WEBVTT 00:00.520 --> 00:01.570 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 00:01.570 --> 00:03.630 Mr. Secretary, if the president were to declare 00:03.630 --> 00:05.970 a national emergency over climate change, 00:05.970 --> 00:07.270 would he be able to reprogram money 00:07.270 --> 00:09.160 from DOD to respond to that emergency 00:09.160 --> 00:11.470 using existing transfer authority? 00:11.470 --> 00:12.660 - [Secretary Esper] I don't know, Congressman. 00:12.660 --> 00:14.150 - You don't know, okay. 00:14.150 --> 00:15.580 Would there be a limit how much money 00:15.580 --> 00:17.560 the president could reprogram to have the Pentagon pay 00:17.560 --> 00:19.800 for that declared national emergency? 00:19.800 --> 00:20.633 - I just don't know. 00:20.633 --> 00:22.390 It's speculative, and I'm not a lawyer. 00:23.510 --> 00:24.730 - [Gallego] Well you are the Secretary of Defense 00:24.730 --> 00:26.504 and they just reprogrammed a lot of money away from us. 00:26.504 --> 00:27.740 Do you have an opinion on that? 00:27.740 --> 00:29.660 - I know that is legally available to us 00:29.660 --> 00:32.090 because the DOD lawyers and the White House lawyers 00:32.090 --> 00:33.680 and the Department of Homeland Security lawyers 00:33.680 --> 00:36.660 have advised me that it is legally available. 00:36.660 --> 00:38.920 - It's legally available because the president has declared 00:38.920 --> 00:40.230 that the border is an emergency, 00:40.230 --> 00:42.020 so therefore if present occurring, 00:42.020 --> 00:43.940 something random, an emergency, 00:43.940 --> 00:45.280 don't you think the same authorization 00:45.280 --> 00:46.414 would be legal at that point? 00:46.414 --> 00:48.274 - [Dr. Esper] Well, again, I'm not gonna speculate. 00:48.274 --> 00:49.550 - Okay. 00:49.550 --> 00:51.250 So there, in that case then also, 00:51.250 --> 00:52.083 you wouldn't be able to speculate 00:52.083 --> 00:54.110 what accounts would be available to be reprogrammed. 00:54.110 --> 00:57.140 So is it ships, true pay military construction, 00:57.140 --> 00:58.220 all that should be fair game 00:58.220 --> 01:00.920 according to the ideology this president's using 01:00.920 --> 01:02.220 in terms of reprogramming. 01:03.210 --> 01:04.860 - Again, I'm not gonna speculate. 01:06.090 --> 01:08.520 - General Milley, let me get your advice, then. 01:08.520 --> 01:10.192 Does the recent reprogramming notification 01:10.192 --> 01:12.730 that we have received, taking money away from what we, 01:12.730 --> 01:15.460 you have previous briefed us as critical department needs, 01:15.460 --> 01:17.610 does that constitute a threat to the defense of the nation 01:17.610 --> 01:19.660 now that we have reprogrammed that money? 01:20.780 --> 01:22.570 - I was, on this particular case, 01:22.570 --> 01:24.700 I was asked to conduct a formal assessment, 01:24.700 --> 01:25.533 I did that, I submitted it 01:25.533 --> 01:27.580 to the Secretary of Defense in writing. 01:27.580 --> 01:30.830 And in short, what I said was, 01:30.830 --> 01:33.170 that this reprogramming of $3.8 billion 01:34.320 --> 01:37.860 was not a significant, immediate, 01:37.860 --> 01:42.680 strategic negative impact to the overall defense 01:42.680 --> 01:44.760 of the United States of America. 01:44.760 --> 01:48.510 Those are precisely selected words. 01:48.510 --> 01:50.850 So, strategic, and overall. 01:50.850 --> 01:54.050 It's a half of 1% of the overall budget, 01:54.050 --> 01:57.460 so I can't, in conscience, say that it's significant, 01:57.460 --> 01:59.580 it's immediate, it's gonna, the sky's falling, 01:59.580 --> 02:01.820 it's gonna be a dramatic detriment 02:01.820 --> 02:04.050 in the preparedness of the US Military to defend ourselves. 02:04.050 --> 02:06.100 We can defend the United States of America. 02:06.100 --> 02:07.390 So I had to do a risk assessment, 02:07.390 --> 02:09.940 I did that, and that's what I said. 02:09.940 --> 02:11.280 - Thank you General. 02:11.280 --> 02:13.130 Let's move on to the Army Fifth Corps 02:13.130 --> 02:14.470 Headquarters in Europe. 02:14.470 --> 02:15.640 And I'll start with Secretary Esper. 02:15.640 --> 02:16.473 I was really pleased to actually see 02:16.473 --> 02:18.220 that we reactivated the Fifth Corps 02:18.220 --> 02:20.050 and I understand it's focused on our interests 02:20.050 --> 02:22.190 and national security in Europe. 02:22.190 --> 02:26.170 And I think we all here applaud that, without a doubt. 02:26.170 --> 02:27.120 But then my question is, 02:27.120 --> 02:29.660 if Fifth Corps is European focused, 02:29.660 --> 02:33.400 why was the decision made for it to be based in Fort Knox? 02:33.400 --> 02:34.710 - I'd have to refer you to the Army 02:34.710 --> 02:36.220 for that answer, Mr. Gallego. 02:36.220 --> 02:37.850 I don't know why they chose Fort Knox 02:37.850 --> 02:39.670 as the basing location. 02:39.670 --> 02:40.530 - General Milley, I don't know if you have 02:40.530 --> 02:41.730 any insight into this? 02:41.730 --> 02:45.380 - Yeah, it's an Army, in the rule sets that we operate by, 02:45.380 --> 02:48.390 basing decision's a Service Secretary decision. 02:48.390 --> 02:50.073 But having said that, just a short while ago, 02:50.073 --> 02:52.940 then being the Chief of Staff of the Army, 02:52.940 --> 02:55.510 it was discussed, it's been out there for quite a while, 02:55.510 --> 02:56.910 the entire decision making process. 02:56.910 --> 02:57.993 The bottom line is, 02:59.188 --> 03:00.760 do you want a forward base permanent force 03:00.760 --> 03:01.780 or do you wanna rotate it through, 03:01.780 --> 03:03.250 and what's the needs of the Combatant Commander. 03:03.250 --> 03:06.341 And the consensus that the decisions were made 03:06.341 --> 03:09.380 with then Scaparrotti, now Walters, fully involved 03:09.380 --> 03:11.900 in the decision making, that it's best 03:11.900 --> 03:14.870 to have a CONUS base, continental US base, 03:14.870 --> 03:18.470 and rotate forward a small forward command post 03:18.470 --> 03:19.760 that can then move around 03:19.760 --> 03:21.530 to various countries within Europe, 03:21.530 --> 03:24.330 rather than be tied to a given base 03:24.330 --> 03:26.010 and have a big structure put in Europe. 03:26.010 --> 03:27.550 So that was the logic behind it 03:27.550 --> 03:29.310 and that's why we decided to base it 03:29.310 --> 03:32.320 in the United States and the Army decided Fort Knox. 03:32.320 --> 03:33.540 - General, thank you for that answer. 03:33.540 --> 03:37.100 Was there a cost-benefit analysis 03:37.100 --> 03:40.590 between having it in Europe or other places in Europe 03:40.590 --> 03:42.090 and here at CONUS? 03:42.090 --> 03:44.250 - Cost-benefit analysis, I would say yes. 03:44.250 --> 03:46.460 I'd have to check with Secretary McCarthy 03:46.460 --> 03:48.330 for a final analysis on that, but I would say yes 03:48.330 --> 03:50.020 because cost-benefit analysis 03:50.020 --> 03:53.280 is part of the process of basing decisions. 03:53.280 --> 03:55.430 Along with environmental impact statements 03:55.430 --> 03:56.263 and all kinds of other things. 03:56.263 --> 03:57.480 There's an entire checklist 03:57.480 --> 03:58.760 of requirements you have to do 03:58.760 --> 03:59.930 to do a basing decision, 03:59.930 --> 04:02.219 and cost-benefit analysis is part of that. 04:02.219 --> 04:04.269 - And just to drill down a little deeper, 04:05.130 --> 04:07.430 when doing a cost-benefit analysis 04:07.430 --> 04:11.140 between European headquarters and CONUS, 04:11.140 --> 04:16.140 there was a actual analysis of European potential sites, 04:17.690 --> 04:19.140 they weren't just automatically excluded 04:19.140 --> 04:21.650 from that cost-benefit analysis. 04:21.650 --> 04:24.210 - I can't answer that specifically. 04:24.210 --> 04:25.180 But I would tell ya, 04:25.180 --> 04:28.050 at a broader level and for several years, 04:28.050 --> 04:30.370 I have been an advocate within the Department of Defense 04:30.370 --> 04:34.290 on rotating forces forward and minimizing forward presence 04:34.290 --> 04:36.670 and permanent basing in foreign countries. 04:36.670 --> 04:37.910 There's reasons for that. 04:37.910 --> 04:41.100 Force protection is a key part of that, 04:41.100 --> 04:42.410 but also expense. 04:42.410 --> 04:44.560 It's very expensive to have us, 04:44.560 --> 04:46.940 US military with our families, et cetera, 04:46.940 --> 04:50.020 and DOD schools and commissaries and PXs and all that. 04:50.020 --> 04:53.370 And operationally, it's much more useful 04:53.370 --> 04:57.290 if the Combatant Commander can move forces around quickly 04:57.290 --> 04:59.320 without thinking about having to, 04:59.320 --> 05:00.980 well, I'm taking them away from their family 05:00.980 --> 05:02.270 for two or three weeks or whatever. 05:02.270 --> 05:05.130 If you deploy on a rotational basis, 05:05.130 --> 05:07.410 as a Soldier, Sailor, Airman, Marine, 05:07.410 --> 05:10.440 you're much more flexible if you are operating 05:10.440 --> 05:12.030 on a rotational basis. 05:12.030 --> 05:13.530 That's why the Army wants the brigades, 05:13.530 --> 05:16.350 for example, to rotate into Korea. 05:16.350 --> 05:18.120 So, I'm an advocate for-- 05:18.120 --> 05:19.690 - The General's time has expired. 05:19.690 --> 05:21.310 If you could just sum that up? 05:21.310 --> 05:23.353 - Yeah, an advocate of minimizing foreign presence, 05:23.353 --> 05:26.809 and I'm an advocate for rotating forces forward. 05:26.809 --> 05:29.158 - Thank you, General, thank you, Mr. Chair. 05:29.158 --> 05:30.408 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 05:32.800 --> 05:34.310 Necessarily blame this on you, 05:34.310 --> 05:36.560 but would appreciate your assistance with it. 05:37.440 --> 05:40.400 We received your testimony sometime around 05:40.400 --> 05:44.070 five p.m. yesterday afternoon, just shortly before that. 05:44.070 --> 05:46.150 I know that you have to submit your testimony, 05:46.150 --> 05:47.737 I believe, to OPM and then OPM has to approve it 05:47.737 --> 05:50.550 before it actually comes to committee staff. 05:50.550 --> 05:52.993 Obviously you, with your history, understand, 05:54.070 --> 05:57.470 when we receive it at five p.m. or thereabout 05:57.470 --> 06:02.350 and the hearing is the next morning at 10 a.m. 06:02.350 --> 06:04.803 that has become more commonplace than not, 06:06.050 --> 06:08.920 and would appreciate your help in having 06:10.110 --> 06:12.810 those reports submitted in a more timely manner. 06:12.810 --> 06:17.810 Some of us do, I think most of us personally read them 06:18.230 --> 06:20.480 and if not get the opportunity to personally read them, 06:20.480 --> 06:23.370 have somebody in our office 06:23.370 --> 06:24.620 point out the highlights of them. 06:24.620 --> 06:26.060 - Well, I wasn't aware of that, so that's, 06:26.060 --> 06:28.260 we do wanna get it to you on time, for sure. 06:29.700 --> 06:32.943 - General Milley, you mentioned the F-35 versus the A-10. 06:34.660 --> 06:39.660 My understanding is that a report was due at the end of 2019 06:39.760 --> 06:42.360 from the Operational Test and Evaluation Office, 06:42.360 --> 06:44.600 a comparison between the F-35 and the A-10 06:44.600 --> 06:47.030 on the close air support mission. 06:47.030 --> 06:48.743 Has that report been completed? 06:49.750 --> 06:50.950 - I honestly don't know. 06:52.200 --> 06:54.700 I can give you a comparison from my own personal experience 06:54.700 --> 06:57.198 having not called in close air support 06:57.198 --> 07:00.760 from an F-35, but on an A-10. 07:00.760 --> 07:02.870 A10's a great weapon system too. 07:02.870 --> 07:04.950 So, when it comes to close air support, 07:04.950 --> 07:06.670 we on the ground, we really don't care 07:06.670 --> 07:09.100 where that bomb comes from as long as it shows up. 07:09.100 --> 07:12.440 And all of these weapons systems are very, very effective. 07:12.440 --> 07:15.290 The A-10 has proven extraordinarily effective 07:15.290 --> 07:17.300 in Afghanistan and Iraq. 07:17.300 --> 07:19.830 But the F-35 is your next generation, 07:19.830 --> 07:22.160 you start looking at great power competition, 07:22.160 --> 07:23.710 it's the F-35. 07:23.710 --> 07:25.760 - Absolutely, but from a close air support mission, 07:25.760 --> 07:27.790 the F-35, depending on which variant, 07:27.790 --> 07:32.220 has between 182 and 220 round of ammunition. 07:32.220 --> 07:33.053 - [General Milley] Roger that. 07:33.053 --> 07:38.053 - And that is, in prior National Defense Authorizations Acts 07:38.570 --> 07:39.950 and appropriation measures, 07:39.950 --> 07:44.440 we have prohibited the drawing down of the A-10 07:44.440 --> 07:49.440 until the DOD could convince this body, 07:49.610 --> 07:51.740 the legislative branch of the government, 07:51.740 --> 07:54.820 that the F-35 was capable of handling 07:54.820 --> 07:57.130 the close air support mission. 07:57.130 --> 07:59.360 And yet, the one thing that is not mentioned 07:59.360 --> 08:00.680 in either of your testimonies 08:00.680 --> 08:02.140 is the fact that you have proposed 08:02.140 --> 08:05.880 to draw down 44 of the current A-10s 08:06.978 --> 08:08.260 that are in the inventory. 08:08.260 --> 08:09.537 And so that is-- 08:11.880 --> 08:15.150 - I don't wanna, decisions like that 08:15.150 --> 08:16.186 are that are Secretary's decisions, 08:16.186 --> 08:17.810 so I'm not gonna get into the Secretary's, 08:17.810 --> 08:20.113 but from an advice standpoint, 08:21.360 --> 08:23.370 there's a fundamental issue at stake here. 08:23.370 --> 08:27.060 Which is, and it's coming up in a lot of areas, 08:27.060 --> 08:32.060 whether it's tankers and maritime and ships, whatever it is, 08:32.297 --> 08:35.100 it's a question of divest to invest. 08:35.100 --> 08:38.322 We are at a pivot point, in my opinion, 08:38.322 --> 08:41.060 my military assessment is we're at a pivot point 08:41.060 --> 08:43.407 relative to the changing character of war 08:43.407 --> 08:44.840 and the geopolitical landscape 08:44.840 --> 08:46.700 that's occurring in the world today. 08:46.700 --> 08:49.020 And we've gotta make some fundamental choices 08:49.020 --> 08:51.060 and to lay down the markers 08:51.060 --> 08:53.060 for what that future military's gonna look like 08:53.060 --> 08:56.570 five, 10 years, and if we don't make those hard choices, 08:56.570 --> 08:59.620 then we're gonna be in the short end of the stick 08:59.620 --> 09:00.770 here 10 years from now. 09:02.220 --> 09:03.310 - If I could, General Milley, 09:03.310 --> 09:07.760 war is a decision between the bad and the worse. 09:07.760 --> 09:09.570 And budgets are decisions between 09:09.570 --> 09:11.760 the needs and the needs more. 09:11.760 --> 09:13.550 My concern with what I see from the department 09:13.550 --> 09:15.150 is sometimes we give up a weapon system 09:15.150 --> 09:16.760 that is extremely efficient to operate 09:16.760 --> 09:19.220 and extremely effective, in the hopes 09:19.220 --> 09:20.560 that we're gonna have one that's better 09:20.560 --> 09:22.370 at some point in the future. 09:22.370 --> 09:23.830 And in the private sector, 09:23.830 --> 09:25.800 nobody would give up the system that works 09:25.800 --> 09:29.730 until the replacement system had proven itself 09:29.730 --> 09:31.440 both capable and efficient. 09:31.440 --> 09:32.480 And I know, Secretary Esper, 09:32.480 --> 09:34.030 you were about to make your statement. 09:34.030 --> 09:35.500 - Just, I know, 'cause you're short on time, 09:35.500 --> 09:37.950 Just like the Navy did with older ships, 09:37.950 --> 09:39.690 what the Air Force is trying to do 09:39.690 --> 09:41.360 is retire a number of aircraft. 09:41.360 --> 09:43.360 It's not just some A-10s, 09:43.360 --> 09:47.370 but it's tankers and B-1s and F-15s. 09:47.370 --> 09:49.210 What they're trying to do is retire older aircraft 09:49.210 --> 09:52.570 that cost more to maintain and operate than they do. 09:52.570 --> 09:54.761 So I don't think what the Air Force is doing, 09:54.761 --> 09:56.610 was not a statement about the A-10. 09:56.610 --> 09:59.656 It was a statement about, just retiring legacy aircraft, 09:59.656 --> 10:01.207 some legacy aircraft-- - I'm down about 30 seconds. 10:01.207 --> 10:03.600 And I wanna say this, ABMS and JSTARS 10:03.600 --> 10:05.649 there at Robins Air Force Base, 10:05.649 --> 10:07.550 I think it was a premature decision to cancel 10:07.550 --> 10:10.320 the recap of the JSTARS fleet. 10:10.320 --> 10:12.320 I think if you could've bought a new platform 10:12.320 --> 10:14.420 that was a better platform, 10:14.420 --> 10:16.410 that would've served its purpose long into the future 10:16.410 --> 10:17.910 cheaper than you can maintain 10:17.910 --> 10:21.150 the existing fleet of JSTARS as time goes on. 10:21.150 --> 10:24.260 I'm concerned about an article that I read, 10:24.260 --> 10:27.597 this is the article, "ABMS Can't be the Sole Solution 10:27.597 --> 10:30.440 "for Joint C2, Army tells Air Force". 10:30.440 --> 10:33.130 There are three generals quoted in that article, 10:33.130 --> 10:35.150 Generally Wesley, General Gallagher, 10:35.150 --> 10:36.540 and General Bassett, I believe, 10:36.540 --> 10:39.240 were quoted in that article expressing their concerns 10:39.240 --> 10:44.240 about the ABMS platform not being able 10:44.410 --> 10:46.603 to deliver for the ground troops. 10:47.620 --> 10:49.398 - [Chairman] The gentleman's time has expired, I apologize. 10:49.398 --> 10:52.052 And I think your point has been made. 10:52.052 --> 10:53.280 That'd be great, yes. 10:53.280 --> 10:54.380 - [General Milley] I'm heading out to take a hard look 10:54.380 --> 10:55.908 at exactly what you're talking about. 10:55.908 --> 10:59.640 - That's an ongoing discussion, we'd love to get an answer. 10:59.640 --> 11:00.473 Mr. Moulton. 11:00.473 --> 11:01.860 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 11:01.860 --> 11:03.450 Mr. Chairman, I could not agree more 11:03.450 --> 11:05.490 with your statement that we are at a pivot point 11:05.490 --> 11:06.560 where we have to modernize 11:06.560 --> 11:08.340 our approach to national security. 11:08.340 --> 11:10.080 Do you believe in a whole-of-government 11:10.080 --> 11:11.400 approach to national security? 11:11.400 --> 11:13.810 - [General Milley] 110%, yes. 11:13.810 --> 11:15.590 - Secretary Mattis has said before Congress 11:15.590 --> 11:18.007 that "If you don't fund the State Department fully, 11:18.007 --> 11:20.962 "then I need to buy more ammunition." 11:20.962 --> 11:21.960 Do you agree with that, Secretary Esper, 11:21.960 --> 11:23.190 do you agree with that statement? 11:23.190 --> 11:24.820 - I do, I think we need to fund the interagency, 11:24.820 --> 11:26.700 particularly in places like Africa 11:26.700 --> 11:29.420 where the interagency brings a lot to the game. 11:29.420 --> 11:31.370 - Great, 'cause that's actually where I'm going. 11:31.370 --> 11:33.187 To quote again from Secretary Mattis, 11:33.187 --> 11:34.637 "What you have to do, is you have to make certain 11:34.637 --> 11:35.907 "that your foreign policy is lead 11:35.907 --> 11:38.240 "by the diplomat, not by the military." 11:38.240 --> 11:40.180 Do you agree with that statement? 11:40.180 --> 11:41.013 - [Secretary Esper] I agree. 11:41.013 --> 11:43.080 - So, Mr. Secretary, what is the State Department's opinion 11:43.080 --> 11:44.880 on the blank slate review in Africa? 11:46.140 --> 11:46.973 - They support it. 11:46.973 --> 11:49.720 I've had a number on conversations with Secretary Pompeo 11:49.720 --> 11:52.523 with regard to the process I'm going through. 11:53.530 --> 11:54.760 My aim is to-- 11:54.760 --> 11:57.930 - That's illuminating because I was just in east Africa 11:57.930 --> 12:00.230 and literally every single military officer 12:00.230 --> 12:02.320 and State Department official I spoke to 12:03.510 --> 12:05.700 on the ground, said that we should both 12:05.700 --> 12:08.330 increase State Department and DOD funding 12:08.330 --> 12:10.050 and effort for AFRICOM. 12:10.050 --> 12:12.960 But your blank slate review is not really a blank slate 12:12.960 --> 12:14.770 because the only options on the table 12:14.770 --> 12:17.960 are reducing our commitment to AFRICOM, isn't that correct? 12:17.960 --> 12:19.550 - That is not correct. 12:19.550 --> 12:21.990 In fact, I actually approved an increase recently 12:21.990 --> 12:24.180 for security forces at Manda Bay. 12:24.180 --> 12:27.280 So, we're looking at a variety of options. 12:27.280 --> 12:30.060 The predominantly ones are to make reductions right now-- 12:30.060 --> 12:31.500 - Okay, well there's a fundamental disagreement 12:31.500 --> 12:33.020 between you and the AFRICOM Commander, then. 12:33.020 --> 12:35.060 Because he briefed me that the only options 12:35.060 --> 12:36.140 were reducing the presence. 12:36.140 --> 12:38.290 - They are predominantly to reduce presence, 12:38.290 --> 12:41.470 but if they have a proposal to increase, 12:41.470 --> 12:42.350 I would look at anything. 12:42.350 --> 12:43.870 But it is a blank slate review, 12:43.870 --> 12:47.180 and I can't speak to what State Department is doing 12:47.180 --> 12:49.690 with regard to how they look at the situation-- 12:49.690 --> 12:51.380 - Well the State Department people on the ground 12:51.380 --> 12:52.390 said they haven't even been asked. 12:52.390 --> 12:55.860 So you might suggest that Secretary Pompeo 12:55.860 --> 12:58.280 actually ask his people on the ground what they think. 12:58.280 --> 13:02.980 I do know that in 2018, President Xi announced 13:02.980 --> 13:05.680 that China will be providing $60 billion 13:05.680 --> 13:07.100 in financial support to Africa. 13:07.100 --> 13:08.740 China now has surpassed the US 13:08.740 --> 13:10.430 as Africa's largest trading partner. 13:10.430 --> 13:11.710 They have troops on the ground 13:11.710 --> 13:14.420 in Africa for the first time ever. 13:14.420 --> 13:17.020 So we've got a rising threat from China 13:17.020 --> 13:19.633 to meet right on the ground in Africa. 13:20.690 --> 13:22.070 - Well this is what I'm trying to look at, 13:22.070 --> 13:24.080 is make sure we're properly positioned 13:24.080 --> 13:26.610 and rightsized to deal with great power competition. 13:26.610 --> 13:28.300 My senses right now were focused 13:28.300 --> 13:30.360 maybe too much on counter-terrorism. 13:30.360 --> 13:32.660 So I wanna get the balance right with regard to forces. 13:32.660 --> 13:35.380 On the other hand, it it not a purely military mission. 13:35.380 --> 13:37.930 It requires a whole-of-government approach. 13:37.930 --> 13:39.440 The third thing I'd say is, look, 13:39.440 --> 13:40.960 we can't play man to man defense 13:40.960 --> 13:42.410 with the Chinese and Russians in Africa. 13:42.410 --> 13:45.030 We have to be very thoughtful with regard to 13:45.030 --> 13:46.500 how we allocate our resources, 13:46.500 --> 13:47.910 whether it's the military, diplomats, 13:47.910 --> 13:49.580 whatever the case may be, otherwise we'll-- 13:49.580 --> 13:51.660 - [Moulton] Couldn't agree more. 13:51.660 --> 13:53.590 - I'll never be able to meet the demands imposed-- 13:53.590 --> 13:54.423 - Couldn't agree more. 13:54.423 --> 13:57.390 Mr. Secretary, Republican Mac Thornberry of Texas 13:57.390 --> 13:59.960 courageously asked if Congress's military budget 13:59.960 --> 14:02.110 next year would matter, or whether you and OMB 14:02.110 --> 14:03.900 would simply reprogram money for things 14:03.900 --> 14:06.010 like the border wall that the president wants and congress 14:06.010 --> 14:10.270 has not in our Constitutional authority, authorized. 14:10.270 --> 14:11.440 Now, you failed to answer the question. 14:11.440 --> 14:13.020 You simply said that you hope Congress 14:13.020 --> 14:15.430 and the administration will be partners. 14:15.430 --> 14:16.960 Mr. Secretary, does the word partners 14:16.960 --> 14:19.837 occur in the Constitution, describing Congress 14:19.837 --> 14:21.837 and the committee's budgetary authority? 14:23.050 --> 14:24.380 - Not that I'm aware of, Congressman. 14:24.380 --> 14:25.760 - Mr. Secretary, after you were nominated 14:25.760 --> 14:27.560 to be Secretary of Defense 14:27.560 --> 14:28.930 of the greatest military in the world, 14:28.930 --> 14:30.820 I was pleased to see a smart 14:30.820 --> 14:33.490 and accomplished professional in national security. 