WEBVTT 00:00.250 --> 00:01.266 - All right, 00:01.266 --> 00:02.320 and we will call the meeting to order. 00:02.320 --> 00:04.720 Thank you all for being here. 00:04.720 --> 00:07.977 This morning we have testimony from the Northern Command 00:07.977 --> 00:12.410 and the Southern Command, and it is a very topical time 00:12.410 --> 00:13.243 to have both of the men. 00:13.243 --> 00:15.327 There's a lot going on in both areas. 00:15.327 --> 00:18.960 We will have four witnesses with opening testimony. 00:18.960 --> 00:21.830 We have General Terrence O'Shaughnessy, who is the commander 00:21.830 --> 00:24.990 of the US Northern Command, Admiral Craig Faller, 00:24.990 --> 00:27.290 who is the commander of US Southern Command, 00:27.290 --> 00:28.800 the honorable Kathryn Wheelbarger, 00:28.800 --> 00:30.260 who is the Assistant Secretary of Defense 00:30.260 --> 00:32.400 for International Security Affairs, 00:32.400 --> 00:34.390 and the honorable Kenneth Rapuano, 00:34.390 --> 00:36.930 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 00:36.930 --> 00:38.420 and Global Security. 00:38.420 --> 00:39.850 And as I was mentioning 00:39.850 --> 00:41.620 when I went out with these two gentlemen earlier, 00:41.620 --> 00:44.040 we do not have to say this will probably be your last time 00:44.040 --> 00:45.430 before you testify before us. 00:45.430 --> 00:46.470 We've had a lot of turnover, 00:46.470 --> 00:49.650 and a lot of folks coming before us for the last time. 00:49.650 --> 00:51.670 But both of you, I think, as far as we know, 00:51.670 --> 00:53.190 gonna be here for a little while. 00:53.190 --> 00:56.168 Before we begin, I probably do wanna start on a sad note. 00:56.168 --> 01:00.276 Many of you, some of us up here served with Ellen Tauscher, 01:00.276 --> 01:02.960 who is a member of the Armed Services Committee 01:02.960 --> 01:04.380 for a little over 12 years. 01:04.380 --> 01:06.940 She passed away this week very sadly. 01:06.940 --> 01:09.850 I came into Congress actually in 1996 with Ellen, 01:09.850 --> 01:12.040 served in this committee with her for her whole time 01:12.040 --> 01:14.700 before she moved over to the Obama Administration 01:14.700 --> 01:18.340 to engage in arms controlled discussions with the Russians. 01:18.340 --> 01:19.470 Ellen was a terrific person, 01:19.470 --> 01:21.270 and a great member of this committee. 01:21.270 --> 01:22.560 She will be missed my many. 01:22.560 --> 01:25.513 And I just wanna express my condolences and sympathies 01:25.513 --> 01:27.980 for her family and friends, and just mention 01:27.980 --> 01:29.710 what a great pleasure it was serving with her, 01:29.710 --> 01:31.330 and appreciate her service to our country 01:31.330 --> 01:32.930 and to her district. 01:32.930 --> 01:35.720 Mac, did you want say anything? 01:35.720 --> 01:36.553 - Thank you sir. 01:36.553 --> 01:39.480 I would just add that I think Ellen reflects the best 01:39.480 --> 01:43.020 of the bipartisan traditions of this committee. 01:43.020 --> 01:46.240 She worked on both sides of the aisle, 01:46.240 --> 01:49.100 especially on nuclear arms control issues. 01:49.100 --> 01:52.360 A wonderful, warm, caring person, 01:52.360 --> 01:56.700 and I think we're all going to miss her, 01:56.700 --> 01:59.060 but also continue to benefit 01:59.060 --> 02:00.797 from the example she set for both of us, 02:00.797 --> 02:03.510 and I appreciate the opportunity to say that. 02:03.510 --> 02:05.740 - Thank you, and with that, as I mentioned, 02:05.740 --> 02:07.900 we are having the testimony from the 02:07.900 --> 02:08.890 Southern Command and the Northern Command, 02:08.890 --> 02:11.950 and it is a very very interesting time. 02:11.950 --> 02:13.960 I think the most topical thing right at the moment 02:13.960 --> 02:16.700 to hear from the Southern Command 02:16.700 --> 02:18.050 is on the issue of Venezuela, 02:18.050 --> 02:21.208 and what is happening down there really minute by minute. 02:21.208 --> 02:23.280 There's a lot going on in that area. 02:23.280 --> 02:25.890 And I do wanna emphasize how important it is 02:25.890 --> 02:28.150 to get a stable government in Venezuela. 02:28.150 --> 02:31.910 And my belief that the Maduro government is not legitimate. 02:31.910 --> 02:34.080 The facts, I think, make that clear, 02:34.080 --> 02:36.440 and the devastation throughout Venezuela shows 02:36.440 --> 02:39.640 how their leadership has impacted that country. 02:39.640 --> 02:41.730 The statistics are staggering. 02:41.730 --> 02:45.420 The incredible rise in poverty and malnutrition, 02:45.420 --> 02:47.340 the people who are displaced. 02:47.340 --> 02:49.050 It is devastating for Venezuela, 02:49.050 --> 02:51.750 but it's also devastating for the region. 02:51.750 --> 02:52.840 Some of us were on this committee 02:52.840 --> 02:54.550 when we passed Plan Columbia, 02:54.550 --> 02:57.840 and we've worked with Columbia for literally decades now 02:57.840 --> 03:01.250 to try to combat the narco terrorists down there, 03:01.250 --> 03:04.470 and really made an enormous amount of progress. 03:04.470 --> 03:07.840 That progress is threatened by the instability in Venezuela 03:07.840 --> 03:09.910 as refugees pour across the border, 03:09.910 --> 03:12.690 and as various criminals, terrorists, 03:12.690 --> 03:14.020 and violent organizations 03:14.020 --> 03:16.380 take advantage of that instability. 03:16.380 --> 03:18.450 And trying to get back to a more stable situation 03:18.450 --> 03:20.740 in Venezuela is enormously important. 03:20.740 --> 03:22.660 We'll also be very interested by the role 03:22.660 --> 03:25.330 that both Cuba and Russia are playing in that region, 03:25.330 --> 03:28.750 as Russia in particular attempts to expand their reach. 03:28.750 --> 03:31.470 We have seen obviously what they've done, 03:31.470 --> 03:34.370 meddling in Europe, and in the Middle East. 03:34.370 --> 03:36.996 But I think this is instructive of just how ambitious 03:36.996 --> 03:40.280 President Putin's plans are to spread Russia's 03:40.280 --> 03:42.450 malign influence throughout the globe. 03:42.450 --> 03:43.737 We'll be interested in hearing about that. 03:43.737 --> 03:46.910 And the broader overarching issue with Southern Command 03:46.910 --> 03:49.191 is almost always the drug trafficking. 03:49.191 --> 03:53.820 How we can contain the drugs that flow south to north. 03:53.820 --> 03:56.171 And the one piece, and I spoke yesterday 03:56.171 --> 03:59.020 with Admiral Faller about this, 03:59.020 --> 04:01.830 is we have to focus on a, I believe 04:01.830 --> 04:03.490 a total approach to this, 04:03.490 --> 04:05.280 and look at the demand side of this. 04:05.280 --> 04:07.710 If there was not the demand in the United States of America 04:07.710 --> 04:09.460 for these drugs they wouldn't come. 04:09.460 --> 04:11.930 And as long as the demand remains as high as it is 04:11.930 --> 04:13.990 it's going to be incredibly expensive 04:13.990 --> 04:15.680 and difficult to stop them. 04:15.680 --> 04:16.840 So I think it would be instructive, 04:16.840 --> 04:19.260 not to just try to stop the drug cartels 04:19.260 --> 04:21.010 from shipping them north, but what can we do 04:21.010 --> 04:22.810 to combat the entire problem, 04:22.810 --> 04:25.210 a whole of government approach. 04:25.210 --> 04:26.650 You know, working with people here, 04:26.650 --> 04:27.750 domestically in the United States, 04:27.750 --> 04:29.880 to try to reduce the demand for drugs. 04:29.880 --> 04:32.450 And Northern Command, obviously we're very focused 04:32.450 --> 04:33.980 on the southern border, and I won't, 04:33.980 --> 04:35.660 I've given speeches about that before, 04:35.660 --> 04:37.610 I won't take this moment to do that. 04:37.610 --> 04:40.140 But we do have a significant challenge 04:40.140 --> 04:41.330 on the southern border right now. 04:41.330 --> 04:42.480 The sheer number of people 04:42.480 --> 04:44.170 who are flowing towards the border 04:44.170 --> 04:46.310 is overwhelming our ability to process 04:46.310 --> 04:48.530 the asylum seekers that are coming. 04:48.530 --> 04:49.860 And we need to come up with a plan for that, 04:49.860 --> 04:51.980 because right now the only thing that I would hope 04:51.980 --> 04:52.830 we could all agree on, 04:52.830 --> 04:56.000 is what we're doing now is not working. 04:56.000 --> 04:57.580 So I would appreciate some insights 04:57.580 --> 04:59.090 about how we can change that 04:59.090 --> 05:01.450 to try to address the situation, and would only offer 05:01.450 --> 05:05.410 one specific thought, again, like with the drugs, 05:05.410 --> 05:07.280 focusing on stopping them from coming in, 05:07.280 --> 05:08.930 as opposed to stopping the demand, 05:08.930 --> 05:10.800 is perhaps the wrong approach. 05:10.800 --> 05:12.870 When it comes to the border, folks say, 05:12.870 --> 05:15.000 how can we stop these people once they get here? 05:15.000 --> 05:17.540 We have to figure out some way to change the equation 05:17.540 --> 05:19.170 so that they don't want to come. 05:19.170 --> 05:22.260 The best way to do that is to have greater prosperity 05:22.260 --> 05:25.560 and stability in the countries that they are coming from. 05:25.560 --> 05:29.400 They are free fleeing violence, poverty, and hopelessness. 05:29.400 --> 05:31.980 Until we replace those things it's hard to imagine 05:31.980 --> 05:34.260 that they're gonna stop making that choice. 05:34.260 --> 05:36.270 So we're gonna, again, need a comprehensive approach 05:36.270 --> 05:38.560 to addressing that problem and challenge, 05:38.560 --> 05:40.120 and I look forward to the testimony 05:40.120 --> 05:41.300 from all four of our witnesses. 05:41.300 --> 05:42.220 And with that, I'll turn it over 05:42.220 --> 05:44.530 to the ranking member, Mr. Thornberry. 05:44.530 --> 05:45.983 - Thank you Mr. Chairman, 05:45.983 --> 05:47.820 and I join you in welcoming our witnesses. 05:47.820 --> 05:50.589 Appreciate each of you being here. 05:50.589 --> 05:53.310 All of us are intensely focused 05:53.310 --> 05:56.710 on the developments in Venezuela. 05:56.710 --> 05:58.100 A week before last, 05:58.100 --> 06:00.640 I had the opportunity to be there on the border, 06:00.640 --> 06:04.550 and to listen to some of the 06:04.550 --> 06:06.330 thousands of people 06:06.330 --> 06:09.980 who are streaming across that border every day, 06:09.980 --> 06:14.900 and hear their desire to be freed from oppression, 06:14.900 --> 06:18.123 and to have a chance for a better life. 06:20.028 --> 06:24.610 As you said, I think we all have something at stake here. 06:24.610 --> 06:28.931 I'm also very disturbed by the reports of Russian, Cuban, 06:28.931 --> 06:32.790 Chinese, other interference there. 06:32.790 --> 06:36.410 For example, I think the Secretary of State has said 06:36.410 --> 06:39.040 that Maduro was ready to leave yesterday, 06:39.040 --> 06:41.170 but the Russian's wouldn't let him. 06:41.170 --> 06:44.620 So there is a tremendous concern, 06:44.620 --> 06:46.620 not only about the people of Venezuela, 06:46.620 --> 06:49.530 but about foreign manipulation 06:49.530 --> 06:52.650 that prevents the people of Venezuela 06:52.650 --> 06:54.920 from having a better life, and of course, 06:54.920 --> 06:58.530 a lot of that is directed against us. 06:58.530 --> 07:03.380 I would also just say that my takeaway from visiting 07:03.380 --> 07:07.930 at least three of the countries in South America was 07:07.930 --> 07:10.630 we have tremendous opportunities there. 07:10.630 --> 07:15.233 Tremendous economic, security, all sorts of opportunities, 07:17.330 --> 07:20.023 but we also have significant concerns. 07:21.180 --> 07:24.930 Chinese involvement, and the Russian, Iranian, 07:24.930 --> 07:27.840 other things that you have mentioned. 07:27.840 --> 07:30.323 A lot of issues to talk today, 07:31.350 --> 07:35.260 and obviously protecting the homeland 07:35.260 --> 07:38.690 is absolutely central to the purpose 07:38.690 --> 07:41.730 of the Department of Defense and the Federal Government. 07:41.730 --> 07:44.670 And there are a variety of ways that, 07:44.670 --> 07:48.252 a variety of concerns that we have. 07:48.252 --> 07:49.340 The last thing I would say is, 07:49.340 --> 07:51.090 and it goes beyond the scope of this committee 07:51.090 --> 07:54.130 and this hearing, but I completely agree with your statement 07:54.130 --> 07:57.410 that we need a more comprehensive approach 07:57.410 --> 08:00.650 to deal with the challenges at the southern border. 08:00.650 --> 08:04.390 Part of that is helping the countries of Central America 08:04.390 --> 08:09.370 so that people are not, have a safer place to stay, 08:09.370 --> 08:13.240 part of it, in my opinion, is the asylum laws 08:13.240 --> 08:17.020 in the United States, part of it is doing better 08:17.020 --> 08:18.690 for the Department of Homeland Security 08:18.690 --> 08:22.757 so they can do their job, rather than rely on the military. 08:22.757 --> 08:24.500 A lot of that is beyond our scope. 08:24.500 --> 08:27.030 I know we will talk about some of those aspects. 08:27.030 --> 08:28.480 The key thing is, 08:28.480 --> 08:32.400 maybe more so than any time I've been on this committee, 08:32.400 --> 08:35.170 our own hemisphere is 08:36.360 --> 08:37.920 at stake 08:37.920 --> 08:39.740 with American national security 08:39.740 --> 08:42.120 in ways that I think it hasn't been before. 08:42.120 --> 08:44.440 So I think it's appropriate to have these witnesses, 08:44.440 --> 08:47.423 and I look forward to hearing their testimony. 08:49.430 --> 08:53.050 - [Mr. Smith] Thank you, Mr. Rapuano we'll start with you. 08:53.050 --> 08:55.450 - [Rapuano] Chairman Smith, ranking member Thornberry, 08:55.450 --> 08:57.590 and distinguished members of the committee. 08:57.590 --> 09:00.040 I'm honored to be here with General O'Shaughnessy, 09:00.040 --> 09:03.920 Admiral Faller, and Assistant Secretary Wheelbarger. 09:03.920 --> 09:06.570 For the Department of Defense, defending the homeland 09:06.570 --> 09:08.500 is our highest priority. 09:08.500 --> 09:10.760 Our homeland, once a sanctuary, 09:10.760 --> 09:12.920 is threatened by potential adversaries 09:12.920 --> 09:15.750 that are developing a wide range of capabilities 09:15.750 --> 09:17.810 to threaten the homeland. 09:17.810 --> 09:20.440 Our adversaries are developing these capabilities 09:20.440 --> 09:23.030 to threaten or to commit acts of aggression 09:23.030 --> 09:24.900 against the United States. 