WEBVTT 00:03.840 --> 00:04.673 - Good? 00:05.710 --> 00:09.610 Okay, folks, we're gonna continue with our program here. 00:09.610 --> 00:11.533 We got some folks coming back in. 00:13.970 --> 00:18.110 Probably like you, I'm a little bit intrigued 00:18.110 --> 00:20.575 by the title of the next panel, 00:20.575 --> 00:25.575 Agile Land Forces: Black Swans and Pink Flamingos. 00:28.010 --> 00:30.700 We've got a couple of guys who will explain 00:30.700 --> 00:33.412 what that means to us here, two of my good friends. 00:33.412 --> 00:36.990 The panel chair, Lieutenant General Mike Bills, 00:36.990 --> 00:39.660 who is the commanding general of Eighth Army 00:39.660 --> 00:40.880 and the Chief of Staff 00:40.880 --> 00:44.630 for the Combined Forces Command in Korea 00:44.630 --> 00:45.970 and the moderator, 00:45.970 --> 00:50.400 one of the founders of the LANPAC symposium, 00:50.400 --> 00:53.487 a former commander of U.S. Army Pacific, 00:53.487 --> 00:56.600 Lieutenant General (Retired) Frank Wiercinski. 00:56.600 --> 00:59.420 Before they do that, I would just remind the crowd 00:59.420 --> 01:02.363 that there are a series of forums going on 01:02.363 --> 01:06.830 in the building here in parallel with the session 01:06.830 --> 01:08.520 that we have in this room, 01:08.520 --> 01:10.070 and I would just draw to your attention, 01:10.070 --> 01:13.528 when this panel concludes, and we break for lunch, 01:13.528 --> 01:17.930 in the Oahu Room across the foyer here 01:17.930 --> 01:22.590 is a panel called Building Pacific Partners Through Health. 01:22.590 --> 01:25.329 Healthcare and medical issues being discussed there 01:25.329 --> 01:29.770 for those that are interested at 11:30 when we break. 01:29.770 --> 01:32.894 With that, I'll turn it over to my good friends 01:32.894 --> 01:35.090 General Bills and General Wiercinski. 01:35.090 --> 01:36.390 Gents, go ahead. 01:36.390 --> 01:39.710 - Well, good morning LANPAC, and welcome to our panel 01:39.710 --> 01:43.382 on Black Swans, Pink Flamingos, and Agile Land Forces. 01:43.382 --> 01:45.916 We appreciate the opportunity to explore this topic. 01:45.916 --> 01:48.525 I thank my fellow panelists for taking the time 01:48.525 --> 01:52.103 and mental energy to tackle this challenging problem set. 01:52.103 --> 01:54.720 Thanks as well to the AUSA team: 01:54.720 --> 01:58.470 General Ham, General Swan, to General Brown and Yushebeck 01:58.470 --> 02:01.210 and for hosting this outstanding event its seventh year. 02:01.210 --> 02:04.100 I look forward to conversation today in remaining forums 02:04.100 --> 02:05.500 and panels this week. 02:05.500 --> 02:06.333 Let's start off 02:06.333 --> 02:08.930 by having Lieutenant General Frank Wiercinski 02:08.930 --> 02:11.820 introducing our panel members and offer some opening remarks 02:11.820 --> 02:13.330 on our topic. 02:13.330 --> 02:14.500 - Hey, good morning to everybody. 02:14.500 --> 02:15.900 Thanks for being here today. 02:16.992 --> 02:18.050 You know, Frank Hoffman, 02:18.050 --> 02:21.910 in his commentary Black Swans and Pink Flamingos. 02:21.910 --> 02:23.035 What is that? 02:23.035 --> 02:25.150 Well, I'll quote from him 02:25.150 --> 02:27.460 so that we have something to start, 02:27.460 --> 02:30.430 a basis for which you to think and prepare your questions 02:30.430 --> 02:31.983 for this esteemed panel. 02:32.987 --> 02:35.731 "We cannot pierce the opaqueness of the future, 02:35.731 --> 02:39.768 "nor can we simply stand pat and wait for the appearance 02:39.768 --> 02:42.613 "of the unknown unknowns, 02:43.597 --> 02:46.377 "or tomorrow's black swans. 02:46.377 --> 02:49.617 "A black swan is an event or a situation 02:49.617 --> 02:51.322 "which is unpredictable 02:51.322 --> 02:55.385 "and for which the consequences could not be measured. 02:55.385 --> 03:00.385 "In contrast, a pink flamingo is a predictable event 03:01.437 --> 03:05.847 "that is ignored due to cognitive biases 03:05.847 --> 03:09.017 "of a senior leader or a group of leaders trapped 03:09.017 --> 03:11.797 "by powerful institutional forces. 03:11.797 --> 03:15.857 "These are the cases which are the known knowns, 03:15.857 --> 03:20.740 "often brightly lit but remain studiously abject." 03:22.580 --> 03:24.670 So that's what we're looking at today, 03:24.670 --> 03:26.210 and it's a tough topic. 03:26.210 --> 03:28.270 But we have a great panel here today, 03:28.270 --> 03:30.881 a very international panel of experts 03:30.881 --> 03:34.330 to accompany General Bills as we look at this. 03:34.330 --> 03:37.730 Our first, Lieutenant General (Retired) In-Bum Chun, 03:37.730 --> 03:42.080 good friend and a visiting fellow, Foreign Policy 03:42.080 --> 03:45.245 for East Asia Policy, the Brookings Institute. 03:45.245 --> 03:48.040 Major General Carl Turenne, 03:48.040 --> 03:50.063 deputy commander of the Canadian Army, 03:50.960 --> 03:52.682 and Brigadier Edward Dawes, 03:52.682 --> 03:55.650 head of the army engagement and communications 03:55.650 --> 03:57.960 of the United Kingdom Army. 03:57.960 --> 03:59.080 Please, ladies and gentlemen, 03:59.080 --> 04:01.330 let's welcome these panel members here today. 04:02.210 --> 04:05.990 (audience clapping) 04:05.990 --> 04:08.890 The rules are everybody gets 10 minutes, 04:08.890 --> 04:10.700 and then we open it up for questions. 04:10.700 --> 04:12.240 As with every other panel, 04:12.240 --> 04:14.097 please start preparing your questions 04:14.097 --> 04:16.630 for these esteemed panel members, 04:16.630 --> 04:18.870 and I will be sure to get them to them 04:18.870 --> 04:20.550 as soon as you prepare them. 04:20.550 --> 04:24.460 First, our esteemed panel chair, Lieutenant General Bills. 04:24.460 --> 04:25.820 - Thanks. 04:25.820 --> 04:27.850 So when General Brown wrote me a few weeks ago 04:27.850 --> 04:30.596 and said he wanted to talk about Black Swans 04:30.596 --> 04:33.196 and Pink Flamingos, I first asked myself 04:33.196 --> 04:36.733 was this a panel on ornithology or warfare? 04:36.733 --> 04:39.943 Next, like a good commander, I told my staff 04:39.943 --> 04:43.560 look this stuff up for me, 'cause I was clueless. 04:43.560 --> 04:45.760 So here's the bottom line upfront, 04:45.760 --> 04:48.820 Black Swans are things you can't imagine, 04:48.820 --> 04:51.941 and Pink Flamingos are things you don't want to imagine. 04:51.941 --> 04:53.380 To be more specific, 04:53.380 --> 04:56.263 Black Swans are undirected and unpredicted events. 04:57.230 --> 04:58.290 They have no precedent 04:58.290 --> 05:01.660 and thus exceed the observer's ability to predict. 05:01.660 --> 05:04.147 Take for example the Internet, World War I, 05:04.147 --> 05:06.550 and the collapse of the Soviet Union. 05:06.550 --> 05:09.171 Pink Flamingos, on the other hand, are possible events 05:09.171 --> 05:11.750 that are ignored due to senior leader biases 05:11.750 --> 05:14.292 or organizational aversion to change. 05:14.292 --> 05:17.290 An example of this was the reluctance to change 05:17.290 --> 05:19.770 from the horse cavalry to the armored formations 05:19.770 --> 05:21.440 during the interwar years. 05:21.440 --> 05:25.860 Simply put, these terms serve as metaphors for events 05:25.860 --> 05:29.510 that happen in our operational environment that surprise us, 05:29.510 --> 05:32.410 introduce tremendous risk to force and mission, 05:32.410 --> 05:35.271 and by their very nature, are difficult or impossible 05:35.271 --> 05:39.423 to plan for or design a strategy to mitigate risk. 05:40.410 --> 05:42.610 Though both of these terms are normally applied 05:42.610 --> 05:43.900 in global events, 05:43.900 --> 05:45.590 I do believe they are scalable 05:45.590 --> 05:49.080 to operational and tactical levels as well. 05:49.080 --> 05:53.180 How surprised must the Roman soldiers have been in 218 BC 05:53.180 --> 05:56.090 to see Hannibal's elephants coming down from the Alps 05:56.090 --> 05:57.258 into Northern Italy. 05:57.258 --> 06:00.900 Where they more or less shocked than the citizens 06:00.900 --> 06:01.733 of New York 06:01.733 --> 06:04.530 as commercial jets struck the World Trade Center towers 06:04.530 --> 06:05.920 in 2001. 06:05.920 --> 06:07.710 Are these Black Swans? 06:07.710 --> 06:10.760 Does the same apply to the French soldiers of 1940 06:10.760 --> 06:14.070 as the German soldiers bypassed the Maginot line 06:14.070 --> 06:16.930 through what French General Philippe Petain characterized 06:16.930 --> 06:19.890 as the impenetrable Ardennes of Belgium? 06:19.890 --> 06:22.160 Was this a Black Swan or a Pink Flamingo? 06:22.160 --> 06:27.060 In the former, did it become a Pink Flamingo in 1944 06:27.060 --> 06:30.940 as the US chose the same area as an economy of force zone 06:30.940 --> 06:33.890 believing that a large-scale German offensive was unlikely. 06:34.820 --> 06:37.520 What I know to be true is that there is no tool 06:37.520 --> 06:41.240 that cannot be harnessed for these purposes. 06:41.240 --> 06:42.400 There is no piece of ground 06:42.400 --> 06:45.770 upon which the tool cannot be brought to bare. 06:45.770 --> 06:48.910 History is replete with examples such as these 06:48.910 --> 06:51.670 and our inability to see what dangers await us 06:51.670 --> 06:55.469 in either our failure or imaginations of a victim 06:55.469 --> 06:57.900 of our own biases. 