14:33.490 --> 14:35.070 A fellow infantry officer, 14:35.070 --> 14:36.510 and someone who I have worked with 14:36.510 --> 14:38.310 personally on a number of issues, 14:38.310 --> 14:41.070 selected to succeed Secretary Mattis. 14:41.070 --> 14:43.590 And if you remember, I addressed one pointed question 14:43.590 --> 14:46.160 to you which is this, I said, Secretary Mattis 14:46.160 --> 14:48.830 left big shoes to fill and the single most important thing 14:48.830 --> 14:50.800 that he did in your position, 14:50.800 --> 14:53.800 was he was willing to stand up to the president. 14:53.800 --> 14:57.130 To disagree with Donald Trump when he proposed doing things 14:57.130 --> 14:58.770 against the national security interests 14:58.770 --> 15:01.900 of the United States and our troops. 15:01.900 --> 15:03.620 Now look, we all know that Trump, 15:03.620 --> 15:06.100 a draft-dodger in great contrast to yourself, 15:06.100 --> 15:08.710 and the Chairman who have served out country for decades, 15:08.710 --> 15:11.010 has often done things that are in his own personal 15:11.010 --> 15:12.330 or political interests, 15:12.330 --> 15:13.820 against the national security interests 15:13.820 --> 15:16.430 of the United States or the wellbeing of our troops. 15:16.430 --> 15:18.960 Mr. Secretary, have you been willing 15:18.960 --> 15:23.630 to not just disagree, but stand up to the president? 15:23.630 --> 15:25.850 - I'm not gonna speak to my personal conversations 15:25.850 --> 15:27.083 with the president, but I can assure you 15:27.083 --> 15:30.800 that the president welcomes dissenting views, 15:30.800 --> 15:32.740 opposing views, because what he seeks 15:32.740 --> 15:35.810 from his advisors is a wide range of opinions 15:35.810 --> 15:37.498 that can help him make the best choices. 15:37.498 --> 15:38.900 - Mr. Secretary, when you took this job 15:38.900 --> 15:40.290 did you take an oath the the president 15:40.290 --> 15:41.150 or to the Constitution? 15:41.150 --> 15:42.350 - Constitution of the United States. 15:42.350 --> 15:43.860 I've taken that oath multiple times 15:43.860 --> 15:45.883 over my 40 years of professional life. 15:48.560 --> 15:50.840 - It must be very difficult to reconcile 15:50.840 --> 15:53.150 having lived with the West Point Honor Code 15:53.150 --> 15:56.097 that "no cadet shall lie, cheat, or steal, 15:56.097 --> 15:59.080 "or tolerate those that do", 15:59.080 --> 16:01.980 when working for this president. 16:01.980 --> 16:03.150 Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 16:03.150 --> 16:04.874 - [Chairman] Thank you. 16:04.874 --> 16:05.763 Miss Stefanik? 16:06.740 --> 16:08.500 - Mr. Chairman, I just wanna take a moment 16:08.500 --> 16:10.737 to remind members of the rules of the committee 16:10.737 --> 16:12.860 and the rules of the House, 16:12.860 --> 16:17.010 given the questions asked by Mr. Moulton, 16:17.010 --> 16:20.260 denigrating the president. 16:20.260 --> 16:22.830 But, moving on, I wanna focus my questions 16:22.830 --> 16:24.940 on missile defense. 16:24.940 --> 16:26.860 As both you, Secretary Esper, 16:26.860 --> 16:28.003 and you, Chairman Milley, are aware, 16:28.003 --> 16:31.350 accordinig to the 2019 Missile Defense Review, 16:31.350 --> 16:34.700 it states that building a new GBI interceptor site 16:34.700 --> 16:36.610 in the continental United States 16:36.610 --> 16:38.410 would add interceptor capabilities 16:38.410 --> 16:39.940 against the potential expansion 16:39.940 --> 16:41.620 of missile threats to the homeland, 16:41.620 --> 16:44.930 including a future Iranian ICBM capability. 16:44.930 --> 16:47.320 The decision to do so in site selection 16:47.320 --> 16:50.220 will be informed by pertinent factors at the time, 16:50.220 --> 16:53.010 particularly emerging threat conditions. 16:53.010 --> 16:55.430 So my question is, knowing that we are facing 16:55.430 --> 16:57.490 emerging threats, whether it's Iran 16:57.490 --> 17:01.600 not abiding by the Iranian restrictions in the JCPOA, 17:01.600 --> 17:04.220 the ongoing status of North Korea, 17:04.220 --> 17:06.860 the cancellation of the redesigned kill vehicle, 17:06.860 --> 17:09.680 the 10 year delay with NGI, 17:09.680 --> 17:11.470 these are all pertinent factors 17:11.470 --> 17:13.700 when it comes to our assessment of emerging threats 17:13.700 --> 17:15.730 and the conditions that we're facing. 17:15.730 --> 17:18.170 Would this prompt an operational requirement, 17:18.170 --> 17:19.420 from your perspective, 17:19.420 --> 17:22.040 for a third CONUS interceptor site? 17:24.100 --> 17:25.320 - Congresswoman, what I'd like to do 17:25.320 --> 17:28.520 is take that back to actually my staff, 17:28.520 --> 17:30.950 both military and uniform, to get their assessment. 17:30.950 --> 17:32.730 Obviously, it has to be threat-driven. 17:32.730 --> 17:34.060 Many of the studies have been conducted 17:34.060 --> 17:36.450 so far on some of the sites. 17:36.450 --> 17:38.320 But it is threat-driven. 17:38.320 --> 17:41.291 It probably warrants an update to find out 17:41.291 --> 17:42.960 as things, circumstances have changed 17:42.960 --> 17:45.450 on the ground with regard to Iran in particular, 17:45.450 --> 17:48.920 does it warrant a re-look or an updated assessment. 17:48.920 --> 17:51.560 - And, Chairman Milley, I would like your assessment 17:51.560 --> 17:54.010 of the threats as you look to the future 17:54.010 --> 17:55.123 for missile defense. 17:56.000 --> 17:56.990 - Basically the same thing. 17:56.990 --> 17:58.540 Right now it's a little bit too early to tell 17:58.540 --> 18:00.500 with respect to Iran, as to whether 18:00.500 --> 18:02.920 the need is there yet or not. 18:02.920 --> 18:05.173 Because we do know that as of today, 18:06.114 --> 18:07.760 an intercontinental ballistic missile 18:07.760 --> 18:09.030 capable of carrying a nuclear weapon 18:09.030 --> 18:11.720 has not been fully developed and tested by Iran. 18:11.720 --> 18:13.720 But, we don't know what the future's gonna hold. 18:13.720 --> 18:18.720 So, it's something that we're under constant evaluation on, 18:18.781 --> 18:20.190 specifically what you're talking about, 18:20.190 --> 18:25.190 is a missile defense, an array of layered defenses 18:25.190 --> 18:28.120 like we have in the Pacific, also on the east coast. 18:28.120 --> 18:29.270 But we're taking a hard look at it 18:29.270 --> 18:31.460 and the decisions are not yet made, 18:31.460 --> 18:32.440 but we owe the studies back 18:32.440 --> 18:34.083 to the Secretary of Defense for a decision. 18:34.083 --> 18:36.540 - So, as you know, Mr. Secretary, 18:36.540 --> 18:38.990 Fort Drum was selected as the preferred location 18:38.990 --> 18:41.400 for an east coast missile defense capability. 18:41.400 --> 18:46.293 In the 2019 MDR it directs 12 follow on studies 18:46.293 --> 18:48.430 that should be conducted for missile defense 18:48.430 --> 18:50.910 to include the necessity of an east coast site. 18:50.910 --> 18:52.550 Is that study complete? 18:52.550 --> 18:54.480 Are you able to share the results of that study? 18:54.480 --> 18:57.200 If not, when can we expect those results? 18:57.200 --> 18:59.320 - Yeah, those are great questions, I don't have the answer. 18:59.320 --> 19:01.509 Let me take that back and get back to you, Congresswoman. 19:01.509 --> 19:02.342 - Great. 19:02.342 --> 19:03.770 Really important for my district, 19:03.770 --> 19:07.260 very important for our broader missile defense discussions. 19:07.260 --> 19:12.260 Shifting gears, I wanted to ask about Coronavirus. 19:12.290 --> 19:14.960 Last night, US forces, Korea confirmed 19:14.960 --> 19:18.570 the first case of a Soldier with Coronavirus. 19:18.570 --> 19:22.550 And giving the metastization that we're seeing 19:22.550 --> 19:26.770 within CENTCOM and EUCOM and around the world, 19:26.770 --> 19:29.450 whether it's in Italy, whether it's in the Middle East, 19:29.450 --> 19:32.620 how is DOD addressing this? 19:32.620 --> 19:34.630 And particularly, what is your perspective 19:34.630 --> 19:37.670 on the potential impact for our joint training exercises 19:37.670 --> 19:39.600 and our overall readiness? 19:39.600 --> 19:42.900 - Sure, so first of all, the commands have, 19:42.900 --> 19:44.600 many of the commands have established plans 19:44.600 --> 19:45.920 for dealing with things like this. 19:45.920 --> 19:47.790 I'm sure the Chairman can speak to that. 19:47.790 --> 19:49.920 On the first of February as this emerged 19:49.920 --> 19:52.120 coming out of China, I signed a campaign plan 19:52.120 --> 19:53.560 that directed NORTHCOM to integrate 19:53.560 --> 19:56.650 all of our operations with regard to the Coronavirus. 19:56.650 --> 19:57.777 The Commander, General O'Shaughnessy 19:57.777 --> 20:00.410 has been implementing that, we meet daily. 20:00.410 --> 20:02.350 My team on a basis. 20:02.350 --> 20:04.780 There's also an interagency team working this. 20:04.780 --> 20:08.680 Between him and OSD staff personnel and readiness, 20:08.680 --> 20:10.700 we've issued a variety of memorandums 20:10.700 --> 20:14.110 advising the force on how to deal with the Coronavirus. 20:14.110 --> 20:15.750 The tools are in their tool kit. 20:15.750 --> 20:18.910 We continue to respond to requests for information. 20:18.910 --> 20:21.180 I've empowered the commanders in this case, 20:21.180 --> 20:23.520 INDOPACOM, I met with Admiral Davidson yesterday, 20:23.520 --> 20:26.040 but I get frequent updates from General Abrams 20:26.040 --> 20:28.590 on the peninsula in regard to what's happening in Korea. 20:28.590 --> 20:30.040 But we're taking a look at all of this. 20:30.040 --> 20:33.030 My first priority is protection of our people, 20:33.030 --> 20:34.710 both servicemembers and families, 20:34.710 --> 20:36.060 and then make sure we protect 20:36.060 --> 20:38.620 our ability to accomplish our mission. 20:38.620 --> 20:40.270 So those are the two priorities for me, 20:40.270 --> 20:41.103 and then third, I wanna make sure 20:41.103 --> 20:42.710 that we can support the interagency 20:42.710 --> 20:43.897 as they need support from DOD 20:43.897 --> 20:45.910 and what we bring to the table. 20:45.910 --> 20:48.700 - And with respect to exercises we're taking a look at, 20:48.700 --> 20:50.890 specifically, as you know the center of gravity 20:50.890 --> 20:52.540 of the thing is in China, 20:52.540 --> 20:55.347 but South Korea, Japan, some other countries, 20:55.347 --> 20:58.730 Italy, in fact, in Europe, are the next countries 20:58.730 --> 21:00.410 that have the highest number of infected cases. 21:00.410 --> 21:03.020 So we're taking a hard look at that with the joint exercises 21:03.020 --> 21:06.130 with the Republic of Korea Army that are coming up 21:06.130 --> 21:09.190 and whether or not they continue, postpone, or modified. 21:09.190 --> 21:10.560 We're waiting for the final recommendations from 21:10.560 --> 21:13.280 General Abrams and the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff 21:13.280 --> 21:15.983 of the ROK Army, General Park, to see what those are. 21:16.970 --> 21:19.320 More broadly, though, I wanna put some of this in context. 21:19.320 --> 21:20.617 Coronavirus is a very serious thing 21:20.617 --> 21:22.820 and we, the US military, and we, the Department of Defense, 21:22.820 --> 21:25.320 are taking all kinds of appropriate precautions. 21:25.320 --> 21:28.293 We've enacted one of our global pandemic OPLANS 21:28.293 --> 21:30.510 that work this, and that's what he was talking about 21:30.510 --> 21:31.687 with O'Shaughnessy, et cetra. 21:31.687 --> 21:33.940 But we also need to keep it in context as well, this-- 21:33.940 --> 21:36.370 - [Chairman Smith] And, I do apologize, Mr. Chairman, 21:36.370 --> 21:37.520 the General's time has expired. 21:37.520 --> 21:38.353 I think that's-- 21:38.353 --> 21:39.997 - That's the way it'll be for the record, ma'am. 21:39.997 --> 21:40.841 - Thanks. 21:40.841 --> 21:41.674 - [Chairman Smith] Mr. Carbajal. 21:41.674 --> 21:43.700 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 21:43.700 --> 21:45.910 Secretary Esper, the president's budget 21:45.910 --> 21:49.170 requests funding to begin phase one 21:49.170 --> 21:52.640 for the W93 nuclear warhead 21:52.640 --> 21:55.060 however, as late as August 2019 21:55.060 --> 21:59.293 the NNSA referred to a "next Navy warhead" 22:00.410 --> 22:01.770 but estimated that the weapon 22:01.770 --> 22:05.070 would not need funding until 2023. 22:05.070 --> 22:06.950 I have a three part question. 22:06.950 --> 22:10.340 Why has the timeline shifted forward by two years? 22:10.340 --> 22:13.080 Two, does the department plan to maintain 22:13.080 --> 22:15.830 the three other warheads in the submarine leg, 22:15.830 --> 22:20.830 the W761, the 762, and the W88 22:22.390 --> 22:24.540 if this warhead is developed? 22:24.540 --> 22:29.540 And three, the 761 life was extended only a few years ago 22:30.580 --> 22:33.930 and the W88 is about to enter production. 22:33.930 --> 22:35.970 Both will last a decade. 22:35.970 --> 22:36.973 Why the rush? 22:38.510 --> 22:39.780 - Congressman, I'd have to refer you 22:39.780 --> 22:41.510 to the NNSA on those questions. 22:41.510 --> 22:43.790 Maybe number two I can help on and get back to you, 22:43.790 --> 22:46.493 but certainly one and three are NNSA questions 22:46.493 --> 22:49.490 that I don't have the answer for you at this point in time. 22:49.490 --> 22:51.420 - [Carbajal] I'd appreciate your follow up. 22:51.420 --> 22:54.920 Well, too, let me continue with you, Secretary Esper. 22:54.920 --> 22:57.880 As we all know, New START is expected to expire 22:57.880 --> 23:01.520 in February of 2021, in just one year. 23:01.520 --> 23:03.930 What are the risks for allowing New START 23:03.930 --> 23:06.330 to expire without a replacement? 23:06.330 --> 23:08.330 Is negotiating an extension a priority 23:08.330 --> 23:10.683 for the administration this year? 23:12.400 --> 23:16.160 - The administration is, I have not yet met at my level yet 23:16.160 --> 23:19.030 with my counterparts to discuss the way forward. 23:19.030 --> 23:21.150 We hope to engage on that soon. 23:21.150 --> 23:22.680 Beyond that, there's nothing I can add 23:22.680 --> 23:24.173 to the question you've asked. 23:27.100 --> 23:28.360 - That's disconcerting. 23:28.360 --> 23:32.820 Well, let me continue with General Milley. 23:32.820 --> 23:36.860 The Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States 23:36.860 --> 23:40.610 and is a partner in our efforts to fight against terrorism. 23:40.610 --> 23:43.800 The US signed the Visiting Forces Agreement, VFA, 23:43.800 --> 23:46.980 and an enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement 23:48.290 --> 23:50.563 as a sign of our close defense partnership. 23:51.450 --> 23:52.700 With the government of the Philippines 23:52.700 --> 23:56.870 submitting a notice of termination of the VFA, 23:56.870 --> 24:00.030 have you been in contact with your counterpart to decide 24:00.030 --> 24:04.040 next steps in the US-Philippines defense relationship, 24:04.040 --> 24:06.600 and two, will this decision impact 24:06.600 --> 24:08.450 our freedom on navigation operations 24:08.450 --> 24:10.900 in the South China Sea? 24:10.900 --> 24:13.830 And three, how will the termination affect 24:13.830 --> 24:15.600 the Philippine government's ability 24:15.600 --> 24:18.513 to combat terrorist organizations? 24:19.990 --> 24:23.040 - We have concerns about the notification to terminate 24:23.040 --> 24:25.520 and it is a six month notification, 24:25.520 --> 24:27.240 so we've got six months to work it out. 24:27.240 --> 24:29.420 I have not yet personally called 24:29.420 --> 24:31.460 my counterpart on that notification. 24:31.460 --> 24:32.743 I do intend to do that, 24:33.800 --> 24:35.400 but I'm still working through the staff, 24:35.400 --> 24:38.210 exactly what our position's gonna be. 24:38.210 --> 24:41.150 If, if, it is implemented, and again, 24:41.150 --> 24:43.130 this is six month notification, 24:43.130 --> 24:44.990 if that is implemented, then yes, 24:44.990 --> 24:48.520 it would have a impact on US military force posture 24:48.520 --> 24:51.630 and our exercises, and a wide variety of other things. 24:51.630 --> 24:53.910 We want access basing, all fly rights, 24:53.910 --> 24:56.880 those sorts of things, relative to the South China Sea. 24:56.880 --> 24:57.713 Philippines is key, 24:57.713 --> 24:59.670 we've had a longstanding relationship with Philippines. 24:59.670 --> 25:02.700 We want to keep our Visiting Forces Agreement 25:02.700 --> 25:04.300 in place, if possible. 25:04.300 --> 25:06.080 That'll be a decision for the Philippine government, 25:06.080 --> 25:08.430 but we think it's an important thing for the mutual defense 25:08.430 --> 25:11.300 of both the Philippines and the United States. 25:11.300 --> 25:13.950 - Thank you, Mr. Chair, I yield back. 25:13.950 --> 25:16.160 - [Chairman Smith] Thank you. Mr. Kelly? 25:16.160 --> 25:18.140 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 25:18.140 --> 25:23.140 Secretary, and Chairman, I am, number one, just, 25:24.330 --> 25:27.110 I'm very concerned about security at our southern border. 25:27.110 --> 25:28.230 I always have been. 25:28.230 --> 25:29.430 Not just at our southern border, 25:29.430 --> 25:31.610 but all our borders, all our ports of entry, 25:31.610 --> 25:33.190 and our entire immigration policy 25:33.190 --> 25:35.830 to make sure that we're only letting folks 25:35.830 --> 25:38.150 who are friendly the the United States in. 25:38.150 --> 25:42.580 That being said, I think we risk a whole lot 25:42.580 --> 25:45.150 with the $3.8 billion reprogramming 25:46.050 --> 25:50.670 to fund a border wall without consulting with Congress. 25:50.670 --> 25:55.460 Now, at a minimum, I think it would be much easier, 25:55.460 --> 25:58.450 and that we would, for short term progress, 25:58.450 --> 26:01.250 if you at least discussed with the Chair and ranking member 26:01.250 --> 26:04.050 what we're gonna reprogram and how we're gonna reprogram, 26:04.050 --> 26:06.380 I think at a minimum if you discuss with those two, 26:06.380 --> 26:07.670 that would make that a whole lot 26:07.670 --> 26:09.990 more palatable to all of us. 26:09.990 --> 26:12.750 That being said, I'm supportive 26:12.750 --> 26:14.800 of the president's policy on the border, 26:14.800 --> 26:17.210 but we have to be careful about how we reprogram. 26:17.210 --> 26:19.790 Now, I wanna talk about the $3.8 billion. 26:19.790 --> 26:23.840 The National Guard is 40% of our combat forces, 26:23.840 --> 26:27.050 yet the cuts in the reprogramming of the $3.8 billion 26:27.050 --> 26:30.640 is $1 billion, or 30% of the total budget, 26:30.640 --> 26:31.790 comes out of the Guard. 26:32.850 --> 26:35.240 I think that is alarming to me. 26:35.240 --> 26:37.830 Because if we're relying on 40% of our force 26:37.830 --> 26:40.130 to be able to fight tomorrow, as General Milley 26:40.130 --> 26:41.451 has said over and over again, 26:41.451 --> 26:43.230 we gotta be able to fight tonight, 26:43.230 --> 26:45.040 we've gotta get those guys in the fight, 26:45.040 --> 26:47.670 and what we're doing is taking away 26:47.670 --> 26:49.890 the ability for them to keep pace 26:49.890 --> 26:54.290 with their active component counterparts with equipment. 26:54.290 --> 26:57.800 So, Secretary Esper and Chairman Milley, 26:57.800 --> 26:59.570 just please tell me that you are planning 26:59.570 --> 27:02.490 on making sure that our Guard and Reserve 27:02.490 --> 27:04.840 will continue to be an operational force 27:04.840 --> 27:06.533 with these cuts and future cuts. 27:08.150 --> 27:10.330 - Mr. Kelly, the Guard and Reserve are actually 27:10.330 --> 27:13.820 very important, critical components of the total force, 27:13.820 --> 27:16.150 whether it's Army or Air Force. 27:16.150 --> 27:17.530 Everywhere I travel around the world 27:17.530 --> 27:18.930 I see Guardsmen and Reservists 27:18.930 --> 27:21.610 standing shoulder to shoulder with active duty. 27:21.610 --> 27:23.270 The integration is seamless, 27:23.270 --> 27:25.400 their professionalism is exceptional, 27:25.400 --> 27:28.020 and so I think there is the commitment between, 27:28.020 --> 27:30.130 by me, I'm sure by the Chairman, he'll speak to it, 27:30.130 --> 27:32.048 and the services to make sure 27:32.048 --> 27:34.690 that the Guard and Reserve has the tools 27:34.690 --> 27:35.900 and equipment and everything they need 27:35.900 --> 27:38.163 to perform those important missions. 27:39.210 --> 27:40.043 - [Kelly] And Secretary, I just-- 27:40.043 --> 27:41.940 - [General Milley] You have my commitment as well. 27:41.940 --> 27:43.510 - Thank you, and I knew that, Chairman Milley, 27:43.510 --> 27:45.870 I knew that answer from both of you, I was hoping. 27:45.870 --> 27:47.500 The second part of that is, 27:47.500 --> 27:48.700 is we have the Futures Command, 27:48.700 --> 27:50.673 which I think is the absolute way 27:50.673 --> 27:54.730 that we need to start acquisition and it is a great program. 27:54.730 --> 27:57.550 And the development is, have been, 27:57.550 --> 27:59.930 we're doing great things in the Futures Command. 27:59.930 --> 28:01.360 What concerns me is, though, 28:01.360 --> 28:03.600 is when I see the patch chart for the fielding, 28:03.600 --> 28:06.200 there are no Guard and Reserve units in that fielding. 28:06.200 --> 28:08.890 I think we need to make sure that we don't field 28:08.890 --> 28:12.310 next generation stuff to the active component 28:12.310 --> 28:15.077 and then give the left behinds to the Guard and Reserve. 28:15.077 --> 28:16.380 And I hope that when we look at 28:16.380 --> 28:18.435 the fielding of those systems, that, 28:18.435 --> 28:20.097 and I don't think there's a proportionality thing there, 28:20.097 --> 28:22.330 I think it's the units that are going downrange 28:22.330 --> 28:23.580 to do the mission ought to be 28:23.580 --> 28:24.687 on the newest and best equipment 28:24.687 --> 28:26.660 the United States has to offer. 28:26.660 --> 28:28.580 Do you guys agree with that? 28:28.580 --> 28:30.250 - I do, I'm a little surprised. 28:30.250 --> 28:32.100 I know the last time we discussed this 28:32.100 --> 28:35.060 in our previous roles, and certainly General McConville 28:35.060 --> 28:37.320 and Secretary McCarthy agreed, 28:37.320 --> 28:40.170 I recall National Guard units 28:40.170 --> 28:42.160 being some of the early fielders 28:42.160 --> 28:44.010 of some of the equipment we were considering. 28:44.010 --> 28:45.700 So, I'll certainly take that back 28:45.700 --> 28:47.760 and have them follow up with you. 28:47.760 --> 28:48.990 - Thank you, and I may just have missed it. 28:48.990 --> 28:50.940 I just wanna make sure that they're on that. 28:50.940 --> 28:51.883 The second thing I wanna talk about 28:51.883 --> 28:54.960 is I just got back from Africa with Senator Inhofe 28:54.960 --> 28:56.980 and I can tell you, every African president, 28:56.980 --> 28:59.070 prime minister, that we met with while we were there, 28:59.070 --> 29:00.593 all the military and State Department folks 29:00.593 --> 29:02.700 that we met while we were there, 29:02.700 --> 29:05.280 we do not need to reduce the number of troops that we have. 29:05.280 --> 29:07.790 Is a great economy a force mission? 29:07.790 --> 29:10.490 I think we get great return for investment. 29:10.490 --> 29:12.700 I think we have some real threats, both terrorists 29:12.700 --> 29:16.170 and great power competition in that region, 29:16.170 --> 29:18.960 and I just think that we need to be judicious in making sure 29:18.960 --> 29:21.680 that we don't reduce the amount of troops there, 29:21.680 --> 29:23.100 we at least keep them the same 29:23.100 --> 29:25.243 or either invest a little more to make sure, 29:25.243 --> 29:27.430 because I think the return on investment is great. 29:27.430 --> 29:29.600 And the final thing that I'll say 29:29.600 --> 29:32.050 in my final 40 something seconds, 29:32.050 --> 29:34.930 is I hope that we will continue to stay committed 29:34.930 --> 29:38.850 and work with the State Department on the IMET programs. 29:38.850 --> 29:42.370 We are losing opportunities that we cannot regain 29:42.370 --> 29:44.920 for the next 30 years, when all of us 29:44.920 --> 29:46.780 will be long gone out of government. 