WEBVTT 00:01.420 --> 00:02.740 - We'll receive testimony from 00:02.740 --> 00:04.440 the United States Central Command. 00:04.440 --> 00:07.463 I'd like to welcome our witness General Joseph Votel, 00:07.463 --> 00:10.880 commander of the United States Central Command. 00:10.880 --> 00:12.163 Welcome here. 00:13.140 --> 00:16.120 General Votel will hand over the Central Command at 00:16.120 --> 00:18.280 the end of March and I want to thank him for his 00:18.280 --> 00:23.280 outstanding service to our country over his 38 year career. 00:23.800 --> 00:27.680 General, you've had a tough job at CENTCOM and with the rise 00:27.680 --> 00:31.800 of ISIS and the spread of Iran's proxies and the return 00:31.800 --> 00:35.540 of Russia to the Middle East, you and the president 00:35.540 --> 00:39.940 have grappled with some of the very hard decisions. 00:39.940 --> 00:42.960 Thank you for all you've done to keep America safe. 00:42.960 --> 00:44.960 The Senate Armed Services Committee's top priority 00:44.960 --> 00:47.530 is to ensure the effective implementation of the National 00:47.530 --> 00:51.150 Defense Strategy which identifies competition with 00:51.150 --> 00:55.247 China and Russia as "the central challenge 00:55.247 --> 00:58.710 "to the United States' prosperity and security." 00:58.710 --> 01:00.980 Clearly we don't want to be the world's policeman, 01:00.980 --> 01:03.705 but without any US presence our strategic 01:03.705 --> 01:06.740 competitors will rush to fill the void. 01:06.740 --> 01:09.330 We have seen this repeatedly in the Middle East, 01:09.330 --> 01:13.510 when we step away from partners, Russia steps in. 01:13.510 --> 01:16.620 When our military pulls back, Russia pulls forward. 01:16.620 --> 01:18.807 When we don't enforce our red lines, 01:18.807 --> 01:22.200 Russia tries to create its own. 01:22.200 --> 01:24.540 The NDS also makes countering 01:24.540 --> 01:27.220 terrorist threats a top priority. 01:27.220 --> 01:29.630 Part of this strategy has been achieved. 01:29.630 --> 01:33.610 The ISIS caliphate has been defeated but ISIS and Al-Qaeda 01:33.610 --> 01:36.470 are still active in the region and threaten our homeland. 01:36.470 --> 01:40.690 Both priorities competing with Russia 01:40.690 --> 01:44.483 and countering terrorists are at stake in Syria. 01:44.483 --> 01:48.550 As we draw down in Syria we must continue to support 01:48.550 --> 01:50.620 our partners and friends and I'm also interested 01:50.620 --> 01:53.620 in how we're going to prevent ISIS resurging. 01:53.620 --> 01:56.400 It's one thing to kick them out but then of course 01:56.400 --> 01:59.370 to stop them from coming back up and we believe that's 01:59.370 --> 02:01.200 going to happen and the right person's here 02:01.200 --> 02:05.270 to explain that to us so we welcome you General Votel. 02:05.270 --> 02:06.193 Senator Reed. 02:07.440 --> 02:09.440 - Thank you very much Mr. Chairman and General Votel, 02:09.440 --> 02:12.700 welcome back which will likely be 02:12.700 --> 02:15.020 your last hearing before the committee. 02:15.020 --> 02:16.710 Let me thank you for 39 years 02:16.710 --> 02:19.430 of exemplary service to the nation. 02:19.430 --> 02:22.620 We owe you and your family an incredible debt of gratitude 02:22.620 --> 02:24.927 for the contribution you've made to our national security 02:24.927 --> 02:28.240 throughout your career but especially during your 02:28.240 --> 02:30.859 leadership of the Joint Special Operations Command, 02:30.859 --> 02:33.570 the Special Operations Command, and now Central Command. 02:33.570 --> 02:35.503 So, we sincerely thank you, General. 02:36.690 --> 02:38.830 The focus of the National Defense Strategy is rightly 02:38.830 --> 02:41.190 a return to great power competition and a more 02:41.190 --> 02:44.380 resource sustainable approach to counterterrorism. 02:44.380 --> 02:46.110 However, this has led to some uncertainty 02:46.110 --> 02:48.190 about the US military's continued role in 02:48.190 --> 02:50.830 the CENTCOM area of responsibility. 02:50.830 --> 02:52.820 As we consider this question it is important 02:52.820 --> 02:55.340 we remain clear eyed about the continued threat 02:55.340 --> 02:57.247 to the homeland posed by ISIS, Al-Qaeda, 02:57.247 --> 03:00.624 and other extremist groups, the malign behavior of Iran 03:00.624 --> 03:04.890 and the objectives of Russia and China in the region. 03:04.890 --> 03:07.250 Each of these issues are relevant to current discussions 03:07.250 --> 03:10.207 about our military presence in Afghanistan and Syria. 03:10.207 --> 03:12.871 In addition to a complicated military situation, 03:12.871 --> 03:15.282 resolutions to broader stabilization, 03:15.282 --> 03:17.451 diplomatic and political challenges 03:17.451 --> 03:20.520 have been far more difficult to come by. 03:20.520 --> 03:22.560 Bringing our troops home should always be our 03:22.560 --> 03:25.120 objective but it must be done in a deliberate and well 03:25.120 --> 03:28.550 thought out manner in concert with our partners and allies. 03:28.550 --> 03:33.100 In the case of Syria, contrary statements by the president, 03:33.100 --> 03:35.730 his national security adviser, and other administration 03:35.730 --> 03:38.283 officials have only served to underscore that 03:38.283 --> 03:41.760 this decision was anything but thoughtful and deliberate. 03:41.760 --> 03:44.550 If public reports are accurate, the president may be about 03:44.550 --> 03:47.769 to make similar quick decisions with respect to Afghanistan. 03:47.769 --> 03:50.350 The conflict in Afghanistan has occurred at great 03:50.350 --> 03:53.406 cost in terms of both lives and resources, however, 03:53.406 --> 03:56.519 in considering the prospect of conflict termination, 03:56.519 --> 04:00.200 we must also weigh the cost of getting it wrong. 04:00.200 --> 04:03.710 ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and an estimated 18 other terrorist 04:03.710 --> 04:06.050 groups are still present in the region and some 04:06.050 --> 04:08.560 within the Intelligence Community assess that 04:08.560 --> 04:11.680 external plotting will surge upon our withdrawal. 04:11.680 --> 04:14.040 We must also consider our allies and partners that 04:14.040 --> 04:17.025 have fought alongside us as former Secretary Mattis said, 04:17.025 --> 04:19.917 "Our strength as a nation is inexorably 04:19.917 --> 04:21.597 "linked to the strength of our unique 04:21.597 --> 04:25.260 "and comprehensive system of alliances and partnerships." 04:25.260 --> 04:28.710 The allies and partners who've joined us after 9/11 have 04:28.710 --> 04:32.540 sacrificed with us in Afghanistan and deserve to be included 04:32.540 --> 04:36.010 in conversations with respect to the future of the conflict. 04:36.010 --> 04:38.410 Regarding the decision in Syria, the president's 04:38.410 --> 04:41.640 statement that ISIS is defeated may be premature. 04:41.640 --> 04:43.500 According to the Intelligence Community's 04:43.500 --> 04:46.530 assessment released last week, ISIS, in their words, 04:46.530 --> 04:48.690 very likely will continue to pursue external 04:48.690 --> 04:51.330 attacks from Iraq and Syria against regional 04:51.330 --> 04:54.580 and Western adversaries including the United States. 04:54.580 --> 04:56.510 General McKenzie made a similar point in December 04:56.510 --> 04:59.870 when he said ISIS probably is still as capable as Al-Qaeda 04:59.870 --> 05:02.880 in Iraq at its peak suggesting it is well positioned 05:02.880 --> 05:05.200 to re-emerge if pressure on the group is relieved. 05:05.200 --> 05:08.230 The security and stability of key partners 05:08.230 --> 05:11.020 in the region, most notably Iraq, Israel, 05:11.020 --> 05:14.060 and Jordan, is bolstered by our continued presence. 05:14.060 --> 05:16.570 While deployed forces do not have a military mission 05:16.570 --> 05:19.330 to counter Iran, I agree with our military leaders 05:19.330 --> 05:22.000 that there is a derivative benefit associated 05:22.000 --> 05:25.160 with their presence and the reassurance it provides. 05:25.160 --> 05:27.286 We should not take these partners for granted. 05:27.286 --> 05:29.450 If we were to withdraw precipitously from 05:29.450 --> 05:32.020 the region we would risk a re-emergence of ISIS, 05:32.020 --> 05:35.181 squandering gains made in Iraq, destabilizing Jordan, 05:35.181 --> 05:37.690 and increasing the pressure on King Abdullah. 05:37.690 --> 05:39.780 And allowing Iran and its proxies to become further 05:39.780 --> 05:42.653 entrenched, thereby posing a greater threat to Israel. 05:43.530 --> 05:46.450 No one, myself included, is in favor 05:46.450 --> 05:48.510 of endless wars or indefinite employments 05:48.510 --> 05:50.880 of troops to dangerous parts of the world. 05:50.880 --> 05:52.880 Far too often we view the use of US 05:52.880 --> 05:55.950 military as a solution to every problem. 05:55.950 --> 05:58.480 I share the frustration of Americans that we have 05:58.480 --> 06:02.500 thus far been unable to fully achieve our foreign 06:02.500 --> 06:06.050 policy objectives in Afghanistan, Syria, and elsewhere. 06:06.050 --> 06:10.090 However, just as decisions to employ the US military must 06:10.090 --> 06:13.050 be given great consideration, so, too, must decisions 06:13.050 --> 06:16.180 to disengage military with particular attention paid 06:16.180 --> 06:19.260 to the second and third order effects such a decision 06:19.260 --> 06:22.260 will have on our security and foreign policy interests. 06:22.260 --> 06:23.960 I do not think sufficient consideration 06:23.960 --> 06:26.230 has been given to these issues today. 06:26.230 --> 06:28.170 General Votel, we look forward to hearing 06:28.170 --> 06:29.960 your views on these and other issues. 