06:57.900 --> 06:59.600 Just as we have in the past, 06:59.600 --> 07:01.530 we will be surprised in the future. 07:01.530 --> 07:04.616 Something will happen for which we are not prepared. 07:04.616 --> 07:08.320 The challenge we face is how to best posture ourselves 07:08.320 --> 07:11.430 to absorb these events, to bend without breaking, 07:11.430 --> 07:14.498 and to quickly adapt and respond. 07:14.498 --> 07:17.570 Building military agility requires creativity 07:17.570 --> 07:19.982 in our leaders, innovative training concepts, 07:19.982 --> 07:23.370 and a willingness to think through complex problem sets 07:23.370 --> 07:25.510 and account for complex interactions 07:25.510 --> 07:29.470 across innumerable variables to design complex solutions 07:29.470 --> 07:31.090 for a complex problem. 07:31.090 --> 07:34.550 Military agility can be divided into two components: 07:34.550 --> 07:37.060 versatility as well as adaptability. 07:37.060 --> 07:40.690 Well-prepared forces have a combination of both versatility 07:40.690 --> 07:43.320 as well as adaptability, flexible doctrine, 07:43.320 --> 07:45.600 and can generate an array of options 07:45.600 --> 07:47.690 for decision-makers to apply armored forces 07:47.690 --> 07:49.080 to a problem set. 07:49.080 --> 07:53.020 Versatile forces are capable of performing a large number 07:53.020 --> 07:56.800 of core tasks and are prepared for enormous contingencies. 07:56.800 --> 07:58.910 Versatile units are ready now 07:58.910 --> 08:02.660 for the missions they have anticipated and trained for. 08:02.660 --> 08:05.870 Adaptable forces are able to react to changes 08:05.870 --> 08:08.377 in operational environment, adjust on the fly 08:08.377 --> 08:11.370 and respond to emerging problem sets. 08:11.370 --> 08:14.150 Adaptable units are flexible and resourced 08:14.150 --> 08:16.730 to re-mission their forces for the new environment 08:16.730 --> 08:18.230 or mission requirements 08:18.230 --> 08:20.720 and more importantly have the time available to prepare 08:20.720 --> 08:22.180 for their new missions. 08:22.180 --> 08:23.840 The question we must answer 08:23.840 --> 08:26.741 is whether we should design versatile forces capable 08:26.741 --> 08:28.660 of doing everything now 08:28.660 --> 08:29.942 or whether we should assume 08:29.942 --> 08:32.401 that whatever we do will be insufficient 08:32.401 --> 08:34.150 for the unknown surprises, 08:34.150 --> 08:36.120 and we should therefore be adaptable 08:36.120 --> 08:37.373 when it becomes apparent. 08:39.240 --> 08:41.160 To that end, a few thoughts. 08:41.160 --> 08:44.010 There are certain things that if you get them wrong, 08:44.010 --> 08:46.230 you can correct relatively quickly, 08:46.230 --> 08:48.980 if you are willing to put resources against them. 08:48.980 --> 08:51.800 Among these are force size, doctrine, 08:51.800 --> 08:53.450 and equipment, and material. 08:53.450 --> 08:56.810 Note that I said that these can be done quickly 08:56.810 --> 08:58.890 if you apply the right assets. 08:58.890 --> 09:00.980 In this case, the guiding maxim is 09:00.980 --> 09:05.049 that you can have it fast, cheap, or good or pick two. 09:05.049 --> 09:07.240 On the other hand, there are few things 09:07.240 --> 09:10.800 that no matter how much money or energy you throw at them, 09:10.800 --> 09:13.610 simply cannot be made better in short time. 09:13.610 --> 09:15.660 The first of these are the leadership 09:15.660 --> 09:17.870 and it's enabler experience. 09:17.870 --> 09:20.480 This is totally of deployments and exercises, 09:20.480 --> 09:23.520 wins and failures, the training and education 09:23.520 --> 09:25.640 that can only be a product of time. 09:25.640 --> 09:27.007 It was Napoleon who said, 09:27.007 --> 09:30.530 "The moral is to physical as three is to one." 09:30.530 --> 09:33.600 And it is our non-commissioned officers and junior officers 09:33.600 --> 09:35.702 who daily instill our soldiers 09:35.702 --> 09:37.890 with the necessary fighting spirit. 09:37.890 --> 09:40.660 Leaders who know themselves and their craft 09:40.660 --> 09:43.660 and who are trusted by their soldiers and commanders. 09:43.660 --> 09:45.529 Leaders who have the experience to know 09:45.529 --> 09:47.280 when to apply doctrine 09:47.280 --> 09:49.650 and when to venture outside the bounds. 09:49.650 --> 09:52.930 Leaders who have tested themselves, their soldiers, 09:52.930 --> 09:55.580 and their equipment to understand the combined effects 09:55.580 --> 09:58.120 of physics and morale 09:58.120 --> 10:01.520 and how those can exceed the sum of their parts. 10:01.520 --> 10:04.820 Leaders with the experience to respond to Black Swans 10:04.820 --> 10:09.060 and the courage and foresight to avoid Pink Flamingos. 10:09.060 --> 10:10.110 These are critical elements 10:10.110 --> 10:12.203 in the tactical and operational agility. 10:13.590 --> 10:16.640 As a strategic level, our agility is dependent 10:16.640 --> 10:18.581 on our alliances and partnerships, 10:18.581 --> 10:23.010 which are themselves a product of trust and commitment. 10:23.010 --> 10:26.880 America's global reach is predicted on freedom of movement 10:26.880 --> 10:29.500 and access that only comes with the conviction 10:29.500 --> 10:32.650 of other nations that the US is a force for good 10:32.650 --> 10:34.480 and reliable partner. 10:34.480 --> 10:37.430 Our ability to call upon our nations to contribute 10:37.430 --> 10:39.749 to operations around the globe is a byproduct 10:39.749 --> 10:41.740 of the military relationships we build 10:41.740 --> 10:43.680 over years and decades. 10:43.680 --> 10:46.637 My command, the Eighth Army, has been in Korea continuously 10:46.637 --> 10:50.150 since 1950, and it embodies the American commitment 10:50.150 --> 10:53.500 to freedom and prosperity in Northeast Asia. 10:53.500 --> 10:57.440 The return on the United States in Vietnam, Iraq, 10:57.440 --> 10:59.420 Afghanistan, among the other operations 10:59.420 --> 11:00.800 that Korea participated in, 11:00.800 --> 11:03.994 the economic ties between our nations are tremendous, 11:03.994 --> 11:06.700 and the visible welcome and continued presence 11:06.700 --> 11:10.000 of U.S. Forces has moderated the worst tendencies 11:10.000 --> 11:11.229 of regional challenges 11:11.229 --> 11:14.130 while assuring other nations in the region. 11:14.130 --> 11:17.300 It's these things that are a bedrock of agility. 11:17.300 --> 11:19.940 Land forces provide the political leadership 11:19.940 --> 11:23.570 with an array of options in the Indo-Asia Pacific. 11:23.570 --> 11:25.840 These are tailorable and scalable support 11:25.840 --> 11:28.046 in any number of operational strategic problems. 11:28.046 --> 11:30.689 From our small Special Operations Advisory forces 11:30.689 --> 11:32.950 to our State Partnerships Program 11:32.950 --> 11:34.700 in the regionally aligned forces, 11:34.700 --> 11:37.790 land forces are the most adept at building trust 11:37.790 --> 11:41.500 and interoperability with our partners, friends, and allies. 11:41.500 --> 11:44.500 With every bilateral, multilateral, combined, 11:44.500 --> 11:46.330 and joint exercise we conduct, 11:46.330 --> 11:49.940 Pacific Pathways deepens the experience and pull 11:49.940 --> 11:51.870 of our leaders and soldiers 11:51.870 --> 11:53.660 and further strengthens the foundation 11:53.660 --> 11:56.290 of trust, capability, and access 11:56.290 --> 11:58.350 upon the agility it depends. 11:58.350 --> 12:00.320 The more our partners, friends, and allies are able 12:00.320 --> 12:02.400 to work together to solve problems 12:02.400 --> 12:04.485 with or without U.S. direct assistance, 12:04.485 --> 12:06.860 the more land forces are able 12:06.860 --> 12:09.828 to demonstrate the agility necessary to respond 12:09.828 --> 12:11.910 to the Black Swans of the world 12:11.910 --> 12:14.383 and increase regional stability and prosperity. 12:15.590 --> 12:18.870 The Indo-Asia Pacific is an operational environment rife 12:18.870 --> 12:22.927 with potential Black Swans, both geopolitical and natural. 12:22.927 --> 12:26.430 Where should we invest our time, energy, and resources 12:28.000 --> 12:29.660 to prepare for the future so that 12:29.660 --> 12:32.557 when the inevitable Black Swan event hits us, 12:32.557 --> 12:36.760 we avoid the knockout punch and can still react and adapt 12:36.760 --> 12:38.060 to the new environment. 12:38.060 --> 12:39.750 I've asked our panel members to join me 12:39.750 --> 12:42.160 in exploring the challenging topic today. 12:42.160 --> 12:43.997 With that, I pass the panel back to Frank 12:43.997 --> 12:45.820 to manage the discussion. 12:45.820 --> 12:46.653 Thank you. 12:47.490 --> 12:49.040 - General Bills, thank you very much 12:49.040 --> 12:52.006 for that really superb opening remarks 12:52.006 --> 12:56.017 and introduction to our discussion here today. 12:56.017 --> 12:58.390 Again, to our esteemed panel members, 12:58.390 --> 13:01.680 let me first pass to a good friend and colleague, 13:01.680 --> 13:03.730 Lieutenant General (Retired) In-Bum Chun. 13:04.670 --> 13:05.720 - Next slide, please. 