WEBVTT 00:01.930 --> 00:05.300 - Pivot to Asia, the focus on great power competition. 00:05.300 --> 00:06.879 There was the notion that, well, 00:06.879 --> 00:09.190 what can we sort of not do anymore 00:09.190 --> 00:12.760 and Africa popped up mainly because I guess you're first 00:12.760 --> 00:15.040 in the alphabet for the blank slate review there. 00:15.040 --> 00:16.090 I don't think they did it that way 00:16.090 --> 00:17.420 but you came up first anyway. 00:17.420 --> 00:19.480 But it did prompt a very interesting 00:19.480 --> 00:22.350 discussion about how the world is interconnected 00:22.350 --> 00:24.640 and having just returned from a CODEL 00:24.640 --> 00:26.158 to Africa a few weeks ago, 00:26.158 --> 00:28.230 the great power competition 00:28.230 --> 00:31.130 is alive and well on the continent of Africa. 00:31.130 --> 00:33.310 So, when we're looking at how we meet 00:33.310 --> 00:35.440 the national security challenges we have, 00:35.440 --> 00:38.401 we have to look at them in a broad geographical way. 00:38.401 --> 00:40.390 Russia and China are certainly 00:40.390 --> 00:43.010 very active in Africa as we are as well. 00:43.010 --> 00:45.480 So, how do how do we meet our interests there? 00:45.480 --> 00:47.690 And I know there's been a lot of interest in that subject. 00:47.690 --> 00:49.560 And we'll look forward to those comments 00:49.560 --> 00:51.980 from the members who asked questions about that. 00:51.980 --> 00:55.132 And obviously Central Command has been the central focus 00:55.132 --> 01:00.132 for going on 20 years now between Afghanistan and Iraq 01:01.310 --> 01:03.420 and various activities in the Middle East. 01:03.420 --> 01:05.560 It continues to be a challenge 01:05.560 --> 01:08.250 and while we are focused on great power competition 01:08.250 --> 01:09.880 that great power competition, of course, 01:09.880 --> 01:12.900 is present in the Central Command as well 01:12.900 --> 01:15.390 but we also have to continue to be worried about 01:15.390 --> 01:18.359 the threat from violent extremist organizations 01:18.359 --> 01:20.610 and you know the lesson learned right 01:20.610 --> 01:22.966 back to 9/11 started in Afghanistan, 01:22.966 --> 01:26.211 an ungoverned space became fertile ground 01:26.211 --> 01:28.750 for a dangerous terrorist organization 01:28.750 --> 01:31.617 to find safe haven and plot and plan attacks against us 01:31.617 --> 01:34.910 and our interests and that risk is still there. 01:34.910 --> 01:37.288 If we do not find partners in regions 01:37.288 --> 01:39.599 like the Central Command represents 01:39.599 --> 01:41.870 to deter those groups from forming 01:41.870 --> 01:44.440 they will form and they are still there, 01:44.440 --> 01:46.800 ISIS, al-Qaeda and various other offshoots. 01:46.800 --> 01:50.630 So, we have to have a plan to meet all of our challenges 01:50.630 --> 01:52.630 in a reasonable way within our budget 01:52.630 --> 01:56.120 and I think these two regions are particularly ripe 01:56.120 --> 01:57.552 for a discussion of how we do that 01:57.552 --> 01:59.970 because you can sort of look at the needs there 01:59.970 --> 02:02.150 and it can very quickly overwhelm you in terms 02:02.150 --> 02:03.890 of the resources we have available. 02:03.890 --> 02:06.295 Let me say I'm a 100% confident that with 02:06.295 --> 02:09.909 the best U.S. military the world has ever seen, 02:09.909 --> 02:12.137 with the number of partners that we have 02:12.137 --> 02:14.290 and the capabilities that we can bring to bear, 02:14.290 --> 02:16.730 that we can absolutely meet those challenges, 02:16.730 --> 02:19.790 if we're smart, if we make the right resource decisions, 02:19.790 --> 02:22.113 if we manage risks in an appropriate way, 02:22.113 --> 02:25.500 and if we, you know, give our troops the support they need, 02:25.500 --> 02:28.410 I'm a 100% confident that we can meet those challenges 02:28.410 --> 02:30.242 even in complex parts of the world 02:30.242 --> 02:32.900 like the two that you gentlemen represent. 02:32.900 --> 02:35.246 Lastly, given what's going on in the world 02:35.246 --> 02:38.020 we will need to hear from you about how 02:38.020 --> 02:40.050 the coronavirus is impacting your regions. 02:40.050 --> 02:43.354 Obviously Iran is one of the most impacted countries 02:43.354 --> 02:45.130 and how that affects things 02:45.130 --> 02:47.850 and how it is affecting your operations 02:47.850 --> 02:50.280 as we've seen various cancellations, 02:50.280 --> 02:52.300 travel restrictions, difficulties. 02:52.300 --> 02:54.330 Your perspective on how that's going 02:54.330 --> 02:56.530 to impact your areas of responsibility 02:56.530 --> 02:58.414 will be very helpful to informing us how we 02:58.414 --> 03:02.073 can help you do that and that is all I have. 03:02.073 --> 03:03.490 With that, I'll turn it over 03:03.490 --> 03:06.240 to Ranking Member Thornberry for his opening statement. 03:07.850 --> 03:08.860 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman 03:08.860 --> 03:10.831 and let me join in welcoming each 03:10.831 --> 03:12.943 of our witnesses here today. 03:14.140 --> 03:18.110 And General McKenzie let me begin by expressing condolences 03:18.110 --> 03:20.660 at the loss of two Marines in Iraq 03:20.660 --> 03:24.290 within the past couple of days. 03:24.290 --> 03:27.060 My understanding is they were working with the Iraqi forces 03:27.060 --> 03:32.060 to clear out ISIS from some tunnels and a complex there 03:36.544 --> 03:38.305 and have given the ultimate sacrifice 03:38.305 --> 03:40.850 to protect us here at home. 03:40.850 --> 03:43.040 I support the National Defense Strategy. 03:43.040 --> 03:46.210 I completely agree and I think it makes sense 03:46.210 --> 03:49.360 to put greater emphasis on great power competition. 03:49.360 --> 03:53.070 I completely agree with the Chairman that great power 03:53.070 --> 03:55.760 competition takes place all over the world 03:55.760 --> 03:57.950 and his recent trip as well 03:57.950 --> 04:02.233 as these two maps that are in front of us 04:04.820 --> 04:08.260 show Russian, Chinese activity in Africa as one example, 04:08.260 --> 04:10.754 also takes place in the Middle East, in South Asia, 04:10.754 --> 04:13.350 it occurs all over the world. 04:13.350 --> 04:15.310 But the rest of the story 04:15.310 --> 04:18.326 is the job against terrorism is not done yet. 04:18.326 --> 04:21.480 They are certainly not finished with us 04:22.619 --> 04:24.750 and we cannot wish it away 04:24.750 --> 04:29.750 and just presume that if we say peace has broken out 04:31.670 --> 04:33.090 that they're gonna leave us alone. 04:33.090 --> 04:34.350 And I think it's a, you know, 04:34.350 --> 04:38.960 we get focused on different issues as time goes on. 04:38.960 --> 04:40.369 I think it's an important reminder 04:40.369 --> 04:43.800 that every day there are men and women 04:43.800 --> 04:46.291 risking their lives to protect us here 04:46.291 --> 04:48.300 at home from terrorist threat. 04:48.300 --> 04:49.740 And that's true in Afghanistan, 04:49.740 --> 04:54.740 it's true in Iraq and in Syria, and it's true in Africa. 04:55.070 --> 04:58.490 It's true in a variety of places around the world. 04:58.490 --> 05:01.810 And so, as we talk about great power competition, 05:01.810 --> 05:05.003 I don't think we can forget the other issue, 05:06.000 --> 05:08.860 and we certainly can't afford to walk away from it, 05:08.860 --> 05:12.990 and in y'all's two AORs that's particularly true. 05:12.990 --> 05:14.580 I yield back. 05:14.580 --> 05:15.413 - [Smith] Thank you. 05:15.413 --> 05:18.140 Before we begin, two quick programming announcements. 05:18.140 --> 05:21.330 We are again going in reverse order on our questions, 05:21.330 --> 05:24.750 so, we'll start well start with me and Mr. Thornberry 05:24.750 --> 05:26.240 and then we'll go in reverse order. 05:26.240 --> 05:28.060 Second, we have a classified hearing 05:28.060 --> 05:29.500 after the public hearing 05:29.500 --> 05:32.300 so we will stop exactly at noon 05:32.300 --> 05:34.441 and head upstairs to 2212 05:34.441 --> 05:37.222 for the classified portion of this hearing 05:37.222 --> 05:39.600 and with that I will turn it over 05:39.600 --> 05:41.980 to Ms. Wheelbarger over her opening statement. 05:41.980 --> 05:43.180 - Good morning. 05:43.180 --> 05:44.982 Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, 05:44.982 --> 05:47.430 distinguished members of this committee. 05:47.430 --> 05:50.440 We are grateful for the opportunity to testify today. 05:50.440 --> 05:51.660 I would like to start by thanking 05:51.660 --> 05:53.460 the men and women of the Department of Defense 05:53.460 --> 05:55.324 whose dedication and sacrifices 05:55.324 --> 05:57.740 enable us to achieve our objectives 05:57.740 --> 05:59.583 in the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere. 05:59.583 --> 06:02.340 I would also like to recognize the strong collaboration 06:02.340 --> 06:04.899 and bipartisan support provided by this committee. 06:04.899 --> 06:07.980 As I said last year, as a former professional staffer 06:07.980 --> 06:09.780 on multiple committees in Congress, 06:09.780 --> 06:12.780 I understand that this is a vital institution 06:12.780 --> 06:14.600 ensuring our military has the resources, 06:14.600 --> 06:16.675 oversight, and political legitimacy 06:16.675 --> 06:19.770 to succeed at the hard missions we give it. 06:19.770 --> 06:22.040 Congress also helps ensure we 06:22.040 --> 06:23.670 have civilian control of the military 06:23.670 --> 06:25.380 as enshrined in the Constitution 06:25.380 --> 06:28.690 and required for the preservation of our democratic values. 06:28.690 --> 06:30.220 So, thank you for all you do. 06:30.220 --> 06:31.627 As you know, our approach to the Middle East 06:31.627 --> 06:33.300 and Africa policy is guided by 06:33.300 --> 06:36.834 our National Security Strategy and our NDS. 06:36.834 --> 06:39.810 Our overall goals are to protect the American people, 06:39.810 --> 06:41.930 defend the homeland, and promote prosperity and peace 06:41.930 --> 06:43.550 from a position of strength. 06:43.550 --> 06:45.080 As you have heard numerous times, 06:45.080 --> 06:46.203 our NDS directs the Department 06:46.203 --> 06:48.073 to focus on near peer competition 06:48.073 --> 06:50.560 while remaining vigilant in countering threats 06:50.560 --> 06:52.750 from rogue states like Iran and North Korea 06:52.750 --> 06:55.820 and continuing to address violent extremist organizations 06:55.820 --> 06:57.680 like al-Qaeda and ISIS. 06:57.680 --> 07:00.650 The need to address near peer competitors requires us 07:00.650 --> 07:02.210 to make adjustments to our posture 07:02.210 --> 07:05.790 and avoid prioritizing near-term problems 07:05.790 --> 07:08.000 at the expense of building readiness and capacity 07:08.000 --> 07:10.190 for high-end conflict in the future. 07:10.190 --> 07:12.640 As we do so, though, we must also deter and confront 07:12.640 --> 07:13.830 current adversaries while 07:13.830 --> 07:16.107 avoiding miscalculation or escalation 07:16.107 --> 07:17.900 that would distract and undermine 07:17.900 --> 07:19.670 our national security interests. 07:19.670 --> 07:21.450 In the Middle East, the United States' strategy 07:21.450 --> 07:23.940 is to keep the region from being a safe haven for terrorists 07:23.940 --> 07:26.980 or dominated by any power hostile to the United States. 07:26.980 --> 07:28.820 The Department is focused on ensuring 07:28.820 --> 07:31.180 continued success against ISIS and al-Qaeda, 07:31.180 --> 07:34.020 strengthening deterrence and our defenses against Iran, 07:34.020 --> 07:36.060 and competing with China and Russia. 07:36.060 --> 07:38.510 This requires investing in sustainable partnerships 07:38.510 --> 07:40.360 as a whole-of-government effort. 07:40.360 --> 07:42.300 As to Afghanistan, our mission is guided 07:42.300 --> 07:44.340 by the president's South Asia strategy. 07:44.340 --> 07:46.560 As you are aware, on February 29th the President 07:46.560 --> 07:48.090 announced an agreement with the Taliban 07:48.090 --> 07:50.460 that is a major step toward political settlement 07:50.460 --> 07:52.120 but it is just a first step. 07:52.120 --> 07:53.760 We have insisted to the Taliban that they 07:53.760 --> 07:55.540 abide by their counterterrorism commitments, 07:55.540 --> 07:58.521 negotiate in good faith with all Afghan stakeholders, 07:58.521 --> 08:00.550 and not restart violence. 08:00.550 --> 08:03.140 However, we are prepared for all eventualities, 08:03.140 --> 08:06.150 our presence in Afghanistan is conditions-based 08:06.150 --> 08:09.600 and future posture will be based on the facts on the ground. 08:09.600 --> 08:11.750 In Africa, the United States maintains 08:11.750 --> 08:12.810 a whole-of-government approach 08:12.810 --> 08:15.730 to advancing security and stability on the continent. 08:15.730 --> 08:18.430 Our efforts, our commitment to the African continent 08:18.430 --> 08:20.836 includes diplomatic, military, and economic efforts 08:20.836 --> 08:24.470 and persistent U.S. presence is not the only measure 08:24.470 --> 08:25.303 of DOD's commitment. 08:25.303 --> 08:27.090 Our commitment is demonstrated by 08:27.090 --> 08:29.330 our counterterrorism training and operations, 08:29.330 --> 08:32.910 our dynamic force employment, military training exercises, 08:32.910 --> 08:35.730 foreign military sales, intelligence sharing, 08:35.730 --> 08:39.060 crisis responses, and emergency humanitarian assistance. 08:39.060 --> 08:40.580 So, I'll close by saying I think 08:40.580 --> 08:41.720 the Department is well positioned 08:41.720 --> 08:43.890 to address all the range of threats that we face. 08:43.890 --> 08:45.720 Our approach helps us meet a variety 08:45.720 --> 08:47.470 of present and future threats 08:47.470 --> 08:49.890 while enhancing the strength and agility of our forces. 08:49.890 --> 08:52.423 Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 08:53.860 --> 08:55.113 - [Smith] General McKenzie. 08:57.090 --> 08:58.942 - Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, 08:58.942 --> 09:01.450 distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, 09:01.450 --> 09:04.050 thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. 09:04.050 --> 09:05.660 I'm proud to testify alongside 09:05.660 --> 09:07.286 General Steve Townsend from AFRICOM, 09:07.286 --> 09:10.409 Ms. Katie Wheelbarger from OSD policy. 09:10.409 --> 09:12.500 It's this partnership within DOD, 09:12.500 --> 09:15.040 across COCOMs, and between the interagency 09:15.040 --> 09:17.140 that ensures synchronized execution 09:17.140 --> 09:18.870 of the National Defense Strategy. 09:18.870 --> 09:20.870 My senior enlisted leader fleet Master Chief 09:20.870 --> 09:22.220 Jamie Herdel of the Navy 09:22.220 --> 09:24.160 is also here with me today. 09:24.160 --> 09:26.680 Before I begin, I would like to recognize the sacrifice 09:26.680 --> 09:30.348 of Captain Moises Navas and Gunnery Sergeant Diego Pongo 09:30.348 --> 09:33.228 who were killed in action against ISIS last Sunday 09:33.228 --> 09:35.240 in the Qarachokh mountains in Iraq 09:35.240 --> 09:37.150 as part of Joint Task Force OIR. 09:37.150 --> 09:38.780 They will be remembered. 09:38.780 --> 09:41.220 Today there are nearly 90,000 men and women serving 09:41.220 --> 09:43.710 within the 20 nations comprising Central Command 09:43.710 --> 09:45.570 as well as the headquarters in Tampa. 09:45.570 --> 09:47.270 I'm proud of their remarkable dedication 09:47.270 --> 09:49.530 and humbled by their personal sacrifice 09:49.530 --> 09:51.180 and it's my honor to serve with them. 09:51.180 --> 09:53.310 They are young Americans in the line of fire 09:53.310 --> 09:55.098 working to prevent attacks on the homeland, 09:55.098 --> 09:57.475 counter destabilizing regional influence, 09:57.475 --> 10:00.570 prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 10:00.570 --> 10:01.918 and assure the freedom of navigation 10:01.918 --> 10:04.000 through international waterways. 10:04.000 --> 10:05.810 Your annual and timely passage of both 10:05.810 --> 10:07.660 the National Defense Authorization Act 10:07.660 --> 10:09.250 and the Defense appropriation bills 10:09.250 --> 10:11.210 honors their courage and sacrifice. 10:11.210 --> 10:13.350 I encourage you to maintain this tradition. 10:13.350 --> 10:14.960 Keeping a pledge from my confirmation 10:14.960 --> 10:16.725 hearing in December 2018, 10:16.725 --> 10:20.010 I appear before you and offer my best military advice. 10:20.010 --> 10:21.720 My written statement highlights several 10:21.720 --> 10:22.610 of the nation's areas 10:22.610 --> 10:24.270 of interest within the Central Command 10:24.270 --> 10:26.973 but my opening statement today will focus on Iran. 10:27.980 --> 10:29.180 The National Defense Strategy 10:29.180 --> 10:30.760 directs us to work with partners 10:30.760 --> 10:34.000 to deny the Iranian regime all paths to a nuclear weapon 10:34.000 --> 10:37.410 and to neutralize Iranian malign influence. 10:37.410 --> 10:39.100 This is no easy task. 10:39.100 --> 10:40.022 Iran is persistent 10:40.022 --> 10:42.430 and it's growing its arsenal of ballistic missiles 10:42.430 --> 10:44.920 despite international condemnation. 10:44.920 --> 10:48.430 Iran remains the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism. 10:48.430 --> 10:50.663 Since May 2019, Iranian proxies 10:50.663 --> 10:53.150 and Shia militia groups in Iraq 10:53.150 --> 10:55.290 have increased attacks on U.S. interests 10:55.290 --> 10:56.990 and conducted scores of unmanned 10:56.990 --> 10:58.880 aerial system reconnaissance flights 10:58.880 --> 11:01.830 near U.S. and Iraqi security force bases. 11:01.830 --> 11:03.300 The Iranian regime has attacked 11:03.300 --> 11:05.200 or seized foreign vessels in the Gulf, 11:05.200 --> 11:07.698 sponsored attacks by Houthi forces 11:07.698 --> 11:08.640 from Yemen to Saudi Arabia, 11:08.640 --> 11:10.750 continued the export of lethal aid 11:10.750 --> 11:13.120 to destabilizing groups across the region, 11:13.120 --> 11:15.260 and carried out an unprecedented cruise missile 11:15.260 --> 11:17.230 and UAS attack in September 11:17.230 --> 11:19.520 against oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. 11:19.520 --> 11:20.550 In early January, 11:20.550 --> 11:22.820 Iran launched more than a dozen ballistic missiles 11:22.820 --> 11:24.640 in a deliberate attack against U.S. 11:24.640 --> 11:27.480 and coalition forces at two bases in Iraq. 11:27.480 --> 11:29.490 This state-sponsored missile strike 11:29.490 --> 11:32.090 crossed the threshold compared to previous attacks 11:32.090 --> 11:33.610 and has probably set a lower bar 11:33.610 --> 11:35.640 for future actions by the regime. 11:35.640 --> 11:37.070 While periods of decreased tension 11:37.070 --> 11:39.660 may provide the illusion of a return to normalcy, 11:39.660 --> 11:41.921 ample intelligence indicates the regime's desire 11:41.921 --> 11:44.665 to continue malign activities that threaten lives, 11:44.665 --> 11:46.800 destabilize sovereign nations, 11:46.800 --> 11:48.610 and threaten freedom of navigation, 11:48.610 --> 11:51.230 regional commerce, global energy supplies, 11:51.230 --> 11:53.320 and the global economy itself. 11:53.320 --> 11:55.900 At CENTCOM we recognize that so long as the U.S. 11:55.900 --> 11:58.680 applies diplomatic and economic pressure, 11:58.680 --> 12:01.550 the Joint Force must be postured to deter Iran 12:01.550 --> 12:03.050 from employing the military element 12:03.050 --> 12:05.260 of power to counter our actions. 12:05.260 --> 12:07.970 Our presence sends a clear signal about our capabilities 12:07.970 --> 12:11.420 and our will to defend partners and U.S. national interests. 12:11.420 --> 12:13.283 Going forward, it is CENTCOM's objective 12:13.283 --> 12:15.520 to posture forces in the region 12:15.520 --> 12:17.500 with the operational depth to achieve 12:17.500 --> 12:19.760 a consistent state of deterrence against Iran 12:19.760 --> 12:22.350 and be adaptable to future Iranian threats. 12:22.350 --> 12:25.940 The FY 2021 DOD budget supports CENTCOM's ability 12:25.940 --> 12:29.040 to keep our forces agile, lethal, and adaptable. 12:29.040 --> 12:30.100 As we work with our partners 12:30.100 --> 12:32.320 to safeguard our mutual interests, 12:32.320 --> 12:34.598 we do so with the knowledge that we are stronger together. 12:34.598 --> 12:37.270 Key to building and maintaining regional partnerships 12:37.270 --> 12:39.290 is the authorization, the funding, 12:39.290 --> 12:41.730 and the employment security assistance programs. 12:41.730 --> 12:44.165 Additionally the National Guard State Partnership Program 12:44.165 --> 12:46.016 currently cultivates relationships 12:46.016 --> 12:48.010 and improves interoperability 12:48.010 --> 12:49.932 with six nations across the CENTCOM AOR 12:49.932 --> 12:52.030 with more considering entry. 12:52.030 --> 12:55.446 Again, the FY 2021 budget supports building new partnerships 12:55.446 --> 12:58.650 and forming an enduring Middle East coalition. 12:58.650 --> 13:01.320 As CENTCOM continues ongoing operations, 13:01.320 --> 13:03.902 we appreciate the efforts of our DOD civilian leadership, 13:03.902 --> 13:06.250 we acknowledge the teamwork of the interagency, 13:06.250 --> 13:08.470 and thank the members of Congress and your staffs 13:08.470 --> 13:09.927 without whose consistent backing 13:09.927 --> 13:12.500 we would be unable to accomplish our mission. 13:12.500 --> 13:13.940 In order for America's Armed Forces 13:13.940 --> 13:15.900 to sustain all domain dominance, 13:15.900 --> 13:17.252 the Department requires your support 13:17.252 --> 13:20.150 as well as predictable adequate and timely funding. 13:20.150 --> 13:22.480 Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and committee members, 13:22.480 --> 13:24.910 thanks again for all you do for our troops and our families 13:24.910 --> 13:26.860 and I look forward to your questions. 13:26.860 --> 13:27.693 - [Smith] Thank you. 13:27.693 --> 13:28.526 General Townsend. 13:29.890 --> 13:32.670 - Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, 13:32.670 --> 13:33.950 and members of the committee, 13:33.950 --> 13:34.783 good morning and thank you 13:34.783 --> 13:37.390 for the opportunity to appear today. 13:37.390 --> 13:40.100 It's a privilege to be a part of and lead America's 13:40.100 --> 13:43.540 exceptional men and women of U.S. Africa Command 13:43.540 --> 13:45.420 who are dedicated to protecting America 13:45.420 --> 13:48.510 and advancing her interests on the African continent. 13:48.510 --> 13:50.670 This morning I'm accompanied by my State Department 13:50.670 --> 13:51.973 foreign policy advisor, 13:52.823 --> 13:56.090 and AFRICOM's new command senior enlisted leader 13:56.090 --> 13:58.040 Marine Sergeant Major Richard Thresher. 13:59.030 --> 14:00.240 I'd like to take a moment to honor 14:00.240 --> 14:02.270 the memories of three Americans, 14:02.270 --> 14:05.430 U.S. Army Specialist Henry J. Mayfield Jr., 14:05.430 --> 14:08.183 Mr. Bruce Triplett, and Mr. Dustin Harrison 14:08.183 --> 14:11.210 who lost their lives in the service of our nation 14:11.210 --> 14:13.633 on January 5th in Manda Bay Kenya. 14:14.480 --> 14:17.050 To their families, our thoughts and prayers are with you. 14:17.050 --> 14:19.700 Your loved ones died while protecting the American people 14:19.700 --> 14:20.819 from the very real threat 14:20.819 --> 14:24.543 of the al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab terrorist groups. 14:25.980 --> 14:28.176 I'm here this morning with my battle buddies and friends 14:28.176 --> 14:31.110 Ms. Wheelbarger and General McKenzie 14:31.110 --> 14:33.310 to discuss shared challenges and opportunities 14:33.310 --> 14:34.870 in our areas of responsibility 14:34.870 --> 14:38.503 while furthering Joint Force readiness. 14:38.503 --> 14:41.380 Africa overwatch is a global crossroads 14:41.380 --> 14:44.090 with strategic choke points and sea lines of communication 14:44.090 --> 14:46.590 that are essential to global commerce 14:46.590 --> 14:49.458 and critical to U.S. operations in the world. 14:49.458 --> 14:51.810 Our future security and prosperity 14:51.810 --> 14:53.204 rests on our strategic access 14:53.204 --> 14:56.963 and influence in Africa in times of crisis. 14:58.960 --> 15:00.550 U.S. Africa Command is engaged 15:00.550 --> 15:04.640 in an ongoing blank slate now COCOM review. 15:04.640 --> 15:06.790 In concert with the Department of Defense, 15:06.790 --> 15:09.857 we've developed a prioritized list of objectives and actions 15:09.857 --> 15:11.307 to protect the homeland 15:11.307 --> 15:14.327 and secure our strategic interests in Africa 15:14.327 --> 15:16.070 while focusing the American 15:16.070 --> 15:18.673 taxpayers' investments in the right areas. 