06:29.960 --> 06:31.690 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 06:31.690 --> 06:33.320 - Thank you, Senator Reed. 06:33.320 --> 06:35.530 Now that a quorum is present, I'd ask the committee to 06:35.530 --> 06:39.570 consider and approve a Senate resolution authorizing funding 06:39.570 --> 06:43.510 for our committee from March 1st through February 28th. 06:43.510 --> 06:45.800 The funding resolution is completely consistent 06:45.800 --> 06:49.432 with the majority and the majority and leader, 06:49.432 --> 06:54.432 the January 9th agreement. 06:55.360 --> 06:56.210 - [Senator] So moved. 06:56.210 --> 06:57.160 - [Senator] Second. 06:58.890 --> 07:00.020 - Entertain a motion. 07:00.020 --> 07:01.010 Is there a motion? 07:01.010 --> 07:02.603 - [Senator] So moved, Mr. Chairman. 07:02.603 --> 07:03.608 - [Senator] Second. 07:03.608 --> 07:04.890 - And all in favor say aye. 07:04.890 --> 07:06.298 Opposed, no. 07:06.298 --> 07:07.131 The ayes have it. 07:07.131 --> 07:09.637 Alright, General Votel, you are recognized 07:09.637 --> 07:11.473 for your opening statements. 07:14.200 --> 07:17.160 - Senator Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished 07:17.160 --> 07:19.610 members of the committee, good morning and thank 07:19.610 --> 07:21.210 you for the opportunity to appear before 07:21.210 --> 07:23.518 the Senate Armed Services Committee today. 07:23.518 --> 07:25.770 I come before you representing the over 07:25.770 --> 07:28.229 80,000 men and women working tirelessly 07:28.229 --> 07:31.636 across the Central Command area of responsibility. 07:31.636 --> 07:34.223 They represent the very best in our nation and I 07:34.223 --> 07:37.710 am proud to stand among them as their commander. 07:37.710 --> 07:39.620 All of these great Americans have families 07:39.620 --> 07:41.930 in communities across our country that support their 07:41.930 --> 07:45.237 service members from near and far and we are equally 07:45.237 --> 07:50.050 proud and appreciative of their service and sacrifice. 07:50.050 --> 07:51.787 I am honored to be joined by the CENTCOM 07:51.787 --> 07:54.720 senior enlisted leader United States Army 07:54.720 --> 07:56.880 Command Sergeant Major Bill Thetford. 07:56.880 --> 07:59.170 Command Sergeant Major Thetford has been with me 07:59.170 --> 08:02.210 my entire tour at CENTCOM and for the five years 08:02.210 --> 08:05.310 we served together in other commands before that. 08:05.310 --> 08:08.210 He is the most experienced soldier in our outfit 08:08.210 --> 08:10.430 and his support and steady leadership helped us 08:10.430 --> 08:13.310 navigate very treacherous waters over the years. 08:13.310 --> 08:14.985 He is representative of the people we 08:14.985 --> 08:17.059 have across this command and indeed 08:17.059 --> 08:20.340 throughout the armed forces of our nation. 08:20.340 --> 08:22.570 Command Sergeant Major Thetford and his wife Allie will 08:22.570 --> 08:26.190 retire after 38 years of service later this spring and our 08:26.190 --> 08:29.120 nation owes them an incredible debt of gratitude. 08:29.120 --> 08:31.303 We could not have been served better. 08:31.303 --> 08:34.309 There is no other region in the world as dynamic, 08:34.309 --> 08:37.497 hopeful, challenging, and dangerous as 08:37.497 --> 08:40.170 the CENTCOM area of responsibility. 08:40.170 --> 08:43.347 Made up of the areas we typically refer to as the Levant, 08:43.347 --> 08:47.150 the Middle East, and central and south Asia. 08:47.150 --> 08:49.952 It is an area of great contrast and contradiction. 08:49.952 --> 08:53.494 It is an area rich in history, culture, and resources 08:53.494 --> 08:57.818 but also an area pulsing with sectarianism, violence, 08:57.818 --> 09:01.291 poor governance, corruption, disenfranchisement, 09:01.291 --> 09:05.650 profound human suffering, and economic disparity. 09:05.650 --> 09:09.080 It is also an area where we retain vital interests, 09:09.080 --> 09:10.833 preventing attacks on our homeland, 09:10.833 --> 09:13.922 countering malign and destabilizing influence, 09:13.922 --> 09:17.890 containing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 09:17.890 --> 09:19.980 and ensuring freedom of navigation and commerce 09:19.980 --> 09:23.660 through critical international waterways. 09:23.660 --> 09:27.270 It is worth noting that four of the five major competitors 09:27.270 --> 09:30.255 or threats identified in the National Defense Strategy, 09:30.255 --> 09:33.958 China, Russia, Iran, and violent extremist 09:33.958 --> 09:37.490 organizations reside or are contested in 09:37.490 --> 09:40.376 the CENTCOM area of responsibility every day. 09:40.376 --> 09:44.483 In the final two weeks of 2018, CENTCOM supported the UN 09:44.483 --> 09:48.590 special envoy in the establishment of a nascent ceasefire in 09:48.590 --> 09:51.658 Yemen, enabled the efforts of the US special representative 09:51.658 --> 09:55.345 for Afghanistan reconciliation, began planning for the 09:55.345 --> 09:58.467 orderly and professional withdrawal under pressure of US 09:58.467 --> 10:02.560 forces in Syria while maintaining our coalition efforts to 10:02.560 --> 10:05.979 support the government of Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces 10:05.979 --> 10:09.680 in addressing the remnants of ISIS in that country. 10:09.680 --> 10:12.400 We monitored and mitigated the unprofessional acts 10:12.400 --> 10:14.879 of Iranian naval forces in international waters 10:14.879 --> 10:17.897 and observed the professional and mature actions 10:17.897 --> 10:21.590 of the US-advised Lebanese armed forces as they 10:21.590 --> 10:24.602 maintained stability along the border with Israel. 10:24.602 --> 10:27.750 Those two weeks were not an aberration for the command, 10:27.750 --> 10:30.973 they were business as usual as they have been in CENTCOM 10:30.973 --> 10:35.101 nearly every day since its inception in the early 1980s. 10:35.101 --> 10:38.720 Today in Afghanistan, the conditions based south Asia 10:38.720 --> 10:42.591 strategy is working and we continue to use military ways 10:42.591 --> 10:46.218 and means to advance our end state of reconciliation. 10:46.218 --> 10:49.132 We recognize this conflict will not be resolved solely by 10:49.132 --> 10:53.100 military force but our military pressure serves as an 10:53.100 --> 10:56.717 enabler to a whole of government process and more directly 10:56.717 --> 11:01.003 supports diplomatic efforts led by Ambassador Khalilzad. 11:01.003 --> 11:03.404 While these efforts have had recent promise, 11:03.404 --> 11:05.550 our mission has not changed. 11:05.550 --> 11:08.030 We will continue our military pressure in support 11:08.030 --> 11:10.688 of our national objectives until they are met. 11:10.688 --> 11:14.200 In Syria and Iraq, the unrelenting work of 11:14.200 --> 11:17.905 the 79 member defeat ISIS coalition, the determination 11:17.905 --> 11:21.520 and bravery of our Iraqi Security Force, and Syrian 11:21.520 --> 11:24.083 Democratic Force partners, and the support of multiple 11:24.083 --> 11:27.623 international government organizations has largely 11:27.623 --> 11:31.930 liberated the so-called physical caliphate of ISIS. 11:31.930 --> 11:35.027 An area of 34,000 square miles of territory 11:35.027 --> 11:37.757 which they once controlled is now reduced 11:37.757 --> 11:40.361 to an area less than 20 square miles. 11:40.361 --> 11:42.749 The successful partnership with the Syrian 11:42.749 --> 11:45.772 Democratic Forces and the Iraqi Security Forces 11:45.772 --> 11:49.380 was instrumental in these gains against ISIS 11:49.380 --> 11:51.914 but it is important to understand that even though 11:51.914 --> 11:55.046 this territory has been reclaimed, the fight against 11:55.046 --> 11:58.272 ISIS and violent extremists is not over 11:58.272 --> 12:01.140 and our mission has not changed. 12:01.140 --> 12:04.000 The coalition's hard won battlefield gains can only 12:04.000 --> 12:06.973 be secured by maintaining a vigilant offensive against 12:06.973 --> 12:10.673 a now largely dispersed and disaggregated ISIS 12:10.673 --> 12:15.673 that retains leaders, fighters, facilitators, resources, 12:16.369 --> 12:20.100 and the profane ideology that fuels their efforts. 12:20.100 --> 12:22.573 As the defeat ISIS campaign in Syria transitions 12:22.573 --> 12:26.079 from liberating territory to enabling local security 12:26.079 --> 12:30.316 and addressing the ISIS clandestine insurgency, 12:30.316 --> 12:33.850 US ground forces will depart Syria in a deliberate 12:33.850 --> 12:37.070 and coordinated manner while we concurrently consult with 12:37.070 --> 12:41.801 allies and partners to implement stabilization efforts. 12:41.801 --> 12:44.670 These details are being developed now and will 12:44.670 --> 12:47.760 ensure campaign continuity and capitalize on 12:47.760 --> 12:50.280 the contributions of the international community 12:50.280 --> 12:53.590 to prevent a resurgence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. 12:53.590 --> 12:57.402 Today in Yemen, a fragile ceasefire in the port of Hudaydah 12:57.402 --> 13:01.592 is a promising albeit challenging to implement step 13:01.592 --> 13:05.491 demonstrating a willingness by both sides to negotiate. 13:05.491 --> 13:08.105 And which will hopefully allow the United Nations 13:08.105 --> 13:11.530 to expand efforts to end this humanitarian disaster. 13:11.530 --> 13:14.654 Towards this end, CENTCOM supports the international 13:14.654 --> 13:17.942 diplomatic efforts and the work of the UN special envoy 13:17.942 --> 13:21.210 to facilitate the peace process by providing advice 13:21.210 --> 13:24.150 and assistance and serving as an interlocutor through 13:24.150 --> 13:27.210 our trusted relationships in the region to help ensure 13:27.210 --> 13:31.140 transparency, cohesion, and positive momentum. 13:31.140 --> 13:33.360 We also remain steadfast in reminding 13:33.360 --> 13:35.380 the Saudi led coalition partners of their 13:35.380 --> 13:38.520 obligations under the law of armed conflict 13:38.520 --> 13:41.627 and ensuring the fight in Yemen does not spread across 13:41.627 --> 13:45.080 the region sowing more instability and threatening 13:45.080 --> 13:48.900 critical infrastructure, and US lives and interests. 