29:46.780 --> 29:48.330 We need to make those relationship, 29:48.330 --> 29:49.540 and I use as a point in case, 29:49.540 --> 29:52.500 when I was in Iraq a week ago, 29:52.500 --> 29:57.500 the CHOD, I actually served with him in five in Iraq. 29:58.130 --> 30:00.220 That relationship matters. 30:00.220 --> 30:02.180 That familiarity matters. 30:02.180 --> 30:04.260 And so, I think we need to make sure 30:04.260 --> 30:06.010 we continue to invest in IMET 30:06.010 --> 30:08.849 and not be so quick to take them off the list, Secretary. 30:08.849 --> 30:09.682 - I completely agree. 30:09.682 --> 30:11.630 In the six seconds, I can tell you, 30:11.630 --> 30:14.400 during my time in uniform I participated in these programs, 30:14.400 --> 30:15.983 sponsored foreign students, you're absolutely correct. 30:15.983 --> 30:19.040 I think it's the best investment our country can make. 30:19.040 --> 30:21.730 I put 10% growth in the budget this year, 30:21.730 --> 30:25.130 I wanna get 50% growth by the end of the FYDP. 30:25.130 --> 30:27.150 We're gonna ask for legislative authority 30:27.150 --> 30:30.140 to expand it under DOD terms and not just state, 30:30.140 --> 30:32.170 so that we can actually then prioritize it 30:32.170 --> 30:34.020 and allocate it where we need it as well. 30:34.020 --> 30:36.180 But I think it's a great investment for our country, 30:36.180 --> 30:37.640 and the more we can do, the better. 30:37.640 --> 30:38.770 - [Chairman Smith] Thank you. 30:38.770 --> 30:39.990 Mr. Brown? 30:39.990 --> 30:40.840 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 30:40.840 --> 30:44.990 I want to focus my questions and comments on Africa. 30:44.990 --> 30:47.590 I am actually excited that not only 30:47.590 --> 30:51.290 did the Chairman raise Africa as an issue, 30:51.290 --> 30:54.760 but you see that there's bipartisan interest in Africa. 30:54.760 --> 30:57.300 It's probably the most we've talked about Africa 30:57.300 --> 30:59.820 outside of an AFRICOM posture hearing, 30:59.820 --> 31:01.720 of all the hearings that I've participated in 31:01.720 --> 31:03.080 in this committee. 31:03.080 --> 31:06.740 And before I say anything or ask a question, 31:06.740 --> 31:09.330 I do wanna highlight that Africa 31:09.330 --> 31:11.100 is not a monolithic continent 31:11.100 --> 31:12.580 and there's a diversity and variety 31:12.580 --> 31:15.303 of challenges and opportunities. 31:16.510 --> 31:20.440 So, I visited Africa, started in Stuttgart AFRICOM 31:20.440 --> 31:22.830 when General Townsend, soon after he took command, 31:22.830 --> 31:24.900 it was a bipartisan delegation. 31:24.900 --> 31:28.590 And I was very much interested in the comment 31:28.590 --> 31:30.900 that General Townsend made at the end of January, 31:30.900 --> 31:35.000 I think, before the Senate, and he said that at AFRICOM 31:35.000 --> 31:37.290 we recognize the strategic environment is changing 31:37.290 --> 31:39.200 and the joint force must orient the bulk 31:39.200 --> 31:42.010 of our efforts against China and Russia, 31:42.010 --> 31:44.680 even as we counter VEOs that threaten America. 31:44.680 --> 31:47.760 In Africa, the C-VEO fight is a key component 31:47.760 --> 31:49.660 of global power competition, 31:49.660 --> 31:52.590 as these efforts are not mutually exclusive. 31:52.590 --> 31:56.150 So, my question, we often, great power competition, 31:56.150 --> 31:57.740 China, we think Indo-Pacific. 31:57.740 --> 32:01.210 Great power competition, Russia, we think Europe. 32:01.210 --> 32:05.080 And I'd like you kinda describe for the committee, 32:05.080 --> 32:07.920 in as much detail as you can, 32:07.920 --> 32:10.160 what is great power competition 32:10.160 --> 32:12.670 with China and Russia, in Africa, 32:12.670 --> 32:17.630 and is there an intersection with the C-VEO effort or not? 32:17.630 --> 32:20.950 - It's a great question, 'cause this is the strategy, right? 32:20.950 --> 32:23.980 The great power competition is global with China and Russia, 32:23.980 --> 32:25.700 but we'll just focus on China. 32:25.700 --> 32:28.670 We see China busy in South America, 32:28.670 --> 32:30.410 and frankly, in every continent, we see-- 32:30.410 --> 32:32.090 - No, I wanna go right to Africa. 32:32.090 --> 32:33.370 Let's just stay right on Africa. 32:33.370 --> 32:35.540 - Completely agree, 'cause we see then in the arctic too. 32:35.540 --> 32:37.860 But in Africa you see them, in terms of, 32:37.860 --> 32:41.650 certain countries maybe trying to get port authorities, 32:41.650 --> 32:44.630 maybe access to critical materials, minerals, et cetera. 32:44.630 --> 32:47.070 So that is happening through, not all of Africa, 32:47.070 --> 32:48.690 but through many critical parts. 32:48.690 --> 32:50.270 Obviously they're in Djibouti. 32:50.270 --> 32:53.940 And so, as we look at the continent, all 53, 54 countries, 32:53.940 --> 32:56.240 we gotta ask ourselves, what's important to us 32:57.536 --> 33:00.120 and make sure we sustain that, if not improve that. 33:00.120 --> 33:02.840 And then, what are the Chinese going after and why, 33:02.840 --> 33:04.110 and understanding that. 33:04.110 --> 33:05.960 And it may or may not require a presence 33:05.960 --> 33:08.010 by either the military or state 33:08.010 --> 33:10.480 or USAID or whoever the case may be. 33:10.480 --> 33:15.020 - So, you, in response to a letter that I wrote 33:15.020 --> 33:18.400 along with 10 of my colleagues, a bipartisan letter, 33:18.400 --> 33:20.057 you did respond, I appreciate it. 33:20.057 --> 33:23.510 And you mentioned today about the SFAB substitution 33:23.510 --> 33:24.991 for the 101st Airborne. 33:24.991 --> 33:28.920 The Commander, Brigadier General Jackson, 33:28.920 --> 33:31.990 he commented recently that they're not gonna have 33:31.990 --> 33:35.041 the military structure like they had in Afghanistan 33:35.041 --> 33:39.110 and network of bases, supply chains readily available, 33:39.110 --> 33:41.650 helicopters and other lift. 33:41.650 --> 33:44.160 What are we doing to ensure that the SFAB 33:44.160 --> 33:47.503 has the infrastructure they need to do their job? 33:47.503 --> 33:48.715 What is that investment? 33:48.715 --> 33:52.210 - Obviously, two different theaters, Africa very austere. 33:52.210 --> 33:54.180 I might let the Chairman speak to this but 33:54.180 --> 33:55.260 we're not gonna put them out there 33:55.260 --> 33:56.500 without the means to do their job. 33:56.500 --> 33:58.130 They are, again, ideally suited, 33:58.130 --> 33:59.182 prepared, trained, organized, 33:59.182 --> 34:01.840 to do the train, advise and assist mission, 34:01.840 --> 34:02.980 and we'll make sure they have what they need 34:02.980 --> 34:03.910 to get the job done. 34:03.910 --> 34:04.870 - Yeah, I'd like to hear detail. 34:04.870 --> 34:07.330 'Cause I've been to Ouallam in west Niger, 34:07.330 --> 34:09.200 I've been to Diffa in east Niger, 34:09.200 --> 34:11.830 special operators do a great job out there 34:11.830 --> 34:13.590 in kinda sparse conditions. 34:13.590 --> 34:15.050 SFAB is a lot different. 34:15.050 --> 34:17.470 Can you please talk maybe in some detail, General Milley, 34:17.470 --> 34:20.300 how we're gonna support them with the infrastructure? 34:20.300 --> 34:23.190 - Yeah, so Steve Townsend, General Townsend, 34:23.190 --> 34:26.000 the Commander of AFRICOM is conducting a review, 34:26.000 --> 34:28.200 the blank slate review that everyone's talked about. 34:28.200 --> 34:30.610 Part of that is the infrastructure, 34:30.610 --> 34:33.640 to how is is gonna adjust the infrastructure 34:33.640 --> 34:35.360 based on the prioritization of the countries, 34:35.360 --> 34:37.310 based on the US national security interests. 34:37.310 --> 34:40.520 And the the SfAB will overlay on top of that, 34:40.520 --> 34:42.330 the soldiers from the SFAB. 34:42.330 --> 34:44.500 Just so we're clear, though, the SFAB 34:44.500 --> 34:47.450 is not special operations forces, 34:47.450 --> 34:51.910 however, they are trained and explicitly selected 34:51.910 --> 34:54.210 to be able to operate in exhibitionary manner 34:54.210 --> 34:56.460 in very austere environments. 34:56.460 --> 34:59.660 They knew that going in to it, the volunteered for that, 34:59.660 --> 35:04.010 and they are specifically trained or specifically prepared 35:04.010 --> 35:06.120 to train, advise, assist, coach, 35:06.120 --> 35:09.370 teach, mentor, and accompany indigenous forces 35:09.370 --> 35:11.320 in the conduct of their operations. 35:11.320 --> 35:14.540 So the SFABs conduct a foreign internal defense mission. 35:14.540 --> 35:16.600 That is their very narrow mission set. 35:16.600 --> 35:18.760 They don't do all the other special forces missions, 35:18.760 --> 35:20.140 but they are capable of operating 35:20.140 --> 35:21.050 in very austere environments. 35:21.050 --> 35:22.940 - So let me just use my last 20 seconds here 35:22.940 --> 35:23.950 making this comment. 35:23.950 --> 35:26.330 I completely understand, 35:26.330 --> 35:28.220 but General Jackson made those comments 35:28.220 --> 35:29.590 because he does have concerns 35:29.590 --> 35:31.370 about the infrastructure support, 35:31.370 --> 35:34.340 logistics support that he'll get while he's on the ground. 35:34.340 --> 35:39.330 And unlike what we demand in Korea and other places, 35:39.330 --> 35:41.760 we cannot ask African nations to foot the bill 35:41.760 --> 35:44.060 because they are broke. 35:44.060 --> 35:45.840 - Well the infrastructure for General Jackson 35:45.840 --> 35:48.163 and his guys is gonna be very austere. 35:49.170 --> 35:50.880 - [Chairman] Thank you very much. 35:50.880 --> 35:52.500 Mr. Gallagher? 35:52.500 --> 35:54.160 - Chairman Courtney, in talking about 35:54.160 --> 35:56.040 the shipbuilding plan, I thought, 35:56.040 --> 35:59.200 delivered an assessment that was tough but fair, 35:59.200 --> 36:01.910 and I think reflects bipartisan frustration 36:01.910 --> 36:05.380 about the different force structure assessments we've had, 36:05.380 --> 36:07.853 the lack of a shipbuilding plan in this case, 36:08.840 --> 36:10.510 and so I'd like to just clarify something, 36:10.510 --> 36:11.590 Mr. Secretary, that you said, 36:11.590 --> 36:14.730 you said in response, I believe to something he asked, 36:14.730 --> 36:18.450 that you had not yet seen the 30 year shipbuilding plan, 36:18.450 --> 36:20.800 you're awaiting it to be presented to you. 36:20.800 --> 36:21.640 Could you clarify that? 36:21.640 --> 36:23.980 Because there was a report yesterday from Breaking Defense, 36:23.980 --> 36:26.140 that you have been given the plan 36:26.140 --> 36:27.610 and have been reviewing it for two weeks, 36:27.610 --> 36:31.030 but are awaiting that plan versus potentially a plan 36:31.030 --> 36:33.010 that's coming from CAPE? 36:33.010 --> 36:34.930 And this is all just in the spirit of, 36:34.930 --> 36:38.190 we wanna see plan, we wanna get your vision 36:38.190 --> 36:41.143 for what the future fleet looks like and work with you. 36:41.990 --> 36:44.440 - I think there's confusion and a little bit misreporting. 36:44.440 --> 36:47.910 So I was briefed last Friday, a few days ago on the INFSA, 36:47.910 --> 36:50.050 which is the Integrated Naval Force Structure Assessment, 36:50.050 --> 36:52.410 that I had a lot of questions coming out of that. 36:52.410 --> 36:55.360 But that is not the 30 year shipbuilding plan. 36:55.360 --> 36:57.220 I asked again, the Navy, the other day, 36:57.220 --> 36:58.270 let's get it on my schedule, 36:58.270 --> 37:00.870 come tell me what your shipbuilding plan is. 37:00.870 --> 37:01.900 Break, break. 37:01.900 --> 37:02.960 What I've said what I want to do 37:02.960 --> 37:05.360 is to see what the Navy plan is, 37:05.360 --> 37:07.760 CAPE, my own internal think-tank, 37:07.760 --> 37:11.070 has a plan to get us the 355 plus, 37:11.070 --> 37:12.940 and there's some great work going on out there 37:12.940 --> 37:14.960 by the think-tanks and other places 37:14.960 --> 37:16.600 about what the future should look like 37:16.600 --> 37:20.440 to deal with, let's say China, in the year 2030 and beyond. 37:20.440 --> 37:22.210 And what I said is what I wanna do 37:22.210 --> 37:24.320 is get all these great ideas together, 37:24.320 --> 37:26.090 get some innovative thinking, 37:26.090 --> 37:30.110 and kind of level set the playing field 37:30.110 --> 37:31.810 and let's run these competing plans 37:31.810 --> 37:33.610 and to see which one really optimizes 37:33.610 --> 37:34.730 what we need for the future. 37:34.730 --> 37:36.480 The two things we don't have, however, right now, 37:36.480 --> 37:39.780 is an approved OP Plan, War Plan, from which to baseline, 37:39.780 --> 37:42.080 and we should have that in a few months, here. 37:42.080 --> 37:43.394 The other one's gonna take time. 37:43.394 --> 37:44.890 We can't wait for it, but it's gonna be 37:44.890 --> 37:46.700 the new Joint Warfighting Doctrine, 37:46.700 --> 37:48.230 because we fight as a joint force. 37:48.230 --> 37:49.870 We just don't fight as the Navy, 37:49.870 --> 37:51.820 or as the Air Force, or as the Marine Corps, 37:51.820 --> 37:52.787 we fight as a joint force. 37:52.787 --> 37:54.690 And I wanna make sure that, 37:54.690 --> 37:57.810 I recognize that we're beyond the date that it was due, 37:57.810 --> 38:00.270 but I wanna present to you a right plan, a good plan, 38:00.270 --> 38:01.810 and not just something that was 38:01.810 --> 38:03.490 generated up and delivered on time. 38:03.490 --> 38:04.410 I think we owe you that. 38:04.410 --> 38:06.530 The Marine Corps is doing some extraordinary thinking, 38:06.530 --> 38:09.190 the Commandant, and how he wants to reorganize his force, 38:09.190 --> 38:10.360 and I think we own you that. 38:10.360 --> 38:11.970 The Chairman, I'm gonna ask him to review it 38:11.970 --> 38:14.020 because he's my Senior Military Advisor, 38:14.020 --> 38:16.070 but then present to Congress what is really 38:16.070 --> 38:17.670 a well thought out, innovative, 38:17.670 --> 38:19.190 takes everything into consideration, 38:19.190 --> 38:22.060 to include surge sealift, 38:22.060 --> 38:23.367 but a different composition force. 38:23.367 --> 38:25.470 - So just so I understand in simplest terms, 38:25.470 --> 38:28.110 you have the Integrated Naval Force Structure Assessment, 38:28.110 --> 38:29.280 which you've been briefed on, 38:29.280 --> 38:32.430 but you are going to sort of balance that off against 38:32.430 --> 38:34.600 potentially an alternative analysis by CAPE, 38:34.600 --> 38:35.990 as well as some outside thinkers, 38:35.990 --> 38:38.070 come up with what you view to be 38:38.070 --> 38:39.920 the Force Structure Assessment, 38:39.920 --> 38:41.500 and that will be a source document 38:41.500 --> 38:42.440 for the 30 year shipbuilding plan? 38:42.440 --> 38:44.120 - Yeah, we actually kinda have four plans right now. 38:44.120 --> 38:46.038 You have the 21 Plan, you have the FYDP, 38:46.038 --> 38:48.250 you have the INSA, which is a 10 to 15 year plan, 38:48.250 --> 38:49.083 then you have the 30 year plan. 38:49.083 --> 38:50.620 And as we know, the further you go out, 38:50.620 --> 38:52.430 the less credible they become. 38:52.430 --> 38:53.263 But I wanna look at those. 38:53.263 --> 38:55.770 There's some questions with regard to the INFSA 38:55.770 --> 38:57.060 that I have that I'm concerned about. 38:57.060 --> 39:01.230 So, an assumption in the INFSA is that the OFRP works. 39:01.230 --> 39:03.060 The OFRP hasn't worked for years, 39:03.060 --> 39:05.420 so why should we assume that it will work in the future? 39:05.420 --> 39:07.010 So there are assumptions that I wanna go back 39:07.010 --> 39:09.560 and have discussions with the Navy about how do we make, 39:09.560 --> 39:11.410 and there are others, there's assumptions in there 39:11.410 --> 39:13.140 about ships and warfighting, 39:13.140 --> 39:14.230 that I wanna make sure we get right 39:14.230 --> 39:16.590 so when I present you the plan, 39:16.590 --> 39:18.680 it's defensible and I feel confident in it, 39:18.680 --> 39:20.313 and the Chairman feels confident in it 39:20.313 --> 39:22.840 that we think this is where we should be in the future. 39:22.840 --> 39:24.160 - Can you give us any, 39:24.160 --> 39:25.750 I know this is a very complicated process, 39:25.750 --> 39:28.040 could you give us any sort of notional timeline 39:28.040 --> 39:29.850 about when we can expect to be briefed on that? 39:29.850 --> 39:30.770 I know, it seemed that you were looking over 39:30.770 --> 39:32.070 at my colleague Miss Lori, 39:32.070 --> 39:33.626 and you've made comments in the past-- 39:33.626 --> 39:34.597 - [Secretary Esper] We've had a lot of conversations. 39:34.597 --> 39:35.430 - Oh, I know. 39:36.400 --> 39:37.780 You've made some comments about trying 39:37.780 --> 39:40.360 to bring Congress into that process. 39:40.360 --> 39:41.670 I think that's wise. 39:41.670 --> 39:42.860 - [Secretary Esper] I do, I wanna run it across-- 39:42.860 --> 39:44.740 - Particularly bringing Miss Lori into that process 39:44.740 --> 39:47.660 'cause she's smarter on this than most every other. 39:47.660 --> 39:48.980 - I'm pushing, I'm pushing, 39:48.980 --> 39:51.440 I've anointed the DEPSECDEF to run this. 39:51.440 --> 39:54.310 I want to move quickly in a matter of a few short months, 39:54.310 --> 39:55.760 I wanna find key points in there 39:55.760 --> 39:58.120 where we can invite interested members of Congress in 39:58.120 --> 40:00.040 to look at the process, what we're doing, 40:00.040 --> 40:03.130 does that make sense, does it pass the common sense test. 40:03.130 --> 40:04.897 And then at the end, we see what comes up. 40:04.897 --> 40:06.780 I'd also like, I think we should invite 40:06.780 --> 40:09.700 the Navy's future leadership into this process. 40:09.700 --> 40:12.200 Whether they're young Ensigns and Lieutenants 40:12.200 --> 40:14.490 or whatever the case may be, to help inform this, 40:14.490 --> 40:15.323 'cause they're gonna have to, 40:15.323 --> 40:17.030 this is the Navy they're gonna sail, 40:17.030 --> 40:18.350 that they're gonna fight. 40:18.350 --> 40:20.190 And I just wanna kinda open the lens up 40:20.190 --> 40:21.740 and get the best assessment from everybody 40:21.740 --> 40:23.890 to include inviting interested members in. 40:23.890 --> 40:25.800 - And just to close, I wanna commend 40:25.800 --> 40:28.470 what you had said earlier about just kind of 40:28.470 --> 40:30.670 your hunch about where the fleet needs to go 40:30.670 --> 40:32.720 in terms of smaller ships, 40:32.720 --> 40:36.550 experimenting with optionally-manned, unmanned ships. 40:36.550 --> 40:40.080 I think, if you can make a geopolitically informed, 40:40.080 --> 40:41.700 in other words, something that makes sense in terms 40:41.700 --> 40:43.610 of geography and international politics, 40:43.610 --> 40:45.680 case to this committee, 40:45.680 --> 40:47.030 I think you would find a lot of support. 40:47.030 --> 40:49.430 Notwithstanding the very real concerns 40:49.430 --> 40:51.800 that Chairman Courtney and others have articulated. 40:51.800 --> 40:52.633 - Thank you. 40:52.633 --> 40:54.210 That is my ambition, like I said there, 40:54.210 --> 40:57.270 I'm a big believer in attack subs, from what I've seen. 40:57.270 --> 40:59.910 I think we need more than what has been there in the past. 40:59.910 --> 41:01.483 - [Chairman Smith] Thank you 41:01.483 --> 41:02.771 Mr. Khanna? 41:02.771 --> 41:03.604 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 41:03.604 --> 41:06.800 Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General, for your service. 41:06.800 --> 41:09.490 As you know, Mr. Secretary, we were in Muich 41:09.490 --> 41:11.620 with the delegation with Speaker Pelosi 41:11.620 --> 41:14.430 and the delegation was unified in echoing the message 41:14.430 --> 41:18.310 that European countries shouldn't be using Huawei. 41:18.310 --> 41:19.810 One of the questions that came up 41:19.810 --> 41:21.970 from the former president of Estonia was, 41:21.970 --> 41:26.120 well if you're telling us not to use Huawei, 41:26.120 --> 41:28.370 what alternative are you providing? 41:28.370 --> 41:30.580 And as you know, there's been a report 41:30.580 --> 41:32.910 that suggests that one of the things 41:32.910 --> 41:34.640 the United States should be doing 41:34.640 --> 41:37.860 is allowing medium and low range spectrum 41:37.860 --> 41:41.340 to be used to develop an alternative. 41:41.340 --> 41:44.720 Just the high speed spectrum isn't sufficient. 41:44.720 --> 41:48.560 My question for you is, have you considered that? 41:48.560 --> 41:50.140 What do you think we need to do 41:50.140 --> 41:52.970 with either Nokia and Ericsson or other industry 41:52.970 --> 41:54.620 to help develop alternatives? 41:54.620 --> 41:56.210 And whether you'd be willing to come out 41:56.210 --> 41:59.180 to the Defense Innovation Unit in Silicon Valley 41:59.180 --> 42:02.090 and discuss some of these strategies? 42:02.090 --> 42:03.250 - Yes, I would like to come out. 42:03.250 --> 42:05.990 I'm actually trying to make a trip out to the west coast 42:05.990 --> 42:07.130 to speak to them and some others, 42:07.130 --> 42:09.460 so, yes, Congressman, for sure. 42:09.460 --> 42:11.610 We have a lot of great western companies, 42:11.610 --> 42:13.670 and I don't wanna exclude any Japanese, 42:13.670 --> 42:15.440 let's just say non-Chinese companies out there 42:15.440 --> 42:17.860 that I think provide great products. 42:17.860 --> 42:19.700 I'm very concerned about Huawei. 42:19.700 --> 42:23.193 I spoke about it publicly in Munich, as did the Speaker. 42:24.607 --> 42:26.970 DOD is investing hundreds of millions of dollars 42:26.970 --> 42:30.810 to set up prototypes at four of our bases around the country 42:30.810 --> 42:33.050 where we could invite companies in to test, 42:33.050 --> 42:35.070 'cause we would benefit from 5G. 42:35.070 --> 42:36.310 I'm conscious of the time, 42:36.310 --> 42:38.770 the last thing I would say on the 5G side 42:38.770 --> 42:41.667 is that a lot of US companies, at least, 42:41.667 --> 42:43.810 wanna got to the mid-band range. 42:43.810 --> 42:48.150 The mid-band range is between 3,100 and 3,550 megahertz. 42:48.150 --> 42:50.320 It's where we operate our air defense systems, 42:50.320 --> 42:53.030 whether it's AWACS, whether it's Navy Aegis, 42:53.030 --> 42:57.900 or Army and Marine Corps air defense systems. 42:57.900 --> 42:59.570 Private sector wants that. 42:59.570 --> 43:01.720 We need that, we're willing to share it. 43:01.720 --> 43:03.430 We think that's the way, is to share this, 43:03.430 --> 43:05.780 the technology is out there, I'm told, to do that. 43:05.780 --> 43:07.230 I think that's the best way to move forward 43:07.230 --> 43:09.010 so we can meet the economic priority 43:09.010 --> 43:10.530 with the national security priority. 43:10.530 --> 43:13.940 - Well that's encouraging to hear, I appreciate that. 43:13.940 --> 43:16.953 My next question concerns encryption. 43:17.850 --> 43:22.710 Your department has, understandably, and I think rightfully, 43:22.710 --> 43:25.000 talked about the importance of encryption. 43:25.000 --> 43:26.880 There's some people who are saying, 43:26.880 --> 43:28.880 well, let's have a backdoor. 43:28.880 --> 43:30.830 And I guess from a national security perspective, 43:30.830 --> 43:32.370 I really don't understand that. 43:32.370 --> 43:34.300 I mean, if you were to tell Apple 43:34.300 --> 43:37.590 to have a backdoor key to get in to every iPhone, 43:37.590 --> 43:39.180 would you really wanna risk 43:39.180 --> 43:41.570 having Apple have that technology 43:41.570 --> 43:44.250 that could be hacked by any employee or the Chinese, 43:44.250 --> 43:46.670 and then have access to every phone 43:46.670 --> 43:48.090 in this country or world? 43:48.090 --> 43:51.780 And so, it seems that the administration actually has 43:51.780 --> 43:53.530 different approaches to encryption. 43:58.090 --> 43:59.500 - What specific question can I answer? 43:59.500 --> 44:02.080 - So, your department has said 44:02.080 --> 44:04.810 encryption is really important to protect these phones. 