23:55.090
exceptionally helpful to the

01:23:55.100 --> 01:23:57.267
cooperative threat reduction program .

01:23:57.267 --> 01:23:59.480
Historically is a reference earlier um

01:23:59.490 --> 01:24:02.040
um And over the last number of years

01:24:02.050 --> 01:24:05.120
and so support that we'd asked is

01:24:05.120 --> 01:24:06.953
really continued support for the

01:24:06.953 --> 01:24:09.090
program way . Appreciate the

01:24:09.100 --> 01:24:11.211
information flow between , you know ,

01:24:11.211 --> 01:24:13.378
our department . And I think I can say

01:24:13.378 --> 01:24:15.433
the same for State Department . Um ,

01:24:15.433 --> 01:24:18.020
and between our staffs , um , it's

01:24:18.020 --> 01:24:20.076
exceptional . And we look forward to

01:24:20.076 --> 01:24:22.131
continuing that communication flow .

01:24:22.131 --> 01:24:24.720
Thank you , sir . E no additional

01:24:24.720 --> 01:24:26.664
authorities that you're asking for

01:24:26.664 --> 01:24:28.664
right now that you but enhance your

01:24:28.664 --> 01:24:32.230
work . So I think at the

01:24:32.230 --> 01:24:34.870
moment we're good . I know that our

01:24:34.870 --> 01:24:37.790
staffs have communicated historically ,

01:24:37.800 --> 01:24:41.320
Um , and I hope that they can continue

01:24:41.320 --> 01:24:43.376
to do that part of me . And if we do

01:24:43.376 --> 01:24:46.500
identify on issue or an authority that

01:24:46.500 --> 01:24:48.740
is necessary will be absolutely certain

01:24:48.740 --> 01:24:50.796
to bring that to you and your team .

01:24:51.390 --> 01:24:55.120
Okay . Thank you . Uh , that

01:24:55.120 --> 01:24:58.220
concludes my questions right now . Has

01:24:58.220 --> 01:25:00.331
anyone from the minority returned yet

01:25:00.331 --> 01:25:03.720
or or Miss Bamberger ? She returned .

01:25:06.690 --> 01:25:09.050
Okay . Mr . Chairman , this is Rick

01:25:09.050 --> 01:25:11.320
Larson again . Still the only member in

01:25:11.320 --> 01:25:14.560
the room . Okay . Thank you . Mr Carson .

01:25:14.570 --> 01:25:16.870
Uh , I'll yield now to Miss Bamberger

01:25:16.870 --> 01:25:18.430
if if she's returning .

01:25:22.690 --> 01:25:25.820
Okay . Okay . I understand that she is

01:25:25.820 --> 01:25:28.860
not on . Can you can you hear me ? Can

01:25:28.860 --> 01:25:31.420
you hear me , Mr Lines ? Yes . Yeah , I

01:25:31.420 --> 01:25:33.253
have you . Now , go ahead . Miss

01:25:33.253 --> 01:25:35.420
Bamberger . You're recognized for five

01:25:35.420 --> 01:25:37.642
minutes . Excellent . So thank you very

01:25:37.642 --> 01:25:39.864
much for the witnesses for being here .

