WEBVTT

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- Sent the opening statements
to be inserted for the record.

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Hearing no objection, will be done.

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And second, I would like to ask
our usual unanimous consent,

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so that members of the full
committee, like Mr. Lamborn,

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are also able to participate

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in the subcommittee questioning,

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after the subcommittee members

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had a chance to ask their questions.

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Hearing no objection.

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Well, is the gentleman
asking for a recorded vote?

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The gentleman withdraws
his questionable objection.

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I would like to welcome

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the distinguished
witnesses before us today.

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I apologize on behalf of
the House of Representatives

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that this is getting such a late start,

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but you know that's
business as usual here.

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So, since there are no opening statements,

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why don't we go ahead and
hear from the witnesses?

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We're lucky to have such a
distinguished panel today,

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and I appreciate all the witnesses coming.

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But why don't we start with
Secretary Trachtenberg?

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- Chairman Cooper, distinguished
members of the committee,

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thank you for the opportunity
to testify on the president's

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fiscal-year-2020 budget
request for nuclear forces.

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The 2018 national defense strategy

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recognizes today's increasingly complex

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global security environment,

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characterized by overt challenges

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to the free and open international order

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and the re-emergence of strategic

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competition between nations.

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For decades the United
States led the world

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in efforts to reduce the role
and number of nuclear weapons.

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Unfortunately, Russia and China
have chosen a different path

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and have increased the
role of nuclear weapons

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in their strategies, along with
the size and sophistication

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of their nuclear forces.

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For this reason, a robust and
modern U.S. nuclear deterrent

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is necessary to ensure
that the re-emergence

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of strategic competition
does not lead to conflict

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or escalate to large-scale war.

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Russia continues to prioritize

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high levels of defense spending

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to upgrade its nuclear forces

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and pursue advanced weapons
specifically designed

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to counter U.S. military capability.

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Russia's nuclear modernization program

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covers every leg of its strategic triad,

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and includes modern
intercontinental ballistic missiles,

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submarine-launched ballistic missiles

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and long-range strategic bombers.

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Russia's minister of defense
has stated that by 2020,

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90% of the country's
strategic nuclear forces

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will be armed with modern weaponry.

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In March 2018 Vladimir Putin announced

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that Russia is developing even more

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new nuclear weapons capabilities.

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In addition, Russia is
modernizing and expanding

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an active stockpile of approximately 2,000

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non-strategic nuclear weapons
that can be deployed on ships,

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bombers, aircraft and with ground forces.

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China continues its expansive
military modernization

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and remains focused on
establishing regional dominance

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and expanding its ability to coerce

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U.S. allies and partners.

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Modernization of its
nuclear missile forces

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include deploying advanced
sea-based weapons,

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developing more modern road-mobile
and silo-based missiles,

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and testing hypersonic glide vehicles.

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The Chinese are also developing a new

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nuclear-capable strategic bomber.

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And although we remain hopeful

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that negotiations with North Korea

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may produce a pathway to
peace and denuclearization,

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North Korea's nuclear capabilities

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pose a potential threat to
our allies and our homeland,

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and add to an already
complex strategic picture.

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The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reflects

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the Department of Defense's
strategic priority

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to maintain a safe, secure,

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survivable and effective
nuclear deterrent.

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Nuclear forces are the ultimate foundation

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of our nation's security.

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Our deterrent forces must be
modernized to remain credible.

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Delay is not an option.

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The highest U.S. nuclear
policy and strategy priority

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is to deter potential adversaries

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from nuclear attack of any scale

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against the United States or its allies.

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However, deterring nuclear attack

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is not the sole purpose
of nuclear weapons.

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The U.S. nuclear forces are also intended

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to deter non-nuclear strategic attacks,

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assure allies and partners,

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achieve U.S. objectives
if deterrence fails

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and hedge against an uncertain future.

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Effective deterrence of nuclear attack

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and non-nuclear strategic attack requires

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ensuring that potential
adversaries do not miscalculate

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regarding the consequences
of nuclear fist use,

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either regionally or
against the United States.

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They must understand that
the costs far outweigh

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any perceived benefits
from non-nuclear aggression

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or limited nuclear escalation.

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The U.S. nuclear declaratory policy

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is consistent with long-standing precepts

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that the United States
would employ nuclear weapons

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only in extreme circumstances
to defend our vital interests

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and those of our allies.

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Our policy also maintains
the long-standing approach

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of constructive ambiguity
regarding U.S. nuclear employment

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that has help deter potential adversaries

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from nuclear coercion or aggression.

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A policy of no first use

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would undermine U.S. extended deterrence

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and damage the health of our alliances,

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because it would call into
question the assurance

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that the United States would
come to the defense of allies

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in extreme circumstances.

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A no-first-use policy
might embolden adversaries

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who may perceive it as a weakened

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U.S. resolve to defend our
allies and vital interests

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with every means at our disposal.

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It may also undermine U.S.
non-proliferation objectives

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if allies felt the need
to develop or possess

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their own nuclear weapons for deterrence.

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The 2018 NPR reaffirmed the conclusions

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of previous Republican and
Democratic administrations,

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that the diverse capabilities
of the nuclear triad

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provide the flexibility and
resilience needed for deterrence

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in the most cost-effective manner.

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Each leg is essential,
complementary and critical

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to ensuring no adversary
believes it can employ

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nuclear weapons for any reason
under any circumstances.

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Unfortunately, each leg of
the triad is now operating

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far beyond its originally
planned service life.

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Most of the nation's
nuclear delivery systems

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will reach their end-of-service life

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in the 2025 to 2035 timeframe

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and cannot be sustained further.

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If not recapitalized

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these forces will age into obsolescence.

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Consequently, we must not delay

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the recapitalization of the triad

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initiated by the previous administration.

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The FY20 budget request funds

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all critical DoD
modernization requirements.

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The request for nuclear
forces is roughly $25 billion,

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or roughly 3.5% of the overall DoD budget,

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this includes $16.5 billion

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to sustain and operate our nuclear forces

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and $8.4 billion for
recapitalization programs.

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The department's request

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to recapitalize the nuclear enterprise

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is about 1.2% of the
total DoD budget request.

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Mr. Chairman, I'm prepared to discuss

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arms control at length,

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including the administration's position

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on both the INF Treaty

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and developments with respect
to the New START treaty.

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But in the interest of time,

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let me conclude by stating
that nuclear deterrence

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is the bedrock of U.S. national security.

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Our nuclear deterrent underwrites

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all U.S. military operations
and diplomacy across the globe.

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It is the backstop and foundation
of our national defense.

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A strong nuclear
deterrent also contributes

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to U.S. non-proliferation goals

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by eliminating the incentive

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for allies to have their
own nuclear weapons.

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I urge the committee to support

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the important nuclear
programs and funding contained

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in the president's FY20 budget request.

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Thank you again for the
opportunity to testify,

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and I look forward to your questions.

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- Thank you very much,
Secretary Trachtenberg.

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Now we will hear from General John Hyten.

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- Thank you very much, Chairman Cooper,

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Ranking Member Turner,
distinguished committee members,

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it is an honor to be here today

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alongside my fellow
Department of Defense leaders.

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And it's also continuing privileged

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to represent the 162,000 Americans

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that accomplish the mission of my command

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and U.S. strategic command
each and every day.

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I wanna begin by thanking the committee

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for your enduring support
to our national defense.

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The stability afforded through
this year's on time budget

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came at a critical time for us,

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and I cannot overstate the enormous impact

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that it had on modernization efforts

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and our overall force readiness.

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I'd also like to express my gratitude

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to the Armed Services Committee

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for broadening our strategic deterrence

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and space discussions
over the last few years,

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and bringing them to the forefront
of our national dialogue.

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Protecting Americans from harm

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is the single most important
job of our government.

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The methods we use must be the result

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of a robust debate and analytical rigor.

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Experts on all sides of the issue

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should be able to answer
the tough questions

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that steer us to the best possible

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security solutions for our nation.

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But the most important message
I wanna deliver today is that

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I am fully confident
in my command's ability

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to preserve the peace

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and decisively respond in any conflict.

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We're ready, postured and partnered

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for all the threats that exist today,

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and no one should doubt this.

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Our forces, our capabilities

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and the strategic deterrence
they help provide,

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underpin and enable all
joint-forces operations.

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They are the ultimate guarantors

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of our national and allied security.

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Stratcom's first priority
mission, strategic deterrence,

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is not a passive mission.

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It's an active mission, it's dynamic.

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Our capabilities and posture
must continue to evolve

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as the global threat changes.

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And the threat is changing,

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as Secretary Trachtenberg just described.

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Today we're challenged
by multiple adversaries

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with an expanding range of capabilities

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that we must adapt to
overcome these new threats.

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To effectively deter and
if necessary respond,

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we must outthink, outmaneuver,

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out-partner and out-innovate
our adversaries.

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Deterrence in the 21st century

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is an active mission
that requires integration

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of all our capabilities
across all domains.

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For over two decades

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China and Russia have
studied our way of warfare.

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They understand and seek to counter

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our long-held advantages.

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They're actively exploring new methods

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to exploit perceived vulnerabilities

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and they're directly challenging us

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in areas of long-held strength.

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My focus this year

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is to advance operations and modernization

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of the foundation of our
national strategic deterrent,

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our nuclear triad.

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Our ICBMs, submarines, bombers
and the weapons they carry

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are unique and complementary.

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The triad complicates our
adversaries' decision calculus,

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has been a proven deterrent
for over 60 years.

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I will also intensify implementation

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of my new responsibilities
as the department's

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Nuclear Command and
Control and Communication

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NC3 Enterprise lead,

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while supporting a seamless transition

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as the department stands up a new

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Space Force organization as well.

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A strong continuing deterrent

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is critical to our nation's security.

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Nuclear war cannot be won,

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and therefore it must never be fought.

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And so, to preserve the peace
we must be ready for war.

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Today we're ready.

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I look forward to an on-time
budget for fiscal year 2020,

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so we can sustain the momentum

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invigorating this department right now.

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So, thank you for the
opportunity to be here today,

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I look forward to your questions.

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- Thank you very much, General.

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And now we will hear from
Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe.

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- Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner

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and distinguished members
of this subcommittee,

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thank you for the opportunity to testify

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on the budget priorities
for nuclear forces

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and for your continued support

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of the Navy's deterrent mission.

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I'm honored to be here today,
and I respectfully request

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my written statement be
submitted for the record.

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Nuclear deterrence is the
number-one-priority mission

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of the Department of Defense.

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The Navy's Strategic
Systems Programs or SSPs,

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fiscal-year-2020 budget

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supports the continued
sustainment of that deterrent

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as well as the modernization efforts

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directed in the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review.

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Additionally, although not part of

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the strategic nuclear
portfolio that I manage,

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the SSP budget request supports the

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Hypersonic Conventional Strike Program,

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an effort that leverages SSP's unique

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and critical non-nuclear skillset

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that the workforce has refined
over the last 60 years.

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The men and women of SSP
and their predecessors

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have provided unwavering and
single-mission-focused support

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to the sea-based leg of the
triad for over six decades.

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Now with a bow wave

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of development activities on the horizon,

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the organization must be prepared

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not only to support to today's deterrent,

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but to ensure it remains
a credible and effective

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strategic weapons system into the future.

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As the 14th director,
it is my highest honor

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to represent the men and women of SSP,

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comprising approximately 1,700 sailors,

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1,000 Marines, 300 Coastguardsmen,

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1,200 civilians and over
2,000 contractor personnel.

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It is my most critical
goal as the director of SSP

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to ensure that they are
poised to execute the mission

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with the same level of
success, passion and rigor,

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both today and tomorrow,

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as they have since our
program's inception in 1955.

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Again, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today

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on behalf of those who make
deterrence their life's work.