13:06.619 --> 13:08.230 Good morning, everyone. 13:08.230 --> 13:09.700 Next slide. 13:09.700 --> 13:12.010 The question posed to me is 13:13.315 --> 13:16.210 how do land forces anticipate the future 13:16.210 --> 13:18.670 and prepare for the unknown or unknowable 13:18.670 --> 13:21.230 without incurring unacceptable risks 13:21.230 --> 13:23.591 to the spectrum of possible contingencies 13:23.591 --> 13:27.265 in the complex Indo-Pacific environment? 13:27.265 --> 13:30.410 When I was faced with this question, 13:30.410 --> 13:31.890 I thought to myself, 13:31.890 --> 13:35.420 only Americans would come up with a topic like this. 13:35.420 --> 13:37.500 I thought as a Korean I would never have to think 13:37.500 --> 13:38.849 about this, and it was common wisdom 13:38.849 --> 13:42.365 for an Asian guy like me to think that gee, 13:42.365 --> 13:44.930 why in hell would you think about things like this? 13:44.930 --> 13:46.590 I'd worry about it when it came to me. 13:46.590 --> 13:50.130 But this was a good opportunity for me to think about this, 13:50.130 --> 13:51.970 and I'd like to just share with you 13:51.970 --> 13:56.170 what a Korean officer might think from this respect. 13:56.170 --> 13:57.003 Next slide. 13:58.590 --> 14:01.593 First, Black Swans, Gray Swans. 14:02.520 --> 14:04.580 Unknown or unlikely events 14:04.580 --> 14:07.313 with unknown, unlikely consequences. 14:08.780 --> 14:12.650 War with our neighbors. 14:12.650 --> 14:16.310 In our 25-year history, we've had two wars 14:16.310 --> 14:17.673 with the United States. 14:18.510 --> 14:20.353 We won one battle. 14:21.230 --> 14:23.720 The other battle the United States won. 14:23.720 --> 14:25.886 And I think what happened was America thought, 14:25.886 --> 14:27.880 we don't need Korea, 14:27.880 --> 14:30.961 and you forgot about us for about 50 years. 14:30.961 --> 14:35.830 But I just thought that it was interesting that the Koreans 14:35.830 --> 14:38.190 and the Americans actually fought each other 14:38.190 --> 14:39.790 about 100 years ago, 14:39.790 --> 14:41.856 but I didn't put it on the slide. 14:41.856 --> 14:43.950 (audience laughing) 14:43.950 --> 14:45.715 Because I wanted to be nice to you guys. 14:45.715 --> 14:48.180 (audience laughing) 14:48.180 --> 14:52.390 But in our history, we count about a thousand invasions, 14:52.390 --> 14:56.740 clashes, conflicts, and wars on the Korean Peninsula. 14:56.740 --> 14:57.680 For whatever reason, 14:57.680 --> 15:00.761 people want to fight in my neighborhood, in my home. 15:00.761 --> 15:04.423 The biggest contributor is China. 15:05.440 --> 15:08.453 How I define China is 58 ethnicities, 15:11.374 --> 15:14.700 and I think every one of those ethnicities tried 15:14.700 --> 15:15.933 to conquer Korea. 15:17.230 --> 15:21.690 The scoreboard for that is we had a definite one win 15:21.690 --> 15:24.170 about 2500 years ago where we killed 15:24.170 --> 15:26.010 about a million of them, 15:26.010 --> 15:31.010 and the dying will of the Chinese emperor at that time 15:31.270 --> 15:34.470 was don't you ever, ever try to conquer the Koreans. 15:34.470 --> 15:35.710 They're just bad luck. 15:35.710 --> 15:39.620 It kept for about 1000 years, and then they forgot, 15:39.620 --> 15:42.080 and they started invading us again. 15:42.080 --> 15:43.910 Among the thousand invasions, 15:43.910 --> 15:46.993 about 700 of those were by the Chinese. 15:49.390 --> 15:52.093 If we were to go to war with China, 15:52.970 --> 15:56.797 it would be catastrophic for Korea, especially at this age, 15:56.797 --> 15:59.200 because we learned a long time ago 15:59.200 --> 16:03.940 that it's just too difficult to win a war 16:03.940 --> 16:07.220 with such a big adversary as China, 16:07.220 --> 16:09.250 so we had to try to figure out 16:09.250 --> 16:14.250 how we could establish some sort of balance with China. 16:15.660 --> 16:18.930 It was not easy, but I'm still speaking Korean, 16:18.930 --> 16:23.930 and I still have a free environment to live in, 16:25.380 --> 16:28.580 and it's mostly because of our relationship 16:28.580 --> 16:30.547 and alliance with the United States. 16:31.400 --> 16:33.070 War with Russia. 16:33.070 --> 16:37.160 We've never had a war with Russians, which is a good news, 16:37.160 --> 16:38.720 and probably never will 16:38.720 --> 16:40.930 because why would why? 16:40.930 --> 16:43.380 None of our interests really coincide. 16:43.380 --> 16:45.808 Now the Russians had a war with the Japanese 16:45.808 --> 16:49.540 in order to gain some influence in our region, 16:49.540 --> 16:53.710 but it didn't work that well for the Russians, 16:53.710 --> 16:57.010 so again, this would be something that is unlikely, 16:57.010 --> 16:59.853 and probably the consequences are very unlikely. 17:00.970 --> 17:02.530 War with North Korea. 17:02.530 --> 17:06.403 We plan and we've been exercising and preparing 17:08.450 --> 17:11.070 for that event all our lives, 17:11.070 --> 17:15.670 but if you look at the slide, you see a minus. 17:15.670 --> 17:20.660 A unknown or an unlikely would be a war with China 17:20.660 --> 17:22.270 without the United States. 17:22.270 --> 17:26.123 Again, a war with North Korea without the United States. 17:26.123 --> 17:29.803 This again, for the South Koreans, would be a catastrophe. 17:30.800 --> 17:32.593 In fact without the United States, 17:32.593 --> 17:37.360 war probably would be very likely 17:37.360 --> 17:41.150 and so without the United States going to war 17:41.150 --> 17:46.150 with the North Koreans would be catastrophic for us. 17:47.270 --> 17:51.180 So again, the likely consequences of that scenario 17:52.060 --> 17:53.233 is not good news. 17:54.980 --> 17:56.153 War with Japan. 17:57.970 --> 17:59.680 Relations these days are pretty bad, 17:59.680 --> 18:04.288 but during the research of this slide that I was doing, 18:04.288 --> 18:08.410 I found that technically the Koreans 18:08.410 --> 18:11.310 and the Japanese academics can't even decide 18:11.310 --> 18:13.510 how many wars we've had. 18:13.510 --> 18:16.890 In fact, it seems we've had no wars between the Japanese 18:16.890 --> 18:19.980 and the Koreans, according to the scholars. 18:19.980 --> 18:21.600 So I thought oh, fine, 18:21.600 --> 18:25.430 if we've never had wars with the Japanese, 18:25.430 --> 18:27.200 let's just keep it that way. 18:27.200 --> 18:30.040 But again, this is a scenario, a situation 18:30.040 --> 18:35.040 that should never happen because we have a bigger challenge, 18:35.430 --> 18:38.840 and again it goes to the top of the slide, which is China. 18:38.840 --> 18:43.190 So the moral of this slide is number one, don't go to war, 18:43.190 --> 18:46.000 Korea, without the United States, 18:46.000 --> 18:49.095 and the other moral is, if you have the United States, 18:49.095 --> 18:52.560 Korea probably won't have to go to war. 18:52.560 --> 18:55.760 So the alliance with the United States for us Koreans 18:55.760 --> 18:57.649 is very important. 18:57.649 --> 19:02.649 A second lesson that I deduced is a lesson for the Japanese. 19:03.980 --> 19:08.070 While I was doing this, every time that Korea 19:08.070 --> 19:10.710 was under the influence of the Chinese, 19:10.710 --> 19:13.023 the Chinese tried to invade Japan. 19:15.010 --> 19:16.810 I thought this was very interesting. 19:18.000 --> 19:21.020 When the Mongolians, under the flag of China 19:21.020 --> 19:23.120 because they had conquered China, 19:23.120 --> 19:26.810 conquered the Korean Peninsula, 19:26.810 --> 19:31.043 they had the Koreans build 1000 ships and invade Japan, 19:32.980 --> 19:36.020 and the Mongolians were good cavalrymen. 19:36.952 --> 19:40.070 They should have had more lessons from the U.S. Marines, 19:40.070 --> 19:44.250 and they landed, and they returned back to their ships 19:44.250 --> 19:48.353 and a typhoon called a kamikaze sank their ships. 19:52.290 --> 19:57.120 The second time the Japanese wanted to invade China, 19:57.120 --> 20:02.120 and they had to go through Korea, 20:02.630 --> 20:06.573 and again, they fought, and the same results. 20:06.573 --> 20:10.530 A good lesson is that whenever the Korean Peninsula 20:10.530 --> 20:15.060 is under Chinese influence, Japan is threatened. 20:15.060 --> 20:16.083 Next slide, please. 20:17.910 --> 20:19.820 Pink Flamingos. 20:19.820 --> 20:24.744 There is about a hundred items that I could talk about this. 20:24.744 --> 20:27.140 We already know that we have a danger, 20:27.140 --> 20:30.920 but for whatever reason, we're not addressing them. 20:30.920 --> 20:34.430 First is communications from where I stand. 20:34.430 --> 20:38.105 This is the top most important issue that I see. 20:38.105 --> 20:40.570 If you look at the slide, you can see 20:40.570 --> 20:44.290 that the higher echelon of the Koreans has one system, 20:44.290 --> 20:47.467 the Korea Joint Command and Control System. 20:53.810 --> 20:55.420 At the tactical level, 20:55.420 --> 20:59.893 they have the KJAS, the Korea Joint Army System. 21:00.980 --> 21:05.980 In the middle, their connectivity is not solid. 