01:25:39.864 --> 01:25:41.642
I appreciate your time and your

01:25:41.642 --> 01:25:43.587
presence . I have a question about

01:25:43.587 --> 01:25:45.698
staffing related issues . A za former

01:25:45.698 --> 01:25:47.698
CIA case officer . I'm aware of the

01:25:47.698 --> 01:25:49.864
importance of detecting threats before

01:25:49.864 --> 01:25:52.087
they actually harm Americans . And that

01:25:52.087 --> 01:25:54.198
must be our approach when it comes to

01:25:54.198 --> 01:25:56.309
biological security as well . We have

01:25:56.309 --> 01:25:58.198
to get in front of biological and

01:25:58.198 --> 01:26:00.420
health security risks before they could

01:26:00.420 --> 01:26:02.642
do significant damage . Like what we've

01:26:02.642 --> 01:26:04.753
seen with Cove in 19 . And we have to

01:26:04.753 --> 01:26:06.642
work with our partners so that no

01:26:06.642 --> 01:26:08.753
matter where a threat arrive arises ,

01:26:08.753 --> 01:26:10.753
we can contain it . Um , and if the

01:26:10.753 --> 01:26:12.864
office is in charge of preventing and

01:26:12.864 --> 01:26:14.642
responding to these threats are

01:26:14.642 --> 01:26:16.864
understaffed . It is hard for us to get

01:26:16.864 --> 01:26:19.031
ahead of that problem . So I open this

01:26:19.031 --> 01:26:21.198
up to all members of the panel . U . S

01:26:21.198 --> 01:26:23.253
national security agencies have long

01:26:23.253 --> 01:26:25.364
suffered from high rates of vacancies

01:26:25.364 --> 01:26:27.476
in the past few years . And given how

01:26:27.476 --> 01:26:29.531
long federal hiring can take , we're

01:26:29.531 --> 01:26:31.587
likely to see ripple effects of this

01:26:31.587 --> 01:26:33.642
for years . Our vacancies or limited

01:26:33.642 --> 01:26:35.809
staffing affecting your work currently

01:26:35.809 --> 01:26:37.976
in , in your view , how constraint and

01:26:37.976 --> 01:26:40.031
D o . D . Reform hiring practices to

01:26:40.031 --> 01:26:42.120
ramp up to the needed capacity more

01:26:42.120 --> 01:26:46.120
quickly and in a specific call

01:26:46.120 --> 01:26:48.176
out on their do . Your officers have

01:26:48.176 --> 01:26:50.300
trouble finding and recruiting staff

01:26:50.310 --> 01:26:52.860
with the specialized skills needed to

01:26:52.860 --> 01:26:55.090
focus on reducing biological security

01:26:55.090 --> 01:26:56.979
threats , and I open it up to the

01:26:56.979 --> 01:26:57.979
Panelists .

01:27:02.480 --> 01:27:04.790
But thank you , Congresswoman Svanberg .

01:27:04.800 --> 01:27:06.967
It's a great question . It's Ah , it's

01:27:06.967 --> 01:27:10.120
an age old issue . Um , employing , uh ,

01:27:10.130 --> 01:27:12.760
the right staff , I can say from a C W

01:27:12.760 --> 01:27:14.960
m d perspective . We have an immensely

01:27:14.960 --> 01:27:16.780
talented team , uh , full of

01:27:16.780 --> 01:27:18.960
professionals from , uh , career

01:27:18.960 --> 01:27:22.570
civilians thio uniformed personnel to

01:27:22.570 --> 01:27:24.690
government contractors . So it'd be

01:27:24.690 --> 01:27:26.468
hard to speak across the entire

01:27:26.468 --> 01:27:28.579
department me personally doing that .

01:27:28.579 --> 01:27:30.579
But I can tell you that we're right

01:27:30.579 --> 01:27:32.870
sized . We obviously always there

01:27:32.870 --> 01:27:35.760
looking or on the lookout for talent on

01:27:35.760 --> 01:27:37.760
DSO . We'll continue to do that and

01:27:37.760 --> 01:27:39.700
continue to , uh , if we confined

01:27:39.700 --> 01:27:41.700
talent to bring them in the doors .

01:27:41.700 --> 01:27:43.700
I'll defer to my other colleagues ,

01:27:45.680 --> 01:27:47.902
Miss Man Span Burger . From a different

01:27:47.902 --> 01:27:49.902
point of view , we operate a highly

01:27:49.902 --> 01:27:52.069
technical organization similar to some

01:27:52.069 --> 01:27:54.291
of the crew field you're referring to .

01:27:54.291 --> 01:27:56.402
Our recruitment strategy is healthy .