15:19.535 --> 15:22.788 Africa is key terrain for competition with China and Russia 15:22.788 --> 15:26.270 who are aggressively using economic and military means 15:26.270 --> 15:28.803 to expand their access and influence. 15:29.660 --> 15:31.700 I believe Africa offers America 15:31.700 --> 15:34.500 a competitive edge over China and Russia 15:34.500 --> 15:36.634 and we should take advantage of it. 15:36.634 --> 15:39.270 We will grow more efficient to contribute 15:39.270 --> 15:40.741 to higher defense priorities 15:40.741 --> 15:43.951 and refocus resources to global power competition 15:43.951 --> 15:46.610 but we cannot take pressure off major 15:46.610 --> 15:49.853 terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda. 15:50.730 --> 15:52.620 These groups and many others remain 15:52.620 --> 15:55.570 an inconvenient reality in Africa. 15:55.570 --> 15:58.360 While we should not try to confront each one, 15:58.360 --> 16:00.960 we should remain resolute in confronting those 16:00.960 --> 16:03.430 who threaten American interests in the region 16:03.430 --> 16:05.081 and the American homeland. 16:05.081 --> 16:07.290 Today AFRICOM does that using 16:07.290 --> 16:10.670 a very light and relatively low-cost footprint 16:10.670 --> 16:12.640 by supporting African and international 16:12.640 --> 16:14.773 partners who are leading these efforts. 16:15.854 --> 16:17.680 In my first eight months on the job, 16:17.680 --> 16:19.450 I've learned small investments, 16:19.450 --> 16:22.570 a few troops, and a few bucks can go a long way 16:22.570 --> 16:24.955 and make a real difference in Africa. 16:24.955 --> 16:27.920 Our whole-of-government and partner-centric approach 16:27.920 --> 16:29.337 acts as a force multiplier 16:29.337 --> 16:32.911 to address Africa's many complex challenges. 16:32.911 --> 16:34.830 What AFRICOM accomplishes 16:34.830 --> 16:36.470 with a few people and a few dollars 16:36.470 --> 16:38.380 on a continent three and a half times 16:38.380 --> 16:40.453 the size of the continental United States 16:40.453 --> 16:42.780 is a bargain for the American taxpayer 16:42.780 --> 16:45.453 and low-cost insurance for America. 16:46.810 --> 16:48.310 A secure and stable Africa 16:48.310 --> 16:50.760 remains an enduring American interest. 16:50.760 --> 16:53.400 U.S. Africa Command remains ready to protect and advance 16:53.400 --> 16:57.220 American interests and respond to crises in Africa. 16:57.220 --> 16:58.720 Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, 16:58.720 --> 17:01.950 thanks for your continued support to our Armed Forces. 17:01.950 --> 17:03.600 I look forward to your questions. 17:04.910 --> 17:06.380 - Thank you, General McKenzie 17:06.380 --> 17:08.090 and actually Ms. Wheelbarger, as well, 17:08.090 --> 17:11.100 if you can answer a question about the Taliban peace treaty 17:11.100 --> 17:12.670 and understand the negotiations 17:12.670 --> 17:13.577 that we've had with the Taliban. 17:13.577 --> 17:15.730 But the key part now is the Taliban negotiating 17:15.730 --> 17:17.270 with the Afghan government, 17:17.270 --> 17:19.708 that seems problematic and I support 17:19.708 --> 17:22.690 the effort to try to find a peaceful solution here 17:22.690 --> 17:24.949 to enable us to reduce our footprint 17:24.949 --> 17:27.090 and rely more on partners 17:27.090 --> 17:29.271 but how do you see that negotiation between 17:29.271 --> 17:32.270 the Taliban and the Afghan government going? 17:32.270 --> 17:34.800 What needs to happen in order 17:34.800 --> 17:36.863 for this peace agreement to go forward? 17:38.170 --> 17:39.350 - I'll begin recognizing this 17:39.350 --> 17:41.470 is largely a State Department lead 17:41.470 --> 17:43.690 and my colleagues in IPSA as well, 17:43.690 --> 17:45.040 but from our perspective, 17:45.040 --> 17:46.170 from the Secretary's perspective, 17:46.170 --> 17:49.640 as he said the peace agreement is not perfect, 17:49.640 --> 17:50.850 but it is a good first step 17:50.850 --> 17:53.970 and the inter-Afghan dialogue is a key component of that. 17:53.970 --> 17:58.270 We do have suggestions as late as this morning before I left 17:58.270 --> 18:01.299 that there might be somewhat an offer from President Ghani 18:01.299 --> 18:05.170 to provide some prisoner releases. 18:05.170 --> 18:07.627 That is a basic part of the initial agreement 18:07.627 --> 18:10.123 between the U.S. and the Taliban. 18:11.380 --> 18:13.180 The Afghans were not in that piece of, 18:13.180 --> 18:14.704 the Afghan government was not 18:14.704 --> 18:16.050 a piece of that part of the agreement, 18:16.050 --> 18:17.760 but I do think we might have actual 18:17.760 --> 18:19.541 successful good-faith efforts 18:19.541 --> 18:21.766 as maybe even today that will get 18:21.766 --> 18:24.387 the intra-Afghan conversation started. 18:24.387 --> 18:25.280 - And General McKenzie, 18:25.280 --> 18:28.170 how is it affecting operations at the moment? 18:28.170 --> 18:29.809 - Sir, thank you. 18:29.809 --> 18:32.080 The Taliban need to keep their part of the bargain 18:32.080 --> 18:34.400 and they are continuing attacks. 18:34.400 --> 18:36.830 Those attacks are relatively low in scale, 18:36.830 --> 18:38.840 they are not directed against coalition forces, 18:38.840 --> 18:40.670 they are not occurring in city centers, 18:40.670 --> 18:42.470 they're occurring at isolated checkpoints, 18:42.470 --> 18:44.890 but those attacks are occurring and they are not consistent 18:44.890 --> 18:47.020 with the movement toward a negotiated settlement 18:47.020 --> 18:50.560 and they are not consistent with the undertaking they made. 18:50.560 --> 18:51.393 - Thank you. 18:51.393 --> 18:54.530 General Townsend, focusing on West Africa in particular, 18:54.530 --> 18:58.522 I was alarmed when I was there at the growing threat 18:58.522 --> 19:01.470 from the violent extremist organizations in the region, 19:01.470 --> 19:04.460 Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, to varying degrees, 19:04.460 --> 19:05.980 their governments are all under pressure, 19:05.980 --> 19:08.050 there are portions of their country 19:08.050 --> 19:11.213 that are increasingly outside of their control. 19:12.290 --> 19:13.880 How do you see that fight going 19:13.880 --> 19:15.724 in those three particular countries 19:15.724 --> 19:19.209 and what do we need to do to stop the spread of those groups 19:19.209 --> 19:21.320 and I guess the other question would be where do you see 19:21.320 --> 19:22.700 the risk that those groups will 19:22.700 --> 19:26.413 use those safe havens to plan larger operations? 19:28.820 --> 19:31.168 - Chairman, in West Africa and the Sahel region 19:31.168 --> 19:33.631 I think that the Western 19:33.631 --> 19:36.269 and international and African efforts there 19:36.269 --> 19:39.423 are not getting the job done. 19:40.430 --> 19:44.270 ISIS and al-Qaeda are on the march in West Africa. 19:44.270 --> 19:45.701 They're having success 19:45.701 --> 19:47.783 and the international efforts are not. 19:50.035 --> 19:51.630 So, why is that? 19:51.630 --> 19:54.073 I think that there's, you know, 19:55.962 --> 19:57.750 the African partners there don't have 19:57.750 --> 19:59.740 a lot of capacity or capability, 19:59.740 --> 20:03.360 there's a lot of Western assistance going on there, 20:03.360 --> 20:06.632 European-led, French-led and European-led 20:06.632 --> 20:08.157 with the U.S. in support. 20:08.157 --> 20:11.510 I think it's insufficient and it's uncoordinated. 20:11.510 --> 20:15.150 I think the French and the Europeans have recognized this 20:15.150 --> 20:18.770 and they're taking steps to make it better coordinated. 20:18.770 --> 20:20.110 Those efforts might actually 20:20.110 --> 20:23.220 be sufficient if they were better coordinated. 20:23.220 --> 20:27.930 If we don't turn this around in West Africa, 20:27.930 --> 20:31.830 I think it becomes a growing threat in the region. 20:31.830 --> 20:34.120 I think the threat will begin 20:34.120 --> 20:36.610 to impact on the littoral states. 20:36.610 --> 20:38.110 It's already started to reach 20:38.110 --> 20:41.270 the northern fringes of the littoral states. 20:41.270 --> 20:45.210 I think that Europe can and should do more 20:45.210 --> 20:48.800 before America should do more in this part of the world. 20:48.800 --> 20:51.530 I think the problems that manifest from West Africa 20:51.530 --> 20:54.840 will manifest in Europe before they manifest in America 20:54.840 --> 20:57.705 but I do believe that if ISIS can 20:57.705 --> 21:01.910 carve out a new caliphate or al-Qaeda can 21:01.910 --> 21:03.530 they will do it and they will attempt 21:03.530 --> 21:05.220 to do it in West Africa. 21:05.220 --> 21:06.053 - Thank you. 21:06.053 --> 21:06.886 Mr. Thornberry. 21:08.700 --> 21:10.090 - Let me just, excuse me, 21:10.090 --> 21:11.930 follow-up on the on the Chairman really, 21:11.930 --> 21:14.660 and General McKenzie and General Townsend 21:14.660 --> 21:19.110 would each of you give us a thumbnail sketch 21:19.110 --> 21:22.330 of the terrorist threat in your AORs? 21:22.330 --> 21:23.740 I know we'll have more detail 21:23.740 --> 21:25.460 when we go to classified setting 21:25.460 --> 21:27.920 but I think it's important for all members 21:27.920 --> 21:28.900 and the American people 21:28.900 --> 21:31.430 to know is this threat still there? 21:31.430 --> 21:33.140 We kind of, what's it look like, 21:33.140 --> 21:36.053 how's it evolving that sort of thing? 21:37.969 --> 21:38.985 - Thank you, sir. 21:38.985 --> 21:40.200 I'll begin and go from east to west. 21:40.200 --> 21:42.530 So, in Afghanistan the principal threat 21:42.530 --> 21:44.360 that could threaten our homeland 21:44.360 --> 21:46.350 or the homelands of our allies and partners 21:46.350 --> 21:50.940 is either ISIS-K or elements of al-Qaeda. 21:50.940 --> 21:52.070 Both of those forces are under 21:52.070 --> 21:54.090 considerable pressure now from us. 21:54.090 --> 21:56.170 They're pushed up into the east of Afghanistan. 21:56.170 --> 21:58.570 If unrelenting CT pressure is maintained, 21:58.570 --> 22:00.860 it is likely they will find it very hard to achieve 22:00.860 --> 22:02.744 a degree of coordination necessary to attack us. 22:02.744 --> 22:05.090 We believe that if that pressure is relieved 22:05.090 --> 22:06.910 at some point in those ungoverned spaces 22:06.910 --> 22:08.480 they would regain that capability, 22:08.480 --> 22:10.530 so that's one thing. 22:10.530 --> 22:12.690 The next thing I would note is the Taliban actually 22:12.690 --> 22:14.673 does not entertain attack plans against the United States. 22:14.673 --> 22:16.500 They're a regional entity. 22:16.500 --> 22:19.190 There are good reasons why we're conducting 22:19.190 --> 22:21.240 and have been conducting operations against them 22:21.240 --> 22:24.090 because of the fact they host two other organizations 22:24.090 --> 22:25.930 that actually are sworn to destroy us. 22:25.930 --> 22:27.654 But the Taliban themselves are not poised 22:27.654 --> 22:29.970 or have any background of attacking, you know, 22:29.970 --> 22:31.810 certainly not attacking our homeland. 22:31.810 --> 22:34.040 I would tell you in the far west end of the theater, 22:34.040 --> 22:35.360 in the Idlib pocket, 22:35.360 --> 22:38.960 there are remnants of al-Qaeda and remnants of ISIS 22:38.960 --> 22:41.810 that do entertain attack plans against us. 22:41.810 --> 22:43.403 They are being compressed right now. 22:43.403 --> 22:46.730 It's hard for them to generate those attacks at the moment 22:46.730 --> 22:48.670 because the conflict that's going on out there 22:48.670 --> 22:50.830 and that conflict, while it does have the effect 22:50.830 --> 22:53.140 of limiting their ability to operate against us, 22:53.140 --> 22:54.500 is also going to have profoundly 22:54.500 --> 22:56.730 horrific humanitarian outcomes 22:56.730 --> 22:58.050 in the western part of Syria. 22:58.050 --> 23:00.730 So, we watch that carefully. 23:00.730 --> 23:02.850 In the south, in the Arabian Peninsula. 23:02.850 --> 23:07.040 AQAP still has visions of attacking the United States. 23:07.040 --> 23:09.700 They are under pressure and find it hard to realize that 23:09.700 --> 23:11.030 but if left unconstrained, 23:11.030 --> 23:12.480 undoubtedly they would regenerate 23:12.480 --> 23:14.750 and present a threat to us as well. 23:14.750 --> 23:17.339 Last, I need to mention the largest state sponsored 23:17.339 --> 23:19.980 terror organization in the theater, 23:19.980 --> 23:20.813 the Iranian threat network. 23:20.813 --> 23:23.283 Whether it is Shia militia groups in Iraq, 23:23.283 --> 23:26.130 Lebanese Hezbollah or Khatib Hezbollah, 23:26.130 --> 23:28.740 all of those entities entertain to some degree 23:28.740 --> 23:31.880 a desire to attack Americans generally in the theater 23:31.880 --> 23:34.790 but Iran's reach is not only regional, it is global. 23:34.790 --> 23:35.650 And in fact, as you know, 23:35.650 --> 23:37.440 has been manifested a few miles 23:37.440 --> 23:38.940 from where we stand right now. 23:42.670 --> 23:45.030 - I'll go from west to east. 23:45.030 --> 23:46.691 In West Africa and the Sahel, 23:46.691 --> 23:48.947 as I was just discussing a moment ago, 23:48.947 --> 23:53.260 the threat there is both ISIS and al-Qaeda. 23:53.260 --> 23:56.447 Al-Qaeda has a branch there called JNIM, 23:56.447 --> 23:59.090 Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam. 23:59.090 --> 24:02.960 That group is as part of al-Qaeda 24:02.960 --> 24:05.833 as any group is on the planet. 24:06.730 --> 24:09.660 And they are a growing threat there. 24:09.660 --> 24:12.760 And what's an interesting dynamic that we see in West Africa 24:12.760 --> 24:15.460 that we don't see in other parts of the world, 24:15.460 --> 24:19.710 there al-Qaeda and ISIS cooperate with one another. 24:19.710 --> 24:21.307 I can't really explain that 24:21.307 --> 24:24.010 and I've been asked before if I thought that might 24:24.010 --> 24:26.600 be something new that we would see growing. 24:26.600 --> 24:27.450 I don't think so. 24:27.450 --> 24:29.209 I think it's a local phenomenon 24:29.209 --> 24:32.440 that these folks have grown up with each other, 24:32.440 --> 24:33.970 known each other all their lives, 24:33.970 --> 24:36.040 one joined one gang, one joined the other, 24:36.040 --> 24:37.990 and so they cooperate with one another. 24:38.970 --> 24:43.560 This threat, if it continues to grow at the pace it has, 24:43.560 --> 24:45.660 and we're seeing a five-fold increase 24:45.660 --> 24:49.160 since last year just in the Sahel alone, 24:49.160 --> 24:51.713 we're going to see that threat emerge 24:51.713 --> 24:55.433 and manifest in the littoral states of West Africa, 24:56.410 --> 24:58.343 I think unchecked this threat 24:58.343 --> 25:01.660 becomes a threat beyond the region. 25:01.660 --> 25:05.834 Moving to the north, we have ISIS there in Libya. 25:05.834 --> 25:08.766 That threat has been significantly reduced 25:08.766 --> 25:11.680 and we are keeping close watch on that 25:11.680 --> 25:14.020 to ensure that it stays that way 25:14.020 --> 25:15.620 and we've been able to do that, 25:15.620 --> 25:18.655 work with both sides of the Libyan civil war, 25:18.655 --> 25:21.988 they have both supported our counterterrorism efforts there. 25:21.988 --> 25:23.168 Moving to the east, 25:23.168 --> 25:27.950 there's a small presence of ISIS in Somalia and East Africa 25:27.950 --> 25:30.330 but it's not a great operational concern, 25:30.330 --> 25:32.300 but al-Shabaab is. 25:32.300 --> 25:34.119 Al-Shabaa is the largest 25:34.119 --> 25:38.115 and most kinetically violent arm of al-Qaeda 25:38.115 --> 25:41.170 and they are a serious threat 25:41.170 --> 25:45.160 to not only the Somali people but the entire region. 25:45.160 --> 25:48.640 As one example is a recent attack in Kenya, 25:48.640 --> 25:51.000 another example is their threats 25:51.000 --> 25:54.133 to embassies in the region outside of Somalia. 25:55.700 --> 25:57.730 I can discuss more about the threat 25:57.730 --> 25:59.620 of al-Shabaab in a closed hearing. 25:59.620 --> 26:00.840 I would just say that I'm 26:00.840 --> 26:03.580 of the belief that al-Shabaab today 26:03.580 --> 26:05.430 poses a significant threat 26:05.430 --> 26:07.022 to American interests in the region 26:07.022 --> 26:09.059 and that threat would continue 26:09.059 --> 26:12.677 whether we were in Somalia or we were not in Somalia. 26:12.677 --> 26:15.850 And I also believe that if left unchecked, 26:15.850 --> 26:17.370 and we've been putting a fair amount 26:17.370 --> 26:18.810 of pressure on al-Shabaab, 26:18.810 --> 26:21.640 if left unchecked, I believe that that would 26:21.640 --> 26:23.963 manifest into an international threat. 26:25.910 --> 26:26.910 - [Smith] Ms. Luria. 26:29.660 --> 26:32.850 - Well, thank you and it's great to go at the beginning 26:32.850 --> 26:35.250 so we can talk about aircraft carriers up front. 26:36.360 --> 26:39.020 So, I wanted to start with General McKenzie. 26:39.020 --> 26:41.180 Recently the Abraham Lincoln 26:41.180 --> 26:42.560 completed the longest deployment 26:42.560 --> 26:44.040 for a carrier since the Vietnam War 26:44.040 --> 26:46.530 and that was due to a casualty on the Harry S. Truman 26:46.530 --> 26:49.483 which made it unable to deploy on time. 26:50.520 --> 26:53.010 I was just giving that background to focus on 26:53.010 --> 26:55.350 how vital it is to your completing your mission 26:55.350 --> 26:58.123 to have a continuous carrier presence in the Gulf? 27:00.520 --> 27:03.130 - So, the aircraft carrier brings mobility, 27:03.130 --> 27:04.670 it brings offensive firepower, 27:04.670 --> 27:06.450 it brings defensive firepower. 27:06.450 --> 27:08.340 We can position it, we can move it around, 27:08.340 --> 27:10.520 it complicates an adversary's targeting. 27:10.520 --> 27:13.660 So, it's a uniquely American piece of capability. 27:13.660 --> 27:15.460 Additionally the virtue of the aircraft carriers, 27:15.460 --> 27:18.420 there are no access basing and oversight restrictions 27:18.420 --> 27:21.010 that operate on forces that launch from that carrier, 27:21.010 --> 27:22.930 so that gives me great flexibility. 27:22.930 --> 27:23.940 Having said all of that it, 27:23.940 --> 27:27.110 also has a profound deterring effect principally upon Iran. 27:27.110 --> 27:28.250 They know where the carrier is, 27:28.250 --> 27:29.792 they track the presence of the carrier, 27:29.792 --> 27:31.510 and I view a carrier as 27:31.510 --> 27:33.680 a critical part of a deterrent posture 27:33.680 --> 27:35.400 effective against Iran. 27:35.400 --> 27:36.560 - So, that actually leads into what 27:36.560 --> 27:38.440 the next part of my question would be 27:38.440 --> 27:41.690 is if you were to deploy Air Force assets to the region, 27:41.690 --> 27:42.870 would you feel that you could have 27:42.870 --> 27:45.007 an equivalent deterrent effect by Air Force 27:45.007 --> 27:47.590 and a combination of other assets in the region 27:47.590 --> 27:49.840 if you were not to have a continuous carrier presence? 27:49.840 --> 27:52.230 And then secondly, has the carrier presence 27:52.230 --> 27:54.030 or any of our presence actually deterred 27:54.030 --> 27:55.780 any of the recent Iranian aggression 27:55.780 --> 27:58.423 because they continue to harass, aggress, 27:58.423 --> 28:00.950 even though we are putting more forces there. 28:00.950 --> 28:03.720 So, I was wondering what your assessment of that was? 28:03.720 --> 28:04.832 - Sure. 28:04.832 --> 28:06.892 So, I tend to think of land-based air power 28:06.892 --> 28:09.350 as complimentary to sea-based air power. 28:09.350 --> 28:10.227 Again, we can use them both, 28:10.227 --> 28:12.370 they both bring unique capabilities. 28:12.370 --> 28:14.570 Again the particular and unique advantage 28:14.570 --> 28:16.960 of sea-based air power is its launch 28:16.960 --> 28:19.110 is from a piece of United States sovereignty 28:19.110 --> 28:21.010 so there are no restrictions that'll 28:21.010 --> 28:22.540 be placed on where those airplanes go 28:22.540 --> 28:24.040 or what they do which gives 28:24.040 --> 28:26.024 the commander-in-chief significant flexibility 28:26.024 --> 28:27.990 as we look at what we might want to do. 28:27.990 --> 28:31.900 So, that's the military component of it. 28:31.900 --> 28:33.821 It is my best judgment that we have 28:33.821 --> 28:37.380 reestablished a form of rough deterrence, 28:37.380 --> 28:40.010 what I would call contested deterrence with Iran 28:40.010 --> 28:44.560 in the wake of the strike on Qassem Soleimani 28:44.560 --> 28:46.053 and the attack on our bases. 28:47.190 --> 28:48.625 And part of that deterrence is obtained 28:48.625 --> 28:51.750 by our obvious force presence in the theater, 28:51.750 --> 28:53.314 force presence that was not there 28:53.314 --> 28:55.770 in the spring of 2019 that led them 28:55.770 --> 28:57.240 to undertake the cycle of violence 28:57.240 --> 28:59.050 that culminated in January. 28:59.050 --> 29:01.125 - Well, thank you and pivoting more 29:01.125 --> 29:03.310 on that continuous presence 29:03.310 --> 29:04.910 and I switch to Ms. Wheelbarger, 29:06.120 --> 29:07.900 recently and in your statement here 29:07.900 --> 29:10.630 you discussed the dynamic force employment. 29:10.630 --> 29:13.270 And in January as Lincoln was heading home, 29:13.270 --> 29:15.183 a spokesman for Naval Air Forces San Diego 29:15.183 --> 29:17.670 said the new Navy deployment model 29:17.670 --> 29:19.240 of dynamic force employment 29:19.240 --> 29:24.010 means less predictable deployments will become more routine. 29:24.010 --> 29:26.183 So, less predictable will be the routine. 29:27.942 --> 29:29.160 And the statement went on to say 29:29.160 --> 29:31.300 the length of this deployment is not ideal 29:31.300 --> 29:33.611 or something that's going to become a regular thing 29:33.611 --> 29:35.270 but they're not going to be as predictable 29:35.270 --> 29:37.520 as they were in the past. 29:37.520 --> 29:39.560 Our crews and families should, prior to deployment, 29:39.560 --> 29:41.460 discuss the possibility of something like this, 29:41.460 --> 29:43.570 i.e. an extended deployment happening. 29:43.570 --> 29:44.690 Do you think that the extension 29:44.690 --> 29:46.000 of the Lincoln was an example 29:46.000 --> 29:49.150 of what you really mean by dynamic force employment 29:49.150 --> 29:53.050 and should we expect deployments to be of longer duration, 29:53.050 --> 29:54.770 eight months such as the Lincoln, 29:54.770 --> 29:58.160 in order to satisfy these requirements in these AORS? 29:58.160 --> 29:59.613 - Thanks for the question. 29:59.613 --> 30:00.560 I don't think we saw that particular example 30:00.560 --> 30:04.620 as a key example of dynamic force employment. 30:04.620 --> 30:05.453 We wanted that. 30:05.453 --> 30:06.830 - You think that was a misstatement 30:06.830 --> 30:08.050 by the spokesman for. 30:08.050 --> 30:10.460 - No, I think what we want to see 30:10.460 --> 30:12.410 is that dynamic force employment allows us 30:12.410 --> 30:14.850 to be as I think the spokesman was trying to say 30:14.850 --> 30:17.910 strategically predictable but operationally unpredictable. 30:17.910 --> 30:19.270 But we have to have the kind of forces 30:19.270 --> 30:20.810 that can respond to current events 30:20.810 --> 30:23.280 both, you know, based on the adversary 30:23.280 --> 30:26.120 but also based on the situation within our forces. 30:26.120 --> 30:29.480 So, it's I would say the extension is, 30:29.480 --> 30:31.810 that's common but something we're gonna 30:31.810 --> 30:33.563 need to be prepared for. 30:33.563 --> 30:35.850 - So, would you say that we have been able 30:35.850 --> 30:37.940 to respond adequately when we had 30:37.940 --> 30:39.820 the delay in the Harry S. Truman 30:39.820 --> 30:41.870 and the extension of the Lincoln? 30:41.870 --> 30:43.440 For the combatant commanders specifically 30:43.440 --> 30:45.042 and specifically for CENTCOM, 30:45.042 --> 30:47.687 have you felt that the Navy 30:47.687 --> 30:49.280 and the carrier fleet has been able 30:49.280 --> 30:51.629 to respond adequately to meet your needs 30:51.629 --> 30:53.690 for deterrence within the region? 30:53.690 --> 30:58.190 - Through heroic efforts and just tremendous flexibility, 30:58.190 --> 30:59.710 yes, they have been able to do that. 30:59.710 --> 31:01.500 I am keenly aware of the total burden 31:01.500 --> 31:03.327 that places on the Navy, in particular, 31:03.327 --> 31:04.620 and the Joint Force in general 31:04.620 --> 31:06.320 when they meet these requirements. 