21:07.174 --> 21:09.320 I won't go through into details, 21:09.320 --> 21:13.290 but you can imagine that without this connectivity, 21:13.290 --> 21:16.390 there is a communications problem. 21:16.390 --> 21:18.700 Now some people think that it is not a problem, 21:18.700 --> 21:20.700 but I think it is a big problem. 21:20.700 --> 21:21.533 Next slide. 21:24.570 --> 21:29.050 This is the number of JTAX that we have 21:29.050 --> 21:33.283 in the South Korean military, about one per division. 21:34.830 --> 21:36.539 What does this mean? 21:36.539 --> 21:41.280 This means that you can call in aircraft fires 21:42.570 --> 21:44.713 one team per division. 21:45.720 --> 21:49.810 Any of you who's done modern warfare realizes 21:49.810 --> 21:52.693 that this is something that you would need. 21:53.980 --> 21:56.910 This goes back to, for me, the capabilities 21:56.910 --> 22:00.093 that the U.S. Special Forces might be able to bring, 22:01.380 --> 22:05.628 similar to what you did in the initial stages of war 22:05.628 --> 22:09.759 in Afghanistan, where small teams provided air support 22:09.759 --> 22:14.759 to the Afghan rebels, so I just throw that out to you. 22:16.252 --> 22:17.373 Next slide. 22:21.220 --> 22:24.800 Any force is as strong as the weakest link, 22:24.800 --> 22:29.800 so the two Pink Flamingo examples that I shared with you 22:30.120 --> 22:33.600 could be the weakest link for the chain 22:33.600 --> 22:36.460 of the alliance that we have on the Korean Peninsula, 22:36.460 --> 22:40.200 and hopefully this is the focus that we can all share 22:40.200 --> 22:41.816 to rectify and fix 22:41.816 --> 22:45.680 so that it can save some really important lives. 22:45.680 --> 22:46.513 Next slide. 22:47.730 --> 22:48.563 Thank you. 22:51.440 --> 22:55.280 - General Chun, as always, fascinating. 22:55.280 --> 22:56.680 Thank you for your comments. 22:57.936 --> 22:59.269 General Turenne. 23:02.280 --> 23:04.600 - General Ham, General Brown, 23:04.600 --> 23:08.609 delighted to be back here for LANPAC, my third one. 23:08.609 --> 23:12.220 I always enjoy this symposium. 23:12.220 --> 23:14.640 General Bills, thank you for the opportunity 23:14.640 --> 23:16.749 to be part of this panel. 23:16.749 --> 23:18.060 Ladies and gentleman, 23:18.060 --> 23:20.560 what I would like to do over the next few minutes 23:20.560 --> 23:24.500 is to give you some thoughts on the importance of agility 23:24.500 --> 23:26.238 from a Canadian perspective 23:26.238 --> 23:30.060 and how Canada is moving forward on that front. 23:30.060 --> 23:33.477 And perhaps also some thoughts on what I believe 23:33.477 --> 23:37.200 to be a very dangerous Pink Flamingo, 23:37.200 --> 23:40.843 the rise of bureaucracy in democracies. 23:43.330 --> 23:44.740 The Canadian Army is in the midst 23:44.740 --> 23:48.300 of a major transformation of the force. 23:48.300 --> 23:52.580 I would argue evolutionary in nature but nevertheless, 23:52.580 --> 23:57.430 major changes are required to meet the security trends, 23:57.430 --> 24:00.220 including the evolving balance of power, 24:00.220 --> 24:02.645 the changing nature of conflict, 24:02.645 --> 24:05.603 and the rapid evolution of technology. 24:07.200 --> 24:10.491 Scalable, agile, and responsive forces 24:10.491 --> 24:15.200 operating amongst populations are core components 24:15.200 --> 24:16.500 of the commander's vision. 24:17.960 --> 24:22.040 How do you man, train, and equip the force 24:22.040 --> 24:24.423 to get maximum bang for your buck? 24:25.410 --> 24:29.220 Cover as much of the spectrum of conflict as possible 24:29.220 --> 24:32.623 with a relatively small army of 45,000. 24:34.632 --> 24:38.706 As you try to cover multiple regions of the world, 24:38.706 --> 24:43.163 believe me, capacity quickly becomes an issue. 24:45.350 --> 24:48.271 So here are some of the major thrusts, efforts 24:48.271 --> 24:51.723 to improve agility from our perspective. 24:52.699 --> 24:57.699 We are rebalancing the force in favor of emerging 24:58.990 --> 25:02.480 or emerged, as mentioned yesterday, capabilities, 25:02.480 --> 25:07.480 such as cyber, but also, as mentioned on the last panel, 25:08.320 --> 25:10.923 capabilities such as sustainment. 25:11.860 --> 25:16.860 In some ways, the enabler's becoming the enabled. 25:17.000 --> 25:22.000 We need to rebalance our land force to have the ability 25:22.080 --> 25:25.967 to conduct and, more importantly, sustain operations 25:25.967 --> 25:30.100 in multiple theaters of operations, 25:30.100 --> 25:32.040 multiple theaters of operations. 25:32.040 --> 25:34.743 This is now ingrained in Canadian policy. 25:36.080 --> 25:39.890 As the Canadian Armed Forces are a legally unified force, 25:39.890 --> 25:42.580 a complete review of the Canadian Armed Forces structure 25:42.580 --> 25:46.040 has been ordered by the Chief of Defense staff 25:46.040 --> 25:47.980 to ensure that we invest 25:47.980 --> 25:50.737 in the right enablers and capabilities, 25:50.737 --> 25:54.940 not just from a land perspective or land-domain perspective, 25:54.940 --> 25:57.650 but a multi-domain perspective. 25:57.650 --> 26:02.220 This is significant for us, as all past reviews 26:02.220 --> 26:04.803 have always been service-centric. 26:05.970 --> 26:10.300 Yes, emotions will be running high, 26:10.300 --> 26:13.040 particularly with our regimental system, 26:13.040 --> 26:14.933 over the next couple of years. 26:16.230 --> 26:18.430 But we are coming at the problem set 26:18.430 --> 26:22.690 from a strategic perspective, and there is significant reger 26:22.690 --> 26:25.160 in the logic models and algorithms applied 26:25.160 --> 26:26.853 to guide decision-making. 26:29.060 --> 26:33.170 We are also focusing on the total fitness of the force. 26:33.170 --> 26:36.372 Agility requires fitness. 26:36.372 --> 26:40.100 The total fitness of the force to ensure optimization 26:40.100 --> 26:43.680 of performance and improved resilience. 26:43.680 --> 26:46.050 There's much to do on this front, 26:46.050 --> 26:48.170 but there are plenty of great initiatives 26:48.170 --> 26:50.740 from many of our allies here in the room 26:50.740 --> 26:52.563 and within our own force. 26:56.830 --> 27:01.130 HR and benefit policies need to be revamped, 27:01.130 --> 27:03.890 all with a view of encouraging, enticing a culture 27:03.890 --> 27:06.140 of deployability and readiness, 27:06.140 --> 27:09.620 while adapting to the realities of demographic trends 27:09.620 --> 27:10.973 of the 21st century. 27:12.810 --> 27:16.350 We are also essentially recapitalizing most 27:16.350 --> 27:19.720 of the Canadian Army over the next ten years. 27:19.720 --> 27:20.730 Too slow? 27:20.730 --> 27:23.007 I'll get back to that in a moment. 27:23.007 --> 27:26.780 We are focusing not only on enhanced mobility, 27:26.780 --> 27:28.993 lethality, and survivability, 27:31.230 --> 27:33.670 including emerging capabilities, 27:33.670 --> 27:38.240 but with interoperability in mind for every project, 27:38.240 --> 27:42.320 including the technical aspect, the policy aspect, 27:42.320 --> 27:44.870 and of course, the human dimension, 27:44.870 --> 27:47.306 to ensure multi-domain operations 27:47.306 --> 27:52.306 and with the ability to upgrade technology 27:52.340 --> 27:54.673 and to keep up with the pace of technology. 27:56.190 --> 27:59.485 We are moving forward and further integrating 27:59.485 --> 28:02.070 and operationalizing all the components 28:02.070 --> 28:05.960 of the Canadian Army to maximize operational output. 28:05.960 --> 28:09.243 And really this speaks to the Canadian Army Reserves, 28:10.100 --> 28:13.820 always been part of the force but not fully integrated. 28:13.820 --> 28:16.870 We've been working very hard over the last couple of years 28:16.870 --> 28:18.320 to take it to the next level. 28:22.220 --> 28:25.800 We need to move much more towards a knowledge-based culture, 28:25.800 --> 28:28.620 an environment that leverages new technologies 28:28.620 --> 28:30.460 for enhanced decision-making. 28:30.460 --> 28:32.720 Read analytics and AI. 28:32.720 --> 28:37.373 Again, too slow for our liking right now due to bureaucracy. 28:38.920 --> 28:41.360 We are embracing the multi-domain fight, 28:41.360 --> 28:45.550 and I applaud the efforts and the comments yesterday 28:45.550 --> 28:49.250 by General Volesky, and we really do need to move forward, 28:49.250 --> 28:51.390 and we are all in favor 28:51.390 --> 28:54.923 of the Joint Warfare Assessment Exercise Series. 28:58.090 --> 29:02.390 Then, finally, how we train and educate is really important. 29:02.390 --> 29:05.683 Agility comes from versatility in our troops. 29:06.670 --> 29:09.650 Collective training, from austere, degraded environments 29:09.650 --> 29:12.020 to fully-enabled environments, 29:12.020 --> 29:14.943 increased multi-domain and multi-national training, 29:14.943 --> 29:17.120 are really important. 29:17.120 --> 29:20.410 We continue to invest in our leader development, 29:20.410 --> 29:24.470 generating empowered, versatile leaders who can easily adapt 29:24.470 --> 29:26.163 and thrive in the human domain. 29:29.460 --> 29:33.670 Perhaps now just a few thoughts in the final minutes here 29:33.670 --> 29:37.940 on a Pink Flamingo that I consider very dangerous. 