44:04.810 --> 44:07.830 The Attorney General is saying, is asking Apple 44:07.830 --> 44:11.700 or some other companies to create a backdoor key. 44:11.700 --> 44:14.040 Now, a backdoor key, just to be clear, 44:14.040 --> 44:15.610 would be, Apple would have it, 44:15.610 --> 44:17.440 so basically any employee at Apple, 44:17.440 --> 44:19.030 if you create a backdoor key, 44:19.030 --> 44:21.350 would be able to break in to any phone 44:21.350 --> 44:23.860 and who knows who's working at Apple. 44:23.860 --> 44:25.980 I guess, I just would wonder whether 44:25.980 --> 44:27.100 you could be working with the Justice Department 44:27.100 --> 44:30.480 to look at the national security implications 44:30.480 --> 44:32.510 of having a backdoor to encryption. 44:32.510 --> 44:34.610 - Okay, I'm not completely fluent 44:34.610 --> 44:37.200 with what the Department of Justice's views 44:37.200 --> 44:38.610 on the law enforcement side of it. 44:38.610 --> 44:41.210 Clearly, for DOD, we need encryption 44:41.210 --> 44:44.320 to pass classified data, operational plans, et cetera, 44:44.320 --> 44:45.930 amongst ourselves and with allies and partners. 44:45.930 --> 44:48.000 So, I can take that back for you. 44:48.000 --> 44:51.283 - I appreciate that, and my final question is, 44:52.192 --> 44:53.890 while we were in Germany, one thing that struck me 44:53.890 --> 44:56.780 is that the Bundestag actually has to approve 44:56.780 --> 45:00.680 every increase in troops anywhere around the world. 45:00.680 --> 45:02.357 Now, obviously that's asking a lot 45:02.357 --> 45:04.810 for Congress to be able to do that, 45:04.810 --> 45:07.230 but is there a way Congress could be more involved 45:07.230 --> 45:10.160 in understanding exactly where our troops are 45:10.160 --> 45:13.490 and decisions about how many troops we're sending and why, 45:13.490 --> 45:15.610 and have input in that? 45:15.610 --> 45:17.840 - I think that is the, been the longstanding prerogative 45:17.840 --> 45:19.670 of the Commander-in-Chief, but I do know we have, 45:19.670 --> 45:20.730 I believe we have systems 45:20.730 --> 45:24.490 where we notify you of deployments. 45:24.490 --> 45:27.768 I'd have to check and see, but that's my understanding. 45:27.768 --> 45:30.990 - That would be great if we could even get a sense 45:30.990 --> 45:32.210 of where all we're deployed, 45:32.210 --> 45:34.733 and have some ability to have an input in that. 45:35.760 --> 45:37.150 Thank you. 45:37.150 --> 45:38.030 - [Chairman Smith] Thank you. 45:38.030 --> 45:39.150 Mr. Gates? 45:39.150 --> 45:40.050 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 45:40.050 --> 45:42.380 And Mr. Secretary I want to start by thanking you 45:42.380 --> 45:44.240 for your recent visit to my district 45:44.240 --> 45:47.010 after my constituents were attacked by a terrorist. 45:47.010 --> 45:48.750 You brought calm and comfort, 45:48.750 --> 45:51.720 and I have been very encouraged by our discussions 45:51.720 --> 45:53.790 that DOD is doing everything necessary 45:53.790 --> 45:55.750 to ensure that we have a productive, 45:55.750 --> 45:59.590 safe, working environment for our servicemembers 45:59.590 --> 46:02.160 and the servicemembers that we host from foreign countries. 46:02.160 --> 46:04.700 And so, I thank you for that great progress. 46:04.700 --> 46:08.540 I also wanna thank you for the development of this budget 46:08.540 --> 46:12.400 that seems to prioritize our near-peer adversaries. 46:12.400 --> 46:14.580 There are enhancements in research, 46:14.580 --> 46:17.060 development, test, and evaluation dollars. 46:17.060 --> 46:18.930 We're particularly proud of that mission 46:18.930 --> 46:20.260 at Eglin Air Force Base 46:20.260 --> 46:23.760 where the eastern Gulf of Mexico is an unparalleled range. 46:23.760 --> 46:26.620 There's money in the budget to enhance our ranges 46:26.620 --> 46:29.260 and it's my hope that the Department will continue 46:29.260 --> 46:30.960 to maintain the strong position 46:30.960 --> 46:33.180 opposed to offshore oil drilling 46:33.180 --> 46:35.280 which is not consistent with the launching 46:35.280 --> 46:36.520 of experimental missiles. 46:36.520 --> 46:38.540 Which is, I can't believe, something I have to say out loud, 46:38.540 --> 46:42.050 but, indeed it is, and so, thank you for that great work. 46:42.050 --> 46:44.410 As the Department is raising it's gaze 46:44.410 --> 46:45.580 under your leadership 46:45.580 --> 46:47.460 to meet those challenges of the future 46:47.460 --> 46:49.920 against our near-peer adversaries, 46:49.920 --> 46:54.480 it's notable to me that we have de-conflicted in Syria 46:54.480 --> 46:57.960 from what was US involvement in a Syrian civil war 46:57.960 --> 46:59.910 with tremendous sectarian violence. 46:59.910 --> 47:02.330 In this budget you've presented to us, 47:02.330 --> 47:05.300 is there an expectation that our nation 47:05.300 --> 47:08.373 would reengage in the Syrian civil war? 47:09.640 --> 47:11.010 - There has not been that discussion 47:11.010 --> 47:12.580 about reengaging in the civil war. 47:12.580 --> 47:14.210 We think the best path forward 47:14.210 --> 47:17.270 is through the UN process that is underway. 47:17.270 --> 47:20.760 And that needs to be pursued vigorously. 47:20.760 --> 47:22.640 I know the State Department is pushing that as well 47:22.640 --> 47:26.040 and obviously this situation's become a lot more complicated 47:26.040 --> 47:27.320 in Idlib province right now, 47:27.320 --> 47:30.820 given the confluence of many actors. 47:30.820 --> 47:34.070 - And in our current role, securing oil fields 47:34.070 --> 47:38.330 so that the Kurds are able to maintain their own resistance 47:38.330 --> 47:40.080 and to have resources to do that, 47:40.080 --> 47:42.760 is it our expectation in this budget 47:42.760 --> 47:44.530 that we would be funding efforts 47:44.530 --> 47:49.210 to reinsert Americans on the Turkish-Syria border, 47:49.210 --> 47:52.240 in that area where Americans were previously withdrawn? 47:52.240 --> 47:53.580 - Our current mission, Congressman, 47:53.580 --> 47:56.130 is to ensure the continuing defeat of ISIS 47:56.130 --> 47:58.290 in that eastern portion of Syria 47:58.290 --> 48:00.020 working alongside of our SDF partners. 48:00.020 --> 48:02.070 That happens on a daily basis. 48:02.070 --> 48:04.680 At this point in time, I don't see any likelihood 48:04.680 --> 48:07.090 that we would be back along the border, if you will. 48:07.090 --> 48:08.300 - That's great news. 48:08.300 --> 48:11.370 And General Milley, I recall a conversation we had 48:11.370 --> 48:15.810 where you informed me that the only correct decision 48:15.810 --> 48:17.690 in your mind, that the president could've made, 48:17.690 --> 48:19.960 was the decision the president, in fact, did make. 48:19.960 --> 48:23.390 To take the tens of Americans on the Syria-Turkey border 48:23.390 --> 48:25.630 and to remove them from that conflict zone. 48:25.630 --> 48:27.380 Is that still your position? 48:27.380 --> 48:30.870 - It is, and I'll just reinforce what the Secretary said, 48:30.870 --> 48:33.380 our mission remains, primary mission remains 48:33.380 --> 48:34.470 the counter-ISIS mission there 48:34.470 --> 48:37.570 in the Easter parts of Syria. 48:37.570 --> 48:40.840 And to my knowledge, there's no intent nor plans 48:40.840 --> 48:42.210 to reengage in the Syrian civil war, 48:42.210 --> 48:44.400 nor put troops back on the Syrian-Turkish border. 48:44.400 --> 48:45.440 - Again, great news. 48:45.440 --> 48:48.560 I very much look forward to the Trump presidency 48:48.560 --> 48:51.690 being one where we end our involvement in some of these wars 48:51.690 --> 48:55.000 rather than reigniting new conflicts in new places 48:55.000 --> 48:57.210 for newfound reasons that distract us 48:57.210 --> 49:00.800 from that important national security strategy focus 49:00.800 --> 49:03.883 that I think the two of you have lead quite deftly. 49:05.680 --> 49:07.990 In budgetary times, we're always looking forward, 49:07.990 --> 49:10.080 but at times, it's appropriate to look back 49:10.080 --> 49:11.600 at the decisions that Congress has made 49:11.600 --> 49:14.460 and determine whether or not we've got the right focus. 49:14.460 --> 49:18.400 And I'm specifically referencing House Joint Resolution 77, 49:18.400 --> 49:20.820 which was supported by most of the members 49:20.820 --> 49:22.860 of this committee, Republican and Democrat, 49:22.860 --> 49:25.920 and it was very critical of the administration's decision 49:25.920 --> 49:28.410 to disengage from that civil war 49:28.410 --> 49:31.350 and specifically in the Whereas Clause of that resolution, 49:31.350 --> 49:33.835 it says "Whereas an abrupt withdrawal 49:33.835 --> 49:35.147 "of United States military personnel 49:35.147 --> 49:36.937 "from certain parts of northeast Syria 49:36.937 --> 49:39.017 "is beneficial to the adversaries 49:39.017 --> 49:40.720 "of the United State government." 49:40.720 --> 49:42.600 I'm wondering if you concur with that statement, 49:42.600 --> 49:45.030 or now, with the benefit of hindsight, 49:45.030 --> 49:49.120 we could say that disengaging from that conflict zone 49:49.120 --> 49:51.390 actually was beneficial to the United States government 49:51.390 --> 49:52.670 and our position? 49:52.670 --> 49:55.053 - I think from a military standpoint, 49:56.240 --> 49:58.810 we had two special forces ODAs, 49:58.810 --> 50:00.810 a very small amount of forces, 50:00.810 --> 50:04.260 that were facing off against 15,000 Turkish troops. 50:04.260 --> 50:06.670 And they were going to come across that border, 50:06.670 --> 50:07.990 they were prepared to come across that border, 50:07.990 --> 50:09.640 they told us to come across that border, 50:09.640 --> 50:11.900 and we have very, very little choice 50:11.900 --> 50:14.540 except to remove them from the avenues of attack 50:14.540 --> 50:15.390 that the Turkish were gonna do. 50:15.390 --> 50:17.420 Otherwise we would've unnecessarily 50:17.420 --> 50:19.240 jeopardized their lives for no purpose. 50:19.240 --> 50:20.950 - And given that decision that we made, 50:20.950 --> 50:22.820 I think very correctly, despite the fact 50:22.820 --> 50:24.410 that many of my colleagues disagree with it, 50:24.410 --> 50:25.900 I agree with it. 50:25.900 --> 50:27.950 Are we sensing that there is some 50:27.950 --> 50:30.040 insurmountable resurgence of ISIS 50:30.040 --> 50:31.330 that we're not prepared to deal with 50:31.330 --> 50:33.400 as a consequence of that sound decision? 50:33.400 --> 50:35.480 - We know that ISIS, the caliphate, 50:35.480 --> 50:38.490 the physical entity, has been eliminated. 50:38.490 --> 50:40.900 We also know that ISIS as an organization 50:40.900 --> 50:43.440 is not yet destroyed. 50:43.440 --> 50:45.440 They have broken down into small groups 50:45.440 --> 50:48.020 and they're continuing to conduct insurgency 50:48.020 --> 50:50.460 and terrorist operations in a very disparate 50:50.460 --> 50:52.940 and disaggregated way. 50:52.940 --> 50:54.270 But they are no longer the threat 50:54.270 --> 50:55.898 that they were just a year ago. 50:55.898 --> 50:57.290 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. - [Chairman Smith] Thank you. 50:57.290 --> 50:58.213 Mr. Cisneros? 51:00.280 --> 51:01.113 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 51:01.113 --> 51:03.470 and thank you gentleman both for being here today. 51:04.800 --> 51:07.470 Policy cooperation between the US and South Korea 51:07.470 --> 51:09.040 has been, at best, inconsistent 51:09.040 --> 51:11.580 under the Trump and Moon administrations. 51:11.580 --> 51:13.430 I'm concerned with the Department's plan 51:13.430 --> 51:16.660 with basing US troops in South Korea 51:16.660 --> 51:19.070 and maintaining operation readiness 51:19.070 --> 51:20.330 given the underlying tensions 51:20.330 --> 51:23.910 associated with an expired Special Measures Agreement. 51:23.910 --> 51:25.880 The president's administration's demand, 51:25.880 --> 51:27.440 demanded that South Korea increase 51:27.440 --> 51:30.527 its payments to the US by 400%, 51:30.527 --> 51:32.860 and the administration's public statements 51:32.860 --> 51:35.420 questioning whether or not the presence of US troops 51:35.420 --> 51:38.570 in South Korea is even in our interest. 51:38.570 --> 51:41.040 General Milley, what is the strategic significance 51:41.040 --> 51:43.460 of basing US troops on the Korean Peninsula 51:43.460 --> 51:46.930 and how does it positively impact our national security? 51:46.930 --> 51:49.250 - We have a bilateral defense agreement 51:49.250 --> 51:52.250 with the Republic of Korea and that requires, 51:52.250 --> 51:54.810 the requirement has been for seven decades now, 51:54.810 --> 51:56.910 to have forces there to prevent 51:56.910 --> 51:59.000 an outbreak of yet another Korean War. 51:59.000 --> 52:01.600 And I would argue that you can never prove a negative 52:01.600 --> 52:03.010 as to why something didn't happen, 52:03.010 --> 52:07.080 but I would argue that US forces in South Korea 52:07.080 --> 52:09.960 have deterred North Korean aggression, 52:09.960 --> 52:10.920 territorial aggression, 52:10.920 --> 52:14.200 and have prevented the outbreak of a second Korean War. 52:14.200 --> 52:16.760 I think that the outbreak of that war, 52:16.760 --> 52:18.060 the prevention of that, 52:18.060 --> 52:21.040 is in the US national security interests 52:21.040 --> 52:23.170 for general stability in northeast Asia, 52:23.170 --> 52:25.160 but also for global stability. 52:25.160 --> 52:28.480 So I think it is a vital US national security interest 52:28.480 --> 52:32.520 to maintain our treaty agreement with South Korea 52:32.520 --> 52:34.551 and maintain US forces there. 52:34.551 --> 52:35.384 - All right. 52:35.384 --> 52:36.780 So we wanna make sure that we do maintain 52:36.780 --> 52:38.880 the US forces on the Korean Peninsula? 52:38.880 --> 52:40.080 - [General Milley] That's my military opinion, 52:40.080 --> 52:42.100 that's correct. - Thank you, sir. 52:42.100 --> 52:44.000 Also, the US desire to maintain 52:44.000 --> 52:45.540 rule-based international order 52:45.540 --> 52:47.363 in the Indo-Pacific AOR, 52:48.540 --> 52:50.900 with China's desire to build military capability 52:50.900 --> 52:53.060 and expand influence in the region, 52:53.060 --> 52:55.600 what policies are in place to prevent 52:55.600 --> 52:58.030 potential escalation of hostilities, 52:58.030 --> 53:00.100 should an act of aggression be perceived 53:00.100 --> 53:03.610 by either side towards the other on a tactical level? 53:03.610 --> 53:06.690 Can you identify any potential gaps in communication 53:06.690 --> 53:08.690 between senior leaders on either side 53:08.690 --> 53:10.920 of the operational or strategic levels 53:10.920 --> 53:14.320 in order to deescalate a potential volatile situation, 53:14.320 --> 53:15.540 should it arise? 53:15.540 --> 53:16.660 - [General Milley] You're talking about with China? 53:16.660 --> 53:18.060 - Yes, sir. - Specifically? 53:19.260 --> 53:20.400 Well, a couple things. 53:20.400 --> 53:23.390 Both in air and maritime we maintain 53:23.390 --> 53:25.360 communications systems that, 53:25.360 --> 53:26.500 we do communicate to each other 53:26.500 --> 53:28.930 so that we don't have inadvertent incidents 53:28.930 --> 53:31.220 at sea or in the air that could then escalate. 53:31.220 --> 53:33.840 So there's an escalation control mechanism. 53:33.840 --> 53:36.640 I have, and will continue to maintain 53:36.640 --> 53:38.840 a communication channel with my counterpart. 53:38.840 --> 53:39.673 I know the Secretary does as well, 53:39.673 --> 53:44.220 and I know the Commander of USPACOM or INDOPACOM 53:44.220 --> 53:45.400 has channels of communication 53:45.400 --> 53:47.720 to try to deescalate any kind of issue. 53:47.720 --> 53:51.850 At the broader geostrategic level, 53:51.850 --> 53:53.900 I think it's in our national security interest 53:53.900 --> 53:56.780 to continue to maintain adequate forces there 53:56.780 --> 53:58.270 and at the end of the day, 53:58.270 --> 54:00.630 it goes toward that great power competition, 54:00.630 --> 54:02.720 the preservation of great power peace. 54:02.720 --> 54:04.520 The last thing that anyone needs 54:04.520 --> 54:06.960 is a war between China and the United States 54:06.960 --> 54:08.550 or a war between Russia and the United States. 54:08.550 --> 54:10.710 So great power war's a really bad thing, 54:10.710 --> 54:12.450 and great power peace has been maintained 54:12.450 --> 54:13.950 for seven and a half decades, 54:13.950 --> 54:15.570 and we wanna continue that, 54:15.570 --> 54:17.963 that legacy of maintaining that peace. 54:19.383 --> 54:21.160 - And just one more question about China, 54:21.160 --> 54:22.327 in what specific areas 54:22.327 --> 54:24.360 is the Pople's Republic of China investing 54:24.360 --> 54:26.360 in terms of military capability 54:26.360 --> 54:29.043 and how are we countering their investments? 54:31.460 --> 54:33.800 - Without going into specific classification, 54:33.800 --> 54:38.440 I think China is, since Deng Xiaoping's reforms in 1979, 54:38.440 --> 54:41.250 they've made huge economic advances, 10% a year, 54:41.250 --> 54:44.080 and they're down to about 6% or 7% a year 54:44.080 --> 54:45.740 over the last 40 years. 54:45.740 --> 54:47.380 And with that, history tells us 54:47.380 --> 54:49.110 that countries tend to develop 54:49.110 --> 54:51.217 a very significant military capability 54:51.217 --> 54:52.980 and that is, in fact, the case with China. 54:52.980 --> 54:55.610 So they've developed all the domains. 54:55.610 --> 55:00.250 Space, cyber, land, sea, and air, the traditional domains. 55:00.250 --> 55:02.070 They've developed those significantly 55:02.070 --> 55:03.430 over the course of the last 40 years. 55:03.430 --> 55:07.150 They are not our peer yet, 55:07.150 --> 55:09.610 but their objective is to be the co-equal, 55:09.610 --> 55:11.870 military co-equal, of the United States, 55:11.870 --> 55:13.610 and even surpass the United States militarily 55:13.610 --> 55:14.640 by mid-century. 55:14.640 --> 55:16.260 They've said that publicly. 55:16.260 --> 55:18.250 They're on trendlines to do that. 55:18.250 --> 55:20.420 And that's what this budget is all about, 55:20.420 --> 55:23.430 is efforts to try to mitigate 55:23.430 --> 55:24.840 the Chinese from closing the gaps, 55:24.840 --> 55:27.920 or, in fact, overtaking us in some capabilities. 55:27.920 --> 55:28.753 - All right. 55:28.753 --> 55:32.120 And Secretary Esper, just one last question. 55:32.120 --> 55:33.240 There have been improvements 55:33.240 --> 55:34.580 in diversity in the officer ranks 55:34.580 --> 55:38.410 since the military became an all volunteer force after 1973. 55:38.410 --> 55:41.070 There's still disproportionate demographic representation 55:41.070 --> 55:42.560 in the officer ranks. 55:42.560 --> 55:45.080 What specific steps has the Department taken 55:45.080 --> 55:47.680 to recruit, retain, minority officers 55:47.680 --> 55:49.300 so our Officer Corps better reflects 55:49.300 --> 55:51.420 US general population demographics? 55:51.420 --> 55:52.440 And I'm running out of time, 55:52.440 --> 55:54.430 so I could take that for the record. 55:54.430 --> 55:56.250 - Okay, let me get back to you with details, 55:56.250 --> 55:57.600 but I would say I completely agree. 55:57.600 --> 56:00.840 I think we are, more than any other institution, 56:00.840 --> 56:01.970 really embrace diversity 56:01.970 --> 56:04.537 and have a very diverse Officer Corps workforce 56:04.537 --> 56:06.620 and Enlisted and NCO Corps, 56:06.620 --> 56:08.650 but we can always do better, and should do better. 56:08.650 --> 56:09.724 - [Cisneros] All right, I yield back. 56:09.724 --> 56:10.557 - Thank you. 56:10.557 --> 56:11.400 Mr. Banks. 56:11.400 --> 56:12.660 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 56:12.660 --> 56:15.870 As the co-chair of the Future of Defense Taskforce, 56:15.870 --> 56:18.020 a role that I share with Representative Moulton 56:18.020 --> 56:20.160 on a bipartisan basis, 56:20.160 --> 56:22.300 I'm optimistic about the role 56:22.300 --> 56:24.320 that the National Security Innovation Base, 56:24.320 --> 56:27.760 and more specifically, non-traditional defense companies 56:27.760 --> 56:30.370 can play in emerging technologies. 56:30.370 --> 56:32.610 Space is one of the domains that's attracting 56:32.610 --> 56:35.150 a great deal of commercial innovation. 56:35.150 --> 56:36.070 And while I'm encouraged 56:36.070 --> 56:38.430 by the establishment of the Space Force, 56:38.430 --> 56:41.580 I'm disheartened by federal acquisition regulations 56:41.580 --> 56:43.750 that create barriers to entry 56:43.750 --> 56:45.250 for small start-up companies, 56:45.250 --> 56:48.240 unable to dedicate the significant resources needed 56:48.240 --> 56:51.760 to navigate the DOD's massive bureaucracy. 56:51.760 --> 56:53.650 Mr. Secretary, if we view the establishment 56:53.650 --> 56:57.370 of Space Force as an opportunity to revitalize our approach, 56:57.370 --> 56:59.760 what can be done to reorganize the FAR 56:59.760 --> 57:02.230 to include more new, innovative companies 57:02.230 --> 57:04.260 in our defense ecosystem? 57:04.260 --> 57:05.093 - Thank you, Mr. Banks. 57:05.093 --> 57:06.250 I think, first of all, I agree with you. 57:06.250 --> 57:08.200 I think the, so much of the innovation 57:08.200 --> 57:11.220 and entrepreneurial is out there with the small providers, 57:11.220 --> 57:13.430 and that's why we stood up Forces Command 57:13.430 --> 57:14.880 in the Army to tap into that. 57:14.880 --> 57:16.040 The Air Force is doing things 57:16.040 --> 57:17.603 like pitch days to get at that. 57:18.460 --> 57:20.040 The regulations are a tough thing. 57:20.040 --> 57:23.350 We recently published an update to the FAR, 57:23.350 --> 57:26.120 the 5,000 Series, and we should come brief you on that, 57:26.120 --> 57:28.530 to get at that and bring you ideas. 57:28.530 --> 57:30.160 Because we have some challenges, 57:30.160 --> 57:32.340 some is regulatory that we control in policy, 57:32.340 --> 57:33.590 some are required by law, 57:33.590 --> 57:34.990 that you might be able to help with. 57:34.990 --> 57:36.563 We've had a lot of good reforms in the last few years 57:36.563 --> 57:39.170 that have helped us in terms of prototyping, 57:39.170 --> 57:41.000 mid-tier going, stuff like that. 57:41.000 --> 57:43.020 The biggest challenge we have, frankly, is culture, 57:43.020 --> 57:45.470 and we have to change our culture so it's less risk-averse, 57:45.470 --> 57:49.240 and more one to kinda make bets on the small guys 57:49.240 --> 57:51.300 and kinda feed that, because you find 57:51.300 --> 57:53.250 a lot of success there, a lot of great ideas, 57:53.250 --> 57:55.860 and that's gonna be where we're gonna get our best, 57:55.860 --> 57:57.810 is from those players. - Can we use the Space Force 57:57.810 --> 57:59.980 as an experiment, in some ways, to do that, 57:59.980 --> 58:02.470 by cracking down on the FAR, maybe, 58:02.470 --> 58:03.670 just for the Space Force, versus-- 58:03.670 --> 58:04.863 - I would fully support that. 58:04.863 --> 58:06.950 I had a great conversation with General Raymond 58:06.950 --> 58:08.880 yesterday about that, about how he has the chance 58:08.880 --> 58:11.310 to rewrite everything with regard 58:11.310 --> 58:13.010 to not just acquisition, but the force, 58:13.010 --> 58:14.490 and that's one of the reasons, frankly, 58:14.490 --> 58:17.450 we stood up the SDA, is to kinda break outta that, 58:17.450 --> 58:18.760 break outta the conventional system 58:18.760 --> 58:20.056 and find different, more creative ways 58:20.056 --> 58:22.530 to field our capabilities. 58:22.530 --> 58:24.357 - The Department has identified artificial intelligence 58:24.357 --> 58:25.980 as one of the core technologies 58:25.980 --> 58:27.720 that warrant additional investment, 58:27.720 --> 58:30.910 has designated, the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center 58:30.910 --> 58:32.750 as the lead of the department. 58:32.750 --> 58:36.230 We've met as part of our taskforce hearings, 58:36.230 --> 58:38.850 with the Joint AI Center, Lieutenant General Shanahan, 58:38.850 --> 58:40.970 and have been impressed with his leadership 58:40.970 --> 58:43.030 across the services and building relationships 58:43.030 --> 58:44.380 with industry and academia. 