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I look forward to your questions.

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- Thank you Admiral.

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And now we will hear from
Lieutenant General Richard Clark.

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- Good morning, Chairman
Cooper, Ranking Member Turner,

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distinguished members of the committee.

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On behalf of my wingman,

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Lieutenant General Arnie Bunch and myself,

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thank you for the opportunity to discuss

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Air Force nuclear programs and policies.

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The return of great power competition

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is increasing the significance
of nuclear weapons

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in our ever-changing
strategic environment.

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Our primary strategic
adversaries are modernizing

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existing nuclear and conventional systems

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while pursuing new disruptive technologies

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such as hypersonics,
artificial intelligence

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and cyber capabilities.

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And despite the efforts of
multiple administrations

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to negotiate nuclear-stockpile reductions

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and the role of nuclear weapons,

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neither of our competitors
have followed our lead.

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In light of this, the U.S. must maintain

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a credible nuclear deterrent
to promote strategic stability,

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protect the nation, our
allies and our partners.

14:41.370 --> 14:44.260
Since the 1960s, every
administration has recognized

14:44.260 --> 14:46.690
the critical role of the nuclear triad.

14:46.690 --> 14:49.000
The synergy of its
three complementary legs

14:49.000 --> 14:52.070
ensures that we can
deter strategic attack,

14:52.070 --> 14:55.860
assure our partners and allies
achieve strategic objectives

14:55.860 --> 14:58.700
and hedge against future uncertainties.

14:58.700 --> 15:02.830
Modernization and
recapitalization are paramount

15:02.830 --> 15:05.370
if we are to maintain a credible deterrent

15:05.370 --> 15:08.030
in the evolving strategic environment.

15:08.030 --> 15:11.400
ICBMs deny the adversary the ability

15:11.400 --> 15:14.610
to preemptively destroy the U.S. arsenal

15:14.610 --> 15:16.840
with a small-scale strike.

15:16.840 --> 15:18.690
Replacing the Minuteman III

15:18.690 --> 15:20.950
with the ground-based strategic deterrent

15:20.950 --> 15:24.540
will provide a responsive, safe, secure

15:24.540 --> 15:26.160
and accurate weapons system

15:26.160 --> 15:29.960
capable of holding
adversary targets at risk.

15:29.960 --> 15:32.410
Nuclear-capable bombers
are the most flexible

15:32.410 --> 15:34.570
and visible leg of the triad.

15:34.570 --> 15:38.120
Modernizing the B-52 and fielding the B-21

15:38.120 --> 15:40.740
ensures standoff and
penetrating capability

15:40.740 --> 15:42.830
far into the future.

15:42.830 --> 15:45.370
Cruise missiles such as the
Long Range Stand Off Weapon

15:45.370 --> 15:48.520
can penetrate advanced
air defense systems,

15:48.520 --> 15:53.500
execute multi-axis attacks
and saturate enemy defenses.

15:53.500 --> 15:55.660
This weapon effectively extends

15:55.660 --> 15:57.660
the range of our bomber force,

15:57.660 --> 16:01.663
greatly complicating enemy
defense requirements and costs.

16:02.590 --> 16:04.620
Nuclear Command and Control Communications

16:04.620 --> 16:08.410
is the central nervous system
of our nuclear deterrent.

16:08.410 --> 16:12.220
Like the triad, legacy
NC3 systems are aging

16:12.220 --> 16:16.940
and require persistent resourcing
to sustain and modernize.

16:16.940 --> 16:19.930
It must link the president
and the national leaders

16:19.930 --> 16:22.950
to the force, all day, every day,

16:22.950 --> 16:25.253
under all conditions and without fail.

16:26.310 --> 16:29.100
The U.S. requires the
tools necessary to prevent

16:29.100 --> 16:33.370
the most existential threat
to our survival as a nation.

16:33.370 --> 16:35.090
The flexible capabilities

16:35.090 --> 16:37.750
and complementary nature
of the nuclear triad

16:37.750 --> 16:40.640
ensures the credibility
of the U.S. deterrent,

16:40.640 --> 16:44.360
while complicating the
adversaries' decision calculus.

16:44.360 --> 16:47.460
It is the backstop of
U.S. national security.

16:47.460 --> 16:51.260
It is both necessary and
affordable, and we must continue

16:51.260 --> 16:53.660
to support the critical role of the triad

16:53.660 --> 16:57.270
in defending our country
and our way of life.

16:57.270 --> 16:59.670
Thank you, and I look
forward to your questions.

17:00.670 --> 17:02.310
- Thank you very much, General Clarke.

17:02.310 --> 17:04.900
And as you pointed out,
we also are welcoming

17:04.900 --> 17:07.890
Lieutenant General Arnold
Bunch Jr. with us today,

17:07.890 --> 17:10.440
appreciate your being at
the witness table as well.

17:11.830 --> 17:13.470
As I was walking into the hearing earlier,

17:13.470 --> 17:16.897
one of the attendees in the audience said,

17:16.897 --> 17:18.737
"You have today in this hearing

17:18.737 --> 17:21.568
"four of the most important
people in the world."

17:21.568 --> 17:23.400
And that might be a little
bit of an exaggeration,

17:23.400 --> 17:26.210
but it's probably not far from the truth.

17:26.210 --> 17:27.460
'Cause when it comes to determining

17:27.460 --> 17:29.010
the future of the planet,

17:29.010 --> 17:31.880
the degree to which you bear
your heavy responsibilities,

17:31.880 --> 17:33.660
it makes a difference.

17:33.660 --> 17:35.433
So, thank you for joining us today.

17:36.600 --> 17:38.530
I want to be as considerate as possible

17:38.530 --> 17:39.920
to my colleagues who have joined us

17:39.920 --> 17:42.030
instead of taking an
immediate flight home,

17:42.030 --> 17:45.170
so I will be very short in my questioning.

17:45.170 --> 17:46.780
But I thought that in many ways,

17:46.780 --> 17:51.390
the most important sentence
in all the testimony

17:51.390 --> 17:54.200
was what Secretary Trachtenberg said.

17:54.200 --> 17:57.847
Top of page five, and he
also said this orally.

17:57.847 --> 18:01.407
"We must not delay the
recapitalization of the triad

18:01.407 --> 18:05.797
"and our Nuclear Command,
Control and Communications System

18:05.797 --> 18:08.447
"initiated by the
previous administration."

18:09.400 --> 18:11.100
And on behalf of the
previous administration,

18:11.100 --> 18:13.850
I would like to take
that as a compliment that

18:13.850 --> 18:15.200
American nuclear policy

18:15.200 --> 18:18.053
has generally been
characterized by continuity,

18:19.250 --> 18:21.870
regardless of partisanship
and regardless of politics,

18:21.870 --> 18:22.810
regardless of anything.

18:22.810 --> 18:26.980
And that continuity is in many
ways our greatest strength.

18:26.980 --> 18:28.730
So I'm hoping that even in this

18:28.730 --> 18:30.850
contentious political environment,

18:30.850 --> 18:34.350
that continuity can be preserved.

18:34.350 --> 18:37.500
Now, we don't wanna just
meld the old boilerplate.

18:37.500 --> 18:39.690
And we have a heavy
obligation on all of us

18:39.690 --> 18:42.030
to teach new generations

18:42.030 --> 18:44.610
why the boilerplate was
crafted to begin with,

18:44.610 --> 18:47.283
and on occasion, to
improve the boilerplate.

18:48.130 --> 18:52.270
But continuity is a great strength.

18:52.270 --> 18:55.880
So, I'm hopeful that in this
subcommittee's deliberations

18:55.880 --> 18:57.510
and in full-committee deliberations,

18:57.510 --> 19:00.960
we can bear those important
principles in mind.

19:00.960 --> 19:03.130
For some of my fellow subcommittee members

19:03.130 --> 19:06.250
who haven't had a chance
to see the testimony,

19:06.250 --> 19:08.090
there's a lot of information in here,

19:08.090 --> 19:10.310
in the written testimony,
which has of course been

19:10.310 --> 19:13.260
already accepted by unanimous
consent for the record.

19:13.260 --> 19:14.820
But, appreciate the brevity

19:14.820 --> 19:16.290
of some of the presenters' statements,

19:16.290 --> 19:19.300
but the details in the testimony

19:19.300 --> 19:21.940
are sometimes awesomely important.

19:21.940 --> 19:24.110
So I appreciate the hard work

19:24.110 --> 19:26.253
that was put in to crafting the testimony.

19:27.420 --> 19:29.350
I'd like to now turn to my ranking member,

19:29.350 --> 19:30.950
Mr. Turner, thank you for joining us

19:30.950 --> 19:32.840
and I look forward to your questions.

19:32.840 --> 19:33.673
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

19:33.673 --> 19:35.610
and thank you for your
statement and dedication

19:35.610 --> 19:38.200
to this issue being bipartisan.

19:38.200 --> 19:41.280
Because it has, as you
and I have sat in Congress

19:41.280 --> 19:44.057
since your second time
in coming to Congress.

19:45.553 --> 19:48.240
- The second coming.
- Right, right.

19:48.240 --> 19:50.960
When the chair was re-elected
back to Congressman

19:50.960 --> 19:53.400
from taking a period
where he was not here,

19:53.400 --> 19:55.290
we were in the same class,

19:55.290 --> 19:56.920
so we have the same
perspective of time period.

19:56.920 --> 19:58.660
And we've been here during

19:58.660 --> 20:00.090
Republican and Democrat administrations,

20:00.090 --> 20:03.710
Republican a Democrat
gavels at the speakership,

20:03.710 --> 20:06.210
and I join him in saying
that this has been

20:06.210 --> 20:08.510
a bipartisan commitment to deterrence.

20:08.510 --> 20:09.980
Because this is about keeping us safe,

20:09.980 --> 20:12.980
and it has kept us safe for years.

20:12.980 --> 20:17.100
And I think, as long as we
continue to be committed

20:17.100 --> 20:22.100
to a nuclear policy that
is focused on deterrence,

20:22.610 --> 20:24.580
that we will continue to
deter our adversaries,

20:24.580 --> 20:27.472
or as we've heard from our presenters,

20:27.472 --> 20:29.580
the great power conflict.

20:29.580 --> 20:31.080
I wanna welcome General Bunch,

20:31.080 --> 20:33.550
you soon will be going to
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base

20:33.550 --> 20:35.650
as the head of Air Force Materiel Command.

20:35.650 --> 20:37.520
I look forward to you returning

20:37.520 --> 20:38.670
to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,

20:38.670 --> 20:40.083
and your leadership there.

20:41.300 --> 20:43.810
Mr. Trachtenberg, I wanna start with you.

20:43.810 --> 20:45.210
I've got two areas of questions

20:45.210 --> 20:49.353
and I'm gonna ask your
opinion and General Hyten.

20:50.910 --> 20:53.250
Two concepts that we're
struggling with in this committee

20:53.250 --> 20:57.370
are the issues of
low-yield nuclear weapons

20:57.370 --> 20:59.823
and no-first-use policy.

21:00.990 --> 21:05.990
And there are concerns, obviously

21:07.940 --> 21:10.320
that if the United States
does not have and deploy

21:10.320 --> 21:11.610
low-yield nuclear weapons,

21:11.610 --> 21:13.510
that our adversaries would believe

21:13.510 --> 21:15.210
that if they had undertaken an attack

21:15.210 --> 21:17.540
with low-yield nuclear weapons against us,

21:17.540 --> 21:19.203
that we might not retaliate.

21:21.149 --> 21:24.730
Because of all of our weapons
being of such a large size

21:24.730 --> 21:26.620
that we would be deterred,

21:26.620 --> 21:29.653
because we be seen as
escalating to their escalate.

21:31.340 --> 21:33.500
We have a policy in war

21:33.500 --> 21:37.050
of trying to limit collateral damage.