13:48.900 --> 13:50.897 And so it is in the central region today 13:50.897 --> 13:53.353 and every day, great promise and opportunity 13:53.353 --> 13:56.078 mixed with contradiction and conflict. 13:56.078 --> 13:58.760 Let me conclude my remarks where I started 13:58.760 --> 14:01.000 with our people and their families. 14:01.000 --> 14:03.620 In an era of great change when we consistently ask 14:03.620 --> 14:06.270 our people to do more with less, the service 14:06.270 --> 14:09.580 and sacrifice of these men and women and their families 14:09.580 --> 14:13.300 in support of our nation is both humbling and inspirational. 14:13.300 --> 14:16.286 For over 17 years of sustained conflict across the CENTCOM 14:16.286 --> 14:20.046 area of responsibilities, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, 14:20.046 --> 14:23.032 Marines, coastguardsmen, and civilians have 14:23.032 --> 14:26.120 answered the call with an unwavering commitment 14:26.120 --> 14:29.651 and devotion matched only by the families who support them. 14:29.651 --> 14:31.800 We could not have accomplished what we do without 14:31.800 --> 14:34.857 all of them and they deserve the very best capabilities 14:34.857 --> 14:36.878 and support we can provide from weapons 14:36.878 --> 14:40.286 and communications systems to healthcare and housing. 14:40.286 --> 14:42.872 I ask for continued strong support from Congress 14:42.872 --> 14:45.154 and from the American people to provide our service 14:45.154 --> 14:48.300 men and women everything they need to accomplish 14:48.300 --> 14:49.860 their vital missions and lead healthy, 14:49.860 --> 14:53.049 fulfilling lives in continued service to our nation. 14:53.049 --> 14:55.240 Thank you, again, for allowing me to represent 14:55.240 --> 14:57.810 the men and women of CENTCOM before you today. 14:57.810 --> 14:59.210 I look forward to your questions. 14:59.210 --> 15:00.770 - Thank you very much, General Votel. 15:00.770 --> 15:03.420 I'm going to bring up three things that have 15:03.420 --> 15:07.030 grown into some controversy and they should not have 15:07.030 --> 15:10.910 and just very briefly get your opinion on that. 15:10.910 --> 15:14.818 First of all, as we draw down, I'd made some statement 15:14.818 --> 15:18.327 about, characterizing what the president's position was 15:18.327 --> 15:23.327 in Syria and that was challenged by some not too friendly 15:24.090 --> 15:27.850 media on this and I'd like to quote what the president 15:27.850 --> 15:31.830 actually said initially, he said, "We'll have a slow and 15:31.830 --> 15:36.830 "highly coordinated draw down and we will be leaving at a 15:38.247 --> 15:42.958 "proper pace while at the same time continuing to fight ISIS 15:42.958 --> 15:47.958 "and doing all else that is prudent and necessary." 15:48.250 --> 15:50.770 Do you think these are the proper conditions 15:50.770 --> 15:53.490 and this is your understanding also of his position? 15:53.490 --> 15:56.530 - In the instructions that I have been given and we 15:56.530 --> 16:00.399 have issued down to our organizations in Syria, 16:00.399 --> 16:03.519 that represents our approach, a very deliberate 16:03.519 --> 16:06.150 approach to how we depart Syria. 16:06.150 --> 16:08.790 - Yeah, I think that was certainly our understanding. 16:08.790 --> 16:11.808 Do you believe that the territorial state of ISIS 16:11.808 --> 16:14.883 will be eliminated by the time that US draws down? 16:15.850 --> 16:18.210 - I do, Senator, Chairman. 16:18.210 --> 16:21.651 - And what's being done to prevent ISIS 16:21.651 --> 16:24.810 from re-emerging at this time. 16:24.810 --> 16:27.330 - Well, we continue to work with our Iraqi Security 16:27.330 --> 16:30.295 Force partners and international coalition here to continue 16:30.295 --> 16:35.136 to keep pressure on ISIS and we continue our 16:35.136 --> 16:38.370 efforts by, with, and through our partners in Syria 16:38.370 --> 16:42.470 and in some cases for them to keep pressure 16:42.470 --> 16:47.470 on ISIS as they continue to present threats to us. 16:47.680 --> 16:50.956 We should expect that they will attempt to attack us 16:50.956 --> 16:54.865 and continue to regenerate themselves and we will 16:54.865 --> 16:58.760 continue to put pressure on them to prevent that. 16:58.760 --> 16:59.593 - Alright, very good. 16:59.593 --> 17:02.190 The second area that could be subject to some 17:02.190 --> 17:04.970 misinterpretation has to do with Yemen. 17:04.970 --> 17:08.842 I am concerned that disengaging our partners 17:08.842 --> 17:12.470 in Yemen will undermine Israel, bolster Iran, 17:12.470 --> 17:14.610 and increase human suffering. 17:14.610 --> 17:16.280 In your assessment, what are the costs 17:16.280 --> 17:19.773 of disengagement from our partners in Yemen? 17:21.310 --> 17:24.940 - Well, certainly, there is a very significant 17:24.940 --> 17:29.255 humanitarian disaster in Yemen but I do believe departing 17:29.255 --> 17:33.251 from our partners there removes the leverage that we 17:33.251 --> 17:36.080 have to continue to influence them which I think 17:36.080 --> 17:39.120 we have used in a positive manner and I think 17:39.120 --> 17:42.153 it further endangers Americans in the region. 17:43.270 --> 17:44.103 - I appreciate that. 17:44.103 --> 17:47.310 And the third one has to do with IMET, the IMET program. 17:47.310 --> 17:50.810 I've always been very partial to that primarily my 17:50.810 --> 17:54.456 activity's been in Africa, it's been so successful 17:54.456 --> 17:58.560 not just in Africa but around the world, that we see 17:58.560 --> 18:03.007 China and Russia both, particularly China, trying to beat 18:03.007 --> 18:06.698 us to the punch on the IMET program recognizing that 18:06.698 --> 18:11.698 some of our middle officers are getting training in 18:16.230 --> 18:18.800 a country that they are we'd forever. 18:18.800 --> 18:21.330 We've seen this happen but I think right 18:21.330 --> 18:24.320 now China is starting to do the same thing. 18:24.320 --> 18:27.110 So what do you see as far as the benefits 18:27.110 --> 18:30.359 of IMET and is China moving in on us? 18:30.359 --> 18:33.750 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I think China 18:33.750 --> 18:35.880 is opportunistic and they will look for places that 18:35.880 --> 18:39.665 they can step in where we or others may create voids. 18:39.665 --> 18:43.432 To your comments on IMET, I think IMET, International 18:43.432 --> 18:47.687 Military Education Training funding dollar for dollar 18:47.687 --> 18:51.462 is perhaps one of the best tools that the Department 18:51.462 --> 18:53.520 of Defense, Department of State can wield 18:53.520 --> 18:56.810 in building our partnerships throughout the region. 18:56.810 --> 18:59.163 Typically the people who take advantage of these 18:59.163 --> 19:02.501 resources and come to our schools in the United States 19:02.501 --> 19:05.830 often rise to positions of leadership in their countries. 19:05.830 --> 19:08.191 They don't forget the experience they had in our military 19:08.191 --> 19:11.787 schools and most importantly, they don't forget 19:11.787 --> 19:16.520 the American people and I think this is an extraordinarily 19:16.520 --> 19:19.633 wise investment for us to continue to make. 19:19.633 --> 19:22.730 - I sure agree with that and you're probably aware that 19:22.730 --> 19:26.547 in Africa, China has invited in one meeting 50 of the 19:26.547 --> 19:31.547 leaders of the 52 nations in Africa to China, wining, 19:32.190 --> 19:34.682 dining, and all this, trying to move in on that program is 19:34.682 --> 19:37.837 something we all to be very sensitive to because they 19:37.837 --> 19:41.960 realize the benefits that we've received from that program. 19:41.960 --> 19:42.793 Senator Reed. 19:44.440 --> 19:45.620 - Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 19:45.620 --> 19:48.900 First, General Votel, let me join you in recognizing the 19:48.900 --> 19:52.024 Sergeant Major, thank you for your service, Sergeant Major. 19:52.024 --> 19:54.360 Generals only become generals if they listen 19:54.360 --> 19:56.100 to their first sergeants and sergeant majors 19:56.100 --> 20:00.543 so we both admit the truth for the moment here. 20:01.760 --> 20:04.160 General Votel, thank you again for your 20:04.160 --> 20:06.593 extraordinary service in so many different ways. 20:06.593 --> 20:09.670 When General McKenzie was here he stated that 20:09.670 --> 20:12.890 ISIS probably still is more capable than Al-Qaeda 20:12.890 --> 20:16.120 in Iraq at its peak suggesting it is well positioned 20:16.120 --> 20:19.190 to re-emerge if pressure on the group is relieved. 20:19.190 --> 20:22.430 And our, you pointed out, 20:22.430 --> 20:24.222 our staged withdrawal from Syria, 20:24.222 --> 20:26.920 almost in effect lessens some of 20:26.920 --> 20:30.198 the pressure that's on ISIS. 20:30.198 --> 20:33.930 So, do you concur with the general that there 20:33.930 --> 20:38.612 will be some renewed vigor with respect to ISIS? 20:38.612 --> 20:40.123 - I do agree Senator. 20:44.349 --> 20:47.623 - And we're trying as a alternate approach to 20:48.691 --> 20:51.300 at least posit the idea that we can conduct airstrikes 20:51.300 --> 20:53.560 from Iraq and we can have forces in Iraq. 20:53.560 --> 20:56.770 Is that the fall back position? 20:56.770 --> 20:59.512 - Senator, right now we are working through a variety of 20:59.512 --> 21:04.512 planning scenarios for how we would potentially continue 21:06.220 --> 21:10.950 to maintain pressure on ISIS as we withdraw out of Syria. 21:10.950 --> 21:12.960 I'd be happy to, I think that's probably a discussion 21:12.960 --> 21:15.584 more appropriate for the closed session but we certainly 21:15.584 --> 21:18.470 are looking at all options for how we might do that. 21:18.470 --> 21:21.010 - And again, this might be something you can touch 21:21.010 --> 21:24.981 on later but there have been some indications that the SDF, 21:24.981 --> 21:29.981 given the announcement which was rather sudden of our plans 21:31.590 --> 21:34.909 to pull out, have made approaches to the Assad regime 21:34.909 --> 21:39.630 to work out a kind of understanding of how they 21:39.630 --> 21:42.290 might cooperate, at least tolerate each other. 