58:46.490 --> 58:49.310 With his pending retirement and the competition 58:49.310 --> 58:52.040 for for General Officer billets, 58:52.040 --> 58:53.670 I wanted to stress how important today's 58:53.670 --> 58:57.270 strong military leadership is within the Joint AI Center. 58:57.270 --> 58:59.680 The next few years for that will be critical. 58:59.680 --> 59:01.550 Mr. Secretary, what actions are you taking 59:01.550 --> 59:04.820 to ensure continued leadership of artificial intelligence 59:04.820 --> 59:08.010 in the Department, and in the Joint AI center specifically? 59:08.010 --> 59:09.170 - Yeah, I completely agree Congressman, 59:09.170 --> 59:10.740 he's done a great job standing it up, 59:10.740 --> 59:13.280 working closely with the (mumbles). 59:13.280 --> 59:14.720 We need to find a great replacement 59:14.720 --> 59:16.620 to carry on his good work. 59:16.620 --> 59:19.530 At the same time, we've increased the budget by over 4% 59:19.530 --> 59:21.300 because I think AI is a game changer 59:21.300 --> 59:24.050 out there in the years ahead. 59:24.050 --> 59:25.530 The Army stood up the AI taskforce 59:25.530 --> 59:26.720 at Carnegie Mellon University 59:26.720 --> 59:28.730 with a very capable commander there. 59:28.730 --> 59:29.870 At the same time, we're trying to use 59:29.870 --> 59:31.260 the authorities Congress gave us 59:31.260 --> 59:34.350 to bring more people from the outside into this system 59:34.350 --> 59:37.150 so that we can tap into that rich civilian talent out there. 59:37.150 --> 59:39.440 And, again, they have good plans 59:39.440 --> 59:41.270 to continue that along that we're growing, 59:41.270 --> 59:42.670 we're growing the JAIC as quickly as we can 59:42.670 --> 59:44.010 to meet those needs. 59:44.010 --> 59:45.030 - Thank you. 59:45.030 --> 59:47.120 Biometric identifiers, as both of you know, 59:47.120 --> 59:49.050 plays an increasingly important role 59:49.050 --> 59:51.700 in military technological capabilities and threats. 59:51.700 --> 59:54.900 Again, we've heard a great deal from a number of experts 59:54.900 --> 59:56.950 in our Future of Defense Taskforce hearings 59:56.950 --> 59:58.390 about this subject. 59:58.390 --> 01:00:00.870 In December 2019, the DOD issued a directive 01:00:00.870 --> 01:00:03.430 advising US servicemembers against 01:00:03.430 --> 01:00:07.360 using genetic testing kits such at 23andMe. 01:00:07.360 --> 01:00:10.127 The memo states, "The test could expose 01:00:10.127 --> 01:00:12.517 "personal and genetic information 01:00:12.517 --> 01:00:15.577 "and potentially create unintended security consequences 01:00:15.577 --> 01:00:18.847 "and increase risk to the joint force and mission." 01:00:20.280 --> 01:00:22.420 General Milley, I wonder if you could maybe 01:00:22.420 --> 01:00:24.670 comment about what could the possible 01:00:24.670 --> 01:00:26.810 national security implications be 01:00:26.810 --> 01:00:29.260 if an adversary like China gained access 01:00:29.260 --> 01:00:32.780 to the genetic makeup of US servicemembers? 01:00:32.780 --> 01:00:35.720 - There's a lot of things that the Chinese are working on 01:00:35.720 --> 01:00:38.830 which, I'm not gonna discuss in an open hearing, 01:00:38.830 --> 01:00:42.550 but when you expose any type 01:00:42.550 --> 01:00:47.380 of personal identity information, it can be exploited. 01:00:47.380 --> 01:00:51.760 And we know that the Chinese have extracted 01:00:53.890 --> 01:00:55.890 thousands, if not millions, of records 01:00:55.890 --> 01:00:58.260 a couple of years ago. 01:00:58.260 --> 01:00:59.660 They have everything from fingerprints 01:00:59.660 --> 01:01:02.600 and all your biometrics and your eye color and all that, 01:01:02.600 --> 01:01:04.070 a description, all your contacts, 01:01:04.070 --> 01:01:06.910 your families, all that kinda business, right? 01:01:06.910 --> 01:01:09.750 Adding DNA to it just multiplies 01:01:09.750 --> 01:01:12.980 that ability to exploit you as an individual, 01:01:12.980 --> 01:01:15.430 and there's all kinds of things that can be done. 01:01:17.800 --> 01:01:19.470 And I don't wanna spook the herd, 01:01:19.470 --> 01:01:21.460 but there's a lot of things that can be done 01:01:21.460 --> 01:01:24.500 with exploiting personal information such as DNA. 01:01:24.500 --> 01:01:25.562 - [Secretary Esper] Particularly at the time when 01:01:25.562 --> 01:01:27.790 they're building a 21st century surveillance state in China, 01:01:27.790 --> 01:01:29.865 think about them exporting the technology abroad 01:01:29.865 --> 01:01:31.440 and be able to identify key Americans, 01:01:31.440 --> 01:01:33.160 whoever the case may be. 01:01:33.160 --> 01:01:34.430 - [Chairman Smith] Gentleman's time as expired. 01:01:34.430 --> 01:01:35.263 Miss Houlahan? 01:01:36.640 --> 01:01:38.040 - Thank you, Mr. Chair, 01:01:38.040 --> 01:01:40.700 and thank you very much to you all for being here today. 01:01:40.700 --> 01:01:42.700 I want to first, just associate myself 01:01:42.700 --> 01:01:44.380 and my colleagues on both sides of the aisle 01:01:44.380 --> 01:01:46.070 with my concern about moving 01:01:46.070 --> 01:01:48.160 already Congressionally appropriated money 01:01:48.160 --> 01:01:49.290 towards the border wall, 01:01:49.290 --> 01:01:51.100 and also my concerns about making sure 01:01:51.100 --> 01:01:53.560 that we're thinking very hard about our role and presence 01:01:53.560 --> 01:01:56.300 in Africa as we see the rise of China in the area. 01:01:56.300 --> 01:01:59.430 But, my questions are actually a little bit more mundane 01:01:59.430 --> 01:02:01.680 and have a lot more to do with regards 01:02:01.680 --> 01:02:03.170 to the committees that I serve on, 01:02:03.170 --> 01:02:05.470 specifically readiness and emerging threats. 01:02:05.470 --> 01:02:07.570 And my first question, and I have four, 01:02:07.570 --> 01:02:08.970 and so if I'm not able to get time, 01:02:08.970 --> 01:02:11.230 I might be able to submit them to the record, 01:02:11.230 --> 01:02:14.230 has to do with just being a woman in the military. 01:02:14.230 --> 01:02:16.810 I separated, and one of the reasons I separated, 01:02:16.810 --> 01:02:19.120 in the late 80s and early 90s 01:02:19.120 --> 01:02:21.760 was due to access to childcare. 01:02:21.760 --> 01:02:23.760 My base up at Hanscom Air Force Base 01:02:23.760 --> 01:02:25.270 was an expensive area to live in 01:02:25.270 --> 01:02:26.920 and had a six month wait list 01:02:26.920 --> 01:02:29.210 in order for me to access the base childcare. 01:02:29.210 --> 01:02:31.030 And so, one of the things that I see 01:02:31.030 --> 01:02:33.300 with the rising presence of women in the military 01:02:33.300 --> 01:02:35.860 and the rising need for more people in the military, 01:02:35.860 --> 01:02:38.680 a population of 51% of us are women, 01:02:38.680 --> 01:02:39.970 is that we really need to be able 01:02:39.970 --> 01:02:41.770 to allow women and their families 01:02:41.770 --> 01:02:43.740 to be able to bring their whole selves to work, 01:02:43.740 --> 01:02:47.360 so that we can support these active duty women 01:02:47.360 --> 01:02:50.090 and their families in their pursuit of their careers 01:02:50.090 --> 01:02:51.580 and also so that we can be ready. 01:02:51.580 --> 01:02:54.330 And so my question is, with the number of record number 01:02:54.330 --> 01:02:55.970 of women entering the military, 01:02:55.970 --> 01:02:57.830 would you please be able to share with the committee 01:02:57.830 --> 01:02:59.000 what the Department is doing 01:02:59.000 --> 01:03:01.740 and what aspects of the president's budget are doing 01:03:01.740 --> 01:03:04.700 to ensure that mechanisms exist and are in place 01:03:04.700 --> 01:03:08.280 for childcare and other such things to support the warrior. 01:03:08.280 --> 01:03:10.610 And first, before I allow you to answer that question, 01:03:10.610 --> 01:03:13.040 I would note that right now the base childcare lists 01:03:13.040 --> 01:03:14.710 are upwards of a year wait list. 01:03:14.710 --> 01:03:18.620 When I separated almost 30 years ago, they were six months. 01:03:18.620 --> 01:03:20.310 - And it's terrible. 01:03:20.310 --> 01:03:21.980 We've gotta do a better job. 01:03:21.980 --> 01:03:24.610 This has been a top priority for me as Army Secretary 01:03:24.610 --> 01:03:28.470 both childcare and spouse hiring, licensure, reciprocity. 01:03:28.470 --> 01:03:32.193 I just spoke out in Minot and Omaha about this thing. 01:03:33.110 --> 01:03:35.870 The services are investing, in terms of childcare, 01:03:35.870 --> 01:03:37.650 but there's a lot we can do at the policy level, 01:03:37.650 --> 01:03:39.020 and that I'm doing at the policy level. 01:03:39.020 --> 01:03:42.030 So, just last week I signed a new policy 01:03:42.030 --> 01:03:44.960 that elevated military kids in terms 01:03:44.960 --> 01:03:47.180 of getting the priority of care. 01:03:47.180 --> 01:03:49.290 That is gonna clean a lot of lists out 01:03:49.290 --> 01:03:51.360 so that folks like yourself have access to it. 01:03:51.360 --> 01:03:54.500 I know when I was in service, my wife didn't have access 01:03:54.500 --> 01:03:57.220 to that type of care, and our son. 01:03:57.220 --> 01:04:00.470 And so, a lot of it that we can do on a policy side 01:04:00.470 --> 01:04:01.303 will free that up. 01:04:01.303 --> 01:04:03.400 The two other areas, as I talk to spouses 01:04:03.400 --> 01:04:05.500 or talk to servicemembers, that they need 01:04:05.500 --> 01:04:08.380 are greater access to hourly care, which is important. 01:04:08.380 --> 01:04:12.950 And then more flexibility in terms of 24/7 care. 01:04:12.950 --> 01:04:14.500 That, to me, is the next challenge. 01:04:14.500 --> 01:04:15.780 Once we can kinda get that piece, 01:04:15.780 --> 01:04:17.340 is kinda move to those new phases, 01:04:17.340 --> 01:04:19.580 and I think that's what I hear from servicemembers 01:04:19.580 --> 01:04:20.420 and from their spouses. 01:04:20.420 --> 01:04:22.230 - And I really look forward to working 01:04:22.230 --> 01:04:23.800 with you guys on this critical issue. 01:04:23.800 --> 01:04:26.580 I helped found the Servicewomen and Women Veterans Caucus 01:04:26.580 --> 01:04:28.650 and we're about 50 some strong right now. 01:04:28.650 --> 01:04:31.240 The first caucus of it's kind to focus on these issues 01:04:31.240 --> 01:04:33.480 and last cycle of NDAA we had 01:04:33.480 --> 01:04:35.440 some amendments that were successful 01:04:35.440 --> 01:04:37.300 in investigating this particular issue, 01:04:37.300 --> 01:04:39.450 and I'm really concerned about it 01:04:39.450 --> 01:04:41.650 as we increasingly have more and more women, 01:04:41.650 --> 01:04:43.030 we need to be focused on that. 01:04:43.030 --> 01:04:44.090 General, did you have anything 01:04:44.090 --> 01:04:45.640 that you wanted to add to that? 01:04:46.610 --> 01:04:49.700 - I would just echo what the Secretary said. 01:04:49.700 --> 01:04:52.390 There are a series of policies that can be improved, 01:04:52.390 --> 01:04:54.080 one of which is, as he mentioned, 01:04:54.080 --> 01:04:55.740 prioritizing military children 01:04:55.740 --> 01:05:00.000 over the non-military, non-uniformed folks 01:05:00.000 --> 01:05:02.450 that are entitled to those same benefits. 01:05:02.450 --> 01:05:03.960 And that's gonna make a big difference, 01:05:03.960 --> 01:05:05.820 I think, in terms of these wait lists. 01:05:05.820 --> 01:05:08.650 And I have been 40 years, now, in the military, 01:05:08.650 --> 01:05:10.870 my family's grown up in the military. 01:05:10.870 --> 01:05:14.120 And there's probably nothing more important 01:05:14.120 --> 01:05:15.080 than taking care of our families 01:05:15.080 --> 01:05:18.050 in order for the Soldier, the Sailor, the Airman, Marine, 01:05:18.050 --> 01:05:19.220 in order to focus on their job 01:05:19.220 --> 01:05:20.500 and maintain the high levels of readiness. 01:05:20.500 --> 01:05:23.080 So, it's a critical area and we all recognize it. 01:05:23.080 --> 01:05:25.810 - Thank you, and with my last minute and a half, 01:05:25.810 --> 01:05:27.850 I wanted to talk a little bit more about readiness, 01:05:27.850 --> 01:05:29.100 and this time in tech talent. 01:05:29.100 --> 01:05:31.331 I'm also an engineer, and one of about a dozen 01:05:31.331 --> 01:05:32.810 in the Congress right now, 01:05:32.810 --> 01:05:35.160 and we, as we know, need increasing more and more 01:05:35.160 --> 01:05:37.280 tech talent in the military as well. 01:05:37.280 --> 01:05:40.500 In last year's NDAA, one of the amendments, 01:05:40.500 --> 01:05:42.480 Armed Forces Digital Advantage Act, 01:05:42.480 --> 01:05:45.040 which I proposed, was part of the NDAA. 01:05:45.040 --> 01:05:47.220 And it established a policy to recruit, 01:05:47.220 --> 01:05:49.010 retain, and promote tech talent 01:05:49.010 --> 01:05:51.320 and digital expertise in the DOD. 01:05:51.320 --> 01:05:54.900 The bill was enacted in section 230 of last year's NDAA 01:05:54.900 --> 01:05:56.770 and it isn't supposed to be until May 01:05:56.770 --> 01:05:58.440 that I first hear reports on that. 01:05:58.440 --> 01:06:00.730 But I wanted to know, sir, if you had anything 01:06:00.730 --> 01:06:02.870 that you could report on that, and specifically, 01:06:02.870 --> 01:06:06.230 the legislation also included authorization for a czar 01:06:06.230 --> 01:06:08.040 that would be effectively appointed. 01:06:08.040 --> 01:06:09.960 Do you intend on appointing that individual, 01:06:09.960 --> 01:06:11.200 and have you made progress on that? 01:06:11.200 --> 01:06:12.413 - I'd like to read the legislation 01:06:12.413 --> 01:06:14.406 and let the team brief me, kind of, 01:06:14.406 --> 01:06:15.980 what's in it, and then go from there. 01:06:15.980 --> 01:06:17.080 But I will tell you this much. 01:06:17.080 --> 01:06:20.020 This is very important, it's critical to the JAIC 01:06:20.020 --> 01:06:22.530 in terms of artificial intelligence and cyber world. 01:06:22.530 --> 01:06:25.000 We have a deficit of people with that background 01:06:25.000 --> 01:06:27.410 of digital skills, engineering skills. 01:06:27.410 --> 01:06:28.857 That's one, as I talk to our people 01:06:28.857 --> 01:06:30.600 and as I talk to industry, 01:06:30.600 --> 01:06:31.730 that's one of the things we need. 01:06:31.730 --> 01:06:33.210 So, I'm looking for any authorities 01:06:33.210 --> 01:06:35.110 so that we can bring people in, retain them, 01:06:35.110 --> 01:06:36.420 do things outside the normal 01:06:36.420 --> 01:06:38.003 to make sure we can recruit and retain 01:06:38.003 --> 01:06:39.860 that type of valuable talent. 01:06:39.860 --> 01:06:40.817 - Thank you, and I have ran out, 01:06:40.817 --> 01:06:42.090 and I will go ahead and submit 01:06:42.090 --> 01:06:43.440 the rest of my questions for the record. 01:06:43.440 --> 01:06:44.520 And I yield back. 01:06:44.520 --> 01:06:45.360 - [Chairman Smith] Thank you. 01:06:45.360 --> 01:06:46.500 Miss Cheney? 01:06:46.500 --> 01:06:48.310 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:06:48.310 --> 01:06:50.750 Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Chairman. 01:06:50.750 --> 01:06:52.940 Mr. Secretary, we're hearing reports 01:06:52.940 --> 01:06:55.010 that as the Unites States is prepared 01:06:55.010 --> 01:06:58.060 to sign a deal with the Taliban shortly, 01:06:58.060 --> 01:06:59.280 that that deal may, in fact, 01:06:59.280 --> 01:07:01.270 include secret annexes or side deals. 01:07:01.270 --> 01:07:03.570 Will you give assurances to this committee 01:07:03.570 --> 01:07:05.090 and make a commitment that any deal 01:07:05.090 --> 01:07:07.180 the United States enters into with the Taliban 01:07:07.180 --> 01:07:09.570 will be made public in it's entirety? 01:07:09.570 --> 01:07:11.952 - I'm not aware of that, per say. 01:07:11.952 --> 01:07:13.890 I know we're trying to get folks in 01:07:13.890 --> 01:07:15.490 to brief in the coming days, here, 01:07:15.490 --> 01:07:17.210 but I'm not aware of that. 01:07:17.210 --> 01:07:19.040 I would defer to the State Department 01:07:19.040 --> 01:07:19.873 in terms of-- 01:07:19.873 --> 01:07:22.510 - So you're not aware that there is any, 01:07:22.510 --> 01:07:24.170 are you aware of any contemplation 01:07:24.170 --> 01:07:25.940 of any secret side deals with the Taliban? 01:07:25.940 --> 01:07:28.130 - Nothing comes to mind right now that you're mentioning. 01:07:28.130 --> 01:07:30.087 I know, again, I know there's the base agreement 01:07:30.087 --> 01:07:32.103 and some annexes, I don't know if those have 01:07:32.103 --> 01:07:34.360 been agreed upon as secret, or something, 01:07:34.360 --> 01:07:35.950 but I'll certainly raise that 01:07:35.950 --> 01:07:37.540 with the Secretary of State. 01:07:37.540 --> 01:07:39.000 - Thank you, Mr. Secretary, we'll be raising it as well. 01:07:39.000 --> 01:07:41.230 I think it's crucial that the United States 01:07:41.230 --> 01:07:43.470 not go down the path that we saw, and frankly, 01:07:43.470 --> 01:07:45.820 the Secretary of State was so effective in, 01:07:45.820 --> 01:07:47.450 with respect to the Iranian Nuclear Deal 01:07:47.450 --> 01:07:49.940 and uncovering secret annexes inside deals 01:07:49.940 --> 01:07:51.073 with respect to Iran. 01:07:53.320 --> 01:07:55.310 Any deal that the United States would contemplate 01:07:55.310 --> 01:07:56.870 entering into with the Taliban 01:07:56.870 --> 01:07:59.520 should be made public in it's entirety. 01:07:59.520 --> 01:08:02.820 General Milley, on this same topic, 01:08:02.820 --> 01:08:06.360 we've also see reports that one of these secret annexes 01:08:06.360 --> 01:08:08.130 may, in fact, include some plan 01:08:08.130 --> 01:08:10.110 for counter-terrorism cooperation 01:08:10.110 --> 01:08:11.290 for some sort of a center 01:08:11.290 --> 01:08:13.900 for counter-terrorism cooperation with the Taliban. 01:08:13.900 --> 01:08:16.170 Will you give the committee your assurance 01:08:16.170 --> 01:08:18.400 that you recognize the lunacy 01:08:18.400 --> 01:08:19.810 of pretending that the Taliban 01:08:19.810 --> 01:08:22.380 is a partner for counter-terrorism cooperation 01:08:22.380 --> 01:08:24.820 and that there will be no center 01:08:24.820 --> 01:08:26.300 for counter-terrorism cooperation 01:08:26.300 --> 01:08:29.270 between the United States and the Taliban? 01:08:29.270 --> 01:08:32.630 - I'll be candid, you're quoting things that I haven't seen. 01:08:32.630 --> 01:08:35.160 So, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 01:08:35.160 --> 01:08:36.300 I will take a rigorous look 01:08:36.300 --> 01:08:39.590 at whatever annexes are out there 01:08:39.590 --> 01:08:42.830 and I have very, very strong feelings and opinions 01:08:42.830 --> 01:08:45.610 and lots of experience in Afghanistan with the Taliban. 01:08:45.610 --> 01:08:46.914 So I do give you my commitment 01:08:46.914 --> 01:08:48.860 that I'm gonna give all of this a hard look. 01:08:48.860 --> 01:08:51.040 I am not aware of anything that you just described, 01:08:51.040 --> 01:08:51.910 not even aware of it. 01:08:51.910 --> 01:08:55.290 - Is it your best military advice, Chairman Milley, 01:08:55.290 --> 01:08:58.640 that the Taliban is not an effective partner 01:08:58.640 --> 01:09:00.620 for counter-terrorism? 01:09:00.620 --> 01:09:04.170 - I would, here's my view on the whole thing, 01:09:04.170 --> 01:09:06.490 from big to small, I suppose. 01:09:06.490 --> 01:09:09.590 We've been in a military stalemate for several years. 01:09:09.590 --> 01:09:11.670 We're not gonna defeat the Taliban militarily, 01:09:11.670 --> 01:09:12.510 and they're not gonna defeat 01:09:12.510 --> 01:09:14.480 the government of Afghanistan militarily. 01:09:14.480 --> 01:09:16.520 So the only responsible way to end this thing 01:09:16.520 --> 01:09:17.850 is to negotiate a settlement, 01:09:17.850 --> 01:09:19.270 and that's what's happening right now 01:09:19.270 --> 01:09:20.810 with this reduction in violence, 01:09:20.810 --> 01:09:21.797 and I support that 100%. 01:09:21.797 --> 01:09:24.480 And I support signing a peace agreement with the Taliban, 01:09:24.480 --> 01:09:27.580 fully recognizing what the Taliban is all about-- 01:09:27.580 --> 01:09:28.413 - [Cheney] But, Chairman Milley-- 01:09:28.413 --> 01:09:29.827 - Well, I don't wanna say-- 01:09:29.827 --> 01:09:31.680 - But with all due respect, Chairman Milley, though, 01:09:31.680 --> 01:09:33.440 I think the question is making sure 01:09:33.440 --> 01:09:36.520 that whatever troop level we have on the ground 01:09:36.520 --> 01:09:38.230 is a troop level that's determined 01:09:38.230 --> 01:09:40.848 based upon US national security interests. 01:09:40.848 --> 01:09:45.300 And that an agreement with the Taliban, 01:09:45.300 --> 01:09:47.850 for example, that would include secret annexes, 01:09:47.850 --> 01:09:50.240 that would include counter-terrorism cooperation 01:09:50.240 --> 01:09:52.300 or intelligence sharing with the Taliban, 01:09:52.300 --> 01:09:54.110 which is a terrorist entity, 01:09:54.110 --> 01:09:56.420 which continues to fight with Al Quaeda, 01:09:56.420 --> 01:09:58.360 would be counter to that. 01:09:58.360 --> 01:10:02.820 And finally, I would like to get your best military-- 01:10:02.820 --> 01:10:03.653 - Number one, I'm not aware of it, 01:10:03.653 --> 01:10:06.530 and number two, I would not support sharing intelligence-- 01:10:06.530 --> 01:10:07.780 - [Cheney] Great. - With that organization. 01:10:07.780 --> 01:10:10.080 - I would also like to get your commitment 01:10:10.080 --> 01:10:11.350 and your best military advice 01:10:11.350 --> 01:10:13.090 about the extent to which a commitment 01:10:13.090 --> 01:10:15.410 in an agreement with the Taliban 01:10:15.410 --> 01:10:18.333 for the complete withdrawal of US forces, 01:10:19.660 --> 01:10:22.060 that putting such a commitment in writing 01:10:22.060 --> 01:10:23.530 with the Taliban right now, 01:10:23.530 --> 01:10:26.000 would, by definition, be counter 01:10:26.000 --> 01:10:27.710 to making troop level decisions 01:10:27.710 --> 01:10:29.730 based on conditions on the ground. 01:10:29.730 --> 01:10:33.970 And would also undermine our ally, the Afghan government, 01:10:33.970 --> 01:10:36.190 I know President Ghani has specifically asked us 01:10:36.190 --> 01:10:38.370 not to make that kind of a commitment 01:10:38.370 --> 01:10:40.550 for a complete withdrawal. 01:10:40.550 --> 01:10:43.510 And that such a commitment, again, 01:10:43.510 --> 01:10:45.730 in any sort of decisions about troop levels 01:10:45.730 --> 01:10:48.553 that are based on agreements with the Taliban, 01:10:49.520 --> 01:10:52.570 would clearly not be in keeping 01:10:52.570 --> 01:10:54.970 with making those decisions based upon 01:10:54.970 --> 01:10:56.650 what's in the best interest of the United States. 01:10:56.650 --> 01:10:58.950 And I would also say, I think the issue is not 01:11:01.177 --> 01:11:02.820 a complete defeat of the Taliban. 01:11:02.820 --> 01:11:04.470 I think the issue is, what do we need to do 01:11:04.470 --> 01:11:06.530 to make sure that our enemies 01:11:06.530 --> 01:11:08.610 and that terrorists cannot establish safe havens. 01:11:08.610 --> 01:11:12.660 - Yeah, and I think that the, depending on, 01:11:12.660 --> 01:11:15.000 I think the whole thing is dependent upon conditions. 01:11:15.000 --> 01:11:17.560 And depending upon Taliban behavior. 01:11:17.560 --> 01:11:20.670 And if the Taliban do not agree 01:11:20.670 --> 01:11:23.980 to continued reduction in violence and so on, 01:11:23.980 --> 01:11:25.390 then I think we're in a different place. 01:11:25.390 --> 01:11:27.950 But right now, things are looking good as of today, 01:11:27.950 --> 01:11:29.148 so we're gonna see. 01:11:29.148 --> 01:11:31.270 It's conditions-based, and we're gonna take it 01:11:31.270 --> 01:11:32.670 step by step, week by week. 01:11:32.670 --> 01:11:35.170 - The standard is that Afghanistan never again 01:11:35.170 --> 01:11:36.980 becomes a place where, a safe haven 01:11:36.980 --> 01:11:38.680 for terrorists that attack the United States, period. 01:11:38.680 --> 01:11:40.260 And if any point in time, 01:11:40.260 --> 01:11:42.684 it's completely conditions-based, we stop. 01:11:42.684 --> 01:11:44.363 - And I would just say, and I appreciate that, 01:11:44.363 --> 01:11:47.920 I would just say ensuring or committing now 01:11:47.920 --> 01:11:49.440 that we are gonna have a complete withdrawal 01:11:49.440 --> 01:11:51.920 of US forces in this agreement 01:11:51.920 --> 01:11:53.430 makes it very difficult for us 01:11:53.430 --> 01:11:55.900 to have the credibility that we need 01:11:55.900 --> 01:11:58.583 to ensure that terrorists cannot 01:11:58.583 --> 01:12:00.267 in the future establish safe haven. 