31:08.642 --> 31:10.130 - Thank you and I yield back. 31:10.130 --> 31:10.963 - [Smith] Thank you. 31:10.963 --> 31:11.796 Mr. Wallace. 31:13.090 --> 31:14.370 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman 31:14.370 --> 31:17.180 and I certainly share the condolences 31:18.874 --> 31:22.440 for the two Marines that we just lost fighting ISIS. 31:22.440 --> 31:26.900 And I think that dynamic fighting ISIS right now, 31:26.900 --> 31:29.070 a resurgent ISIS in Iraq 31:29.070 --> 31:31.410 and what we just went through in Syria 31:31.410 --> 31:33.610 is exactly what we want to prevent 31:33.610 --> 31:37.660 happening in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 31:37.660 --> 31:40.260 General McKenzie you just mentioned a moment ago, 31:40.260 --> 31:43.329 you just testified that we have sufficient pressure 31:43.329 --> 31:47.340 on ISIS and al-Qaeda to keep them on their back foot 31:47.340 --> 31:49.534 but if we relieve that pressure they could be 31:49.534 --> 31:51.980 and would likely be resurgent. 31:51.980 --> 31:55.737 So, let's just fast forward a bit. 31:55.737 --> 31:57.740 Let's presume the Taliban is sincere about peace, 31:57.740 --> 31:59.990 they enter into a process with the Afghan government, 31:59.990 --> 32:01.560 they meet all of our conditions 32:01.560 --> 32:03.399 for a full withdrawal in 14 months, 32:03.399 --> 32:05.410 although I have a lot of questions 32:05.410 --> 32:06.810 about what those conditions are 32:06.810 --> 32:09.020 which I'll hold for the classified setting, 32:09.020 --> 32:10.583 but let's presume all of that happens. 32:10.583 --> 32:14.140 I'm struggling to wrap my mind around 32:14.140 --> 32:16.606 how the Taliban has a military capability, 32:16.606 --> 32:19.110 even partnered with the Afghan army, 32:19.110 --> 32:20.210 which I think we would agree 32:20.210 --> 32:22.275 is not independently operable at this point 32:22.275 --> 32:26.030 to keep that sufficient pressure 32:26.030 --> 32:28.420 on half the world's terrorist organizations 32:28.420 --> 32:31.220 in one of the most difficult places in the world. 32:31.220 --> 32:33.790 So, how does that, help me understand, 32:33.790 --> 32:35.590 help all of us understand how that happens 32:35.590 --> 32:37.206 in the absence of U.S. forces. 32:37.206 --> 32:40.660 Does the Taliban have the military capability 32:40.660 --> 32:43.410 along with the Afghan army to keep sufficient pressure? 32:44.630 --> 32:47.329 - Over the last several months in eastern Afghanistan 32:47.329 --> 32:52.329 we've watched the Taliban compress and crush ISIS presence 32:52.430 --> 32:54.720 on the ground in southern Nangarhar province 32:54.720 --> 32:56.400 and they've been very effective doing that. 32:56.400 --> 32:58.140 That's some of the worst terrain in the world. 32:58.140 --> 33:00.390 They paid a very steep price in their own fighters. 33:00.390 --> 33:02.010 - [Wallace] Was that independent of our support? 33:02.010 --> 33:03.615 - There was very limited support from us 33:03.615 --> 33:04.810 and I would characterize that 33:04.810 --> 33:06.470 as very limited support from us. 33:06.470 --> 33:08.970 So, they've demonstrated capability to do it. 33:08.970 --> 33:10.620 It was a bloody mess but they did it. 33:10.620 --> 33:13.042 In fact, ISIS really now no longer 33:13.042 --> 33:15.180 holds ground in Nangarhar province. 33:15.180 --> 33:17.020 They're trying to re-establish themselves 33:17.020 --> 33:18.490 up to the north and other provinces 33:18.490 --> 33:19.820 and it remains yet to be seen 33:19.820 --> 33:21.260 if they're gonna be successful doing that 33:21.260 --> 33:22.850 and we'll know over time if they are 33:22.850 --> 33:24.820 but they've demonstrated a capability to do that. 33:24.820 --> 33:29.060 Frankly, sir, it is more a question of will than capability 33:29.060 --> 33:31.010 and that will have to be developed 33:31.010 --> 33:32.180 in the fullness of time. 33:32.180 --> 33:34.658 I defer to no one in my distrust of the Taliban. 33:34.658 --> 33:37.013 But we will have the opportunity to. 33:37.013 --> 33:38.110 - Just to be clear. 33:38.110 --> 33:39.440 I'm sorry I have limited time. 33:39.440 --> 33:41.640 You believe in the absence of all U.S. forces, 33:41.640 --> 33:42.740 your military advice, 33:42.740 --> 33:44.050 the Taliban and the Afghan army 33:44.050 --> 33:46.020 have sufficient military capability 33:47.220 --> 33:49.712 to keep all of those, not just ISIS, 33:49.712 --> 33:53.270 al-Qaeda, everything that exists in Pakistan, 33:53.270 --> 33:56.793 to keep them at bay, to keep the homeland safe? 33:57.920 --> 34:00.264 And I would just remark that if we all know 34:00.264 --> 34:02.370 that if we have to fight our way back in 34:02.370 --> 34:06.130 that we will be attending I think many more funerals 34:06.130 --> 34:07.943 than a current sustained pressure 34:07.943 --> 34:11.050 campaign with limited forces. 34:11.050 --> 34:13.030 - First of all, I share those concerns. 34:13.030 --> 34:14.890 I think those are very reasonable concerns. 34:14.890 --> 34:18.120 It is less a capability than it is a question of will. 34:18.120 --> 34:21.240 And it's less a question of will against ISIS 34:21.240 --> 34:22.550 than it is against al-Qaeda. 34:22.550 --> 34:24.350 And those are things that we're just going 34:24.350 --> 34:26.450 to have to see in order to believe 34:26.450 --> 34:28.320 as we go forward as conditions are set 34:28.320 --> 34:29.830 or they either meet those conditions 34:29.830 --> 34:31.180 or they don't meet those conditions. 34:31.180 --> 34:35.173 - If we shut down Bagram Air Base, 34:37.215 --> 34:40.180 I think it's important to have on the record here 34:40.180 --> 34:42.409 in Syria and Yemen and other places 34:42.409 --> 34:45.980 we have basing capabilities around those countries 34:45.980 --> 34:49.690 whether it's Incirlik, Idlib, Djibouti. 34:49.690 --> 34:51.850 What do we have around Afghanistan 34:51.850 --> 34:53.240 should those presumptions, 34:53.240 --> 34:54.440 should they not have the capability 34:54.440 --> 34:57.060 of the Taliban and AAA. 34:57.060 --> 35:00.053 What other bases do we have in terms of a plan B 35:00.053 --> 35:03.537 to be able to conduct operations into Afghanistan 35:03.537 --> 35:06.060 and the FATA or the Western Pakistan. 35:06.060 --> 35:08.290 - Well, sir, so right now we're executing withdrawal. 35:08.290 --> 35:09.520 - [Wallace] In the absence of Bagram. 35:09.520 --> 35:11.040 I mean assuming playing this all out 35:11.040 --> 35:11.940 we withdraw all forces. 35:11.940 --> 35:15.410 - So, we have no plans beyond going to 8,600 right now. 35:15.410 --> 35:17.572 No one's given me any guidance to go to a lower. 35:17.572 --> 35:18.480 - There's a public statement 35:18.480 --> 35:22.920 of zero forces full withdrawal in 14 months. 35:22.920 --> 35:23.900 - There is, however, 35:23.900 --> 35:26.710 we have not developed military plans to that end yet. 35:26.710 --> 35:28.050 - Okay. 35:28.050 --> 35:29.450 I think it's also worth noting 35:29.450 --> 35:31.440 that we still have an American hostage 35:31.440 --> 35:34.870 held by the Taliban just taken in the last few months. 35:34.870 --> 35:37.214 So, I would be extremely concerned 35:37.214 --> 35:39.960 to see Taliban prisoner releases 35:39.960 --> 35:42.060 while the Taliban and the Haqqani network 35:42.060 --> 35:46.100 are holding a U.S. citizen, former Navy diver, hostage. 35:46.100 --> 35:47.150 And then the last piece, 35:47.150 --> 35:49.279 in terms of great power competition, 35:49.279 --> 35:54.279 I can't think of another American military base 35:54.630 --> 35:57.695 or coalition military base now that Manas is gone, 35:57.695 --> 36:00.310 besides Bagram, on China's western flank. 36:00.310 --> 36:04.370 Can you talk to the western flank of China 36:04.370 --> 36:06.027 and what platforms we have there? 36:06.027 --> 36:08.432 - So, the platform's we have are intermittent platforms 36:08.432 --> 36:10.760 as we go in and conduct joint training 36:10.760 --> 36:12.090 but we have no permanent platform 36:12.090 --> 36:14.050 up in the stands as you noted, sir. 36:14.050 --> 36:15.420 - Thank you everyone for your service. 36:15.420 --> 36:17.330 I appreciate your testimony. 36:17.330 --> 36:19.040 - [Smith] Ms. Escobar 36:19.040 --> 36:20.010 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 36:20.010 --> 36:22.333 - And I'm sorry, I apologize. 36:23.680 --> 36:25.140 I'm sorry I was right. 36:25.140 --> 36:26.450 Ms. Escobar go ahead. 36:26.450 --> 36:27.680 Sorry. 36:27.680 --> 36:28.690 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman 36:28.690 --> 36:30.160 and many thanks to our witnesses 36:30.160 --> 36:32.230 for your presence here today and for your service. 36:32.230 --> 36:34.530 And I just want to say at the outset, 36:34.530 --> 36:38.580 obviously we all want to see peace happen. 36:38.580 --> 36:41.930 We are hoping for successful conversations 36:41.930 --> 36:44.740 between the Taliban and the Afghan government 36:44.740 --> 36:49.300 but I do have some serious concerns, General McKenzie. 36:49.300 --> 36:51.240 Secretary Esper has authorized 36:51.240 --> 36:56.170 the draw down to the 8,600 troops, that's happening. 36:56.170 --> 36:58.410 That's happening before the deal 36:58.410 --> 37:01.630 between the Taliban and the Afghan government 37:01.630 --> 37:04.043 is sealed and worked out. 37:05.330 --> 37:06.750 Given recent events, 37:06.750 --> 37:09.070 especially our need to strike 37:09.070 --> 37:11.020 against Taliban fighters just days 37:11.020 --> 37:13.017 after we signed the peace deal, 37:13.017 --> 37:14.822 what confidence do you have 37:14.822 --> 37:17.760 in the Taliban honoring their commitments to us? 37:17.760 --> 37:21.230 You keep saying it's not a question of capacity 37:21.230 --> 37:23.490 but that it's more a question of will. 37:23.490 --> 37:26.440 What confidence do you have in that will? 37:26.440 --> 37:27.932 - So, I have no confidence 37:27.932 --> 37:31.440 because I'm going to be driven by the observed facts. 37:31.440 --> 37:33.400 Either they will draw down 37:33.400 --> 37:35.360 the current level of attacks or they won't. 37:35.360 --> 37:36.277 And if they're unable to draw down 37:36.277 --> 37:37.670 the current levels of attacks 37:37.670 --> 37:38.960 then political leadership will be able 37:38.960 --> 37:40.427 to make decisions based on that. 37:40.427 --> 37:42.340 But it doesn't matter whether 37:42.340 --> 37:44.380 I'm optimistic or I'm pessimistic. 37:44.380 --> 37:45.830 We'll see what happens on the ground. 37:45.830 --> 37:48.250 To date, Taliban attacks are higher 37:48.250 --> 37:49.920 than we believe are consistent 37:49.920 --> 37:51.970 with an idea to actually carry out this plan. 37:51.970 --> 37:53.866 And that may be because the Taliban 37:53.866 --> 37:55.750 has made a decision at the top 37:55.750 --> 37:57.670 to continue those attacks and presses. 37:57.670 --> 37:59.915 It may be because the Taliban's leadership is fractured 37:59.915 --> 38:02.000 and it takes a while to get all this down 38:02.000 --> 38:03.320 to the subordinate leaders. 38:03.320 --> 38:04.840 Their command and control is not 38:04.840 --> 38:06.780 as effective or as rapid as ours. 38:06.780 --> 38:08.940 We will know very soon on that 38:08.940 --> 38:10.220 but I would say first of all right now 38:10.220 --> 38:11.550 attacks are higher than we want, 38:11.550 --> 38:14.350 although they have not chosen to attack coalition forces, 38:14.350 --> 38:15.490 they have not chosen to attack 38:15.490 --> 38:17.000 inside the major urban areas. 38:17.000 --> 38:20.120 Although ISIS has conducted some of those attacks. 38:20.120 --> 38:22.350 So, we will see what happens going forward. 38:22.350 --> 38:24.987 The last point is we are going to go to 8,600 38:24.987 --> 38:26.650 and we're going to achieve that here 38:26.650 --> 38:28.120 about by the middle of the summer. 38:28.120 --> 38:30.170 It is my best judgment and the judgment 38:30.170 --> 38:32.400 of the commander on the ground, General Scott Miller, 38:32.400 --> 38:33.890 that we can be very effective 38:33.890 --> 38:36.203 in our CT efforts at that force level. 38:37.870 --> 38:40.040 - What is our plan specifically 38:40.040 --> 38:41.722 and who makes the determination 38:41.722 --> 38:45.330 about when that that line is crossed, 38:45.330 --> 38:47.040 when we've had enough, 38:47.040 --> 38:51.230 when we're not seeing enough progress, are there specifics? 38:51.230 --> 38:52.300 I understand you may not be able 38:52.300 --> 38:55.560 to divulge those in an unclassified setting, 38:55.560 --> 38:59.410 but are there very specific measures 38:59.410 --> 39:03.600 that we will be using, is it somebody's sense? 39:03.600 --> 39:05.320 - So, we report, we have a very 39:05.320 --> 39:08.730 sophisticated system for tracking attacks, 39:08.730 --> 39:09.950 how many were initiated, 39:09.950 --> 39:11.320 how many casualties were caused 39:11.320 --> 39:12.750 as a result of those attacks, 39:12.750 --> 39:14.720 where those attacks occur. 39:14.720 --> 39:17.560 We report that and I have a recommendation on that, 39:17.560 --> 39:19.250 General Miller has a recommendation on that. 39:19.250 --> 39:21.160 It goes to the Chairman and the Secretary. 39:21.160 --> 39:22.900 The decision about what is tolerable 39:22.900 --> 39:24.080 and what is not tolerable 39:24.080 --> 39:25.390 is not a military decision. 39:25.390 --> 39:27.650 That's a political decision, a policy decision. 39:27.650 --> 39:30.573 I defer that to Ms. Wheelbarger to talk about. 39:31.830 --> 39:33.360 - I will just add what I've heard the Secretary 39:33.360 --> 39:35.390 and I think you've probably heard the Secretary say 39:35.390 --> 39:37.450 in response to Mr. Wallace's question as well. 39:37.450 --> 39:39.190 The 14 months of going to zero 39:39.190 --> 39:40.740 is an aspirational benchmark 39:40.740 --> 39:42.956 based on the conditions being achieved. 39:42.956 --> 39:44.970 The Secretary is well prepared to look 39:44.970 --> 39:47.640 at the terrain in a few months 39:47.640 --> 39:50.700 and see what the Afghans and the Taliban have come to. 39:50.700 --> 39:52.610 And he is prepared, as he has said to me, 39:52.610 --> 39:54.570 and I think he has said to the committees, 39:54.570 --> 39:57.040 to readjust our force posture up or down 39:57.040 --> 39:58.530 based on what the conditions required 39:58.530 --> 39:59.560 to achieve our objectives 39:59.560 --> 40:01.060 which are to continue to ensure 40:01.060 --> 40:03.280 Afghanistan is not a safe haven for terrorists 40:03.280 --> 40:04.670 who could particularly hit the homeland. 40:04.670 --> 40:07.240 So, he is prepared to look at the truth on the ground 40:07.240 --> 40:09.420 and make decisions accordingly. 40:09.420 --> 40:10.253 - Thank you. 40:10.253 --> 40:12.770 And Ms. Wheelbarger we know that we're 40:12.770 --> 40:15.260 at the beginning of the process and understandably 40:15.260 --> 40:18.900 we've gotta wait and see and have high hopes 40:18.900 --> 40:21.990 but you know obviously keep close watch, 40:21.990 --> 40:24.645 but the intra-Afghan dialogue phase 40:24.645 --> 40:28.612 which was supposed to start today has been delayed. 40:28.612 --> 40:30.545 How do we know this is not just 40:30.545 --> 40:33.220 the Taliban trying to run out the clock? 40:33.220 --> 40:34.250 - Sure. 40:34.250 --> 40:35.730 Like I said before I arrived this morning 40:35.730 --> 40:36.970 I did ask if there's any updates 40:36.970 --> 40:39.020 and it did seem like there might be 40:39.020 --> 40:41.010 a sort of a fig leaf from Ghani coming down 40:41.010 --> 40:43.780 where we actually will start those conversations today. 40:43.780 --> 40:46.710 I think all of us have to remain somewhat skeptical 40:46.710 --> 40:48.780 that this is going to work precisely as planned 40:48.780 --> 40:51.175 but remained open and flexible to the Afghans 40:51.175 --> 40:54.010 over time working this out with themselves. 40:54.010 --> 40:55.760 But again our interests are continuing 40:55.760 --> 40:57.130 to put political pressure on them 40:57.130 --> 40:58.980 to achieve that objective while continuing 40:58.980 --> 41:01.005 to have the military platforms and posture 41:01.005 --> 41:05.150 to allow us to achieve our national security requirements. 41:05.150 --> 41:10.145 - Perhaps not beginning the withdrawals so soon 41:10.145 --> 41:11.810 would have helped provide some 41:11.810 --> 41:13.800 leverage for the Afghan government. 41:13.800 --> 41:14.633 I yield back 41:14.633 --> 41:15.680 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 41:15.680 --> 41:16.995 - Thank you. 41:16.995 --> 41:17.828 Mr. Mitchell. 41:17.828 --> 41:18.661 - Thanks, Mr. Chair. 41:18.661 --> 41:20.834 First let me start by thanking you all for your service, 41:20.834 --> 41:22.074 for those you command. 41:22.074 --> 41:24.839 You're in a tough neighborhood some days, many days, 41:24.839 --> 41:26.930 and I appreciate it. 41:26.930 --> 41:28.770 Let's stay on the subject of Afghanistan 41:28.770 --> 41:29.890 which needs to be a significant. 41:29.890 --> 41:32.070 If I have time hop to Syria just 41:32.070 --> 41:33.470 to keep us entertained here. 41:34.440 --> 41:35.600 I think Mr. Wallace's comment 41:35.600 --> 41:37.965 which I want to reinforce is that, 41:37.965 --> 41:39.580 General McKenzie correct me, 41:39.580 --> 41:41.242 but I think the ability to manage 41:41.242 --> 41:44.410 or to keep ISIS under control in Afghanistan 41:44.410 --> 41:46.428 very much depends upon the Taliban 41:46.428 --> 41:48.781 working with the Afghan army 41:48.781 --> 41:51.752 in some cooperative manner to manage that 41:51.752 --> 41:54.100 or to keep that under control 41:54.100 --> 41:56.370 yet we haven't exactly seen that 41:56.370 --> 41:59.130 the Taliban seems interested in doing that. 41:59.130 --> 42:02.593 Am I mistaken in my impression at this point in time? 42:03.450 --> 42:05.040 - You are correct, 42:05.040 --> 42:07.010 we have not seen any movement in that direction. 42:07.010 --> 42:09.060 I would agree that coming to some ability 42:09.060 --> 42:12.090 to operate together or at least in a complementary fashion 42:12.090 --> 42:14.970 is gonna be critical to their movement forward. 42:14.970 --> 42:17.040 - Well, in keeping with Mr. Wallace's question, 42:17.040 --> 42:21.410 the reality is as while zero may be an aspirational goal, 42:21.410 --> 42:22.410 the point that he makes, 42:22.410 --> 42:24.522 which, with all due respect, sir, you avoided, 42:24.522 --> 42:27.277 which was if we withdraw from Bagram, 42:27.277 --> 42:29.870 if they run out the clock, 42:29.870 --> 42:31.728 don't attack coalition or U.S. forces, 42:31.728 --> 42:34.037 continue the current mode they're at, 42:34.037 --> 42:37.170 we then have to face going back in 42:37.170 --> 42:39.400 because it's my impression we don't have 42:39.400 --> 42:44.060 an alternative kind of staging in that area. 42:44.060 --> 42:45.610 Is that incorrect? 42:45.610 --> 42:47.660 Leaving Bagram is a problem. 42:47.660 --> 42:49.750 - If we were to pull out completely from Afghanistan, 42:49.750 --> 42:50.860 you are correct. 42:50.860 --> 42:52.703 We've looked at all kinds of over the horizon options 42:52.703 --> 42:54.600 and none of them are particularly good. 42:54.600 --> 42:57.810 Back in 2001, 2002 it was very difficult 42:57.810 --> 42:59.740 to get into Afghanistan in the first place. 42:59.740 --> 43:01.530 Those problems would present themselves again, 43:01.530 --> 43:02.580 so, I acknowledge that. 43:02.580 --> 43:03.810 The only point I would make is, 43:03.810 --> 43:07.020 and again I emphasize I'm not optimistic or pessimistic, 43:07.020 --> 43:09.330 I'm just going to be driven by the facts here as we see it, 43:09.330 --> 43:12.910 over a 14 month period the Taliban are also going 43:12.910 --> 43:15.770 to be acted upon by the Afghans. 43:15.770 --> 43:17.550 So, it's not strictly that the Taliban 43:17.550 --> 43:20.040 have a perfect secret plan to take over. 43:20.040 --> 43:21.970 You know, there are a lot of people in Afghanistan 43:21.970 --> 43:23.690 that have a strong view of the Taliban 43:23.690 --> 43:25.340 and the Taliban consistently polls 43:25.340 --> 43:28.360 at about 12% popularity in Afghanistan. 43:28.360 --> 43:30.890 So, they face their challenges, too, 43:30.890 --> 43:32.670 and we should not assume that they will run 43:32.670 --> 43:34.463 to victory as we withdraw. 43:35.560 --> 43:36.393 - Ms. Wheelbarger, 43:36.393 --> 43:38.470 if you could relay, I think, to Secretary Esper 43:38.470 --> 43:40.310 and maybe if you get a chance, 43:40.310 --> 43:41.862 relay to the Secretary of State, 43:41.862 --> 43:43.760 I'm not sure it's an adequate standard 43:43.760 --> 43:46.194 to say so long as the Taliban dial back 43:46.194 --> 43:49.610 or stop attacks on coalition or U.S. forces 43:49.610 --> 43:53.020 that we're comfortable saying it's all good in Afghanistan. 43:53.020 --> 43:55.220 I support, we don't want to be there, 43:55.220 --> 43:56.970 we've been there far too long now, 43:56.970 --> 43:59.800 but the idea that so long as you don't bother us 43:59.800 --> 44:00.980 we'll go away and hope you don't 44:00.980 --> 44:02.630 bother anything in the future is, 44:04.029 --> 44:04.900 let me put this way, 44:04.900 --> 44:06.960 I told my management staff when I ran a company, 44:06.960 --> 44:08.135 hope is not a plan, 44:08.135 --> 44:11.040 it's the last step before desperation 44:11.040 --> 44:13.240 and we need to have more indication 44:13.240 --> 44:15.340 that the Taliban and Afghans can actually 44:15.340 --> 44:17.249 work in some manner cooperatively 44:17.249 --> 44:20.650 before we just walk away and say we're done with it 44:20.650 --> 44:23.240 because we do not want to have to go back in. 44:23.240 --> 44:24.590 That would be catastrophic. 44:25.620 --> 44:27.190 - Understood, I'll relay that back. 44:27.190 --> 44:28.640 I do think part of the conditions 44:28.640 --> 44:30.710 that we expect the Taliban to live up to 44:30.710 --> 44:32.340 is ensuring that they are not 44:32.340 --> 44:34.110 renewing their counterterrorism activities 44:34.110 --> 44:35.350 that brings insecurity 44:35.350 --> 44:38.389 and lack of stability to the entire country. 44:38.389 --> 44:40.860 I mean I've heard the Secretary say numerous times 44:40.860 --> 44:42.750 that he is prepared to ensure 44:42.750 --> 44:44.597 that we will defend our interests 44:44.597 --> 44:46.470 and that is again going after 44:46.470 --> 44:49.020 the terrorist elements that will now 44:49.020 --> 44:50.050 or in the future pose an external 44:50.050 --> 44:51.825 operations threat to us. 44:51.825 --> 44:52.720 - Well, our interests also included 44:52.720 --> 44:55.285 the one U.S. Armed Forces hostage 44:55.285 --> 44:57.360 that the Taliban hold. 44:57.360 --> 44:58.193 - [Wheelbarger] Understood. 44:58.193 --> 44:59.910 - And if I were in a different seat, 44:59.910 --> 45:01.010 and I'm not I'm in the seat, 45:01.010 --> 45:02.440 there's no way in God's green earth 45:02.440 --> 45:04.740 I'd sign off any agreement until that hostage 45:04.740 --> 45:07.400 was put in front of me in good condition. 45:07.400 --> 45:09.718 The idea they are holding a member of our Armed Forces 45:09.718 --> 45:12.900 and we signed some agreement offends me 45:12.900 --> 45:13.840 and I think it, frankly, 45:13.840 --> 45:16.830 if I asked privately, the gentlemen sitting to your left, 45:16.830 --> 45:19.150 I'm not sure they wouldn't be equally offended. 45:19.150 --> 45:21.050 We want him back, we want him back now, 45:21.050 --> 45:23.090 and we want him back in good shape. 45:23.090 --> 45:24.713 - There's one thing I will add, 45:24.713 --> 45:26.190 I think this administration has been very, very 45:26.190 --> 45:29.040 focused on hostage releases and rescues. 45:29.040 --> 45:30.390 So, it continues to be a priority 45:30.390 --> 45:31.670 but I take your point. 45:31.670 --> 45:33.173 - Well, focus is one thing. 45:34.620 --> 45:35.933 Someone needs to relay the message 45:35.933 --> 45:37.620 that it's not acceptable. 45:37.620 --> 45:39.333 I am offended by it. 45:40.330 --> 45:42.530 Quickly if I can make a comment about Syria. 45:44.670 --> 45:48.190 I think someone needs to explain to, 45:48.190 --> 45:50.200 not sure our commanders as well, 45:50.200 --> 45:51.763 but also to the forces on the ground 45:51.763 --> 45:53.130 and the American people, 45:53.130 --> 45:54.980 what our objectives are in Syria. 