21:42.290 --> 21:44.130 Is that something that's been happening. 21:44.130 --> 21:46.140 - Senator I think something we've learned 21:46.140 --> 21:47.843 in our experience, certainly in my experience, 21:47.843 --> 21:50.390 is that all these parties talk to each other all 21:50.390 --> 21:54.413 the time and so we do expect that that is occurring. 21:56.049 --> 22:01.049 - Turning to Afghanistan, there's two major functions, one 22:01.220 --> 22:06.220 is train and equip the Afghan forces and counterterrorism. 22:11.582 --> 22:14.520 If we withdraw, presumably the first elements that will go 22:14.520 --> 22:18.360 are the train and equip and the last elements would be 22:18.360 --> 22:21.070 counterterrorism because we have threats in the region. 22:21.070 --> 22:24.519 Is that a fair summary of the process? 22:24.519 --> 22:27.014 - Senator, again, I think is probably something that 22:27.014 --> 22:29.885 would be better discussed in a closed session but I think 22:29.885 --> 22:34.885 we have a more sophisticated way of looking at that. 22:35.240 --> 22:37.990 We understand the importance of both of those missions. 22:38.830 --> 22:42.228 - Turning to the situation in Afghanistan again, 22:42.228 --> 22:47.008 if we were to withdraw and there is mounting pressure and 22:47.008 --> 22:52.008 mounting evidence that that is a path that might be pursued, 22:54.346 --> 22:59.346 we still provide the Afghan security forces about $4 billion 22:59.688 --> 23:04.688 a year in sustenance, so if we were to withdraw our forces, 23:07.040 --> 23:09.600 we would still have to maintain the $4 billion 23:09.600 --> 23:12.730 a year contribution or those Afghan forces would 23:12.730 --> 23:15.293 disintegrate, is that an accurate assessment? 23:16.420 --> 23:18.680 - There certainly would need to be continued support 23:18.680 --> 23:23.008 to the Afghan forces, the amounts certainly we'd have 23:23.008 --> 23:27.900 to look at but yes, I think that's accurate, Senator. 23:27.900 --> 23:32.900 Again, that money there without us does make it challenging. 23:35.480 --> 23:37.811 - Indeed because I think one of the things we provide 23:37.811 --> 23:41.160 with the presence is to a degree at least, 23:41.160 --> 23:42.760 the money is being spent appropriately. 23:42.760 --> 23:45.950 I think the experience we've had elsewhere is if we just 23:45.950 --> 23:48.623 send money, it gets to places we don't want it to go. 23:52.457 --> 23:54.830 And again I think as you're doing this has to be a very, 23:54.830 --> 23:59.340 very careful thought out second order effects, third order 23:59.340 --> 24:04.340 effects, and indeed I think the issue is not just it's such 24:04.711 --> 24:09.227 a complicated multinational, multi factor analysis. 24:11.770 --> 24:14.050 We have not yet gotten the government 24:14.050 --> 24:15.900 of Afghanistan in the negotiations, 24:15.900 --> 24:18.250 they're still on the sidelines, that's correct? 24:20.000 --> 24:23.034 - That's what Ambassador Khalilzad has reported, Senator. 24:23.034 --> 24:25.243 - And long term I think our instincts, and we've been 24:25.243 --> 24:29.040 dealing with this for 17 years, is that unless there's 24:29.040 --> 24:32.241 some type of regional buy in which would include Pakistan, 24:32.241 --> 24:36.550 Iran to a degree, China because of its influence, 24:36.550 --> 24:39.050 Russia because of influence, the Stans because 24:39.050 --> 24:41.027 of their influence, the likelihood of something 24:41.027 --> 24:44.920 stable is probably minimal, is that accurate? 24:44.920 --> 24:47.299 - Absolutely, a key part of the strategy has been 24:47.299 --> 24:50.240 the regionalization and I would add, Senator, 24:50.240 --> 24:52.730 that Pakistan, in my estimation, has played 24:52.730 --> 24:56.700 the more helpful role in, a more constructive role 24:56.700 --> 25:00.110 in helping us move forward towards this objective. 25:00.110 --> 25:01.646 - Just one quick question. 25:01.646 --> 25:04.300 We were able to identify through great staff work 25:04.300 --> 25:09.220 by both sides that the governments of Saudi Arabia and 25:09.220 --> 25:13.730 the UAE owe the United States $331 million for refueling. 25:13.730 --> 25:15.670 Have you received a definite commitment that 25:15.670 --> 25:18.093 they are going to repay that money they owe us? 25:19.360 --> 25:21.280 - Senator, we are working through that. 25:21.280 --> 25:23.970 Both those governments have acknowledged the bills 25:23.970 --> 25:28.530 that we have provided them, have indicated to us that 25:28.530 --> 25:31.249 they will meet the payment schedule in accordance with the 25:31.249 --> 25:36.249 ACSA and we have teams from CENTCOM, from AFCENT, from DLA, 25:37.970 --> 25:42.640 that are working to resolve that satisfactorily. 25:42.640 --> 25:46.157 - And you have looked at other beneficiaries 25:46.157 --> 25:49.840 in your command to ensure that there aren't other 25:49.840 --> 25:52.173 areas where they're deficient in paying? 25:53.940 --> 25:56.193 - We have, Senator. 25:57.172 --> 25:58.169 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 25:58.169 --> 25:59.002 - [Chairman Inhofe] Thank you, Senator Reed. 25:59.002 --> 26:00.300 Senator Wicker. 26:00.300 --> 26:03.290 - Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself not only 26:03.290 --> 26:06.354 with your opening statement but with a very fine opening 26:06.354 --> 26:10.883 statement of the ranking Democrat on this committee. 26:12.750 --> 26:16.660 And particularly thank Senator Reed for pointing 26:16.660 --> 26:21.660 out the cost of getting it wrong as we 26:22.280 --> 26:27.240 withdraw from both Syria and Afghanistan. 26:27.240 --> 26:30.070 I'm going to enter into the record at this point 26:30.070 --> 26:33.949 Mr. Chairman an op-ed that appeared in the Washington Post 26:33.949 --> 26:38.949 on January 29 by Ambassador Ryan Crocker entitled, 26:40.527 --> 26:42.757 "I was ambassador to Afghanistan. 26:42.757 --> 26:44.807 "This deal is a surrender." 26:45.790 --> 26:47.133 - [Chairman Inhofe] Without objection. 26:49.720 --> 26:52.416 - General thank you for service. 26:52.416 --> 26:57.187 Just to follow up on a couple points that Senator Reed made 26:57.187 --> 27:00.625 with regard to the $4 billion a year contribution, 27:00.625 --> 27:05.150 you're not quite sure that it would still be that amount. 27:05.150 --> 27:07.396 But it's close to that amount that we would still be 27:07.396 --> 27:12.321 obligated to pay and we still need to contribute and we 27:12.321 --> 27:17.321 would not have the oversight on the ground that we have now? 27:19.273 --> 27:22.690 - That would be correct if we departed, Senator. 27:22.690 --> 27:26.217 - And I think also Senator Reed pointed out that this 27:26.217 --> 27:31.217 agreement with regard to the Taliban in Afghanistan has 27:34.955 --> 27:39.955 been made without the participation of the government 27:41.980 --> 27:44.800 of Afghanistan and that is correct is it not? 27:44.800 --> 27:47.221 - Senator, the work of Ambassador Khalilzad, 27:47.221 --> 27:50.464 first of all there have been no agreements 27:50.464 --> 27:53.220 that have actually been finalized. 27:53.220 --> 27:54.715 - [Senator Wicker] There's been a framework agreement? 27:54.715 --> 27:57.173 - What I would describe has worked is creating 27:57.173 --> 28:01.400 a framework for continuing discussions moving forward here. 28:01.400 --> 28:03.900 Ambassador Khalilzad's efforts are done with 28:03.900 --> 28:05.889 the knowledge of the government of Afghanistan. 28:05.889 --> 28:08.382 They are aware that we are doing this and they have 28:08.382 --> 28:13.382 supported our efforts to get this process started. 28:13.430 --> 28:15.079 Ultimately, we need to get to 28:15.079 --> 28:18.320 a Taliban, Afghanistan discussion. 28:18.320 --> 28:20.038 Only they will be able to resolve 28:20.038 --> 28:23.840 the key issues involved in the dispute. 28:23.840 --> 28:26.040 - In the op-ed that I've entered into the record, 28:26.040 --> 28:29.041 Ambassador Crocker points out "The framework was reached 28:29.041 --> 28:31.990 "without the involvement of the Afghan government." 28:31.990 --> 28:34.497 He goes on to say that "The Taliban has said all 28:34.497 --> 28:38.008 "along that it refuses to negotiate with the government 28:38.008 --> 28:41.257 "considering the government the illegitimate 28:41.257 --> 28:43.261 "puppet of the United States occupation." 28:43.261 --> 28:46.824 His opinion is "By acceding to this Taliban demand, 28:46.824 --> 28:50.697 "we have ourselves delegitimized 28:50.697 --> 28:54.310 "the government we claim to support." 28:54.310 --> 28:56.357 He goes on to say "This current process bears 28:56.357 --> 28:58.222 "an unfortunate resemblance to the Paris 28:58.222 --> 29:01.997 "peace talks during the Vietnam War. 29:01.997 --> 29:04.207 "Then, as now, it was clear that by going 29:04.207 --> 29:06.357 "to the table we were surrendering." 29:07.780 --> 29:12.480 Further Ambassador Crocker says, "The United States could 29:12.480 --> 29:15.767 "announce that talks won't proceed beyond the framework, 29:15.767 --> 29:17.707 "to matters of substance, without the full 29:17.707 --> 29:20.347 "inclusion of the Afghan government. 29:20.347 --> 29:21.510 "Right now, the inclusion of 29:21.510 --> 29:23.320 the Afghans is only theoretical." 29:23.320 --> 29:26.137 And I think you touched on that, General. 29:26.137 --> 29:28.307 "We could also note that unless some other solution is 29:28.307 --> 29:30.750 "found, US troops will remain in Afghanistan 29:30.750 --> 29:34.160 "as long as the current government wants them." 29:34.160 --> 29:37.263 The current government of Afghanistan wants us to continue 29:37.263 --> 29:41.576 our presence there, is that right General Votel? 