01:12:00.267 --> 01:12:01.100 - [Chairman Smith] And Miss Cheney 01:12:01.100 --> 01:12:02.940 will have to get the last word on that one. 01:12:02.940 --> 01:12:04.410 Mr. Crow? 01:12:04.410 --> 01:12:06.510 - Thank you, Secretary Esper, General Milley 01:12:06.510 --> 01:12:09.660 for your continued service and your testimony here today. 01:12:09.660 --> 01:12:11.140 Secretary Esper, is it safe to say 01:12:11.140 --> 01:12:13.000 that China is a central focus 01:12:13.000 --> 01:12:14.910 of the national defense strategy? 01:12:14.910 --> 01:12:16.460 - It is the principal focus. 01:12:16.460 --> 01:12:19.160 - Is it safe to say that the acquisition 01:12:19.160 --> 01:12:20.650 of additional ships and aircraft 01:12:20.650 --> 01:12:24.220 are a central component of meeting that central focus? 01:12:24.220 --> 01:12:27.243 - Yes, they are, in an appropriate timeframe. 01:12:29.209 --> 01:12:31.480 - Is the construction of barrier walls 01:12:31.480 --> 01:12:33.920 or a wall along the southern border, 01:12:33.920 --> 01:12:36.200 is that contained within the NDS? 01:12:36.200 --> 01:12:39.080 - Homeland Security is part of the NDS. 01:12:39.080 --> 01:12:40.640 - But specifically, is the construction 01:12:40.640 --> 01:12:42.100 of border barriers at our southern border 01:12:42.100 --> 01:12:43.500 contained within the NDS? 01:12:43.500 --> 01:12:45.050 - Well there's a lot of things, 01:12:47.550 --> 01:12:48.923 there are a lot of things that are not in the NDS 01:12:48.923 --> 01:12:49.820 that we do and that we fund 01:12:49.820 --> 01:12:53.200 and that we put troops against all the time. 01:12:53.200 --> 01:12:56.900 - Is the reduction in the acquisition of F-35 aircraft 01:12:56.900 --> 01:12:59.990 and ships as a result of the reprogramming of funds 01:12:59.990 --> 01:13:01.670 to build additional borders, 01:13:01.670 --> 01:13:03.230 does that make it more challenging 01:13:03.230 --> 01:13:05.770 to meet the central focus, in your words, 01:13:05.770 --> 01:13:07.990 of the rise of China as a peer adversary? 01:13:07.990 --> 01:13:09.960 - Well, I go, again, based on the recommendation 01:13:09.960 --> 01:13:11.610 of the Chairman that he made to me formally 01:13:11.610 --> 01:13:13.970 and I'd say again, the items that were sourced 01:13:13.970 --> 01:13:16.470 for the barrier were what we determined to be 01:13:16.470 --> 01:13:20.797 in the FY20 bill either excess or early to need. 01:13:20.797 --> 01:13:25.680 - All right, appreciate your efforts 01:13:25.680 --> 01:13:29.330 to try to support the president's reprogramming requests, 01:13:29.330 --> 01:13:31.010 but you have been very disciplined 01:13:31.010 --> 01:13:33.450 and very focused on making hard decisions. 01:13:33.450 --> 01:13:35.890 The discipline and focus that I share, as a matter of fact, 01:13:35.890 --> 01:13:38.930 and you have long spoke about the need 01:13:38.930 --> 01:13:41.950 to cut back on missions in places 01:13:41.950 --> 01:13:45.410 where we are addressing very well established threats. 01:13:45.410 --> 01:13:46.960 In the Middle East, for example, 01:13:46.960 --> 01:13:50.070 in reducing troop levels where we know there are terrorists. 01:13:50.070 --> 01:13:53.160 And it seems entirely inconsistent with me then, 01:13:53.160 --> 01:13:58.090 that you then support the shifting of resources 01:13:58.090 --> 01:13:59.920 from well established defense programs 01:13:59.920 --> 01:14:03.920 that are directly tied to meeting that central threat, 01:14:03.920 --> 01:14:05.600 at the detriment of the NDS. 01:14:05.600 --> 01:14:10.600 And I would just urge you to be consistent in your focus. 01:14:11.520 --> 01:14:15.700 The next question is, do you anticipate additional need 01:14:15.700 --> 01:14:17.580 for money or resources to meet 01:14:17.580 --> 01:14:19.480 the Coronavirus threat within the DOD? 01:14:23.180 --> 01:14:25.120 - We have not had that discussion yet internally. 01:14:25.120 --> 01:14:27.134 What I'd like to do is consult with the Chairman. 01:14:27.134 --> 01:14:29.150 This is moving pretty quickly, 01:14:29.150 --> 01:14:31.340 and then get feedback from my Combatant Commanders 01:14:31.340 --> 01:14:32.970 and principally, General O'Shaughnessy, 01:14:32.970 --> 01:14:35.440 Northern Command, who has the campaign order right now, 01:14:35.440 --> 01:14:37.530 and maybe get back to you in writing on that one. 01:14:37.530 --> 01:14:38.890 - There is some urgency, 01:14:38.890 --> 01:14:40.680 I think that's urgency that we share 01:14:40.680 --> 01:14:42.520 and members of this committee share. 01:14:42.520 --> 01:14:45.190 Public health officials have been ringing alarm bells 01:14:45.190 --> 01:14:47.630 for quite some time, I think we are out of time. 01:14:47.630 --> 01:14:49.890 General Milley, would you care to comment on that? 01:14:49.890 --> 01:14:51.940 - No, I think the Secretary's exactly right. 01:14:51.940 --> 01:14:53.680 We've gotta get with General O'Shaughnessy 01:14:53.680 --> 01:14:54.513 and assess the situation. 01:14:54.513 --> 01:14:55.978 But also with Admiral Davidson 01:14:55.978 --> 01:14:57.620 and General Walters over in Europe. 01:14:57.620 --> 01:15:00.190 Because it is spreading 01:15:00.190 --> 01:15:02.950 and we can't give you a definitive answer 01:15:02.950 --> 01:15:05.410 whether we're gonna need additional resources or not. 01:15:05.410 --> 01:15:07.320 We are taking all the appropriate measures right now, 01:15:07.320 --> 01:15:08.507 we're doing the estimates of the situation. 01:15:08.507 --> 01:15:10.360 So, we owe you some answers. 01:15:10.360 --> 01:15:12.070 - The quicker you can get those, the better. 01:15:12.070 --> 01:15:14.510 Obviously, we're having the discussions right now 01:15:14.510 --> 01:15:16.910 about funding and resources. 01:15:16.910 --> 01:15:18.320 We'll need that information to make sure 01:15:18.320 --> 01:15:21.400 that we're working together with the Pentagon 01:15:21.400 --> 01:15:24.540 to meet, what I believe, is a very urgent threat. 01:15:24.540 --> 01:15:26.780 So we appreciate your urgency behind that. 01:15:26.780 --> 01:15:30.940 Secretary Esper, do you believe that clime change is real? 01:15:30.940 --> 01:15:31.773 - Yes I do, Congressman. 01:15:31.773 --> 01:15:33.020 - Do you believe that it's a threat 01:15:33.020 --> 01:15:35.140 to our national security and to our military? 01:15:35.140 --> 01:15:37.033 - I don't believe it's a threat to our national security, 01:15:37.033 --> 01:15:38.530 as I have traditionally defined it. 01:15:38.530 --> 01:15:41.220 I do believe it's a challenge for our military installations 01:15:41.220 --> 01:15:44.360 that are confronted with the impact of climate change. 01:15:44.360 --> 01:15:46.380 - Do you believe that the well establish threat 01:15:46.380 --> 01:15:49.390 of refugees, increased pandemics, 01:15:49.390 --> 01:15:51.790 instability and increased terrorism 01:15:51.790 --> 01:15:53.670 that could result from all that instability, 01:15:53.670 --> 01:15:55.050 pose additional challenges for us 01:15:55.050 --> 01:15:56.150 from a national security perspective? 01:15:56.150 --> 01:15:56.983 - They do. 01:15:58.077 --> 01:15:59.670 It's a chain of events, right, 01:15:59.670 --> 01:16:01.030 that creates certain situations. 01:16:01.030 --> 01:16:03.003 We see that in many conflicts, 01:16:04.402 --> 01:16:06.410 over time, it's happened. 01:16:06.410 --> 01:16:09.900 - So destabilization and mass migration of refugees 01:16:10.790 --> 01:16:12.720 does pose a threat to our national security? 01:16:12.720 --> 01:16:14.630 - Well, it could create the situation 01:16:14.630 --> 01:16:18.010 by which we are encountered with a national security matter 01:16:18.010 --> 01:16:19.330 that could involve the military. 01:16:19.330 --> 01:16:22.290 But that's a series of ifs and whens and thises and thats. 01:16:22.290 --> 01:16:25.621 - General Milley, do you agree with that characterization? 01:16:25.621 --> 01:16:28.100 - I think climate change is real. 01:16:28.100 --> 01:16:30.000 I think it is probably gonna result 01:16:30.000 --> 01:16:32.040 in increased destabilization. 01:16:32.040 --> 01:16:35.140 With resource depletion, water, and things like that, 01:16:35.140 --> 01:16:37.300 you're gonna see increases in diseases. 01:16:37.300 --> 01:16:39.400 There's a lot of second and third order effects. 01:16:39.400 --> 01:16:40.803 And does it impact on US national security? 01:16:40.803 --> 01:16:41.930 Yes, it does. 01:16:41.930 --> 01:16:44.380 - Do you believe that we're making the efforts right now 01:16:44.380 --> 01:16:46.143 to address those increased threats? 01:16:47.400 --> 01:16:50.240 - I think we're making reasonable efforts, yes. 01:16:50.240 --> 01:16:51.830 - Do you believe that there could be more 01:16:51.830 --> 01:16:54.130 that we could be doing to address the threats? 01:16:55.660 --> 01:16:59.900 - Right now, in terms of the international piece, no. 01:16:59.900 --> 01:17:02.560 In terms of our basing and infrastructure here at CONUS, 01:17:02.560 --> 01:17:05.170 which was one of the previous questions, 01:17:05.170 --> 01:17:07.910 I think we've gotta look at all of our infrastructure 01:17:07.910 --> 01:17:09.720 to make sure that it can withstand 01:17:09.720 --> 01:17:11.600 things like rising seas and increased storms 01:17:11.600 --> 01:17:12.433 and so on and so forth, 01:17:12.433 --> 01:17:15.550 and that is a level of effort DOD's been-- 01:17:15.550 --> 01:17:16.800 - [Chairman Smith] The gentleman's time has expired. 01:17:16.800 --> 01:17:18.040 - [Crow] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 01:17:18.040 --> 01:17:20.090 - Thank you. Mr. Bergman? 01:17:20.090 --> 01:17:20.923 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 01:17:20.923 --> 01:17:23.370 and thank you, gentlemen, for your endurance. 01:17:23.370 --> 01:17:26.980 I wanna augment and reinforce Mr. Kelly's comments 01:17:26.980 --> 01:17:30.960 before he left here about the Guard and Reserve. 01:17:30.960 --> 01:17:34.550 If in fact, we use the term, if we're gonna fight tonight, 01:17:34.550 --> 01:17:36.300 whether you be active or reserve, 01:17:36.300 --> 01:17:39.010 we need to make sure that the Guard and Reserve 01:17:39.010 --> 01:17:42.340 is not viewed as a bill payer for the active component 01:17:42.340 --> 01:17:44.310 'cause all we have to do is look back at the example 01:17:44.310 --> 01:17:48.840 of, let's say, 1953, on, for a period of 15 years 01:17:48.840 --> 01:17:50.400 and what we had capability wise 01:17:50.400 --> 01:17:52.950 or lack thereof in the Guard and Reserve component. 01:17:54.750 --> 01:17:58.950 I would, you know that, I just feel it's important 01:17:58.950 --> 01:18:01.630 to reinforce that as we do budgets 01:18:01.630 --> 01:18:04.263 and as we do bill payers. 01:18:05.107 --> 01:18:07.450 'Cause we have to maintain 01:18:07.450 --> 01:18:09.793 the capability of the total force. 01:18:10.840 --> 01:18:14.210 I would, one of my colleagues mentioned 01:18:14.210 --> 01:18:15.670 being an all volunteer force. 01:18:15.670 --> 01:18:18.920 I would suggest to you we're an all recruited force 01:18:18.920 --> 01:18:20.330 'cause if you've ever been a recruiter, 01:18:20.330 --> 01:18:23.233 you know that you have a mission to accomplish. 01:18:24.340 --> 01:18:27.790 And where we have our longterm talent management, 01:18:27.790 --> 01:18:30.010 retention talent challenges, 01:18:30.010 --> 01:18:31.720 is to retain the best of the best, 01:18:31.720 --> 01:18:35.940 whether we retain them on active duty or they do transition 01:18:35.940 --> 01:18:38.300 to the Guard and Reserve with those talents, 01:18:38.300 --> 01:18:40.480 that we need to keep the best of the best 01:18:40.480 --> 01:18:42.423 for as long as possible, in uniform. 01:18:46.080 --> 01:18:49.580 I wanna switch subjects here for you, just for a second. 01:18:49.580 --> 01:18:52.760 General Milley, you mentioned early on in the hearing 01:18:52.760 --> 01:18:57.760 about a strategy driven budget, is what I wrote down. 01:18:58.830 --> 01:19:02.400 Now, having used your terms, Secretary Esper, 01:19:02.400 --> 01:19:07.360 does the strategy include serious efforts 01:19:07.360 --> 01:19:11.810 to control internal costs, reduce waste, 01:19:11.810 --> 01:19:13.810 and streamline, if you will, 01:19:13.810 --> 01:19:18.400 a forward thinking Department of Defense business model? 01:19:18.400 --> 01:19:22.610 Because we can talk about things and capabilities, 01:19:22.610 --> 01:19:24.410 but if our business processes 01:19:24.410 --> 01:19:27.170 are just funneling money down black holes, 01:19:27.170 --> 01:19:28.520 I need to hear your thoughts 01:19:28.520 --> 01:19:30.120 on what we're doing on that part of the strategy. 01:19:30.120 --> 01:19:32.020 - Absolutely, we have to be good stewards 01:19:32.020 --> 01:19:33.970 of the taxpayer dollar, day in and day out. 01:19:33.970 --> 01:19:36.090 I think it begins, in many cases, with the audit. 01:19:36.090 --> 01:19:38.650 It was mentioned earlier but not discussed. 01:19:38.650 --> 01:19:40.020 I'm a big believer in the audit. 01:19:40.020 --> 01:19:41.610 It shows you a lot about yourself. 01:19:41.610 --> 01:19:43.430 You look in the mirror and find out 01:19:43.430 --> 01:19:45.120 your inventory, where you're spending money, 01:19:45.120 --> 01:19:46.680 losing money, whatever the case may be, 01:19:46.680 --> 01:19:48.450 and we need to continue along that process 01:19:48.450 --> 01:19:50.220 until we get a clean opinion. 01:19:50.220 --> 01:19:51.300 And that will take some time. 01:19:51.300 --> 01:19:53.530 But there's a lot of process reform we can do. 01:19:53.530 --> 01:19:56.370 I think in time we will get there using AI 01:19:56.370 --> 01:19:57.600 that can help us a lot in terms 01:19:57.600 --> 01:20:01.110 of understanding our processes, doing better on maintenance. 01:20:01.110 --> 01:20:03.610 And then look, you just gotta go back every now and then, 01:20:03.610 --> 01:20:05.020 I shouldn't say every now and then, 01:20:05.020 --> 01:20:06.710 I think annually, you have to make it a business 01:20:06.710 --> 01:20:08.270 of going back and looking at what you've been doing, 01:20:08.270 --> 01:20:10.300 whether it's, I call it the defense-wide review, 01:20:10.300 --> 01:20:12.600 and getting rid of the old, getting rid of the legncy, 01:20:12.600 --> 01:20:14.320 getting rid of the low return on investment 01:20:14.320 --> 01:20:16.090 and that's hard for people to do. 01:20:16.090 --> 01:20:18.280 It's hard for people up here to do. 01:20:18.280 --> 01:20:20.030 That's the only way we can kinda shed the past 01:20:20.030 --> 01:20:20.890 and keep moving forward. 01:20:20.890 --> 01:20:25.040 Because, $740 billion is a lot of money 01:20:25.040 --> 01:20:27.210 for the nation's security, and we appreciate that. 01:20:27.210 --> 01:20:28.900 So I'm committed to making good use 01:20:28.900 --> 01:20:31.660 of every penny, nickel, and dollar. 01:20:31.660 --> 01:20:33.870 - Well, you said in your own words, 01:20:33.870 --> 01:20:36.090 the Jim Collins, good to great. 01:20:36.090 --> 01:20:38.860 Every year, keep doing what you need to keep doing, 01:20:38.860 --> 01:20:40.530 start doing what you're not doing, 01:20:40.530 --> 01:20:43.160 but most importantly and most difficult, 01:20:43.160 --> 01:20:46.860 is stop doing what you no longer need to be doing. 01:20:46.860 --> 01:20:50.340 Switching gears on you a little bit, Mr. Secretary, 01:20:50.340 --> 01:20:52.650 what progress has the Department of Defense made 01:20:52.650 --> 01:20:55.920 in their efforts to invest the PFOS/PFOA cleanup, 01:20:55.920 --> 01:20:57.700 particularly in locations that maybe 01:20:57.700 --> 01:20:59.690 have a more immediate need? 01:20:59.690 --> 01:21:02.970 I realize that the DOD is not the EPA here, 01:21:02.970 --> 01:21:05.300 and this is not gonna be shouldered by, 01:21:05.300 --> 01:21:09.150 the responsibility, totally by the DOD. 01:21:09.150 --> 01:21:10.810 But what are you doing to keep up 01:21:10.810 --> 01:21:13.040 the inertia in the PFOS cleanup? 01:21:13.040 --> 01:21:14.500 - This is a nationwide problem 01:21:14.500 --> 01:21:16.430 and the DOD's been leading on it. 01:21:16.430 --> 01:21:19.030 Within, I think, the first 24, 48 hours 01:21:19.030 --> 01:21:20.960 of being sworn in as Secretary of Defense, 01:21:20.960 --> 01:21:24.960 I chartered a DOD taskforce on PFOS/PFOA. 01:21:24.960 --> 01:21:27.130 They've been working for some time now, giving me updates. 01:21:27.130 --> 01:21:29.100 I hope to submit a report to this committee, 01:21:29.100 --> 01:21:31.720 to the Congress, here in the next couple weeks. 01:21:31.720 --> 01:21:34.270 We've been closely engaged with the EPA, supporting, 01:21:34.270 --> 01:21:36.090 we're gonna abide by whatever standard they set, 01:21:36.090 --> 01:21:37.840 but I think there's a few things we need to do. 01:21:37.840 --> 01:21:40.900 We need to get a replacement for the firefighting thumb. 01:21:40.900 --> 01:21:42.170 Number two, we need to make sure 01:21:42.170 --> 01:21:43.480 that we understand the impacts 01:21:43.480 --> 01:21:47.660 on our people, our communities, people outside our gate. 01:21:47.660 --> 01:21:50.680 And then, number three, we need to just keep moving forward 01:21:50.680 --> 01:21:52.880 with regard to understanding 01:21:52.880 --> 01:21:54.220 how to mitigate it going forward. 01:21:54.220 --> 01:21:56.610 And that's kinda the commitment we've made 01:21:56.610 --> 01:21:59.010 and you'll get my report soon 01:21:59.010 --> 01:22:00.922 in terms of where we stand on this. 01:22:00.922 --> 01:22:01.755 - Thank you. 01:22:01.755 --> 01:22:02.671 Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 01:22:02.671 --> 01:22:03.504 - Thank you. 01:22:03.504 --> 01:22:04.540 Miss Slotkin? 01:22:04.540 --> 01:22:06.350 Just continuing on the issues of PFOS 01:22:06.350 --> 01:22:07.830 since you have two Michiganders 01:22:07.830 --> 01:22:09.150 going right after each other. 01:22:09.150 --> 01:22:11.240 Thank you for setting up that taskforce 01:22:11.240 --> 01:22:13.750 as soon as you came in, that was a great thing, 01:22:13.750 --> 01:22:16.490 and I was really pleased that on a bipartisan basis 01:22:16.490 --> 01:22:18.260 in last year's Pentagon budget, 01:22:18.260 --> 01:22:21.050 we passed the first six provisions into law 01:22:21.050 --> 01:22:22.780 dealing with PFOS, that did anything more 01:22:22.780 --> 01:22:24.110 than just study the problem. 01:22:24.110 --> 01:22:26.070 Including laying down the marker 01:22:26.070 --> 01:22:27.740 that you have to be off by 2024, 01:22:27.740 --> 01:22:30.210 off of PFOS firefighting foam. 01:22:30.210 --> 01:22:31.043 Which is great. 01:22:31.043 --> 01:22:33.110 And to Representative Bergman's point, 01:22:33.110 --> 01:22:34.130 you're not the EPA, 01:22:34.130 --> 01:22:36.120 and EPA has not done its job 01:22:36.120 --> 01:22:40.180 in setting a standard for what's safe and what's not safe. 01:22:40.180 --> 01:22:43.410 So you can't live up to that standard that doesn't exist. 01:22:43.410 --> 01:22:44.430 My question is this, 01:22:44.430 --> 01:22:47.920 based on DOD regulation, you all are required 01:22:47.920 --> 01:22:50.890 to live up to state environmental standards. 01:22:50.890 --> 01:22:52.870 The state of Michigan is currently reviewing 01:22:52.870 --> 01:22:55.930 setting up our own statewide PFOS standard. 01:22:55.930 --> 01:22:58.360 Once enacted, and officially promulgated, 01:22:58.360 --> 01:22:59.730 will you commit to living up 01:22:59.730 --> 01:23:01.680 to Michigan's statewide standards? 01:23:01.680 --> 01:23:04.160 - I think if that's or regulation driven by law, 01:23:04.160 --> 01:23:06.550 we'd be required to, but let me come back 01:23:06.550 --> 01:23:07.930 and give you a formal answer to make sure-- 01:23:07.930 --> 01:23:08.960 - Yeah, I think the people of Michigan 01:23:08.960 --> 01:23:11.210 would love a formal answer, cause we're moving ahead. 01:23:11.210 --> 01:23:12.760 It's happening, it's happening. 01:23:14.430 --> 01:23:16.410 Switching gears, I wanna associate myself 01:23:16.410 --> 01:23:20.080 with Representative Thornberry's comments about the budget. 01:23:20.080 --> 01:23:22.180 And I wanna take the conversation away 01:23:22.180 --> 01:23:24.010 from the wall and not the wall. 01:23:24.010 --> 01:23:25.820 People can have a big, healthy debate, 01:23:25.820 --> 01:23:28.430 and we certainly have, about the value of the wall. 01:23:28.430 --> 01:23:30.330 But I do have to note that there's 01:23:30.330 --> 01:23:32.250 an issue of precedent here. 01:23:32.250 --> 01:23:34.440 You're the first confirmed Secretary of Defense 01:23:34.440 --> 01:23:37.440 to ever voluntarily move money out of his own budget 01:23:37.440 --> 01:23:39.850 against the will of the Oversight Defense Committees. 01:23:39.850 --> 01:23:42.380 And that precedent is important for you, 01:23:42.380 --> 01:23:45.470 but it's important for every Secretary of Defense to come. 01:23:45.470 --> 01:23:48.280 So, I'm concerned that we're gonna become the piggy bank. 01:23:48.280 --> 01:23:49.490 The Pentagon is gonna become 01:23:49.490 --> 01:23:51.440 the piggy bank for any pet project. 01:23:51.440 --> 01:23:52.790 Today it could be the wall, 01:23:52.790 --> 01:23:54.550 tomorrow it could be someone's decision 01:23:54.550 --> 01:23:55.900 to fund a healthcare project 01:23:55.900 --> 01:23:58.640 exclusively out of DOD's budget. 01:23:58.640 --> 01:24:00.880 And I think, I appreciate that you say 01:24:00.880 --> 01:24:03.590 you wanna work with Congress and that you respect us, 01:24:03.590 --> 01:24:06.010 but you don't if, in the end day, 01:24:06.010 --> 01:24:07.360 the money that we have appropriated 01:24:07.360 --> 01:24:09.400 is going for something else. 01:24:09.400 --> 01:24:12.490 The second issue, and I think you leave us no choice, 01:24:12.490 --> 01:24:14.070 but to look at what we can do 01:24:14.070 --> 01:24:16.110 to constrain your reprogramming authority. 01:24:16.110 --> 01:24:18.370 And this kills me, 'cause I used to be at the Pentagon 01:24:18.370 --> 01:24:21.410 and I relied desperately on that reprogramming authority, 01:24:21.410 --> 01:24:22.990 but you've put us in a situation where, 01:24:22.990 --> 01:24:25.430 to uphold our Constitutional oath, 01:24:25.430 --> 01:24:27.010 and the separation of powers, 01:24:27.010 --> 01:24:29.870 we have to exert our authority, and I'm sorry to say that. 01:24:29.870 --> 01:24:32.130 On where you're taking that money from, 01:24:32.130 --> 01:24:34.717 of the $3.9 billion that you've ask to take away, 01:24:34.717 --> 01:24:37.440 $1.5 billion of it is from the Guard and Reserve, 01:24:37.440 --> 01:24:39.680 and Michigan is exclusively Guard and Reserve. 01:24:39.680 --> 01:24:42.070 And you say that is all excess to need, 01:24:42.070 --> 01:24:45.280 including all the equipment upgrades and requests. 01:24:45.280 --> 01:24:47.470 Can you say directly to the National Guardsman 01:24:47.470 --> 01:24:48.950 and Reservists in Michigan, 01:24:48.950 --> 01:24:52.710 why they're gonna be 34% of the bill 01:24:52.710 --> 01:24:54.400 to pay for the movement of money? 01:24:54.400 --> 01:24:56.410 Please speak directly to them on why 01:24:56.410 --> 01:24:58.600 all that equipment is excess to need. 01:24:58.600 --> 01:25:00.660 - Well, it's excess to need in a sense 01:25:00.660 --> 01:25:01.950 that that's what was reported to me 01:25:01.950 --> 01:25:04.340 based on DOD budget in '20. 01:25:04.340 --> 01:25:06.540 Our assessment, I had a chance to speak with 01:25:06.540 --> 01:25:08.460 all the service secretaries about this. 01:25:08.460 --> 01:25:09.870 There was agreement along the same lines. 01:25:09.870 --> 01:25:12.437 I take my recommendation from the, 01:25:12.437 --> 01:25:14.270 the Chairman here, about his advice. 01:25:14.270 --> 01:25:17.210 But look, I say it not as a former Soldier, 01:25:17.210 --> 01:25:18.890 but also a former Guardsman, 01:25:18.890 --> 01:25:20.770 I get it, I understand. 01:25:20.770 --> 01:25:23.810 But we had sources we had to fill 01:25:23.810 --> 01:25:26.763 and we try to be very, not arbitrary, 01:25:28.240 --> 01:25:29.840 we try to be very objective 01:25:29.840 --> 01:25:31.210 in terms of where we took the sources. 