09:24.900 --> 09:28.910 Their actions are intended to limit US response options, 09:28.910 --> 09:30.770 thus preventing us from our defending 09:30.770 --> 09:33.450 our allies and partners. 09:33.450 --> 09:34.890 China and Russia, 09:34.890 --> 09:38.120 by far our most advanced potential adversaries, 09:38.120 --> 09:42.220 increasingly developing 21st century technologies 09:42.220 --> 09:45.000 to hold the US homeland at risk. 09:45.000 --> 09:48.970 Employing systems intended to deny our advantages, 09:48.970 --> 09:50.870 delay our warning time, 09:50.870 --> 09:53.970 and likely target our civil infrastructure. 09:53.970 --> 09:57.120 These capabilities include anti-satellite systems, 09:57.120 --> 10:01.500 hypersonic glide vehicles, and advanced cyber capabilities. 10:01.500 --> 10:03.350 While North Korea has not conducted 10:03.350 --> 10:07.140 any nuclear capable missile tests in more than a year, 10:07.140 --> 10:09.423 it retains weapons of mass destructions. 10:10.760 --> 10:13.680 North Korea also posseses cyber capabilities, 10:13.680 --> 10:16.090 and has demonstrated its intent to use them 10:16.090 --> 10:18.260 to threaten the US homeland. 10:18.260 --> 10:21.480 Iran continues to work on a space launch vehicle, 10:21.480 --> 10:23.440 reducing the timeline to development 10:23.440 --> 10:26.720 of intercontinental range ballistic missiles. 10:26.720 --> 10:30.010 Although our focus is on great power competition, 10:30.010 --> 10:33.040 and rogue states, we must continue to address 10:33.040 --> 10:36.550 the treat posed by violent extremist organizations. 10:36.550 --> 10:40.230 ISIS and others continue to strive for opportunities 10:40.230 --> 10:42.770 to strike the US homeland. 10:42.770 --> 10:43.970 The defense of the homeland 10:43.970 --> 10:46.660 is not restricted to adversaries abroad. 10:46.660 --> 10:49.090 In providing defense support to civil authorities 10:49.090 --> 10:51.340 my office coordinates the department's role 10:51.340 --> 10:54.320 for disaster relief and border security support 10:54.320 --> 10:56.270 to the Department of Homeland Security. 10:57.220 --> 10:59.040 To meet this range of challenges 10:59.040 --> 11:02.380 the Administration released its National Security Strategy. 11:02.380 --> 11:04.540 This informed the National Defense Strategy, 11:04.540 --> 11:07.920 which in turn helped shape the National Military Strategy. 11:07.920 --> 11:10.320 A common thread throughout all these documents 11:10.320 --> 11:13.180 is the need to strengthen homeland defense 11:13.180 --> 11:16.170 by enhancing our deterrents and assurance posture, 11:16.170 --> 11:19.290 improving our ability to respond if deterrents fails, 11:19.290 --> 11:21.400 and strengthening our negotiating position 11:21.400 --> 11:23.290 against adversaries. 11:23.290 --> 11:25.740 To that end, every element of my team 11:25.740 --> 11:29.240 is focused on strengthening US homeland defense. 11:29.240 --> 11:31.770 I'd like to highlight outer space. 11:31.770 --> 11:35.830 Space is a key domain for our national and homeland defense. 11:35.830 --> 11:38.350 However, the space domain is changing, 11:38.350 --> 11:42.450 and we must address growing foreign counter space threats, 11:42.450 --> 11:45.550 thus the Department provided Congress a legislative proposal 11:45.550 --> 11:48.380 for the establishment of the US Space Force 11:48.380 --> 11:51.040 as a new branch of our armed forces. 11:51.040 --> 11:52.570 The Space Force will catalyze 11:52.570 --> 11:54.450 the Department's transformation of space 11:54.450 --> 11:56.420 as a war fighting domain 11:56.420 --> 11:59.070 to ensure we are postured to deter aggression, 11:59.070 --> 12:01.370 and if necessary, are prepared to defend 12:01.370 --> 12:03.860 our vital interests in space. 12:03.860 --> 12:06.376 Cyber policies development of the Defense Cyber Strategy 12:06.376 --> 12:09.910 and first ever Cyber Posture Review 12:09.910 --> 12:14.420 has put the Department of Defense on a path to fight and win 12:14.420 --> 12:16.550 against a capable adversary, 12:16.550 --> 12:19.380 enhance the effectiveness of the joint force, 12:19.380 --> 12:21.320 defend critical infrastructure, 12:21.320 --> 12:24.380 secure DOD information anywhere, 12:24.380 --> 12:28.330 and prioritize cyber cooperation with partners and allies. 12:28.330 --> 12:31.840 These objectives, along with our intent to defend forward, 12:31.840 --> 12:34.620 puts the United States in a far better position 12:34.620 --> 12:38.658 to protect the homeland and counter adversary aggression. 12:38.658 --> 12:41.380 Additionally, the Department is enhancing 12:41.380 --> 12:43.460 its missile defenses for the homeland, 12:43.460 --> 12:45.360 and improving its ability to counter 12:45.360 --> 12:48.120 unmanned aircraft systems to further deny 12:48.120 --> 12:51.140 potential adversaries any potential advantage 12:51.140 --> 12:54.190 of using these capabilities against the homeland. 12:54.190 --> 12:56.050 Support to the homeland is not limited 12:56.050 --> 12:57.890 to countering foreign adversaries, 12:57.890 --> 13:01.610 we must also be prepared to support civil authorities. 13:01.610 --> 13:05.350 DOD actively supports the DHS mission on the border, 13:05.350 --> 13:07.730 because border security is a core element 13:07.730 --> 13:09.480 of national security. 13:09.480 --> 13:11.940 The immigration crisis on the southwest border 13:11.940 --> 13:13.930 poses significant national security, 13:13.930 --> 13:16.620 and humanitarian challenges for the nation, 13:16.620 --> 13:17.930 and threatens to overwhelm 13:17.930 --> 13:20.220 the Department of Homeland Security. 13:20.220 --> 13:24.750 In the last six months, over 430,000 undocumented aliens 13:24.750 --> 13:27.930 have been apprehended on the southwest border, 13:27.930 --> 13:30.960 which already surpasses the total number of aliens 13:30.960 --> 13:34.580 apprehended in the entire fiscal year of 2018. 13:34.580 --> 13:38.390 Last month alone, over 92,000 undocumented aliens 13:38.390 --> 13:41.240 were apprehended on the border. 13:41.240 --> 13:43.970 DHS will continue to need DOD support 13:43.970 --> 13:46.440 into the foreseeable future until they have 13:46.440 --> 13:48.536 the necessary resources and tools 13:48.536 --> 13:52.360 to properly exercise their responsibilities. 13:52.360 --> 13:54.570 Each of these missions have greatly contributed 13:54.570 --> 13:57.150 to homeland defense, and our pivotal to enhancing 13:57.150 --> 13:59.660 the US deterrents and assurance posture, 13:59.660 --> 14:02.750 improving our ability to respond should deterrents fail, 14:02.750 --> 14:05.410 and strengthening our ability to deter or defeat 14:05.410 --> 14:08.490 potential adversaries that threaten our way of life. 14:08.490 --> 14:11.263 Thank you again, and I look forward to your questions. 14:12.340 --> 14:13.827 - Thank you, Ms. Wheelbarger. 14:16.270 --> 14:18.270 - Chairman Smith, ranking member Thornberry, 14:18.270 --> 14:19.240 members of the committee, 14:19.240 --> 14:21.910 thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. 14:21.910 --> 14:24.860 We enjoy enormous potential in our hemisphere. 14:24.860 --> 14:26.570 Given the significant cooperation 14:26.570 --> 14:29.330 we received from our partners, and the Democratic values 14:29.330 --> 14:31.730 we share with most nations in the region, 14:31.730 --> 14:34.260 our vision is for a hemisphere that is collaborative, 14:34.260 --> 14:36.410 prosperous, and secure. 14:36.410 --> 14:38.820 But we face significant challenges as well, 14:38.820 --> 14:41.580 and Venezuela is the foremost example. 14:41.580 --> 14:43.720 Yet we have unprecedented regional unity 14:43.720 --> 14:45.400 at this historical moment. 14:45.400 --> 14:47.410 And the United States and our international partners 14:47.410 --> 14:49.820 continue to harness diplomatic information, 14:49.820 --> 14:52.320 and economic means to encourage 14:52.320 --> 14:54.650 a peaceful transition of power. 14:54.650 --> 14:56.470 For the Department of Defense, we have responded 14:56.470 --> 14:59.340 to Interim President Guaidó call for humanitarian aid 14:59.340 --> 15:01.940 by assisting USAID in those efforts 15:01.940 --> 15:04.580 to preposition aid in Columbia. 15:04.580 --> 15:06.930 We face other challenges in the region as well, 15:06.930 --> 15:10.040 including autocratic regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua, 15:10.040 --> 15:12.720 terrorist and criminal organizations, trafficking, 15:12.720 --> 15:15.130 natural disasters, and external actors 15:15.130 --> 15:18.290 seeking undo influence over countries decisions. 15:18.290 --> 15:21.010 For the Department, our partnerships are paramount. 15:21.010 --> 15:24.000 We deepen our relationships to address shared challenges, 15:24.000 --> 15:26.490 and focus on interoperability, intelligence sharing, 15:26.490 --> 15:28.750 science and technology cooperation, 15:28.750 --> 15:32.060 advancing cyber defenses, and expanding exercises. 15:32.060 --> 15:33.440 We counter illicit trafficking 15:33.440 --> 15:35.130 by supporting law enforcement agencies, 15:35.130 --> 15:37.310 and emphasizing human rights training. 15:37.310 --> 15:39.040 We prioritize regional cooperation, 15:39.040 --> 15:41.420 and humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. 15:41.420 --> 15:43.690 And we emphasize defense institution building, 15:43.690 --> 15:47.090 because strong institutions and anti-corruption measures 15:47.090 --> 15:50.380 encourage efficiency and support legitimate government. 15:50.380 --> 15:52.860 And as we see in Venezuela, the western hemisphere 15:52.860 --> 15:55.210 is a region of great power competition. 15:55.210 --> 15:57.600 We counter Chinese and Russian influence by gaining 15:57.600 --> 16:00.680 the trust of our partners to achieve objectives together. 16:00.680 --> 16:03.120 Unlike relationships with Russia and China, 16:03.120 --> 16:06.260 our cooperation is built on respect, collaboration, 16:06.260 --> 16:10.250 and a desire to bolster prosperity and security for all. 16:10.250 --> 16:11.930 With that I'll simply conclude by saying 16:11.930 --> 16:13.750 the Department takes a global view 16:13.750 --> 16:16.150 of the challenges we face and remains committed 16:16.150 --> 16:17.100 to the region. 16:17.100 --> 16:18.620 Thank you for your time. 16:18.620 --> 16:19.453 - Thank you very much. 16:19.453 --> 16:20.900 And let me just say you told me beforehand 16:20.900 --> 16:22.240 that your statement would be two minutes 16:22.240 --> 16:24.200 and it was exactly two minutes. 16:24.200 --> 16:26.190 That is incredibly impressive in this line of work, 16:26.190 --> 16:27.670 so I appreciate that. 16:27.670 --> 16:28.770 General O'Shaughnessy. 16:29.670 --> 16:31.460 - Chairman Smith, and ranking member Thornberry, 16:31.460 --> 16:33.130 and distinguished members of the committee. 16:33.130 --> 16:34.330 I'm truly honored to be here today 16:34.330 --> 16:35.793 as a Commander of the United States Northern Command 16:35.793 --> 16:38.470 and the US Canadian Binational Command, 16:38.470 --> 16:40.830 North American Aerospace Defense Command. 16:40.830 --> 16:42.300 I'm also proud to testify this morning 16:42.300 --> 16:44.200 along side my good friend Craig Faller. 16:44.200 --> 16:45.820 And Craig and the USSOUTHCOM team 16:45.820 --> 16:47.300 are vital partners and continue to bring 16:47.300 --> 16:48.750 our commands closer together 16:48.750 --> 16:50.680 to better defend our nation. 16:50.680 --> 16:52.360 And I'm also proud to appear with our great 16:52.360 --> 16:55.870 OSD partners Assistant Secretaries Rapuano and Wheelbarger. 16:55.870 --> 16:58.600 USNORTHCOM and NORAD are two complimentary 16:58.600 --> 17:00.840 but distinct commands driven by a single 17:00.840 --> 17:03.300 unyielding priority, defending the homeland 17:03.300 --> 17:04.510 from attack. 17:04.510 --> 17:06.690 In this era of rapidly evolving technology 17:06.690 --> 17:09.140 and renewed great power of competition 17:09.140 --> 17:11.850 the need for energized and active defense of the homeland 17:11.850 --> 17:13.720 cannot be overstated. 17:13.720 --> 17:15.530 Revisionist powers of Russia and China 17:15.530 --> 17:17.320 have given every indication that their 17:17.320 --> 17:19.290 security strategies are based on holding 17:19.290 --> 17:20.800 the United States at risk 17:20.800 --> 17:23.180 with both conventional and nuclear weapons. 17:23.180 --> 17:24.890 And they have signaled that we must anticipate 17:24.890 --> 17:28.040 attacks against our civilian and defense infrastructure 17:28.040 --> 17:29.950 in the event of a conflict. 17:29.950 --> 17:32.440 Russia has modernized its' aviation and submarine fleets 17:32.440 --> 17:34.440 and field of long range cruise missiles 17:34.440 --> 17:36.780 designed to evade radar detection. 17:36.780 --> 17:38.490 Russia and China continue their efforts 17:38.490 --> 17:40.750 to penetrate our networks while developing and testing 17:40.750 --> 17:43.910 hypersonic glide vehicles and both have also established 17:43.910 --> 17:46.290 a noticeably stronger foothold in the Arctic 17:46.290 --> 17:47.760 along the northern approaches 17:47.760 --> 17:50.160 to the United States and Canada. 17:50.160 --> 17:52.190 As a result, the strategic value of the Arctic 17:52.190 --> 17:53.670 as our first line of defense 17:53.670 --> 17:56.030 has re-emerged and USNORTHCOM and NORAD 17:56.030 --> 17:57.650 are taking active measures to ensure 17:57.650 --> 18:00.140 our ability to detect, track and defeat 18:00.140 --> 18:02.430 potential threats in that region. 18:02.430 --> 18:04.160 Our adversaries have engaged in deliberate 18:04.160 --> 18:05.810 focused efforts over a number of years 18:05.810 --> 18:08.104 to exploit our perceived weaknesses. 18:08.104 --> 18:10.700 As a result it is clear that our homeland 18:10.700 --> 18:12.093 is not a sanctuary. 18:14.180 --> 18:16.120 Our mission to deter our adversaries 18:16.120 --> 18:18.240 is dependent on our ability to detect 18:18.240 --> 18:20.660 and defeat potential threats to our homeland. 18:20.660 --> 18:22.890 And I'm grateful to the committee for your strong support 18:22.890 --> 18:24.983 of USNORTHCOM and NORAD along the lines 18:24.983 --> 18:28.470 of the efforts, for example, fielding ASR radars 18:28.470 --> 18:30.590 for our aerospace control alert fighters 18:30.590 --> 18:33.295 and improving the capability and capacity 18:33.295 --> 18:36.330 of our missile defense sensors and interceptors 18:36.330 --> 18:39.680 clearly demonstrates our shared sense of urgency. 