01:27:56.402 --> 01:27:58.513
Our retention rates are healthy , but

01:27:58.513 --> 01:28:00.458
we continue to look for additional

01:28:00.458 --> 01:28:02.624
talent as necessary . But so far , our

01:28:02.624 --> 01:28:04.624
attribution rates are our rates air

01:28:04.624 --> 01:28:06.791
going , you know , steady . So I think

01:28:06.791 --> 01:28:08.791
in in a kim biodefense area that we

01:28:08.791 --> 01:28:10.847
operate as well as the rest of our R

01:28:10.847 --> 01:28:12.847
and D organization , our health and

01:28:12.847 --> 01:28:15.290
welfare , the R and D community is very

01:28:15.290 --> 01:28:18.870
sound . Thank you . Um , Miss Ben

01:28:18.870 --> 01:28:21.470
Burger , on behalf of the O s bureau at

01:28:21.470 --> 01:28:23.692
the State Department , I'm very pleased

01:28:23.692 --> 01:28:25.914
to report we have an outstanding , very

01:28:25.914 --> 01:28:27.914
active and extremely expert team of

01:28:27.914 --> 01:28:30.137
both civil service long term colleagues

01:28:30.137 --> 01:28:32.026
and foreign service colleagues on

01:28:32.026 --> 01:28:34.192
usually to your assignments . Uh , I'm

01:28:34.192 --> 01:28:36.248
pleased to say that in recent months

01:28:36.248 --> 01:28:38.414
we've been able to add to our staffing

01:28:38.414 --> 01:28:40.470
and bring on permanently a number of

01:28:40.470 --> 01:28:42.692
colleagues , including fellows from the

01:28:42.692 --> 01:28:44.303
American Association for the

01:28:44.303 --> 01:28:46.248
Advancement of Science . The State

01:28:46.248 --> 01:28:47.914
Department has a longstanding

01:28:47.914 --> 01:28:50.081
cooperation with Triple A s so that we

01:28:50.081 --> 01:28:51.914
benefit from their technical and

01:28:51.914 --> 01:28:53.970
professional expertise . The team is

01:28:53.970 --> 01:28:56.081
doing an outstanding job both dealing

01:28:56.081 --> 01:28:58.248
with co vid on the home front and , of

01:28:58.248 --> 01:29:00.470
course , working on it professionally .

01:29:00.470 --> 01:29:03.340
Thank you . Yeah , this is filled off

01:29:03.340 --> 01:29:06.590
from a state s Oh , I think I echo the

01:29:06.590 --> 01:29:08.830
remarks of my colleagues . I think that

01:29:08.840 --> 01:29:10.951
vacancies have not been a substantial

01:29:10.951 --> 01:29:13.173
challenge in our part of the department

01:29:13.173 --> 01:29:15.760
on this issue . A Zai testified , we

01:29:15.760 --> 01:29:17.880
have also been increasing our staff .

01:29:17.880 --> 01:29:20.540
We've added experts using a special

01:29:20.540 --> 01:29:22.429
authority that the department has

01:29:22.429 --> 01:29:24.429
provided in this regard . And we've

01:29:24.429 --> 01:29:26.484
added to the staffing of the offices

01:29:26.484 --> 01:29:28.707
that deal with biological issues . So ,

01:29:28.707 --> 01:29:31.070
um , I think in general we don't have

01:29:31.070 --> 01:29:33.070
staffing challenges . We too have a

01:29:33.070 --> 01:29:36.510
great partnership Onda fellowships that

01:29:36.510 --> 01:29:38.566
bring us technical expertise . But I

01:29:38.566 --> 01:29:40.900
think , um , recruiting technical

01:29:40.900 --> 01:29:43.067
specialists is sometimes a challenge ,

01:29:43.067 --> 01:29:46.180
and and we that that is probably the

01:29:46.180 --> 01:29:49.730
one area where , um at times it has

01:29:49.730 --> 01:29:51.790
been a bit of a challenge for us .