21:37.050 --> 21:39.410
So, I have two parts to my question.

21:39.410 --> 21:42.851
One, does it affect the
calculus of our adversaries

21:42.851 --> 21:45.550
in a negative way that
could put us at risk.

21:45.550 --> 21:48.350
And secondly, are there targets

21:48.350 --> 21:51.350
in which we might want to use
a low-yield nuclear weapon

21:51.350 --> 21:52.910
for which a high yield nuclear weapon

21:52.910 --> 21:54.380
would be completely inappropriate,

21:54.380 --> 21:56.430
understanding that obviously

21:56.430 --> 21:58.930
it is the most destructive
force unleashed by man

21:58.930 --> 22:00.881
and the collateral
damage that would occur.

22:00.881 --> 22:03.233
And then General Hyten, if
you would answer the same.

22:04.690 --> 22:05.650
- Congressman, thank you.

22:05.650 --> 22:07.380
I couldn't agree more with you

22:07.380 --> 22:10.330
in terms of the emphasis
on deterrence being key.

22:10.330 --> 22:13.990
The whole objective behind
our policy, of course,

22:13.990 --> 22:17.960
is to prevent conflict and
certainly to prevent nuclear war.

22:17.960 --> 22:20.410
So, what we are doing
and what we are proposing

22:20.410 --> 22:25.270
is entirely designed to
reduce the risk of conflict

22:25.270 --> 22:29.620
by enhancing our deterrent
through creating uncertainty

22:29.620 --> 22:32.390
in the mind of any potential adversary,

22:32.390 --> 22:35.560
whether it be Russia or
China or anyone else.

22:35.560 --> 22:39.380
I happen to believe that
the supplemental programs

22:39.380 --> 22:44.380
that we announced in the
Nuclear Posture Review in 2018

22:44.800 --> 22:48.900
to include a
low-yield-ballistic-missile warhead

22:49.750 --> 22:54.100
is certainly designed to help ensure

22:54.100 --> 22:59.100
that no adversary believes that
they would have at any point

22:59.640 --> 23:03.410
any kind of advantage that they
believe might be exploitable

23:03.410 --> 23:06.550
in a way where they felt
that they could either

23:06.550 --> 23:09.830
initiate conflict or escalate conflict

23:09.830 --> 23:11.830
to the point where the United States

23:11.830 --> 23:15.130
might have to think twice
about responding at all.

23:15.130 --> 23:19.740
So, indeed the purpose of moving
forward with those programs

23:19.740 --> 23:24.050
is ultimately designed
to improve our deterrent

23:26.072 --> 23:27.853
and to enhance stability.

23:30.690 --> 23:32.700
- So, Congressman Turner,

23:32.700 --> 23:34.890
I think the most important
element of deterrence

23:34.890 --> 23:39.000
is not our view, but it's what
the adversary is thinking.

23:39.000 --> 23:41.210
We always have to try to put

23:41.210 --> 23:42.427
ourselves in the position
of our adversaries

23:42.427 --> 23:45.380
and we have to listen very
closely to what they say

23:45.380 --> 23:47.980
and watch very closely what they do.

23:47.980 --> 23:50.080
And when we see statements

23:50.080 --> 23:52.790
as well as when we see them operate

23:52.790 --> 23:54.200
in the ways that you described,

23:54.200 --> 23:56.360
where they have stated they believe

23:56.360 --> 23:59.180
that employment of a
low-yield nuclear weapon

23:59.180 --> 24:02.700
would not be responded to by
NATO or the United States,

24:02.700 --> 24:04.510
that causes a concern.

24:04.510 --> 24:06.430
And so, the most important role

24:06.430 --> 24:07.840
of the low-yield nuclear weapon

24:07.840 --> 24:10.210
is to make sure that the adversary

24:10.210 --> 24:11.930
doesn't think that would happened.

24:11.930 --> 24:14.520
So the first role of that
weapon is a deterrent weapon,

24:14.520 --> 24:16.410
to make sure they don't cross that line.

24:16.410 --> 24:17.720
And in order for that to happen,

24:17.720 --> 24:21.940
we have to be able to use that
weapon in an appropriate way.

24:21.940 --> 24:23.610
We can't talk about what
those would be here.

24:23.610 --> 24:25.630
But the second part of your question was,

24:25.630 --> 24:29.370
are there targets that we
would employ them against.

24:29.370 --> 24:31.650
And I'll just say for
record that yes there is,

24:31.650 --> 24:34.930
but we'd have to discuss
specifics in a classified session.

24:34.930 --> 24:37.670
- Thank you, so secondly would
be the no-first-use policy.

24:37.670 --> 24:40.960
I was just at the Congressional dialogue

24:40.960 --> 24:43.570
at the Library of Congress
that included author Michael,

24:43.570 --> 24:46.020
I'm gonna slaughter this
I'm sure, Beschloss.

24:46.020 --> 24:47.230
Thank you, it is Beschloss?

24:47.230 --> 24:48.500
Ah, I have it right.

24:48.500 --> 24:50.760
Author of Presidents at War.

24:50.760 --> 24:53.730
And he actually said
something, and I thought

24:53.730 --> 24:56.590
we should probably look
at it at this committee.

24:56.590 --> 24:58.780
He said, that in the Korean Conflict,

24:58.780 --> 25:00.450
that there was a period of time in which

25:00.450 --> 25:03.070
North Korea and China perceived that

25:03.070 --> 25:06.590
we might use nuclear
weapons in that conflict,

25:06.590 --> 25:09.350
and that because of their concern

25:09.350 --> 25:13.060
that it affected the
outcome and the behavior

25:13.060 --> 25:14.190
of North Korea and China,

25:14.190 --> 25:16.450
and that at some point in the conflict

25:16.450 --> 25:19.220
they learned that we had
decided not to, thank God,

25:19.220 --> 25:22.070
because obviously that would
be an inappropriate use,

25:22.070 --> 25:24.310
but they had learned that we had dismissed

25:24.310 --> 25:25.460
that nuclear weapons would not be used.

25:25.460 --> 25:29.000
And it affected the
conflict negatively for us,

25:29.000 --> 25:31.760
our adversaries became more emboldened.

25:31.760 --> 25:33.840
So, my concern with no-first-use is again,

25:33.840 --> 25:35.180
back to as you were saying, General Hyten,

25:35.180 --> 25:37.780
what is in the minds of our adversaries.

25:37.780 --> 25:39.260
Mr. Trachtenberg, General Hyten,

25:39.260 --> 25:43.953
could you tell us, as Michael has,

25:43.953 --> 25:48.323
what effect that might have
on our adversaries, thank you.

25:49.240 --> 25:51.470
- I would agree with
you, Congressman Turner.

25:51.470 --> 25:54.420
And I would also agree with General Hyten,

25:54.420 --> 25:56.080
in terms of what matters most is

25:56.080 --> 25:58.330
what's in the mind of our adversary.

25:58.330 --> 26:02.070
Further, I would agree
with Chairman Cooper

26:02.070 --> 26:05.740
when he spoke about the
continuity in U.S. nuclear policy.

26:05.740 --> 26:07.700
One of the continuities in our policy

26:07.700 --> 26:10.190
has been that the United
States has not adopted

26:10.190 --> 26:14.760
a no-first-use policy,
regardless of administrations.

26:14.760 --> 26:17.350
Because among other reasons,

26:17.350 --> 26:20.450
but we extend our nuclear
security guarantees,

26:20.450 --> 26:21.960
a so-called nuclear umbrella

26:21.960 --> 26:25.026
or the extended deterrent to allies.

26:25.026 --> 26:28.359
We do that in order to assure our allies

26:29.441 --> 26:32.100
that the United States is willing and able

26:32.100 --> 26:34.950
to defend their security

26:34.950 --> 26:38.410
under the most stressing of conditions,

26:38.410 --> 26:40.850
that we will be able to do that.

26:40.850 --> 26:43.040
As I said in my prepared statement,

26:43.040 --> 26:46.410
the concern I have with
a no-first-use policy

26:46.410 --> 26:48.410
is that it may cause others to believe

26:48.410 --> 26:51.870
that we are backing away
from some of our assurances

26:51.870 --> 26:53.940
to allies and partners,

26:53.940 --> 26:57.240
and may reduce the level of uncertainty

26:57.240 --> 26:59.300
in the minds of potential adversaries

26:59.300 --> 27:03.340
and cause concern in the
minds of some of our allies.

27:03.340 --> 27:07.210
And so, for those reasons, I
think a no-first-use policy

27:07.210 --> 27:09.923
would be destabilizing
rather than stabilizing.

27:14.610 --> 27:16.633
- [Man] General, you didn't
turn your microphone on.

27:16.633 --> 27:19.680
- I think Chairman Dunford
said it well on Tuesday,

27:19.680 --> 27:21.460
when he said that anything that simplifies

27:21.460 --> 27:25.320
an enemy's decision-making
calculus would be a mistake,

27:25.320 --> 27:28.500
and that's exactly what this would do.

27:28.500 --> 27:30.690
That would create an
environment where an adversary

27:30.690 --> 27:33.140
could think that crossing
the line would be okay,

27:33.994 --> 27:36.190
and that the United
States would not respond

27:36.190 --> 27:38.110
to whatever the situation was.

27:38.110 --> 27:40.690
I think the current
policy is exactly right.

27:40.690 --> 27:43.770
It's been that way through
multiple administrations.

27:43.770 --> 27:46.310
I think it's important
to continue that policy.

27:46.310 --> 27:48.320
It improves our strategic deterrent,

27:48.320 --> 27:50.870
it improves the support
that we give to our allies.

27:52.590 --> 27:54.000
When I travel overseas,

27:54.000 --> 27:56.770
the extended-deterrent message I bring

27:56.770 --> 27:58.770
from the United States is hugely powerful

27:58.770 --> 28:00.700
to our allies that have chosen

28:00.700 --> 28:02.510
not to build their own nuclear weapons

28:02.510 --> 28:04.410
and to trust that the United States'

28:04.410 --> 28:06.718
nuclear umbrella will cover them.

28:06.718 --> 28:07.873
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

28:09.003 --> 28:10.140
- I thank the gentleman.

28:10.140 --> 28:11.653
Now we'll hear from Ms. Davis.

28:12.930 --> 28:15.170
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
and thank you to all of you

28:15.170 --> 28:20.110
for your dedicated service
and the way in which

28:20.110 --> 28:21.730
you've conducted yourself over the years,

28:21.730 --> 28:23.330
we greatly appreciate it.

28:23.330 --> 28:25.710
I wanted to follow up on that discussion,

28:25.710 --> 28:29.050
because maybe I'm here as
a little bit of a doubter

28:29.050 --> 28:33.240
and probably represent
a good number of people

28:33.240 --> 28:35.990
who are really quite sophisticated enough

28:35.990 --> 28:38.670
to enter into this discussion

28:38.670 --> 28:42.590
and see that from their
vantage point as well.

28:42.590 --> 28:47.219
So I continue to be
unconvinced of the value

28:47.219 --> 28:50.800
of low-yield nuclear weapons
as part of our arsenal.

28:50.800 --> 28:52.390
I would like to ask you,

28:52.390 --> 28:54.930
and you've certainly addressed this,

28:54.930 --> 28:57.220
Mr. Trachtenberg and
General Hyten particularly.

28:57.220 --> 29:01.430
But, can you tell us, on a personal level,

29:01.430 --> 29:04.630
how did you arrive at that position,

29:04.630 --> 29:07.790
and if you have someone
who looks at you in the eye

29:07.790 --> 29:10.540
and says, okay, so what's next?

29:10.540 --> 29:13.313
How does that what's next,

29:14.380 --> 29:19.380
how is that addressed by
our current stockpile?