29:37.940 --> 29:41.503 If we consider the rise of nationalism a Pink Flamingo, 29:41.503 --> 29:44.700 then I would definitely argue that the rise of bureaucracy 29:44.700 --> 29:48.470 in democracies is a very dangerous Pink Flamingo. 29:48.470 --> 29:49.380 Why? 29:49.380 --> 29:53.810 Because it is directly at odds with the concept of agility. 29:53.810 --> 29:56.060 Clearly, it is a known known. 29:56.060 --> 30:00.402 We all hate it, but for some reason, cognitive biases 30:00.402 --> 30:04.760 and institutional forces make it such a tough fight, 30:04.760 --> 30:06.863 that we often just accept it. 30:07.932 --> 30:10.860 But it is of serious concern, 30:10.860 --> 30:15.320 and it has direct impact on achieving strategic agility. 30:15.320 --> 30:18.220 The gap is widening due to the speed of changes 30:18.220 --> 30:22.101 in technology and demographic makeup in society. 30:22.101 --> 30:25.907 In essence, we need to speed up procurement processes, 30:25.907 --> 30:30.907 adopt more flexible HR policies, delegate authorities, 30:31.030 --> 30:34.850 simplify policies, make them from restrictive 30:34.850 --> 30:38.940 to more permissive to make the institution more agile. 30:38.940 --> 30:43.133 Unfortunately, bureaucracy is having an allergic reaction. 30:44.100 --> 30:45.760 It's not for a lack of trying. 30:45.760 --> 30:49.490 We all have successes, but certainly in our case, 30:49.490 --> 30:52.950 we are nowhere close to achieving transformation speeds 30:52.950 --> 30:55.572 achieved by large corporations. 30:55.572 --> 30:59.661 Too many checks and balances, added processes 30:59.661 --> 31:03.030 due to bad past knee-jerk reactions, 31:03.030 --> 31:06.030 total risk adversion, cumbersome, and stovepipes 31:06.030 --> 31:08.590 are just some of the characteristics, 31:08.590 --> 31:10.023 of course, of bureaucracy. 31:11.040 --> 31:14.130 In the Canadian case, it's been built to minimize spending 31:14.130 --> 31:16.400 over the last 50 years, 31:16.400 --> 31:18.110 where we were living a bit of a slow 31:18.110 --> 31:20.740 and constant reduction in force size, 31:20.740 --> 31:24.783 and it is not geared for growth, our current reality. 31:29.470 --> 31:32.420 This has had a significant impact on our land forces, 31:32.420 --> 31:35.130 as we try to procure capabilities in a system 31:35.130 --> 31:38.095 that lacks the responsiveness and agility necessary 31:38.095 --> 31:41.670 to exploit emerging technologies in a timely manner 31:41.670 --> 31:45.900 ahead of our adversaries or competitors. 31:45.900 --> 31:48.550 Tackling bureaucracy must start from the top 31:48.550 --> 31:50.420 and be strategically led. 31:50.420 --> 31:54.640 It is an inter-agency and inter-departmental affair. 31:54.640 --> 31:57.270 Challenging bureaucracy at every step 31:57.270 --> 32:01.010 has certainly become one of my operating principles. 32:01.010 --> 32:03.723 If you don't, it will control the agenda. 32:05.320 --> 32:09.350 In summary, learning organizations are always transforming, 32:09.350 --> 32:10.713 and that is a good thing. 32:11.550 --> 32:14.480 I'm confident about improving operational 32:14.480 --> 32:15.962 and tactical agility, 32:15.962 --> 32:19.610 perhaps not so much of the strategic 32:19.610 --> 32:24.200 and institutional agility due to the powers of bureaucracy. 32:24.200 --> 32:27.432 I strongly believe that empowered, versatile leaders, 32:27.432 --> 32:29.820 senior and COs and young officers, 32:29.820 --> 32:33.667 are at the heart of achieving operational agility. 32:33.667 --> 32:37.196 Ladies and gentleman, thank you so much for the opportunity. 32:37.196 --> 32:40.430 The Canadian Army is committed and will continue 32:40.430 --> 32:42.630 to build relationships and partnerships 32:42.630 --> 32:44.950 throughout the Indo-Pacific. 32:44.950 --> 32:46.100 Strong, proud, ready. 32:46.100 --> 32:46.933 Thank you. 32:48.010 --> 32:49.440 - General Turenne, thank you so very much 32:49.440 --> 32:51.430 for your outstanding comments. 32:51.430 --> 32:53.203 And finally, Brigadier Dawes. 32:54.210 --> 32:56.070 - Thank you general. 32:56.070 --> 33:01.070 Well, I recognize and identify with many of my colleagues 33:02.940 --> 33:06.771 up here on this powerful panel, particularly General Chun, 33:06.771 --> 33:10.305 because the Brits have also once fought the Americans. 33:10.305 --> 33:12.380 (audience laughing) 33:12.380 --> 33:14.834 At least you guys didn't burn the White House. 33:14.834 --> 33:16.540 (audience laughing) 33:16.540 --> 33:18.970 We've got that on our charge sheet from 1814. 33:18.970 --> 33:20.049 Check it out. 33:20.049 --> 33:22.170 (audience laughing) 33:22.170 --> 33:24.190 There's no risk of it happening again, 33:24.190 --> 33:26.545 that is a real Black Swan. 33:26.545 --> 33:27.810 (audience laughing) 33:27.810 --> 33:31.210 It's a real delight to be here and to join you 33:31.210 --> 33:33.656 for this fascinating symposium. 33:33.656 --> 33:37.640 Looking at the Black Swans and Pink Flamingo analogy, 33:37.640 --> 33:41.680 I was struck very much at the start of this conference 33:41.680 --> 33:46.520 by how the spirit of Aloha was defined so kindly for us, 33:46.520 --> 33:49.783 the path of seeking to know the unknowable. 33:50.640 --> 33:52.480 Seeking to know the unknowable, 33:52.480 --> 33:54.870 and as we glance into the future, 33:54.870 --> 33:58.033 that is the very essence of this panel's job, I guess. 33:59.720 --> 34:01.890 Well, we live and operate 34:01.890 --> 34:04.673 in an increasingly hyper-connected world. 34:05.668 --> 34:08.730 Other distinguished speakers have already drawn reference 34:08.730 --> 34:11.850 to the pace of that change, be it technological, 34:11.850 --> 34:16.850 environmental, economic, military, or societal, 34:17.050 --> 34:19.614 and it is startling. 34:19.614 --> 34:23.370 It is amidst this change that the breadth and potency 34:23.370 --> 34:25.970 of the threats to our citizens 34:25.970 --> 34:30.730 and to global and regional stability will flourish. 34:30.730 --> 34:35.730 We must seek ways to set conditions to our advantage, 34:36.130 --> 34:39.340 whilst retaining agility and adaptability 34:39.340 --> 34:42.403 to respond decisively when required. 34:44.000 --> 34:45.610 Now as you'd expect from a Brit, 34:45.610 --> 34:47.890 I choose my words carefully. 34:47.890 --> 34:52.281 Agility, adaptability, and decisively. 34:52.281 --> 34:57.281 Words that are so easy to say but so hard to deliver. 34:58.636 --> 35:01.610 As the theme of this panel session is agility, 35:01.610 --> 35:05.560 let me just unpick that, and let me tell you what that means 35:05.560 --> 35:07.800 to the British Army right now 35:07.800 --> 35:09.573 and how we're getting after it. 35:11.254 --> 35:12.760 Well, by way of context, 35:12.760 --> 35:14.410 General Brown did a great job yesterday 35:14.410 --> 35:17.423 summarizing the contemporary dichotomy. 35:18.390 --> 35:22.134 We are confronting hostile state activity taking place 35:22.134 --> 35:25.530 just below the threshold of armed aggression 35:25.530 --> 35:29.220 whilst also undertaking conventional warfare 35:29.220 --> 35:32.210 combined with unconventional activity, 35:32.210 --> 35:34.453 usually by non-state actors. 35:36.120 --> 35:37.770 Both these hybrid strategies seek 35:37.770 --> 35:41.210 to challenge us all in new ways, 35:41.210 --> 35:44.150 seeking asymmetric advantage with which 35:44.150 --> 35:48.393 to offset our opponents' conventional military weaknesses. 35:49.800 --> 35:53.290 As we've heard, the solution is to offer a force 35:53.290 --> 35:57.363 of credible deterrents to prevent major combat operations. 35:58.233 --> 36:01.560 And for that deterrence to be compelling, 36:01.560 --> 36:06.399 the force must be truly agile so as to meet both the aspects 36:06.399 --> 36:10.927 of that dichotomy quickly and in the right place. 36:10.927 --> 36:15.700 In this way, I would offer that agility is a combination 36:15.700 --> 36:19.190 of tempo and credible presence, 36:19.190 --> 36:22.260 the latter stressed yesterday so eloquently 36:23.180 --> 36:24.313 by General Wesley. 36:26.018 --> 36:28.820 Yet dealing with a contemporary, asymmetric threat 36:28.820 --> 36:31.450 continues to baffle and frustrate, 36:31.450 --> 36:34.050 and I guess that's why we're talking about it today. 36:35.080 --> 36:37.180 This should not be a complete surprise, 36:37.180 --> 36:40.500 because in many ways, it calls for our institutions 36:40.500 --> 36:44.177 to be counter-culture and identify much with what you said 36:44.177 --> 36:47.520 about what the Canadian Armed Forces are doing now, 36:47.520 --> 36:51.400 because all our respective armies are hierarchical, 36:51.400 --> 36:53.163 they are overly deferential, 36:54.260 --> 36:57.800 and they are pragmatically cautious by nature 36:57.800 --> 37:00.933 and inhomogeneous by design. 37:01.852 --> 37:04.340 Rapid adaptability is difficult 37:04.340 --> 37:06.760 for these large, complex organizations, 37:06.760 --> 37:11.670 and the truth is, we cannot just reorganize into the future. 