18:39.680 --> 18:42.360 In that same spirit, we must take prudent steps now 18:42.360 --> 18:44.743 to ensure our next generation defensive capabilities 18:44.743 --> 18:48.026 to include a space based sensing layer for missile defense 18:48.026 --> 18:50.500 are not to late to need. 18:50.500 --> 18:53.250 We must develop an integrated family of systems including 18:53.250 --> 18:56.320 undersea, terrestrial, airborne and space based sensors 18:56.320 --> 18:58.290 with a sense of urgency. 18:58.290 --> 18:59.600 Given the fact that our adversaries 18:59.600 --> 19:02.150 are already developing these and testing these weapons, 19:02.150 --> 19:04.720 time is of the upmost important. 19:04.720 --> 19:07.080 And while the challenges facing us our significant 19:07.080 --> 19:08.870 I have great faith that through collaboration 19:08.870 --> 19:11.850 with industry and harnessing the power of innovation 19:11.850 --> 19:13.685 in the United States of America we will restore 19:13.685 --> 19:16.310 our competitive advantage and continue to outpace 19:16.310 --> 19:19.530 any adversary that might threaten our homeland. 19:19.530 --> 19:21.330 And I sincerely appreciate the committee's work 19:21.330 --> 19:23.760 providing much needed predictability and stability 19:23.760 --> 19:26.200 with an on time budget in FY19. 19:26.200 --> 19:28.610 And I'm also grateful for the committee's ongoing efforts 19:28.610 --> 19:31.274 to ensure we avoid the devastating, deep cutting impacts 19:31.274 --> 19:33.720 that are return to sequestration would bring 19:33.720 --> 19:36.078 to the Department of Defense. 19:36.078 --> 19:38.120 USNORTHCOM and NORAD work every day with our 19:38.120 --> 19:40.130 partners to keep our citizens safe 19:40.130 --> 19:41.900 while confronting challenges emanating from 19:41.900 --> 19:44.750 a multiple approaches and all domains. 19:44.750 --> 19:46.360 I especially wanna take this opportunity 19:46.360 --> 19:48.170 to express my gratitude to the amazing 19:48.170 --> 19:50.530 men and women in the National Guard who are great 19:50.530 --> 19:52.450 partners and critical to our ability 19:52.450 --> 19:54.310 to perform our missions. 19:54.310 --> 19:56.050 And whether intercepting Russian bombers 19:56.050 --> 19:57.140 of the coast of Alaska 19:57.140 --> 19:58.730 or providing much needed support 19:58.730 --> 20:00.940 along our Federal law enforcement partners 20:00.940 --> 20:02.150 along our southern border, 20:02.150 --> 20:03.950 the airmen, soldiers, sailors, marines, 20:03.950 --> 20:06.700 coastguardsmen and civilians of USNORTHCOM and NORAD 20:06.700 --> 20:09.350 are deeply committed to defending our nation. 20:09.350 --> 20:11.570 And I'm honored to represent them today 20:11.570 --> 20:12.910 and we have the watch. 20:12.910 --> 20:15.133 Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 20:16.290 --> 20:18.023 - [Mr. Smith] Thank you, Admiral Faller. 20:19.210 --> 20:21.140 - Good morning Chairman Smith, 20:21.140 --> 20:22.800 ranking member Thornberry. 20:22.800 --> 20:24.810 Thank you for the opportunity to testify before 20:24.810 --> 20:27.370 you today with my shipmates General O'Shaughnessy, 20:27.370 --> 20:29.450 Assistant Secretary of Defense Rapuano 20:29.450 --> 20:32.600 and acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Wheelbarger. 20:32.600 --> 20:34.880 Also thanks to this committee for the steadfast support 20:34.880 --> 20:36.883 you provide our men and women everyday. 20:37.930 --> 20:40.120 Western Hemisphere is our shared home. 20:40.120 --> 20:41.340 Our neighborhood. 20:41.340 --> 20:43.077 We're connected to the nations of Latin America 20:43.077 --> 20:45.983 and the Caribbean by shared democratic traditions, 20:45.983 --> 20:47.733 culture and geography. 20:48.690 --> 20:50.400 From my headquarters in Doral, Florida 20:50.400 --> 20:52.500 it takes me longer to travel to DC 20:52.500 --> 20:55.920 than it does to many countries in my area of responsibility. 20:55.920 --> 20:58.240 We're connected to our neighbors in every domain. 20:58.240 --> 21:00.860 Sea, air, land, space and cyber 21:00.860 --> 21:03.313 and most importantly shared values. 21:04.250 --> 21:06.300 Only by working together can we meet current 21:06.300 --> 21:09.110 and future global challenges. 21:09.110 --> 21:11.692 Ultimately what we want enemies to fear us, 21:11.692 --> 21:13.918 friends to partner with us, 21:13.918 --> 21:15.870 and the Western Hemisphere to shine 21:15.870 --> 21:17.610 as a beacon of peace, 21:17.610 --> 21:20.160 democracy and prosperity. 21:20.160 --> 21:22.000 To ensure the security of our homeland 21:22.000 --> 21:24.280 SOUTHCOM works closely with our inter-agency 21:24.280 --> 21:27.730 teammates, who at the Department of State, USAID, 21:27.730 --> 21:28.707 Department of Homeland Security 21:28.707 --> 21:31.690 and the Department of Justice to name just a few. 21:31.690 --> 21:34.120 This teamwork, especially with Northern Command, 21:34.120 --> 21:35.660 and the US Coast Guard is critical 21:35.660 --> 21:37.590 to mission accomplishment. 21:37.590 --> 21:39.170 Over the past five months I've traveled 21:39.170 --> 21:40.797 throughout Central America, South America 21:40.797 --> 21:42.560 and the Caribbean to get a first hand view 21:42.560 --> 21:44.840 of the opportunities and the challenges 21:44.840 --> 21:48.370 that directly impact the security of our hemisphere 21:48.370 --> 21:49.680 and our homeland. 21:49.680 --> 21:52.540 Criminal organizations, narco trafficking, 21:52.540 --> 21:55.060 illegal migration, violent extremists, 21:55.060 --> 21:57.300 corruption all enabled by weak governance 21:57.300 --> 21:59.720 are principal amongst these challenges. 21:59.720 --> 22:01.700 The most disturbing insight however that I have 22:01.700 --> 22:03.370 garnered in my time in command 22:03.370 --> 22:05.520 has been the degree to which external state 22:05.520 --> 22:08.870 actors have been rapidly expanding their presence 22:08.870 --> 22:11.278 and influence in the Western Hemisphere. 22:11.278 --> 22:14.290 Across the world to include in our neighborhood 22:14.290 --> 22:16.800 democratic values are under assault by China, 22:16.800 --> 22:18.093 Russia and Iran. 22:19.240 --> 22:21.460 So how do we best counter these threats 22:21.460 --> 22:22.760 to our neighborhood? 22:22.760 --> 22:25.220 Security cooperation is our best tool 22:25.220 --> 22:27.240 to continue building on the strong partnerships 22:27.240 --> 22:29.810 in the region and turn the challenges of the hemisphere 22:29.810 --> 22:31.070 into opportunities. 22:31.070 --> 22:34.240 Our partners are doing great things everyday. 22:34.240 --> 22:36.600 In this hemisphere, in our neighborhood, 22:36.600 --> 22:38.180 a little goes a long way. 22:38.180 --> 22:40.120 We need the right focus and consistent 22:40.120 --> 22:42.550 military presence, we cannot achieve 22:42.550 --> 22:44.390 positive results and influence outcomes 22:44.390 --> 22:46.140 without being on the playing field. 22:47.050 --> 22:48.940 But every security challenge and threat 22:48.940 --> 22:50.450 in our hemisphere is compounded by 22:50.450 --> 22:52.540 the crisis in Venezuela. 22:52.540 --> 22:54.630 Russia provides lifelines through loans, 22:54.630 --> 22:56.630 technical and military support 22:56.630 --> 22:57.870 and rhetoric. 22:57.870 --> 23:00.430 China is Venezuela's single largest state creditor, 23:00.430 --> 23:03.580 saddling the Venezuelan people with more 23:03.580 --> 23:06.590 than 50 billion in debt and exporting surveillance 23:06.590 --> 23:08.950 technology used to monitor and repress 23:08.950 --> 23:10.520 the Venezuelan people. 23:10.520 --> 23:12.060 Iran has restarted direct flights 23:12.060 --> 23:15.140 from Tehran and re-invigorated diplomatic ties. 23:15.140 --> 23:17.540 Ever present Cuba provides critical personnel 23:17.540 --> 23:19.950 and resources to prop up a corrupt 23:19.950 --> 23:21.810 and illegitimate dictator. 23:21.810 --> 23:23.320 In the face of this malign influence 23:23.320 --> 23:25.110 the rest of the world unites in support 23:25.110 --> 23:27.060 of Venezuela's legitimate leader 23:27.060 --> 23:28.623 interim President Guaidó. 23:29.490 --> 23:31.680 A transition to legitimate democracy 23:31.680 --> 23:33.670 is underway. 23:33.670 --> 23:35.700 And I have a message for the professionals 23:35.700 --> 23:38.580 in the Venezuelan military and security forces. 23:38.580 --> 23:40.300 The brutal dictatorship of Maduro 23:40.300 --> 23:42.570 has led to this man made crisis. 23:42.570 --> 23:44.410 Cuba and Russia have invaded your country 23:44.410 --> 23:46.300 and disgraced your sovereignty. 23:46.300 --> 23:48.010 You have a chance to do the right thing 23:48.010 --> 23:49.888 and alleviate the suffering of your people 23:49.888 --> 23:51.920 and your families. 23:51.920 --> 23:54.430 Those you have sworn an oath to protect. 23:54.430 --> 23:57.170 When a legitimate democracy has been restored 23:57.170 --> 23:58.640 we look forward to having you return 23:58.640 --> 24:00.290 to the profession of arms 24:00.290 --> 24:01.890 including attendance in the United States 24:01.890 --> 24:03.723 military training and education. 24:05.100 --> 24:06.850 Mr. Chairman, ranking member Thornberry 24:06.850 --> 24:09.570 thank you again for the opportunity to testify. 24:09.570 --> 24:12.150 The SOUTHCOM team, our civilians and military 24:12.150 --> 24:14.330 members and our families appreciate 24:14.330 --> 24:16.220 this support Congress has provided. 24:16.220 --> 24:18.260 We will continue to honor your trust 24:18.260 --> 24:20.320 and our fellow citizens have placed in us. 24:20.320 --> 24:21.679 I look forward to your questions. 24:21.679 --> 24:22.920 Thank you. 24:22.920 --> 24:24.000 - Thank you all. 24:24.000 --> 24:25.172 Admiral I'll start with you. 24:25.172 --> 24:27.903 Picking up where you left off on Venezuela. 24:29.610 --> 24:32.010 What is sort of the military's role 24:32.010 --> 24:33.070 in what's going on down there? 24:33.070 --> 24:34.980 Because I agree with your statement, 24:34.980 --> 24:36.970 that Maduro is not a legitimate President. 24:36.970 --> 24:39.590 We need to have a transition to a 24:39.590 --> 24:41.350 true democracy and a legitimate leader 24:41.350 --> 24:42.500 in Venezuela. 24:42.500 --> 24:44.303 I am concerned though that we would think 24:44.303 --> 24:45.830 that there is some sort of role 24:45.830 --> 24:48.290 for the US Military given our history down there 24:48.290 --> 24:50.030 and given what we've learned about using 24:50.030 --> 24:53.570 the military to sort of change governments. 24:53.570 --> 24:56.990 What are your, what role do you see 24:56.990 --> 24:59.490 for our military and what's going on in Venezuela 24:59.490 --> 25:01.740 and where do you see the limits of that role? 25:03.260 --> 25:05.620 - We've been focused on working with our regional 25:05.620 --> 25:09.223 partners, intelligence sharing, information sharing. 25:10.210 --> 25:12.480 Gathering and generating a shared appreciation 25:12.480 --> 25:14.830 for the complexities associated with the problem. 25:14.830 --> 25:19.510 The impacts both in Venezuela, the horrific starvation 25:19.510 --> 25:22.080 over 90% of the population is starving. 25:22.080 --> 25:24.010 And the impacts of security with the partners. 25:24.010 --> 25:26.196 We're looking at a way to apply our security assistance 25:26.196 --> 25:27.930 in a mutually beneficial way. 25:27.930 --> 25:30.100 That's been the primary line of effort. 25:30.100 --> 25:32.010 Secondary line of effort has been focused on 25:32.010 --> 25:33.990 planning for non-combative evacuation 25:33.990 --> 25:36.210 and protection of American citizens and lives 25:36.210 --> 25:37.820 within Venezuela. 25:37.820 --> 25:40.370 Prudent planning as you'd expect, Chairman, 25:40.370 --> 25:42.046 for a combative commander. 25:42.046 --> 25:45.950 In support of USAID was mentioned by our colleagues 25:45.950 --> 25:48.630 here, USAID we've supported the delivery 25:48.630 --> 25:51.100 of humanitarian aid and we're working and planning 25:51.100 --> 25:53.730 with USAID, and then we're broadly, 25:53.730 --> 25:56.360 we're looking at a day after, when we have 25:56.360 --> 25:59.250 a democratic Venezuela, how do we work 25:59.250 --> 26:01.390 with their militaries and security cooperation 26:01.390 --> 26:04.710 that's representative of a normal Mil-to-Mil relationship. 26:04.710 --> 26:06.130 Those have been our priorities sir. 26:06.130 --> 26:10.140 - But you do not see a role for the US Military 26:10.140 --> 26:13.483 in actually overthrowing the Maduro government, correct? 26:14.355 --> 26:17.740 - Our leadership's been clear, it has to be, 26:17.740 --> 26:20.230 should be, primarily a democratic transition. 26:20.230 --> 26:22.470 We're in total support of the diplomacy 26:22.470 --> 26:26.440 and we stand ready to, to support that effort sir. 26:26.440 --> 26:27.680 - And one final question in this area 26:27.680 --> 26:28.770 on the sanctions. 26:28.770 --> 26:31.100 Obviously Venezuela has many challenges 26:31.100 --> 26:32.900 you've outlined some of them. 26:32.900 --> 26:35.670 What role do you see US sanctions on Venezuela 26:35.670 --> 26:38.000 having played in the economic difficulties 26:38.000 --> 26:40.050 that are there, and how do you balance 26:40.050 --> 26:42.010 the pressure we want to put on the regime 26:42.010 --> 26:44.340 to change with the potential impact 26:44.340 --> 26:45.840 of those sanctions? 26:45.840 --> 26:47.743 - The misery of the people of Venezuela 26:47.743 --> 26:51.290 came about as the result of the illegitimate dictator's 26:51.290 --> 26:53.790 actions, and his inept way with which he's 26:53.790 --> 26:56.033 run the country and China and Cuba's 26:56.033 --> 26:59.440 complete inclusion in that problem set. 26:59.440 --> 27:02.580 The sanctions have been a necessary tool 27:02.580 --> 27:04.870 to help apply pressure to accelerate 27:04.870 --> 27:06.530 the diplomatic efforts. 27:06.530 --> 27:10.650 The misery began and ends with Maduro. 27:10.650 --> 27:13.707 - And it's worth noting, much like Putin in Russia 27:13.707 --> 27:15.700 a huge part of the problem is that Maduro 27:15.700 --> 27:17.329 and his cronies take all the money. 27:17.329 --> 27:19.020 They don't care about the people whatsoever. 27:19.020 --> 27:21.380 They're running a kleptocracy there, 27:21.380 --> 27:24.719 and the people are the one's paying the price for that. 27:24.719 --> 27:27.267 Couple of quick questions on the border side of it 27:27.267 --> 27:30.210 and I'll shift over to the policy folks. 