01:25:31.210 --> 01:25:33.710 And the clearest source was early to need 01:25:33.710 --> 01:25:35.793 or excess to request. - Okay. 01:25:36.730 --> 01:25:38.650 I'm really concerned that you guys haven't done 01:25:38.650 --> 01:25:40.690 internal work on Coronavirus. 01:25:40.690 --> 01:25:43.100 I was at the Pentagon when we were dealing with Ebola 01:25:43.100 --> 01:25:45.140 and we didn't wanna get involved, 01:25:45.140 --> 01:25:46.630 and then we had to get involved 01:25:46.630 --> 01:25:48.480 because the crisis was looming. 01:25:48.480 --> 01:25:50.540 And I would note that the president's request 01:25:50.540 --> 01:25:52.620 for Coronavirus supplemental funds 01:25:53.910 --> 01:25:56.530 is $2.5 billion against the $10 billion 01:25:56.530 --> 01:25:57.970 that he's requested and moved, 01:25:57.970 --> 01:26:00.470 not requested, moved to the wall. 01:26:00.470 --> 01:26:03.250 Tell me what you're gonna do to make sure you're on this 01:26:03.250 --> 01:26:05.050 so that we understand your needs now, 01:26:05.050 --> 01:26:06.950 since there are some concerning reports 01:26:06.950 --> 01:26:09.420 that this could turn in to a pandemic. 01:26:09.420 --> 01:26:11.159 - No, as I said to Mr. Crow, 01:26:11.159 --> 01:26:13.180 we owe you a quick response on this. 01:26:13.180 --> 01:26:15.360 This continues to evolve rapidly. 01:26:15.360 --> 01:26:17.630 We've been very engaged for several weeks now, 01:26:17.630 --> 01:26:20.770 not just internally, but in the interagency. 01:26:20.770 --> 01:26:22.650 And so, I appreciate the offer 01:26:22.650 --> 01:26:24.960 and we'll get that back to you soonest in terms of 01:26:24.960 --> 01:26:26.880 just anticipating leaning forward into it. 01:26:26.880 --> 01:26:27.713 - Thank you. 01:26:27.713 --> 01:26:29.170 And then lastly, I just was a little confused 01:26:29.170 --> 01:26:31.240 on your answer on climate change. 01:26:31.240 --> 01:26:33.490 I sort of heard from General Milley 01:26:33.490 --> 01:26:35.900 that, yes, you believe it's a national security threat. 01:26:35.900 --> 01:26:39.133 Secretary Esper, you were more caveated. 01:26:40.180 --> 01:26:42.220 The Pentagon itself, your own staffs, 01:26:42.220 --> 01:26:46.030 put out a report in 2014 that climate change 01:26:46.030 --> 01:26:48.150 has an impact on national security. 01:26:48.150 --> 01:26:51.360 Even just more super storms, et cetera, 01:26:51.360 --> 01:26:53.350 means more Guardsmen and more Reservists. 01:26:53.350 --> 01:26:55.980 Can you say yes or no, do you believe climate change 01:26:55.980 --> 01:26:57.370 is a threat to national security? 01:26:57.370 --> 01:26:59.940 - But what you just said, Congresswoman, is different. 01:26:59.940 --> 01:27:01.600 I agree that climate change 01:27:01.600 --> 01:27:03.220 creates impacts on national security. 01:27:03.220 --> 01:27:05.610 The specific question was, do I define it 01:27:05.610 --> 01:27:06.810 as a national security threat. 01:27:06.810 --> 01:27:08.260 I don't, in my traditional thinking 01:27:08.260 --> 01:27:10.560 about how I identify national security threats. 01:27:10.560 --> 01:27:11.410 - General Milley? 01:27:12.340 --> 01:27:14.240 - Yeah, and I agree with that. 01:27:14.240 --> 01:27:15.690 What I said, it has second and third order 01:27:15.690 --> 01:27:17.600 impacts on national security. 01:27:17.600 --> 01:27:19.960 I think the significant national security threats 01:27:19.960 --> 01:27:21.110 to the United States the Department of Defense 01:27:21.110 --> 01:27:23.220 needs to focus on is China, Russia, 01:27:23.220 --> 01:27:25.680 North Korea, Iran, and terrorists. 01:27:25.680 --> 01:27:26.890 And we can't do everything for everyone. 01:27:26.890 --> 01:27:27.723 There's a lot of threats. 01:27:27.723 --> 01:27:29.520 There's infrastructure, there's education systems, 01:27:29.520 --> 01:27:31.170 there's climate change, healthcare system. 01:27:31.170 --> 01:27:32.680 There's all kinds of threats, 01:27:32.680 --> 01:27:34.230 all of which could be bundled theoretically 01:27:34.230 --> 01:27:36.250 under the rubric of national security. 01:27:36.250 --> 01:27:39.160 But I think climate change has impacts 01:27:39.160 --> 01:27:41.500 that result in national security challenges. 01:27:41.500 --> 01:27:43.600 Such as, resource constraints, instability, 01:27:43.600 --> 01:27:45.770 and those sorts of things, in different parts of the world. 01:27:45.770 --> 01:27:46.610 Absolutely. 01:27:46.610 --> 01:27:48.480 So there's second and third order impacts, 01:27:48.480 --> 01:27:50.810 there's national security challenges as a result. 01:27:50.810 --> 01:27:52.860 But, the threats as I define them, 01:27:52.860 --> 01:27:55.190 are right in accordance with that NDS. 01:27:55.190 --> 01:27:56.633 - [Chairman Smith] Thank you, gentlemen. 01:27:57.680 --> 01:27:58.883 Mr. Waltz? 01:27:59.720 --> 01:28:00.840 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:28:00.840 --> 01:28:03.900 Thank you Mr. Secretary, Chairman Milley, 01:28:03.900 --> 01:28:04.953 for being here today. 01:28:06.206 --> 01:28:09.240 To follow on to some of my colleagues on Corona, 01:28:09.240 --> 01:28:10.640 I just wanna be clear. 01:28:10.640 --> 01:28:13.740 We have a Soldier in South Korea 01:28:13.740 --> 01:28:17.480 that has, from reportings, self-quarantined. 01:28:17.480 --> 01:28:19.170 Mr. Secretary, have you given guidance 01:28:19.170 --> 01:28:22.500 to US forces Korea to limit the movement 01:28:22.500 --> 01:28:24.290 of Soldiers and their families 01:28:24.290 --> 01:28:27.156 understanding that this virus is very asymptomatic, 01:28:27.156 --> 01:28:31.700 that people can carry it, we don't know the exposure levels, 01:28:31.700 --> 01:28:33.080 people can carry it for weeks. 01:28:33.080 --> 01:28:35.360 Are you prepared or have you given guidance 01:28:35.360 --> 01:28:38.030 or are you giving guidance to limit 01:28:39.080 --> 01:28:40.920 the back and forth of those Soldiers and families? 01:28:40.920 --> 01:28:42.480 - I've given guidance to the commanders 01:28:42.480 --> 01:28:44.150 with regard to protection of the force 01:28:44.150 --> 01:28:45.810 and making sure that we can continue our mission. 01:28:45.810 --> 01:28:48.110 General Abrams and also Admiral Davidson 01:28:48.110 --> 01:28:50.530 have acted very aggressively. 01:28:50.530 --> 01:28:52.250 Abrams has taken action already 01:28:52.250 --> 01:28:55.430 with regard to limiting certain things, 01:28:55.430 --> 01:28:57.380 controlling the gates, who's coming through and all that. 01:28:57.380 --> 01:28:58.213 They're very attuned to this-- 01:28:58.213 --> 01:29:00.190 - I understand protecting the force there, 01:29:00.190 --> 01:29:05.190 but protecting the transmission back home via our military-- 01:29:05.330 --> 01:29:07.020 - Yes, and it's not just local 01:29:07.020 --> 01:29:08.500 with regard to the commander on the peninsula, 01:29:08.500 --> 01:29:10.420 but it's also, again, the INDOPACOM Commander 01:29:10.420 --> 01:29:13.290 and our own folks at the OSDPNR 01:29:13.290 --> 01:29:14.147 in terms of how we manage this 01:29:14.147 --> 01:29:15.830 and making sure it doesn't escape us. 01:29:15.830 --> 01:29:17.940 And, in fact, got another update this morning 01:29:17.940 --> 01:29:20.393 from General Abrams on this particular issue. 01:29:21.540 --> 01:29:22.520 - Thank you, appreciate it. 01:29:22.520 --> 01:29:27.520 So, just to follow on Chairman Smith's opening comments, 01:29:28.000 --> 01:29:29.990 and I think this is important that we begin talking 01:29:29.990 --> 01:29:33.100 about our competition with China this way, 01:29:33.100 --> 01:29:36.270 that we may be in a post-Cold War strategy, 01:29:36.270 --> 01:29:39.460 but I don't think Moscow or Beijing ever got that message. 01:29:39.460 --> 01:29:42.190 That they are currently in a Cold War with us. 01:29:42.190 --> 01:29:45.000 They're explicit, particularly the Chinese, 01:29:45.000 --> 01:29:47.300 in their desire to supplant the United States. 01:29:47.300 --> 01:29:49.380 It's a whole-of-government effort. 01:29:49.380 --> 01:29:51.470 Taking advantage of our free markets, 01:29:51.470 --> 01:29:53.870 our universities, international institutions 01:29:53.870 --> 01:29:56.060 such as the EU and the UN. 01:29:56.060 --> 01:29:57.400 This is a concerted effort. 01:29:57.400 --> 01:29:59.330 Would you agree with me that actually 01:29:59.330 --> 01:30:03.980 the strength of the United States, but also our adversary, 01:30:03.980 --> 01:30:07.063 China, is their economy much more, 01:30:08.740 --> 01:30:11.610 much more so than, necessarily, the military strength? 01:30:11.610 --> 01:30:13.160 - Yeah, I spoke to this in Munich last week. 01:30:13.160 --> 01:30:15.700 What concerns me, people like to make comparisons 01:30:15.700 --> 01:30:19.460 between China and the USSR, or China and Russia. 01:30:19.460 --> 01:30:21.500 The big difference is the economic might 01:30:21.500 --> 01:30:24.531 and potential of China as compared to Russia. 01:30:24.531 --> 01:30:26.680 That could really feed their economy, 01:30:26.680 --> 01:30:28.290 their military, their innovation, et cetera. 01:30:28.290 --> 01:30:30.160 - So would you share my concern, 01:30:30.160 --> 01:30:33.740 I mean, we have the largest RTD&E budget ever, 01:30:33.740 --> 01:30:35.690 which I think is a great thing, 01:30:35.690 --> 01:30:37.990 but I'm also concerned that we're funding 01:30:37.990 --> 01:30:40.731 Beijing's research and development. 01:30:40.731 --> 01:30:41.564 So would you share my concern 01:30:41.564 --> 01:30:44.470 that a lot of those dollars are going to institutions 01:30:44.470 --> 01:30:46.890 where we don't know if their faculty, 01:30:46.890 --> 01:30:49.690 their researchers, and many of the Chinese students, 01:30:49.690 --> 01:30:51.390 are part of the Talents Program 01:30:51.390 --> 01:30:53.902 and where that research is going. 01:30:53.902 --> 01:30:56.650 You share that concern that on the one hand 01:30:56.650 --> 01:30:58.610 we have such a large budget, 01:30:58.610 --> 01:31:01.740 on the other hand we could be funding our adversary. 01:31:01.740 --> 01:31:04.590 - I'm concerned about espionage, obviously, 01:31:04.590 --> 01:31:07.100 IP theft, theft of our cyber systems. 01:31:07.100 --> 01:31:08.137 And I'm concerned about research-- 01:31:08.137 --> 01:31:09.930 - Would you support legislation 01:31:09.930 --> 01:31:13.290 that limits institutions from receiving federal dollars, 01:31:13.290 --> 01:31:15.810 particularly DOD dollars, if they have faculty 01:31:15.810 --> 01:31:17.730 that are part of the Chinese Talents Program? 01:31:17.730 --> 01:31:20.320 - I don't know enough about the legislation 01:31:20.320 --> 01:31:21.620 or the Chinese Talents Program, 01:31:21.620 --> 01:31:22.550 but I'm very concerned-- - [Waltz] I think you should. 01:31:22.550 --> 01:31:24.980 - About the Chinese students in America, 01:31:24.980 --> 01:31:29.040 or professors in America, that have access to our research. 01:31:29.040 --> 01:31:31.990 - Would you share my concern, differently, on markets, 01:31:31.990 --> 01:31:35.440 that US pensioners and some of our biggest pension programs 01:31:35.440 --> 01:31:37.790 including the Thrift Savings Plan 01:31:37.790 --> 01:31:41.930 are providing billions of dollars to Chinese companies, 01:31:41.930 --> 01:31:44.630 many of them in China's defense industry? 01:31:44.630 --> 01:31:47.170 So essentially, indirectly, US pensioners 01:31:47.170 --> 01:31:50.463 are funding the Chinese defense build up. 01:31:51.520 --> 01:31:53.140 Would you agree with that characterization? 01:31:53.140 --> 01:31:54.470 - I've worked on this issue in the past 01:31:54.470 --> 01:31:56.570 about China using our capital markets and others 01:31:56.570 --> 01:31:58.150 to fund their activities. 01:31:58.150 --> 01:31:59.810 Again, it's something I'd wanna understand better 01:31:59.810 --> 01:32:01.900 before commenting, but I am concerned about 01:32:01.900 --> 01:32:05.350 Americans or groups providing the capital that China needs-- 01:32:05.350 --> 01:32:07.240 - Should we limit the TSP from investing 01:32:07.240 --> 01:32:10.080 in Chinese firms, particularly those that are, 01:32:10.080 --> 01:32:12.510 that are funding the defense program? 01:32:12.510 --> 01:32:14.180 - Congressman, I appreciate you want an affirmative answer 01:32:14.180 --> 01:32:16.510 but I'd like to understand things and get my facts right 01:32:16.510 --> 01:32:19.160 and my data and my arguments before I commit to something. 01:32:19.160 --> 01:32:19.993 - Totally understandable. 01:32:19.993 --> 01:32:21.180 Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 01:32:21.180 --> 01:32:23.573 Quickly, Mr. Chairman, on Afghanistan. 01:32:25.120 --> 01:32:27.860 I think the concern from Miss Cheney, myself, and others, 01:32:27.860 --> 01:32:32.360 is that the signal that we are prepared to draw down 01:32:32.360 --> 01:32:34.530 and withdrawal from Afghanistan, 01:32:34.530 --> 01:32:36.240 the signal sent now, even if that 01:32:36.240 --> 01:32:39.100 is at some point in the near future, 01:32:39.100 --> 01:32:41.390 could cause a fracturing of the government 01:32:41.390 --> 01:32:43.660 by extension of fracturing of the army, 01:32:43.660 --> 01:32:45.800 which to me is the canary in the coal mine 01:32:45.800 --> 01:32:47.230 with the ethnic tensions, 01:32:47.230 --> 01:32:49.880 and essentially put us back to 2001. 01:32:49.880 --> 01:32:52.420 But here's my concern. 01:32:52.420 --> 01:32:54.130 Would you agree in your military advice 01:32:54.130 --> 01:32:56.340 that the Taliban has the capability, 01:32:56.340 --> 01:32:57.680 so let's assume they have the will 01:32:57.680 --> 01:33:01.710 to enter in to a peaceful political process, 01:33:01.710 --> 01:33:04.680 how do they have the capability to enforce the agreement 01:33:04.680 --> 01:33:07.140 and keep Al Qaeda and ISIS at bay 01:33:07.140 --> 01:33:09.560 where we have struggled, coalition has struggled, 01:33:09.560 --> 01:33:12.690 and a 300,000 man Afghan Army has struggled? 01:33:12.690 --> 01:33:15.370 Do you think they have the military capability 01:33:15.370 --> 01:33:19.130 to keep Al Qaeda and ISIS subdued 01:33:20.123 --> 01:33:21.260 in the wake of a withdrawal? 01:33:21.260 --> 01:33:22.093 - [Chairman Smith] That's gonna have to 01:33:22.093 --> 01:33:22.926 be taken for the record, 01:33:22.926 --> 01:33:25.080 cause we're comfortably over time at this point. 01:33:25.080 --> 01:33:27.980 So, you'll have to get back to him on that. 01:33:27.980 --> 01:33:29.030 Miss Escobar? 01:33:29.030 --> 01:33:30.420 - Thank you, Chairman, and gentlemen, 01:33:30.420 --> 01:33:32.460 thank you so much for sticking around 01:33:32.460 --> 01:33:34.470 and for being here all morning with us. 01:33:34.470 --> 01:33:37.540 Thank you for your testimony and your service. 01:33:37.540 --> 01:33:40.900 This is a hearing to focus on the budget 01:33:40.900 --> 01:33:42.800 and I heard some things, a couple things, 01:33:42.800 --> 01:33:45.030 that were alarming to me, 01:33:45.030 --> 01:33:48.300 and I'd like to drill down a little bit on them. 01:33:48.300 --> 01:33:50.140 In particular, about the wall 01:33:50.140 --> 01:33:52.690 and the reprogramming of the funds 01:33:52.690 --> 01:33:54.920 that were appropriated by Congress. 01:33:54.920 --> 01:33:58.690 I represent El Paso, Texas, home to Fort Bliss, 01:33:58.690 --> 01:34:01.660 our second largest military in the installation. 01:34:01.660 --> 01:34:06.530 A critical key asset to our national defense. 01:34:06.530 --> 01:34:10.800 And so the juxtaposition of what we're dealing with 01:34:10.800 --> 01:34:12.500 is not lost on me. 01:34:12.500 --> 01:34:17.150 The kind of profound disconnect for me, 01:34:17.150 --> 01:34:20.740 that while we have investments that are badly needed, 01:34:20.740 --> 01:34:23.860 strategic investments that should be made at Fort Bliss 01:34:23.860 --> 01:34:27.200 like a rail yard that could help, 01:34:27.200 --> 01:34:31.780 or rail improvements that are critical to Defender 20, 01:34:31.780 --> 01:34:36.440 and we have infrastructure has been deemed unsafe, 01:34:36.440 --> 01:34:38.740 money is being pulled for a wall 01:34:38.740 --> 01:34:42.690 that is preventing moms and babies 01:34:42.690 --> 01:34:45.330 and dads and their children 01:34:45.330 --> 01:34:48.700 from seeking asylum protection in the United States 01:34:48.700 --> 01:34:53.700 and that that somehow is key to our national security. 01:34:53.720 --> 01:34:58.720 And so I'd like to ask Mr. Secretary, 01:34:58.810 --> 01:35:02.760 how will you ensure that a community like mine 01:35:02.760 --> 01:35:07.690 and Fort Bliss, that our Soldiers who serve at Fort Bliss 01:35:07.690 --> 01:35:10.940 are not asked to rely on unsafe infrastructure 01:35:10.940 --> 01:35:13.270 when that money is being diverted for a wall 01:35:13.270 --> 01:35:16.190 that is keeping out those moms and babies 01:35:16.190 --> 01:35:17.963 and those fathers and children? 01:35:19.200 --> 01:35:21.080 - Well, Congresswoman, we wouldn't 01:35:21.080 --> 01:35:22.473 put any servicemember in a situation 01:35:22.473 --> 01:35:24.920 where is affects life, health, and safety. 01:35:24.920 --> 01:35:26.230 If you're aware of something like that, 01:35:26.230 --> 01:35:27.490 I'd like to know, frankly, 01:35:27.490 --> 01:35:28.323 'cause then I could follow up 01:35:28.323 --> 01:35:29.156 with the Secretary of the Army. 01:35:29.156 --> 01:35:31.430 But life, health, and safety issues 01:35:31.430 --> 01:35:33.053 immediately pop to the top of my list of things 01:35:33.053 --> 01:35:35.480 that we would wanna make sure that we understand, 01:35:35.480 --> 01:35:37.330 but that has not been reported to me. 01:35:37.330 --> 01:35:39.536 So I'd like to follow up with you, if that's the case, 01:35:39.536 --> 01:35:41.259 if you have something like that. 01:35:41.259 --> 01:35:42.700 - Okay, I'll definitely follow up with that. 01:35:42.700 --> 01:35:46.923 How does a border wall improve our strategic capabilities? 01:35:48.940 --> 01:35:50.340 - Well the purpose of the wall, obviously, 01:35:50.340 --> 01:35:54.230 is to secure the border from illicit activity. 01:35:54.230 --> 01:35:57.600 Whether it's trafficking of human persons, 01:35:57.600 --> 01:35:59.550 whether it's criminal trespassing, 01:35:59.550 --> 01:36:01.680 or whether it's, for example, it's counter-narcotics. 01:36:01.680 --> 01:36:05.870 In fact, in the case of the sources just drawn up, 01:36:05.870 --> 01:36:09.140 it comes under the 284 account, which is counter-narcotics. 01:36:09.140 --> 01:36:11.680 So that's the purpose, is to put a border up there 01:36:11.680 --> 01:36:14.270 so our border patrol can respond more effectively 01:36:14.270 --> 01:36:16.020 and quickly to make sure we prevent 01:36:16.020 --> 01:36:18.490 those elements from coming across the border. 01:36:18.490 --> 01:36:20.630 - Well the funding is being pulled 01:36:20.630 --> 01:36:22.860 not just from those accounts, is that correct? 01:36:22.860 --> 01:36:24.480 - It's pulled from the excess to need 01:36:24.480 --> 01:36:27.473 or early to need accounts, through the counter-narcotics. 01:36:28.410 --> 01:36:30.900 Where we've been asked to support DHS 01:36:30.900 --> 01:36:32.960 is on parts of the border that are these routes 01:36:32.960 --> 01:36:36.120 for counter-narcotics to come across. 01:36:36.120 --> 01:36:37.990 - And I actually, one of the things 01:36:37.990 --> 01:36:40.120 that I heard from you was about this, 01:36:40.120 --> 01:36:42.500 the funding being pulled from projects 01:36:42.500 --> 01:36:46.030 that were ahead of or in excess of need. 01:36:46.030 --> 01:36:48.713 And when one of my colleagues asked you, 01:36:50.110 --> 01:36:53.620 I think it was Miss Davis, asked in more detail 01:36:53.620 --> 01:36:56.080 about that funding you said, well, Congress put it there. 01:36:56.080 --> 01:36:58.830 And so, are you essentially telling us 01:36:58.830 --> 01:37:02.490 that we over-programmed in those cases? 01:37:02.490 --> 01:37:07.260 - Well this is not unusual, going back decades. 01:37:07.260 --> 01:37:11.580 But, if we ask for three F-35s and you provide five, 01:37:11.580 --> 01:37:14.000 we consider those two as additional, 01:37:14.000 --> 01:37:16.317 excess to need, in that budget year. 01:37:16.317 --> 01:37:18.740 - And I appreciate that, and I don't mean to interrupt, 01:37:18.740 --> 01:37:21.850 I apologize, it's just five minutes goes very quickly. 01:37:21.850 --> 01:37:25.600 So, as we're looking to plus up programs 01:37:25.600 --> 01:37:29.330 that we believe are critical to our national defense 01:37:29.330 --> 01:37:32.290 or critical to helping reinforce 01:37:32.290 --> 01:37:34.410 the mission that we all share, 01:37:34.410 --> 01:37:38.960 it would be very helpful for us to know in advance 01:37:38.960 --> 01:37:41.860 where we see an excess of need. 01:37:41.860 --> 01:37:45.080 And obviously, we know where some of those areas are, 01:37:45.080 --> 01:37:49.600 but I feel like this excess of need component 01:37:49.600 --> 01:37:51.760 essentially enables the president's, 01:37:51.760 --> 01:37:56.030 what I consider his usurping of Congressional authority 01:37:56.030 --> 01:37:59.090 and usurping the will of the people. 01:37:59.090 --> 01:38:01.450 And so any help that we could get 01:38:01.450 --> 01:38:04.750 as we try to determine what those plus ups are 01:38:04.750 --> 01:38:07.190 and then we have to look for those offsets. 01:38:07.190 --> 01:38:09.930 Would love your ideas on where we can find those offsets 01:38:09.930 --> 01:38:11.860 to better utilize that money, 01:38:11.860 --> 01:38:16.860 so that the wall debate can be had within the committee 01:38:17.370 --> 01:38:19.420 on the Department of Homeland Security 01:38:19.420 --> 01:38:22.970 and not the committee for armed services. 01:38:22.970 --> 01:38:25.380 My time is up, I have a number of other questions, 01:38:25.380 --> 01:38:26.463 but I'll follow up separately with you. 01:38:26.463 --> 01:38:27.960 Thank you. - [Chairman Smith] Thank you. 01:38:27.960 --> 01:38:28.793 Miss Luria? 01:38:30.090 --> 01:38:32.060 - Well thank you, and thank you both, gentlemen, 01:38:32.060 --> 01:38:35.380 for staying long enough to get to the last person 01:38:35.380 --> 01:38:38.980 and our newest member, Mr. Brindisi as well. 01:38:38.980 --> 01:38:41.330 Leading up to this hearing, 01:38:41.330 --> 01:38:44.630 I wanted to understand the data-drive approach 01:38:44.630 --> 01:38:47.380 that I thought DOD would be using 01:38:47.380 --> 01:38:49.070 to develop their budget requests 01:38:49.070 --> 01:38:51.810 and in doing that I reference two documents 01:38:51.810 --> 01:38:53.440 produced by your department. 01:38:53.440 --> 01:38:55.640 One is the Annual Performance Plan 01:38:55.640 --> 01:38:58.160 and the other is the Annual Performance Report. 01:38:58.160 --> 01:39:00.850 Are you familiar with and have you review those documents? 01:39:00.850 --> 01:39:02.480 And were they used in guiding 01:39:02.480 --> 01:39:05.450 your submission to this committee? 01:39:05.450 --> 01:39:09.090 - I am aware of them, I have not reviewed them recently, 01:39:09.090 --> 01:39:11.070 and I'd have to defer to my staff. 01:39:11.070 --> 01:39:12.514 I can get you an answer whether it was used. 01:39:12.514 --> 01:39:13.379 - There's just a couple things 01:39:13.379 --> 01:39:16.000 that stood out in there to me. 01:39:16.000 --> 01:39:20.050 The first, strategic objective in this document 01:39:20.050 --> 01:39:22.390 says that we should restore military readiness 01:39:22.390 --> 01:39:24.750 to build a more lethal force. 01:39:24.750 --> 01:39:26.980 Think that sounds like a great objective, 01:39:26.980 --> 01:39:28.220 we can all agree with that. 01:39:28.220 --> 01:39:29.053 - [Secretary Esper] It's the first line 01:39:29.053 --> 01:39:30.120 of effort in our strategy. 01:39:30.120 --> 01:39:32.950 - Yes, but I'll dig down, because I thought 01:39:32.950 --> 01:39:34.280 I would find some great metrics 01:39:34.280 --> 01:39:35.920 'cause this is a performance report 01:39:35.920 --> 01:39:39.030 and the goal is that you use last year's budget, 01:39:39.030 --> 01:39:41.110 how did you accomplish that, where are we this year, 01:39:41.110 --> 01:39:44.470 and therefore that's justifying the next request 01:39:44.470 --> 01:39:46.240 that you're making to achieve those goals. 