37:11.670 --> 37:14.083 We have to reimagine the future, 37:16.140 --> 37:18.040 and there are some things we could do. 37:19.200 --> 37:20.470 The British Army is looking at this 37:20.470 --> 37:23.930 through our conceptual study program called Agile Warrior, 37:23.930 --> 37:27.980 which is akin, a much smaller version of Unified Quest, 37:27.980 --> 37:30.320 run by your future's command. 37:30.320 --> 37:35.080 Our recent analysis shows that future agility will be built 37:35.080 --> 37:40.080 on speed of thought, speed of movement, new equipment, 37:40.450 --> 37:42.583 and aggressive doctrinal development. 37:45.100 --> 37:48.530 Firstly, we can enhance our speed of thought 37:48.530 --> 37:49.963 by adapting our planning. 37:50.860 --> 37:53.740 We know that tempo wins on the contemporary battlefield. 37:53.740 --> 37:55.303 That is not being argued. 37:56.350 --> 38:00.913 Cutting planning time trades detail for tempo, 38:01.810 --> 38:03.610 and it takes us, as military planners, 38:03.610 --> 38:05.470 into an uncomfortable territory, 38:05.470 --> 38:06.883 but go there we must. 38:08.470 --> 38:10.320 Tempo allows us to set the agenda 38:10.320 --> 38:14.430 to make the adversary react to our calculus 38:14.430 --> 38:15.803 instead of us to them. 38:16.820 --> 38:19.280 This will probably be achieved by deploying 38:19.280 --> 38:23.230 what we envisage as small headquarters with fewer staff 38:23.230 --> 38:27.810 to drive efficiency and with streamlined planning processes. 38:27.810 --> 38:31.060 Second, we can be quicker 38:31.060 --> 38:33.533 by revising our command and control mechanisms. 38:34.430 --> 38:37.170 Over the next five years we hope to employ algorithms 38:37.170 --> 38:40.373 that are effectively artificial intelligence 38:40.373 --> 38:43.760 and we saw them trailed in the last panel 38:43.760 --> 38:46.006 being used for logistic planning. 38:46.006 --> 38:48.950 But we hope to use them to help our commanders 38:48.950 --> 38:52.480 to focus on the command element of command and control 38:52.480 --> 38:54.843 versus the control aspect, 38:54.843 --> 38:58.264 because machine learning is developing so rapidly. 38:58.264 --> 39:02.555 It's unlikely, though, to be the panacea, 39:02.555 --> 39:05.860 because whilst AI can tell you what to do, 39:05.860 --> 39:08.883 it can seldom if ever tell you why. 39:11.270 --> 39:14.690 But with 5G enabling supercomputing 39:14.690 --> 39:17.737 and connecting the military Internet of Things, 39:17.737 --> 39:20.800 we will bring an advantage to the C2 39:20.800 --> 39:24.040 that must be harnessed if we are to unlock our commanders 39:24.040 --> 39:27.170 to use their military genius to think of better 39:27.170 --> 39:30.517 and more cunning ways to outfox the adversary 39:30.517 --> 39:34.710 while algorithms take care of the root planning, 39:34.710 --> 39:38.453 preempting resupply, and battle space management. 39:40.390 --> 39:43.720 Thirdly, we must change our doctrine and training 39:43.720 --> 39:48.720 to inculcate a culture of curiosity and innovation. 39:50.120 --> 39:51.140 I guess you're with me, 39:51.140 --> 39:53.630 because you wouldn't be attending a symposium like this 39:53.630 --> 39:55.563 if you weren't professionally curious. 39:57.090 --> 39:58.455 In the drive to create tempo, 39:58.455 --> 40:02.616 we are likely to adapt a far more dispersed approach, 40:02.616 --> 40:05.893 avoiding massing to mitigate against long-range attack. 40:06.740 --> 40:09.460 Being dispersed allows us to move independently, 40:09.460 --> 40:12.420 not to take up as much road and rail capacity, 40:12.420 --> 40:14.990 to deceive our enemy in the direction of travel, 40:14.990 --> 40:19.003 and always to challenge in this all-seeing world. 40:20.880 --> 40:22.920 Most importantly, we can challenge the adversary 40:22.920 --> 40:25.860 in many places at the same time rather than 40:25.860 --> 40:27.880 in one decisive engagement, 40:27.880 --> 40:31.263 because the next fight will be resource-intensive. 40:32.620 --> 40:34.700 Fundamentally, dispersal allows us 40:34.700 --> 40:36.301 to achieve greater agility 40:36.301 --> 40:39.980 as we are harder to find, fix, and strike 40:39.980 --> 40:42.913 and affords the adversary less chance to engage us 40:42.913 --> 40:44.173 as we maneuver. 40:45.240 --> 40:49.870 We think and act quicker than they can deal with, 40:49.870 --> 40:51.970 and that really gets the heart of agility. 40:52.850 --> 40:54.390 Fourth and finally, 40:54.390 --> 40:56.881 we must think about our future vehicle design 40:56.881 --> 41:01.881 that has spent 20 years being predicated on size 41:01.920 --> 41:04.880 and protection at the expense, arguably, of tactical 41:04.880 --> 41:07.318 and operational mobility. 41:07.318 --> 41:11.070 In the European theater, the limiting factor 41:11.070 --> 41:14.640 of many of our armored systems is the bridge classifications 41:14.640 --> 41:19.483 from a bygone age, but that is a useful force and function. 41:20.480 --> 41:22.390 It is time, I would argue, 41:22.390 --> 41:25.133 to think smaller, faster, and lighter. 41:26.590 --> 41:29.370 Avoid the temptation of the exquisite platform, 41:29.370 --> 41:32.470 as you will never enjoy the benefits it affords 41:32.470 --> 41:34.313 if it takes too long to field, 41:35.460 --> 41:38.273 because nothing creates agility like speed. 41:39.200 --> 41:41.783 Moving faster for longer generates agility. 41:43.610 --> 41:46.860 I am not for a moment advocating for unprotected vehicles 41:46.860 --> 41:50.350 in a disposable age, just quicker 41:50.350 --> 41:52.700 and relatively lighter than today, 41:52.700 --> 41:54.100 giving us the ability to project 41:54.100 --> 41:56.990 across even greater operational range 41:56.990 --> 41:58.423 without second-line support. 41:59.324 --> 42:01.080 This is what we're exploring 42:01.080 --> 42:02.792 with our Strike Brigade concept, 42:02.792 --> 42:06.250 and it offers a potential for new theater entry options 42:06.250 --> 42:11.250 that get under, around, or ahead of networked A2AD, 42:12.500 --> 42:15.513 giving land forces a renewed relevance in the Joint fight. 42:16.479 --> 42:19.530 Our experimentation points to the fact 42:19.530 --> 42:20.690 that the ability to deploy 42:20.690 --> 42:22.460 across long lines of communication, 42:22.460 --> 42:26.500 which abound in the Indo-Pacific region, 42:26.500 --> 42:28.770 will significantly increase survivability 42:28.770 --> 42:33.770 as we become less predictable, particularly in territory 42:33.870 --> 42:36.123 that the adversary already knows well. 42:38.306 --> 42:41.620 In conclusion, agility combines drivers 42:41.620 --> 42:46.620 of a new way of warfare, post-attritional, if you will, 42:46.814 --> 42:49.590 one that is well-suited to the Information Age 42:49.590 --> 42:52.670 of this century, where hybrid conflict calls 42:52.670 --> 42:55.469 for increasingly rapid reaction times. 42:55.469 --> 42:57.240 This will demand a shift 42:57.240 --> 42:59.172 in our loyal and dependable doctrine 42:59.172 --> 43:04.172 to drive new tactics, greater dispersal and fluidity, 43:04.360 --> 43:06.023 and focused collective training. 43:06.950 --> 43:09.720 This must be enabled by technology. 43:09.720 --> 43:11.659 It will create a mass effect, 43:11.659 --> 43:14.558 survivability and sustainment. 43:14.558 --> 43:19.558 Envisioning this fully is to know the unknowable, 43:20.720 --> 43:24.233 and we ignore this Pink Flamingo at our peril. 43:25.070 --> 43:25.903 Thank you. 43:27.460 --> 43:28.293 - Ladies and gentlemen, 43:28.293 --> 43:29.700 please join me in a round of applause 43:29.700 --> 43:32.093 for the outstanding comments by our panel members. 43:32.093 --> 43:35.093 (audience clapping) 43:37.410 --> 43:40.223 We have generated a lot of questions, 43:41.210 --> 43:43.640 and there's obviously a lot of interest. 43:43.640 --> 43:45.080 Thank you all for your comments, 43:45.080 --> 43:47.510 because they were very insightful. 43:47.510 --> 43:49.270 I think this first one here is probably 43:49.270 --> 43:53.173 for Lieutenant General In-bum Chun and General Bills. 43:54.020 --> 43:56.564 Gentlemen, two questions. 43:56.564 --> 43:59.830 When will Iraq be ready to assume leadership 43:59.830 --> 44:00.793 on the peninsula? 44:02.032 --> 44:06.413 And is the delay due to logistics upgraded equipment, 44:07.320 --> 44:09.396 or thinking the loss of U.S. leadership 44:09.396 --> 44:14.396 might reduce U.S. support for war under Iraq leadership? 44:15.250 --> 44:16.943 I'll start with General Chun. 44:19.430 --> 44:20.540 - I thought you guys were gonna give 44:20.540 --> 44:22.141 the Korean guy some slack. 44:22.141 --> 44:24.499 (panel members laughing) 44:24.499 --> 44:29.499 I think the real question is the quality of the leadership. 44:29.530 --> 44:33.880 I mean, if you wanna, 44:33.880 --> 44:36.010 can I use the word half-ass? 44:36.010 --> 44:36.880 - [Frank] Uh, sure. 44:36.880 --> 44:41.310 - If you want it half-assed now, we can do it now. 44:41.310 --> 44:45.300 But if you want it as best as you can, 44:45.300 --> 44:47.370 you need to set the conditions right, 44:47.370 --> 44:48.980 and that's why it's taking time. 44:48.980 --> 44:52.130 Now, having said that, you know how institutions are. 44:52.130 --> 44:54.260 My colleague here just pointed out 44:54.260 --> 44:56.310 the bureaucracy that's involved. 