27:30.210 --> 27:33.590 It seems, if you go back before the Trump administration 27:33.590 --> 27:36.890 started implementing its' immigration policies, 27:36.890 --> 27:39.520 we're in much worse shape now then we were 27:39.520 --> 27:40.670 when that started. 27:40.670 --> 27:43.810 Do you see any connection between a variety 27:43.810 --> 27:46.440 of those policies and what's happening on the border, 27:46.440 --> 27:48.610 and if so, have you started to talk about how 27:48.610 --> 27:50.453 you might do things differently? 27:51.670 --> 27:53.420 And I guess that's for Mr. Rapuano. 27:55.430 --> 27:57.440 - So we do not, 27:57.440 --> 28:02.290 we don't, we do not deeply asses the causation 28:02.290 --> 28:06.370 in terms of the desire of individuals to immigrate 28:06.370 --> 28:09.190 to the United States and how that contributes 28:09.190 --> 28:10.580 to illegal immigration. 28:10.580 --> 28:14.160 Our support is to Department of Homeland Security 28:14.160 --> 28:16.290 which is responsible for that mission. 28:16.290 --> 28:18.600 And we are providing support in that role. 28:18.600 --> 28:19.627 The support that's appropriate for 28:19.627 --> 28:21.870 the Department of Defense to provide. 28:21.870 --> 28:24.230 - But surely you're around for the conversations 28:24.230 --> 28:27.440 about what policy might make sense. 28:27.440 --> 28:30.750 So I'm just curious as someone who's involved 28:30.750 --> 28:32.200 in this and the Department of Defense 28:32.200 --> 28:33.870 is now deeply into what's going on 28:33.870 --> 28:35.590 at the border cause Homeland Security 28:35.590 --> 28:37.620 has asked for a lot of money, 28:37.620 --> 28:40.040 and a lot of human resources. 28:40.040 --> 28:42.070 What is your thought about how we can 28:42.070 --> 28:44.350 adjust that policy to improve the situation? 28:44.350 --> 28:47.200 - Well I can certainly say that the Administration 28:47.200 --> 28:50.700 has been very focused on looking at the diplomatic, 28:50.700 --> 28:54.995 the legal, the engagement with nations 28:54.995 --> 28:58.920 that are the primary sources of illegal immigration 28:58.920 --> 28:59.753 to the United States. 28:59.753 --> 29:01.690 - Yeah the only thing I've heard is the Administration 29:01.690 --> 29:03.220 talking about how they want to cut off 29:03.220 --> 29:05.610 money from those places which doesn't strike 29:05.610 --> 29:08.210 me as particularly productive approach. 29:08.210 --> 29:10.410 So if you could drill down a little bit, 29:10.410 --> 29:12.990 what is the Administration doing to try 29:12.990 --> 29:15.890 to look at, and specifically, Guatemala, Honduras 29:15.890 --> 29:18.600 and El Salvador, say how can we help them 29:18.600 --> 29:22.160 towards a more stable less desperate situation? 29:22.160 --> 29:24.957 - Well I really cannot speak for the Administration's 29:24.957 --> 29:28.740 efforts associated with engaging with countries 29:28.740 --> 29:30.140 south of the border. 29:30.140 --> 29:33.745 That's outside of my portfolio and my writ. 29:33.745 --> 29:36.295 - [Mr. Smith] Anybody else wanna take a stab at it? 29:37.460 --> 29:39.360 - I'll say from the perspective of the regional 29:39.360 --> 29:42.930 policy shop and OSD, we continue to focus on 29:42.930 --> 29:44.210 security cooperation efforts 29:44.210 --> 29:46.600 with Central American countries. 29:46.600 --> 29:48.730 The President has made a decision with respect to 29:48.730 --> 29:51.320 looking at our cooperation in the region 29:51.320 --> 29:53.090 but from the DOD perspective, 29:53.090 --> 29:55.540 DOD activities are gonna continue forward 29:55.540 --> 29:57.420 'cause the Mil-to-Mil relationships 29:57.420 --> 30:00.360 we find, and I'll defer to, Admiral Faller as well, 30:00.360 --> 30:03.050 our significant source of security and stability 30:03.050 --> 30:05.070 in those countries but in the region writ large. 30:05.070 --> 30:07.660 - And I guess that's the biggest point I wanna make. 30:07.660 --> 30:11.010 There are other tools in our toolbox 30:11.010 --> 30:12.890 other than the military. 30:12.890 --> 30:14.660 In fact we're already confronting this 30:14.660 --> 30:18.387 with the request for more Mil-to-Mil cooperation 30:18.387 --> 30:21.630 around Venezuela whereas the cutoff on 30:21.630 --> 30:25.040 State Department and USAID remains in place. 30:25.040 --> 30:28.190 I just frankly do not get this Administration's 30:28.190 --> 30:30.930 complete and total blind spot towards the notion 30:30.930 --> 30:33.080 that international affairs involves more 30:33.080 --> 30:34.760 than just the military. 30:34.760 --> 30:38.670 The USAID, diplomatic, cutting them off 30:38.670 --> 30:40.320 and focusing only on the military. 30:40.320 --> 30:42.000 Saying to Central America we're not going 30:42.000 --> 30:44.930 to give you any more money, just encourages 30:44.930 --> 30:47.480 more people to flow forward. 30:47.480 --> 30:50.190 That is more a message for you to deliver back 30:50.190 --> 30:52.000 to the people at the White House, than anything 30:52.000 --> 30:53.190 you need to answer. 30:53.190 --> 30:55.250 But it is contributing to the problem. 30:55.250 --> 30:57.340 'Cause the irony for me is when the President 30:57.340 --> 30:59.460 started to talking about there being an emergency 30:59.460 --> 31:01.660 at the border, there wasn't. 31:01.660 --> 31:02.960 Now there is. 31:02.960 --> 31:04.540 And I think the two are connected. 31:04.540 --> 31:06.330 So I hope we'll figure out those policies, 31:06.330 --> 31:08.330 because nobody on this committee wants 31:08.330 --> 31:09.940 the Department of Defense to have to have 31:09.940 --> 31:12.210 their resources drained out to go 31:12.210 --> 31:14.140 to Department of Homeland Security missions. 31:14.140 --> 31:16.730 And DOD has enough to do. 31:16.730 --> 31:18.420 So we're in serious trouble down there 31:18.420 --> 31:21.000 and we need to figure out how to better confront it. 31:21.000 --> 31:23.410 I wanna give General O'Shaughnessy and Admiral Faller 31:23.410 --> 31:24.740 a chance if you have any response 31:24.740 --> 31:26.970 or any ideas for how we can improve 31:26.970 --> 31:29.160 that situation, don't go on for too long 31:29.160 --> 31:30.320 'cause I'm over my time. 31:30.320 --> 31:31.490 I wanna turn it over to somebody else. 31:31.490 --> 31:34.290 But just curious if you have any quick thoughts on that. 31:36.670 --> 31:38.860 - Chairman I would just say, from our vantage point 31:38.860 --> 31:42.930 we have a role to support our CBP partners 31:42.930 --> 31:44.440 and from the NORTHCOM perspective we're 31:44.440 --> 31:47.710 executing that role and the mission we've been given. 31:47.710 --> 31:48.777 To support CBP. 31:50.357 --> 31:52.000 - [Mr. Smith] 'K. 31:52.000 --> 31:54.130 - I'll be in Honduras Monday next week 31:54.130 --> 31:56.730 as cohost of a Central Americas Security Conference 31:56.730 --> 31:58.720 with all the Central American countries 31:58.720 --> 32:01.020 including some of the neighbors. 32:01.020 --> 32:02.990 This will be a topic of what we can do, 32:02.990 --> 32:04.700 working mutually together to better 32:04.700 --> 32:06.270 the security of both their countries, 32:06.270 --> 32:07.830 the United States homeland. 32:07.830 --> 32:10.750 - Yeah, and again, I hope we can include more folks 32:10.750 --> 32:12.720 than just on the security side. 32:12.720 --> 32:14.553 There's a very complex humanitarian problem 32:14.553 --> 32:16.290 done there, I think there are lot of tools 32:16.290 --> 32:18.960 in our toolbox, we have a lot of allies and neighbors 32:18.960 --> 32:20.560 throughout the region who could help. 32:20.560 --> 32:22.640 We need to start employing all those tools 32:22.640 --> 32:26.040 'cause it is a serious situation as we all know. 32:26.040 --> 32:26.873 Mr. Thornberry. 32:29.190 --> 32:31.990 - Admiral I appreciate the statement you made 32:31.990 --> 32:33.413 particularly at the end. 32:34.370 --> 32:36.730 Making an appeal to the Venezuelan military. 32:36.730 --> 32:38.850 It seems to me that a relatively small number 32:38.850 --> 32:41.380 of people have the future of their country 32:41.380 --> 32:42.860 in their hands. 32:42.860 --> 32:44.620 One of these days the Venezuelan people 32:44.620 --> 32:46.500 are gonna have a say and the question is 32:46.500 --> 32:48.400 how long the suffering's got to go on? 32:49.859 --> 32:50.840 And, 32:50.840 --> 32:53.640 there are folks now who are making decisions 32:53.640 --> 32:57.850 that for which they may be held accountable 32:57.850 --> 33:00.405 someday so I appreciate, 33:00.405 --> 33:02.900 appreciate that appeal. 33:02.900 --> 33:04.360 General I wanted to ask you briefly, 33:04.360 --> 33:06.580 you mentioned space based sensors. 33:06.580 --> 33:10.420 Can you just again briefly describe why 33:10.420 --> 33:13.960 it is important that we have space based sensors 33:13.960 --> 33:15.193 to defend the homeland. 33:16.210 --> 33:17.800 - I thank you for that opportunity. 33:17.800 --> 33:19.440 A clear way is to look at the advanced threats 33:19.440 --> 33:22.050 that we're facing both from Russia and China. 33:22.050 --> 33:23.290 They're of a changing nature. 33:23.290 --> 33:25.120 And our current sensors that we have 33:25.120 --> 33:26.830 are just not situated to be able 33:26.830 --> 33:28.340 to be effective against that. 33:28.340 --> 33:30.340 Part of it is just the pure track, 33:30.340 --> 33:32.200 that the, a weapon would take, 33:32.200 --> 33:35.590 is not conducive to a terrestrial based sensing grid. 33:35.590 --> 33:37.570 And therefore if we looked at the space based sensors 33:37.570 --> 33:39.130 it gives you the opportunity, for example, 33:39.130 --> 33:42.100 a hypersonic track that you could maintain 33:42.100 --> 33:43.700 the track from birth to death, right? 33:43.700 --> 33:45.130 You could see it from the time it launched 33:45.130 --> 33:47.940 to the time we are able to take that intercept, 33:47.940 --> 33:50.190 out with an interceptor or directed energy, 33:50.190 --> 33:54.080 or some ability to defend against it. 33:54.080 --> 33:56.630 Right now if we just put more money into just 33:56.630 --> 33:59.200 what we're doing today with terrestrial based sensors 33:59.200 --> 34:01.310 we will never get to the point we can actively 34:01.310 --> 34:02.143 defend against them. 34:02.143 --> 34:03.860 So the space based sensing layer to me 34:03.860 --> 34:06.410 is absolutely critical if we are going 34:06.410 --> 34:10.400 to be able to defend against these advanced threats. 34:10.400 --> 34:11.233 - I appreciate that. 34:11.233 --> 34:12.810 I suspect there's more detail we can get into 34:12.810 --> 34:15.933 in a classified session but I think that's helpful. 34:16.840 --> 34:17.673 Mr. Rapuano, 34:19.080 --> 34:20.530 Chairman said this and I think we all 34:20.530 --> 34:24.010 agree we face an unprecedented situation 34:24.010 --> 34:25.210 at the border. 34:25.210 --> 34:28.653 The border patrol is completely overwhelmed. 34:29.520 --> 34:32.610 Reports this week are that military folks 34:32.610 --> 34:35.163 are gonna be asked to do more tasks, 34:36.170 --> 34:40.110 at the border than they have been doing before. 34:40.110 --> 34:42.932 My question to you is, why can we not 34:42.932 --> 34:47.520 use contractors for these support activities 34:47.520 --> 34:50.650 that we are now asking the military to do? 34:50.650 --> 34:54.480 Anytime any of us visit Afghanistan, other places 34:54.480 --> 34:57.270 around the world the people, a lot of the people 34:57.270 --> 34:59.790 doing the cooking, the cleaning, 34:59.790 --> 35:02.003 the driving, 35:02.850 --> 35:06.700 monitoring sensors are often contractors. 35:06.700 --> 35:08.510 Why can't we use contractors? 35:08.510 --> 35:11.340 - So the Department of Homeland Security and CBP 35:11.340 --> 35:13.876 have been using contractors, but what they've described 35:13.876 --> 35:16.930 to us is there's a practical limit. 35:16.930 --> 35:20.330 There are in terms of availability of contractors 35:20.330 --> 35:22.680 in the areas where they seek to have the work done 35:22.680 --> 35:24.780 and the timelines associated with getting 35:24.780 --> 35:27.890 those contractors on task, 35:27.890 --> 35:30.340 in addition to that there are certain functions 35:31.290 --> 35:35.470 that are DOD military capabilities. 35:35.470 --> 35:39.150 Sensors, the barrier construction in terms 35:39.150 --> 35:41.220 of the concertina wire, 35:41.220 --> 35:44.260 for which we do have ready capabilities. 35:44.260 --> 35:46.430 In the other areas and you described some of them 35:46.430 --> 35:51.200 in terms of the logistics management for migrant processing, 35:51.200 --> 35:53.957 that is not necessarily a lead military skill. 35:53.957 --> 35:58.563 But it certainly is a capability that we can provide in, 36:00.740 --> 36:02.240 in exigent circumstances, 36:02.240 --> 36:04.023 such as being experienced today. 36:05.300 --> 36:09.270 - Well I hope that as DOD considers requests 36:09.270 --> 36:11.600 from the Department of Homeland Security 36:11.600 --> 36:15.510 that you look at, independently 36:15.510 --> 36:18.290 the availability of contractors to perform 36:18.290 --> 36:20.053 some of these functions. 36:21.051 --> 36:24.460 As especially as the task ask of our military has been, 36:24.460 --> 36:25.850 I know we can do it. 36:25.850 --> 36:28.110 The question is, is it US Military, 36:28.110 --> 36:31.440 are US Military people the best entity 36:31.440 --> 36:35.061 to be deploying wire, 36:35.061 --> 36:38.420 as I say, contractors run sensors 36:38.420 --> 36:40.200 all over the world. 36:40.200 --> 36:43.160 And the other logistical support. 36:43.160 --> 36:46.330 I think that's maybe a better way forward 36:46.330 --> 36:49.330 than to continue to expand the job of our military. 36:49.330 --> 36:50.163 I yield back. 36:52.700 --> 36:53.990 - Thank you Mr. Chairman I want to thank 36:53.990 --> 36:55.530 our witnesses for your testimony today 36:55.530 --> 36:57.480 and your service to the country. 36:57.480 --> 36:59.800 Just to follow up on the Chairman's discussion 36:59.800 --> 37:01.083 on Venezuela, 37:02.320 --> 37:04.090 just so we're clear. 37:04.090 --> 37:06.270 First of all I agree with where the session was going. 37:06.270 --> 37:10.500 That we need to apply maximum diplomatic pressure 37:10.500 --> 37:13.570 and resolve the situation with Venezuela diplomatically 37:13.570 --> 37:15.590 but just so we don't leave anything hanging 37:15.590 --> 37:18.870 out there we're not missing something. 