29:20.270 --> 29:23.840
It calls into question use after that.

29:23.840 --> 29:26.193
And what's next?

29:28.630 --> 29:31.190
- Well, if I might, Congresswoman,
first of all let me say,

29:31.190 --> 29:35.330
I appreciate the opportunity
to engage in this discussion.

29:35.330 --> 29:37.050
It is very important and I understand

29:37.050 --> 29:40.600
there are differing views among people

29:40.600 --> 29:44.690
who have followed this
issue for many years.

29:44.690 --> 29:48.540
I do have to come back
however to the view,

29:48.540 --> 29:53.020
it is my personal view that
when we're talking about

29:53.020 --> 29:56.260
such serious matters
of nuclear deterrence,

29:56.260 --> 29:59.330
it really is very critical for us

29:59.330 --> 30:03.690
to try to assess as best
we can, how an adversary

30:03.690 --> 30:07.820
or how a potential
adversary views the issue.

30:07.820 --> 30:11.780
We have tried to look at, for example,

30:11.780 --> 30:15.870
Russian military doctrine, statements,

30:15.870 --> 30:19.943
military deployments, capabilities,

30:21.510 --> 30:24.500
investments, exercises,

30:24.500 --> 30:29.500
and I have to say that what I have seen,

30:31.860 --> 30:33.470
certainly in recent years,

30:33.470 --> 30:36.380
has given me significant pause and concern

30:36.380 --> 30:40.170
in terms of how I think
the Russian Federation

30:40.170 --> 30:43.840
actually views these issues of deterrence.

30:43.840 --> 30:46.370
And therefore, I look at the issue of say,

30:46.370 --> 30:49.100
a low-yield ballistic-missile warhead

30:49.950 --> 30:53.370
as something that I
believe would be useful

30:53.370 --> 30:58.370
in trying to at least
close a gap in capabilities

30:58.730 --> 31:02.100
that I think Russia may be looking at

31:02.100 --> 31:06.370
as affording them some kind of advantage

31:06.370 --> 31:11.250
that they could use to either
engage in nuclear coercion

31:11.250 --> 31:15.323
or some type of aggression.

31:16.246 --> 31:19.670
And so, I'm looking at
it from the standpoint of

31:19.670 --> 31:23.420
how I think the other side
may be approaching this

31:23.420 --> 31:25.880
and what we might be able to do

31:25.880 --> 31:30.770
in order to best make them think twice

31:30.770 --> 31:35.533
about the course that they
may be on as a result.

31:37.040 --> 31:38.150
- What comes next?

31:38.150 --> 31:40.290
And maybe for all of you too, what?

31:40.290 --> 31:42.370
- So, ma'am, when I looked at it,

31:42.370 --> 31:45.320
I looked at it just from
a threat perspective.

31:45.320 --> 31:49.990
As a commander of the nuclear
command of our country,

31:49.990 --> 31:51.960
I have to look at the threat
and then I have to make sure

31:51.960 --> 31:55.380
that my command is as best postured

31:55.380 --> 31:56.700
to respond to that threat as I could.

31:56.700 --> 31:58.450
And as when we look at it in
the Nuclear Posture Review,

31:58.450 --> 31:59.590
we saw threat that was out there

31:59.590 --> 32:01.530
that we didn't have all the capabilities

32:01.530 --> 32:03.360
that we thought we needed
to respond to that.

32:03.360 --> 32:04.193
We already have some

32:04.193 --> 32:07.070
low-yield nuclear weapons in our arsenal,

32:07.070 --> 32:08.870
they're in the air leg of the triad.

32:08.870 --> 32:10.810
They're not in the submarine leg

32:10.810 --> 32:12.910
and they're not in the ICBM leg.

32:12.910 --> 32:15.170
We felt like we needed a small number

32:15.170 --> 32:18.150
of immediate response
capabilities to do that.

32:18.150 --> 32:19.150
But it's also interesting to note

32:19.150 --> 32:22.340
that our low-yield nuclear weapons

32:22.340 --> 32:26.250
will all be inside of
the New START agreements.

32:26.250 --> 32:27.670
Almost all the Russian nuclear weapons

32:27.670 --> 32:29.030
are outside the New START agreement,

32:29.030 --> 32:31.670
building under platforms
and aren't accountable.

32:31.670 --> 32:33.560
We'll actually, when we remove

32:34.714 --> 32:36.910
the big weapons from the submarine
and put small weapons in,

32:36.910 --> 32:39.480
we're gonna have still the
same number of weapons,

32:39.480 --> 32:41.340
they'll just be a smaller yield.

32:41.340 --> 32:42.660
But we think that smaller yield

32:42.660 --> 32:45.130
actually gives us a better chance to deter

32:45.130 --> 32:46.370
our primary adversary.

32:46.370 --> 32:48.160
And I think what comes next is that

32:48.160 --> 32:49.560
this puts us in a very good place,

32:49.560 --> 32:51.120
that we can deter for the coming year.

32:51.120 --> 32:53.390
If this was the Cold War
we would be going back

32:53.390 --> 32:55.110
and we'd build all the things

32:55.110 --> 32:56.460
that the Russians are building now,

32:56.460 --> 32:58.693
nuclear-powered torpedoes,
nuclear-armed torpedoes.

32:58.693 --> 33:01.257
- If we had them in the past,

33:01.257 --> 33:03.460
and more capabilities
that you're speaking of,

33:03.460 --> 33:06.350
would we have used them, at what time?

33:06.350 --> 33:08.350
- If they worked we
wouldn't have used them.

33:08.350 --> 33:10.420
The whole goal of these
weapons is to not use them.

33:10.420 --> 33:12.040
That's a dichotomy that's hard

33:12.040 --> 33:15.563
for many of our fellow
countrymen to understand.

33:15.563 --> 33:19.860
But the key is, by being
ready, by being obviously ready

33:19.860 --> 33:21.340
and communicating that to the advisory,

33:21.340 --> 33:22.287
they will not cross the line

33:22.287 --> 33:23.920
and we will not have to use them.

33:23.920 --> 33:26.040
If we're not ready someday,
that's when I get concerned

33:26.040 --> 33:27.790
that somebody will cross that line.

33:28.980 --> 33:31.410
- I think my time is up, so I
can't go to the rest of you.

33:31.410 --> 33:33.360
But thank you very much for being here.

33:34.490 --> 33:37.190
- [Chairman] I thank the
gentlelady, Mr. Bishop.

33:37.190 --> 33:39.130
- Thank you, and I thank
our witnesses here.

33:39.130 --> 33:40.890
You're basically all saying
the same thing I guess.

33:40.890 --> 33:42.390
One of our tasks is to tell the other

33:42.390 --> 33:44.690
427 members who aren't here

33:44.690 --> 33:46.760
exactly what you guys are saying.

33:46.760 --> 33:48.570
I do have a couple of questions.

33:48.570 --> 33:49.880
General Clark, If I could start with you,

33:49.880 --> 33:51.757
our most appropriate one.

33:51.757 --> 33:54.160
Has as the Air Force
ever considered directing

33:54.160 --> 33:58.790
the two GBSD prime contractors

33:58.790 --> 34:01.680
to utilize both suppliers
of the solid rocket motors

34:01.680 --> 34:04.170
for the program
development and production?

34:04.170 --> 34:06.520
And if so, would there be a benefit

34:06.520 --> 34:09.070
or a programmatic challenge
of doing that approach?

34:11.720 --> 34:13.750
- Sir, thank you for the question.

34:13.750 --> 34:16.740
And that is under consideration right now.

34:16.740 --> 34:20.380
I would have to defer however
to my wingman, General Bunch,

34:20.380 --> 34:22.280
who is our acquisition expert

34:22.280 --> 34:25.730
and he is involved
heavily in this process.

34:25.730 --> 34:27.559
So, General.
- I thought we were the ones

34:27.559 --> 34:28.530
that deflect, but go ahead.

34:28.530 --> 34:30.923
General Bunch, please.
- Yes sir, I'm learning.

34:33.390 --> 34:35.740
- So, sir, we are in those
discussions right now.

34:35.740 --> 34:37.940
We're weighing out the cost

34:37.940 --> 34:40.770
and the schedule and the performance,

34:40.770 --> 34:43.210
technical risks associated to the programs

34:43.210 --> 34:45.830
if it were to go to two and direct,

34:45.830 --> 34:49.320
that we had to use each of the
solid-rocket motor producers.

34:49.320 --> 34:50.270
We're also weighing that

34:50.270 --> 34:52.660
against the risk to the industrial base.

34:52.660 --> 34:54.230
We're having those ongoing dialogues

34:54.230 --> 34:56.470
within the Department of Defense.

34:56.470 --> 34:58.490
And then, once we look at that equation

34:58.490 --> 34:59.850
and where those risks are,

34:59.850 --> 35:02.240
as the acquisition part of this team,

35:02.240 --> 35:05.180
we have to go back to the
requirer part of this team,

35:05.180 --> 35:08.030
General Hyten, and explain
what those risks are,

35:08.030 --> 35:10.640
both from a performance
and a schedule and a cost

35:10.640 --> 35:12.940
and how that plays out on a timeline,

35:12.940 --> 35:15.670
so that we can determine if
we can meet his requirements.

35:15.670 --> 35:18.100
So, that debate and discussion
is ongoing right now.

35:18.100 --> 35:19.410
- You're still in the process.
- Yes sir, we are.

35:19.410 --> 35:21.710
- When you get done with that,
I'd like to actually know

35:21.710 --> 35:23.700
the response of that process.
- Yes sir, we will.

35:23.700 --> 35:25.750
- General Hyten, either
you or the secretary,

35:25.750 --> 35:26.910
let me ask the same thing.

35:26.910 --> 35:30.950
CBO, bless her heart,
have put a 30-year score

35:30.950 --> 35:35.190
on GBSD or our nuclear policy,

35:35.190 --> 35:38.230
and it has been described as eye-bleeding.

35:38.230 --> 35:40.790
Anytime there's a 30-year score,

35:40.790 --> 35:45.100
whoever's doing that uses an
eight ball and a Ouija board.

35:45.100 --> 35:47.310
But what I would like to ask you is,

35:47.310 --> 35:50.560
obviously I have questions
in the methodology of CBO,

35:50.560 --> 35:53.340
but they have both tried to conduct

35:54.260 --> 35:57.560
the modernization and
operations in the same number.

35:57.560 --> 36:00.970
So, if I could have you
kind of divest those,

36:00.970 --> 36:04.370
tell me, what would the
operation number simply be?

36:04.370 --> 36:06.920
Or I'm sorry, the
modernization number simply be?

36:06.920 --> 36:09.750
And perhaps even as a percentage

36:09.750 --> 36:11.263
of our overall defense budget.

36:13.850 --> 36:15.520
- So, I'll start,
Secretary, if that's okay.

36:15.520 --> 36:20.520
So, the specific numbers are
in my prepared statement,

36:21.270 --> 36:22.920
and we'll get you the exact numbers

36:22.920 --> 36:23.760
if you'd like for the record.

36:23.760 --> 36:25.593
But broadly speaking,

36:27.050 --> 36:32.050
at the height of the build-out
of our nuclear capabilities,

36:32.970 --> 36:36.240
it would add up to about,
our numbers say 6.4%,

36:36.240 --> 36:39.220
the CBO said 7% of the
entire defense budget.

36:39.220 --> 36:41.880
Which means 93-plus percent
of the defense budget

36:41.880 --> 36:42.980
would be available for other things.

36:42.980 --> 36:45.380
And as this is the most important

36:45.380 --> 36:47.260
item in our defense budget,

36:47.260 --> 36:48.730
I think that's a reasonable thing.