45:54.980 --> 45:56.860 They seem to keep changing dramatically 45:56.860 --> 45:57.860 and it's not helpful, 45:57.860 --> 45:59.153 it's not helpful to our allies, 45:59.153 --> 46:01.876 it's not helpful to our forces on the ground. 46:01.876 --> 46:04.270 I'm not sure we understand them here. 46:04.270 --> 46:06.350 I was pretty blunt about my assessment 46:06.350 --> 46:09.150 that these material changes simply did not allow 46:09.150 --> 46:13.310 for an ineffective command in Syria 46:13.310 --> 46:14.880 and leave us vulnerable. 46:14.880 --> 46:16.830 So, someone needs to explain to Congress, 46:16.830 --> 46:18.880 never mind the gentlemen sitting to your left, 46:18.880 --> 46:20.230 what our objective is in Syria 46:20.230 --> 46:21.970 and when we define that we've met that objective, 46:21.970 --> 46:23.510 we're prepared to leave. 46:23.510 --> 46:26.580 So, I would ask simply someone, some time please, 46:26.580 --> 46:27.940 because that would be helpful. 46:27.940 --> 46:30.510 - [Smith] Thank you, the gentleman's out of time. 46:30.510 --> 46:31.343 Ms. Trahan. 46:33.190 --> 46:35.110 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 46:35.110 --> 46:37.830 General McKenzie, thank you for being here. 46:37.830 --> 46:40.080 You recently indicated that your biggest concern 46:40.080 --> 46:42.870 in the near term was not necessarily 46:42.870 --> 46:44.723 a direct Iranian attack 46:44.723 --> 46:48.360 it's their proxies in areas like Iraq and Syria 46:48.360 --> 46:50.947 where they could come against us. 46:50.947 --> 46:53.130 And in your written testimony 46:53.130 --> 46:55.120 you also indicated that ample intelligence 46:55.120 --> 46:59.109 points to Iran's desire to continue malign activities 46:59.109 --> 47:00.710 that threaten Americans' lives. 47:00.710 --> 47:02.540 So, can you please describe 47:02.540 --> 47:07.540 the threat of Iranian retaliation as you understand it, 47:07.810 --> 47:10.076 conventional or by proxy forces, 47:10.076 --> 47:13.423 to us, our soldiers, and to our allies? 47:14.550 --> 47:15.383 - Certainly. 47:15.383 --> 47:18.362 So, we believe that Iran has a long-term vision 47:18.362 --> 47:21.400 of ejecting the United States from the theater, 47:21.400 --> 47:23.060 from the Central Command region 47:23.060 --> 47:24.900 and specifically the place where they'd like 47:24.900 --> 47:27.656 to see that first would be in Iraq, 47:27.656 --> 47:29.010 that's the place that they would like to start. 47:29.010 --> 47:31.890 So, they would believe they can apply 47:31.890 --> 47:33.440 considerable pressure on us, 47:33.440 --> 47:34.830 raise the level of pain high enough 47:34.830 --> 47:36.340 so that we'd come out. 47:36.340 --> 47:39.350 They have a lot of tools to do that in Iraq. 47:39.350 --> 47:42.700 They have a large Shia militia group there 47:42.700 --> 47:44.540 numbering in the tens of thousands 47:44.540 --> 47:48.780 that is responsive in varying degrees to Iranian control. 47:48.780 --> 47:50.340 But nonetheless they hold everything 47:50.340 --> 47:52.330 from explosively formed penetrators, 47:52.330 --> 47:53.820 which killed a lot of people 47:53.820 --> 47:57.254 in Iraq in the 2007, 2010 period, 47:57.254 --> 47:59.690 to large rockets and precise missiles 47:59.690 --> 48:01.070 that they can employ. 48:01.070 --> 48:02.420 The Iranian desire, I believe, 48:02.420 --> 48:03.720 would be to try to do that in a manner 48:03.720 --> 48:06.030 that's not completely attributable to Iran. 48:06.030 --> 48:07.880 They may be wrong in making that guess 48:07.880 --> 48:09.260 because we're pretty confident 48:09.260 --> 48:10.810 we can determine attribution. 48:10.810 --> 48:12.970 But, you know, what we've seen are a number 48:12.970 --> 48:14.940 of attacks at the U.S. embassy, 48:14.940 --> 48:17.290 some as recent as just less than two weeks ago, 48:17.290 --> 48:19.290 rockets fell very close, 48:19.290 --> 48:21.650 rockets falling inside the embassy compound. 48:21.650 --> 48:24.008 We have variety of things that we do to protect ourselves 48:24.008 --> 48:28.260 and we've been good so far in doing that. 48:28.260 --> 48:30.231 That luck's not gonna hold out forever. 48:30.231 --> 48:31.872 And at some point the degree 48:31.872 --> 48:34.420 of Iranian command and control 48:34.420 --> 48:37.400 over those Shia militia groups may be tested. 48:37.400 --> 48:39.040 I have always said that Iran can certainly 48:39.040 --> 48:41.120 direct attacks in Iraq. 48:41.120 --> 48:43.020 Iran may not be able to prevent attacks 48:43.020 --> 48:44.180 from occurring in Iraq. 48:44.180 --> 48:46.676 And, frankly, you know, the fact that Qassem Soleimani 48:46.676 --> 48:48.970 is no longer there to tie it all together 48:48.970 --> 48:50.200 makes it a little more difficult 48:50.200 --> 48:51.880 for them to affect command and control 48:51.880 --> 48:55.253 even though I think the threat is less with his death. 48:56.730 --> 48:57.710 - Sure. 48:57.710 --> 48:59.060 Thank you. 48:59.060 --> 49:01.512 So, as we draw down troops in Afghanistan, 49:01.512 --> 49:04.020 I'm wondering are we expanding 49:04.020 --> 49:05.800 our military footprint in the region, 49:05.800 --> 49:08.810 are we reshuffling troops? 49:08.810 --> 49:11.240 I ask because I'm concerned with force protection 49:11.240 --> 49:12.710 but I'd also like visibility 49:12.710 --> 49:15.747 into what our troop presence is going to look like 49:15.747 --> 49:19.540 or as you project it through the year. 49:19.540 --> 49:20.758 - Certainly. 49:20.758 --> 49:21.591 So, we are on a glide slope 49:21.591 --> 49:23.960 to draw down to 8,600 in Afghanistan. 49:23.960 --> 49:26.320 We'll reach that goal by the middle of the summer. 49:26.320 --> 49:27.660 We will have, in my judgment, 49:27.660 --> 49:28.830 adequate force protection 49:28.830 --> 49:30.630 for those forces that remain there. 49:30.630 --> 49:32.510 On the other end of the theater, in Iraq, 49:32.510 --> 49:36.520 you know, we've got around 5,000 U.S. forces there. 49:36.520 --> 49:37.920 Got a number in Syria 49:37.920 --> 49:39.160 and I'll be happy to talk about 49:39.160 --> 49:41.430 that in the closed session in just a little bit later. 49:41.430 --> 49:43.450 But we believe that in general 49:43.450 --> 49:45.750 we have adequate force protection measures there. 49:45.750 --> 49:47.050 We are also in the process 49:47.050 --> 49:49.270 of bringing air defense systems, 49:49.270 --> 49:50.950 ballistic missile defense systems, 49:50.950 --> 49:53.780 into Iraq in particular to protect ourselves 49:53.780 --> 49:56.350 against another potential Iranian attack. 49:56.350 --> 49:57.430 So, we will look at those, 49:57.430 --> 50:00.600 we will balance those two active theaters all the time. 50:00.600 --> 50:02.430 Now, there are other forces obviously 50:02.430 --> 50:03.540 in the theater as well. 50:03.540 --> 50:05.160 Over the last few months, as you know, 50:05.160 --> 50:07.480 we brought forces into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 50:07.480 --> 50:08.653 both to assure them 50:08.653 --> 50:11.008 and to add operational depth 50:11.008 --> 50:13.840 to our force presentation against Iran 50:13.840 --> 50:15.240 in order to deter them. 50:15.240 --> 50:17.080 Our build-up at Prince Sultan Air Base 50:17.080 --> 50:19.370 or PSAB is indicative of that. 50:19.370 --> 50:21.500 The beauty of that base is it is out 50:21.500 --> 50:23.720 of short-range ballistic missile range of Iran 50:23.720 --> 50:25.820 but yet it's close enough for our various types 50:25.820 --> 50:28.190 of fighter attack aircraft to operate out of there. 50:28.190 --> 50:29.440 It is well defended 50:29.440 --> 50:32.430 and provides significant additional depth in the theater. 50:32.430 --> 50:33.520 We talked a little bit earlier 50:33.520 --> 50:35.420 about naval presence in the theater. 50:35.420 --> 50:37.120 Naval presence is always the most 50:37.120 --> 50:38.713 effective and flexible form of presence 50:38.713 --> 50:40.660 because you can dial it up and down 50:40.660 --> 50:42.720 and you don't have to worry, again, 50:42.720 --> 50:44.670 as I've noted earlier about access basing 50:44.670 --> 50:46.720 and overflight as you bring those in. 50:46.720 --> 50:49.450 So, we constantly balance forces in the theater 50:49.450 --> 50:51.290 and I would just close by saying 50:51.290 --> 50:53.010 I was the director of the Joint Staff 50:53.010 --> 50:54.440 when the NDS was written. 50:54.440 --> 50:57.040 I am very much aware of the larger priority 50:57.040 --> 50:58.730 we need to place against the China threat, 50:58.730 --> 51:00.470 the Russia threat and other threats. 51:00.470 --> 51:02.735 So, I know the cost that we ask 51:02.735 --> 51:05.604 when we bring forces into the CENTCOM AOR. 51:05.604 --> 51:07.110 - Thank you, I appreciate that. 51:07.110 --> 51:08.275 In my remaining time, 51:08.275 --> 51:09.740 and I know I don't have much, 51:09.740 --> 51:10.840 but I'm wondering if Secretary 51:10.840 --> 51:15.597 could just comment on the diplomatic efforts 51:15.597 --> 51:18.133 that are riding alongside our military presence. 51:19.820 --> 51:21.623 - With respect to Iran specifically? 51:23.210 --> 51:24.670 Our major policy continues to be 51:24.670 --> 51:27.380 an economic and diplomatic pressure campaign. 51:27.380 --> 51:30.220 None of us see that light decreasing anytime soon 51:30.220 --> 51:32.679 and we think that pressure is going to gain over time. 51:32.679 --> 51:37.130 Economically we do think the Iran economy 51:37.130 --> 51:38.275 faces a lot of challenges. 51:38.275 --> 51:40.553 They are resilient but we think that over time 51:40.553 --> 51:42.180 the goal is to bring them back 51:42.180 --> 51:45.810 to the negotiating table for a more comprehensive deal. 51:45.810 --> 51:46.830 - [Smith] Thank you. 51:46.830 --> 51:47.960 Mr. Bacon 51:47.960 --> 51:48.900 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 51:48.900 --> 51:50.903 Thank you for being here today. 51:50.903 --> 51:52.403 Americans want to see a positive, 51:52.403 --> 51:54.490 peaceful outcome in Afghanistan 51:54.490 --> 51:55.670 especially after eight and a half, 51:55.670 --> 51:57.127 18 and a half years of war 51:57.127 --> 51:58.367 and we also can't afford 51:58.367 --> 52:03.140 to have Afghanistan return to a pre-9/11 capability 52:03.140 --> 52:06.356 where the Taliban are providing safe haven for al-Qaeda. 52:06.356 --> 52:08.471 I think today we have a minimal presence 52:08.471 --> 52:10.842 there at a cost that's much less 52:10.842 --> 52:13.380 than what we've had in years past. 52:13.380 --> 52:14.930 However, if we withdraw 52:14.930 --> 52:16.570 and the Taliban find themselves dominant in Kabul 52:16.570 --> 52:18.430 and provide safe haven again 52:18.430 --> 52:20.280 I think it'd be a much higher cost later. 52:20.280 --> 52:21.990 So, those are some of my concerns. 52:21.990 --> 52:23.346 So, my question General McKenzie 52:23.346 --> 52:25.022 is what evidence do you have 52:25.022 --> 52:27.212 that the Taliban have severed 52:27.212 --> 52:30.583 their close ties or alliance with al-Qaeda? 52:32.290 --> 52:33.720 - So, we think in terms of two groups 52:33.720 --> 52:34.700 that threaten the United States. 52:34.700 --> 52:36.673 We're confident of the Taliban's picture 52:36.673 --> 52:38.970 on ISIS-K as an example. 52:38.970 --> 52:40.482 We talked a little bit about that. 52:40.482 --> 52:43.510 I'm less optimistic about al-Qaeda. 52:43.510 --> 52:45.183 That's something they're going to have to demonstrate 52:45.183 --> 52:47.718 that has not yet been demonstrated. 52:47.718 --> 52:49.930 Not the beauty of it but the fact of it is 52:49.930 --> 52:52.040 as we go forward we're gonna have ample time 52:52.040 --> 52:53.760 to see if they actually do that 52:53.760 --> 52:55.440 and that will be before we become 52:55.440 --> 52:57.850 irrevocably committed to a force presence 52:57.850 --> 52:58.810 that would not allow us 52:58.810 --> 53:01.743 to have adequate leverage in Afghanistan. 53:02.622 --> 53:03.950 We don't need to trust them, 53:03.950 --> 53:04.930 we don't need to like them, 53:04.930 --> 53:06.540 we don't need to believe anything they say, 53:06.540 --> 53:07.510 we need to observe what they do 53:07.510 --> 53:10.326 and we have the capability to do that. 53:10.326 --> 53:11.607 - It would be the chief concern 53:11.607 --> 53:13.720 is that alliance with al-Qaeda. 53:13.720 --> 53:15.730 Let's say in two and a half years 53:15.730 --> 53:18.340 the Taliban are largely in control of Kabul 53:18.340 --> 53:20.543 and they're providing safe haven to al-Qaeda, 53:20.543 --> 53:22.590 what's our options at that point? 53:22.590 --> 53:24.990 How do we respond? 53:24.990 --> 53:26.670 I think the cost would be much higher 53:26.670 --> 53:29.000 than what we're putting in now. 53:29.000 --> 53:30.184 Just curious for your, 53:30.184 --> 53:31.070 I know it's a hypothetical 53:31.070 --> 53:33.260 but just curious your response. 53:33.260 --> 53:34.093 Where do we come in from 53:34.093 --> 53:36.130 and how do we hold them in check? 53:36.130 --> 53:38.300 - Sir, so, without getting into a hypothetical, 53:38.300 --> 53:41.210 I would tell you that we know how we got in in 2001. 53:41.210 --> 53:43.690 So, we have an object lesson on how to enter Afghanistan. 53:43.690 --> 53:45.230 It is difficult, it is painful, 53:45.230 --> 53:46.800 it's very expensive to do that. 53:46.800 --> 53:48.080 But we did it. 53:48.080 --> 53:49.680 Having said that, again, 53:49.680 --> 53:52.290 I come back to, we talk about this a lot. 53:52.290 --> 53:54.330 I think we're gonna have a lot of opportunity 53:54.330 --> 53:56.360 to see the way this this goes forward 53:56.360 --> 53:58.190 and the dynamic between the Taliban 53:58.190 --> 53:59.360 and the government of Afghanistan 53:59.360 --> 54:01.650 and I'm just not prepared to assume 54:01.650 --> 54:03.910 that the Taliban have good intentions, no, 54:03.910 --> 54:05.350 but I'm also not prepared to assume 54:05.350 --> 54:06.520 that the government of Afghanistan 54:06.520 --> 54:09.175 is defenseless and unable to assert themselves 54:09.175 --> 54:11.670 and come to a workable agreement with the Taliban. 54:11.670 --> 54:13.350 We don't know the answer to that question. 54:13.350 --> 54:15.140 We're gonna have good opportunity to observe 54:15.140 --> 54:16.610 and get the answers to those questions. 54:16.610 --> 54:17.760 - I would say the strength of this 54:17.760 --> 54:19.950 is it is a delayed agreement 54:19.950 --> 54:21.576 where we can watch and monitor 54:21.576 --> 54:24.560 and turn up the thermostat or lower the thermostat 54:24.560 --> 54:26.270 based on Taliban response. 54:26.270 --> 54:27.878 So, I do appreciate that. 54:27.878 --> 54:30.360 Ms. Wheelbarger, I want to ask your thoughts 54:30.360 --> 54:32.670 on missile defense coordination and integration. 54:32.670 --> 54:34.067 As we know Iran has approximately 54:34.067 --> 54:35.877 a thousand ballistic missiles 54:35.877 --> 54:37.682 and a lot of the countries in the region 54:37.682 --> 54:39.810 need to have some capable to respond. 54:39.810 --> 54:41.900 How are we doing it helping them integrate 54:41.900 --> 54:45.630 a capability so it's not every man or woman for himself? 54:45.630 --> 54:46.846 - Right. 54:46.846 --> 54:47.679 One of our key priorities at the moment 54:47.679 --> 54:49.740 is helping Saudi Arabia, in particular, 54:49.740 --> 54:51.050 be more capable and integrated 54:51.050 --> 54:53.217 with their own missile defense assets. 54:53.217 --> 54:55.020 They do have significant numbers of them 54:55.020 --> 54:56.840 but I do think over the last few decades 54:56.840 --> 54:57.673 we've been trying to get them 54:57.673 --> 54:58.810 to improve their integration 54:58.810 --> 55:00.875 to advance their capability. 55:00.875 --> 55:04.060 With respect to integration within the region writ large, 55:04.060 --> 55:07.210 that I would say is aspirational at best. 55:07.210 --> 55:08.960 I mean you could see these countries 55:08.960 --> 55:11.180 eventually improving their defenses by working together 55:11.180 --> 55:13.700 but we have many interagency efforts 55:13.700 --> 55:15.754 to try to get our Gulf partners, in particular, 55:15.754 --> 55:17.840 to work more cohesively across 55:17.840 --> 55:19.410 the numerous lines of effort 55:19.410 --> 55:21.570 and it's a long-term project. 55:21.570 --> 55:22.450 I'll just put it that way. 55:22.450 --> 55:25.450 But the key, and I defer to General McKenzie as well, 55:25.450 --> 55:27.780 to talk about what the military has been able to achieve 55:27.780 --> 55:30.680 in advancing particularly Saudi Arabia's capabilities. 55:30.680 --> 55:32.030 - We look at Iranian capabilities, 55:32.030 --> 55:34.360 this is probably their primary capability, 55:34.360 --> 55:36.820 to hold as a threat and our allies. 55:36.820 --> 55:38.600 - [McKenzie] Sir, it is and I would say Iran 55:38.600 --> 55:41.160 actually has about 2,500 to 3,000 missiles. 55:41.160 --> 55:42.730 - Thanks for the update. 55:42.730 --> 55:44.630 - But the point that Ms. Wheelbarger made 55:44.630 --> 55:47.190 is integrated air defense, the ability to sit, 55:47.190 --> 55:49.330 for example, if I go and look at a console 55:49.330 --> 55:51.715 at one of my ballistic missile defense sites in UAE 55:51.715 --> 55:54.530 or I go up into another location, 55:54.530 --> 55:55.660 the far West of the theater, 55:55.660 --> 55:56.780 we're going to see the whole theater 55:56.780 --> 55:58.522 in a common operational picture. 55:58.522 --> 56:01.177 That is a strength of the United States' approach to war 56:01.177 --> 56:03.370 and with our NATO and coalition partners. 56:03.370 --> 56:04.390 We would like to have that 56:04.390 --> 56:06.350 capability replicated in the Gulf. 56:06.350 --> 56:07.920 We're working hard to that end. 56:07.920 --> 56:09.470 We begin with small steps. 56:09.470 --> 56:10.900 It's taken a long time. 56:10.900 --> 56:13.467 When I was the J5 at U.S. Central Command in 2011 56:13.467 --> 56:14.990 we said the same thing 56:14.990 --> 56:16.960 so I'm very much aware this is something 56:16.960 --> 56:19.250 we have not been very good at. 56:19.250 --> 56:21.310 However, the fact that there is a clear, 56:21.310 --> 56:23.875 obvious, evident threat tends to focus people 56:23.875 --> 56:25.540 and I think in particular 56:25.540 --> 56:28.000 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is now focused on this. 56:28.000 --> 56:29.430 - And I had a question for General Townsend, 56:29.430 --> 56:31.206 but I'll just close with a comment 56:31.206 --> 56:32.039 because I'm running out of time. 56:32.039 --> 56:34.340 I just want to commend you for starting task force Somalia, 56:34.340 --> 56:37.480 especially after Manda Bay, I think it's needed. 56:37.480 --> 56:38.890 So, I just applaud the effort 56:38.890 --> 56:40.320 of your command for doing that. 56:40.320 --> 56:41.153 Thank you. 56:41.153 --> 56:42.220 I yield back. 56:42.220 --> 56:43.486 - [Smith] Thank you. 56:43.486 --> 56:44.319 Ms. Slotkin. 56:44.319 --> 56:45.152 - [Slotkin] Hi everyone. 56:45.152 --> 56:46.466 Hello. 56:46.466 --> 56:48.360 General McKenzie can you just answer for me, 56:48.360 --> 56:50.570 is the U.S. engaged in hostilities 56:50.570 --> 56:52.923 against Iran or Iranian forces. 56:54.080 --> 56:55.750 - [McKenzie] No, we're not. 56:55.750 --> 56:57.980 - [Slotkin] Do you believe as CENTCOM commander 56:57.980 --> 56:59.420 that you have authorization 56:59.420 --> 57:01.510 for military force against Iran. 57:01.510 --> 57:02.610 - [McKenzie] No, I do not. 57:02.610 --> 57:05.120 - [Slotkin] Does the 2001 or 2002 57:05.120 --> 57:06.634 Authorization of Military Force 57:06.634 --> 57:11.634 give you authority to get into hostilities with Iran? 57:13.470 --> 57:14.840 - With the caveat that you always have 57:14.840 --> 57:16.170 the authority to defend yourselves. 57:16.170 --> 57:17.003 - [Slotkin] Of course, self defense. 57:17.003 --> 57:18.090 But from the authorization? 57:18.090 --> 57:19.720 - No, no it does not. 57:19.720 --> 57:21.730 - According to the IAEA quarterly report 57:21.730 --> 57:23.110 that just came out on March 2nd, 57:23.110 --> 57:26.080 Tehran now has enough enriched uranium 57:26.080 --> 57:27.830 to produce a nuclear weapon. 57:27.830 --> 57:31.640 They reported 220 pounds of enriched uranium 57:31.640 --> 57:35.193 which is three times what they reported in November 2019. 57:36.220 --> 57:38.260 Today in addition to more uranium, 57:38.260 --> 57:39.999 we have more spinning centrifuges, 57:39.999 --> 57:43.094 the UN has been kicked out of many facilities. 57:43.094 --> 57:45.040 In addition, as you noted, 57:45.040 --> 57:47.835 Iranian proxies have become more active. 57:47.835 --> 57:50.072 We've had, as you say, 57:50.072 --> 57:53.570 we crossed a critical, forget your term, 57:53.570 --> 57:55.560 a critical threshold with the attacks, 57:55.560 --> 57:57.210 the ballistic missile attacks 57:57.210 --> 57:59.360 on the Al Asad Air Base, 57:59.360 --> 58:01.010 which is personally sensitive to me 58:01.010 --> 58:03.520 since my son-in-law's unit is on that base. 58:03.520 --> 58:07.622 Are we more or less safe as a country from Iran 58:07.622 --> 58:11.567 and are our allies more or less safe than a year ago? 58:14.040 --> 58:16.810 - So, I think I would go from the period 58:16.810 --> 58:18.640 of the exchange in early January, 58:18.640 --> 58:23.278 I think since then we have established a rough deterrence. 58:23.278 --> 58:24.111 - Just from a year ago, though. 58:24.111 --> 58:26.963 I mean, I respect your best military advice. 58:28.210 --> 58:30.230 In terms of a force protection matter, 58:30.230 --> 58:34.853 our allies in the region, ourselves, our partners. 58:34.853 --> 58:37.103 when you look at Iran in totality, 58:37.103 --> 58:39.140 particularly the nuclear file 58:39.140 --> 58:41.370 which we know is the existential threat, 58:41.370 --> 58:42.680 are we more or less safe, 58:42.680 --> 58:45.470 are your forces more or less safe in theater? 58:45.470 --> 58:47.547 - So, I would say we are more safe in theater now 58:47.547 --> 58:50.674 because last spring there weren't many forces in theater 58:50.674 --> 58:52.981 and the fact that the force density was so low 58:52.981 --> 58:56.393 was a major part of the Iranian calculus 58:56.393 --> 58:58.770 to act out in the kinetic sphere. 58:58.770 --> 59:00.690 I think that by the posture 59:00.690 --> 59:02.220 we have established in the theater 59:02.220 --> 59:04.500 really beginning since May of last year, 59:04.500 --> 59:06.010 they are far more constrained 59:06.010 --> 59:07.740 than they were a year before then. 59:07.740 --> 59:08.950 So, yes I believe we're safer. 59:08.950 --> 59:10.220 - From the nuclear threat, 59:10.220 --> 59:11.570 are our allies and partners 59:11.570 --> 59:13.323 more or less safe from a year ago? 59:14.380 --> 59:17.205 - I would defer to Ms. Wheelbarger on the. 59:17.205 --> 59:18.110 - I'll take that. 59:18.110 --> 59:21.000 I want to ask a couple of questions on Iraq and Syria. 59:21.000 --> 59:24.278 We did lose two Marine special operators. 59:24.278 --> 59:28.020 My understanding is it took six hours to get to these guys. 59:28.020 --> 59:28.960 Can you help me understand, 59:28.960 --> 59:30.410 since I know many of us are concerned 59:30.410 --> 59:31.470 about the golden hour 59:31.470 --> 59:33.200 and making sure we get to forces, 59:33.200 --> 59:35.300 what happened, do we have enough on the ground 59:35.300 --> 59:37.339 to actually protect the forces we have? 59:37.339 --> 59:38.650 - Sure, the terrain was vertical. 59:38.650 --> 59:39.860 It's some of the worst terrain in the world. 59:39.860 --> 59:41.530 I monitored at an hour by hour 59:41.530 --> 59:43.150 along with General Pat White. 59:43.150 --> 59:44.713 There's no way to do it any faster than we did. 59:44.713 --> 59:47.520 It's a very tough, difficult, tactical situation. 59:47.520 --> 59:48.353 The problems we encountered 59:48.353 --> 59:50.240 were not problems of resources. 59:50.240 --> 59:52.000 Sometimes you fight in hard ground, 59:52.000 --> 59:53.770 sometimes someone falls a long way 59:53.770 --> 59:54.970 and has to be recovered. 59:54.970 --> 59:55.803 What you don't want to do 59:55.803 --> 59:57.470 is get somebody else killed in that recovery 59:57.470 --> 59:58.750 or put yourself in a situation 59:58.750 --> 01:00:00.530 where you're going to put more lives at risk. 01:00:00.530 --> 01:00:02.450 I'm completely confident the commander's on the ground 01:00:02.450 --> 01:00:04.070 did everything they could to get 01:00:04.070 --> 01:00:05.560 these two folks out as quickly as possible. 