37:18.870 --> 37:20.590 Have any of you in any way shape or form 37:20.590 --> 37:23.900 been given instruction by your leadership 37:23.900 --> 37:27.570 to prepare for any type of military conflict? 37:27.570 --> 37:29.923 Just wanna make sure we're clear on that. 37:30.810 --> 37:34.550 So pre-positioning troops or any kind of forces, 37:34.550 --> 37:35.653 we run down the line? 37:37.040 --> 37:39.170 - We of course always review available options 37:39.170 --> 37:41.260 and plan for contingencies but in this case 37:41.260 --> 37:43.250 we have not been given the sort of orders 37:43.250 --> 37:44.600 that you're discussing, no. 37:45.880 --> 37:46.840 - General, Admiral? 37:46.840 --> 37:47.690 Or Mr. Secretary? 37:49.420 --> 37:51.680 - The missions sets that I discussed 37:51.680 --> 37:55.170 with respect to the Chairman's question. 37:55.170 --> 37:58.520 Our principal focus really focusing on building 37:58.520 --> 38:01.880 those partnerships, leveraging our partners, 38:01.880 --> 38:04.210 making sure that whatever happens in the future, 38:04.210 --> 38:05.980 and we know we won't be able to predict it. 38:05.980 --> 38:08.160 We are ready to approach this together 38:08.160 --> 38:10.043 as a united region and working with our military 38:10.043 --> 38:13.023 it's been our principal line of focus. 38:17.337 --> 38:18.320 - General? 38:18.320 --> 38:20.480 - Sir, we're just in support of Admiral Faller 38:20.480 --> 38:23.220 in the SOUTHCOM aspect but nothing directly, 38:23.220 --> 38:25.380 just helping Admiral Faller. 38:25.380 --> 38:26.729 - [Mr. Langevin] Okay. 38:26.729 --> 38:28.183 Mr. Secretary anything that you wanna add? 38:30.790 --> 38:32.058 - No, nothing to add. 38:32.058 --> 38:32.891 - [Mr. Langevin] Thanks. 38:32.891 --> 38:34.300 Okay thank you just wanted to get that on the record. 38:34.300 --> 38:36.000 General O'Shaughnessy, if I could, 38:36.000 --> 38:40.623 I'm pleased the DHS has assigned a liaison officer 38:40.623 --> 38:45.520 to NORTHCOM headquarters and I hope that the inter-agency 38:45.520 --> 38:47.550 partnership will enhance the resilience 38:47.550 --> 38:50.440 of US critical infrastructure, particularly in a time 38:50.440 --> 38:51.500 of crisis. 38:51.500 --> 38:54.130 What I wanted to ask is how are you and your counterparts 38:54.130 --> 38:56.850 institutionalizing the relationship of those 38:56.850 --> 39:00.559 so that it's not just personality driven 39:00.559 --> 39:04.077 or public attention driven 39:04.077 --> 39:07.100 and that you're exercising the various scenarios 39:07.100 --> 39:12.100 under which CISA may call upon NORTHCOM for support. 39:13.330 --> 39:14.640 - Thank you for the opportunity to highlight 39:14.640 --> 39:16.580 the close coordination and collaboration we have 39:16.580 --> 39:18.240 with the Department of Homeland Security. 39:18.240 --> 39:21.000 And specifically with respect to CISA. 39:21.000 --> 39:22.960 As you mentioned, literally within the first week 39:22.960 --> 39:26.100 of it standing up we actually had exchanged 39:26.100 --> 39:28.280 liaisons back and forth that are full-time within 39:28.280 --> 39:30.030 each others headquarters. 39:30.030 --> 39:32.007 And these are well seasoned 39:32.007 --> 39:34.180 professionals who truly understand 39:34.180 --> 39:36.670 that nature of the threats that we face. 39:36.670 --> 39:38.710 Part of the way we go forward is we are inserting 39:38.710 --> 39:40.070 ourselves and have inserted ourselves 39:40.070 --> 39:43.510 inside the battle rhythm of each other's headquarters 39:43.510 --> 39:47.200 and so every day we have integration and coordination 39:47.200 --> 39:49.430 in the various issues that we're working. 39:49.430 --> 39:52.370 Under Secretary Nielsen and will continue 39:52.370 --> 39:54.240 no doubt with acting Secretary McAleenan. 39:54.240 --> 39:57.380 I actually met with them on a biweekly basis. 39:57.380 --> 39:58.810 Where we talk about not only the support 39:58.810 --> 40:00.190 to the border but things like we're doing 40:00.190 --> 40:02.050 to support the critical infrastructure. 40:02.050 --> 40:04.330 And to the point of how do we institutionalize it? 40:04.330 --> 40:06.200 We're bringing it into our exercises. 40:06.200 --> 40:09.360 We're bringing it into both our annual exercises, 40:09.360 --> 40:11.570 as well as the longer term exercises 40:11.570 --> 40:13.110 to make sure that we do it all the way 40:13.110 --> 40:15.280 from a table top exercise to a full 40:16.270 --> 40:17.890 inter-agency exercise. 40:17.890 --> 40:20.100 That we do this together because you simply can't 40:20.100 --> 40:22.720 separate home and defense and homeland security. 40:22.720 --> 40:25.090 They are intertwined in ways that we need 40:25.090 --> 40:26.390 to collaborate together. 40:26.390 --> 40:28.950 Not on a one off event, not when a crisis happens, 40:28.950 --> 40:30.020 but every day. 40:30.020 --> 40:30.853 - Excellent. 40:30.853 --> 40:33.320 Thank you, the exercising part of that is essential. 40:35.021 --> 40:35.854 I agree with you especially. 40:35.854 --> 40:39.200 How are you working with USCYBERCOM also to ensure 40:39.200 --> 40:41.630 that it's prepared to support you, 40:41.630 --> 40:44.149 if you're called upon in a 40:44.149 --> 40:48.670 DESCA role and I'm thinking particularly of coordination 40:48.670 --> 40:50.883 with the national mission teams. 40:51.917 --> 40:52.970 - Thank you for that. 40:52.970 --> 40:55.922 We have twofold interaction with Cyber Command 40:55.922 --> 40:57.830 in this area. 40:57.830 --> 40:59.120 One is for our own systems. 40:59.120 --> 41:02.240 We have our own systems designed to defend the United States 41:02.240 --> 41:04.090 and Canada that we want to make sure 41:04.090 --> 41:07.944 are able to survive any attacks, any attempts 41:07.944 --> 41:09.730 to take them down. 41:09.730 --> 41:12.050 Not only in crisis, but day to day. 41:12.050 --> 41:14.440 So we have a day to day engagement with Cyber Command 41:14.440 --> 41:16.440 and their cyber teams that are actually 41:16.440 --> 41:18.440 in support of us on a regular basis. 41:18.440 --> 41:21.720 We have two actively engaged as we speak right now. 41:21.720 --> 41:24.530 In addition to that though as we look at 41:24.530 --> 41:27.190 the broader protection of the nation, 41:27.190 --> 41:30.310 we also, to your point, use the DESCA model 41:30.310 --> 41:32.330 of how we can work with Cyber Command 41:32.330 --> 41:35.624 to present that force to both our state, 41:35.624 --> 41:37.710 for example, within the elections. 41:37.710 --> 41:41.240 Was an example in the 2018, how we present the force 41:41.240 --> 41:43.610 throughout the nation both in a critical infrastructure, 41:43.610 --> 41:45.489 things like election, and that DESCA model 41:45.489 --> 41:48.720 with us is essentially the DOD synchronizer 41:48.720 --> 41:51.400 has proven to be quite effective in hurricanes, wildfires, 41:51.400 --> 41:54.000 and so we're approaching that with the same model 41:54.000 --> 41:56.580 as we look at the cyber and have had great 41:56.580 --> 41:58.500 success already and look forward to maturing that 41:58.500 --> 41:59.590 as we go forward. 41:59.590 --> 42:00.664 - Thank you very much. 42:00.664 --> 42:03.720 - I would just add to that, that at the Departmental level 42:03.720 --> 42:05.790 the Department of Defense and the Department 42:05.790 --> 42:08.010 of Homeland Security now have a memorandum 42:08.010 --> 42:10.700 of agreement signed last year by Secretary Madison, 42:10.700 --> 42:13.110 Secretary Neilsen, in which we are working 42:13.110 --> 42:15.510 with them across the board starting with defense 42:15.510 --> 42:18.270 critical infrastructure as well as civil infrastructure. 42:18.270 --> 42:19.910 How are we prioritizing between 42:19.910 --> 42:22.180 the Department of Defense and DHS and the other 42:22.180 --> 42:24.820 sector lead agencies and then how are we looking 42:24.820 --> 42:26.800 at where and how we support them best. 42:26.800 --> 42:28.840 - James' time has expired and I apologize 42:28.840 --> 42:29.790 I should've warned the witnesses. 42:29.790 --> 42:31.400 We try to keep it to five minutes. 42:31.400 --> 42:33.620 I will not cut you off in mid-sentence or anything. 42:33.620 --> 42:35.260 But once we hit five minutes we do try to move on 42:35.260 --> 42:37.940 to other folks even if you're in mid-question. 42:37.940 --> 42:39.890 At that point we'd take it for the record 42:39.890 --> 42:41.798 if you have an answer you wanna submit to the member. 42:41.798 --> 42:42.631 You can do that then. 42:42.631 --> 42:43.464 Mr. Wilson. 42:43.464 --> 42:44.357 - And thank you Mr. Chairman 42:44.357 --> 42:45.507 and thank each of you for being here 42:45.507 --> 42:47.223 and your service to our country. 42:48.210 --> 42:51.277 Admiral Faller, the grateful, 42:51.277 --> 42:54.149 I'm grateful for the relationship of the US Southern Command 42:54.149 --> 42:56.870 maintains with the Republic of Columbia 42:56.870 --> 42:59.780 as part of the National Guard's State Sponsorship program. 42:59.780 --> 43:02.570 Since 2012, South Carolina and Columbia 43:02.570 --> 43:05.070 have partnered to enhance military cooperation 43:05.070 --> 43:08.681 with the Rotary wing and air defense capabilities. 43:08.681 --> 43:13.160 As Columbia continues to expand its NATO global partner, 43:13.160 --> 43:16.400 how do you judge the strategies for Plan Columbia? 43:16.400 --> 43:19.140 Specifically what are the investments DOD is making 43:19.140 --> 43:21.980 to combat terrorist activities to drug trafficking 43:21.980 --> 43:23.803 to continue the successes. 43:25.478 --> 43:28.770 - We'll start with the South Carolina Guard. 43:28.770 --> 43:33.050 A fantastic partner, in fact they're down there 43:33.050 --> 43:35.220 this week working with the Columbians. 43:35.220 --> 43:36.510 They'll be down later this summer 43:36.510 --> 43:38.420 for an air defense exercise with some 43:38.420 --> 43:42.050 of our high end capability exercising with Columbians. 43:42.050 --> 43:44.270 And we're very appreciative of the National Guard 43:44.270 --> 43:46.900 what they do across the range of security cooperation. 43:46.900 --> 43:49.430 There's absolutely a wonderful partnership. 43:49.430 --> 43:53.530 Columbia is a, their military and security forces 43:53.530 --> 43:55.360 are making a difference, and they are taking 43:55.360 --> 43:57.913 the attack to the narco traffickers. 43:58.750 --> 44:02.270 They're taking it to the ELN, the FARC distance 44:02.270 --> 44:05.280 and the results that we'll see 44:05.280 --> 44:09.440 a eradication, a plateau in cocoa production, 44:09.440 --> 44:11.530 high interdiction rates, 44:11.530 --> 44:13.290 these are gonna have an impact on both 44:13.290 --> 44:15.500 the internal security of Columbia 44:15.500 --> 44:17.320 and the United States security. 44:17.320 --> 44:18.660 A very capable partner. 44:18.660 --> 44:22.030 I have the upmost trust for the Columbian armed forces 44:22.030 --> 44:24.090 and what they do as professionals 44:24.090 --> 44:27.660 and what they do in terms of their war fighting ability. 44:27.660 --> 44:28.520 - Thank you very much. 44:28.520 --> 44:31.050 And Ms. Wheelbarger, Russia and China 44:31.050 --> 44:33.610 are expanding their presence in Latin America. 44:33.610 --> 44:35.850 They're using economic and military influence 44:35.850 --> 44:39.230 to strategically compete against US in this vital region 44:39.230 --> 44:42.900 and systematically engage with the autocratic regimes. 44:42.900 --> 44:47.210 Admiral Faller has already cited Russia and China, 44:47.210 --> 44:51.340 Russia and Cuba are increasing military intelligence 44:51.340 --> 44:53.080 activities in Venezuela. 44:53.080 --> 44:55.300 What types of equipment, aircraft capabilities 44:55.300 --> 44:56.750 are you most concerned about? 44:59.620 --> 45:02.180 - I'll defer to Admiral Faller for the specific 45:02.180 --> 45:04.400 technical concerns but in terms of Russia 45:04.400 --> 45:06.250 and Chinese influence writ large in the region 45:06.250 --> 45:09.160 we're very focused on countering that influence 45:09.160 --> 45:10.760 with our own productive activities. 45:10.760 --> 45:13.620 Building partner capacity as I discussed in 45:13.620 --> 45:17.440 the opening, we really see our national defense 45:17.440 --> 45:19.270 strategy encourages us as a Department 45:19.270 --> 45:21.460 to look at these as global threats, 45:21.460 --> 45:24.150 and that includes countering their influence 45:24.150 --> 45:25.830 in our region. 45:25.830 --> 45:28.720 We are in our hemisphere, excuse me. 45:28.720 --> 45:31.740 Therefore we are consistently and continuously 45:31.740 --> 45:34.778 looking for opportunities to build our partners, 45:34.778 --> 45:37.710 build new relationships and we have a significant 45:37.710 --> 45:39.400 opportunity right now to do so. 45:39.400 --> 45:41.820 With respect to their specific activity 45:41.820 --> 45:45.310 in Venezuela, as it was cited at the beginning 45:45.310 --> 45:49.010 this morning with respect to Secretary Pompeo's statements 45:49.010 --> 45:51.670 it's not just technical concerns that we have, 45:51.670 --> 45:53.040 but it's just the overall influence 45:53.040 --> 45:55.130 that they can have and bear on the decision making 45:55.130 --> 45:57.290 of these countries and that's why we 45:57.290 --> 45:59.220 as an international community call on 45:59.220 --> 46:01.730 Russia and China in particular to cease 46:01.730 --> 46:03.930 their support to the Maduro regime. 46:03.930 --> 46:04.763 - Thank you. 46:04.763 --> 46:07.800 And General O'Shaughnessy the North American 46:07.800 --> 46:10.930 Aerospace Command is improving defense coverage 46:10.930 --> 46:13.340 to the national capital region. 46:13.340 --> 46:16.040 The South Carolina National Guard currently 46:16.040 --> 46:20.890 has personnel in the region to support this mission. 46:20.890 --> 46:23.070 What is your timeline of the three phase plan 46:23.070 --> 46:24.990 to expand the national capital region 46:24.990 --> 46:27.257 architecture to protect the rest of the country, 46:27.257 --> 46:31.330 and are you working with our neighbor Canada. 46:31.330 --> 46:32.427 - Yeah thank you for the question. 