01:29:52.570 --> 01:29:55.190
Thank you very much for sharing that ,

01:29:55.190 --> 01:29:58.510
and I hope the committee can be

01:29:58.510 --> 01:30:00.732
involved to whatever end is appropriate

01:30:00.732 --> 01:30:02.880
in ensuring that you all can into the

01:30:02.880 --> 01:30:04.991
future recruit to the staffing levels

01:30:04.991 --> 01:30:07.158
that are necessary . I'm gonna ask for

01:30:07.158 --> 01:30:09.269
the next portion if you'll indulge me

01:30:09.269 --> 01:30:11.380
because it will direct what my follow

01:30:11.380 --> 01:30:13.324
up question is , um , by a show of

01:30:13.324 --> 01:30:16.550
hands , do your teams participate in a

01:30:16.550 --> 01:30:19.160
war game exercise to train and prepare

01:30:19.160 --> 01:30:21.540
potential biological security risks for

01:30:21.540 --> 01:30:23.318
the ease in this awkward , um ,

01:30:23.320 --> 01:30:26.510
circumstance with virtual in present ,

01:30:26.520 --> 01:30:28.631
if you could just raise your hands if

01:30:28.631 --> 01:30:30.798
you do , because my follow up question

01:30:30.798 --> 01:30:33.280
depends very much on if it's divided or

01:30:33.660 --> 01:30:37.370
so I see two and two from here . Three .

01:30:37.380 --> 01:30:40.840
Okay , so I'm curious . Then , with the

01:30:40.840 --> 01:30:43.140
majority of you participating in war

01:30:43.140 --> 01:30:46.110
games , do you and your colleagues draw

01:30:46.110 --> 01:30:48.166
upon the modeling and the simulation

01:30:48.166 --> 01:30:51.300
analysis to think through what quickly

01:30:51.300 --> 01:30:53.356
changing threats could look like And

01:30:53.356 --> 01:30:55.578
how to respond ? Are you using this for

01:30:55.578 --> 01:30:57.800
biological threats on DWhite ? Have you

01:30:57.800 --> 01:31:00.078
learned from these table top exercises ?