36:48.730 --> 36:50.050
Now, you talk about operations--

36:50.050 --> 36:51.690
- Wait, I think you just
said the next question,

36:51.690 --> 36:53.770
which is, you wonder, if
it's six or seven percent,

36:53.770 --> 36:55.183
is that worth the cost?

36:56.040 --> 36:58.587
- I think former Secretary
Mattis said it right,

36:58.587 --> 36:59.977
"America can afford survival,

36:59.977 --> 37:02.090
"and this is about our nation's survival."

37:02.090 --> 37:04.580
Now, we have to look at it
that way and go down that path.

37:04.580 --> 37:08.260
Now, inside that roughly
6% that we get to,

37:08.260 --> 37:10.540
at the height of it, a little over 3%

37:10.540 --> 37:13.240
would be in modernization
and a little under 3%

37:13.240 --> 37:14.930
would be operation sustainment,

37:14.930 --> 37:18.270
and I have the specific numbers
in my prepared statement.

37:18.270 --> 37:19.730
- We'll get them from there.

37:19.730 --> 37:20.744
I thank you.

37:20.744 --> 37:23.350
And let's suppose, just for a second,

37:23.350 --> 37:25.290
that we do something
really silly around here

37:25.290 --> 37:29.070
and we postpone funding of
this, we push it to the right.

37:29.070 --> 37:31.270
Can you tell me quickly,
what would be either

37:31.270 --> 37:35.397
mid or long-term financial
or programmatic significance

37:35.397 --> 37:38.822
of any kind of delay in that funding?

37:38.822 --> 37:41.240
- As Chairman Cooper pointed out

37:41.240 --> 37:43.503
and so did Secretary Trachtenberg,

37:43.503 --> 37:44.680
this modernization program

37:44.680 --> 37:47.173
started in the last administration.

37:48.150 --> 37:51.910
But it started late, we
should've started a decade ago.

37:51.910 --> 37:53.860
My biggest long-term
concern as the Stratcom.

37:53.860 --> 37:55.700
I'm not concerned about
anything today actually,

37:55.700 --> 37:58.690
I'm ready to respond
to any threat anywhere.

37:58.690 --> 38:00.700
But I'm concerned, 10 years from now,

38:00.700 --> 38:02.270
unless all of these stay on track,

38:02.270 --> 38:03.830
that a future Stratcom commander

38:03.830 --> 38:05.550
will sit in front of you and say,

38:05.550 --> 38:07.660
I'm concerned about the
readiness of my force.

38:07.660 --> 38:10.180
Because the submarines
will deliver just in time,

38:10.180 --> 38:12.440
when Ohio goes off, Columbia comes on.

38:12.440 --> 38:15.180
When GBSD comes on, Minuteman goes off.

38:15.180 --> 38:16.963
- So, 2035 would be out of the question,

38:16.963 --> 38:19.530
if we keep pushing to the right?

38:19.530 --> 38:22.730
- 2030 is the date where we
have to have these come online,

38:22.730 --> 38:24.890
and everything right now
delivers just in time.

38:24.890 --> 38:26.623
- Can I ask just one last favor?

38:28.590 --> 38:33.290
GBSD is a terrible name
that has no beauty.

38:33.290 --> 38:35.240
It sounds like one of
those medical diseases

38:35.240 --> 38:37.120
you try and eliminate.

38:37.120 --> 38:38.440
Minuteman, that's cute.

38:38.440 --> 38:39.790
Come up with a better name.

38:40.660 --> 38:42.550
And the other problem I have is simply,

38:42.550 --> 38:44.193
if we're gonna argue first use,

38:45.040 --> 38:48.573
we already used it, we
done that, historically.

38:50.500 --> 38:52.980
Get over it, let's get on with that issue.

38:52.980 --> 38:55.810
- So, I concur with the
name, it's just horrible.

38:55.810 --> 38:59.020
And I would encourage my Air Force

38:59.020 --> 39:01.020
to come up with a name for that program.

39:02.110 --> 39:04.310
- Get that before the numbers.

39:04.310 --> 39:05.883
Thank you.
- Yes, sir.

39:05.883 --> 39:06.810
- [Chairman] I thank the gentlemen.

39:06.810 --> 39:10.780
The next questioner will
be Mr. Brooks, he's gone.

39:10.780 --> 39:11.843
Mr. Rogers.

39:14.230 --> 39:15.580
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

39:15.580 --> 39:19.070
General Hyten, in the past
outside advocates have argued

39:19.070 --> 39:22.573
that the LRSO is destabilizing,
what's your thought?

39:24.610 --> 39:27.610
- We've had nuclear-powered
cruise missiles

39:27.610 --> 39:30.520
or nuclear cruise
missiles for a long time.

39:30.520 --> 39:31.770
Not nuclear-powered cruise missiles,

39:31.770 --> 39:33.840
but nuclear-tipped cruise
missiles for a long time.

39:33.840 --> 39:36.400
We've also had conventional
cruise missiles for a long time.

39:36.400 --> 39:38.440
We've had them for years, decades.

39:38.440 --> 39:40.710
It's never been destabilizing before.

39:40.710 --> 39:42.370
I don't know how it's destabilizing now.

39:42.370 --> 39:45.350
It's interesting to
note, that the Russians

39:45.350 --> 39:47.573
employed cruise missiles in Syria.

39:49.150 --> 39:50.170
Somehow we weren't concerned

39:50.170 --> 39:52.930
that they were deploying
nuclear weapons into Syria,

39:52.930 --> 39:54.160
and we didn't respond like they were

39:54.160 --> 39:56.040
deploying nuclear weapons into Syria.

39:56.040 --> 39:58.400
Cruise missiles have been dual-use

39:58.400 --> 39:59.960
capabilities for a long long time.

39:59.960 --> 40:03.550
And nothing changes in 2019

40:03.550 --> 40:06.010
that wasn't the same in the last century,

40:06.010 --> 40:06.843
it's the same structure.

40:06.843 --> 40:08.500
I don't believe they're destabilizing.

40:08.500 --> 40:09.333
- Excellent.

40:10.380 --> 40:13.200
General Clark, in the
beginning of the GBSD program,

40:13.200 --> 40:15.570
my buddy's favorite name,

40:15.570 --> 40:17.950
did the Air Force do an assessment

40:17.950 --> 40:20.410
on the service-life extending
of the Minuteman III

40:20.410 --> 40:23.393
versus the GBSD, and which is
the most cost-efficient way?

40:24.990 --> 40:26.950
- Yes, sir, thank you for that question.

40:26.950 --> 40:30.550
We did do an analysis
of alternatives on GBSD,

40:30.550 --> 40:34.310
and considering the continued
sustainment of Minuteman III

40:34.310 --> 40:37.060
was one of those alternatives
that was analyzed.

40:37.060 --> 40:39.640
And it is less cost-effective

40:39.640 --> 40:42.720
to try to extend the
life of Minuteman III.

40:42.720 --> 40:44.700
We have several of the components

40:44.700 --> 40:48.030
that are becoming obsolete.

40:48.030 --> 40:50.970
The the propulsion system,
the guidance system.

40:50.970 --> 40:55.260
Even the ability to provide
the solid-rocket-motor fuel,

40:55.260 --> 40:56.850
we only have one more opportunity

40:56.850 --> 40:58.430
to do that for these weapons.

40:58.430 --> 41:01.200
After that, we'll have
to buy a new weapon.

41:01.200 --> 41:03.030
And as General Hyten stated,

41:03.030 --> 41:07.410
if we continue to push this
decision down the road,

41:07.410 --> 41:11.140
these systems that are
part of the overall system

41:11.140 --> 41:14.090
start to come off, the
missile comes off line,

41:14.090 --> 41:15.980
and then it costs us even more money

41:15.980 --> 41:17.770
to recapitalize and modernize.

41:17.770 --> 41:21.403
So, our best alternative,
as General Hyten stated,

41:23.332 --> 41:24.850
is to recapitalize now.

41:24.850 --> 41:28.900
We will sustain Minuteman
III until GBSD comes online,

41:28.900 --> 41:30.540
but we are right at the point

41:30.540 --> 41:33.030
of being able to make
that happen now, sir.

41:33.030 --> 41:35.090
- And when is it supposed to come online?

41:35.090 --> 41:38.060
- We start coming online
in the early 2030s,

41:38.060 --> 41:42.290
and by the mid 30s we are complete.

41:42.290 --> 41:46.240
- We're gonna pass the date
of the end-of-service life

41:46.240 --> 41:47.810
for those that are online.

41:47.810 --> 41:50.310
- Congressman Rogers, can I
add just one item into that?

41:50.310 --> 41:51.630
I'm sorry, sir, I didn't
mean to interrupt you.

41:51.630 --> 41:53.130
I apologize, it's a great question.

41:53.130 --> 41:56.870
Our IOC right now for GBSD is 2029.

41:56.870 --> 41:58.913
That's when we reach the
initial operational capability,

41:58.913 --> 42:02.640
and our full operational
capability is 2036.

42:02.640 --> 42:05.320
So we are tracking exactly
as General Hyten said,

42:05.320 --> 42:06.770
we need these by 2030.

42:06.770 --> 42:09.020
We're right on that timeline,
that's why it's so critical

42:09.020 --> 42:12.220
that we continue to execute
these programs the way we are.

42:12.220 --> 42:17.020
One other item I would add to
what my wingman said here is,

42:17.020 --> 42:20.100
even if we did the SLEP
on the Minuteman III,

42:20.100 --> 42:22.120
there are requirements
that General Hyten has

42:22.120 --> 42:25.100
that we do not believe
we would be able to meet.

42:25.100 --> 42:26.910
So it's not just about the cost,

42:26.910 --> 42:29.420
it's about the ability to meet
the warfighter requirement

42:29.420 --> 42:31.290
that were also weighed in to that decision

42:31.290 --> 42:33.340
when we did the analysis of alternatives.

42:35.470 --> 42:37.640
- Admiral Wolfe, can you talk about

42:37.640 --> 42:40.530
what the Navy is doing
with the PEO Columbia-class

42:40.530 --> 42:43.750
to better integrate the work
you were doing in the SSP

42:43.750 --> 42:45.017
with the overall program?

42:45.017 --> 42:46.130
And what's your assessment

42:46.130 --> 42:48.130
of the pace of the Columbia replacement?

42:49.360 --> 42:50.193
- Yes, sir.

42:50.193 --> 42:53.940
So, Columbia, although not
in my direct portfolio,

42:53.940 --> 42:56.240
we stay very close on the development

42:56.240 --> 42:57.960
of the Columbia-class submarine.

42:57.960 --> 42:59.430
That is still on plan.

42:59.430 --> 43:01.410
As a matter of fact, if you look at

43:01.410 --> 43:05.280
what CNO has just published in
his design for Superior 2.0,

43:07.720 --> 43:10.710
he challenges that program
to pull the Columbia left

43:10.710 --> 43:14.300
and get it out sooner, per
General Hyten's point of,

43:14.300 --> 43:15.960
we are line on line right now.

43:15.960 --> 43:18.330
So, that program is moving forward.

43:18.330 --> 43:22.010
Obviously, I know Secretary
Geurts has briefed you on,

43:22.010 --> 43:24.760
they stood up a separate
program executive officer

43:24.760 --> 43:27.370
specifically for Colombia,
because this is the Navy's

43:27.370 --> 43:28.950
number one acquisition program.

43:28.950 --> 43:31.430
And so, that's for their submarine.

43:31.430 --> 43:32.610
From our perspective,

43:32.610 --> 43:34.790
what we are doing on the weapon system,

43:34.790 --> 43:38.510
we are on track for both modernizing

43:38.510 --> 43:41.670
the Ohio weapons system, which
will then go on the Columbia

43:41.670 --> 43:43.510
so we will not have two populations.

43:43.510 --> 43:46.220
So, all of those efforts
are on track right now, sir.