46:32.427 --> 46:35.880 And as you highlight the Guard participation 46:35.880 --> 46:38.890 in all the defense within NORAD and NORTHCOM 46:38.890 --> 46:40.560 is significant and the example you used 46:40.560 --> 46:43.460 in national capital region as we sit right here today 46:43.460 --> 46:45.930 we have guardsmen on alert protecting us 46:45.930 --> 46:47.360 literally as we sit here today. 46:47.360 --> 46:49.050 And so my hats off to the great support 46:49.050 --> 46:50.190 that we get from them. 46:50.190 --> 46:52.280 Now with respect to the specifically 46:52.280 --> 46:54.400 the homeland defense design phase one and phase two 46:54.400 --> 46:57.040 are actually funded, in phase one in place, 46:57.040 --> 46:58.550 phase two ongoing now. 46:58.550 --> 47:00.800 As we look to phase three it becomes 47:00.800 --> 47:02.540 significantly more complicated as the threat 47:02.540 --> 47:04.530 has continued to develop to as well. 47:04.530 --> 47:06.960 And so we're continuing to refine what 47:06.960 --> 47:08.910 that homeland defense design should look like 47:08.910 --> 47:10.550 going into the future with the advance threats, 47:10.550 --> 47:12.980 hypersonics, etc., cruise missiles that we know 47:12.980 --> 47:14.640 we have to defend against. 47:14.640 --> 47:17.990 And we are using the basis from the homeland defense 47:17.990 --> 47:19.480 phase one and two as a starting point 47:19.480 --> 47:22.430 but in a much more complicated and complex manner 47:22.430 --> 47:24.757 to defend both the United States and Canada. 47:24.757 --> 47:28.300 - And the level of synchronization with Canada? 47:28.300 --> 47:30.460 - Extreme, NORAD's 60 years of history 47:30.460 --> 47:33.340 of the great relationship with NORAD and modernization 47:33.340 --> 47:35.600 within NORAD we're trying to look bi-nationally. 47:35.600 --> 47:38.750 I could submit for the record some studies 47:38.750 --> 47:40.700 that we're doing bi-nationally with Canada, 47:40.700 --> 47:42.220 in the interest of time. 47:42.220 --> 47:44.570 But we are looking at this together with Canada. 47:44.570 --> 47:45.729 - Thank you very much. 47:45.729 --> 47:46.562 - [Mr.Smith] Thank you, Mr. Larson. 47:46.562 --> 47:49.030 - Thank you General the Coast Guard 47:49.030 --> 47:53.320 came out with their Arctic strategy a few weeks ago 47:53.320 --> 47:55.620 it's called Protecting Sovereignty. 47:55.620 --> 47:59.010 The Administration under General Mattis at the time 47:59.010 --> 48:02.670 said that it had an updated military strategy 48:02.670 --> 48:06.403 in June, is that, will we have that by June? 48:08.910 --> 48:11.010 - I will to defer to OSD on that. 48:11.010 --> 48:13.010 We have been working with the OSD office 48:13.010 --> 48:14.290 that is working that strategy. 48:14.290 --> 48:15.690 - [Mr. Larson] All right, OSD is it gonna 48:15.690 --> 48:16.920 be done by June? 48:16.920 --> 48:19.270 - My belief is, I currently understand that it will be. 48:19.270 --> 48:23.270 I was seeing final deliberations over the last 48:23.270 --> 48:25.180 couple of weeks so we will get you an update 48:25.180 --> 48:27.220 if it's not, if we think it's gonna be delayed 48:27.220 --> 48:28.070 for any reason. 48:28.070 --> 48:29.500 - Please do that, thank you. 48:29.500 --> 48:32.020 Back to General then, could you talk a little bit, 48:32.020 --> 48:36.143 in your testimony pages 11 through 12-ish or so, 48:37.403 --> 48:40.590 you're the DOD advocate for Arctic capabilities 48:40.590 --> 48:42.190 and combatant commander responsible for 48:42.190 --> 48:43.700 dependent approaches to the homeland. 48:43.700 --> 48:47.450 Rather than get into what Russia and China are doing, 48:47.450 --> 48:49.080 could you just review your testimony a little 48:49.080 --> 48:52.760 bit for us on what we are doing because this is, 48:52.760 --> 48:55.210 the Arctic has been an obvious interest for us 48:55.210 --> 48:56.390 for a long time. 48:56.390 --> 48:58.100 What are we doing that isn't in response 48:58.100 --> 48:58.933 to Russia and China? 48:58.933 --> 49:01.050 What are we doing because we ought to be doing it 49:01.050 --> 49:03.600 for our own reasons? 49:03.600 --> 49:06.040 - Right and really as we look at the Arctic 49:06.040 --> 49:09.020 it is a very difficult operating environment 49:09.020 --> 49:11.930 and so we feel we need the ability to operate 49:11.930 --> 49:13.990 in that environment and for example, 49:13.990 --> 49:15.480 the work that we're doing in the Jay Park range 49:15.480 --> 49:18.360 in Alaska gives us the ability to train 49:18.360 --> 49:21.050 our force in ways that we haven't been getting after 49:21.050 --> 49:22.920 for the last several decades. 49:22.920 --> 49:24.210 If you look at the work that we're doing 49:24.210 --> 49:26.210 in the US Navy for example sailed 49:26.210 --> 49:28.680 the areas Truman in the high north 49:29.881 --> 49:32.680 that we hadn't done in literally decades. 49:32.680 --> 49:34.301 And so we are really trying to, 49:34.301 --> 49:37.780 exposing our team, our airman, soldiers, 49:37.780 --> 49:39.860 sailors, marines to that environment 49:39.860 --> 49:41.910 and making sure that we are prepared to operate. 49:41.910 --> 49:45.170 Just last week I personally went out to Thule Air Base 49:45.170 --> 49:46.030 in Greenland. 49:46.030 --> 49:50.450 I went up to Nunavik in higher areas of Canada 49:50.450 --> 49:52.150 and I will tell you first hand, 49:52.150 --> 49:53.980 those conditions that we're gonna ask 49:53.980 --> 49:56.360 our force to operate in are extreme. 49:56.360 --> 49:57.610 And you can't go there without 49:57.610 --> 49:59.470 the adequate preparation and training. 49:59.470 --> 50:00.590 The second thing we're looking on 50:00.590 --> 50:03.020 is actually what do we need to be able to operate 50:03.020 --> 50:04.900 there, so we look at the main awareness, 50:04.900 --> 50:06.310 we look at our ability to communicate. 50:06.310 --> 50:07.667 Many of the traditional means of communication 50:07.667 --> 50:10.140 simply don't work in the Arctic. 50:10.140 --> 50:11.530 We're looking at our ability to sustain 50:11.530 --> 50:14.480 those operations there so that once we have the training 50:14.480 --> 50:16.410 we'll have the ability to actually have a force 50:16.410 --> 50:19.160 with an infrastructure that we'll actually support 50:19.160 --> 50:21.250 them in a sustained way. 50:21.250 --> 50:23.010 The way we're looking to advocate 50:23.010 --> 50:24.870 for that is that we are working closely 50:24.870 --> 50:28.158 with UCOM and PAYCOM so as we can be the lead 50:28.158 --> 50:30.790 but it is not something that is just done alone 50:30.790 --> 50:33.230 at NORTHCOM and NORAD, it is done in coordination 50:33.230 --> 50:36.680 with our sister combatant commands. 50:36.680 --> 50:38.800 But it's also done for example with the Coast Guard. 50:38.800 --> 50:40.573 And as they are looking to get 50:40.573 --> 50:45.573 the heavy icebreaker critically important for us. 50:45.751 --> 50:48.160 And so it's that coordination and doing these 50:48.160 --> 50:48.993 things together. 50:48.993 --> 50:52.540 We're running symposiums, we're trying to be a little bit 50:52.540 --> 50:55.070 of the vocal advocate for it. 50:55.070 --> 50:58.300 Not only within DOD but within the inter-agency as well. 50:58.300 --> 51:00.400 And we'll continue to take those measures. 51:01.240 --> 51:03.280 - [Mr. Larson] How are you using the CONUS 51:03.280 --> 51:06.863 bases as platforms for deployment? 51:08.870 --> 51:11.280 - Well I think as we look at some of the places 51:11.280 --> 51:14.060 here within the CONUS we have for example 51:14.060 --> 51:18.130 the international guard, the 109th has the LC-130's 51:18.130 --> 51:20.724 that have capability that is absolutely 51:20.724 --> 51:24.190 critical for us and so being able to use that 51:24.190 --> 51:26.310 in fact they were up at Greenland 51:26.310 --> 51:27.690 last week as well, they're up there for about 51:27.690 --> 51:28.650 a four month tour. 51:28.650 --> 51:30.700 They are also going to Antarctica 51:30.700 --> 51:32.347 but making sure we use that capability 51:32.347 --> 51:33.800 and that expertise. 51:33.800 --> 51:37.450 Now as far other bases within the US 51:38.315 --> 51:40.710 and the CONUS we try to take advantage 51:40.710 --> 51:42.873 of some of the experiences that we have 51:42.873 --> 51:45.160 that we can leverage forward. 51:45.160 --> 51:47.850 What we see right now is look at for example 51:47.850 --> 51:50.200 some of the operations that we see 51:50.200 --> 51:52.410 are just a lack of experience 51:52.410 --> 51:55.400 of being in those environments. 51:55.400 --> 51:56.640 - [Mr. Larson] Yeah thanks. 51:56.640 --> 51:57.473 So, 51:57.473 --> 52:00.320 Secretary Wheelbarger we'll expect then 52:01.460 --> 52:03.330 maybe just by the end of the week 52:03.330 --> 52:06.582 get us an update on more precise timeline. 52:06.582 --> 52:07.643 - [Secretary Wheelbarger] Yup we'll get you an update 52:07.643 --> 52:08.476 by the end of the week. 52:08.476 --> 52:09.354 - That'd be great, thank you. 52:09.354 --> 52:12.763 And I'll yield back to myself and recognize, 52:14.940 --> 52:16.490 Mrs. Hartzler for five minutes. 52:18.160 --> 52:18.993 - Well thank you. 52:18.993 --> 52:20.070 Thank you Mr. Chairman. 52:20.070 --> 52:23.400 General O'Shaughnessy the F-15C fleet base 52:23.400 --> 52:25.560 within the US is tasked with as you know 52:25.560 --> 52:28.520 supporting our top mission of defending the homeland. 52:28.520 --> 52:31.550 And the Air Force plans to refresh the F-15C fleet 52:31.550 --> 52:33.770 with the F-15EX and has requested 52:33.770 --> 52:37.790 funding for eight aircraft in the FY20 budget. 52:37.790 --> 52:40.100 So how would bringing an advanced F-15's into 52:40.100 --> 52:43.130 these units impact NORTHCOM in terms of the capacity 52:43.130 --> 52:46.220 and capabilities available for the homeland defense. 52:46.220 --> 52:48.100 - Ma'am as you, I think you know 52:48.100 --> 52:50.370 the Air Force is very publicly talked about 52:50.370 --> 52:52.860 they need 72 aircraft a year in their procurement 52:52.860 --> 52:55.820 in order to sustain and grow the Air Force 52:55.820 --> 52:57.640 to the size that it needs to be. 52:57.640 --> 52:59.640 We are one of those requirements, right? 52:59.640 --> 53:03.200 We are one of the forcing agents for the US Air Force 53:03.200 --> 53:05.830 to respond to that demand signal. 53:05.830 --> 53:07.990 And so we are very supportive of the work 53:07.990 --> 53:09.620 that they are doing to maintain a capability 53:09.620 --> 53:12.350 and capacity to support all of the requirements. 53:12.350 --> 53:14.160 We also understand that they're committed to fifth gen, 53:14.160 --> 53:16.980 and that hasn't changed as we do go forward. 53:16.980 --> 53:19.880 But as we look at the readiness capability 53:19.880 --> 53:21.600 of a sustained fourth gen fleet 53:21.600 --> 53:23.290 it needs to be refreshed. 53:23.290 --> 53:25.312 And as such we're looking forward to 53:25.312 --> 53:26.600 continue working with the Air Force, 53:26.600 --> 53:28.540 make sure they provide us a capability and capacity 53:28.540 --> 53:30.890 that we need and we support the Air Force's 53:30.890 --> 53:32.190 initiatives going forward. 53:33.030 --> 53:38.030 - So you support their plan to buy more F-15B's? 53:39.450 --> 53:42.160 - We are fairly agnostic to the platform 53:42.160 --> 53:43.990 in the sense of a capability a capacity 53:43.990 --> 53:46.740 that we need them to have and so I do support 53:46.740 --> 53:48.940 General Goldfein, Secretary Wilson and the approach 53:48.940 --> 53:51.125 that they have taken to have both readiness 53:51.125 --> 53:53.510 and capability and capacity available for us 53:53.510 --> 53:55.100 as a combatant commander. 53:55.100 --> 53:56.690 - So the Air Force has testified they're converting 53:56.690 --> 53:59.670 the F-15C squadrants to the F-15EX will 53:59.670 --> 54:01.280 better support the needs of the Air Force 54:01.280 --> 54:03.540 and combatant commands by minimizing the downtime 54:03.540 --> 54:05.660 of mission conversion. 54:05.660 --> 54:07.490 Compared to the years it would take to convert 54:07.490 --> 54:10.240 to an entirely new platform, the Air Force believes 54:10.240 --> 54:12.269 units transitioning between F-15 variance 54:12.269 --> 54:14.410 would take just months. 54:14.410 --> 54:16.980 Looking at the forces available to NORTHCOM today 54:16.980 --> 54:19.630 how important is that mission conversion timeline 54:19.630 --> 54:21.080 to meeting your requirements? 54:22.090 --> 54:23.440 - Well ma'am the service will be ultimately 54:23.440 --> 54:25.210 responsible for that but what we can't afford 54:25.210 --> 54:26.043 is a gap, right? 54:26.043 --> 54:30.410 We cannot have a gap in the capability and the capacity. 54:30.410 --> 54:32.590 As we sit here today we have five different 54:32.590 --> 54:35.067 F-15 units that support us within NORAD. 54:35.067 --> 54:38.140 It is an important platform for us. 54:38.140 --> 54:41.550 And in the end we can't afford to have any detriment 54:41.550 --> 54:45.500 in the capacity or capability that we have supporting NORAD. 54:45.500 --> 54:46.333 - Okay. 54:46.333 --> 54:47.640 In your written testimony you discussed 54:47.640 --> 54:49.630 the challenges of unmanned aerial systems 54:49.630 --> 54:52.150 in the US air space and the importance of the authorities 54:52.150 --> 54:54.969 provided to DOJ and DHS, and the recent 54:54.969 --> 54:57.390 FAA Reauthorization Act. 54:57.390 --> 55:00.830 DOD has also received counter UAS authorities 55:00.830 --> 55:04.315 in both FY17 and FY18 NDAA's. 55:04.315 --> 55:07.710 How is NORTHCOM using the granted DOD authorities 55:07.710 --> 55:09.970 and have any gaps been identified from 55:09.970 --> 55:11.893 a COCOM perspective? 55:13.090 --> 55:14.650 - Ma'am I'd first like to start by 55:14.650 --> 55:16.490 thanking you and your team for the great support 55:16.490 --> 55:18.436 that we've had with respect to these authorities 55:18.436 --> 55:20.560 over the last several years have not only 55:20.560 --> 55:22.890 for the DOD because it's an important 55:22.890 --> 55:25.120 aspect for us for our authorities but as you mentioned 55:25.120 --> 55:26.920 the inter-agency is equally as important. 55:26.920 --> 55:28.410 And so as we work closely with 55:28.410 --> 55:29.407 the Department of Homeland Security 55:29.407 --> 55:32.350 and as you work to help get them the similar authorities 55:32.350 --> 55:34.826 that we have within DOD, that has been extremely helpful. 