01:31:00.078 --> 01:31:03.950
Um , recently , um , a zit relates

01:31:03.950 --> 01:31:06.470
Thio Cove in 19 . And and and my time

01:31:06.470 --> 01:31:08.581
is limited . So if if one of you want

01:31:08.581 --> 01:31:10.637
to take this one , I welcome you all

01:31:10.637 --> 01:31:12.960
thio , choose who goes next . So ,

01:31:12.960 --> 01:31:15.127
Congresswoman , this is Mr Oxford from

01:31:15.127 --> 01:31:17.182
Detroit . One of the things we do to

01:31:17.182 --> 01:31:19.238
sustain capability overseas with the

01:31:19.238 --> 01:31:21.182
people that we've trained over the

01:31:21.182 --> 01:31:23.349
course of time and bio responses we do

01:31:23.349 --> 01:31:25.349
exercises periodically just to make

01:31:25.349 --> 01:31:27.516
sure they're maintaining readiness and

01:31:27.516 --> 01:31:26.860
their standards that they've been

01:31:26.860 --> 01:31:29.027
trained to . It's one of the ways that

01:31:29.027 --> 01:31:30.527
we start thio transfer the

01:31:30.527 --> 01:31:32.710
responsibility of the CTR program to

01:31:32.710 --> 01:31:35.050
those host nations , But exercises and

01:31:35.050 --> 01:31:37.161
training or one of the key aspects of

01:31:37.161 --> 01:31:39.383
us understanding that their retention ,

01:31:39.383 --> 01:31:41.606
the retention is there . Thank you very

01:31:41.606 --> 01:31:43.661
much on Mr Chairman . Thanks for the

01:31:43.661 --> 01:31:46.940
extra time I yield back . Thank you ,

01:31:46.940 --> 01:31:49.800
Miss Van Burger . Um , seeing that

01:31:49.800 --> 01:31:53.360
there are no additional , um , members

01:31:53.360 --> 01:31:55.940
who have questions and obviously always

01:31:55.940 --> 01:31:58.220
difficult in this virtual hybrid in

01:31:58.220 --> 01:32:01.740
person format on Ben Toss on top of

01:32:01.740 --> 01:32:04.320
that votes getting polity . So , yeah ,

01:32:04.330 --> 01:32:06.441
I'm gonna use the chair's prerogative

01:32:06.441 --> 01:32:08.552
and just make a closing statement and

01:32:08.552 --> 01:32:10.608
see if I'm Chairman Lang Lang Driven

01:32:10.608 --> 01:32:12.886
would like to make a statement as well ,

01:32:12.886 --> 01:32:15.490
but actually , maybe a closing question

01:32:15.500 --> 01:32:18.220
and the issue of buyer surveillance .

01:32:18.220 --> 01:32:20.442
And it's something that I thought a lot

01:32:20.442 --> 01:32:22.776
about in terms of pandemic preparedness ,

01:32:22.776 --> 01:32:24.942
etcetera and thinking about how we use

01:32:24.942 --> 01:32:26.942
some of the the naturally occurring

01:32:26.942 --> 01:32:28.831
technologies that are out there .

01:32:28.831 --> 01:32:30.776
Social media search words , Google

01:32:30.776 --> 01:32:32.776
etcetera . Um , you know , all of a

01:32:32.776 --> 01:32:34.553
sudden you see a jump in people

01:32:34.553 --> 01:32:36.553
searching incidents of fever or flu

01:32:36.553 --> 01:32:38.553
like symptoms etcetera . You know ,

01:32:38.553 --> 01:32:40.442
some of that can be early warning

01:32:40.442 --> 01:32:42.220
systems for us . Thio pay close

01:32:42.220 --> 01:32:44.930
attention . Yeah , I know . Wireless

01:32:44.930 --> 01:32:47.041
thermometers , etcetera were thinking

01:32:47.041 --> 01:32:48.986
about how both in the midst of the

01:32:48.986 --> 01:32:50.986
pandemic . But then also , you know

01:32:50.986 --> 01:32:53.041
what ? Our early warning systems for

01:32:53.041 --> 01:32:55.152
naturally occurring threats , But you

01:32:55.152 --> 01:32:57.263
know , um , and that that are already

01:32:57.263 --> 01:32:59.430
there widely in used . I don't know if

01:32:59.430 --> 01:33:01.374
folks from dio to your state could

01:33:01.374 --> 01:33:03.374
perhaps comment on how we should be

01:33:03.374 --> 01:33:05.541
thinking about that chairman , right ?

01:33:05.541 --> 01:33:07.819
It's a It's a exceptional question and ,

01:33:07.819 --> 01:33:09.652
you know , it's an all the above

01:33:09.652 --> 01:33:12.090
approach way . We've all talked today

01:33:12.100 --> 01:33:14.156
about the information sharing that's

01:33:14.156 --> 01:33:16.520
absolutely vital . It's fundamental if

01:33:16.520 --> 01:33:18.490
we're going to ensure that we're

01:33:18.850 --> 01:33:21.400
detecting , um , interdicting . But

01:33:21.400 --> 01:33:23.567
specifically on this issue , detecting

01:33:23.567 --> 01:33:25.810
threats and flowing that information .