43:46.220 --> 43:47.170
- Excellent.

43:47.170 --> 43:48.110
Thank you all for being here

43:48.110 --> 43:49.400
and thank you for your
service to our country.

43:49.400 --> 43:50.240
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

43:50.240 --> 43:52.490
- [Chairman] I thank
the gentleman, Ms. Horn.

43:55.010 --> 43:56.560
- Thank you gentlemen
for being here today.

43:56.560 --> 44:01.380
And I wanna echo Mr. Cooper's comments

44:01.380 --> 44:04.290
and everyone's comments about
the importance of making sure

44:04.290 --> 44:06.690
that we're creating
consistency in prioritizing.

44:08.168 --> 44:11.490
So, I wanna continue along
that line of questioning,

44:11.490 --> 44:14.890
and I hope you can help me
understand a few things.

44:14.890 --> 44:17.610
Given that we don't have unlimited funds

44:17.610 --> 44:19.930
to do all that we need to do,
and I'm sure we could continue

44:19.930 --> 44:24.380
to invest in more things
in making our choices,

44:24.380 --> 44:27.900
can you help me understand
a little bit more on the?

44:27.900 --> 44:30.090
I know we've been talking along the lines

44:30.090 --> 44:33.920
of the current low-yield
weapons and the modernization

44:33.920 --> 44:38.920
and transitioning to the new
ones, that distinction of,

44:40.030 --> 44:43.810
if there were any pathway to draw down one

44:43.810 --> 44:47.173
or transition between the two.

44:48.015 --> 44:50.265
And that, General Hyten
and Mr. Trachtenberg.

44:51.550 --> 44:54.710
- Ma'am, one of the good things

44:54.710 --> 44:56.660
about the low-yield nuclear weapon,

44:56.660 --> 44:59.430
it's nomenclature is the W76-2.

45:02.950 --> 45:05.403
It's actually just a
modification of the W76-1

45:06.470 --> 45:08.300
that has been going
through a production line

45:08.300 --> 45:10.670
in the Department of Energy
for the last few years.

45:10.670 --> 45:12.940
And as they're approaching
the end of that,

45:12.940 --> 45:16.420
the only thing we had to
do to build the W76-2,

45:16.420 --> 45:18.370
the low-yield nuclear weapon, was make.

45:19.220 --> 45:20.080
They are nuclear weapons,

45:20.080 --> 45:21.860
so there's nothing minor
about a nuclear weapon.

45:21.860 --> 45:24.380
But in the realm of the work

45:24.380 --> 45:26.750
that is done at the nuclear weapons lab,

45:26.750 --> 45:29.330
it's a fairly minor
adjustment to that weapon

45:29.330 --> 45:31.530
to make it a low-yield nuclear weapon.

45:31.530 --> 45:33.390
That work has begun this year,

45:33.390 --> 45:35.093
that work is underway right now.

45:37.168 --> 45:39.800
That budget is a very small amount

45:39.800 --> 45:42.030
of the overall budget to get to that.

45:42.030 --> 45:43.420
And then the employment on the submarines

45:43.420 --> 45:46.493
is actually a straightforward process.

45:48.470 --> 45:51.390
As we build out the
submarine, as we go through,

45:51.390 --> 45:53.360
we can talk about how we do
that in a classified world.

45:53.360 --> 45:58.280
But as we go through that,
we'll just take this weapon,

45:58.280 --> 45:59.240
put it into the missile.

45:59.240 --> 46:00.430
And we still have to load the missile

46:00.430 --> 46:01.590
just like you always do.

46:01.590 --> 46:03.450
So, there's really no cost delta there.

46:03.450 --> 46:06.503
In the overall scheme
it's a very small number.

46:07.520 --> 46:10.140
- Congresswoman, I would agree with you

46:10.140 --> 46:12.620
in terms of the necessity
of prioritization.

46:12.620 --> 46:14.130
And obviously, this is something

46:14.130 --> 46:16.610
that the department
looks at very carefully.

46:16.610 --> 46:19.480
But I would Echo General
Hyten's comments as well,

46:19.480 --> 46:24.440
in terms of looking at the
low-yield ballistic missile

46:24.440 --> 46:27.300
warhead, the program,

46:27.300 --> 46:32.300
as relatively inexpensive
vis-a-vis other programs.

46:32.760 --> 46:37.030
We have asked in the
fiscal-year-2020 budget

46:37.030 --> 46:41.710
for about $19.6 million
to pursue that program.

46:41.710 --> 46:45.880
We do think it is a
reasonable investment to make

46:45.880 --> 46:49.400
for the ultimate objective
of enhancing our deterrent

46:49.400 --> 46:52.730
against what is the most destructive

46:52.730 --> 46:55.960
potential possibility
that we can think of.

46:55.960 --> 46:57.040
- Thank you.

46:57.040 --> 47:01.850
And following on with that
line of prioritization.

47:01.850 --> 47:02.960
With our current challenges,

47:02.960 --> 47:05.640
this is clearly an
incredibly critical area,

47:05.640 --> 47:07.180
but with our current challenges

47:07.180 --> 47:10.830
in the rest of our strategic space,

47:10.830 --> 47:13.870
missile defense, new technology,
development of space,

47:13.870 --> 47:16.217
and the growing number of adversaries,

47:16.217 --> 47:18.560
and the attention and the money

47:18.560 --> 47:21.400
and the development that
they're putting into this.

47:21.400 --> 47:23.450
I would just like to
hear from both of you,

47:23.450 --> 47:25.660
and then if there's time, anyone else,

47:25.660 --> 47:28.830
about what you see as the right balance

47:28.830 --> 47:32.110
between investments in
those critical areas

47:32.110 --> 47:35.890
so that we don't lose our
strategic advantage there,

47:35.890 --> 47:38.663
and here in the nuclear arena, please.

47:39.747 --> 47:40.809
- Certainly, Congresswoman.

47:40.809 --> 47:43.180
I do think that we have
certainly attempted

47:43.180 --> 47:44.470
to strike the right balance

47:44.470 --> 47:46.110
in our investments going forward.

47:46.110 --> 47:48.300
And I think the budget request

47:48.300 --> 47:50.120
that has been submitted to Congress

47:50.120 --> 47:52.820
reflects our prioritization based on

47:52.820 --> 47:55.650
our assessment of what
the right balance is.

47:55.650 --> 47:59.550
We have of course focused on readiness,

47:59.550 --> 48:02.300
but also on modernization in this budget.

48:02.300 --> 48:04.950
You are exactly right to note that

48:04.950 --> 48:07.600
adversaries and potential adversaries

48:07.600 --> 48:11.040
have been moving forward
with advanced technologies

48:12.035 --> 48:13.580
quite at a rapid pace.

48:13.580 --> 48:15.820
We all know that technology advances

48:15.820 --> 48:18.950
quite substantially, very rapidly.

48:18.950 --> 48:21.763
We believe the investment
priorities we have set out,

48:22.670 --> 48:25.610
at least in terms of our recapitalization

48:25.610 --> 48:29.546
of the nuclear force, some of
the supplemental capabilities

48:29.546 --> 48:31.290
that we have been speaking about

48:31.290 --> 48:33.480
that were reflected in the
Nuclear Posture Review,

48:33.480 --> 48:35.700
as well as in the Missile Defense Review

48:35.700 --> 48:38.290
and some of our missile
defense priorities,

48:38.290 --> 48:41.710
reflect not only an appreciation
but an understanding

48:41.710 --> 48:44.090
that we need to invest more

48:44.090 --> 48:47.540
in terms of the advanced technologies.

48:47.540 --> 48:52.470
Not only for ourselves, but
also to counter the investments

48:52.470 --> 48:54.220
that potential adversaries are making

48:54.220 --> 48:55.763
in those technologies as well.

48:59.920 --> 49:01.290
- I think my time has expired,

49:01.290 --> 49:03.742
so I'll defer to the chair.

49:03.742 --> 49:06.110
- [Chairman] The gentlelady's
time has expired.

49:06.110 --> 49:07.510
The gentlelady from Wyoming.

49:09.010 --> 49:10.520
- Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,

49:10.520 --> 49:13.540
and thank you to all of our
witnesses for being here today.

49:13.540 --> 49:14.910
General Hyten, thank you very much

49:14.910 --> 49:16.420
for hosting me at Stratcom recently,

49:16.420 --> 49:20.160
it was a very useful and
informative day spent there.

49:20.160 --> 49:24.260
So I appreciate very much your
taking the time to do that.

49:24.260 --> 49:26.110
I wanted to ask you first, General Hyten

49:26.110 --> 49:28.940
about pit production,
and if you could talk

49:28.940 --> 49:31.800
a little bit about where we stand

49:31.800 --> 49:35.760
and specifically, what's
driving the requirement

49:35.760 --> 49:39.493
for the 80 pits per year
that we're seeing now.

49:40.730 --> 49:42.700
- So, thank you, it was
good to have you at office.

49:42.700 --> 49:43.810
Thank you very much for coming

49:43.810 --> 49:45.310
and spending time at Stratcom.

49:46.896 --> 49:49.070
We've had a little water
there since you were there,

49:49.070 --> 49:51.590
but Stratcom is doing fine.

49:51.590 --> 49:53.010
The base has got some serious damage,

49:53.010 --> 49:56.420
but Stratcom is a pretty amazing command,

49:56.420 --> 49:57.520
we're doing just fine.

49:59.546 --> 50:02.460
When you look at pit production,

50:02.460 --> 50:03.780
I think it's important to realize

50:03.780 --> 50:05.330
the United States really
hasn't been producing

50:05.330 --> 50:08.300
plutonium pits for quite a while.

50:08.300 --> 50:13.300
We've been using old plutonium
pits to refurbish and build.

50:14.410 --> 50:18.340
Even the new weapons are
using old plutonium pits.

50:18.340 --> 50:20.770
What I'm concerned about
from a Stratcom perspective.

50:20.770 --> 50:23.110
I was looking at the out years,
when we get into the future,

50:23.110 --> 50:24.810
we could be dealing with 100-year-old

50:24.810 --> 50:26.750
plutonium pits some time.

50:26.750 --> 50:28.260
And we don't really know

50:28.260 --> 50:30.540
what a 100-year-old
plutonium pit looks like.

50:30.540 --> 50:34.330
Now, plutonium has a very long half-life,

50:34.330 --> 50:36.090
but I've looked at the plutonium pits,

50:36.090 --> 50:36.960
I've looked at that structure,

50:36.960 --> 50:40.220
and I'm concerned about
building new weapons

50:40.220 --> 50:41.790
that will have 100-year-old
plutonium pits.

50:41.790 --> 50:42.973
I think that's just a risk

50:42.973 --> 50:44.530
that the United States should not take.

50:44.530 --> 50:45.973
We need to reinvigorate that process.

50:45.973 --> 50:48.280
And so, we've gone through
a detailed analysis

50:48.280 --> 50:50.700
with the Department of Energy
and the Department of Defense,

50:50.700 --> 50:52.390
but Stratcom's been in the middle of it,

50:52.390 --> 50:54.620
to look at exactly what we need.

50:54.620 --> 50:55.980
And we have some very specific numbers.

50:55.980 --> 50:57.870
The minimum requirement is, by 2030,

50:57.870 --> 51:01.660
we need a plutonium-pit
production capacity

51:01.660 --> 51:04.150
up to 80 across the enterprise.

51:04.150 --> 51:06.590
The first step to getting that is 2026,

51:06.590 --> 51:09.680
we need 30 a year by 2026.

51:09.680 --> 51:12.770
Those first 30 will happen at Los Alamos.

51:12.770 --> 51:16.906
We have a plan with the
Department of Energy

51:16.906 --> 51:19.210
that we get to 80 at both Los Alamos

51:19.210 --> 51:20.810
and Savannah River in South Carolina

51:20.810 --> 51:22.730
to get to what we need for the future.