55:34.826 --> 55:36.840 The example I use is right here within 55:36.840 --> 55:38.710 the national capital region 55:38.710 --> 55:40.400 where we're working closely with 55:40.400 --> 55:43.080 many sub-organizations within DHS 55:43.080 --> 55:44.422 but also DOJ. 55:44.422 --> 55:46.751 The capital police, the local police 55:46.751 --> 55:50.010 and the individual services as we work 55:50.010 --> 55:51.820 an exercise here in about two weeks 55:51.820 --> 55:52.777 to try and bring all that together. 55:52.777 --> 55:54.640 And it is very complex. 55:54.640 --> 55:56.830 And so it's a question of the authorities we have 55:56.830 --> 55:58.420 and then the tools and the kit that we have 55:58.420 --> 56:01.110 to actually defeat any threat that we have 56:01.110 --> 56:02.320 with the account of OAS. 56:02.320 --> 56:04.167 So the exercises that we're doing 56:04.167 --> 56:06.640 are driving us to better understand 56:06.640 --> 56:08.740 if there are additional authorities or requirements 56:08.740 --> 56:10.530 that we might have and we'll stay in close 56:10.530 --> 56:12.535 coordination and collaboration with your team 56:12.535 --> 56:14.760 and this committee as we go forth 56:14.760 --> 56:17.920 attention with more authorities that we'll be seeking. 56:17.920 --> 56:19.120 - Appreciate your work on that 56:19.120 --> 56:21.380 and look forward to continuing to work with 56:21.380 --> 56:25.070 you on it 'cause it is such a very important mission. 56:25.070 --> 56:27.931 And lastly another question I'm proud 56:27.931 --> 56:30.250 as you know represent Fort Leonard Wood 56:30.250 --> 56:32.340 in my district which contributes vital 56:32.340 --> 56:34.120 capabilities to NORTCHOM by training 56:34.120 --> 56:36.370 service members for specialties such as 56:36.370 --> 56:39.180 military police and the CBRN response. 56:39.180 --> 56:41.080 In your written testimony you discuss 56:41.080 --> 56:43.530 NORTHCOM's defense support of civil authorities 56:43.530 --> 56:46.240 mission and provided many examples 56:46.240 --> 56:48.360 of inter-agency coordination. 56:48.360 --> 56:50.030 Can you talk in more detail about 56:50.030 --> 56:52.320 coordination and training activities 56:52.320 --> 56:55.390 among DOD's CBRN Specialists and civilian 56:55.390 --> 56:58.503 CBRN experts aimed at protecting the homeland. 56:59.560 --> 57:02.680 - Yes ma'am and let me first thank you 57:02.680 --> 57:05.410 and actually Fort Leonard Wood is instrumental 57:05.410 --> 57:06.950 to our ability to have this capability. 57:06.950 --> 57:09.880 We have about 18,000 personnel at any given time 57:09.880 --> 57:11.630 that are committed to the chemical, biological, 57:11.630 --> 57:13.800 radiological and nuclear response efforts. 57:13.800 --> 57:16.910 We have 57 CST, our teams that are designed 57:16.910 --> 57:19.060 within the States to be able to respond. 57:19.060 --> 57:21.610 And those are almost to a person they are trained 57:21.610 --> 57:24.750 at Fort Leonard Wood and it's also the training 57:24.750 --> 57:26.690 they do is also within the inter-agency 57:26.690 --> 57:28.530 and the local law enforcement officials 57:28.530 --> 57:30.120 and the first responders that they'll work with 57:30.120 --> 57:32.410 and so I know we're short on time but I'll just say 57:32.410 --> 57:34.810 absolutely critical and we would not be able 57:34.810 --> 57:37.060 to do it without the expertise resident there. 57:37.060 --> 57:39.169 And it is not just within DOD but within- 57:39.169 --> 57:40.002 - [Mr. Smith] Thank you. 57:40.002 --> 57:40.974 - The broader response. 57:40.974 --> 57:41.840 - Thank you. 57:41.840 --> 57:43.260 - Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 57:43.260 --> 57:44.760 - Thank you Mr. Chairman and thank you 57:44.760 --> 57:47.590 to all the witnesses for being here today. 57:47.590 --> 57:50.180 Again looking the sort of mission 57:50.180 --> 57:53.235 of Southern Command and I think it's been referenced 57:53.235 --> 57:55.680 by some prior remarks. 57:55.680 --> 57:58.799 Obviously the migration issue in terms of where 57:58.799 --> 58:01.166 there's instability is certainly 58:01.166 --> 58:03.590 the issue of the day. 58:03.590 --> 58:05.540 The Administration's decision to cut aid 58:05.540 --> 58:08.571 to the northern triangle countries. 58:08.571 --> 58:11.907 Again I think has just totally flabbergasted 58:11.907 --> 58:14.858 people in terms of how that possibly 58:14.858 --> 58:17.240 helps stabilize that situation. 58:17.240 --> 58:18.093 Mr. Chairman, 58:19.370 --> 58:22.570 I have a statement that was signed by five 58:22.570 --> 58:25.300 combatant commanders of US Southern Command, 58:25.300 --> 58:28.540 General Craddock, General Hill, General McCaffrey, 58:28.540 --> 58:32.540 Admiral Stavridis, General Whilhelm who all 58:32.540 --> 58:36.070 basically make the point that the solution 58:36.070 --> 58:38.290 in terms of the drivers that cause people to leave 58:38.290 --> 58:40.378 their country and move north 58:40.378 --> 58:43.450 that cutting aid to the region will only increase 58:43.450 --> 58:45.370 the drivers and will be even more costly 58:45.370 --> 58:46.310 to deal with our border. 58:46.310 --> 58:48.560 I'd ask that it be admitted to the record. 58:48.560 --> 58:50.460 - [Mr. Smith] That's five former combatant commanders. 58:50.460 --> 58:51.293 - Correct. 58:51.293 --> 58:52.126 - [Mr. Smith] But yes. 58:52.126 --> 58:53.150 Without objections so ordered. 58:53.150 --> 58:54.183 - Thank you. 58:54.183 --> 58:57.060 No slight intended Admiral (laughs). 58:57.060 --> 58:58.590 And I wanna thank you for being here today. 58:58.590 --> 59:00.783 It's good to see you back on the Hill. 59:01.730 --> 59:04.150 Again, maybe Ms. Wheelbarger or Mr. Rapoano 59:04.150 --> 59:05.400 can respond to that question. 59:05.400 --> 59:08.920 How on earth cutting aid which doesn't go 59:08.920 --> 59:11.770 to the governments they actually go to NGO's, 59:11.770 --> 59:14.560 faith based groups, all the folks who are trying 59:14.560 --> 59:18.320 to help individuals who are definitely in crisis 59:18.320 --> 59:21.110 in economies and almost failed states 59:21.110 --> 59:23.160 in those region, how that's going to help 59:23.160 --> 59:25.933 us at the border, deal with this problem? 59:26.780 --> 59:28.880 - I'll just start by saying, 59:28.880 --> 59:31.520 as I explained before we are continuing 59:31.520 --> 59:34.490 our Mil-to-Mil and MOD to DOD partnerships 59:34.490 --> 59:36.763 in the region as much as we can. 59:37.741 --> 59:40.190 We will inevitably be impacted somewhat 59:40.190 --> 59:45.190 by the ending or the pausing of State Department support. 59:46.450 --> 59:48.023 We agree that, 59:49.330 --> 59:51.160 it is important to do all we can 59:51.160 --> 59:52.670 to bring stability and security 59:52.670 --> 59:55.720 to the regions both to the central region 59:55.720 --> 59:57.403 but also around the hemisphere. 59:58.300 --> 01:00:01.200 And that a key part of that again 01:00:01.200 --> 01:00:03.760 is an inter-agency process that uses 01:00:03.760 --> 01:00:05.370 a whole of government approach. 01:00:05.370 --> 01:00:06.873 I think our perspective is that, 01:00:06.873 --> 01:00:09.600 we will be reviewing what our security cooperation 01:00:09.600 --> 01:00:12.710 is in light of the decision and seeing, 01:00:12.710 --> 01:00:13.623 we're reviewing, 01:00:15.800 --> 01:00:17.380 foreign assistance writ large in the region 01:00:17.380 --> 01:00:18.830 over coming weeks and months. 01:00:20.270 --> 01:00:21.790 - As those former combatant commanders 01:00:21.790 --> 01:00:24.037 stated pretty powerfully is that military 01:00:24.037 --> 01:00:27.599 alone cannot strengthen the investments 01:00:27.599 --> 01:00:31.440 for development, the other whole of government 01:00:31.440 --> 01:00:33.520 has to be part of the effort 01:00:33.520 --> 01:00:36.473 and otherwise you're just, 01:00:37.700 --> 01:00:39.680 chasing something that you'll never catch 01:00:39.680 --> 01:00:42.630 in terms of trying to deal with this issue. 01:00:42.630 --> 01:00:47.010 Admiral we talked yesterday about the flow of drugs 01:00:47.010 --> 01:00:50.520 into our country particularly New England 01:00:50.520 --> 01:00:53.220 which has been hard hit by the addiction issue. 01:00:53.220 --> 01:00:54.260 Maybe you could talk a little bit 01:00:54.260 --> 01:00:56.090 about your efforts with the Coast Guard 01:00:56.090 --> 01:00:57.423 in terms of interdiction. 01:00:58.480 --> 01:01:01.386 - The drugs and the deaths as a result of drugs. 01:01:01.386 --> 01:01:02.324 - [Mr. Courney] Right. 01:01:02.324 --> 01:01:03.157 - In this country are certainly a national 01:01:03.157 --> 01:01:04.910 security crisis. 01:01:04.910 --> 01:01:07.550 The flow of those drugs, cocaine principally 01:01:07.550 --> 01:01:10.790 from Columbia, heroin from Mexico and then fentanyl 01:01:10.790 --> 01:01:13.309 from China and other sources all mixed together 01:01:13.309 --> 01:01:16.790 in a concoction that's killing our citizens. 01:01:16.790 --> 01:01:19.290 The Coast Guard's our number one partner. 01:01:19.290 --> 01:01:21.570 At our joint inter-agency task forth south 01:01:21.570 --> 01:01:26.140 in Key West we have 20 partner nations and all 01:01:26.140 --> 01:01:29.150 elements of the US Government laser focused 01:01:29.150 --> 01:01:32.876 on this across both the NORTHCOM and the SOUTHCOM 01:01:32.876 --> 01:01:35.695 boundaries because as you know sir, 01:01:35.695 --> 01:01:40.695 the drug traffickers know no seams they exploit them. 01:01:41.160 --> 01:01:44.140 The Coast Guard's presence at any given day 01:01:44.140 --> 01:01:49.140 is six to eight cutters, assets beyond that and our 01:01:49.290 --> 01:01:51.140 Navy's now stepping up this fall 01:01:51.140 --> 01:01:53.500 we'll have a Littoral combat ship. 01:01:53.500 --> 01:01:55.880 But keep in mind, we're talking about covering 01:01:55.880 --> 01:01:58.860 an area the size of the United States with from 01:01:58.860 --> 01:02:02.160 six to 10 ships and so the interdiction 01:02:02.160 --> 01:02:05.010 percentage with the current assets we have 01:02:05.010 --> 01:02:07.770 is about 6% of the detections. 01:02:07.770 --> 01:02:11.110 So we need more ships, we need more intelligence, 01:02:11.110 --> 01:02:13.390 surveillance and reconnaissance assets to include 01:02:13.390 --> 01:02:15.910 maritime patrol, aircrafts, the Navy's contributed 01:02:15.910 --> 01:02:16.743 two P8's. 01:02:16.743 --> 01:02:18.610 At Customs and Borders Protection 01:02:18.610 --> 01:02:21.220 has some P3's in the hunt. 01:02:21.220 --> 01:02:24.260 And those are our critical needs. 01:02:24.260 --> 01:02:27.490 - And you mentioned the Littoral combat ship 01:02:27.490 --> 01:02:31.250 as being an additional asset that can be brought 01:02:31.250 --> 01:02:34.360 to this mission, I mean could you talk quickly 01:02:34.360 --> 01:02:36.490 about where that stands? 01:02:36.490 --> 01:02:37.323 - [Admiral Faller] We'll get our. 01:02:37.323 --> 01:02:38.338 - [Mr. Smith] By quickly he means five seconds. 01:02:38.338 --> 01:02:39.392 (Mr. Courney and Mr. Smith laughing) 01:02:39.392 --> 01:02:40.225 - We'll get our first one this fall 01:02:40.225 --> 01:02:41.930 the Navy needs more ships we welcome those 01:02:41.930 --> 01:02:43.760 ships in SOUTHCOM. 01:02:43.760 --> 01:02:45.260 - [Mr. Smith] Very good. 01:02:45.260 --> 01:02:47.120 So, Mr. Lamborn. 01:02:47.120 --> 01:02:49.050 - Thank you Mr. Chairman, thank you all for being here. 01:02:49.050 --> 01:02:53.220 General O'Shaughnessy always good to see you and welcome 01:02:53.220 --> 01:02:54.193 to our community. 01:02:55.200 --> 01:02:57.690 I'd like to ask a question about missile defense 01:02:57.690 --> 01:03:01.700 and then a more Colorado based question. 01:03:01.700 --> 01:03:02.813 But first of all, 01:03:04.920 --> 01:03:08.000 and Mr. Rapuoano if you wanna weigh in on this also 01:03:08.000 --> 01:03:09.840 you'd be welcome to. 01:03:09.840 --> 01:03:11.173 Given that the, 01:03:12.786 --> 01:03:17.600 redesigned kill vehicle schedule continues to slide 01:03:17.600 --> 01:03:20.310 to the right, do you think it makes sense 01:03:20.310 --> 01:03:23.280 to consider next generation solutions 01:03:23.280 --> 01:03:25.330 and I'm thinking of the MOKV, 01:03:25.330 --> 01:03:27.830 the Multiple Object Kill Vehicle 01:03:29.220 --> 01:03:33.670 because the threat is out there and we don't wanna get 01:03:34.710 --> 01:03:35.620 caught 01:03:35.620 --> 01:03:38.370 with our, with the threats, not being 01:03:38.370 --> 01:03:39.690 able to address the threats. 01:03:39.690 --> 01:03:42.660 So MOKV, should we start working on 01:03:42.660 --> 01:03:44.533 that and accelerate our work on that? 01:03:46.240 --> 01:03:47.330 - Well thank you sir. 01:03:47.330 --> 01:03:50.250 First I would say with respect to the RKV 01:03:50.250 --> 01:03:53.360 I do have a concern as you would expect 01:03:53.360 --> 01:03:54.830 from the operational perspective 01:03:54.830 --> 01:03:56.930 of the delay as it hit the critical design 01:03:56.930 --> 01:03:59.180 review and was not ready to move forward. 01:03:59.180 --> 01:04:01.670 So we've working closely with General Greaves, MDA 01:04:01.670 --> 01:04:04.560 in fact immediately after that was highlighted. 01:04:04.560 --> 01:04:06.200 I went down to the headquarters personally. 01:04:06.200 --> 01:04:08.160 Met not only with General Greaves but the technical 01:04:08.160 --> 01:04:10.730 experts to better understand not just the RKV 01:04:10.730 --> 01:04:12.540 but the broader system of systems, 01:04:12.540 --> 01:04:14.010 that things we could do. 01:04:14.010 --> 01:04:16.280 From my perspective I'm very concerned about the overall 01:04:16.280 --> 01:04:18.370 capacity and capability. 01:04:18.370 --> 01:04:21.060 In other words if we look at North Korea as an example. 01:04:21.060 --> 01:04:23.530 One of the, there's a capability that we need to have 01:04:23.530 --> 01:04:26.120 to be able to intercept any missiles that shoot 01:04:26.120 --> 01:04:29.330 but it's also a capacity that we need to maintain. 01:04:29.330 --> 01:04:31.940 And so we wanna make sure that between the radars, 01:04:31.940 --> 01:04:35.250 between the kill vehicles that we maintain 01:04:35.250 --> 01:04:37.520 ahead of that capacity. 