44:56.310 --> 45:00.816 People don't wanna change, and that's basically the reason 45:00.816 --> 45:03.670 from my view why it's taking time. 45:03.670 --> 45:08.670 Now, unfortunately, in most cases, it's outer influences 45:09.495 --> 45:13.040 that'll push us, which will lead to other situations, 45:13.040 --> 45:18.040 but I think the question should never be about when 45:19.650 --> 45:22.933 as a timeframe, but when are we going to be ready. 45:24.920 --> 45:28.010 This is a critical question for us 45:28.010 --> 45:29.780 which leads to your second question 45:29.780 --> 45:33.640 about is there a fear about U.S. commitment, 45:33.640 --> 45:35.640 and I think that's what you were asking. 45:38.370 --> 45:42.790 I try to tell my Koreans that I have never ever doubted 45:42.790 --> 45:47.010 my uniformed American comrade in a foxhole. 45:47.010 --> 45:47.843 Never. 45:48.680 --> 45:52.260 I've never put any trust in any politician, 45:52.260 --> 45:55.890 whether it's American, Korean, or any other country, 45:55.890 --> 45:57.543 and that's where I fear. 46:01.291 --> 46:04.750 I know that my comrades-in-arms in uniform 46:04.750 --> 46:06.440 will be there for me, 46:06.440 --> 46:11.440 but there's always a scare because of the Black Swans 46:11.670 --> 46:12.910 that I explained to you, 46:12.910 --> 46:16.680 because of the relationship with the United States, 46:16.680 --> 46:18.280 the alliance with the United States, 46:18.280 --> 46:23.280 is in direct corelation to the survival of my people. 46:24.614 --> 46:28.800 It's only natural for us to be worried about that. 46:28.800 --> 46:30.403 But it's not because we don't trust you, 46:30.403 --> 46:34.580 it's just because of innate reliance upon the United States, 46:34.580 --> 46:39.050 and this reliance, on another form, is why you can trust us, 46:39.050 --> 46:43.363 because without the United States, we could not survive. 46:44.360 --> 46:46.223 If you talk to your Korean leaders, 46:48.340 --> 46:51.353 unless you're talking to the extreme Korean, 46:53.180 --> 46:54.740 small population, 46:54.740 --> 46:57.890 they all agree that the United States is important to us 46:57.890 --> 47:02.760 and that we need the United States' support. 47:02.760 --> 47:04.240 - [Frank] Thank you, General Chun. 47:04.240 --> 47:05.073 General Bills. 47:05.073 --> 47:07.300 - Well, first, to kind of echo the comments made 47:07.300 --> 47:09.900 by General Abrams this morning is that 47:09.900 --> 47:12.400 the Iraq alliance is ironclad. 47:12.400 --> 47:15.480 I've seen this for three-plus years in Korea, 47:15.480 --> 47:18.133 and even with a missed exercise occurs, 47:18.990 --> 47:22.510 there were still means and ways to come together 47:22.510 --> 47:23.810 to maintain that alliance. 47:24.890 --> 47:27.020 With the recent exercise we did, 47:27.020 --> 47:31.892 it just showed the commitment of both the U.S. and Iraq 47:31.892 --> 47:34.933 to remain together in terms of defense of the pen. 47:36.783 --> 47:37.616 Is there a fracture? 47:37.616 --> 47:39.040 No. 47:39.040 --> 47:42.120 As we work towards what'll be kopte 47:42.120 --> 47:44.270 and Iraq's in the lead, 47:44.270 --> 47:46.493 there's a series of events we have to go through. 47:48.178 --> 47:50.685 With the leadership we currently have on the pen, 47:50.685 --> 47:55.685 and both Iraq and U.S., with objectives we have to reach, 47:55.920 --> 47:56.753 we'll get there. 47:58.860 --> 48:00.500 Very promising for the future, 48:00.500 --> 48:03.223 when it comes to the Iraq's in the lead as well. 48:04.200 --> 48:06.750 - Thank you both very much for your astute answers. 48:07.590 --> 48:09.520 The next question comes for the entire panel, 48:09.520 --> 48:12.620 and I'd ask you to briefly address this, each one of you, 48:12.620 --> 48:15.690 and we'll start with Brigadier Dawes on the end. 48:15.690 --> 48:18.380 How would you characterize potential threats 48:18.380 --> 48:21.585 like chem bio attacks or EMP attacks, 48:21.585 --> 48:24.431 Black Swans or Pink Flamingos? 48:24.431 --> 48:27.866 Are we doing enough to prepare or to mitigate? 48:27.866 --> 48:28.983 Brigadier Dawes. 48:31.020 --> 48:34.970 - Well, speaking as one of the few nations 48:34.970 --> 48:38.094 that has actually experienced, just last year, 48:38.094 --> 48:42.970 a chemical attack on our sovereign soil in Salisbury, 48:42.970 --> 48:45.163 a beautiful market town in England, 48:47.100 --> 48:51.670 it is almost certainly not a Black Swan. 48:51.670 --> 48:54.380 It has happened, it is real. 48:54.380 --> 48:59.380 We do need to address how we react to these events. 48:59.410 --> 49:01.463 We must prepare fully for them. 49:03.890 --> 49:08.603 I guess my instant reaction is these are Pink Flamingos 49:08.603 --> 49:10.460 that we must address. 49:10.460 --> 49:15.460 We must be ready to respond both individually as nations 49:15.460 --> 49:19.823 but also collectively as friends, partners, and allies. 49:24.251 --> 49:25.260 - [Frank] General Turenne. 49:25.260 --> 49:26.420 - I would agree. 49:26.420 --> 49:28.930 It is clearly a known known, 49:28.930 --> 49:33.090 and if I look back at the training over the last 20 years 49:33.090 --> 49:37.690 and what we used to do in terms of CBRN training 49:37.690 --> 49:39.543 compared to what is done today, 49:40.680 --> 49:42.672 there's clearly a lot of work to be done 49:42.672 --> 49:47.672 to get back into that space, certainly in our case. 49:48.040 --> 49:53.040 And it's where do you focus the efforts, 49:53.140 --> 49:56.070 but clearly it is a known known. 49:56.070 --> 49:57.970 It's a Pink Flamingo from my perspective, 49:57.970 --> 50:00.110 and a lot of work to be done to get 50:00.110 --> 50:01.593 where we would need to be at. 50:04.623 --> 50:09.623 - I think this was the third Pink Flamingo on my slide 50:10.310 --> 50:14.370 that I omitted, but it's a definite threat that we have 50:14.370 --> 50:18.940 and it's a definite vulnerability that the Koreans 50:20.330 --> 50:22.683 as well as the alliance has to address, 50:23.930 --> 50:25.810 that we need to look at. 50:25.810 --> 50:29.180 Again, I put the other two: command and control 50:29.180 --> 50:34.180 and close-fire support above this Flamingo. 50:36.224 --> 50:39.080 - It's definitely an area that we watch very closely, 50:39.080 --> 50:41.150 and as our Canadian friend mentioned, 50:41.150 --> 50:42.860 is something that we've gotten away from 50:42.860 --> 50:45.010 for the last 18 years, 50:45.010 --> 50:46.768 and one that has now become a focal point 50:46.768 --> 50:48.560 in terms of our training, 50:48.560 --> 50:51.560 not just for the U.S. side, but Iraq and U.S. 50:51.560 --> 50:53.790 And as you look at your Japanese partners, 50:53.790 --> 50:56.020 what they've gone through with catastrophes, 50:56.020 --> 50:59.100 and equipping and the things they've done to prepare 50:59.100 --> 51:01.120 for another one, a lot of lessons were learned 51:01.120 --> 51:03.150 from that Japanese partnership as well. 51:03.150 --> 51:07.020 But it's a focused effort that we use constantly. 51:07.020 --> 51:11.266 2ID as a combined force trains this piece routinely 51:11.266 --> 51:13.810 with their combined partners in the 17th ID 51:14.830 --> 51:16.282 and Eighth Army staff, too. 51:16.282 --> 51:18.590 It's definitely a focus area. 51:18.590 --> 51:19.730 - Gentlemen, thank you. 51:19.730 --> 51:21.650 I could probably ask this next question 51:21.650 --> 51:23.270 to each and every one of our panel members, 51:23.270 --> 51:24.660 but General Turenne, 51:24.660 --> 51:27.900 this probably affects you the most right now. 51:27.900 --> 51:31.380 How do climate change effects, Pink Flamingos 51:31.380 --> 51:34.400 as our requester would obviously say, 51:34.400 --> 51:36.380 enter into the planning considerations 51:36.380 --> 51:37.720 as a number of our partners 51:37.720 --> 51:40.620 and allies in the region will likely be responding 51:40.620 --> 51:43.980 to extreme weather events with increasing frequency, 51:43.980 --> 51:46.373 which our land forces will be asked to respond? 51:47.630 --> 51:48.803 - Yes, absolutely. 51:49.730 --> 51:50.563 It's funny. 51:50.563 --> 51:53.080 For the last four years, I've heard 51:53.080 --> 51:58.080 that we just hit the 100-year floods in Quebec and Ontario. 51:58.470 --> 51:59.303 Well, wait a minute, here. 51:59.303 --> 52:01.364 It's the third time in four years. 52:01.364 --> 52:04.020 There's a problem here. 52:04.020 --> 52:09.020 We've always seen, certainly the domestic climate change, 52:10.330 --> 52:12.930 the extreme climate issues, 52:12.930 --> 52:17.033 as a residual aspects to the force, 52:17.960 --> 52:22.770 but we just finished another major support to floods 52:22.770 --> 52:25.990 in Quebec and Ontario two weeks ago. 52:25.990 --> 52:27.840 In fact, it's still ongoing right now 52:29.510 --> 52:32.880 having up to 2000, if not more, troops deployed, 52:32.880 --> 52:36.840 and so we're seeing that from March to the end of August. 