51:22.730 --> 51:24.930
But that will put us on a sustainable

51:24.930 --> 51:27.820
path through this century
to make sure we have

51:27.820 --> 51:31.766
the right infrastructure for
our future nuclear stockpile.

51:31.766 --> 51:32.960
- And I'm hopeful that.

51:32.960 --> 51:35.290
It's too bad we weren't
able to get NNSA here today

51:35.290 --> 51:38.133
to talk to us about this,
we will follow up with them.

51:39.270 --> 51:41.140
When you look at what
we're doing right now

51:41.140 --> 51:43.160
to get to the 30 by 2026,

51:43.160 --> 51:45.810
what's your sense of the
progress we're making?

51:45.810 --> 51:48.170
Are you comfortable that it's sufficient,

51:48.170 --> 51:49.370
what's your feel about that?

51:49.370 --> 51:52.270
- So I'm comfortable that all
energy is being put on that.

51:53.236 --> 51:55.100
I still worry about that,

51:55.100 --> 51:57.487
because it's going from zero to 30.

51:57.487 --> 51:59.490
And 30 doesn't sound like a big number

51:59.490 --> 52:00.530
probably to many in the committee,

52:00.530 --> 52:03.920
but going from zero to 30 is a huge step

52:03.920 --> 52:08.000
because plutonium is a very
difficult material to work with.

52:08.000 --> 52:10.790
And so, we watch that very closely.

52:10.790 --> 52:13.610
And I have a stockpile-assessment team

52:13.610 --> 52:14.950
that I send to Los Alamos,

52:14.950 --> 52:17.880
so I have my staff go to Los Alamos.

52:17.880 --> 52:20.990
Because I have to certify the
nuclear stockpile every year,

52:20.990 --> 52:22.680
I probably spend a lot more time

52:22.680 --> 52:24.460
down deep in the technical weeds

52:24.460 --> 52:25.980
than most combatant commanders do,

52:25.980 --> 52:28.260
but that's one of the most
important things I do,

52:28.260 --> 52:29.610
is certify the nuclear stockpile.

52:29.610 --> 52:30.960
And I have to understand where that is.

52:30.960 --> 52:34.390
So, Administrator Lisa
Gordon Hagerty and I

52:34.390 --> 52:36.080
have a very very close relationship.

52:36.080 --> 52:38.220
And we're working hand
in hand to make sure

52:38.220 --> 52:40.830
that we can deliver that
capability the nation needs,

52:40.830 --> 52:42.800
but it's gonna take a
lot of work to get there.

52:42.800 --> 52:43.760
- Thank you.

52:43.760 --> 52:47.630
And then turning to our space-sensor layer

52:47.630 --> 52:49.930
at the Missile Defense Agency.

52:49.930 --> 52:52.340
We've talked in this committee

52:52.340 --> 52:53.977
and certainly we provided an increased

52:53.977 --> 52:56.919
$73 million last year for that.

52:56.919 --> 53:00.860
But now, this has
appeared as the top issue

53:00.860 --> 53:03.870
on the unfunded priorities list for MDA.

53:03.870 --> 53:06.110
Could you give us a little
bit of enlightenment

53:06.110 --> 53:07.680
in terms of what's happening there

53:07.680 --> 53:09.510
and what exactly the department's doing

53:09.510 --> 53:11.280
in response to the hypersonic

53:11.280 --> 53:15.390
and ballistic-defense space spending?

53:15.390 --> 53:20.350
- So, Congressman, in my
letter to Congress this week

53:20.350 --> 53:23.610
I also noticed that I'm watching closely

53:25.930 --> 53:29.670
the space layer of our missile
defense capabilities as well.

53:29.670 --> 53:31.600
I watched it from a
Stratcom perspective though.

53:31.600 --> 53:34.160
'Cause the thing that
enables our deterrence

53:34.160 --> 53:36.510
is the fact that we can see
any threat from wherever,

53:36.510 --> 53:38.840
and we can characterize it, attribute it

53:38.840 --> 53:40.240
and then respond to it if we have to,

53:40.240 --> 53:41.840
that enables our deterrent.

53:41.840 --> 53:43.950
We need that in the space-sensor layer.

53:43.950 --> 53:47.340
And we appreciate very
much the $73 million

53:47.340 --> 53:49.193
that Congress appropriated last year.

53:50.090 --> 53:53.910
That is now transitioning into
the Space Development Agency,

53:53.910 --> 53:57.220
Dr. Mike Griffin has that responsibility.

53:57.220 --> 54:00.540
We are pushing hard to make
sure there's $15 million

54:00.540 --> 54:02.600
in the budget this year
for sensor technology.

54:02.600 --> 54:05.100
There's a DARPA program
that is looking at that.

54:05.100 --> 54:07.960
Dr. Griffin's gotta integrate
all those things together.

54:07.960 --> 54:12.330
We certainly are hoping for
increased funding this year,

54:12.330 --> 54:13.880
but the department has to make

54:13.880 --> 54:15.300
difficult decisions as we go through.

54:15.300 --> 54:17.560
But Dr. Griffin has got his job this year

54:17.560 --> 54:18.840
putting all those pieces together

54:18.840 --> 54:22.420
and having a good plan for
this Congress next year.

54:22.420 --> 54:24.370
- Thank you General, my time's expired.

54:25.380 --> 54:27.970
- [Chairman] The gentleman from Colorado.

54:27.970 --> 54:28.890
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

54:28.890 --> 54:31.340
and thank you for all the
witnesses for being here

54:31.340 --> 54:33.140
and for your service to our country.

54:34.170 --> 54:37.810
Admiral Wolfe, regarding our
hypersonic weapons programs.

54:37.810 --> 54:38.900
I've got several questions,

54:38.900 --> 54:41.330
I hope these haven't already been asked.

54:41.330 --> 54:42.950
I was out of the room at
another committee hearing

54:42.950 --> 54:44.540
but I'm back now,

54:44.540 --> 54:47.830
so I'd like to pursue this
line of reasoning a little bit.

54:47.830 --> 54:50.190
Some of my colleagues on
the other side of the aisle

54:50.190 --> 54:53.120
have worried about the
potential for a miscalculation.

54:53.120 --> 54:54.960
They worry that the Russians or Chinese

54:54.960 --> 54:56.750
won't be able to tell the difference

54:56.750 --> 54:59.290
between a sub-launched hypersonic

54:59.290 --> 55:02.060
and a sub-launched nuclear weapon.

55:02.060 --> 55:05.730
So, you as someone who has
worked on both types of systems,

55:05.730 --> 55:09.260
can you help clarify key
observable differences

55:09.260 --> 55:11.760
that would help put our minds at ease?

55:11.760 --> 55:12.970
- Yes, sir, thanks for the question.

55:12.970 --> 55:16.820
So, at the unclassified level
what I will tell you is,

55:16.820 --> 55:18.800
is that there's no doubt

55:18.800 --> 55:21.723
when a weapon initially
comes out a submarine,

55:25.040 --> 55:26.890
they look very much the
same when they come out.

55:26.890 --> 55:28.450
But what I will tell you is,

55:28.450 --> 55:29.810
because of the difference in

55:29.810 --> 55:32.423
a hypersonic and a ballistic missile,

55:34.180 --> 55:36.260
for anybody that can see it

55:36.260 --> 55:38.400
can quickly tell that
they're not the same.

55:38.400 --> 55:39.570
That's the first issue.

55:39.570 --> 55:42.100
If you look at the size of the boosters

55:42.100 --> 55:45.200
that we're talking about, the
signature is much different.

55:45.200 --> 55:46.900
When you look at the flight profile,

55:46.900 --> 55:50.188
they quickly diverge between the two.

55:50.188 --> 55:53.800
That's the first key issue
from a technology perspective.

55:53.800 --> 55:57.244
Second is, if you look at where we believe

55:57.244 --> 56:02.220
a conventional hypersonic
would actually be deployed,

56:02.220 --> 56:04.150
it would be in a much different area

56:04.150 --> 56:06.520
than where our SSBNs deploy,

56:06.520 --> 56:08.250
so that would be an indicator.

56:08.250 --> 56:11.180
And thirdly, which is also key to that is,

56:11.180 --> 56:14.970
there is no plan to put
a conventional weapon

56:14.970 --> 56:18.340
onto one of our
strategically loaded SSBNs.

56:18.340 --> 56:21.610
So again, you will have
separation from those two.

56:21.610 --> 56:23.300
- Okay, thank you.

56:23.300 --> 56:25.800
And Admiral Wolfe and Mr. Trachtenberg,

56:25.800 --> 56:27.830
what are the operational advantages

56:27.830 --> 56:31.283
of a land-based versus a
sub-based hypersonic weapon?

56:37.960 --> 56:40.100
- The operational advantages

56:40.100 --> 56:44.760
of a land-based versus
sub-based hypersonic weapon.

56:44.760 --> 56:47.452
I think in terms of the
operational details,

56:47.452 --> 56:50.063
I'll defer to Admiral Wolfe on that.

56:51.050 --> 56:53.390
But obviously much depends

56:54.612 --> 56:57.900
on the basic mode of the weapon itself

56:57.900 --> 56:59.710
and where the weapon is based.

56:59.710 --> 57:02.160
So, depending upon where we would look

57:02.160 --> 57:05.933
to base a hypersonic weapon
against a particular threat,

57:06.770 --> 57:08.070
I think that would factor into

57:08.070 --> 57:10.030
the operational characteristics of--

57:10.030 --> 57:11.230
- [Senator] So geography?

57:11.230 --> 57:13.960
- Yeah, that would be one factor, yes sir.

57:13.960 --> 57:15.170
- [Senator] Okay.

57:15.170 --> 57:16.003
- Yes, sir, I would agree.

57:16.003 --> 57:18.790
And of course, it's all about
access and it's all about

57:18.790 --> 57:21.420
the target set that you need to go after.

57:21.420 --> 57:23.270
I will tell you, there
are advantages to both.

57:23.270 --> 57:25.750
Which is why, as part of what we're doing

57:25.750 --> 57:28.950
with our agreement in the
Department of Defense,

57:28.950 --> 57:31.210
we are commonly developing this technology

57:31.210 --> 57:32.850
between us, the Army, the Air Force,

57:32.850 --> 57:34.900
and even the Missile Defense Agency

57:34.900 --> 57:36.670
for just the basic technology.

57:36.670 --> 57:38.610
So, I think again, it gives you

57:38.610 --> 57:41.940
a portfolio of options with that weapon.

57:41.940 --> 57:42.860
- Okay, thank you.

57:42.860 --> 57:45.340
And lastly, Admiral Wolfe, we just had

57:45.340 --> 57:47.780
a closed briefing with
you on hypersonic weapons,

57:47.780 --> 57:51.703
but the organization and
budgetary lines are still unclear.

57:53.899 --> 57:57.410
How much is the DoD asking

57:57.410 --> 58:02.030
for hypersonic weapon development
in this year's budget,

58:02.030 --> 58:05.350
and how much of that
are you responsible for

58:05.350 --> 58:07.970
and what are the specific
milestones you wanna reach

58:07.970 --> 58:11.220
for what you can say in this setting?

58:11.220 --> 58:12.053
- Yes, sir.

58:12.053 --> 58:13.510
So, from a DoD perspective,

58:13.510 --> 58:15.600
I don't have the overall DoD number.

58:15.600 --> 58:17.270
So I'd ask that we take
that for the record

58:17.270 --> 58:19.320
and get back to you with the DoD line.

58:19.320 --> 58:20.780
From a Navy perspective,

58:20.780 --> 58:24.410
my budget request in
20 is for $593 million.