01:04:37.520 --> 01:04:39.220 So without getting into a technical discussion 01:04:39.220 --> 01:04:41.250 which of course we'd have to go classified 01:04:41.250 --> 01:04:43.050 I would say that it's really a bit of both. 01:04:43.050 --> 01:04:44.720 In other words, I don't know that you can just skip 01:04:44.720 --> 01:04:48.830 the RKV but certainly the MOKV needs to be 01:04:48.830 --> 01:04:51.850 continued to be pursued because as you highlighted 01:04:51.850 --> 01:04:53.270 it does give you the ability to go after 01:04:53.270 --> 01:04:56.210 multiple objects and so I think as we go forward 01:04:56.210 --> 01:04:57.990 we can have a following discussion in classified 01:04:57.990 --> 01:05:00.190 but I do believe we need to continue to pursue 01:05:00.190 --> 01:05:02.860 the RKV but also look at the MOKV. 01:05:02.860 --> 01:05:04.313 - [Mr. Lamborn] Okay. 01:05:04.313 --> 01:05:05.312 - MOKV going forward. 01:05:05.312 --> 01:05:06.414 - Well thank you General. 01:05:06.414 --> 01:05:07.360 Mr. Rapuoano would you like to weigh in on that? 01:05:07.360 --> 01:05:09.720 - I think General O'Shaughnessy covered it quite well. 01:05:09.720 --> 01:05:12.870 It's really what the trade space is in terms of time 01:05:12.870 --> 01:05:16.420 as well capabilities between RKV and MOKV 01:05:16.420 --> 01:05:18.310 and those are the things that we're looking at 01:05:18.310 --> 01:05:21.350 because we see adversaries continuing to develop 01:05:21.350 --> 01:05:22.600 their capabilities. 01:05:22.600 --> 01:05:25.120 But we wanna make sure that the trade we make 01:05:25.120 --> 01:05:26.450 is a balanced trade. 01:05:26.450 --> 01:05:27.670 - Okay thank you. 01:05:27.670 --> 01:05:29.600 And lastly General O'Shaughnessy 01:05:29.600 --> 01:05:32.350 I wanted to ask you about a Colorado specific question. 01:05:32.350 --> 01:05:36.210 As you know in Northwest Colorado we have the HAATS site 01:05:36.210 --> 01:05:39.020 or the High Altitude Army and National Guard 01:05:39.020 --> 01:05:43.360 Aviation Training site and that's on public land. 01:05:43.360 --> 01:05:45.350 There's been legislation introduced 01:05:45.350 --> 01:05:48.300 by some of the Colorado delegation to declare 01:05:48.300 --> 01:05:51.010 large areas of Colorado wilderness 01:05:51.010 --> 01:05:54.280 and I'm sure this is unintentional but it could 01:05:54.280 --> 01:05:59.270 have the effect of shutting down that aviation training 01:05:59.270 --> 01:06:03.620 site because wilderness use is very limited, 01:06:03.620 --> 01:06:05.530 very stringently controlled. 01:06:05.530 --> 01:06:08.750 So do you have concerns about this legislation 01:06:08.750 --> 01:06:13.750 which is H.R.823 and how it might effect the HAAT site 01:06:14.390 --> 01:06:16.793 and effect firefighting as well? 01:06:19.470 --> 01:06:21.260 - Yeah thank you sir, I'm not, 01:06:21.260 --> 01:06:22.589 I don't have a direct involvement 01:06:22.589 --> 01:06:24.850 in that as a NORTHCOM or NORAD 01:06:24.850 --> 01:06:27.191 but I clearly understand the dilemma 01:06:27.191 --> 01:06:29.050 that this would put us in, 01:06:29.050 --> 01:06:30.770 within the services. 01:06:30.770 --> 01:06:32.800 And so I do look forward to working 01:06:32.800 --> 01:06:34.040 with your team going forward to see 01:06:34.040 --> 01:06:35.120 if there's something we can do 01:06:35.120 --> 01:06:37.400 together to address this issue. 01:06:37.400 --> 01:06:39.320 - Okay we'll stay in touch with you on that 01:06:39.320 --> 01:06:41.980 it is a work in progress I just wanted to get you 01:06:41.980 --> 01:06:44.490 to weigh in on that because it is of concern 01:06:44.490 --> 01:06:45.570 in our state. 01:06:45.570 --> 01:06:47.630 Thank you Mr. Chairman I yield back. 01:06:47.630 --> 01:06:50.340 - [Mr. Smith] Thank you, Mr. Garamendi. 01:06:50.340 --> 01:06:52.020 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 01:06:52.020 --> 01:06:54.330 Admiral Faller you indicated that one of your 01:06:54.330 --> 01:06:57.613 responsibilities is drug interdiction, is that correct? 01:06:58.640 --> 01:07:01.210 - It's a detection monitoring and then the interdiction 01:07:01.210 --> 01:07:02.043 as well yes sir. 01:07:02.043 --> 01:07:03.460 - [Mr. Garamendi] Thank you. 01:07:03.460 --> 01:07:06.630 How do most drugs enter the United States? 01:07:06.630 --> 01:07:09.470 - Most drugs come through the United States 01:07:09.470 --> 01:07:11.980 crossing in through Central America 01:07:11.980 --> 01:07:13.750 up through Mexico across the border 01:07:13.750 --> 01:07:16.340 and also through other means, containers, 01:07:16.340 --> 01:07:18.687 the mails, the ports, particularly the fentanyl 01:07:18.687 --> 01:07:21.970 which has been the latest trend. 01:07:21.970 --> 01:07:25.260 - How about the oceans or the Caribbean, 01:07:25.260 --> 01:07:26.410 and the Pacific? 01:07:26.410 --> 01:07:28.750 - Sir both the Caribbean and the Pacific 01:07:28.750 --> 01:07:32.330 are high transit areas as the drugs flow out of-- 01:07:32.330 --> 01:07:36.140 - Those drugs that enter through from Mexico 01:07:36.140 --> 01:07:40.183 enter through the ports of entry? 01:07:41.020 --> 01:07:45.330 Or through unsealed borders? 01:07:45.330 --> 01:07:48.490 - Sir I'd defer to General O'Shaughnessy 01:07:48.490 --> 01:07:49.790 on the entry. 01:07:49.790 --> 01:07:51.750 - Sir I would say both and as we work with 01:07:51.750 --> 01:07:53.390 our Customs and Border Protection we certainly 01:07:53.390 --> 01:07:54.580 see it through the ports of entry. 01:07:54.580 --> 01:07:55.860 We certainly see it through the containers 01:07:55.860 --> 01:07:57.710 but we also see it through the open border. 01:07:57.710 --> 01:07:58.543 - I see. 01:07:59.430 --> 01:08:02.480 How best can we spend six to eight billion dollars 01:08:02.480 --> 01:08:07.431 on border fences or on Coast Guard activities, 01:08:07.431 --> 01:08:10.410 Littoral combat ships, 01:08:10.410 --> 01:08:11.913 improvement of our, 01:08:14.170 --> 01:08:16.650 detection at the port of entries? 01:08:16.650 --> 01:08:19.300 How would we best spend six to eight billion dollars? 01:08:22.070 --> 01:08:24.643 - Sir from my perspective it's 01:08:24.643 --> 01:08:28.354 not one silver bullet that's gonna defeat 01:08:28.354 --> 01:08:30.430 this threat to our nation. 01:08:30.430 --> 01:08:33.340 - [Mr. Garamendi] How much would you apply to border walls 01:08:33.340 --> 01:08:35.020 versus ports of entry? 01:08:35.020 --> 01:08:38.020 - I would defer to policy on the specifics 01:08:38.020 --> 01:08:39.610 of that but what I would say is really 01:08:39.610 --> 01:08:41.750 just a little bit of everything. 01:08:41.750 --> 01:08:45.410 - So border barriers is one approach 01:08:45.410 --> 01:08:46.243 of terms of-- 01:08:46.243 --> 01:08:47.190 - [Mr. Garamendi] And on the question 01:08:47.190 --> 01:08:51.670 was how best, where would we best spend the money? 01:08:51.670 --> 01:08:55.160 - So if we were solely considering counter narcotics 01:08:55.160 --> 01:08:58.714 as the primary function that we're investing in 01:08:58.714 --> 01:09:01.360 and addressing versus all the other 01:09:01.360 --> 01:09:03.303 dynamics associated with the border? 01:09:05.090 --> 01:09:07.260 - [Mr. Garamendi] My question is drugs, how best 01:09:07.260 --> 01:09:09.230 could we spend the money? 01:09:09.230 --> 01:09:10.063 - Well I can't speak-- 01:09:10.063 --> 01:09:11.450 - [Mr. Garamendi] Would you spend it on the Coast Guard? 01:09:11.450 --> 01:09:13.873 Would you spend it on ports of entry? 01:09:14.760 --> 01:09:16.490 Or would you spend it on walls? 01:09:16.490 --> 01:09:18.180 - I don't have the counter drug portfolio. 01:09:18.180 --> 01:09:19.980 - [Mr. Garamendi] It's your task. 01:09:19.980 --> 01:09:22.060 You're not going to answer the question? 01:09:22.060 --> 01:09:23.870 - No I simply don't have the information 01:09:23.870 --> 01:09:26.300 to answer the question in terms of looking at drugs 01:09:26.300 --> 01:09:28.710 solely versus looking at border security 01:09:28.710 --> 01:09:30.400 or operational control of the border, 01:09:30.400 --> 01:09:31.720 which are two primary-- 01:09:31.720 --> 01:09:32.553 - [Mr. Garamendi] Thank you. 01:09:32.553 --> 01:09:33.649 - Priorities as well. - [Mr. Garamendi] And you're 01:09:33.649 --> 01:09:34.482 not answering the question. 01:09:34.482 --> 01:09:36.560 Could you please provide me with the data? 01:09:36.560 --> 01:09:37.393 Thank you. 01:09:40.710 --> 01:09:41.810 General O'Shaughnessy, 01:09:42.830 --> 01:09:45.070 we have missile threats, 01:09:45.070 --> 01:09:46.850 we have cyber threats. 01:09:46.850 --> 01:09:49.663 What is the most imminent of those two threats? 01:09:52.080 --> 01:09:54.830 - Sir I think in the near term cyber threats 01:09:54.830 --> 01:09:56.400 are happening every day. 01:09:56.400 --> 01:09:57.620 Quite literally. 01:09:57.620 --> 01:09:59.693 That said I do have significant concern 01:09:59.693 --> 01:10:02.363 on the kinetic or missile threats as well. 01:10:03.500 --> 01:10:06.020 - So cyber threat is the most imminent 01:10:06.020 --> 01:10:07.434 that is here and now? 01:10:07.434 --> 01:10:08.330 - [General O'Shaughnessy] Yes sir. 01:10:08.330 --> 01:10:09.240 - Okay. 01:10:09.240 --> 01:10:13.070 And with regard to the cyber threat 01:10:13.070 --> 01:10:15.210 amongst those threats what is the most 01:10:15.210 --> 01:10:17.293 imminent of those threats? 01:10:19.470 --> 01:10:21.700 - Sir I think as we look at what is happening 01:10:21.700 --> 01:10:24.790 every day within our infrastructure 01:10:24.790 --> 01:10:27.500 when I say our infrastructure I mean as a nation 01:10:27.500 --> 01:10:29.640 not as a Department of Defense. 01:10:29.640 --> 01:10:32.390 Clearly we see both Russia, China 01:10:32.390 --> 01:10:34.930 working in malicious ways. 01:10:34.930 --> 01:10:37.113 - Okay including things like elections. 01:10:38.350 --> 01:10:41.870 Therefore, where should we apply our money 01:10:41.870 --> 01:10:43.963 and our talent and task? 01:10:45.500 --> 01:10:48.930 To the immediate problem or to the long term problem. 01:10:48.930 --> 01:10:50.320 I understand we'll probably do both 01:10:50.320 --> 01:10:51.913 but is their a relationship? 01:10:53.060 --> 01:10:57.620 - Well again sir I do believe it's not one silver bullet 01:10:57.620 --> 01:11:00.690 that's gonna take care of all the threats that 01:11:00.690 --> 01:11:02.400 we're faced with so it is both. 01:11:02.400 --> 01:11:05.634 I know from our Cyber Command is working diligently 01:11:05.634 --> 01:11:07.305 on the cyber threat. 01:11:07.305 --> 01:11:08.850 - Thank you. 01:11:08.850 --> 01:11:11.160 I'll just get back on it here. 01:11:11.160 --> 01:11:14.800 We have an imminent threat, immediate threat. 01:11:14.800 --> 01:11:17.110 We need to attend to that immediately. 01:11:17.110 --> 01:11:19.320 The long term threat, missile defense and so forth 01:11:19.320 --> 01:11:21.980 are also out there I understand that. 01:11:21.980 --> 01:11:25.410 What is the single point of failure in the American 01:11:25.410 --> 01:11:29.320 system of our electronic systems? 01:11:29.320 --> 01:11:30.770 It's GPS. 01:11:30.770 --> 01:11:32.610 It's been identified by the Federal Government 01:11:32.610 --> 01:11:35.380 for the last 25 years as the single point 01:11:35.380 --> 01:11:36.660 of failure. 01:11:36.660 --> 01:11:39.170 We lose GPS these lights go out, 01:11:39.170 --> 01:11:40.970 your cell phone won't work. 01:11:40.970 --> 01:11:41.930 Nothing will work. 01:11:41.930 --> 01:11:44.240 Most of the military equipment won't work. 01:11:44.240 --> 01:11:46.723 Is there a back up system to GPS? 01:11:49.001 --> 01:11:50.130 - Sir I would like to do is address that 01:11:50.130 --> 01:11:52.610 in a classified environment with you. 01:11:52.610 --> 01:11:54.080 - My time is out the answer is 01:11:54.080 --> 01:11:56.480 there is one available but does not yet exist 01:11:56.480 --> 01:11:58.890 and it is a problem for the Continental United States 01:11:58.890 --> 01:12:00.213 it is called eLoran. 01:12:01.370 --> 01:12:03.710 - [Mr. Smith] Thank you, Mr. Byrne. 01:12:03.710 --> 01:12:04.910 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 01:12:04.910 --> 01:12:06.450 Thank you lady and gentlemen for being here 01:12:06.450 --> 01:12:08.240 and thank you for the work that you do. 01:12:08.240 --> 01:12:09.740 I wasn't here earlier and you may have 01:12:09.740 --> 01:12:10.990 already addressed this and if you did 01:12:10.990 --> 01:12:12.660 if you would just quickly summarize it 01:12:12.660 --> 01:12:14.210 but I'd like to know from your perspective 01:12:14.210 --> 01:12:15.980 I know you are not the Department of State 01:12:15.980 --> 01:12:17.980 where we are today with regard to the situation 01:12:17.980 --> 01:12:18.813 in Venezuela? 01:12:21.560 --> 01:12:22.393 - I'll start. 01:12:22.393 --> 01:12:24.660 I think from our perspective we continue 01:12:24.660 --> 01:12:28.680 to see the policy and our strategy 01:12:28.680 --> 01:12:31.860 of multilateral international diplomatic and economic 01:12:31.860 --> 01:12:33.130 pressure on the Maduro 01:12:35.310 --> 01:12:37.150 clique as working. 01:12:37.150 --> 01:12:41.810 That the kind of regional support we see in 01:12:41.810 --> 01:12:44.680 rallying against him and for the interim President 01:12:44.680 --> 01:12:46.320 is a historical moment. 01:12:46.320 --> 01:12:47.840 We will be watching over the course 01:12:47.840 --> 01:12:50.730 of today as events unfold because there has been 01:12:50.730 --> 01:12:53.110 calls for further protests. 01:12:53.110 --> 01:12:56.280 I think yesterday was a significant 01:12:56.280 --> 01:12:58.380 significant day but we are watching 01:12:58.380 --> 01:12:59.630 what's unfolding today as well 01:12:59.630 --> 01:13:03.020 because they have been called for further protests 01:13:03.020 --> 01:13:05.580 and we are seeing further pressure put on Maduro 01:13:05.580 --> 01:13:06.940 around their international community 01:13:06.940 --> 01:13:08.880 but also from within his own system. 01:13:08.880 --> 01:13:10.270 - Are there concerns with what's happening 01:13:10.270 --> 01:13:12.130 in Venezuela might destabalize some of their 01:13:12.130 --> 01:13:14.480 neighbors who are allies of ours in that region? 01:13:14.480 --> 01:13:16.070 - Of course that's a significant challenge 01:13:16.070 --> 01:13:17.910 we face and we focus on particularly 01:13:17.910 --> 01:13:21.610 given the migrant flows into Columbia and Brazil 01:13:21.610 --> 01:13:22.870 in particular. 01:13:22.870 --> 01:13:25.910 These are solid important partners 01:13:25.910 --> 01:13:28.480 in the region for us and for regional stability. 01:13:28.480 --> 01:13:31.240 And so we remain focused and concerned about 01:13:31.240 --> 01:13:33.443 the potential spill over effects to the region. 01:13:33.443 --> 01:13:34.687 - [Mr. Byrne] Thank you.