29:41.576 --> 29:44.220 - That is my understanding, Senator. 29:44.220 --> 29:47.647 - And then the ambassador concludes, "President Barack 29:47.647 --> 29:50.747 "Obama proved in Iraq that the United States cannot 29:50.747 --> 29:52.637 "end a war by withdrawing its forces, 29:52.637 --> 29:57.320 "the battle space is simply left to our adversaries." 29:57.320 --> 29:59.711 I've asked you a question or two about specifics, 29:59.711 --> 30:04.711 but had you read this op-ed before and I've 30:04.950 --> 30:08.410 read to you extensively from it, would you 30:08.410 --> 30:11.223 respond to that for the benefit of the committee? 30:12.410 --> 30:14.656 - Senator, I have read Ambassador Crocker's 30:14.656 --> 30:17.616 article here, his editorial, and I know 30:17.616 --> 30:21.580 Ambassador Crocker, I deeply respect him. 30:21.580 --> 30:25.430 He's certainly one of our leading experts on the region 30:25.430 --> 30:29.381 here and a keen observer of what is happening out there. 30:29.381 --> 30:32.654 From my position as a CENTCOM commander and my discussions 30:32.654 --> 30:35.700 with Ambassador Khalilzad, with General Miller 30:35.700 --> 30:39.080 on the ground, I would characterize where we are 30:39.080 --> 30:42.480 in the process as very, very early in the process. 30:42.480 --> 30:45.630 As I said, Ambassador Khalilzad is attempting to create a 30:45.630 --> 30:48.900 framework by which we can move forward with discussions that 30:48.900 --> 30:52.720 would be certainly involving the government of Afghanistan. 30:52.720 --> 30:54.914 We clearly recognize that that is, that they 30:54.914 --> 30:58.610 have to be part of this solution and must 30:58.610 --> 31:03.610 be in the negotiation aspects of this. 31:04.600 --> 31:06.490 We can't do that on their behalf. 31:06.490 --> 31:09.330 But I do recognize also that the government of Afghanistan 31:09.330 --> 31:13.430 is being consulted as Ambassador Khalilzad does his work. 31:13.430 --> 31:16.668 They're being kept informed of this and are aware of the 31:16.668 --> 31:21.300 work that we are doing to move forward on these talks. 31:21.300 --> 31:25.330 - Well, let me just say, I appreciate your answer. 31:25.330 --> 31:28.050 I hope that turns out to be true and I just want it to be 31:28.050 --> 31:33.050 said that the concerns in this city are bipartisan concerns 31:33.976 --> 31:38.976 and based on advice and counsel that we received from people 31:40.318 --> 31:44.044 who've been involved in this for a long, long time and who 31:44.044 --> 31:47.720 understand how important it is for us to get this right. 31:47.720 --> 31:48.553 Thank you, sir. 32:02.220 --> 32:04.330 - [Senator Reed] Senator Reed presiding 32:04.330 --> 32:05.660 for the next 20 minutes or so. 32:05.660 --> 32:07.560 Senator Shaheen. 32:07.560 --> 32:09.110 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 32:09.110 --> 32:11.090 And thank you General Votel for your 32:11.090 --> 32:13.311 many years of service to this country. 32:13.311 --> 32:16.201 I heard former Afghanistan Commander Nicholson 32:16.201 --> 32:19.250 being interviewed this morning and he was asked 32:19.250 --> 32:21.840 about the circumstance under which we 32:21.840 --> 32:23.480 should withdraw from Afghanistan. 32:23.480 --> 32:26.020 And he talked about the fact that it should be conditions 32:26.020 --> 32:29.720 based, it should not be based on an arbitrary timeline 32:29.720 --> 32:32.220 or numbers of troops that we want to leave there. 32:32.220 --> 32:35.820 So, have you and General Miller been given 32:35.820 --> 32:39.049 conditions whereby we should withdraw troops 32:39.049 --> 32:43.320 from Afghanistan and if so, what are those conditions? 32:43.320 --> 32:46.500 - Senator, I think some of that discussion is best left 32:46.500 --> 32:49.960 for a different forum here but certainly General Miller 32:49.960 --> 32:53.510 and I speak very frequently about the ongoing situation 32:53.510 --> 32:56.583 in Afghanistan and the circumstances that we are 32:56.583 --> 32:59.670 trying to create to support Ambassador Khalilzad 32:59.670 --> 33:02.553 and move forward with the reconciliation process. 33:03.400 --> 33:06.630 - I share the concerns that have been raised by Senators 33:06.630 --> 33:10.637 Reed and Wicker about what's happening right now in 33:10.637 --> 33:15.637 Afghanistan and particularly the framework that's being put 33:15.750 --> 33:19.490 in place without the engagement of the Afghan government. 33:19.490 --> 33:21.700 Can you tell me how the framework addresses 33:21.700 --> 33:24.330 the rights of women in Afghanistan given 33:24.330 --> 33:27.720 the horrific treatment by the Taliban of women 33:27.720 --> 33:30.390 during the years in which they were in control? 33:30.390 --> 33:33.810 - Senator, I think that perhaps is a question best posed 33:33.810 --> 33:36.160 for Ambassador Khalilzad at this particular point. 33:36.160 --> 33:39.760 I do agree that the progress that has been made 33:39.760 --> 33:44.760 in Afghanistan with women and improving their ability 33:47.431 --> 33:52.317 to be part of the fabric of life in Afghanistan is 33:52.317 --> 33:55.660 an important one that has to be incorporated in this 33:55.660 --> 33:58.915 and I would envision that this would be part of 33:58.915 --> 34:02.430 the more detailed discussions that will take place 34:02.430 --> 34:06.130 between the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan. 34:06.130 --> 34:10.733 But certainly we acknowledge that and we see the goodness 34:10.733 --> 34:13.970 that that has brought to the country of Afghanistan. 34:13.970 --> 34:16.130 - And I would point out that we have actually 34:16.130 --> 34:19.230 passed legislation in this Congress that says 34:19.230 --> 34:21.410 that women should be at the negotiating table 34:21.410 --> 34:24.080 when conflicts are being resolved around the world. 34:24.080 --> 34:26.830 So, is it your understanding that that 34:26.830 --> 34:31.210 is a basis on which we are looking at negotiations? 34:31.210 --> 34:34.630 - Certainly, again, as Ambassador Khalilzad and our 34:34.630 --> 34:38.329 diplomats work with the government of Afghanistan on that 34:38.329 --> 34:43.329 I would imagine they are emphasizing that legislation. 34:45.574 --> 34:50.056 - To move to Syria, there is the report of a new 34:50.056 --> 34:55.056 DOD Inspector General report relative to ISIS 34:55.204 --> 34:59.640 and the report says that the command organization 34:59.640 --> 35:03.760 for ISIS is intact and its fighters are battle hardened. 35:03.760 --> 35:06.330 That's a quote from the report. 35:06.330 --> 35:09.330 And it goes on to say that within a year, 35:09.330 --> 35:11.891 US military commanders told the IG 35:11.891 --> 35:15.023 that ISIS would be resurgent in Syria. 35:17.800 --> 35:22.740 Can you talk about how we can prevent ISIS 35:22.740 --> 35:27.740 from becoming resurgent if we have no troops in Syria 35:28.280 --> 35:33.280 and if Iran and Russian and Assad are in control in Syria? 35:37.029 --> 35:40.477 - Senator, as I mentioned in my opening comments, 35:40.477 --> 35:43.020 that is an aspect of the ongoing 35:43.020 --> 35:45.320 planning that we are pursuing right now. 35:45.320 --> 35:47.980 The answer to the question is we do have to keep 35:47.980 --> 35:51.618 pressure on this network, that it is a resilient network, 35:51.618 --> 35:54.412 it does have certain components that are still left 35:54.412 --> 35:57.613 in it although they are dispersed and disaggregated. 35:57.613 --> 36:01.090 They have the capability of coming back together 36:01.090 --> 36:03.440 if we don't and so there are a a variety 36:03.440 --> 36:05.990 of different things that I'd be happy to talk about. 36:05.990 --> 36:08.180 Some of the things under consideration as we get into the 36:08.180 --> 36:11.280 closed session here, I won't speculate publicly here about 36:11.280 --> 36:13.839 things that we might do, but there certainly are different 36:13.839 --> 36:16.290 ways that we can do this, working with partners, 36:16.290 --> 36:20.010 working with our own capabilities to continue to keep 36:20.010 --> 36:24.040 pressure on this network which I think is absolutely vital. 36:24.040 --> 36:27.157 - So, you do agree with the Inspector General that ISIS is 36:27.157 --> 36:30.480 a scourge that's latent in both Syria and Iraq 36:30.480 --> 36:34.690 and it has the potential to resurge if not addressed? 36:34.690 --> 36:35.920 - I do agree. 36:35.920 --> 36:37.060 - Thank you. 36:37.060 --> 36:42.060 As I know you're aware, when we provide or sell US 36:43.270 --> 36:46.390 weapons to end users there are requirements which 36:46.390 --> 36:49.650 prohibit the transfer of any of those weapons to third 36:49.650 --> 36:53.068 parties without prior authorization from the US government. 36:53.068 --> 36:57.514 In legislation that we passed relative to Yemen, there are 36:57.514 --> 37:02.514 requirements for us to certify how the Saudis are using 37:03.786 --> 37:08.786 weapons and so far we have not gotten authoritative 37:11.660 --> 37:15.760 certification of how those weapons are being used 37:15.760 --> 37:20.111 and there is again a recent CNN report that suggests that 37:20.111 --> 37:25.111 weapons that have been provided to UAE and to Saudi Arabia 37:25.990 --> 37:28.730 have wound up in the hands of Houthis, that they have 37:28.730 --> 37:32.660 been traded and been used on both sides of that conflict. 37:32.660 --> 37:36.233 Can you talk about what DOD is doing to address that? 37:37.170 --> 37:40.147 - Well, Senator, I am aware of the references that 37:40.147 --> 37:44.410 you're making to that and we have not authorized 37:44.410 --> 37:48.677 Saudi Arabia or the Emirates to re-transfer any of this 37:48.677 --> 37:52.620 equipment to other parties on the ground in Yemen. 