01:33:25.860 --> 01:33:28.350
Really , at this point globally on DSO ,

01:33:28.360 --> 01:33:30.471
you know , it's it's working with our

01:33:30.471 --> 01:33:32.638
interagency colleagues like we do on a

01:33:32.638 --> 01:33:34.693
daily basis here . It's also working

01:33:34.693 --> 01:33:36.638
with our international friends and

01:33:36.638 --> 01:33:38.770
partners and ah , no Phil Dahllof ,

01:33:38.780 --> 01:33:41.870
Desk college had mentioned the , uh

01:33:42.650 --> 01:33:44.761
you know , the Global Partnership for

01:33:44.761 --> 01:33:46.483
Spread Against Weapons of mass

01:33:46.483 --> 01:33:48.706
destruction of those materials . That's

01:33:48.706 --> 01:33:50.706
a perfect organization . The global

01:33:50.706 --> 01:33:52.872
health care security agenda is another

01:33:52.872 --> 01:33:54.872
effort that can provide information

01:33:54.872 --> 01:33:56.983
flow , uh , to to dozens of countries

01:33:56.983 --> 01:33:59.206
around the world . So So the all of the

01:33:59.206 --> 01:34:01.261
above approach is necessary , and it

01:34:01.261 --> 01:34:03.594
has toe has to require information flow .

01:34:03.840 --> 01:34:06.740
Okay , Mr Chairman , as you , as you

01:34:06.740 --> 01:34:08.851
recall in 11 earlier answers I talked

01:34:08.851 --> 01:34:10.740
about regional approaches when we

01:34:10.740 --> 01:34:12.851
started . The CTR program is mostly ,

01:34:12.851 --> 01:34:14.851
you know , nation state specific 11

01:34:14.851 --> 01:34:16.907
program , one country . The regional

01:34:16.907 --> 01:34:18.740
approach allows for this kind of

01:34:18.740 --> 01:34:20.740
information sharing across regional

01:34:20.740 --> 01:34:22.962
boundaries . So it enhances the overall

01:34:22.962 --> 01:34:25.184
protection within regions as opposed to

01:34:25.184 --> 01:34:27.462
just looking at this solely by country .