58:24.410 --> 58:27.050
And what that does is,
it continues the effort

58:27.050 --> 58:30.980
that we started in FY19,
for both getting to

58:30.980 --> 58:33.180
additional flight testing of the actual

58:33.180 --> 58:37.290
hypersonic body itself, to
continue to prove the technology.

58:37.290 --> 58:40.440
It continues the development
effort for the booster,

58:40.440 --> 58:44.270
which the services will
use for that weapon.

58:44.270 --> 58:49.270
And then it also continues the
integration onto the studies

58:49.530 --> 58:51.910
for which platforms it will
be deployed in the Navy,

58:51.910 --> 58:55.170
and to then start that
integration into those platforms.

58:55.170 --> 58:56.410
- And do you have any particular

58:56.410 --> 58:58.160
milestones that you would like to reach,

58:58.160 --> 59:00.680
or is that still to be determined?

59:00.680 --> 59:05.000
- So obviously, getting to
key flight test is critical.

59:05.000 --> 59:08.320
And that's about all I could
say in this forum, sir.

59:08.320 --> 59:10.590
In a classified forum
we could talk about what

59:10.590 --> 59:12.800
we're planning and when we're
planning on doing it, yes sir.

59:12.800 --> 59:13.810
- Certainly okay, thank you.

59:13.810 --> 59:16.570
And once again, thank all
five of you for your service.

59:16.570 --> 59:17.920
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

59:19.883 --> 59:21.520
- I thank the gentleman.

59:21.520 --> 59:22.533
I think all members of the committee

59:22.533 --> 59:25.090
have had a chance to ask a question.

59:25.090 --> 59:28.720
If anyone has a pressing question
they like to follow up on,

59:28.720 --> 59:29.810
I would be happy to yield to you.

59:29.810 --> 59:33.073
Otherwise, I'll conclude the
hearing with an opportunity.

59:34.540 --> 59:35.790
Ms. Davis.

59:35.790 --> 59:36.623
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

59:36.623 --> 59:39.813
Just very briefly, could
you just clarify for me,

59:41.290 --> 59:45.140
the Pentagon had proposed
funding in the 2020 budget

59:45.140 --> 59:48.823
for the low-yield SLBM,
is that in the OCO budget?

59:51.970 --> 59:53.020
- Ma'am, I'd have to go check.

59:53.020 --> 59:54.930
I don't believe it's in the OCO budget.

59:54.930 --> 59:56.800
If I look at my line, it's rolled up

59:56.800 --> 59:59.430
into other efforts that
we're doing for RDT&E.

59:59.430 --> 01:00:00.840
But I'd have to take that for the record

01:00:00.840 --> 01:00:03.160
to actually verify that,
that's for the low yield.

01:00:03.160 --> 01:00:04.860
There are other parts of my budget

01:00:04.860 --> 01:00:07.400
which are in the OCO line, yes ma'am.

01:00:07.400 --> 01:00:09.200
- But Mr. Trachtenberg, where is it?

01:00:11.150 --> 01:00:12.650
- I believe that is
correct, Congresswoman,

01:00:12.650 --> 01:00:15.720
but I would wanna confirm
that for the record.

01:00:15.720 --> 01:00:17.713
- Correct that it is
not in the OCO budget?

01:00:17.713 --> 01:00:19.650
- That is my understanding,

01:00:19.650 --> 01:00:21.440
but I would like to confirm that.

01:00:21.440 --> 01:00:23.520
- Okay, apparently somebody saw it there.

01:00:23.520 --> 01:00:25.370
- And ma'am, the actual weapon itself

01:00:25.370 --> 01:00:27.163
is in the Department of Energy budget.

01:00:27.163 --> 01:00:28.850
- Okay, all right,

01:00:28.850 --> 01:00:32.190
because obviously there
are concerns about its use,

01:00:32.190 --> 01:00:34.380
where the OCO budget is used for.

01:00:34.380 --> 01:00:35.690
Okay, thank you very much.

01:00:36.723 --> 01:00:39.050
- I thank the subcommittee
members for their questions.

01:00:39.050 --> 01:00:40.430
I think the only major topic

01:00:40.430 --> 01:00:44.080
that hasn't been touched
on is the Space Force,

01:00:44.080 --> 01:00:46.690
and I would like to give
General Hyten a few minutes here

01:00:46.690 --> 01:00:51.570
to summarize his ideas
for the Space Force.

01:00:51.570 --> 01:00:52.650
- Thank you, Chairman.

01:00:52.650 --> 01:00:53.750
I appreciate the opportunity.

01:00:53.750 --> 01:00:56.220
I think there's a couple things

01:00:56.220 --> 01:00:58.730
I'd like to share with the committee.

01:00:58.730 --> 01:00:59.754
I think first and foremost,

01:00:59.754 --> 01:01:02.300
I appreciate this
committee taking on space

01:01:02.300 --> 01:01:05.160
as a warfighting challenge
a couple years ago,

01:01:05.160 --> 01:01:08.040
and I very much appreciate
the president weighing in

01:01:08.040 --> 01:01:10.870
and talking about space
as a warfighting domain.

01:01:10.870 --> 01:01:14.840
It is a place now that we
conduct military operations.

01:01:14.840 --> 01:01:16.710
It's a place that our adversaries

01:01:17.666 --> 01:01:19.760
are building capabilities
and deploying capabilities

01:01:19.760 --> 01:01:20.860
that threaten us in space,

01:01:20.860 --> 01:01:23.060
and we have to deal with it seriously.

01:01:23.060 --> 01:01:25.210
I think the most important
thing we can do in the near term

01:01:25.210 --> 01:01:27.110
is stand up a new unified command,

01:01:27.110 --> 01:01:29.680
moving space out from under my command,

01:01:29.680 --> 01:01:31.460
out from under U.S. Strategic Command

01:01:31.460 --> 01:01:33.500
and creating a new U.S. Space Command

01:01:33.500 --> 01:01:36.960
focused 100% of the time
on the space problem,

01:01:36.960 --> 01:01:40.690
because I've been in the
space business my whole life

01:01:40.690 --> 01:01:42.010
and I love the space business.

01:01:42.010 --> 01:01:45.023
But I'm the Stratcom commander, and space,

01:01:46.040 --> 01:01:48.640
at best will never be higher
than my third priority.

01:01:50.026 --> 01:01:51.640
It has to be nuclear first,

01:01:51.640 --> 01:01:53.410
nuclear command and control second.

01:01:53.410 --> 01:01:55.370
Space will never be higher
than my third priority.

01:01:55.370 --> 01:01:57.380
I get to spend so little time on space

01:01:57.380 --> 01:02:00.080
'cause I have to focus on
the nuclear capability.

01:02:00.080 --> 01:02:02.730
We need a commander focused
on space all the time.

01:02:02.730 --> 01:02:04.790
And that commander was
nominated this week,

01:02:04.790 --> 01:02:07.470
John Jay Raymond, and I hope the Senate

01:02:07.470 --> 01:02:09.980
takes up that nomination quickly.

01:02:09.980 --> 01:02:12.450
The second piece is the Space Force.

01:02:12.450 --> 01:02:15.120
The president said we need a structure

01:02:15.120 --> 01:02:17.900
inside the Pentagon focused
on space all the time,

01:02:17.900 --> 01:02:20.320
and I support that structure.

01:02:20.320 --> 01:02:21.840
I have to admit I had some concerns

01:02:21.840 --> 01:02:24.730
when we were talking
about a separate service,

01:02:24.730 --> 01:02:27.570
separate and distinct from the Air Force.

01:02:27.570 --> 01:02:29.280
But when the president
made the decision and said,

01:02:29.280 --> 01:02:33.370
it's gotta be under the
Air Force, I'm all-in.

01:02:33.370 --> 01:02:35.430
I think the vice president
said it exactly right.

01:02:35.430 --> 01:02:38.277
He said, "So, creating the
Space Force within the Air Force

01:02:38.277 --> 01:02:40.567
"is the best way to minimize
duplication of effort

01:02:40.567 --> 01:02:43.020
"and eliminate bureaucratic
inefficiencies."

01:02:43.020 --> 01:02:43.910
That's what the president

01:02:43.910 --> 01:02:46.140
and the vice president told us to do.

01:02:46.140 --> 01:02:48.150
Now I understand, in meeting with

01:02:48.150 --> 01:02:51.010
many of you over the last 24 hours

01:02:51.010 --> 01:02:52.410
that there are some concerns about that.

01:02:52.410 --> 01:02:55.000
But I just want you to
know, from my perspective,

01:02:55.000 --> 01:02:58.030
if you see any bureaucratic
inefficiencies in there,

01:02:58.030 --> 01:03:00.763
if you see any duplication of effort,

01:03:01.890 --> 01:03:04.270
I would support just
taking that stuff out,

01:03:04.270 --> 01:03:05.730
we need a streamlined focus.

01:03:05.730 --> 01:03:07.150
The problem we're trying
to solve there is,

01:03:07.150 --> 01:03:09.310
there so many people in the Pentagon

01:03:09.310 --> 01:03:11.060
that are in charge of space,

01:03:11.060 --> 01:03:12.520
we need one person in charge of space

01:03:12.520 --> 01:03:14.960
that will then organize,
train and equip forces

01:03:14.960 --> 01:03:19.070
for the new U.S. Space Command.

01:03:19.070 --> 01:03:21.340
That's the structure
that has to be out there.

01:03:21.340 --> 01:03:24.457
I think the president's vision is right

01:03:24.457 --> 01:03:27.780
and it's also very similar
to where this committee was,

01:03:27.780 --> 01:03:30.070
starting as long as two years ago.

01:03:30.070 --> 01:03:33.160
I think somewhere we can come
to agreement on what that is

01:03:33.160 --> 01:03:34.780
and create that structure
that will allow us

01:03:34.780 --> 01:03:37.030
to deal with the space
problems we meet in the future.

01:03:37.030 --> 01:03:39.543
So thank you very much for
letting me talk about that.

01:03:41.220 --> 01:03:42.543
- The gentleman from Ohio.

01:03:43.650 --> 01:03:44.700
I just wanted to thank the chairman

01:03:44.700 --> 01:03:45.533
for asking that question.

01:03:45.533 --> 01:03:47.715
That was a great answer General,
I greatly appreciate it.

01:03:47.715 --> 01:03:50.280
I think that really is
gonna help our debate here.

01:03:50.280 --> 01:03:53.540
And obviously, we look to your expertise

01:03:53.540 --> 01:03:57.970
because it's real application
of what's happening.

01:03:57.970 --> 01:03:58.950
So thank you for that answer,

01:03:58.950 --> 01:04:01.143
and Mr. Chairman, thank you
for asking that question.

01:04:01.143 --> 01:04:02.363
- I thank the gentleman.

01:04:03.240 --> 01:04:05.950
If we could get your answer
on a YouTube video and require

01:04:05.950 --> 01:04:09.000
all of our colleagues in the
other body to watch that.

01:04:09.000 --> 01:04:10.950
I wouldn't even mind
if it was set to music

01:04:10.950 --> 01:04:14.623
or something like that, anything
to induce them to watch it.

01:04:16.040 --> 01:04:18.040
- Can we put an emoji in the
background of you dancing?

01:04:18.040 --> 01:04:18.893
- No no no.

01:04:20.570 --> 01:04:23.910
Perhaps John Lewis, he
has a very good dance.

01:04:23.910 --> 01:04:28.880
But there are few more
important topics than this

01:04:28.880 --> 01:04:31.470
for this Congress, so I
appreciate your weighing in.

01:04:31.470 --> 01:04:33.300
I would like to thank all of the witnesses

01:04:33.300 --> 01:04:34.990
for their excellent testimony.

01:04:34.990 --> 01:04:36.699
The subcommittee is adjourned.

01:04:36.699 --> 01:04:39.782
(gavel being struck)