37:52.620 --> 37:57.620 And as you are well aware, when we do provide equipment, 37:57.630 --> 37:59.780 whether it comes government to government or commercially 37:59.780 --> 38:04.313 provided, the recipients do have to agree to certain 38:04.313 --> 38:08.292 stipulations on the use of those and that we do have 38:08.292 --> 38:11.635 monitoring and enforcing mechanisms that sometimes go 38:11.635 --> 38:14.280 through the Department of State if it's commercially 38:14.280 --> 38:16.447 provided, through the Department of Defense if it's 38:16.447 --> 38:20.030 government to government provided and requires us 38:20.030 --> 38:24.020 to conduct surveys, requires us to conduct inventories 38:24.020 --> 38:27.792 of this type of equipment so we know where it is. 38:27.792 --> 38:29.440 So, there are processes in place with this. 38:29.440 --> 38:32.030 I would also highlight that in some of these cases, again, 38:32.030 --> 38:35.140 I think we have to look more closely at the allegations 38:35.140 --> 38:37.900 in this particular situation to find out what happened. 38:37.900 --> 38:40.677 As we've seen in Iraq in the past where we saw 38:40.677 --> 38:43.984 our partners overrun, we have seen American equipment 38:43.984 --> 38:47.994 provided to them lost in the course of a fight 38:47.994 --> 38:52.437 end up in the hands of our adversaries out there. 38:52.437 --> 38:56.910 And so I think we will have to examine that better. 38:56.910 --> 39:00.080 But to your point, our responsibilities in terms 39:00.080 --> 39:04.328 of ensuring proper end use of the materials, we absolutely 39:04.328 --> 39:09.328 get that and emphasize that with our partners all the time. 39:09.440 --> 39:10.370 - [Senator Shaheen] Thank you. 39:10.370 --> 39:11.430 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 39:11.430 --> 39:12.920 - [Senator Reed] On behalf of the Chairman, 39:12.920 --> 39:14.520 let me recognize Senator Cotton. 39:15.860 --> 39:17.470 - Thank you, General, for appearing 39:17.470 --> 39:18.870 to testify one last time. 39:18.870 --> 39:20.272 I know it breaks your heart that 39:20.272 --> 39:21.800 this will be your last time to testify. 39:21.800 --> 39:23.780 Most importantly, thank you for your many years of service 39:23.780 --> 39:26.970 and thanks to your whole team for their service as well. 39:26.970 --> 39:29.590 We've heard a lot about what might happen in the future 39:29.590 --> 39:32.494 against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq but I 39:32.494 --> 39:35.900 don't think we've heard just yet a simple answer about 39:35.900 --> 39:37.580 how the fight's going so could you tell us how 39:37.580 --> 39:41.088 the fight is going against the Islamic State right now? 39:41.088 --> 39:45.955 - In Syria, as you know, we are focused on completing 39:45.955 --> 39:49.929 the liberation of the physical caliphate, that is. 39:49.929 --> 39:51.790 - Where in Syria are you doing that right now? 39:51.790 --> 39:55.550 - In the southern Euphrates Valley, 39:55.550 --> 39:58.330 up against the border with Iraq right now. 39:58.330 --> 40:03.330 That fight is progressing as we envisioned it. 40:04.540 --> 40:07.155 As I mentioned in my opening comments, 40:07.155 --> 40:08.550 it is limited to a relatively small area. 40:08.550 --> 40:10.776 It's very dense, it's dense urban terrain. 40:10.776 --> 40:14.880 And certainly there is a lot of pressure on ISIS in there. 40:14.880 --> 40:18.114 The area is laden with extreme explosive hazards 40:18.114 --> 40:21.440 that pose significant threats to our partners on 40:21.440 --> 40:23.950 the ground so they're having to proceed very closely. 40:23.950 --> 40:26.260 And I would add, Senator, that there is 40:26.260 --> 40:28.632 a civilian component, there are families of fighters, 40:28.632 --> 40:31.104 there are civilians left in town, there are refugees 40:31.104 --> 40:33.920 that are attempting to depart this area so what we 40:33.920 --> 40:37.447 have seen as we've kind of closed into this last area 40:37.447 --> 40:41.090 here is our Syrian Democratic Force partners with 40:41.090 --> 40:44.098 coalition assistance moving very deliberately, 40:44.098 --> 40:47.340 fully recognizing the situation on the ground and making 40:47.340 --> 40:50.930 sure they don't exacerbate this any more than it is. 40:50.930 --> 40:52.630 But we remain confident that we will 40:52.630 --> 40:54.170 finish this aspect of it. 40:54.170 --> 40:56.490 When we get done with this, what we should expect 40:56.490 --> 40:59.771 that there will be, we will do what you would remember 40:59.771 --> 41:03.170 as back clearance going back and reclearing areas, 41:03.170 --> 41:05.970 removing explosive hazards, instituting local security 41:05.970 --> 41:09.113 and then continuing to keep pressure on the remnants 41:09.113 --> 41:13.260 of the network that have gone to ground and are 41:13.260 --> 41:15.697 operating in a much more insurgent aspect. 41:16.765 --> 41:19.230 In Iraq, that is the case. 41:19.230 --> 41:22.071 We do see ISIS operating in 41:22.071 --> 41:24.750 a guerrilla or an insurgent fashion. 41:24.750 --> 41:27.429 They are at a level where for the most 41:27.429 --> 41:30.774 part the Iraqi Security Forces with the assistance 41:30.774 --> 41:34.423 of the coalition are able to address those threats. 41:34.423 --> 41:38.262 That will be important to continue to do that in the future. 41:38.262 --> 41:40.820 So, in Iraq and Syria that's where we 41:40.820 --> 41:43.730 are with the current fight right now, Senator. 41:43.730 --> 41:46.336 - In Syria, I've heard it said that we've taken 41:46.336 --> 41:50.700 back about 99% what was once the territorial caliphate, 41:50.700 --> 41:52.040 is that number correct? 41:52.040 --> 41:53.750 - That's right, we're down to about 20 41:53.750 --> 41:57.620 square miles that they still control. 41:57.620 --> 42:00.044 - I've also heard estimates of about 20 to 30,000 42:00.044 --> 42:04.000 Islamic State fighters remain, do they remain in that 42:04.000 --> 42:07.450 one percent of territory or is that only a fraction? 42:07.450 --> 42:10.345 - No, those fighters are geographically 42:10.345 --> 42:15.345 dispersed across Syria, across the open areas. 42:17.210 --> 42:18.790 - Some are dug in in the defensive 42:18.790 --> 42:20.930 in that one percent, others as you say are spread 42:20.930 --> 42:23.737 out conducting insurgency or guerrilla type attacks? 42:23.737 --> 42:25.740 - There's probably 1,000 to 1,500 fighters that are left 42:25.740 --> 42:29.650 down in this small area right now that we're fighting over. 42:29.650 --> 42:32.080 But the remainder have dispersed and are 42:32.080 --> 42:34.560 disaggregated in a variety of different areas 42:34.560 --> 42:36.850 and for the most part have gone to ground. 42:36.850 --> 42:40.360 - And in Iraq and very soon we hope throughout Syria 42:40.360 --> 42:43.190 as well, as you talked about countering that insurgency, 42:43.190 --> 42:45.980 those guerrilla tactics, the back clearance, could you 42:45.980 --> 42:47.900 give the American people a little bit of a sense of what our 42:47.900 --> 42:50.190 troops in Iraq are doing or is more like the rangers you 42:50.190 --> 42:53.400 once led, kicking down the doors and shooting bad guys? 42:53.400 --> 42:54.970 Or are we providing them intelligence, 42:54.970 --> 42:56.950 logistic, aerial support? 42:56.950 --> 43:00.673 - The technique that we have used in both Iraq and Syria is 43:00.673 --> 43:03.332 what we refer to as by, with, and through and we have relied 43:03.332 --> 43:06.833 on our partners, Iraqi Security Forces and Syrian Democratic 43:06.833 --> 43:11.710 Forces, to do the fighting and our job has been to enable 43:11.710 --> 43:15.330 them with our fires, with our ISR, with our advice. 43:15.330 --> 43:18.890 Sometimes we do employ our fires in support of them and 43:18.890 --> 43:23.890 directly engage the enemy but our people are not actually, 43:25.440 --> 43:27.670 as you suggest, kicking in doors in this case. 43:27.670 --> 43:29.730 By, with, and through puts the emphasis 43:29.730 --> 43:32.061 on our partners to do this and then we 43:32.061 --> 43:35.630 enable them with our capabilities to do this. 43:35.630 --> 43:38.530 And this has been a very effective approach 43:38.530 --> 43:41.443 over the last several years and I think in the end our 43:41.443 --> 43:46.357 partners own what is left behind, we don't, they own it. 43:46.357 --> 43:49.610 They own the security, they own the responsibility for this. 43:49.610 --> 43:51.390 This has been a different approach for us but it 43:51.390 --> 43:54.020 is one that I think has worked very well for us. 43:54.020 --> 43:55.246 - Thank you. 43:55.246 --> 43:57.110 One final question about the implications for the future. 43:57.110 --> 44:00.149 Syrian Democratic Forces currently are detaining 44:00.149 --> 44:03.723 several hundred ISIS fighters, is that correct? 44:03.723 --> 44:05.280 - That is correct. 44:05.280 --> 44:06.790 - We won't getting into any more details in the open 44:06.790 --> 44:09.106 setting here about the exact numbers or locations but is 44:09.106 --> 44:13.071 it safe to assume some of those are what ISIS leaders 44:13.071 --> 44:16.400 would just call cannon fodder troops to be thrown into 44:16.400 --> 44:19.570 the maw but some are like Khalid Sheik Mohammed, 44:19.570 --> 44:23.430 terrorist masterminds, or Ibrahim al-Asiri master bomb 44:23.430 --> 44:26.140 makers who pose a serious threat to the United States? 44:26.140 --> 44:28.290 - I think that's accurate, Senator. 44:28.290 --> 44:30.850 They come from all aspects of ISIS. 44:30.850 --> 44:34.080 - So, what's gonna happen to those detainees, 44:34.080 --> 44:36.619 especially those extremely dangerous detainees, 44:36.619 --> 44:39.520 in the future if the United States is not present? 44:39.520 --> 44:41.920 - Well, Senator, for those that we kind of characterize 44:41.920 --> 44:44.524 as foreign terrorist fighters, our focus needs to be 44:44.524 --> 44:47.934 on returning them to the countries of origin and that is 44:47.934 --> 44:52.934 the work of our partners in the Department of State, 44:53.140 --> 44:55.323 Department of Justice and others who are working with 44:55.323 --> 44:58.750 their counterparts in these countries of origin 44:58.750 --> 45:01.870 to make sure they have the evidence, the details, 45:01.870 --> 45:03.480 and we can make arrangements. 