01:00:05.560 --> 01:00:07.207 - So, should we expect additional, 01:00:07.207 --> 01:00:08.600 I mean hopefully not, 01:00:08.600 --> 01:00:11.000 but killed in action because of the terrain? 01:00:11.000 --> 01:00:12.870 - Well, that's, so there are different kinds 01:00:12.870 --> 01:00:14.110 of terrain in Iraq as you know. 01:00:14.110 --> 01:00:15.560 This is northeastern Iraq. 01:00:15.560 --> 01:00:17.180 Terrain's particularly bad up there. 01:00:17.180 --> 01:00:19.320 That's partially why ISIS is up there. 01:00:19.320 --> 01:00:20.570 We'll continue to operate there. 01:00:20.570 --> 01:00:22.060 Anytime something like this happens, 01:00:22.060 --> 01:00:24.430 we take a look at our tactics, techniques, and procedures 01:00:24.430 --> 01:00:25.350 to make sure we're going at it 01:00:25.350 --> 01:00:27.540 at the most effective way 01:00:27.540 --> 01:00:30.007 but, as you know, combat's a clash of human wills 01:00:30.007 --> 01:00:32.974 and sometimes the bad guys are going to have a good day. 01:00:32.974 --> 01:00:34.050 - Can you tell me, 01:00:34.050 --> 01:00:36.150 there are reports in Syria of drones 01:00:36.150 --> 01:00:38.473 dropping mortars and grenades 01:00:38.473 --> 01:00:42.860 on our troops near or around oil fields. 01:00:42.860 --> 01:00:44.560 Can you help me understand what's happening there 01:00:44.560 --> 01:00:46.720 and do we have adequate force protection? 01:00:46.720 --> 01:00:48.290 - Sure, so we have reports 01:00:48.290 --> 01:00:51.060 and I don't think as many as in the NPR report, 01:00:51.060 --> 01:00:53.920 but, yes, people work, Group 1 UAS' 01:00:53.920 --> 01:00:55.630 which are the small UAS', 01:00:55.630 --> 01:00:57.800 they'll try to find a way to carry an explosive 01:00:57.800 --> 01:01:00.760 and fly it over either not necessarily us alone 01:01:00.760 --> 01:01:01.960 but the Russians have had some 01:01:01.960 --> 01:01:03.810 significant casualties in this regard 01:01:03.810 --> 01:01:06.049 as have other nations that are operating there. 01:01:06.049 --> 01:01:08.330 So, yes, it is a problem. 01:01:08.330 --> 01:01:09.690 We look at it very hard. 01:01:09.690 --> 01:01:11.190 It's one of my highest priorities. 01:01:11.190 --> 01:01:12.920 - [Slotkin] Who's operating those drones? 01:01:12.920 --> 01:01:15.563 - So, I think probably in this case ISIS, 01:01:16.410 --> 01:01:17.460 but we're still working that. 01:01:17.460 --> 01:01:18.980 But if I had a judge today, 01:01:18.980 --> 01:01:20.760 I would say it was possibly ISIS 01:01:20.760 --> 01:01:24.260 but probably not a state entity operating the drones. 01:01:24.260 --> 01:01:25.093 - [Slotkin] Okay, I yield back 01:01:25.093 --> 01:01:25.926 Thank you. 01:01:26.850 --> 01:01:28.690 - [Smith] Mr. Gallagher. 01:01:28.690 --> 01:01:29.630 - [Gallagher] Just a quick follow up, 01:01:29.630 --> 01:01:31.060 are those commercial off-the-shelf, 01:01:31.060 --> 01:01:33.660 DJI drones that they weaponize? 01:01:33.660 --> 01:01:35.330 - [McKenzie] That would be my guess. 01:01:35.330 --> 01:01:37.000 As you know they're universally available. 01:01:37.000 --> 01:01:39.260 - And then another follow-up to Ms. Slotkin's questions. 01:01:39.260 --> 01:01:41.880 So, I think we're getting ready later this week 01:01:41.880 --> 01:01:43.610 to vote on SJ Res 68 01:01:43.610 --> 01:01:45.680 which directs the President 01:01:45.680 --> 01:01:49.190 to terminate the use of Armed Forces, 01:01:49.190 --> 01:01:51.329 use of armed forces for hostilities against Iran, 01:01:51.329 --> 01:01:52.560 but you have just said we 01:01:52.560 --> 01:01:56.744 are not engaged in hostilities against Iran. 01:01:56.744 --> 01:02:00.760 So, one could say this legislation is unnecessary 01:02:00.760 --> 01:02:03.730 but in your professional military judgment 01:02:03.730 --> 01:02:05.908 what do you assess would be the impact of this legislation 01:02:05.908 --> 01:02:07.759 particularly when it comes 01:02:07.759 --> 01:02:10.780 to our deterrent posture with respect to Iran. 01:02:10.780 --> 01:02:12.860 - So, I have to confess I am not familiar with it. 01:02:12.860 --> 01:02:14.110 I know the legislation exists, 01:02:14.110 --> 01:02:15.784 I've not done a detailed study of it. 01:02:15.784 --> 01:02:18.668 I know that our ability to deter Iran 01:02:18.668 --> 01:02:20.880 effectively comes from two things, 01:02:20.880 --> 01:02:22.452 our capability and our will 01:02:22.452 --> 01:02:25.170 and so the ability to demonstrate those two things 01:02:25.170 --> 01:02:27.460 are what provides a cognitive effect 01:02:27.460 --> 01:02:29.400 in the mind of the person you want to deter 01:02:29.400 --> 01:02:31.800 that, no, you don't actually want to do something now. 01:02:31.800 --> 01:02:34.319 - That's the same question to Ms. Wheelbarger. 01:02:34.319 --> 01:02:35.152 - I think I'd follow up similarly 01:02:35.152 --> 01:02:38.670 that a signal to any potential adversary 01:02:38.670 --> 01:02:40.330 that we don't have support of Congress 01:02:40.330 --> 01:02:41.820 to defend ourselves if necessary 01:02:41.820 --> 01:02:42.850 would send a signal that would 01:02:42.850 --> 01:02:44.667 not be helpful to deterrence. 01:02:44.667 --> 01:02:45.500 - And just to reiterate. 01:02:45.500 --> 01:02:47.630 we are not engaged in hostilities with Iran 01:02:47.630 --> 01:02:49.149 though we retain, as always, 01:02:49.149 --> 01:02:52.190 inherently under Article II, 01:02:52.190 --> 01:02:54.410 the right to defend ourselves if attacked. 01:02:54.410 --> 01:02:55.323 - [Wheelbarger] Yes. 01:02:56.350 --> 01:03:01.350 - Similarly, are you aware of anything you're doing today 01:03:02.500 --> 01:03:06.600 exclusively because of the 2002 AUMF, 01:03:06.600 --> 01:03:09.620 not the 2001, the 2002 AUMF? 01:03:09.620 --> 01:03:11.180 Are you aware of anything you're doing 01:03:11.180 --> 01:03:14.240 that relies on the 2002 AUMF. 01:03:15.482 --> 01:03:17.513 - As you know that 2002 AUMF provides 01:03:17.513 --> 01:03:20.263 buttressing authority for what we're doing in Syria 01:03:20.263 --> 01:03:23.574 because the threat of ISIS emanating from Syria 01:03:23.574 --> 01:03:26.420 has been a supplemental justification 01:03:26.420 --> 01:03:28.100 for our military activity there. 01:03:28.100 --> 01:03:30.020 Our coalition forces for example rely 01:03:30.020 --> 01:03:34.840 on the defense of Iraq for their justification 01:03:34.840 --> 01:03:36.820 so it's a mutual sign that we see 01:03:36.820 --> 01:03:38.650 the threat from ISIS from Iraq. 01:03:38.650 --> 01:03:40.033 I will say that I think 01:03:40.033 --> 01:03:42.360 the notification you all received 01:03:42.360 --> 01:03:44.510 on the Soleimani strike did include 01:03:44.510 --> 01:03:47.640 an additional 2002 AUMF justification 01:03:47.640 --> 01:03:49.066 for domestic legal basis. 01:03:49.066 --> 01:03:52.780 - At the time we got vague assessments 01:03:52.780 --> 01:03:56.290 about perhaps some detentions we have, 01:03:56.290 --> 01:03:57.400 the 2002 AUMF. 01:03:57.400 --> 01:03:59.160 For the record, I disagree with that. 01:03:59.160 --> 01:04:01.105 I'm with you on opposing an attempt 01:04:01.105 --> 01:04:03.480 to undermine our deterrent posture with Iran 01:04:03.480 --> 01:04:05.510 and I think that legislation is unnecessary. 01:04:05.510 --> 01:04:09.520 I think it's far past time for us to repeal the 2002 AUMF. 01:04:09.520 --> 01:04:11.340 I think it's doing no work at all 01:04:11.340 --> 01:04:13.500 and it'd be a good matter of Congressional hygiene 01:04:13.500 --> 01:04:14.800 when it comes to war powers. 01:04:14.800 --> 01:04:16.100 But that's a debate for another day. 01:04:16.100 --> 01:04:17.390 Quickly, I know we've had 01:04:17.390 --> 01:04:19.924 a lot of discussion about Afghanistan. 01:04:19.924 --> 01:04:22.710 General McKenzie, in the PB '21 budget request 01:04:22.710 --> 01:04:24.740 it looks like the request 01:04:24.740 --> 01:04:27.899 for Operation Freedom Sentinel is $14 billion 01:04:27.899 --> 01:04:30.060 while the request for enduring 01:04:30.060 --> 01:04:32.780 OCO requirements is $28 billion. 01:04:32.780 --> 01:04:35.450 So, to clarify, if all U.S. service members 01:04:35.450 --> 01:04:39.155 left Afghanistan would that $14 billion go down to zero 01:04:39.155 --> 01:04:41.287 while that $28 billion would stay 01:04:41.287 --> 01:04:44.370 roughly the same as other forces 01:04:44.370 --> 01:04:46.140 stationed within the CENTCOM AOR, 01:04:46.140 --> 01:04:48.153 would continue to conduct CT operations? 01:04:49.660 --> 01:04:51.440 - So, I'll have to come back to you on the details of that. 01:04:51.440 --> 01:04:52.840 I can tell you it's my understanding 01:04:52.840 --> 01:04:53.970 that that budget does reflect 01:04:53.970 --> 01:04:58.560 a proposed force level of 8,600 in OFS going forward 01:04:58.560 --> 01:05:00.600 from like July of this next year. 01:05:00.600 --> 01:05:02.020 But I will have to take that one for the record 01:05:02.020 --> 01:05:02.853 and come back with you with 01:05:02.853 --> 01:05:04.500 the detailed question that you just asked. 01:05:04.500 --> 01:05:07.148 - And then for those who are concerned 01:05:07.148 --> 01:05:11.480 about the rapidity of our withdrawal from Afghanistan 01:05:15.591 --> 01:05:18.284 what vital interests are at stake if any in Afghanistan 01:05:18.284 --> 01:05:22.170 and what is the geopolitical importance of Afghanistan? 01:05:22.170 --> 01:05:24.520 - So, the vital national interest 01:05:24.520 --> 01:05:26.083 that threatens us from Afghanistan 01:05:26.083 --> 01:05:29.270 is the ability of al-Qaeda and ISIS-K 01:05:29.270 --> 01:05:30.610 to generate attacks against 01:05:30.610 --> 01:05:31.980 the homeland of the United States 01:05:31.980 --> 01:05:34.490 and against the homelands of our allies and partners. 01:05:34.490 --> 01:05:36.560 So, we've seen that happen, 01:05:36.560 --> 01:05:37.930 we know that's not something that 01:05:37.930 --> 01:05:41.130 we're talking about as a conditional future possibility. 01:05:41.130 --> 01:05:42.940 We know that it has happened in the past. 01:05:42.940 --> 01:05:44.550 The best intelligence estimates tell us 01:05:44.550 --> 01:05:46.900 that if we do not maintain pressure 01:05:46.900 --> 01:05:47.910 on those two entities 01:05:47.910 --> 01:05:49.430 that in a period of time, 01:05:49.430 --> 01:05:51.260 and you can you can say a year, 01:05:51.260 --> 01:05:52.160 you could say two years, 01:05:52.160 --> 01:05:53.870 you could say somewhere in between, 01:05:53.870 --> 01:05:55.030 they're going to generate the ability 01:05:55.030 --> 01:05:57.040 to do external attacks again 01:05:57.040 --> 01:05:59.930 and that will manifest itself here in the United States. 01:05:59.930 --> 01:06:01.816 That is a vital national interest. 01:06:01.816 --> 01:06:02.750 - And then finally and most broadly, 01:06:02.750 --> 01:06:04.350 and I only have 25 seconds, 01:06:04.350 --> 01:06:06.390 I know no theater commander's ever gonna argue 01:06:06.390 --> 01:06:08.170 for less attention and resources 01:06:08.170 --> 01:06:11.620 but do you understand the basic premise 01:06:11.620 --> 01:06:13.760 of the NDS which is that because China 01:06:13.760 --> 01:06:14.600 is the pacing threat, 01:06:14.600 --> 01:06:18.273 INDOPACOM is the priority theater not CENTCOM? 01:06:18.273 --> 01:06:19.810 - I was the Joint Staff J5 01:06:19.810 --> 01:06:21.690 director of strategic plans and policy 01:06:21.690 --> 01:06:23.080 and the director of the Joint Staff 01:06:23.080 --> 01:06:24.610 during the creation of that document. 01:06:24.610 --> 01:06:26.160 I was present at the creation. 01:06:26.160 --> 01:06:27.420 I'm intimately familiar with it. 01:06:27.420 --> 01:06:29.124 - A great title for a memoir. 01:06:29.124 --> 01:06:31.330 - [McKenzie] That it is. 01:06:31.330 --> 01:06:32.163 - [Chairwoman] Thank you. 01:06:32.163 --> 01:06:33.420 Ms. Torres Small. 01:06:33.420 --> 01:06:34.410 - Thank you, Ms. Chair. 01:06:34.410 --> 01:06:35.500 Thank you, Ranking Member. 01:06:35.500 --> 01:06:37.990 And thank you all so much for your service. 01:06:37.990 --> 01:06:40.430 General McKenzie I really appreciated your comments 01:06:40.430 --> 01:06:42.160 during your opening statement 01:06:42.160 --> 01:06:43.540 about how important it is that we 01:06:43.540 --> 01:06:46.920 be adaptable to future Iranian threats. 01:06:46.920 --> 01:06:48.810 And DOD has spent billions of dollars 01:06:48.810 --> 01:06:50.650 on kinetic and non-kinetic counter 01:06:50.650 --> 01:06:52.840 drone systems to that effect. 01:06:52.840 --> 01:06:54.210 These systems are often tested 01:06:54.210 --> 01:06:55.700 at White Sands Missile Range 01:06:55.700 --> 01:06:58.400 which is in the district that I represent. 01:06:58.400 --> 01:07:01.100 However, they have yet to be fielded widely 01:07:01.100 --> 01:07:03.384 and I remain concerned that our operators 01:07:03.384 --> 01:07:06.240 are under significant threat 01:07:06.240 --> 01:07:10.690 from especially small drones and enemy drone swarms, 01:07:10.690 --> 01:07:14.070 especially from Iran and its allies and proxies. 01:07:14.070 --> 01:07:15.460 Is it accurate that your command 01:07:15.460 --> 01:07:16.950 is experimenting with new 01:07:16.950 --> 01:07:19.130 and more effective counter drone capabilities 01:07:19.130 --> 01:07:21.500 that utilize artificial intelligence 01:07:21.500 --> 01:07:23.760 and autonomous systems? 01:07:23.760 --> 01:07:25.400 - We aggressively pursue anything 01:07:25.400 --> 01:07:26.580 that will improve the capabilities 01:07:26.580 --> 01:07:27.860 particularly against those 01:07:27.860 --> 01:07:30.050 Group 1 and 2 UAS' as you mentioned. 01:07:30.050 --> 01:07:31.500 That is one of the things that worries me 01:07:31.500 --> 01:07:33.350 the most in the theater every day 01:07:33.350 --> 01:07:36.890 is the vulnerability of our forces to those small UAS'. 01:07:36.890 --> 01:07:38.240 - And specifically to the question 01:07:38.240 --> 01:07:39.400 about AI and autonomous systems? 01:07:39.400 --> 01:07:42.324 - So, I am aware of some experimentation. 01:07:42.324 --> 01:07:45.100 I'll have to come back to you on more details on that. 01:07:45.100 --> 01:07:47.430 I would tell you that we have a very broad set 01:07:47.430 --> 01:07:49.910 of joint requirements to drive that 01:07:49.910 --> 01:07:51.590 so it's possible there's something there. 01:07:51.590 --> 01:07:52.550 - We'll take that for the record. 01:07:52.550 --> 01:07:54.850 It's my understanding there's been specific testing at WSMR 01:07:54.850 --> 01:07:57.710 so, I'd love to look into that further. 01:07:57.710 --> 01:08:00.330 And I'll submit this question to the record as well 01:08:00.330 --> 01:08:01.900 but can you please provide us a plan 01:08:01.900 --> 01:08:03.650 for FY '21 that would enable us 01:08:03.650 --> 01:08:06.640 to accelerate the efforts that you are taking? 01:08:06.640 --> 01:08:07.473 - Absolutely. 01:08:07.473 --> 01:08:08.810 I'd be delighted to do that. 01:08:08.810 --> 01:08:09.826 - Fantastic. 01:08:09.826 --> 01:08:11.630 And are your command's needs 01:08:11.630 --> 01:08:15.130 for effective counter drone systems being met currently? 01:08:15.130 --> 01:08:17.947 - I'm convinced the system is generating as much as it can. 01:08:17.947 --> 01:08:20.380 The Secretary and I have talked about this. 01:08:20.380 --> 01:08:22.570 I own a lot of the systems that are available 01:08:22.570 --> 01:08:24.700 across the entire United States inventory. 01:08:24.700 --> 01:08:26.470 I am not satisfied with where we are 01:08:26.470 --> 01:08:28.980 and I believe we are at great risk because of this. 01:08:28.980 --> 01:08:29.813 - Fantastic. 01:08:29.813 --> 01:08:30.840 And so, you're also exploring options 01:08:30.840 --> 01:08:32.490 that we do not currently own? 01:08:32.490 --> 01:08:33.323 - That is correct. 01:08:33.323 --> 01:08:34.410 We're open to anything 01:08:34.410 --> 01:08:36.325 and a lot of smart people are looking at this. 01:08:36.325 --> 01:08:37.720 We're not there yet 01:08:37.720 --> 01:08:39.160 but I think the Army, 01:08:39.160 --> 01:08:40.900 having executive agency for this, 01:08:40.900 --> 01:08:42.580 will actually help in a lot of ways. 01:08:42.580 --> 01:08:44.383 It will provide a focus to these efforts. 01:08:44.383 --> 01:08:46.910 This is a significant threat. 01:08:46.910 --> 01:08:48.410 - Thank you so much. 01:08:48.410 --> 01:08:50.970 Switching over to Africa briefly. 01:08:50.970 --> 01:08:52.670 It is estimated that over the next decade 01:08:52.670 --> 01:08:54.890 seven out of the 10 of the world's 01:08:54.890 --> 01:08:57.520 fastest-growing economies will be in Africa. 01:08:57.520 --> 01:08:59.680 Against the backdrop of tremendous 01:08:59.680 --> 01:09:01.300 opportunity on the continent, 01:09:01.300 --> 01:09:03.680 China has ramped up its engagement 01:09:03.680 --> 01:09:05.860 and this this was distributed to all of us. 01:09:05.860 --> 01:09:07.260 I think it's a pretty clear example 01:09:07.260 --> 01:09:09.159 of China's ramped up engagement 01:09:09.159 --> 01:09:11.724 not only surpassing the United States 01:09:11.724 --> 01:09:14.270 as Africa's largest trading partner 01:09:14.270 --> 01:09:16.446 but also expanding its military presence 01:09:16.446 --> 01:09:18.670 through an overseas base in Djibouti 01:09:18.670 --> 01:09:19.930 and increased arms sales. 01:09:19.930 --> 01:09:21.810 And what's interesting is this also shows that 01:09:21.810 --> 01:09:23.330 Djibouti has one of the largest debts 01:09:23.330 --> 01:09:25.350 to China on the continent. 01:09:25.350 --> 01:09:26.960 So, General Townsend is it accurate 01:09:26.960 --> 01:09:28.250 that strategic investments 01:09:28.250 --> 01:09:30.213 in development and diplomacy 01:09:30.213 --> 01:09:32.610 support defense to demonstrate 01:09:32.610 --> 01:09:34.080 that the United States is a better partner 01:09:34.080 --> 01:09:35.893 for developing countries than China? 01:09:37.640 --> 01:09:39.779 - Absolutely they do. 01:09:39.779 --> 01:09:41.433 At AFRICOM we work every day 01:09:41.433 --> 01:09:44.454 and hand-in-hand with our diplomatic partners 01:09:44.454 --> 01:09:45.859 and our development partners. 01:09:45.859 --> 01:09:47.270 - Thank you so much. 01:09:47.270 --> 01:09:49.668 And likewise what are the national security costs 01:09:49.668 --> 01:09:52.960 of ceding ground to our competitors like China 01:09:52.960 --> 01:09:55.053 especially in continents like Africa? 01:09:57.370 --> 01:09:59.300 - Well, as you can see from the diagrams 01:09:59.300 --> 01:10:02.160 Russia and China are competing really hard 01:10:02.160 --> 01:10:04.050 on the African continent. 01:10:04.050 --> 01:10:06.860 I don't believe that we have to out-compete them 01:10:06.860 --> 01:10:10.919 in all 53 countries of the AFRICOM AOR, 01:10:10.919 --> 01:10:13.652 there are 54 if you include Egypt on the continent. 01:10:13.652 --> 01:10:15.700 You don't have to out-compete them everywhere 01:10:15.700 --> 01:10:18.308 but we have to pick and choose where we need U.S. 01:10:18.308 --> 01:10:20.820 access and influence in the future. 01:10:20.820 --> 01:10:22.489 And there's probably some places where 01:10:22.489 --> 01:10:26.910 maybe if they have the edge over us it's okay, 01:10:26.910 --> 01:10:29.132 it's not critical for our national security. 01:10:29.132 --> 01:10:31.160 So, I think that's very important 01:10:31.160 --> 01:10:32.900 that we look at the continent 01:10:32.900 --> 01:10:35.720 and decide where we're gonna prioritize our efforts. 01:10:35.720 --> 01:10:37.810 - Where do you think we're not investing now 01:10:37.810 --> 01:10:39.060 that we really should be? 01:10:44.140 --> 01:10:48.070 - I think in global or a great power competition? 01:10:48.070 --> 01:10:48.903 - [Torres Small] Within Africa? 01:10:48.903 --> 01:10:53.300 - Yeah, I think we're appropriately focused right now 01:10:53.300 --> 01:10:55.690 and the whole point of this blank slate 01:10:55.690 --> 01:10:57.924 or a COCOM review that the Secretary 01:10:57.924 --> 01:10:59.760 is running with the entire Department 01:10:59.760 --> 01:11:01.660 is to focus all of our efforts 01:11:01.660 --> 01:11:03.877 more at global power competition 01:11:03.877 --> 01:11:06.475 than we have been in the past. 01:11:06.475 --> 01:11:08.380 So, I think we've got the right focus. 01:11:08.380 --> 01:11:10.090 - Okay and I can take that for the record 01:11:10.090 --> 01:11:12.680 if you want to supplement any specific locations. 01:11:12.680 --> 01:11:13.610 Thank you. 01:11:13.610 --> 01:11:14.880 I yield the remainder of my time. 01:11:14.880 --> 01:11:16.197 - [Chairwoman] Thank you. 01:11:16.197 --> 01:11:17.030 Mr. Byrne. 01:11:18.380 --> 01:11:19.430 - [Byrne] Let me follow up on 01:11:19.430 --> 01:11:21.080 that last line of question, General. 01:11:21.080 --> 01:11:23.100 You said we need to prioritize, 01:11:23.100 --> 01:11:25.000 what would you say the priorities are? 01:11:27.650 --> 01:11:29.820 - Well, the Secretary of Defense 01:11:29.820 --> 01:11:32.422 has given me clear guidance. 01:11:32.422 --> 01:11:36.326 First is to maintain U.S. ability 01:11:36.326 --> 01:11:40.210 to implement our war plans in the world. 01:11:40.210 --> 01:11:43.633 A second is to compete with China and Russia. 01:11:44.695 --> 01:11:49.695 Third is to focus on the counter violent extremists, 01:11:50.060 --> 01:11:51.270 the violent extremist groups 01:11:51.270 --> 01:11:54.810 that threaten U.S. interests and the U.S. homeland. 01:11:54.810 --> 01:11:57.520 And fourth is to be prepared to respond 01:11:57.520 --> 01:11:59.010 to crises on the African continent. 01:11:59.010 --> 01:12:02.000 So, those are my priorities from the Secretary of Defense. 01:12:02.000 --> 01:12:04.891 They're clear and we're working through 01:12:04.891 --> 01:12:08.390 how we adequately ensure those are adequately resourced. 01:12:08.390 --> 01:12:10.520 - Well, maybe I misunderstood what your answer was before. 01:12:10.520 --> 01:12:11.860 I thought you were talking about priorities 01:12:11.860 --> 01:12:15.060 with regard just to trying to measure up 01:12:15.060 --> 01:12:16.600 in the competition with Russia and China. 01:12:16.600 --> 01:12:19.023 Are their priorities that you have within that? 01:12:21.020 --> 01:12:25.200 - There are and they basically revolve around 01:12:25.200 --> 01:12:27.599 ensuring we have access and influence 01:12:27.599 --> 01:12:29.630 in selected parts of the continent 01:12:29.630 --> 01:12:31.510 and I'd prefer to take the rest 01:12:31.510 --> 01:12:33.330 of that in the classified session. 01:12:33.330 --> 01:12:34.810 - Fair enough. 01:12:34.810 --> 01:12:35.643 Let me just one more, and again, 01:12:35.643 --> 01:12:38.373 if you need to say this is classified well it's fine. 01:12:39.323 --> 01:12:41.950 Do you feel like that you have the resources 01:12:41.950 --> 01:12:43.900 that you need to meet those priorities? 01:12:46.580 --> 01:12:49.628 - Today I think AFRICOM is adequately resourced 01:12:49.628 --> 01:12:51.743 to do what we've been told to do. 01:12:53.260 --> 01:12:54.093 - Let me ask you about, 01:12:54.093 --> 01:12:55.250 and maybe you're not the right person to ask, 01:12:55.250 --> 01:12:56.440 let me just ask it anyway, 01:12:56.440 --> 01:12:58.163 where are we on Libya right now? 01:12:59.600 --> 01:13:00.890 - I'll defer to my colleague 01:13:00.890 --> 01:13:01.940 from the Department of Defense. 01:13:01.940 --> 01:13:02.960 - [Byrne] Okay. 01:13:02.960 --> 01:13:04.140 - Yes, if I could just respond 01:13:04.140 --> 01:13:05.890 to your previous line of questioning real quickly. 01:13:05.890 --> 01:13:07.260 I just want to highlight that our 01:13:07.260 --> 01:13:09.190 overall competition with Russia and China 01:13:09.190 --> 01:13:11.430 on the continent is a whole-of-government effort 01:13:11.430 --> 01:13:12.880 more than just the military tool. 01:13:12.880 --> 01:13:15.020 We are looking and we have Prosper Africa 01:13:15.020 --> 01:13:16.350 which is a White House driven effort 01:13:16.350 --> 01:13:18.260 to increase economic activity 01:13:18.260 --> 01:13:19.844 from our private sector in Africa 01:13:19.844 --> 01:13:22.400 find ways for the African economies 01:13:22.400 --> 01:13:24.010 to adjust better to a sort 01:13:24.010 --> 01:13:26.710 of private sector entities in the Western model 01:13:26.710 --> 01:13:28.496 and less just the sort of predatory funding 01:13:28.496 --> 01:13:30.030 that the Chinese provide 01:13:30.030 --> 01:13:33.930 as well as supplemented by diplomacy and development aid. 01:13:33.930 --> 01:13:37.470 So, we do have a very strong whole-of-government effort 01:13:37.470 --> 01:13:40.220 that prioritizes more than just the military component. 