52:36.840 --> 52:39.900 In the spring, there are massive floods out east, 52:39.900 --> 52:43.010 and then British Columbia and Alberta are burning like crazy 52:43.010 --> 52:45.570 in July and August, 52:45.570 --> 52:48.400 and we're talking a significant number of troops. 52:48.400 --> 52:51.410 What we're doing is we're moving away 52:51.410 --> 52:54.090 from it's a residual capability, 52:54.090 --> 52:55.812 and, as I discussed in my comments, 52:55.812 --> 52:58.050 we're rebalancing the force. 52:58.050 --> 53:00.940 We're doing a complete review of the force design, 53:00.940 --> 53:04.010 and we're looking at the domestic requirements 53:04.010 --> 53:07.653 as part of that overall requirement. 53:07.653 --> 53:10.400 There needs to be standing forces available 53:10.400 --> 53:15.173 as part of the package, and not double or triple-tasked. 53:16.891 --> 53:17.870 In other words, we need to be able 53:17.870 --> 53:20.060 to sustain expeditionary deployments 53:20.060 --> 53:23.440 and at the same time being able to respond to this. 53:23.440 --> 53:26.230 That is for the South, and then, of course, 53:26.230 --> 53:28.240 we all know what's going on 53:28.240 --> 53:32.470 in the high Arctic right now where definitely, 53:32.470 --> 53:36.310 there are climate changes on the way, 53:36.310 --> 53:40.210 and we have significantly increased our operations 53:40.210 --> 53:44.100 in the high Arctic in the last few years, 53:44.100 --> 53:47.240 where most formations are obligated 53:47.240 --> 53:51.340 to conduct sovereignty operations in the high Arctic 53:51.340 --> 53:56.143 on every single year, regular force and reserves. 53:57.748 --> 54:00.380 We really need to make that a permanent part, 54:00.380 --> 54:02.320 which is where we're going now. 54:02.320 --> 54:03.153 - [Frank] Thank you. 54:03.153 --> 54:05.210 General Chun, we've had some devastating fires 54:05.210 --> 54:06.700 in South Korea most recently. 54:06.700 --> 54:09.830 How do you feel the reaction of the forces was conducted, 54:09.830 --> 54:11.730 and where do you think it needs to go? 54:12.910 --> 54:16.520 - These fires occurred on our eastern coast. 54:16.520 --> 54:18.126 On that particular day, 54:18.126 --> 54:23.126 we had strong winds close to, I believe, 54:23.880 --> 54:27.991 15 to 20 miles gush winds. 54:27.991 --> 54:30.490 Those are days when everybody knows 54:30.490 --> 54:33.010 that you should not have a barbecue. 54:33.010 --> 54:33.843 Unfortunately, 54:33.843 --> 54:37.500 one of our electrical generators blew up, 54:37.500 --> 54:41.493 and it started this fire, and it was quite admirable 54:42.610 --> 54:45.530 how the Iraq army was able to mobilize 54:45.530 --> 54:48.400 with the civilian fire department 54:52.625 --> 54:55.790 to put the fire out within three days. 54:55.790 --> 54:57.920 What is especially grateful is 54:57.920 --> 55:02.920 that USFK immediately sent in the assets that were required 55:03.370 --> 55:06.010 to assist us in putting out these fires. 55:06.010 --> 55:10.889 It went a long way not only in putting the fires out, 55:10.889 --> 55:15.850 but showing to the Korean people that American forces, 55:15.850 --> 55:20.850 allied forces, contribute to our daily lives and welfare. 55:21.021 --> 55:22.703 It was much appreciated. 55:25.630 --> 55:30.549 That kind of climate effects does affect us, 55:30.549 --> 55:34.956 but when the alliance comes together with this, 55:34.956 --> 55:38.510 it becomes much more manageable. 55:38.510 --> 55:40.060 - Thank you very much. 55:40.060 --> 55:41.500 General Bills, probably for you, 55:41.500 --> 55:42.760 and I'd ask you to answer this 55:42.760 --> 55:45.853 and then go right into your closing comments for the panel. 55:46.890 --> 55:51.490 Some low-density, high-demand forces significantly reside 55:51.490 --> 55:54.730 in the reserve component but are unavailable 55:54.730 --> 55:57.170 for the consistent and persistent engagement 55:57.170 --> 55:59.410 with our allies and partners. 55:59.410 --> 56:00.243 Example: 56:00.243 --> 56:04.420 Engineers, Civil Affairs, bridging equipment. 56:04.420 --> 56:07.623 Setting the theater as readiness, how do you see this? 56:10.200 --> 56:13.113 - When it comes to Civil Affairs, part of the answer, 56:14.070 --> 56:15.370 we've had great success. 56:15.370 --> 56:17.831 Up until recently, we did not have a C9 56:17.831 --> 56:20.173 as part of the Combined Forces Command. 56:22.530 --> 56:25.580 It made a big difference in terms of its continuity, 56:25.580 --> 56:28.410 but more importantly its alliance partnership 56:28.410 --> 56:31.380 with Iraq forces who in themselves 56:31.380 --> 56:34.986 really didn't have a counterpart piece to it as well. 56:34.986 --> 56:36.590 Because of the work that we've done, 56:36.590 --> 56:38.722 and I'll use some of the ranges, 56:38.722 --> 56:41.280 some of the fires that we've talked about 56:41.280 --> 56:43.383 and some of the relationships that go into that. 56:43.383 --> 56:46.490 We've had great success in building relationships, 56:46.490 --> 56:49.080 not only from the C9 but from units like 56:49.080 --> 56:52.400 the 351st out of California, that have come forward. 56:52.400 --> 56:54.550 Not just for the extra systemic purposes, 56:54.550 --> 56:58.670 but spent time on the pen working relationships with 56:58.670 --> 57:02.240 the villages, towns, and cities within Korea. 57:02.240 --> 57:05.540 Pocheon is one of 'em in terms of a relationship 57:05.540 --> 57:07.880 that was not the best because of the 57:07.880 --> 57:10.070 range's encroachment and so on. 57:10.070 --> 57:14.210 And the C9 team, as well as those in the 351st played 57:14.210 --> 57:16.770 a big role in going into that town, 57:16.770 --> 57:18.217 working that relationship, building it, 57:18.217 --> 57:21.520 and coordinating a lot of activities in terms of 57:21.520 --> 57:22.933 improving the schools, 57:24.060 --> 57:27.105 more connection with US forces culturally 57:27.105 --> 57:31.110 and because of that, we've had nothing but success 57:31.110 --> 57:33.740 since then, in terms of working that relationship 57:33.740 --> 57:35.690 with the city of Pocheon. 57:35.690 --> 57:38.413 That's throughout the whole pen when it comes to 57:38.413 --> 57:40.780 what they've done in terms of the touch points 57:40.780 --> 57:43.302 to make sure that we maintain the alliance, 57:43.302 --> 57:45.989 not through, or just through the military side of it, 57:45.989 --> 57:47.821 but through the relationships that we build 57:47.821 --> 57:51.580 for the things that culturally that's accepted 57:51.580 --> 57:53.830 and so on for us with.. 57:53.830 --> 57:56.400 With US with our Korean partners. 57:56.400 --> 57:58.700 And it's one that's been a huge success. 57:58.700 --> 58:01.253 So with that, I'll close here. 58:02.552 --> 58:03.385 So, there ya have it. 58:03.385 --> 58:04.700 It's a problem solved. 58:04.700 --> 58:07.923 This is a wicked problem for which military 58:07.923 --> 58:10.380 doesn't have a great track record. 58:10.380 --> 58:13.410 We know that there are events in our future 58:13.410 --> 58:14.971 that will catch us off guard, 58:14.971 --> 58:17.610 that will impose great risk to our forces 58:17.610 --> 58:19.310 and those of our allies. 58:19.310 --> 58:21.222 A Black Swan event will happen, 58:21.222 --> 58:26.222 but with agile forces working together in Indo-Asia Pacific, 58:26.270 --> 58:28.434 we can instill a culture of readiness 58:28.434 --> 58:30.670 for the variety of contingencies 58:30.670 --> 58:34.570 and help facilitate a freedom and open Indo-Pacific. 58:34.570 --> 58:36.814 The strength of land forces is our ability 58:36.814 --> 58:40.370 and a desire to work together across constellation 58:40.370 --> 58:42.620 of partners, friends and allies, 58:42.620 --> 58:45.740 to manage problem sets and improve regional stability, 58:45.740 --> 58:47.490 security, and welfare. 58:47.490 --> 58:50.620 At their most basic, land forces are people. 58:50.620 --> 58:52.535 Soldiers working side by side, 58:52.535 --> 58:54.789 regardless of the uniform they wear, 58:54.789 --> 58:56.800 to solve problems together. 58:56.800 --> 58:59.260 As the Eighth Army commander for station of Korea, 58:59.260 --> 59:02.180 I remiss if I didn't close with the following, 59:02.180 --> 59:04.500 Kapshi Kapshida, we go together. 59:04.500 --> 59:05.630 In our Black Swan world, 59:05.630 --> 59:08.138 this phrase applies to all our partners, friends, 59:08.138 --> 59:10.620 and allies across Indo-Asia Pacific. 59:10.620 --> 59:11.740 We go together. 59:11.740 --> 59:13.140 Thank you to my fellow panelists 59:13.140 --> 59:16.270 and thanks to all of you for joining us today. 59:16.270 --> 59:17.103 Enjoy the remainder.. 59:17.103 --> 59:17.936 - Ladies and gentlemen, 59:17.936 --> 59:19.104 please join me in a round of applause 59:19.104 --> 59:20.617 for this outstanding panel. 59:20.617 --> 59:22.867 (applause) 59:27.520 --> 59:28.542 - Thank you gentlemen. 59:28.542 --> 59:30.314 Great discussion. 59:30.314 --> 59:33.440 We're gonna take a two hour break here 59:33.440 --> 59:36.553 to let you go into the exhibit area and grab some lunch.