01:39:46.240 --> 01:39:48.907 So the number one priority goal, 1.1.1, 01:39:50.260 --> 01:39:52.330 says to improve the Department's ability 01:39:52.330 --> 01:39:55.120 to measure, assess, and understand readiness. 01:39:55.120 --> 01:39:56.420 All of us who've served, we're familiar 01:39:56.420 --> 01:39:57.980 with the DURS system, I'm assuming 01:39:57.980 --> 01:39:59.830 that it's referring to that. 01:39:59.830 --> 01:40:04.140 And so it's 2020, and our goal is still 01:40:04.140 --> 01:40:06.550 to figure out how to report out readiness. 01:40:06.550 --> 01:40:11.550 And I even found a 1998 GAO study on military readiness, 01:40:12.060 --> 01:40:14.050 that actually says in 1998, 01:40:14.050 --> 01:40:15.810 that for more than a decade, 01:40:15.810 --> 01:40:18.020 various audits and oversight organizations 01:40:18.020 --> 01:40:20.320 have questioned the thoroughness and reliability 01:40:20.320 --> 01:40:22.540 of DOD reports on readiness. 01:40:22.540 --> 01:40:25.690 So you add all this up, I'm not great at math here, 01:40:25.690 --> 01:40:27.140 but over 30 years we've been trying 01:40:27.140 --> 01:40:30.370 to figure out how to report our readiness. 01:40:30.370 --> 01:40:35.370 And then digging in further in your budget outline 01:40:36.160 --> 01:40:38.340 you specifically say that you're going 01:40:38.340 --> 01:40:40.820 to give $125 billion to readiness. 01:40:40.820 --> 01:40:42.280 And then within each service, 01:40:42.280 --> 01:40:45.713 Army, $3.4 billion, Navy Marine Corps $2.7, Air Force, $1.7, 01:40:46.800 --> 01:40:49.590 additional funds to readiness. 01:40:49.590 --> 01:40:51.200 And also in your comments today 01:40:51.200 --> 01:40:54.693 you said you support the Navy's decision to fund readiness. 01:40:56.800 --> 01:40:57.930 But if we can't even find out, 01:40:57.930 --> 01:40:59.300 if we don't even know what our readiness is, 01:40:59.300 --> 01:41:00.740 if we don't even know where, 01:41:00.740 --> 01:41:01.840 do you understand what I'm saying? 01:41:01.840 --> 01:41:02.673 - I do. 01:41:02.673 --> 01:41:04.060 I think one of the changes I made when I came in 01:41:04.060 --> 01:41:05.790 is to get a better accounting of readiness, 01:41:05.790 --> 01:41:07.637 so we've changed the system 01:41:07.637 --> 01:41:09.410 and we're making a lot of great progress 01:41:09.410 --> 01:41:12.077 working between OSD and the joint staff-- 01:41:12.077 --> 01:41:14.860 - But it's still your number one objective? 01:41:14.860 --> 01:41:16.981 Is to actually figure out what readiness is. 01:41:16.981 --> 01:41:18.580 - No, I think we have good metrics on readiness. 01:41:18.580 --> 01:41:20.173 We now assess it based on our immediate reaction force-- 01:41:20.173 --> 01:41:22.850 - So this document is maybe not accurate-- 01:41:22.850 --> 01:41:24.200 - Could be dated because we've, 01:41:24.200 --> 01:41:26.785 at least since I've been on the job now nine months, 01:41:26.785 --> 01:41:28.990 we're continuing to evolve the process 01:41:28.990 --> 01:41:30.540 and make changes so we better understand 01:41:30.540 --> 01:41:33.090 based on war plans, contingency plans, 01:41:33.090 --> 01:41:34.740 what do we need and when do we need it 01:41:34.740 --> 01:41:36.030 so that we're prepared to put that 01:41:36.030 --> 01:41:37.120 at a highest readiness level, 01:41:37.120 --> 01:41:39.690 a second readiness level, et cetera. 01:41:39.690 --> 01:41:42.530 - Okay, so I appreciate that feedback. 01:41:42.530 --> 01:41:43.720 You feel like you have improvement, 01:41:43.720 --> 01:41:44.990 you have a better idea of readiness. 01:41:44.990 --> 01:41:46.960 It just was not reflected in this document 01:41:46.960 --> 01:41:49.550 which was portrayed as being part of the process 01:41:49.550 --> 01:41:52.827 in developing the budget, so that was unclear to me. 01:41:52.827 --> 01:41:54.610 And I do wanna associate myself 01:41:54.610 --> 01:41:56.760 with the comments from Mr. Courtney, 01:41:56.760 --> 01:41:59.450 Mr. Whitman, Mr. Gallagher, about concern 01:41:59.450 --> 01:42:01.310 about the direction we're going 01:42:01.310 --> 01:42:03.110 as far as shipbuilding, ship construction, 01:42:03.110 --> 01:42:06.020 especially if we haven't seen the 30 year shipbuilding plan. 01:42:06.020 --> 01:42:08.110 I won't reiterate at any length 01:42:08.110 --> 01:42:10.190 my concern about the optimized fleet response plan, 01:42:10.190 --> 01:42:11.630 I know that a study if forthcoming 01:42:11.630 --> 01:42:13.300 and you indicated in the next couple weeks 01:42:13.300 --> 01:42:14.310 that I'll look forward-- 01:42:14.310 --> 01:42:15.930 - I think you and I agree on this issue. 01:42:15.930 --> 01:42:19.040 - Yes, and also the importance 01:42:19.040 --> 01:42:22.300 of strategic sealift specifically. 01:42:22.300 --> 01:42:25.000 And just pointing out the scale of that investment. 01:42:25.000 --> 01:42:27.400 I know that that the plan, I spoke with the CNO yesterday, 01:42:27.400 --> 01:42:30.170 it to buy two used ships next year, 01:42:30.170 --> 01:42:31.480 one the additional year. 01:42:31.480 --> 01:42:34.070 But if we look at the importance of strategic sealift 01:42:34.070 --> 01:42:38.153 to get 90% of our ground forces overseas and to the fight, 01:42:39.090 --> 01:42:42.280 for about $1.5 to $2 billion, we could buy 01:42:42.280 --> 01:42:44.370 all of the ships we need used. 01:42:44.370 --> 01:42:46.160 Yet, we don't prioritize that, 01:42:46.160 --> 01:42:47.197 because we buy all this equipment 01:42:47.197 --> 01:42:48.360 and we can't get it there. 01:42:48.360 --> 01:42:49.790 And I know General Milley, 01:42:49.790 --> 01:42:51.940 if you could expand a little bit in the time remaining, 01:42:51.940 --> 01:42:54.560 you seem to indicate that we would just expand the TPFDD, 01:42:54.560 --> 01:42:57.273 we would just look at the way to get the forces to Korea 01:42:57.273 --> 01:42:59.080 and if we don't have enough ships to get them there 01:42:59.080 --> 01:43:00.300 in the time that we've planned for, 01:43:00.300 --> 01:43:02.150 we would just take longer. 01:43:02.150 --> 01:43:04.450 Is that something that you're reevaluating the whole OPLAN 01:43:04.450 --> 01:43:07.650 around not having strategic sealift as designed? 01:43:07.650 --> 01:43:09.600 - Well when we evaluate risk, 01:43:09.600 --> 01:43:12.610 when I have to submit my Chairman's Risk Assessment, 01:43:12.610 --> 01:43:15.100 it's based on the ability of us 01:43:15.100 --> 01:43:17.960 to be able to do our task, military task, the mission, 01:43:17.960 --> 01:43:20.080 to be able to do that at an acceptable level of cost 01:43:20.080 --> 01:43:21.626 expressed in the lives of troops, 01:43:21.626 --> 01:43:25.120 and do it in accordance with time. 01:43:25.120 --> 01:43:28.920 So, the time is a function of getting there 01:43:28.920 --> 01:43:30.300 on time with strategic lift, 01:43:30.300 --> 01:43:31.950 and that's gonna be stretched out. 01:43:31.950 --> 01:43:32.783 - [Chairman Smith] I'm sorry to interrupt 01:43:32.783 --> 01:43:33.690 'cause I understand that you guys 01:43:33.690 --> 01:43:36.150 are running short of time. 01:43:36.150 --> 01:43:38.280 And I do wanna give Mr Brindisi a quick chance 01:43:38.280 --> 01:43:39.860 before we get you outta here, 01:43:39.860 --> 01:43:41.060 so we're gonna have to cut that off, 01:43:41.060 --> 01:43:42.640 and Mr. Brindisi, go ahead. 01:43:42.640 --> 01:43:44.764 - The Chairman's always correct and the Chairman on time. 01:43:44.764 --> 01:43:46.270 (everyone chuckles) 01:43:46.270 --> 01:43:47.270 - Thank you, Chairman. 01:43:47.270 --> 01:43:49.220 Secretary Esper, Chairman Milley, 01:43:49.220 --> 01:43:50.950 thank you so much for sticking around 01:43:50.950 --> 01:43:53.050 to hear from me, the low man here. 01:43:53.050 --> 01:43:54.860 You have terrific endurance to make it through all this, 01:43:54.860 --> 01:43:55.990 so thank you. 01:43:55.990 --> 01:43:57.115 Real quick, I wanted to ask you, 01:43:57.115 --> 01:44:00.180 the national defense strategy outlines 01:44:00.180 --> 01:44:02.140 that we must prioritize R&D 01:44:02.140 --> 01:44:05.710 and emerging technologies like quantum and AI, 01:44:05.710 --> 01:44:08.660 because China's investing very heavily in those areas. 01:44:08.660 --> 01:44:11.100 Secretary, do you feel that we're investing 01:44:11.100 --> 01:44:13.293 adequate resources to keep pace with China? 01:44:14.680 --> 01:44:16.830 - In the two areas that you mentioned, I do. 01:44:16.830 --> 01:44:19.170 There's those two and there's nine other areas 01:44:19.170 --> 01:44:22.320 where we've noted as critical technologies for the future, 01:44:22.320 --> 01:44:25.010 and we're putting as much as we can into those systems 01:44:25.010 --> 01:44:27.223 and trying to accelerate the development. 01:44:28.400 --> 01:44:30.790 - And I wanna ask, too, because I have 01:44:30.790 --> 01:44:32.937 an Air Force research laboratory 01:44:32.937 --> 01:44:34.860 in my district in Rome, New York, 01:44:34.860 --> 01:44:39.860 and in this year's NDAA, last year's NDAA, we established 01:44:40.210 --> 01:44:43.440 a Quantum Information Science Innovation Center there 01:44:43.440 --> 01:44:44.960 to really help leverage partnerships 01:44:44.960 --> 01:44:47.440 between DOD, academia, and industry. 01:44:47.440 --> 01:44:49.760 Can you talk to me a little bit about the importance 01:44:49.760 --> 01:44:52.580 of those kinds of partnerships in this area? 01:44:52.580 --> 01:44:55.420 - I think it gets to the issue we discussed earlier 01:44:55.420 --> 01:44:57.610 about having a broad innovation base 01:44:57.610 --> 01:45:00.630 and making sure we're tapping all potential resources. 01:45:00.630 --> 01:45:03.170 Not just the traditional big defense companies, 01:45:03.170 --> 01:45:07.403 but also academia, small innovators, entrepreneurs, 01:45:08.370 --> 01:45:09.520 the whole broad range, to make sure 01:45:09.520 --> 01:45:11.850 we can deliver the very best for out warfighters. 01:45:11.850 --> 01:45:13.460 - Okay, and then I wanna talk 01:45:13.460 --> 01:45:15.820 a little bit about counter-UAS. 01:45:15.820 --> 01:45:18.650 I'm specifically concerned about 01:45:18.650 --> 01:45:20.490 what our adversaries are up to 01:45:20.490 --> 01:45:23.681 and I wanted to ask, because this same research lab 01:45:23.681 --> 01:45:25.870 in Rome in doing a lot of great work 01:45:25.870 --> 01:45:28.300 developing counter-UAS technologies 01:45:28.300 --> 01:45:31.070 to mitigate these threats from our adversaries. 01:45:31.070 --> 01:45:33.360 So, Secretary Esper, Chairman Milley, 01:45:33.360 --> 01:45:36.290 can you speak briefly about how the services are postured 01:45:36.290 --> 01:45:37.983 to address the UAS threat? 01:45:39.020 --> 01:45:42.023 - It is a challenging threat that's constantly evolving. 01:45:43.010 --> 01:45:45.680 In many cases, quicker than we can respond. 01:45:45.680 --> 01:45:47.880 We had all services moving out 01:45:47.880 --> 01:45:49.210 on a number of different programs. 01:45:49.210 --> 01:45:51.600 I consolidated that last year. 01:45:51.600 --> 01:45:53.350 We made the Army the executive agent, 01:45:53.350 --> 01:45:55.970 and now they're pulling together a much more focused effort 01:45:55.970 --> 01:45:57.230 that looks at fewer systems, 01:45:57.230 --> 01:45:59.370 but tries to accelerate them. 01:45:59.370 --> 01:46:00.460 But we need to get to the point 01:46:00.460 --> 01:46:03.610 where it's much less hardware based, but software based, 01:46:03.610 --> 01:46:05.640 and going back to the roots, 01:46:05.640 --> 01:46:07.200 so we can kinda stay ahead of the enemy 01:46:07.200 --> 01:46:09.070 instead of playing catch up with regard, 01:46:09.070 --> 01:46:09.960 and there's different systems, 01:46:09.960 --> 01:46:12.670 we have to have systems that we can use 01:46:12.670 --> 01:46:15.900 back here in the States, systems we can use overseas 01:46:15.900 --> 01:46:16.790 with partner countries, 01:46:16.790 --> 01:46:17.670 and then there's systems we need 01:46:17.670 --> 01:46:19.840 to be able to use on the battlefield. 01:46:19.840 --> 01:46:21.060 - [Brindisi] Chairman Milley? 01:46:21.060 --> 01:46:25.410 - So the threat is increasing significantly 01:46:25.410 --> 01:46:27.600 in the unmanned aerial systems 01:46:27.600 --> 01:46:30.010 and this threat not only applies to nation sates 01:46:30.010 --> 01:46:32.470 like China and Russia and Iran and North Korea, 01:46:32.470 --> 01:46:34.870 but terrorist organizations are also increasing the use 01:46:34.870 --> 01:46:35.910 of unmanned aerial systems. 01:46:35.910 --> 01:46:38.000 So, we're putting a fair amount of money, I think, 01:46:38.000 --> 01:46:42.400 in the development of ground-based counter-UAS systems 01:46:42.400 --> 01:46:43.670 and we're getting them deployed. 01:46:43.670 --> 01:46:45.790 And, in fact, we're using some of them right now 01:46:45.790 --> 01:46:48.810 in the various locations like Afghanistan and Iraq. 01:46:48.810 --> 01:46:50.630 - Can you talk to the extent that you can talk about it, 01:46:50.630 --> 01:46:52.960 what collaboration is there with private industry 01:46:52.960 --> 01:46:53.793 right now around that? 01:46:53.793 --> 01:46:56.810 Because I can tell you that the lab 01:46:56.810 --> 01:46:58.280 that's in the district that I represent 01:46:58.280 --> 01:47:01.340 is right next door to an FAA test site 01:47:01.340 --> 01:47:02.710 for unmanned aerial research, 01:47:02.710 --> 01:47:05.720 and really, the 50 mile radius that they have 01:47:05.720 --> 01:47:07.610 to test drones in upstate New York 01:47:07.610 --> 01:47:09.510 seems to be in an ideal location 01:47:09.510 --> 01:47:11.790 located right new door to an Air Force research laboratory 01:47:11.790 --> 01:47:13.930 that's doing all this counter-UAS work. 01:47:13.930 --> 01:47:16.440 What kind of collaborations are taking place 01:47:16.440 --> 01:47:18.453 between DOD and private industry? 01:47:19.660 --> 01:47:20.880 - I know there is collaboration. 01:47:20.880 --> 01:47:22.260 I can't give you the specifics, 01:47:22.260 --> 01:47:23.960 I'd have to come back to you 01:47:23.960 --> 01:47:25.860 with specific collaboration, 01:47:25.860 --> 01:47:27.690 or examples of collaboration. 01:47:27.690 --> 01:47:29.210 But I know there is collaboration with industry 01:47:29.210 --> 01:47:31.020 and all of these systems are built 01:47:31.020 --> 01:47:31.990 by the commercial industry. 01:47:31.990 --> 01:47:34.020 So, all we do is lay on requirements 01:47:34.020 --> 01:47:36.470 and then start funding the research, development. 01:47:36.470 --> 01:47:38.100 But all that's done by the commercial industry. 01:47:38.100 --> 01:47:40.333 - Okay, and Secretary Esper, can you? 01:47:41.210 --> 01:47:43.000 - I think we need to take that back, Congressman, 01:47:43.000 --> 01:47:44.300 and give you a response. 01:47:44.300 --> 01:47:45.870 And I'll pass along to the Air Force as well 01:47:45.870 --> 01:47:47.140 when they come up to testify. 01:47:47.140 --> 01:47:47.973 - That'd be great. 01:47:47.973 --> 01:47:49.820 I'd love to invite you up there at some point in time, 01:47:49.820 --> 01:47:50.952 to Rome, if you ever wanna see 01:47:50.952 --> 01:47:53.130 the work they're doing at the lab there, 01:47:53.130 --> 01:47:54.317 the Air Force Research Laboratory 01:47:54.317 --> 01:47:55.870 and the test site right next door there. 01:47:55.870 --> 01:47:57.630 I think there's a lot that can be done, 01:47:57.630 --> 01:47:58.740 and certainly they're on the cutting edge 01:47:58.740 --> 01:48:01.800 of a lot of the counter-UAS technology that's taking place. 01:48:01.800 --> 01:48:03.640 - [Secretary Esper] Good, thank you. 01:48:03.640 --> 01:48:04.520 - Chairman, I yield back. 01:48:04.520 --> 01:48:05.353 - [Chairman Smith] Thank you. 01:48:05.353 --> 01:48:06.918 I'm sorry, we are over time. 01:48:06.918 --> 01:48:08.220 - [Secretary Esper] I'm gonna give you a response 01:48:08.220 --> 01:48:09.730 and I'll it along to the Air Force as well 01:48:09.730 --> 01:48:11.020 when they come up to testify. 01:48:11.020 --> 01:48:11.853 - That'd be great. 01:48:11.853 --> 01:48:13.690 I'd love to invite you up there at some point in time, 01:48:13.690 --> 01:48:14.910 to Rome, if you ever wanna see 01:48:14.910 --> 01:48:16.990 the work they're doing at the lab there, 01:48:16.990 --> 01:48:18.177 the Air Force Research Laboratory 01:48:18.177 --> 01:48:19.740 and the test site right next door there. 01:48:19.740 --> 01:48:21.500 I think there's a lot that can be done, 01:48:21.500 --> 01:48:22.620 and certainly they're on the cutting edge 01:48:22.620 --> 01:48:25.670 of a lot of the counter-UAS technology that's taking place. 01:48:25.670 --> 01:48:27.510 - [Secretary Esper] Good, thank you. 01:48:27.510 --> 01:48:28.390 - Chairman, I yield back. 01:48:28.390 --> 01:48:29.371 - [Chairman Smith] Thank you. 01:48:29.371 --> 01:48:30.964 I'm sorry, we are over time. 01:48:30.964 --> 01:48:32.930 All I have time left is, Miss Speier 01:48:32.930 --> 01:48:34.740 did have a quick question about TBI 01:48:34.740 --> 01:48:36.527 which has not been covered yet 01:48:36.527 --> 01:48:38.150 that I think would be helpful 01:48:38.150 --> 01:48:40.220 if we could just do that reasonably quickly. 01:48:40.220 --> 01:48:42.620 I will yield to Miss Speier for those questions. 01:48:42.620 --> 01:48:44.350 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:48:44.350 --> 01:48:48.520 Very briefly, there was a total of 109 servicemembers 01:48:48.520 --> 01:48:51.040 that were identified as having TBIs 01:48:51.040 --> 01:48:55.080 after the bombing in Iraq. 01:48:55.080 --> 01:48:58.293 Could you give us an update on how many are, 01:48:59.230 --> 01:49:01.340 have been diagnosed and what's the status 01:49:01.340 --> 01:49:03.160 of their conditions? 01:49:03.160 --> 01:49:05.340 - Item number one, Congresswoman, 01:49:05.340 --> 01:49:07.570 first priority for us is taking care of our servicemembers 01:49:07.570 --> 01:49:09.890 and making sure they have medical needs are met 01:49:09.890 --> 01:49:12.680 and they recover expeditiously. 01:49:12.680 --> 01:49:15.660 I think number two, I think the number 01:49:15.660 --> 01:49:20.660 is up to 112 right now, based on what happened. 01:49:20.700 --> 01:49:22.100 This was a new challenge to us. 01:49:22.100 --> 01:49:24.640 It's the first time we've seen our servicemembers 01:49:24.640 --> 01:49:26.750 subject to a ballistic missile attack 01:49:26.750 --> 01:49:30.330 with a 1,000 pound plus warhead, so we're learning things. 01:49:30.330 --> 01:49:33.030 And I've met with the joint staff surgeon to talk about this 01:49:33.030 --> 01:49:35.410 in terms of understanding how these symptoms 01:49:35.410 --> 01:49:37.820 manifest themselves over time, what it means, 01:49:37.820 --> 01:49:40.750 might it change how we categorize, 01:49:40.750 --> 01:49:41.980 take care of them, et cetera, et cetera. 01:49:41.980 --> 01:49:45.750 But the good news is, 70% have been returned to duty. 01:49:45.750 --> 01:49:48.970 The remainder are, some have returned home, 01:49:48.970 --> 01:49:52.050 some stayed in Germany, but 70% have returned to duty, 01:49:52.050 --> 01:49:56.210 and they've all been mild TBI, I think, is the assessment. 01:49:56.210 --> 01:49:57.650 - Thank you, I yield back. 01:49:57.650 --> 01:50:00.180 - Thank you very, very much. 01:50:00.180 --> 01:50:02.070 The only closing comments I have 01:50:02.070 --> 01:50:03.980 are two things that were raised during the hearing. 01:50:03.980 --> 01:50:05.860 One, there was a couple times when it was raised 01:50:05.860 --> 01:50:09.240 that we need to hit 3% to 5% above inflation 01:50:10.350 --> 01:50:11.470 in the defense budget in order 01:50:11.470 --> 01:50:13.750 to meet the national defense strategy. 01:50:13.750 --> 01:50:15.780 Highly unlikely, as you know, 01:50:15.780 --> 01:50:18.130 that we're gonna hit that 3% to 5% number, 01:50:18.130 --> 01:50:20.710 so it might be appropriate to rethink aspects 01:50:20.710 --> 01:50:23.207 of the NDS and see what makes sense, 01:50:23.207 --> 01:50:25.010 and in keeping with the overall theme 01:50:25.010 --> 01:50:29.370 of making sure that our means match our desired ends. 01:50:29.370 --> 01:50:31.170 The other thing is, on the nuclear piece, 01:50:31.170 --> 01:50:33.340 this is something we're going to fight 01:50:33.340 --> 01:50:34.300 over here in the budget 01:50:34.300 --> 01:50:38.060 because the $2.5 billion that was added to the NNSA 01:50:38.060 --> 01:50:40.730 is a big part of what's got Mr. Courtney 01:50:40.730 --> 01:50:43.143 and Mr. Whitman so upset, and rightfully so, 01:50:43.143 --> 01:50:48.143 in that we canceled an attack submarine as part of that. 01:50:48.230 --> 01:50:50.220 At the same time, I hope it was understood 01:50:50.220 --> 01:50:52.340 that what Miss Davis was saying, 01:50:52.340 --> 01:50:54.210 she wasn't questioning the importance 01:50:54.210 --> 01:50:57.010 of the nuclear deterrent, it's incredibly important. 01:50:57.010 --> 01:51:00.620 There is, however, $8 billion in, 01:51:00.620 --> 01:51:04.220 what they artfully refer to as, uncosted balances, 01:51:04.220 --> 01:51:07.620 currently within the NNSA for programs authorized 01:51:07.620 --> 01:51:09.240 and appropriated for over the years. 01:51:09.240 --> 01:51:11.750 If we got $8 billion hanging out in there 01:51:11.750 --> 01:51:14.690 that we haven't spent as planned, 01:51:14.690 --> 01:51:18.410 I question the wisdom of grabbing $2.5 billion 01:51:19.630 --> 01:51:23.110 to add to that, just to make us feel like we're doing more. 01:51:23.110 --> 01:51:27.300 Particularly at the cost of the very difficult battle 01:51:27.300 --> 01:51:30.690 we have over making sure we have enough submarines 01:51:30.690 --> 01:51:32.173 and ships overall. 01:51:33.030 --> 01:51:34.380 With that I yield to Mr. Thornberry 01:51:34.380 --> 01:51:35.950 for any closing comments he might have. 01:51:35.950 --> 01:51:37.633 - Mr. Chairman, I'd just say, 01:51:38.680 --> 01:51:41.140 I think it is also incumbent upon 01:51:41.140 --> 01:51:42.280 the Secretary and the Chairman 01:51:42.280 --> 01:51:45.670 to tell us what they think we need to spend. 01:51:45.670 --> 01:51:47.010 And if we don't provide it, 01:51:47.010 --> 01:51:48.920 then we have some of the responsibility 01:51:48.920 --> 01:51:51.470 for the consequences that come with that. 01:51:51.470 --> 01:51:53.960 Finally I would just say on the unobligated balances, 01:51:53.960 --> 01:51:56.420 I think it's up to us to dig deeper 01:51:56.420 --> 01:51:59.540 into exactly where those funds come from. 01:51:59.540 --> 01:52:03.570 Are they intended for a particular purpose, 01:52:03.570 --> 01:52:05.869 a construction project that's delayed, 01:52:05.869 --> 01:52:10.120 a weapon refurbishment, for example, that's been delayed, 01:52:10.120 --> 01:52:12.100 and I know we've got some of that. 01:52:12.100 --> 01:52:16.260 So, it is more into the details that'll be important. 01:52:16.260 --> 01:52:18.040 But I appreciate our witnesses being here. 01:52:18.040 --> 01:52:19.830 - I think that's a good point. 01:52:19.830 --> 01:52:21.950 We'll point out we had some frustration 01:52:21.950 --> 01:52:24.260 on missile defense along these lines as well, 01:52:24.260 --> 01:52:26.240 that we were sort of getting ahead of our skis, 01:52:26.240 --> 01:52:27.120 and we gotta have missile defense, 01:52:27.120 --> 01:52:28.110 we gotta have missile defense, 01:52:28.110 --> 01:52:29.417 so we poured a bunch of money into things 01:52:29.417 --> 01:52:33.790 and we just canceled the program after spending $2 billion 01:52:33.790 --> 01:52:36.030 and determining that it didn't work. 01:52:36.030 --> 01:52:37.360 That's the kinda thing we wanna 01:52:37.360 --> 01:52:38.970 try to avoid in this area. 01:52:38.970 --> 01:52:41.190 I thank you, very much, for your patience 01:52:41.190 --> 01:52:43.490 in getting through as many members as we did, 01:52:43.490 --> 01:52:45.440 and I appreciate your service 01:52:45.440 --> 01:52:47.040 and look forward to continuing to work with you. 01:52:47.040 --> 01:52:48.870 And with that, we are adjourned. 01:52:48.870 --> 01:52:49.970 Thanks. 01:52:49.970 --> 01:52:51.123 - [General Milley] Thank you, Chairman.