01:13:41.910 --> 01:13:43.680 I lost your second question I'm sorry. 01:13:43.680 --> 01:13:44.600 Libya, yes. 01:13:44.600 --> 01:13:46.270 We are very concerned with events in Libya. 01:13:46.270 --> 01:13:49.040 Obviously it's a location of numerous 01:13:49.040 --> 01:13:51.030 other powers competing with each other. 01:13:51.030 --> 01:13:53.220 You see Russia, you see Egypt, you see Turkey. 01:13:53.220 --> 01:13:55.354 Our overarching strategy is to continue 01:13:55.354 --> 01:13:57.330 to be able to address the terrorism 01:13:57.330 --> 01:13:58.170 threat that we see there 01:13:58.170 --> 01:14:00.135 and I think we can effectively address 01:14:00.135 --> 01:14:03.610 that while bringing diplomacy to bear 01:14:03.610 --> 01:14:05.108 to bring both sides of this 01:14:05.108 --> 01:14:07.144 basically a civil war together, 01:14:07.144 --> 01:14:10.460 recognizing that the military tool in Libya 01:14:10.460 --> 01:14:12.640 needs to be part of a functional government 01:14:12.640 --> 01:14:13.890 and not actually running that government. 01:14:13.890 --> 01:14:15.480 So, we continue to work with 01:14:15.480 --> 01:14:17.310 sort of both competing factions 01:14:17.310 --> 01:14:19.570 and also try to call on other powers 01:14:19.570 --> 01:14:21.580 to not continue to destabilize 01:14:21.580 --> 01:14:24.600 and ignore arms embargoes that are in place. 01:14:24.600 --> 01:14:25.433 - Have things gotten worse 01:14:25.433 --> 01:14:27.700 or better in the last year in Libya? 01:14:27.700 --> 01:14:29.533 - [Wheelbarger] I would assess they've gotten worse. 01:14:31.292 --> 01:14:32.830 - What are we doing about that? 01:14:32.830 --> 01:14:34.950 - Well, we are, again, number one priority for us 01:14:34.950 --> 01:14:36.230 is the counterterrorism effort. 01:14:36.230 --> 01:14:38.640 Number two, with respect to the ongoing strife 01:14:38.640 --> 01:14:40.410 is it's a diplomatic led effort 01:14:40.410 --> 01:14:41.970 from our State Department colleagues 01:14:41.970 --> 01:14:43.970 trying to work with our European partners as well 01:14:43.970 --> 01:14:45.740 to bring the conflict to an end 01:14:45.740 --> 01:14:48.423 given as I think General Townsend said earlier 01:14:48.423 --> 01:14:50.934 the threat emanating from northern Africa 01:14:50.934 --> 01:14:54.300 is a most acutely a European challenge 01:14:54.300 --> 01:14:57.000 but we are very cognizant especially 01:14:57.000 --> 01:14:59.012 from the Department of Defense's perspective 01:14:59.012 --> 01:15:01.210 of what we see a sort of Russian 01:15:01.210 --> 01:15:02.530 encirclement in the Eastern Med 01:15:02.530 --> 01:15:05.330 and it's something that is complicating and a challenge. 01:15:06.370 --> 01:15:08.220 - With a minute 10 seconds left, 01:15:08.220 --> 01:15:10.050 can you tell me where we are in Yemen? 01:15:10.050 --> 01:15:11.910 - Yemen, yes, once again the U.S. 01:15:11.910 --> 01:15:14.060 is trying to support our diplomatic 01:15:14.060 --> 01:15:15.230 colleagues at the State Department 01:15:15.230 --> 01:15:17.210 and the UN led by Martin Griffith 01:15:17.210 --> 01:15:20.130 in his efforts to bring those competing forces together. 01:15:20.130 --> 01:15:21.680 We have seen some successes 01:15:21.680 --> 01:15:24.610 in the Sweden agreement between the two sides 01:15:24.610 --> 01:15:26.419 and some efforts to have, 01:15:26.419 --> 01:15:28.070 I wouldn't call it a ceasefire, 01:15:28.070 --> 01:15:29.777 but minimizing violence. 01:15:29.777 --> 01:15:31.520 The Houthis, like the Taliban, 01:15:31.520 --> 01:15:33.274 are not easily trusted 01:15:33.274 --> 01:15:36.880 but we do see that there's renewed interest, I think, 01:15:36.880 --> 01:15:39.110 from the Saudi-led coalition 01:15:39.110 --> 01:15:40.580 to find an end to the conflict, 01:15:40.580 --> 01:15:41.630 that we just continue to believe 01:15:41.630 --> 01:15:43.600 there is no military solution to it, 01:15:43.600 --> 01:15:46.033 it has to be a diplomatic, political solution. 01:15:47.254 --> 01:15:48.350 And I will just also add we continue 01:15:48.350 --> 01:15:51.490 to support our Saudi and UAE partners 01:15:51.490 --> 01:15:53.190 and how they need to defend themselves against 01:15:53.190 --> 01:15:57.110 a UAV and ballistic missile challenges 01:15:57.110 --> 01:15:58.252 coming out of Yemen. 01:15:58.252 --> 01:15:59.233 - [Byrne] Thank you. 01:15:59.233 --> 01:16:00.070 I yield back. 01:16:00.070 --> 01:16:01.753 - [Chairwoman] Thank you, Mr. Crow. 01:16:02.660 --> 01:16:03.760 - Thank you, Chairwoman. 01:16:03.760 --> 01:16:04.593 Thank you to all of you 01:16:04.593 --> 01:16:06.300 for your testimony and continued service. 01:16:06.300 --> 01:16:09.030 I'd like to start by clarifying a timeline issue 01:16:09.030 --> 01:16:10.849 that I've been struggling with a little bit. 01:16:10.849 --> 01:16:13.420 The administration directed General Miller 01:16:13.420 --> 01:16:16.270 to conduct an assessment of troop withdrawal 01:16:16.270 --> 01:16:18.393 in Afghanistan last year is that correct? 01:16:20.570 --> 01:16:21.710 And based on that assessment, 01:16:21.710 --> 01:16:24.513 he came up at the 8,600 number, is that correct? 01:16:25.660 --> 01:16:26.493 I'm sorry. 01:16:26.493 --> 01:16:27.470 - [McKenzie] That's correct, that is correct. 01:16:27.470 --> 01:16:29.040 - Okay. 01:16:29.040 --> 01:16:30.500 General Miller told a group of us 01:16:30.500 --> 01:16:32.030 when we were in Afghanistan in October 01:16:32.030 --> 01:16:34.327 and then again during testimony in December 01:16:34.327 --> 01:16:37.960 that that 8,600 draw down was going 01:16:37.960 --> 01:16:39.800 to occur regardless of whether 01:16:39.800 --> 01:16:42.070 or not there was an agreement with the Taliban. 01:16:42.070 --> 01:16:44.250 Is that your understanding as well? 01:16:44.250 --> 01:16:45.960 - No, that is not my understanding. 01:16:45.960 --> 01:16:47.466 My understanding is this was driven, 01:16:47.466 --> 01:16:50.020 this was a branch plan that we held, 01:16:50.020 --> 01:16:52.480 we could adopt it if directed to do so, 01:16:52.480 --> 01:16:56.050 but we didn't have clear guidance to do it until recently. 01:16:56.050 --> 01:16:57.440 So, we were not planning to do this 01:16:57.440 --> 01:16:59.370 until we receive presidential direction 01:16:59.370 --> 01:17:01.180 and maybe it seemed like a very fine point 01:17:01.180 --> 01:17:02.700 but it's actually a big deal. 01:17:02.700 --> 01:17:04.230 We have plans for a lot of things. 01:17:04.230 --> 01:17:05.490 We had a plan to go to 8,600. 01:17:05.490 --> 01:17:07.640 - No, it is a big deal but, 01:17:07.640 --> 01:17:11.163 so you're saying that the 8,600 draw down 01:17:11.163 --> 01:17:13.880 was only going to occur if there 01:17:13.880 --> 01:17:15.260 was a peace agreement with the Taliban? 01:17:15.260 --> 01:17:16.420 Is that what you're saying? 01:17:16.420 --> 01:17:18.730 - What I'm saying from the military side, 01:17:18.730 --> 01:17:20.160 we were gonna go to 8,600 01:17:20.160 --> 01:17:21.310 when directed to do so by 01:17:21.310 --> 01:17:22.840 national leadership of the United States. 01:17:22.840 --> 01:17:25.370 I defer the rest of that actually to Ms. Wheelbarger here. 01:17:25.370 --> 01:17:27.670 - I'll just add, I do think based on General Milley's, 01:17:27.670 --> 01:17:29.110 I'm sorry Miller's advice, 01:17:29.110 --> 01:17:31.340 we were prepared then planned to go to 8,600 01:17:31.340 --> 01:17:33.850 and the Secretary was prepared to adjust 01:17:33.850 --> 01:17:36.230 the force posture if in the absence of an agreement 01:17:36.230 --> 01:17:37.860 if that was in our national security interest 01:17:37.860 --> 01:17:39.810 but no decision had been made to do so. 01:17:39.810 --> 01:17:40.643 - Okay. 01:17:40.643 --> 01:17:42.040 Independent of an agreement with the Taliban? 01:17:42.040 --> 01:17:43.320 - Yes, he was prepared to do that 01:17:43.320 --> 01:17:44.820 if it looked like it was necessary 01:17:44.820 --> 01:17:46.720 or appropriate for us given our desire 01:17:46.720 --> 01:17:48.270 to instill readiness in the force 01:17:48.270 --> 01:17:50.574 and being able to achieve the mission. 01:17:50.574 --> 01:17:52.215 - Well, as of October of 2019, 01:17:52.215 --> 01:17:56.160 was it your understanding that that draw down was to occur? 01:17:56.160 --> 01:17:57.160 - [Wheelbarger] No. 01:17:57.160 --> 01:17:58.963 - Okay how about December of 2019? 01:18:01.058 --> 01:18:02.810 - There was a contingency but it was, 01:18:02.810 --> 01:18:04.455 we didn't have a date to start it 01:18:04.455 --> 01:18:07.160 and no intent to execute it until directed. 01:18:07.160 --> 01:18:08.330 We had no direction to do so. 01:18:08.330 --> 01:18:09.610 - Well, then the folks in this committee 01:18:09.610 --> 01:18:11.675 are getting contradictory information 01:18:11.675 --> 01:18:13.313 and I would recommend that you 01:18:13.313 --> 01:18:15.559 clear it up within the Department of Defense. 01:18:15.559 --> 01:18:17.190 Secondly, I had that opportunity 01:18:17.190 --> 01:18:19.580 to review the entire agreement including the annexes. 01:18:19.580 --> 01:18:22.340 2,400 Americans have given their lives in Afghanistan, 01:18:22.340 --> 01:18:24.680 over 20,000 have been wounded. 01:18:24.680 --> 01:18:25.900 This is America's war, 01:18:25.900 --> 01:18:27.710 not any one administration's war. 01:18:27.710 --> 01:18:30.729 Are there plans within the administration 01:18:30.729 --> 01:18:32.460 to release the entire agreement 01:18:32.460 --> 01:18:34.080 so the American public can see 01:18:34.080 --> 01:18:35.610 under what terms we are going 01:18:35.610 --> 01:18:37.990 to be withdrawing from Afghanistan? 01:18:37.990 --> 01:18:41.424 - My understanding is the two side agreements or annexes 01:18:41.424 --> 01:18:44.328 are not public for operational requirements 01:18:44.328 --> 01:18:46.070 and I would defer to my colleagues 01:18:46.070 --> 01:18:47.390 on why that is the case 01:18:47.390 --> 01:18:48.960 and that they're not intended 01:18:48.960 --> 01:18:50.970 to be secret from the committees 01:18:50.970 --> 01:18:53.863 but continue to be not public to the public. 01:18:55.650 --> 01:18:56.510 - I would echo that. 01:18:56.510 --> 01:18:57.343 - Okay. 01:18:57.343 --> 01:18:58.450 I've read the entire agreement 01:18:58.450 --> 01:19:00.470 and I see no reason why they could not be released 01:19:00.470 --> 01:19:01.970 and I just want to be very clear 01:19:01.970 --> 01:19:04.605 that I believe, as do many people on this committee, 01:19:04.605 --> 01:19:06.542 that the American public deserve to know 01:19:06.542 --> 01:19:09.726 under what terms we are withdrawing from Afghanistan. 01:19:09.726 --> 01:19:13.513 Lastly, in October when a group of us was in Afghanistan, 01:19:13.513 --> 01:19:16.350 it was very clear to us by everybody that we talked to 01:19:16.350 --> 01:19:19.250 that the Afghan National Defense and security forces 01:19:19.250 --> 01:19:22.856 was incapable of standing up on its own anytime 01:19:22.856 --> 01:19:24.600 in the next couple of years. 01:19:24.600 --> 01:19:27.190 Yet under the plan we will completely withdraw 01:19:27.190 --> 01:19:30.540 including support services and contractors within 14 months. 01:19:30.540 --> 01:19:31.393 If that occurs, 01:19:31.393 --> 01:19:34.040 will the Afghan National Defense and security forces 01:19:34.040 --> 01:19:36.203 be capable of standing up on its own? 01:19:37.400 --> 01:19:38.520 - That's going to be another 01:19:38.520 --> 01:19:40.920 discovery-based process as we go forward. 01:19:40.920 --> 01:19:43.576 So, we're gonna go to 8,600 by the summer. 01:19:43.576 --> 01:19:47.540 Conditions on the ground will dictate if we go below that. 01:19:47.540 --> 01:19:49.690 If conditions on the ground are not permissive, 01:19:49.690 --> 01:19:52.240 my advice would not be to continue that reduction, 01:19:52.240 --> 01:19:54.960 that would not be my decision, that would be my advice. 01:19:54.960 --> 01:19:56.400 So, that will be based on performance 01:19:56.400 --> 01:19:57.990 of the Afghan military, 01:19:57.990 --> 01:19:59.780 their ability to incorporate the Taliban 01:19:59.780 --> 01:20:02.010 if the Taliban is going to be incorporated at all. 01:20:02.010 --> 01:20:04.040 I will have an opportunity to give advice on this. 01:20:04.040 --> 01:20:05.800 I had an opportunity to give advice 01:20:05.800 --> 01:20:07.660 on the decisions that have just been made. 01:20:07.660 --> 01:20:08.840 So, these are not things that 01:20:08.840 --> 01:20:10.420 will happen in and of themselves. 01:20:10.420 --> 01:20:12.300 - So, 14 months from now, 01:20:12.300 --> 01:20:14.300 the Afghan National Defense and security forces 01:20:14.300 --> 01:20:16.190 are not capable of standing up on their own 01:20:16.190 --> 01:20:18.540 and defending Afghanistan and the government, 01:20:18.540 --> 01:20:20.330 it will be your advice not 01:20:20.330 --> 01:20:21.870 to withdraw those support services? 01:20:21.870 --> 01:20:23.330 - Absolutely that would be my advice 01:20:23.330 --> 01:20:24.630 but that's a future contingency 01:20:24.630 --> 01:20:27.170 and there a lot of, it's far more complex than just that. 01:20:27.170 --> 01:20:29.990 But yes, and I will have an opportunity to give that advice. 01:20:29.990 --> 01:20:31.410 - Okay and what are we doing, 01:20:31.410 --> 01:20:33.480 pivoting to Iraq very briefly, 01:20:33.480 --> 01:20:35.520 what are we doing now to protect 01:20:35.520 --> 01:20:38.144 the Syrian Kurds, stateless persons, and Syrian nationals 01:20:38.144 --> 01:20:39.970 who fought with us and make sure 01:20:39.970 --> 01:20:41.635 that them and their families are secure 01:20:41.635 --> 01:20:43.880 against attacks in the region? 01:20:43.880 --> 01:20:44.850 - So, as you know the area that 01:20:44.850 --> 01:20:47.830 we control in Syria with our Kurdish partners 01:20:47.830 --> 01:20:50.396 is generally what we call the eastern Syria security area. 01:20:50.396 --> 01:20:52.540 We have trained and continue to train 01:20:52.540 --> 01:20:54.630 significant internal security forces 01:20:54.630 --> 01:20:56.380 to maintain local security. 01:20:56.380 --> 01:20:59.240 We can be answerable for that through our SDF partners 01:20:59.240 --> 01:21:00.610 and through our other partners there. 01:21:00.610 --> 01:21:02.722 I'm confident that we have measures 01:21:02.722 --> 01:21:04.410 in place to protect them now. 01:21:04.410 --> 01:21:05.243 I'm obviously less confident 01:21:05.243 --> 01:21:06.076 if you go into western Syria 01:21:06.076 --> 01:21:07.440 because we don't have the ability 01:21:07.440 --> 01:21:08.490 to reach out to there. 01:21:08.490 --> 01:21:09.480 - [Crow] Thank you, I yield back. 01:21:09.480 --> 01:21:10.888 - [Chairwoman] Thank you. 01:21:10.888 --> 01:21:12.270 Mr. Brooks. 01:21:12.270 --> 01:21:13.103 - Thank you. 01:21:13.103 --> 01:21:15.630 I've got four quick points before I get to my questions. 01:21:15.630 --> 01:21:17.024 Point number one, General McKenzie 01:21:17.024 --> 01:21:18.950 in your written testimony you state 01:21:18.950 --> 01:21:22.157 that "all wars have a political end." 01:21:23.490 --> 01:21:25.580 I think that's very insightful. 01:21:25.580 --> 01:21:27.870 Number two, the United States 01:21:27.870 --> 01:21:30.308 has been in Afghanistan the time equivalent 01:21:30.308 --> 01:21:34.120 of a little bit more than five World War IIs, 01:21:34.120 --> 01:21:36.530 five World War IIs. 01:21:36.530 --> 01:21:38.292 That's a remarkable statistic. 01:21:38.292 --> 01:21:41.030 Number three, in my judgment, 01:21:41.030 --> 01:21:43.500 our military has performed superbly 01:21:43.500 --> 01:21:46.234 and we won in Afghanistan, 01:21:46.234 --> 01:21:49.540 we effectively destroyed al-Qaeda's 01:21:49.540 --> 01:21:52.830 operational capability in the early years of the war, 01:21:52.830 --> 01:21:54.930 we toppled the Taliban government 01:21:54.930 --> 01:21:56.430 and we killed Osama bin Laden. 01:22:00.070 --> 01:22:03.361 Number four, I am skeptical that 01:22:03.361 --> 01:22:05.810 the Afghan people adequately 01:22:05.810 --> 01:22:09.942 appreciate America's sacrifice of American lives 01:22:09.942 --> 01:22:12.350 and treasury on their behalf. 01:22:12.350 --> 01:22:14.040 Perhaps you have a different view on that 01:22:14.040 --> 01:22:15.993 but that's my view is I don't think 01:22:15.993 --> 01:22:17.680 that we're properly appreciated 01:22:17.680 --> 01:22:21.135 for the sacrifices that we've engaged in in Afghanistan. 01:22:21.135 --> 01:22:23.273 With that kind of as a backdrop, 01:22:24.710 --> 01:22:28.050 the question, the text of the Afghan peace agreement 01:22:28.050 --> 01:22:29.640 appears to commit the United States 01:22:29.640 --> 01:22:33.040 to withdrawing its forces within 14 months 01:22:33.040 --> 01:22:34.828 subject to conditions on the ground. 01:22:34.828 --> 01:22:38.313 General McKenzie, why was 14 months chosen? 01:22:41.160 --> 01:22:45.980 - I would defer to the negotiator to arrive at that point. 01:22:45.980 --> 01:22:47.530 I cannot answer the question 01:22:47.530 --> 01:22:50.260 why 14 verses 13 verses 22 months. 01:22:50.260 --> 01:22:52.740 I do not know the answer to that question, sir. 01:22:52.740 --> 01:22:55.470 - Does 14 months allow America 01:22:55.470 --> 01:22:57.730 to withdraw its forces and equipment 01:22:57.730 --> 01:23:00.110 from Afghanistan safely? 01:23:00.110 --> 01:23:03.512 - It does if conditions are applied to that withdrawal 01:23:03.512 --> 01:23:06.190 and we hold to the conditions. 01:23:06.190 --> 01:23:08.019 - What is the least amount of time needed 01:23:08.019 --> 01:23:10.510 to safely withdraw American forces 01:23:10.510 --> 01:23:12.210 and equipment from Afghanistan? 01:23:12.210 --> 01:23:14.340 - I prefer to talk about that in the closed session 01:23:14.340 --> 01:23:15.870 and I'll be happy to do that. 01:23:15.870 --> 01:23:20.220 - Ms. Wheelbarger, same three questions. 01:23:20.220 --> 01:23:23.410 First, why was 14 months chosen? 01:23:23.410 --> 01:23:25.250 - Unfortunately I do have to defer 01:23:25.250 --> 01:23:26.900 to the State Department negotiators as well. 01:23:26.900 --> 01:23:28.370 I don't have insight. 01:23:28.370 --> 01:23:29.990 - Do you have a judgment as to whether 01:23:29.990 --> 01:23:33.330 that 14 months allows America adequate time 01:23:33.330 --> 01:23:35.890 to safely withdraw our forces and equipment? 01:23:35.890 --> 01:23:37.340 - I trust my military colleagues 01:23:37.340 --> 01:23:39.360 to do all they can to ensure any removal 01:23:39.360 --> 01:23:40.860 or retrograde of our troops 01:23:40.860 --> 01:23:43.010 is done with force protection 01:23:43.010 --> 01:23:44.720 being their number one priority. 01:23:44.720 --> 01:23:46.720 - And do you also have no opinion 01:23:46.720 --> 01:23:49.330 that you're willing to express in this setting 01:23:49.330 --> 01:23:52.297 about the minimum amount of time required 01:23:52.297 --> 01:23:55.682 for us to safely withdraw our troops 01:23:55.682 --> 01:24:00.370 and our equipment, salvageable equipment from Afghanistan? 01:24:00.370 --> 01:24:01.730 - I would assess that 14 months 01:24:01.730 --> 01:24:04.160 is probably enough time to withdraw safely. 01:24:04.160 --> 01:24:06.180 I just want a second what we've said before 01:24:06.180 --> 01:24:08.700 which is 14 months is aspirational, 01:24:08.700 --> 01:24:11.099 trying to set sort of a timeline suggestion 01:24:11.099 --> 01:24:13.580 that both sides can see their objectives 01:24:13.580 --> 01:24:15.160 potentially being fulfilled 01:24:15.160 --> 01:24:17.590 and therefore giving us the conditions 01:24:17.590 --> 01:24:18.900 that we feel it's in our national security 01:24:18.900 --> 01:24:20.960 interest to actually withdraw. 01:24:20.960 --> 01:24:22.490 Again, all of this is going to be based 01:24:22.490 --> 01:24:23.770 on whether the commitments are made 01:24:23.770 --> 01:24:25.280 and the security situation is such 01:24:25.280 --> 01:24:27.730 that we can continue to defend our own interests. 01:24:28.600 --> 01:24:31.385 - General Townsend, moving to Africa, 01:24:31.385 --> 01:24:36.208 what in your judgment are the most important flash points 01:24:36.208 --> 01:24:41.208 or critical areas in Africa at this time 01:24:42.170 --> 01:24:45.123 that we should focus our primary efforts on? 01:24:47.360 --> 01:24:49.260 - First I'd say Somalia 01:24:49.260 --> 01:24:51.180 and specifically southern Somalia 01:24:51.180 --> 01:24:53.870 in the Kenya border region 01:24:53.870 --> 01:24:55.350 and southern part of Somalia. 01:24:55.350 --> 01:25:00.040 Secondly, I would say in West Africa in the Sahel region, 01:25:00.040 --> 01:25:01.693 in the tri-border region that's formed 01:25:01.693 --> 01:25:06.630 by Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso 01:25:06.630 --> 01:25:08.740 and where that descends down 01:25:08.740 --> 01:25:09.890 to the littoral states. 01:25:13.130 --> 01:25:14.943 - Back to General McKenzie, 01:25:16.470 --> 01:25:19.964 if the Afghan talks do not begin as scheduled, 01:25:19.964 --> 01:25:22.970 will the United States delay its troop withdrawal, 01:25:22.970 --> 01:25:24.600 and, if so, for how long? 01:25:24.600 --> 01:25:26.360 And perhaps Ms. Wheelbarger 01:25:26.360 --> 01:25:27.610 would be better to answer that 01:25:27.610 --> 01:25:29.277 but I'll defer to each of you. 01:25:29.277 --> 01:25:30.660 - Sir, I would defer to her 01:25:30.660 --> 01:25:32.469 but I would also point out to you 01:25:32.469 --> 01:25:34.470 that that withdrawal has begun. 01:25:34.470 --> 01:25:36.450 - About 3,000 troops more or less? 01:25:36.450 --> 01:25:37.740 - It's a small number. 01:25:37.740 --> 01:25:39.470 It's not linear, it'll go, you know, 01:25:39.470 --> 01:25:41.240 it won't be a certain number every week 01:25:41.240 --> 01:25:43.600 as units come and go but it has begun. 01:25:43.600 --> 01:25:45.570 - And, again, in my conversations with the Secretary, 01:25:45.570 --> 01:25:47.791 his comfort level with that withdrawal decision 01:25:47.791 --> 01:25:50.530 was not just based on the agreement 01:25:50.530 --> 01:25:53.080 but based on the assessment that we can continue 01:25:53.080 --> 01:25:55.560 to achieve our missions with that force posture. 01:25:55.560 --> 01:25:56.990 If something on the ground changes 01:25:56.990 --> 01:25:59.460 in light of the Taliban not keeping its commitments, 01:25:59.460 --> 01:26:01.220 not just on the inter-Afghan agreement 01:26:01.220 --> 01:26:02.860 but on their use of violence, 01:26:02.860 --> 01:26:06.537 it's a decision he's willing to readdress. 01:26:06.537 --> 01:26:08.860 - I pray that we will not be there indefinitely. 01:26:08.860 --> 01:26:10.010 Thank you for your service. 01:26:10.010 --> 01:26:10.843 - [Chairwoman] Thank you. 01:26:10.843 --> 01:26:12.260 Ms. Houlahan. 01:26:12.260 --> 01:26:15.710 - Thank you and thank you all for being here today. 01:26:15.710 --> 01:26:17.927 My question has to do with women and girls, 01:26:17.927 --> 01:26:19.910 the beginning parts of my question. 01:26:19.910 --> 01:26:21.480 The Women Peace and Security Act 01:26:21.480 --> 01:26:23.270 reflects the growing body of evidence 01:26:23.270 --> 01:26:24.560 confirming that the inclusion 01:26:24.560 --> 01:26:26.650 of women in the peace process 01:26:26.650 --> 01:26:29.630 helps to reduce conflict and to advance stability. 01:26:29.630 --> 01:26:31.880 Research shows that higher levels 01:26:31.880 --> 01:26:33.760 of gender equality are associated 01:26:33.760 --> 01:26:36.050 with lower propensity for conflict. 01:26:36.050 --> 01:26:37.750 Data from countries around the world 01:26:37.750 --> 01:26:39.630 demonstrate that women's inclusion 01:26:39.630 --> 01:26:42.130 in peacekeeping units, police forces, 01:26:42.130 --> 01:26:44.694 and in the security sector improves accountability 01:26:44.694 --> 01:26:47.283 and decreases abuse against civilians. 01:26:48.419 --> 01:26:49.740 So, one of my first questions 01:26:49.740 --> 01:26:51.980 and this goes along with Mr. Crow's question, 01:26:51.980 --> 01:26:54.720 is can you first comment on whether or not 01:26:54.720 --> 01:26:57.270 there was any aspect of the agreement with the Taliban 01:26:57.270 --> 01:26:59.673 that related to women and to girls? 01:27:02.540 --> 01:27:03.840 - Based on my conversations 01:27:03.840 --> 01:27:05.510 with my State Department colleagues, 01:27:05.510 --> 01:27:09.010 the focus on this being an inclusive inter-Afghan agreement 01:27:09.010 --> 01:27:11.840 would include the necessity that women in particular 01:27:11.840 --> 01:27:13.690 are part of the peace negotiations 01:27:13.690 --> 01:27:16.230 of inter-Afghan peace negotiations. 