45:03.480 --> 45:05.880 Our responsibility at this time is to make sure that 45:05.880 --> 45:08.679 the Syrian Democratic Forces continue to treat detainees 45:08.679 --> 45:12.600 in accordance with our values, with the law 45:12.600 --> 45:14.605 of armed conflict, and then to facilitate 45:14.605 --> 45:17.630 the movement of these fighters back to their countries. 45:17.630 --> 45:18.463 - Thank you, General. 45:18.463 --> 45:19.640 I hope we can do that with most of them. 45:19.640 --> 45:21.080 I would observe there's a lot 45:21.080 --> 45:23.163 of empty bed space at Guantanamo Bay. 45:25.150 --> 45:27.850 - [Senator Reed] Thank you, on behalf of Chairman Inhofe, 45:27.850 --> 45:30.170 let me recognize Senator Heinrich. 45:30.170 --> 45:31.810 - Welcome General Votel. 45:31.810 --> 45:36.550 A moment ago you described, or in describing by, 45:36.550 --> 45:39.307 with, and through, you mentioned partners left behind 45:39.307 --> 45:41.711 and I want to ask about one of those partners, as our 45:41.711 --> 45:46.120 troops withdraw from Syria, what efforts are being made 45:46.120 --> 45:49.043 to ensure the safety and security of our Kurdish allies? 45:49.990 --> 45:52.360 - Well, certainly, this is a key aspect 45:52.360 --> 45:54.380 of the ongoing planning right now, Senator. 45:54.380 --> 45:59.380 Of the many tasks that we have of defeating ISIS 45:59.430 --> 46:03.030 and withdrawing our forces, certainly we add to that list 46:03.030 --> 46:06.800 the protection of Turkey in making sure that they don't 46:06.800 --> 46:09.700 have threats that would emanate from them and I 46:09.700 --> 46:11.590 would say the added task of making sure that 46:11.590 --> 46:13.970 we protect those who have fought with us. 46:13.970 --> 46:16.660 And so a key aspect of our ongoing planning efforts 46:16.660 --> 46:19.585 right now both at the diplomatic and military level 46:19.585 --> 46:23.634 is to address that very issue and make sure that those 46:23.634 --> 46:26.420 that have fought with us, that have helped us accomplish 46:26.420 --> 46:30.700 the mission are safeguarded as we depart Syria. 46:30.700 --> 46:32.940 - I agree with you that that should be a priority, 46:32.940 --> 46:36.220 I'm asking what are those specific plans? 46:36.220 --> 46:39.000 - Senator, I think it would be more appropriate 46:39.000 --> 46:41.940 for us to talk about what is under consideration 46:41.940 --> 46:43.880 in a closed session right now but we certainly 46:43.880 --> 46:46.200 are looking at a variety of different options. 46:46.200 --> 46:47.360 - I'd be happy to do that. 46:47.360 --> 46:49.750 I worry that there's a lot of lip service right 46:49.750 --> 46:52.790 now about making good on our promises to 46:52.790 --> 46:56.560 the Kurds and it seems that we are short on plans. 46:56.560 --> 46:58.758 I hope that that is not accurate and I certainly 46:58.758 --> 47:01.502 hope that we have a plan for how to deconflict Turkey 47:01.502 --> 47:04.751 and the Kurds because I think the consequences 47:04.751 --> 47:09.751 could be morally terrible if we don't. 47:14.830 --> 47:16.603 Do you believe that currently 47:16.603 --> 47:19.693 the efforts in this area are adequate? 47:20.620 --> 47:22.730 - I do, right now. 47:22.730 --> 47:25.650 I think we have the leadership up and down the chain 47:25.650 --> 47:27.946 of command both in the Department of Defense and the 47:27.946 --> 47:31.500 Department of State fully aligned in our approach as we 47:31.500 --> 47:35.130 work through what is arguably a very complex problem here 47:35.130 --> 47:38.090 but I think we are very well aligned and we are very focused 47:38.090 --> 47:42.033 on exactly the challenge that you have outlined Senator. 47:43.474 --> 47:44.640 - I look forward to hearing more 47:44.640 --> 47:47.370 about that in a closed setting. 47:47.370 --> 47:51.650 General Votel, on February 3rd, President Trump announced 47:51.650 --> 47:55.944 that we would keep troops in Iraq to "watch over Iran." 47:55.944 --> 48:00.183 Has our military focus there shifted from ISIS to Iran? 48:01.210 --> 48:02.660 - It has not, Senator. 48:02.660 --> 48:03.960 - Glad to hear that. 48:03.960 --> 48:07.037 I am concerned with the response in Iraq as 48:07.037 --> 48:10.936 you probably know Iraqi President Salih responded 48:10.936 --> 48:15.133 very quickly saying that the president of 48:15.133 --> 48:18.090 the United States didn't ask Iraq about this. 48:18.090 --> 48:21.478 Are you at all concerned that Iraq will now be skeptical of 48:21.478 --> 48:26.478 our motivations for being there and how will that perception 48:26.839 --> 48:31.839 affect our ability to relocate US troops from Syria to Iraq? 48:32.920 --> 48:36.110 - Senator, I am but this is not particularly newfound. 48:36.110 --> 48:38.672 I think the government of Iraq understands 48:38.672 --> 48:43.672 the relationship, the view that we have on Iran 48:43.700 --> 48:46.388 and understands our concerns with Iran and 48:46.388 --> 48:50.210 the variety of destabilizing activities 48:50.210 --> 48:52.897 that they conduct around the region. 48:52.897 --> 48:55.990 But having said that, our mission, our military 48:55.990 --> 48:59.090 mission on the ground remains very focused on the reason 48:59.090 --> 49:01.737 the government of Iraq asked us to come there 49:01.737 --> 49:04.870 and that is focusing on the defeat of ISIS and now 49:04.870 --> 49:08.440 preventing the resurgence of that particular organization. 49:08.440 --> 49:12.220 - Let me pivot just a little bit to Russia. 49:12.220 --> 49:15.180 General Votel, as you know, on January 30th, 49:15.180 --> 49:18.906 Russia pledged to support Iraq in its fight against ISIS 49:18.906 --> 49:22.960 in preparation for the United States' withdrawal from Syria. 49:22.960 --> 49:27.563 What's your current perception of Russian influence in Iraq? 49:28.870 --> 49:31.660 - I think right now Russia has limited 49:31.660 --> 49:34.530 influence right now in the country of Iraq. 49:34.530 --> 49:38.600 - Do we have plans or a strategy for maintaining, 49:38.600 --> 49:41.723 countering that Russian influence 49:41.723 --> 49:44.750 once withdrawal from Syria is complete? 49:44.750 --> 49:48.248 - Well, I don't have any specific military tasks 49:48.248 --> 49:51.267 that are related to that, Senator, but what I would 49:51.267 --> 49:53.753 highlight is that one of the most effective tools 49:53.753 --> 49:57.060 that we have is being good, reliable partners on 49:57.060 --> 50:00.747 the ground and that is what we intend to do and that 50:00.747 --> 50:04.498 has always been our approach with the country of Iraq. 50:04.498 --> 50:06.690 Focused on what they have asked us to do 50:06.690 --> 50:09.993 and then being very reliable partners to them. 50:11.521 --> 50:12.354 - [Senator Heinrich] Chairman, I'm going to yield 50:12.354 --> 50:14.070 the remainder of my time. 50:14.070 --> 50:15.230 - Thank you, Senator Heinrich, 50:15.230 --> 50:17.830 on behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Scott, please. 50:23.840 --> 50:26.457 - Thanks for all your hard work, thank you for your service. 50:26.457 --> 50:31.300 I met the other day with some opposition leaders from Syria, 50:31.300 --> 50:34.610 and while they expressed some concern about exactly how 50:34.610 --> 50:39.290 the withdrawal would happen, they did ask what the ability 50:39.290 --> 50:42.380 would be to do a no-fly-zone afterwards which they thought 50:42.380 --> 50:47.380 would have a positive impact of keeping Turkey in place. 50:48.720 --> 50:50.130 Have you considered that? 50:50.130 --> 50:51.233 is that doable? 50:53.090 --> 50:55.767 - Again, we're looking at a variety of options that I'll 50:55.767 --> 50:58.830 be happy to talk about in a closed session right here. 50:58.830 --> 51:00.310 I would not characterize what we're 51:00.310 --> 51:02.383 looking at right now as a no-fly-zone. 51:04.730 --> 51:08.067 - What do you think, why do you believe Russia 51:08.067 --> 51:10.970 has continued to be involved in Syria? 51:10.970 --> 51:13.530 What's their strategic advantage for them to be involved? 51:13.530 --> 51:15.920 Is it just to cause problems for us 51:15.920 --> 51:18.150 or is there strategic interests they have? 51:18.150 --> 51:20.960 - Russia does have some long term interests that they've 51:20.960 --> 51:25.459 had in Syria that go back some ways but certainly part 51:25.459 --> 51:30.459 of their motivation is by making sure they have warm 51:30.474 --> 51:35.060 water access into the Mediterranean and the access that 51:35.060 --> 51:37.580 that provides, they're interested in preserving that. 51:37.580 --> 51:39.590 They are interested in preserving a regime that 51:39.590 --> 51:43.356 is friendly and supportive to their motives and interests. 51:43.356 --> 51:46.820 And I also believe that they share an interest in trying 51:46.820 --> 51:51.376 to subvert our influence and interests in the region 51:51.376 --> 51:55.470 and so I do think they see that as an opportunity 51:55.470 --> 51:58.320 for them and I think they are attempting to exploit that. 52:00.130 --> 52:02.120 - After President Trump made the announcement 52:02.120 --> 52:04.880 that we would do a withdrawal, have you seen 52:04.880 --> 52:07.310 Turkey take different action on the ground? 52:07.310 --> 52:10.830 Is there anything they're doing that causes you concern? 52:10.830 --> 52:14.677 - I think Senator, we probably could talk a little 52:14.677 --> 52:17.850 bit more about that in a closed session but in general 52:17.850 --> 52:19.929 what I would tell you is we've seen all actors 52:19.929 --> 52:22.825 begin to posture themselves for what 52:22.825 --> 52:27.825 might come and we've seen that on all sides. 