01:34:27.462 --> 01:34:29.573
So it really does help in the broader

01:34:29.573 --> 01:34:33.210
understanding e . I

01:34:33.210 --> 01:34:35.321
think the chairman raises a very good

01:34:35.321 --> 01:34:38.240
point that we have a whole set of

01:34:38.240 --> 01:34:40.600
emerging tools that could greatly add

01:34:40.600 --> 01:34:42.450
to information sharing and bio

01:34:42.450 --> 01:34:44.672
surveillance . We've learned during the

01:34:44.672 --> 01:34:47.600
pandemic , um , how to expand the tool

01:34:47.600 --> 01:34:50.470
set that we have thio two additional

01:34:50.470 --> 01:34:53.960
tools , for example , in

01:34:53.960 --> 01:34:55.904
Uganda and in Africa , there are a

01:34:55.904 --> 01:34:58.180
whole set of cellphone based tools that

01:34:58.240 --> 01:35:00.129
we had not previously used to the

01:35:00.129 --> 01:35:02.351
degree we use now . And so we're trying

01:35:02.351 --> 01:35:04.760
to take advantage of the whole new tool

01:35:04.760 --> 01:35:06.940
set that is out there , and I think ,

01:35:06.940 --> 01:35:08.829
the global pandemic . I think the

01:35:08.829 --> 01:35:10.773
chairman noted that there is great

01:35:10.773 --> 01:35:12.996
infrastructure being built to deal with

01:35:12.996 --> 01:35:15.580
this pandemic , and there's new

01:35:15.580 --> 01:35:17.750
technologies that are being integrated

01:35:17.760 --> 01:35:19.871
into bio surveillance . And this is a

01:35:19.871 --> 01:35:21.940
good example of how we need to build

01:35:21.940 --> 01:35:24.162
out our capabilities and our data flows

01:35:24.162 --> 01:35:26.273
to capture all the information that's

01:35:26.273 --> 01:35:30.220
available . Well , great . I certainly

01:35:30.220 --> 01:35:32.670
wanna thank you , Um , all four of our

01:35:32.670 --> 01:35:34.614
witnesses for their service to our

01:35:34.614 --> 01:35:36.780
country and again , you know , make

01:35:36.780 --> 01:35:39.560
sure everyone's safe and we will get

01:35:39.560 --> 01:35:41.616
through this . But let's get through

01:35:41.616 --> 01:35:43.504
this in a more resilient way in a

01:35:43.504 --> 01:35:45.616
stronger way and in a way that weaken

01:35:45.616 --> 01:35:47.671
protect against the next pandemic or

01:35:47.671 --> 01:35:49.727
future bio threats . I don't know if

01:35:49.727 --> 01:35:51.893
Chairman Langevin is still on , and if

01:35:51.893 --> 01:35:54.116
you want to making closing statements ,

01:35:54.116 --> 01:35:56.227
I I am here , Mr Chairman , and thank

01:35:56.227 --> 01:35:59.420
you for your joint collaboration . And

01:35:59.420 --> 01:36:01.531
putting this hearing together enjoyed

01:36:01.531 --> 01:36:03.531
working with you on this and , uh ,

01:36:03.531 --> 01:36:05.698
certainly was an important hearing and

01:36:05.698 --> 01:36:08.230
very timely . Right now , I I do want

01:36:08.230 --> 01:36:11.050
to thank our witnesses . Andi ,

01:36:11.060 --> 01:36:13.260
obviously , the work in your

01:36:13.260 --> 01:36:16.460
portfolio's , uh , whether it's , uh ,

01:36:16.730 --> 01:36:18.900
accounting weapons of mass destruction

01:36:18.900 --> 01:36:22.350
or the work in Detroit . Uh , and , uh ,

01:36:22.360 --> 01:36:24.360
other witnesses in your portfolio ,

01:36:24.360 --> 01:36:26.800
these air obviously essential

01:36:26.810 --> 01:36:28.754
capabilities that you bring to the

01:36:28.754 --> 01:36:31.190
table that important to the nation and

01:36:31.200 --> 01:36:34.690
indeed the world . So we have continued

01:36:34.690 --> 01:36:36.912
work that we're going to continue to do

01:36:36.912 --> 01:36:39.079
together . We wanna make sure that you

01:36:39.079 --> 01:36:41.301
probably resource that we have the , uh

01:36:41.301 --> 01:36:43.412
the plans and the procedures in place

01:36:43.412 --> 01:36:45.579
to respond effectively . And , uh , we

01:36:45.579 --> 01:36:47.579
can rest assured there will be some

01:36:47.579 --> 01:36:49.746
future events that we're gonna have to

01:36:49.746 --> 01:36:51.912
confront . And we wanna make sure that

01:36:51.912 --> 01:36:54.110
we are prepared as possible and his

01:36:54.110 --> 01:36:56.110
father , with the speed and agility

01:36:56.110 --> 01:36:58.690
that is that is necessary to save lives ,

01:36:58.700 --> 01:37:00.700
keep people healthy and protect the

01:37:00.700 --> 01:37:03.130
country . So with that deeply , thank

01:37:03.130 --> 01:37:05.297
you for the work that you're doing . I

01:37:05.297 --> 01:37:07.408
know that members may have additional

01:37:07.408 --> 01:37:09.519
questions on . I asked that you would

01:37:09.519 --> 01:37:12.040
respond in writing expeditiously with

01:37:12.040 --> 01:37:14.096
that . I have no further questions .

01:37:14.096 --> 01:37:16.373
And , uh , I'll your back was chairman .

01:37:17.230 --> 01:37:19.560
Thank you , Chairman Langevin . And

01:37:19.570 --> 01:37:21.681
again , our thoughts and prayers were

01:37:21.681 --> 01:37:23.626
with every , um , buddy around the

01:37:23.626 --> 01:37:25.840
world whose impacted by Cove in 19 and

01:37:25.840 --> 01:37:28.007
certainly with our president and first

01:37:28.007 --> 01:37:30.118
lady and the first family Andi , With

01:37:30.118 --> 01:37:31.951
that again , I want to thank the

01:37:31.951 --> 01:37:34.062
witnesses for being here this morning

01:37:34.062 --> 01:37:34.660
and the hearing is adjourned .