01:27:16.230 --> 01:27:17.640 - [Houlahan] Gentlemen do you have any? 01:27:17.640 --> 01:27:19.120 - I would associate my remarks with that. 01:27:19.120 --> 01:27:20.410 The only other point I would say 01:27:20.410 --> 01:27:22.377 is I particularly agree with you 01:27:22.377 --> 01:27:23.840 that the inclusion of women in policing activities 01:27:23.840 --> 01:27:27.070 and low-level tactical activities is extremely helpful. 01:27:27.070 --> 01:27:29.100 It is difficult to achieve in Afghanistan, 01:27:29.100 --> 01:27:30.130 as you are aware, 01:27:30.130 --> 01:27:31.970 but our inability to do better 01:27:31.970 --> 01:27:34.160 than we are having the results we're getting 01:27:34.160 --> 01:27:35.570 is not from a lack of trying. 01:27:35.570 --> 01:27:37.420 We're trying very hard on that. 01:27:37.420 --> 01:27:39.690 - [Houlahan] Sir, I know you can't. 01:27:39.690 --> 01:27:41.890 - [Townsend] I can't speak to the Taliban issue. 01:27:41.890 --> 01:27:44.180 - So, my understanding is that 01:27:44.180 --> 01:27:46.848 there is no inclusion of women and girls in the agreement 01:27:46.848 --> 01:27:49.343 in any of the aspects of the agreement 01:27:49.343 --> 01:27:52.770 and so I find that really disappointing. 01:27:52.770 --> 01:27:54.980 And I don't know who to aim my ire at 01:27:54.980 --> 01:27:57.940 and so I just would like to understand that better 01:27:57.940 --> 01:27:59.860 and maybe offline if we have the opportunity 01:27:59.860 --> 01:28:02.020 to talk about that I would appreciate it 01:28:02.020 --> 01:28:04.470 because it certainly seems that everybody, 01:28:04.470 --> 01:28:06.540 and I was on the trip with Mr. Crow, 01:28:06.540 --> 01:28:09.400 everyone who we were with assured us 01:28:09.400 --> 01:28:10.370 that that was important. 01:28:10.370 --> 01:28:11.470 You know, we had opportunities 01:28:11.470 --> 01:28:13.710 to meet with a lot of folks about that particular issue 01:28:13.710 --> 01:28:14.980 and it would be really disappointing 01:28:14.980 --> 01:28:16.760 if that was the case. 01:28:16.760 --> 01:28:19.470 Can you comment now on how AFRICOM and CENTCOM 01:28:19.470 --> 01:28:20.500 have engaged women 01:28:20.500 --> 01:28:23.360 in counterterrorism efforts in your regions? 01:28:23.360 --> 01:28:24.870 How are you working to make sure 01:28:24.870 --> 01:28:26.650 that we do continue to include 01:28:26.650 --> 01:28:29.260 this important part of our population? 01:28:29.260 --> 01:28:30.096 - Sure. 01:28:30.096 --> 01:28:32.878 So, women's and peace and security 01:28:32.878 --> 01:28:35.770 is sort of part of our DNA at AFRICOM. 01:28:35.770 --> 01:28:36.840 I actually have a full-time 01:28:36.840 --> 01:28:38.913 gender advisor on our staff there. 01:28:40.210 --> 01:28:42.408 This is an issue that is embedded 01:28:42.408 --> 01:28:45.508 in every training event we do on the continent 01:28:45.508 --> 01:28:48.130 or in Europe, for example, 01:28:48.130 --> 01:28:50.510 and so just three quick examples. 01:28:50.510 --> 01:28:53.294 We had a recent communication symposium which I spoke at 01:28:53.294 --> 01:28:57.061 where we brought women in the armed forces 01:28:57.061 --> 01:29:01.070 from African nations to Germany for a symposium. 01:29:01.070 --> 01:29:04.980 We conducted a female intel officer course on the continent 01:29:04.980 --> 01:29:06.300 and we just had a fairly 01:29:06.300 --> 01:29:08.510 large-scale exercise called Flintlock, 01:29:08.510 --> 01:29:10.960 it's a Special Operations Forces exercise. 01:29:10.960 --> 01:29:15.080 It had a women's and peace and security component to it. 01:29:15.080 --> 01:29:17.546 So, we worked as hard to impress 01:29:17.546 --> 01:29:20.390 upon our African partners the importance of this. 01:29:20.390 --> 01:29:21.497 - [Houlahan] Thank you, sir. 01:29:21.497 --> 01:29:24.121 - So, I would echo what General Townsend said. 01:29:24.121 --> 01:29:26.660 You know, we have two tactical areas of operation 01:29:26.660 --> 01:29:28.880 where ability of women to interact 01:29:28.880 --> 01:29:30.220 at the tactical level is critical 01:29:30.220 --> 01:29:33.170 to obtain cultural entry into locations. 01:29:33.170 --> 01:29:36.440 So, on the U.S. and on the coalition side fully embedded, 01:29:36.440 --> 01:29:37.530 it's a critical capability 01:29:37.530 --> 01:29:39.030 that we simply cannot do without. 01:29:39.030 --> 01:29:40.120 And I'm referring specifically 01:29:40.120 --> 01:29:42.663 in Afghanistan Iraq and in parts of Syria as well. 01:29:43.610 --> 01:29:45.105 Outreach to our partners, 01:29:45.105 --> 01:29:48.021 it's better in some areas than others. 01:29:48.021 --> 01:29:49.770 Afghanistan there are profound 01:29:49.770 --> 01:29:51.460 cultural barriers to doing it. 01:29:51.460 --> 01:29:53.660 We work it across the entire theater. 01:29:53.660 --> 01:29:55.890 It is integral to all our training activities 01:29:55.890 --> 01:29:57.890 and so I'm a very big supporter of it. 01:29:57.890 --> 01:29:58.800 - Thank you. 01:29:58.800 --> 01:29:59.633 Ms. Wheelbarger. 01:29:59.633 --> 01:30:01.490 - I'll just add I myself have visited 01:30:01.490 --> 01:30:04.060 the female commandos that work with Scottie Miller 01:30:04.060 --> 01:30:06.080 and they're impressive and important. 01:30:06.080 --> 01:30:08.847 I will also add from my perspective, from my position, 01:30:08.847 --> 01:30:10.210 one of the things I've tried 01:30:10.210 --> 01:30:13.900 to put a lot of energy to is meeting with parliamentarians, 01:30:13.900 --> 01:30:15.680 particularly female parliamentarians around the world 01:30:15.680 --> 01:30:17.817 because including female voices 01:30:17.817 --> 01:30:19.590 more than just security structures 01:30:19.590 --> 01:30:21.630 but actually in representational democracy 01:30:21.630 --> 01:30:23.480 is part of what we should be pushing forward. 01:30:23.480 --> 01:30:25.930 So, that's a key point that I strive to do. 01:30:25.930 --> 01:30:27.970 - And I couldn't obviously agree with you more 01:30:27.970 --> 01:30:29.734 and I did have the opportunity when I was 01:30:29.734 --> 01:30:33.550 over with the CrowDEL was what we called it, 01:30:33.550 --> 01:30:35.550 to have the opportunity to meet with our side 01:30:35.550 --> 01:30:38.910 who is leading the charge on women and girls issues. 01:30:38.910 --> 01:30:40.240 I only have 30 seconds left 01:30:40.240 --> 01:30:42.540 so I'll just ask this question for the record. 01:30:43.810 --> 01:30:46.850 General Votel, your predecessor, General McKenzie, 01:30:46.850 --> 01:30:48.540 stated that cyber will be integrated 01:30:48.540 --> 01:30:49.680 through all operations. 01:30:49.680 --> 01:30:51.810 However, CENTCOM continues to be challenged 01:30:51.810 --> 01:30:53.900 by constrained resources including 01:30:53.900 --> 01:30:56.010 trained cyber security personnel. 01:30:56.010 --> 01:30:57.179 I was wondering if you could comment 01:30:57.179 --> 01:30:59.040 on whether or not you continue 01:30:59.040 --> 01:31:00.810 to feel the effects of constrained cyber 01:31:00.810 --> 01:31:02.700 resources and trained personnel 01:31:02.700 --> 01:31:05.580 and how you would propose to solve that issue. 01:31:05.580 --> 01:31:09.130 And the same for, you know, both theaters. 01:31:09.130 --> 01:31:10.150 And I only have four seconds, 01:31:10.150 --> 01:31:11.930 so if it's okay I'll just take that for the record. 01:31:11.930 --> 01:31:13.034 - [McKenzie] We'll come back to you. 01:31:13.034 --> 01:31:13.867 - Thank you. 01:31:13.867 --> 01:31:14.700 - [Chairwoman] Thank you. 01:31:14.700 --> 01:31:15.533 Mr. Scott. 01:31:15.533 --> 01:31:16.490 - Thank you, Madam Chairman. 01:31:16.490 --> 01:31:18.290 Gentlemen, thank you for being here. 01:31:19.200 --> 01:31:20.359 One thing I do want to mention, 01:31:20.359 --> 01:31:22.260 I'm a little taken back that we have 01:31:22.260 --> 01:31:24.750 left Sudan on the state sponsor of terrorism list 01:31:25.890 --> 01:31:28.710 along with countries like Iran. 01:31:28.710 --> 01:31:30.230 That country has come a long way since 01:31:30.230 --> 01:31:31.810 the incidence with Darfur 01:31:35.081 --> 01:31:36.420 and I'm disappointed that the State Department 01:31:36.420 --> 01:31:38.900 put additional conditions on them coming off of that list 01:31:38.900 --> 01:31:40.947 as we look to work by, with, and through 01:31:40.947 --> 01:31:43.770 countries in that region. 01:31:43.770 --> 01:31:45.930 If we leave them on the state sponsor of terrorism, 01:31:45.930 --> 01:31:47.800 they're left with no choice 01:31:47.800 --> 01:31:52.520 but to move towards China and Russia. 01:31:52.520 --> 01:31:54.964 And so, I hope that any assistance you can give us 01:31:54.964 --> 01:31:59.273 with helping resolve that you will do. 01:32:00.370 --> 01:32:01.906 As we talk about China, 01:32:01.906 --> 01:32:04.440 I'm extremely concerned especially 01:32:04.440 --> 01:32:06.880 about the natural resource extraction 01:32:10.561 --> 01:32:13.032 and as we met with UN peacekeeping mission in Mali 01:32:13.032 --> 01:32:14.765 they expressed concerns that 01:32:14.765 --> 01:32:17.610 effectively the theft of the natural resources 01:32:17.610 --> 01:32:18.970 of many of the countries would 01:32:18.970 --> 01:32:22.717 in the end lead to civil war in many of those countries 01:32:22.717 --> 01:32:26.060 and I hope that we are attempting 01:32:26.060 --> 01:32:28.950 to make sure that the people of those countries 01:32:28.950 --> 01:32:32.130 get a square deal as much as possible. 01:32:32.130 --> 01:32:35.340 General Townsend, thank you for your hospitality, 01:32:35.340 --> 01:32:38.893 as some colleagues of mine visited AFRICOM. 01:32:40.450 --> 01:32:44.370 I've been in that area a couple of times. 01:32:44.370 --> 01:32:48.810 One of was with General Furness 01:32:48.810 --> 01:32:52.470 at Djibouti for approximately a week. 01:32:52.470 --> 01:32:56.210 Went to Manda Bay, spent some time in Somalia, Mogadishu. 01:32:56.210 --> 01:32:58.362 I'm a little taken back at the lack of assets 01:32:58.362 --> 01:33:01.570 at that base for it to be 01:33:03.100 --> 01:33:04.600 under the command of somebody, 01:33:06.500 --> 01:33:08.290 I believe he was a two star at the time. 01:33:08.290 --> 01:33:12.334 They're just very, very few assets in Djibouti 01:33:12.334 --> 01:33:15.170 and I'm concerned about the lack of assets 01:33:15.170 --> 01:33:18.743 available to our teams in the region. 01:33:19.820 --> 01:33:22.040 General Townsend, you were very kind 01:33:22.040 --> 01:33:26.340 in providing resources to my colleagues and I 01:33:26.340 --> 01:33:30.493 to travel to see a couple of your ODA teams in Africa. 01:33:31.740 --> 01:33:36.148 We saw one ODA operating with the 127 echo program, 01:33:36.148 --> 01:33:39.710 one team operating without. 01:33:39.710 --> 01:33:42.050 Could you speak to the members of the committee 01:33:42.050 --> 01:33:46.490 about the differences in the teams 01:33:46.490 --> 01:33:48.780 that operate with the 127 echo program 01:33:48.780 --> 01:33:50.480 and those that operate without it? 01:33:52.770 --> 01:33:54.450 - Sure, Congressman. 01:33:54.450 --> 01:33:56.380 First, you know, you asked about, 01:33:56.380 --> 01:33:57.240 let me kind of double back to something 01:33:57.240 --> 01:33:59.020 you said a moment ago about 01:33:59.020 --> 01:34:01.560 we hope that we're helping these countries 01:34:01.560 --> 01:34:03.540 get a square deal with the Chinese. 01:34:03.540 --> 01:34:05.448 The Department of State has an initiative 01:34:05.448 --> 01:34:08.850 where they review contracts with these countries. 01:34:08.850 --> 01:34:11.074 It's a free service, bring your contracts in, 01:34:11.074 --> 01:34:12.840 we'll read the Chinese version, 01:34:12.840 --> 01:34:15.360 we'll read the version in your language 01:34:15.360 --> 01:34:17.370 and we'll tell you where the traps are 01:34:17.370 --> 01:34:19.840 and if there's differences in the versions. 01:34:19.840 --> 01:34:21.270 I think this has gone a long way 01:34:21.270 --> 01:34:23.212 to help some of the countries on the continent 01:34:23.212 --> 01:34:28.212 avoid the debt trap diplomacy problem. 01:34:29.140 --> 01:34:31.810 To your question about resources in Africa, 01:34:31.810 --> 01:34:35.250 you know, I've served around the globe, 01:34:35.250 --> 01:34:37.017 a lot of time in CENTCOM. 01:34:37.017 --> 01:34:39.880 In AFRICOM our troops and our efforts there 01:34:39.880 --> 01:34:42.270 are the most thinly resourced of any 01:34:42.270 --> 01:34:46.530 I have ever encountered or had to contend with. 01:34:46.530 --> 01:34:49.130 That said, we're not in the lead 01:34:49.130 --> 01:34:51.150 in any place on the African continent. 01:34:51.150 --> 01:34:52.900 We support our international partners, 01:34:52.900 --> 01:34:55.170 African partners, European partners etc. 01:34:55.170 --> 01:34:59.070 AMISOM, UN, AU partners. 01:34:59.070 --> 01:35:03.480 So, I think if our troops are frustrated 01:35:03.480 --> 01:35:05.700 could they do more if they had more? 01:35:05.700 --> 01:35:10.410 Absolutely they could but it's not their place to do more, 01:35:10.410 --> 01:35:12.290 it's their place to support our partners. 01:35:12.290 --> 01:35:13.450 That's our role. 01:35:13.450 --> 01:35:15.050 And sometimes that's a little hard 01:35:15.050 --> 01:35:18.760 to get our more junior leaders to understand 01:35:18.760 --> 01:35:20.390 because they know what they can do 01:35:20.390 --> 01:35:21.900 especially veterans of other theaters, 01:35:21.900 --> 01:35:24.490 know what they could do if they had more resources. 01:35:24.490 --> 01:35:26.680 So, we are constrained but I think 01:35:26.680 --> 01:35:29.070 it's by deliberate choice. 01:35:29.070 --> 01:35:31.901 Your specific question about 127 echo 01:35:31.901 --> 01:35:34.946 and, for example, a triple three, 01:35:34.946 --> 01:35:38.730 333 resourced force are significant. 01:35:38.730 --> 01:35:42.310 The 127 echo essentially has full resourcing 01:35:42.310 --> 01:35:44.978 because it's a force that's operating 01:35:44.978 --> 01:35:48.750 with U.S. oversight and control 01:35:48.750 --> 01:35:50.930 and the 333 program is a partner force. 01:35:50.930 --> 01:35:54.310 They're just different sections authorized by Congress 01:35:54.310 --> 01:35:55.930 as to what we can provide those forces. 01:35:55.930 --> 01:35:57.790 - General, I'm very short on time. 01:35:57.790 --> 01:35:59.020 I again want to thank you 01:35:59.020 --> 01:35:59.853 but I do want to mention this 01:35:59.853 --> 01:36:01.780 and this is not a military mission, 01:36:01.780 --> 01:36:03.990 it would be more of a State Department mission, 01:36:03.990 --> 01:36:05.819 but we're bringing men in, 01:36:05.819 --> 01:36:07.988 predominantly men in that area, 01:36:07.988 --> 01:36:11.220 and we're training them in military tactics 01:36:11.220 --> 01:36:14.713 and they have a effectively a third grade education level 01:36:14.713 --> 01:36:18.800 and we have them seven days a week 24 hours a day. 01:36:18.800 --> 01:36:21.230 I do think that it would be worthwhile 01:36:21.230 --> 01:36:22.680 for the United States, 01:36:22.680 --> 01:36:24.100 with other governments, 01:36:24.100 --> 01:36:26.810 through some type of aid program, 01:36:26.810 --> 01:36:30.720 to provide educational resources for those men 01:36:30.720 --> 01:36:32.811 while they're there on those bases. 01:36:32.811 --> 01:36:34.630 Otherwise we're training somebody 01:36:34.630 --> 01:36:36.730 and then releasing them without an education. 01:36:36.730 --> 01:36:38.033 - [Smith] Thank you. 01:36:38.033 --> 01:36:39.056 Mr. Brown. 01:36:39.056 --> 01:36:39.889 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:36:39.889 --> 01:36:41.700 Let me just preface by stating the obvious, 01:36:41.700 --> 01:36:44.370 Africa is a large continent, three and a half times 01:36:44.370 --> 01:36:46.702 the size of the United States, 54 nations, 01:36:46.702 --> 01:36:49.300 very diverse in its challenges and opportunities. 01:36:49.300 --> 01:36:50.640 So, as I ask my questions 01:36:50.640 --> 01:36:52.160 I don't want anyone to think 01:36:52.160 --> 01:36:53.930 that I'm confused that it's, you know, 01:36:53.930 --> 01:36:57.913 one nation and homogeneous or monolithic. 01:36:59.410 --> 01:37:01.560 General Townsend, I think you're right, 01:37:01.560 --> 01:37:04.280 you know, that our soldiers may not be, 01:37:04.280 --> 01:37:06.250 you know, I'm quoting you, 01:37:06.250 --> 01:37:08.348 not they are placed to do more 01:37:08.348 --> 01:37:11.130 but I will say that after meeting 01:37:11.130 --> 01:37:14.560 with you in Stuttgart with Representative Scott, 01:37:14.560 --> 01:37:16.307 when we went to Africa, 01:37:16.307 --> 01:37:21.307 USAID said they could do more if there were more of you. 01:37:23.080 --> 01:37:25.020 The State Department mission 01:37:25.020 --> 01:37:28.830 said that they could do more if there were more of you. 01:37:28.830 --> 01:37:31.010 So, there's a lot more that could 01:37:31.010 --> 01:37:33.350 be happening in Africa in terms 01:37:33.350 --> 01:37:36.882 of development and diplomacy 01:37:36.882 --> 01:37:41.882 with a larger military presence. 01:37:43.070 --> 01:37:45.130 Let me ask you this question. 01:37:45.130 --> 01:37:46.740 You know and I really appreciate 01:37:46.740 --> 01:37:48.300 this placemat that you provided. 01:37:48.300 --> 01:37:51.120 You provided a classified version when we were in Stuttgart. 01:37:51.120 --> 01:37:52.140 It's scary when you look 01:37:52.140 --> 01:37:54.589 at the trend line of China's presence, 01:37:54.589 --> 01:37:58.200 both, you know, the infrastructure, 01:37:58.200 --> 01:38:01.800 the business investments, the arms sales. 01:38:01.800 --> 01:38:04.560 African nations don't want to be caught in the middle 01:38:04.560 --> 01:38:07.940 between the United States and China or Russia 01:38:08.970 --> 01:38:11.370 but my question is what will 01:38:11.370 --> 01:38:14.950 the DOD AFRICOM do to assure 01:38:14.950 --> 01:38:18.510 and ultimately deliver on the desire 01:38:18.510 --> 01:38:21.860 to be the preferred partner for African nations? 01:38:21.860 --> 01:38:23.010 And while you're answering that, 01:38:23.010 --> 01:38:25.350 maybe you can once again just define 01:38:25.350 --> 01:38:29.383 great power competition with China in Africa? 01:38:32.210 --> 01:38:34.060 - Thanks, Congressman. 01:38:34.060 --> 01:38:36.810 So, the first part of the question about great power 01:38:36.810 --> 01:38:39.510 or global power of competition as I like to refer to it, 01:38:39.510 --> 01:38:43.850 really it's all about gaining and maintaining influence. 01:38:43.850 --> 01:38:46.440 That's what that competition is all about. 01:38:46.440 --> 01:38:48.300 So, on some future rainy day 01:38:48.300 --> 01:38:51.250 we have the access and influence that we need. 01:38:51.250 --> 01:38:53.940 So, we're in a struggle with China and Russia 01:38:53.940 --> 01:38:56.950 to gain and maintain that influence. 01:38:56.950 --> 01:38:58.422 What they want from us, 01:38:58.422 --> 01:39:00.070 we can't compete with China, 01:39:00.070 --> 01:39:01.590 we're not going to build stadiums 01:39:01.590 --> 01:39:05.660 and railroads and ports and palaces 01:39:05.660 --> 01:39:08.262 which are all things China builds on the continent, 01:39:08.262 --> 01:39:09.980 but what they do want from us 01:39:09.980 --> 01:39:11.945 is they want help building their capacity 01:39:11.945 --> 01:39:13.540 of their security forces 01:39:13.540 --> 01:39:14.980 and they want our help with 01:39:14.980 --> 01:39:17.330 the counterterrorism problem that they have. 01:39:17.330 --> 01:39:19.310 So, even though some people 01:39:21.130 --> 01:39:22.520 may not necessarily agree with this, 01:39:22.520 --> 01:39:26.130 I believe in Africa building partner capacity 01:39:26.130 --> 01:39:28.890 and counterterrorism efforts or counter VEO efforts, 01:39:28.890 --> 01:39:33.180 are a way we do global or great power competition in Africa. 01:39:33.180 --> 01:39:36.280 Because that's what our partners are hungry for. 01:39:36.280 --> 01:39:40.530 They come to us because of our capacity to do that, 01:39:40.530 --> 01:39:42.599 they come to us because of our skill, 01:39:42.599 --> 01:39:44.220 and they come to us because 01:39:44.220 --> 01:39:46.750 of how we treat them and our values. 01:39:46.750 --> 01:39:48.250 - Let me interject with another question. 01:39:48.250 --> 01:39:50.220 Can you briefly describe how you're going 01:39:50.220 --> 01:39:53.190 to deploy the first security force assistance brigade 01:39:53.190 --> 01:39:57.330 that you now have in your AOR? 01:39:57.330 --> 01:39:58.163 - Sure. 01:39:58.163 --> 01:40:00.640 So, I can cover this in more detail 01:40:00.640 --> 01:40:01.710 in the classified session 01:40:01.710 --> 01:40:05.770 but some of them are already on the continent doing the, 01:40:05.770 --> 01:40:08.170 they've been leaning forward since about October 01:40:08.170 --> 01:40:11.354 and they moved very quickly once we got approval. 01:40:11.354 --> 01:40:13.420 We're going to deploy them in some 01:40:13.420 --> 01:40:15.320 countries with persistent presence. 01:40:15.320 --> 01:40:17.700 And in some of our highest priority countries 01:40:17.700 --> 01:40:19.990 we'll have persistent presence for those partners. 01:40:19.990 --> 01:40:21.580 And in other countries we'll have 01:40:21.580 --> 01:40:25.610 a sort of an episodic or scheduled presence. 01:40:25.610 --> 01:40:30.547 And so, in some places they'll elevate our game 01:40:30.547 --> 01:40:35.063 because they can advise and train at a higher level 01:40:35.063 --> 01:40:37.030 than some of our SOF forces 01:40:37.030 --> 01:40:39.230 that are actually training you know units 01:40:39.230 --> 01:40:41.960 of action at the small unit level. 01:40:41.960 --> 01:40:43.820 - Let me see if I can get this one in. 01:40:43.820 --> 01:40:45.740 I know it's an austere environment 01:40:45.740 --> 01:40:47.836 and when I was there in August, 01:40:47.836 --> 01:40:51.840 I mean it takes weeks to get major end items in place. 01:40:51.840 --> 01:40:53.180 I mean, if not months, 01:40:53.180 --> 01:40:58.180 it takes weeks to get repair parts to the ODA teams. 01:40:58.840 --> 01:41:01.766 Now that you're put in bringing in the SFAB, 01:41:01.766 --> 01:41:04.910 what infrastructure needs, 01:41:04.910 --> 01:41:07.060 what are the unmet infrastructure needs 01:41:07.060 --> 01:41:10.173 or logistical support needs on the continent? 01:41:12.140 --> 01:41:13.930 - I don't think that the SFAB 01:41:13.930 --> 01:41:15.930 has any additional requirements 01:41:15.930 --> 01:41:19.560 that other elements of DOD have on the ground there. 01:41:19.560 --> 01:41:22.090 Those are basically the same. 01:41:22.090 --> 01:41:25.110 We'll make sure they have the right support, 01:41:25.110 --> 01:41:27.789 the right security wherever we send them in Africa, 01:41:27.789 --> 01:41:29.650 they'll be properly supported. 01:41:29.650 --> 01:41:31.210 I think they're going to probably, 01:41:31.210 --> 01:41:34.129 if any of them are veterans of Afghanistan or Iraq, 01:41:34.129 --> 01:41:37.310 they're gonna be shocked when they first arrive 01:41:37.310 --> 01:41:38.730 by the level of resourcing 01:41:38.730 --> 01:41:39.910 that I was referring to earlier, 01:41:39.910 --> 01:41:41.790 how thinly resourced Africa is. 01:41:41.790 --> 01:41:44.260 It's gonna be, it's very austere, 01:41:44.260 --> 01:41:45.880 very expeditionary as you've seen 01:41:45.880 --> 01:41:46.890 with your own eyes. 01:41:46.890 --> 01:41:48.070 - [Brown] I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 01:41:48.070 --> 01:41:49.296 - Thank you. 01:41:49.296 --> 01:41:50.129 I just want to emphasize the point 01:41:50.129 --> 01:41:52.960 that General Townsend made and Mr. Brown elicited, 01:41:52.960 --> 01:41:54.630 is you know what's the value add 01:41:54.630 --> 01:41:57.270 that we have to build relationships in Africa? 01:41:57.270 --> 01:41:59.319 China's throwing all kinds of money around 01:41:59.319 --> 01:42:02.400 but it really is and during my trip, you know, 01:42:02.400 --> 01:42:04.107 Tunisia actually this is a huge point. 01:42:04.107 --> 01:42:06.460 I mean they want us and need us 01:42:06.460 --> 01:42:09.604 as the most reliable partner on security. 01:42:09.604 --> 01:42:14.100 That is something that Russia and China really can't offer. 01:42:14.100 --> 01:42:15.920 They don't have the sustainable equipment, 01:42:15.920 --> 01:42:17.200 they don't have the training. 01:42:17.200 --> 01:42:19.163 It's a skill set that we bring that 01:42:19.163 --> 01:42:21.070 helps us build that relationship. 01:42:21.070 --> 01:42:22.380 Obviously there are other things 01:42:22.380 --> 01:42:25.490 that we do with diplomacy and USAID and all of that. 01:42:25.490 --> 01:42:27.020 But that security relationship 01:42:27.020 --> 01:42:28.490 is a way to build partnerships 01:42:28.490 --> 01:42:30.276 in Africa without a question. 01:42:30.276 --> 01:42:31.213 Mr. Rogers. 01:42:33.670 --> 01:42:34.720 - First let me thank all of you 01:42:34.720 --> 01:42:36.310 for your service to our country 01:42:36.310 --> 01:42:38.780 and for making yourself available today. 01:42:38.780 --> 01:42:42.020 General McKenzie in your unfunded priorities list 01:42:42.020 --> 01:42:44.030 you address a need for more drones 01:42:44.030 --> 01:42:47.917 and surveillance to increase your ISR capability 01:42:50.270 --> 01:42:52.670 for base resilience and defense. 01:42:52.670 --> 01:42:55.070 Is that something, are you trying to fill a gap, 01:42:55.070 --> 01:42:57.546 or is it you just don't have enough 01:42:57.546 --> 01:42:58.996 of ISR capability at present? 01:43:01.573 --> 01:43:04.617 - So, every combatant commander wants more ISR capability. 01:43:04.617 --> 01:43:06.950 Their current plans to reduce a number, 01:43:06.950 --> 01:43:10.180 particularly of MQ-9 drones that are available, 01:43:10.180 --> 01:43:11.533 we would like to see if there's a way 01:43:11.533 --> 01:43:13.160 that we can keep in the theater 01:43:13.160 --> 01:43:14.340 and continue to use them. 01:43:14.340 --> 01:43:17.020 I recognize that there's a pressing requirement 01:43:17.020 --> 01:43:18.300 for those drones worldwide 01:43:18.300 --> 01:43:20.250 and there are other places that they can be used. 01:43:20.250 --> 01:43:21.440 Nonetheless, we believe we have 01:43:21.440 --> 01:43:23.380 a genuine requirement for them both 01:43:23.380 --> 01:43:28.110 in the VEO fight as well as positioned against Iran. 01:43:28.110 --> 01:43:30.630 Even though the MQ-9's a vulnerable platform 01:43:30.630 --> 01:43:32.630 against some Iranian capabilities. 01:43:32.630 --> 01:43:34.110 Nonetheless, particularly in places 01:43:34.110 --> 01:43:35.940 like the Strait of Hormuz and other areas, 01:43:35.940 --> 01:43:37.110 it gives us visibility 01:43:37.110 --> 01:43:39.280 and intelligence-gathering capabilities 01:43:39.280 --> 01:43:42.170 that we might not otherwise have. 01:43:42.170 --> 01:43:46.110 - Was this a request that you put in your base request list 01:43:46.110 --> 01:43:47.690 and was pushed to UFR list 01:43:47.690 --> 01:43:50.650 or was it initially put in the UFR list? 01:43:50.650 --> 01:43:54.050 - Sir, I'll have to come back to you on the details of that. 01:43:54.050 --> 01:43:55.870 I believe we're responding to it, 01:43:55.870 --> 01:43:57.970 is our very reasonable understandable 01:43:57.970 --> 01:43:59.560 by the desire by the Air Force 01:43:59.560 --> 01:44:02.380 to divest of some legacy systems in their requests. 01:44:02.380 --> 01:44:03.560 So, we were reacting to that. 01:44:03.560 --> 01:44:04.900 I will have to come back to you 01:44:04.900 --> 01:44:07.180 with a detailed answer to that and I will. 01:44:07.180 --> 01:44:08.890 - Great and I very much appreciate 01:44:08.890 --> 01:44:10.390 your Birmingham Alabama accent. 01:44:10.390 --> 01:44:11.230 I'm glad you haven't lost it 01:44:11.230 --> 01:44:13.540 in all your years of service around the world. 01:44:13.540 --> 01:44:14.373 - [McKenzie] Sir, thank you. 01:44:14.373 --> 01:44:16.100 - I picked up on it real quick. 01:44:16.100 --> 01:44:18.860 General Townsend, your recent completion 01:44:18.860 --> 01:44:23.562 of the exercise Flintlock exercise 2020 01:44:23.562 --> 01:44:25.670 with your African partners, 01:44:25.670 --> 01:44:28.110 tell me about what if anything that did 01:44:28.110 --> 01:44:29.650 to increase your capability 01:44:30.961 --> 01:44:33.733 to combat violent extremists in the region. 01:44:36.010 --> 01:44:36.843 - Thanks, Congressman. 01:44:36.843 --> 01:44:38.567 I'd like to also join General McKenzie 01:44:38.567 --> 01:44:40.830 and his comments about the ISR. 01:44:40.830 --> 01:44:42.612 we're in the same boat as CENTCOM. 01:44:42.612 --> 01:44:45.990 So, we understand that those resources 01:44:45.990 --> 01:44:47.210 could be used elsewhere in the world. 01:44:47.210 --> 01:44:49.450 We also know that the Air Force 01:44:49.450 --> 01:44:51.340 would like to transition to higher end, 01:44:51.340 --> 01:44:53.367 more capable platforms 01:44:53.367 --> 01:44:55.150 and they're gonna have to divest 01:44:55.150 --> 01:44:56.300 some of the lower end stuff 01:44:56.300 --> 01:44:58.820 but the lower end stuff works really well 01:44:58.820 --> 01:45:02.052 for us in AFRICOM and in CENTCOM. 01:45:02.052 --> 01:45:05.430 On your question about Flintlock, 01:45:05.430 --> 01:45:07.410 so Flintlock is an exercise 01:45:07.410 --> 01:45:09.500 for special operations forces 01:45:09.500 --> 01:45:14.020 and it's very much directly focused on counterterrorism. 01:45:14.020 --> 01:45:18.150 It's about improving and building partner capacity 01:45:18.150 --> 01:45:20.670 so these countries come together 01:45:22.292 --> 01:45:26.460 and we operated this year in Mauritania and in Senegal 01:45:26.460 --> 01:45:28.723 were the two main areas of focus. 01:45:30.581 --> 01:45:32.618 And I think that, well, you could just read 01:45:32.618 --> 01:45:34.180 from some of the quotes from some 01:45:34.180 --> 01:45:36.367 of the press reports of the participants 01:45:36.367 --> 01:45:38.820 how much they thought they got out of Flintlock. 01:45:38.820 --> 01:45:42.365 I thought Flintlock is one of our more successful exercises 01:45:42.365 --> 01:45:44.166 and I think it helps build capacity 01:45:44.166 --> 01:45:46.610 for counterterrorism operations in Africa writ large. 01:45:46.610 --> 01:45:48.680 - [Rogers] And it's an annual exercise? 01:45:48.680 --> 01:45:49.643 - It is. 01:45:49.643 --> 01:45:51.470 - [Rogers] And how many years has it been taking place? 01:45:51.470 --> 01:45:52.657 - I'm sorry I didn't hear. 01:45:52.657 --> 01:45:53.857 - [Rogers] How many years has it been taking place. 01:45:53.857 --> 01:45:55.060 - I don't know, I'll have to take that 01:45:55.060 --> 01:45:57.080 and get back to you on that thanks. 01:45:57.080 --> 01:45:59.873 - Ms. Wheelbarger, tell me about the Department's 01:45:59.873 --> 01:46:01.729 objectives with Syria 01:46:01.729 --> 01:46:03.460 and how they comply with 01:46:03.460 --> 01:46:07.020 the overarching objectives of CENTCOM AOR. 01:46:07.020 --> 01:46:08.650 - The military's objectives 01:46:08.650 --> 01:46:10.040 or the Department's objective in Syria 01:46:10.040 --> 01:46:13.450 remains the D-ISIS, enduring defeat of ISIS. 01:46:13.450 --> 01:46:16.160 The U.S. government has broader objectives 01:46:16.160 --> 01:46:17.860 in Syria which includes also 01:46:17.860 --> 01:46:19.330 a political settlement along 01:46:19.330 --> 01:46:21.668 the lines of 2254 the UN process 01:46:21.668 --> 01:46:26.640 as well as having fewer Iranian forces in Syria. 01:46:26.640 --> 01:46:29.338 But the military component is the D-ISIS campaign 01:46:29.338 --> 01:46:31.741 and we have, you know, never, 01:46:31.741 --> 01:46:34.650 we have continued that fight continuously 01:46:34.650 --> 01:46:36.650 even while we repositioned our forces 01:46:36.650 --> 01:46:39.490 based on presidential guidance over the years. 01:46:39.490 --> 01:46:40.903 - [Rogers] Thank you, I yield back. 01:46:42.120 --> 01:46:45.430 - Okay, we're gonna do Mr. Carbajal and Mr. Gallego 01:46:45.430 --> 01:46:46.263 and then we're gonna go do 01:46:46.263 --> 01:46:47.210 the classified briefing. 01:46:47.210 --> 01:46:48.243 So, Mr. Carbajal. 01:46:49.480 --> 01:46:50.580 - Thank you, Mr. Chair 01:46:51.470 --> 01:46:54.060 and welcome to all the witnesses. 01:46:54.060 --> 01:46:57.140 China has steadily increased its influence in Africa 01:46:57.140 --> 01:47:00.169 through its Belt and Road initiative, BRI, 01:47:00.169 --> 01:47:03.164 showing the effectiveness of soft power. 01:47:03.164 --> 01:47:05.260 China has pledged 60 billion 01:47:05.260 --> 01:47:07.858 in new financing for African countries 01:47:07.858 --> 01:47:10.850 and is now the continent's biggest trading partner 01:47:10.850 --> 01:47:15.850 with Sino-African trade topping 200 billion per year. 01:47:16.460 --> 01:47:19.850 While there is a bipartisan criticism for BRI, 01:47:19.850 --> 01:47:21.660 the U.S. must be able to offer 01:47:21.660 --> 01:47:23.639 an alternative narrative. 01:47:23.639 --> 01:47:25.407 Secretary Wheelbarger, 01:47:25.407 --> 01:47:28.290 what actions is DOD taking in conjunction 01:47:28.290 --> 01:47:30.640 with other federal agencies to offer 01:47:30.640 --> 01:47:32.930 an alternative to BRI in Africa? 01:47:32.930 --> 01:47:34.200 I know this was raised earlier 01:47:34.200 --> 01:47:36.240 but I'm not sure the answers 01:47:36.240 --> 01:47:38.690 were as substantive as they can be. 01:47:38.690 --> 01:47:39.523 - Of course. 01:47:39.523 --> 01:47:41.770 So, the administration does have a policy 01:47:41.770 --> 01:47:45.100 to increase trade and development on the continent, 01:47:45.100 --> 01:47:46.600 it's called Prosper Africa. 01:47:46.600 --> 01:47:48.620 I think the efforts are primarily focused, 01:47:48.620 --> 01:47:49.560 again other agencies, 01:47:49.560 --> 01:47:51.250 but the idea is how can we make 01:47:51.250 --> 01:47:53.689 the economic models within Africa 01:47:53.689 --> 01:47:56.050 comport more with our industry standards 01:47:56.050 --> 01:47:58.369 or our economic way of business 01:47:58.369 --> 01:48:00.830 rather than just sort of the Chinese way 01:48:00.830 --> 01:48:02.540 of just sort of flowing in money. 01:48:02.540 --> 01:48:04.520 We do, of course, recognize that a lot of this 01:48:04.520 --> 01:48:06.720 has to do with how we speak to our partners 01:48:06.720 --> 01:48:08.560 and how we can highlight that their 01:48:08.560 --> 01:48:11.230 short term economic gains in the near term 01:48:11.230 --> 01:48:13.807 might result in long term loss of sovereignty 01:48:13.807 --> 01:48:15.680 and we've seen this in other countries. 01:48:15.680 --> 01:48:17.090 And I think many of our African partners 01:48:17.090 --> 01:48:20.140 are actually starting to see that that's affecting them 01:48:20.140 --> 01:48:22.080 that the economic benefits that they think 01:48:22.080 --> 01:48:24.972 they're gonna get rapidly aren't necessarily 01:48:24.972 --> 01:48:26.640 accruing to them to them specifically. 01:48:26.640 --> 01:48:29.201 Many Chinese companies that are there, 01:48:29.201 --> 01:48:31.334 they don't hire local work local workforce, 01:48:31.334 --> 01:48:32.450 they're really just extracting the resources 01:48:32.450 --> 01:48:33.860 and not providing a lot of benefit 01:48:33.860 --> 01:48:35.230 to the countries themselves. 01:48:35.230 --> 01:48:37.010 So, it's not just what we can do 01:48:37.010 --> 01:48:40.050 in addition to bringing economic might in 01:48:40.050 --> 01:48:41.110 but also highlighting that 01:48:41.110 --> 01:48:42.350 they're actually setting themselves up 01:48:42.350 --> 01:48:44.490 for a long term challenging relationship 01:48:44.490 --> 01:48:48.920 if they're going to rely on Chinese monetary investment. 01:48:48.920 --> 01:48:50.260 - Thank you. 01:48:50.260 --> 01:48:52.394 General Townsend has BRI undermined 01:48:52.394 --> 01:48:54.410 or threatened partnerships 01:48:54.410 --> 01:48:57.153 or security cooperation on the continent? 01:48:59.610 --> 01:49:02.430 - I think the short answer is yes. 01:49:02.430 --> 01:49:04.780 I think that the BRI is just part 01:49:04.780 --> 01:49:08.010 of a larger strategic approach that China has 01:49:08.010 --> 01:49:10.010 to not only to Africa but the world, 01:49:10.010 --> 01:49:11.663 but in Africa it's playing out. 01:49:14.600 --> 01:49:17.419 Their approaches, Belt and Road initiative, 01:49:17.419 --> 01:49:20.890 bilateral engagement, multilateral engagement, 01:49:20.890 --> 01:49:23.260 it's very much a whole-of-government approach. 01:49:23.260 --> 01:49:24.093 It's easier for them 01:49:24.093 --> 01:49:25.650 to orchestrate their whole-of-government 01:49:25.650 --> 01:49:27.516 maybe than it is for us to do so. 01:49:27.516 --> 01:49:29.770 And they're putting a lot of money in. 01:49:29.770 --> 01:49:32.190 So, it's without question 01:49:32.190 --> 01:49:35.580 they're able to buy influence in Africa 01:49:35.580 --> 01:49:37.975 not only from partners maybe who 01:49:37.975 --> 01:49:39.860 are willing to take bribes 01:49:39.860 --> 01:49:41.300 but they're willing to buy, 01:49:41.300 --> 01:49:44.450 they can buy influence from even pretty strong partners 01:49:44.450 --> 01:49:47.497 because they're partners in need. 01:49:47.497 --> 01:49:48.447 - Thank you. 01:49:48.447 --> 01:49:50.214 I want to turn to climate change 01:49:50.214 --> 01:49:53.440 and it's nexus with our national security. 01:49:53.440 --> 01:49:56.380 Nine of 10 most climate change 01:49:56.380 --> 01:49:59.280 vulnerable states are in sub-Saharan Africa. 01:49:59.280 --> 01:50:01.690 And in a region whose total population 01:50:01.690 --> 01:50:05.610 is expected to double between now and 2050, 01:50:05.610 --> 01:50:08.050 General Townsend, I'm sure you have considered 01:50:08.050 --> 01:50:09.520 how the changing climate will 01:50:09.520 --> 01:50:11.707 impact security needs and operations. 01:50:11.707 --> 01:50:14.185 How are you managing the risk of regional instability 01:50:14.185 --> 01:50:16.410 due to the impacts of climate change 01:50:16.410 --> 01:50:20.040 such as increasingly dangerous natural disasters 01:50:20.040 --> 01:50:21.743 and food and water insecurity? 01:50:24.170 --> 01:50:26.900 - Well, Congressman, as you said we see the effects 01:50:26.900 --> 01:50:29.023 of climate change all over Africa today. 01:50:30.559 --> 01:50:32.320 The desertification, the creeping southward 01:50:32.320 --> 01:50:34.484 of the Sahara Desert is just one of those. 01:50:34.484 --> 01:50:37.395 Competition for water which has a potential 01:50:37.395 --> 01:50:40.110 to erupt into state-on-state conflict 01:50:40.110 --> 01:50:41.010 in a couple of places 01:50:41.010 --> 01:50:44.240 and we're dealing with locust swarms, 01:50:44.240 --> 01:50:46.030 not an only do we have coronavirus 01:50:46.030 --> 01:50:47.120 we have locust swarms on 01:50:47.120 --> 01:50:49.790 the African continent in East Africa right now. 01:50:49.790 --> 01:50:54.550 So, these are all problems that we have to deal with 01:50:54.550 --> 01:50:57.020 and they don't really have military solutions. 01:50:57.020 --> 01:50:59.660 This is where we have to work with our partners 01:50:59.660 --> 01:51:02.150 not only in our own State Department 01:51:02.150 --> 01:51:05.840 and our own USAID but also NGOs 01:51:07.359 --> 01:51:09.920 and your international partners as well. 01:51:09.920 --> 01:51:11.441 - Do you feel we're being effective 01:51:11.441 --> 01:51:13.360 taking a whole government approach 01:51:13.360 --> 01:51:16.713 with all these different agencies addressing this issue? 01:51:18.810 --> 01:51:20.910 - Well, I think some of these challenges 01:51:20.910 --> 01:51:23.980 defy solutions by any one nation. 01:51:23.980 --> 01:51:27.500 Desertification and the water competition, for example. 01:51:27.500 --> 01:51:32.500 With the smaller scale problem of Ebola and locust swarms, 01:51:32.520 --> 01:51:33.760 I think we are. 01:51:33.760 --> 01:51:35.480 There's an international effort to help 01:51:35.480 --> 01:51:36.580 and I know the United States 01:51:36.580 --> 01:51:38.040 is contributing to both of those 01:51:38.040 --> 01:51:40.475 and in fact in the case of Ebola, 01:51:40.475 --> 01:51:42.420 the countries that are dealing with that 01:51:42.420 --> 01:51:46.574 have developed a self-capacity to handle that problem 01:51:46.574 --> 01:51:49.240 without a lot of outside assistance. 01:51:49.240 --> 01:51:51.383 That's an example of where we have helped. 01:51:51.383 --> 01:51:53.030 - [Carbajal] Thank you, General. 01:51:53.030 --> 01:51:54.749 Mr. Chair I yield back. 01:51:54.749 --> 01:51:55.723 - [Smith] Thank you. 01:51:55.723 --> 01:51:56.723 Mr. Gallego. 01:51:58.470 --> 01:52:00.060 - Thank you. 01:52:00.060 --> 01:52:02.440 Ms. Wheelbarger, we've heard a number of data points 01:52:02.440 --> 01:52:03.410 about our African partners 01:52:03.410 --> 01:52:06.670 AFRICOM itself getting less attention and funding. 01:52:06.670 --> 01:52:09.170 What is the risk that we're accepting in doing so? 01:52:10.450 --> 01:52:11.440 - I'll just take this opportunity 01:52:11.440 --> 01:52:12.740 to highlight that the Secretary 01:52:12.740 --> 01:52:14.930 has not made any decisions other 01:52:14.930 --> 01:52:17.463 than moving the SFAB into the continent. 01:52:18.420 --> 01:52:20.050 He is continuing to review all options 01:52:20.050 --> 01:52:21.470 weighing that against the risk. 01:52:21.470 --> 01:52:22.850 And I think from my perspective, 01:52:22.850 --> 01:52:26.190 one of the primary ones is the long-term risk 01:52:26.190 --> 01:52:28.600 of the evolution and metastasization 01:52:28.600 --> 01:52:29.770 of terrorist organizations, 01:52:29.770 --> 01:52:31.500 they may look one way today 01:52:31.500 --> 01:52:34.070 but if you don't maintain the pressure where they exist 01:52:34.070 --> 01:52:35.580 they may evolve in the future 01:52:35.580 --> 01:52:36.810 where they have both the capability 01:52:36.810 --> 01:52:38.740 and the will to attack us in the homeland. 01:52:38.740 --> 01:52:40.680 So, it's our ability to maintain focus 01:52:40.680 --> 01:52:42.440 across the continent is really necessary 01:52:42.440 --> 01:52:43.950 in this risk calculation. 01:52:43.950 --> 01:52:44.900 - Good. 01:52:44.900 --> 01:52:46.011 General Townsend, what is your opinion 01:52:46.011 --> 01:52:48.161 on this increased risk that she identified? 01:52:50.140 --> 01:52:53.030 - I think I agree with her assessment of the risk 01:52:53.030 --> 01:52:55.130 and I also agree with her characterization 01:52:55.130 --> 01:52:58.540 that so far no decisions have been made 01:52:58.540 --> 01:53:03.433 other than we have gained an SFAB for Africa, AFRICOM. 01:53:05.340 --> 01:53:09.260 - To follow up, General Townsend, 01:53:09.260 --> 01:53:10.920 I noticed that on the front page of your testimony 01:53:10.920 --> 01:53:13.330 you have a statement says secure and stable Africa 01:53:13.330 --> 01:53:15.098 is an enduring American interest. 01:53:15.098 --> 01:53:17.010 So, would you agree that scaling back 01:53:17.010 --> 01:53:18.700 our already modest Africa presence 01:53:18.700 --> 01:53:20.410 will mean that your command will do less, 01:53:20.410 --> 01:53:21.560 it will be less resourced 01:53:21.560 --> 01:53:23.736 to fight for the national interests, 01:53:23.736 --> 01:53:25.373 our national interests on the African continent? 01:53:28.130 --> 01:53:31.300 - Congressman, I agree that if we have less resources 01:53:31.300 --> 01:53:33.448 we'll be able to do less. 01:53:33.448 --> 01:53:34.645 - Okay. 01:53:34.645 --> 01:53:35.478 So, then just to follow up 01:53:35.478 --> 01:53:37.503 and this could be to anyone at the table here, 01:53:37.503 --> 01:53:39.682 if AFRICOM is realigned to deal 01:53:39.682 --> 01:53:41.660 with a great power competition, 01:53:41.660 --> 01:53:43.480 why is the security cooperation budget 01:53:43.480 --> 01:53:47.559 for the continent planning for a $72 million cut? 01:53:47.559 --> 01:53:49.220 Where will these programs be cut 01:53:49.220 --> 01:53:52.833 what parts of the continent will this be cut from? 01:53:52.833 --> 01:53:54.587 Because it seems it's contradicting 01:53:54.587 --> 01:53:56.195 everything that we're hearing. 01:53:56.195 --> 01:53:59.790 If we're going to realign to, you know, 01:53:59.790 --> 01:54:01.764 focus on the big power competition 01:54:01.764 --> 01:54:04.298 then we should show that in the budget also. 01:54:04.298 --> 01:54:06.490 Ms. Wheelbarger, you want start? 01:54:06.490 --> 01:54:07.973 - I'll start by just highlighting again 01:54:07.973 --> 01:54:10.265 the zero-based review that the Secretary is doing 01:54:10.265 --> 01:54:12.440 looking at resources in Africa. 01:54:12.440 --> 01:54:14.630 His intent is to see if the missions 01:54:14.630 --> 01:54:17.275 that we recognize are critical and need to achieve 01:54:17.275 --> 01:54:20.124 can be done in more efficient or effective ways. 01:54:20.124 --> 01:54:23.950 This doesn't necessarily mean absorbing more risk, 01:54:23.950 --> 01:54:25.630 it could mean just is there a better way 01:54:25.630 --> 01:54:28.300 to do the mission than we're already doing? 01:54:28.300 --> 01:54:30.560 With respect to security cooperation writ large, 01:54:30.560 --> 01:54:31.630 we have a lot of global 01:54:31.630 --> 01:54:33.090 requirements on security cooperation. 01:54:33.090 --> 01:54:34.900 My perspective is particularly 01:54:34.900 --> 01:54:36.783 the theaters that have low posture, 01:54:37.890 --> 01:54:39.410 you need to look at other tools 01:54:39.410 --> 01:54:40.520 that you have at your disposal 01:54:40.520 --> 01:54:43.010 and therefore a security cooperation assistance, 01:54:43.010 --> 01:54:44.563 333 programs, for example, 01:54:44.563 --> 01:54:46.668 are invaluable to maintaining 01:54:46.668 --> 01:54:48.380 the security partnerships we have 01:54:48.380 --> 01:54:51.025 with respect to the specific programmatic 01:54:51.025 --> 01:54:52.300 numbers that you've brought up 01:54:52.300 --> 01:54:53.960 unless General Townsend has specifics 01:54:53.960 --> 01:54:54.810 I think we're probably gonna have 01:54:54.810 --> 01:54:57.291 to take the specifics for the record. 01:54:57.291 --> 01:54:59.560 - [Gallego] General Townsend? 01:54:59.560 --> 01:55:01.030 - I would just add, 01:55:01.030 --> 01:55:02.220 I think that some of the most 01:55:02.220 --> 01:55:05.385 important programs that we have 01:55:05.385 --> 01:55:09.997 are programs like FMF, IMET, FMS, 333 programs, 01:55:14.850 --> 01:55:16.170 state partnership programs. 01:55:16.170 --> 01:55:18.540 A lot of those programs I'm advocating for 01:55:18.540 --> 01:55:20.682 are not even Department of Defense programs. 01:55:20.682 --> 01:55:23.940 Those are tremendously valuable for us 01:55:23.940 --> 01:55:27.160 especially in global power competition. 01:55:27.160 --> 01:55:29.115 - It just seems like $75 million compared 01:55:29.115 --> 01:55:31.259 to how big our budget is, 01:55:31.259 --> 01:55:34.493 seems like it'd be, you know, 01:55:35.624 --> 01:55:36.530 it would be very naive for us 01:55:36.530 --> 01:55:37.820 to just cut that funding 01:55:37.820 --> 01:55:39.730 considering I think it does do good work. 01:55:39.730 --> 01:55:41.780 And just last question because 01:55:41.780 --> 01:55:44.070 they're probably our closest allies on the continent 01:55:44.070 --> 01:55:45.288 and have the most experience, 01:55:45.288 --> 01:55:47.420 have you had discussions with our French allies 01:55:47.420 --> 01:55:49.736 about their posture if we make decisions 01:55:49.736 --> 01:55:53.400 about our posture in Africa altogether? 01:55:53.400 --> 01:55:54.330 Ms. Wheelbarger? 01:55:54.330 --> 01:55:56.800 - Yes, the Secretary has had several meetings 01:55:56.800 --> 01:55:58.870 with his counterpart Minister Parly. 01:55:58.870 --> 01:56:01.170 She understands the Secretary's need 01:56:01.170 --> 01:56:02.527 to restore readiness to the force 01:56:02.527 --> 01:56:04.360 and to review all missions 01:56:04.360 --> 01:56:07.480 and all support to foreign partners. 01:56:07.480 --> 01:56:08.700 The French do highlight, of course, 01:56:08.700 --> 01:56:11.990 the importance of U.S. enabling support to their operations. 01:56:11.990 --> 01:56:15.310 They just, some capabilities they simply do not have 01:56:15.310 --> 01:56:16.170 and what we have been doing 01:56:16.170 --> 01:56:17.003 is trying to encourage them 01:56:17.003 --> 01:56:19.020 to speed up their decision-making 01:56:19.020 --> 01:56:21.355 on having those capabilities for themselves 01:56:21.355 --> 01:56:24.479 so they no longer are reliant on United States support. 01:56:24.479 --> 01:56:25.410 - [Gallego] Thank you. 01:56:25.410 --> 01:56:26.482 I yield back. 01:56:26.482 --> 01:56:27.920 - Thank you. 01:56:27.920 --> 01:56:29.700 That will conclude, excuse me, 01:56:29.700 --> 01:56:31.680 this portion of the hearing, 01:56:31.680 --> 01:56:33.530 we'll give you a like 10 minute break 01:56:35.579 --> 01:56:38.230 and we'll reconvene at 12:10, 2212. 01:56:38.230 --> 01:56:39.630 Thank you, we are adjourned.