52:28.598 --> 52:29.810 - Okay, thank you. 52:29.810 --> 52:30.643 Thanks General. 52:30.643 --> 52:31.580 I'm finished Senator Reed. 52:32.969 --> 52:34.353 - [Senator Reed] Thank you, Senator Scott. 52:40.200 --> 52:44.283 We're not used to such subtle and penetrating questions. 52:46.300 --> 52:47.133 Thank you. 52:48.050 --> 52:50.110 Senator Jones, on behalf of Senator Inhofe. 52:50.110 --> 52:52.440 - Thank you, Senator Reed. 52:52.440 --> 52:53.908 Thank you General for your service 52:53.908 --> 52:58.908 and also for all of the team that is behind you. 53:00.453 --> 53:04.490 I'm well aware that your success is only as good as the 53:04.490 --> 53:08.057 success of those that serve with you and I use that term 53:08.057 --> 53:11.330 appropriately as opposed to the chain of command below you. 53:11.330 --> 53:13.832 They serve with you and I appreciate all the folks sitting 53:13.832 --> 53:16.623 behind you and all of those that are still over there. 53:18.381 --> 53:22.380 I want to follow up briefly kind of a question that 53:22.380 --> 53:27.380 Senator Shaheen asked about the CNN report of our 53:28.900 --> 53:31.800 military equipment somehow getting into the hands of others 53:31.800 --> 53:34.400 but I want to come at it a little bit different way. 53:35.820 --> 53:39.649 Last year you said that due to political considerations, 53:39.649 --> 53:42.659 cost, or delivery speed, some of our partners 53:42.659 --> 53:46.230 are seeking alternate sources of military equipment 53:46.230 --> 53:49.740 from near peer competitors like Russia and China. 53:49.740 --> 53:51.601 When our partners go elsewhere, it reduces our 53:51.601 --> 53:55.900 operability and challenges our ability to incorporate 53:55.900 --> 53:59.030 their contributions and to theater efforts. 53:59.030 --> 54:01.209 I think it's critical that we align our practices 54:01.209 --> 54:04.390 with what is necessary to achieve these goals as 54:04.390 --> 54:08.270 you alluded to and we want our partners to come to us. 54:08.270 --> 54:11.430 We're particularly concerned when they are going to 54:11.430 --> 54:15.230 communist China, communist Russia, to get that because we're 54:15.230 --> 54:19.000 seeing around the world the influence of those countries. 54:19.000 --> 54:21.316 So, my question is does this challenge persist today 54:21.316 --> 54:24.530 and if so could you please talk a little bit more about 54:24.530 --> 54:27.800 those challenges and barriers that exist, our partners 54:27.800 --> 54:30.569 coming to us for equipment and what steps you believe 54:30.569 --> 54:33.510 we need to take in order to keep them coming to us 54:33.510 --> 54:37.580 rather than communist Russia and communist China? 54:37.580 --> 54:40.060 - Senator, thank you, to some extent 54:40.060 --> 54:41.750 they do continue to exist today. 54:41.750 --> 54:44.630 I certainly recognize that our foreign military sales, 54:44.630 --> 54:48.630 foreign military funding process must be a deliberative one. 54:48.630 --> 54:50.573 We should make very deliberate decisions about the things 54:50.573 --> 54:55.573 that we sell to people and that has to go through a process. 54:56.530 --> 55:00.154 I am concerned that the process is lengthy and is 55:00.154 --> 55:04.900 not as responsive as our partners require on the ground 55:04.900 --> 55:07.932 and so I am very much in support of trying to look 55:07.932 --> 55:12.293 at how we make those processes more responsive 55:12.293 --> 55:15.260 to the needs that they have on the ground. 55:15.260 --> 55:17.310 I think we should always strive for that. 55:18.980 --> 55:21.189 There are a lot of steps that we go 55:21.189 --> 55:24.150 through to provide equipment to people. 55:24.150 --> 55:26.153 Some of them are within the Department of Defense, 55:26.153 --> 55:29.290 some of them with the Department of State, certainly 55:29.290 --> 55:32.810 some over here in Congress and so to the extent that 55:32.810 --> 55:37.810 we can have a more rapid process to answer the requirements 55:40.150 --> 55:42.800 of our partners I think that would be beneficial. 55:42.800 --> 55:45.160 In some cases if we're not going to provide 55:45.160 --> 55:46.980 things to them we should be very honest with 55:46.980 --> 55:49.280 them up front and tell them we're not going to be. 55:49.280 --> 55:51.470 I think it's always better to give them a yes 55:51.470 --> 55:53.259 or a no answer than it is to string them 55:53.259 --> 55:56.460 along because I think that leads to more frustration 55:56.460 --> 56:00.230 and it does cause them to go do other things. 56:00.230 --> 56:02.110 I also think a key part of this is our 56:02.110 --> 56:05.680 work on the ground beforehand with our partners. 56:05.680 --> 56:08.230 This is within the military here is making 56:08.230 --> 56:12.600 sure that the things that they are asking meet the needs 56:12.600 --> 56:16.259 of each of their countries in their own defense. 56:16.259 --> 56:19.220 And we should try to steer them away from just 56:19.220 --> 56:21.860 buying things they can't maintain, they can't sustain, 56:21.860 --> 56:25.200 they can't man long term and we should 56:25.200 --> 56:28.500 be focused on the equipment that they can. 56:28.500 --> 56:30.620 And equipment that can be integrated with us 56:30.620 --> 56:33.210 and other partners in the region to provide 56:33.210 --> 56:37.600 a more formidable deterrent effect or a defense if needed. 56:37.600 --> 56:39.520 - Great, thank you, thank you, sir. 56:39.520 --> 56:43.580 So, with regard to the Iran nuclear deal, 56:43.580 --> 56:45.300 looks like we're out. 56:45.300 --> 56:48.850 How will US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal 56:48.850 --> 56:52.773 effect our posture in the CENTCOM area of responsibility? 56:53.890 --> 56:56.494 - I don't know that withdrawal from 56:56.494 --> 57:01.494 the Iran deal will specifically impact our posture. 57:02.240 --> 57:03.900 Our posture will be more driven by 57:03.900 --> 57:05.363 the National Defense Strategy than it 57:05.363 --> 57:10.363 will be by a decision to depart from the JCPOA. 57:13.370 --> 57:16.287 I would just add that as I look across the region, 57:16.287 --> 57:21.287 Iran does continue to present concerns to me. 57:21.939 --> 57:24.110 It is one of the, it is the major 57:24.110 --> 57:26.900 destabilizing factor in the region. 57:26.900 --> 57:30.970 And so, while the nuclear weapons program was one aspect 57:30.970 --> 57:33.771 of the threat that they presented, their facilitation 57:33.771 --> 57:36.820 of ballistic missiles, of unmanned aerial systems, 57:36.820 --> 57:41.379 of other lethal materials to their proxies in Yemen, 57:41.379 --> 57:46.379 in Syria, in Iraq, other places here, I think 57:46.410 --> 57:48.646 should give us very, very significant pause. 57:48.646 --> 57:53.646 Their continued efforts to exercise control over critical 57:54.560 --> 57:58.930 waterways I think should give us continued pause here. 57:58.930 --> 58:01.316 Iran continues to present threats to us across 58:01.316 --> 58:05.469 the region and as we look at implementing the National 58:05.469 --> 58:08.783 Defense Strategy, and I agree with the folks on great 58:08.783 --> 58:12.540 power competition, my best advice back up through 58:12.540 --> 58:14.560 my chain of command will be to ensure that we do 58:14.560 --> 58:17.150 retain sufficient capabilities and sufficient 58:17.150 --> 58:20.017 response capabilities to deal with the threats 58:20.017 --> 58:24.640 that remain in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. 58:24.640 --> 58:26.980 - Great, well, thank you, sir, thank you very much. 58:26.980 --> 58:28.637 - [Senator Reed] Thank you on behalf of 58:28.637 --> 58:30.653 the Chairman Inhofe, Senator Hawley please. 58:30.653 --> 58:31.486 - Thank you, very much. 58:31.486 --> 58:32.690 General, thank you for being here 58:32.690 --> 58:33.523 and thank you again for your service. 58:33.523 --> 58:35.564 I want to stay on that same topic about 58:35.564 --> 58:38.651 the National Defense Strategy and Iran and just 58:38.651 --> 58:41.030 explore some of the tensions that the National 58:41.030 --> 58:44.710 Defense Strategy creates for your area of operations. 58:44.710 --> 58:47.420 Can I just ask you, in your judgment are we in 58:47.420 --> 58:51.503 a position to remove, draw down forces, move forces 58:51.503 --> 58:56.210 from your area of operation to Asia or Europe in accord 58:56.210 --> 58:58.686 with the National Defense Strategy's priorities 58:58.686 --> 59:01.060 on great power competition with China and Russia? 59:01.060 --> 59:03.752 Are we in the position to do that and also engage 59:03.752 --> 59:08.752 if necessary Iran should that nation provoke 59:11.170 --> 59:13.030 a conflict with us or should they continue 59:13.030 --> 59:16.384 to accelerate further their uranium enrichment program? 59:16.384 --> 59:19.750 - Senator, the National Defense Strategy necessarily 59:19.750 --> 59:22.650 puts focus on the United States regaining its 59:22.650 --> 59:24.950 competitive advantage against great powers, 59:24.950 --> 59:26.960 Russia and China in this particular case. 59:26.960 --> 59:30.979 I agree with that and we are absolutely supportive of that 59:30.979 --> 59:34.340 from a CENTCOM standpoint and we do recognize that that will 59:34.340 --> 59:38.112 necessitate some change in our posture in the region. 59:38.112 --> 59:41.660 And as we kind of go through the discussions and 59:41.660 --> 59:44.640 the planning aspects of that with the Joint Staff, 59:44.640 --> 59:48.412 with OSD, and certainly with the Services, we will seek 59:48.412 --> 59:52.592 to maintain the capabilities that we need to and then 59:52.592 --> 59:55.582 ensure that we have the right response capabilities to 59:55.582 --> 01:00:00.250 address threats as they present themselves in this area. 01:00:00.250 --> 01:00:02.440 - Let me just ask you a little bit more about that. 01:00:02.440 --> 01:00:05.379 The National Defense Strategy calls for more efficient ways 01:00:05.379 --> 01:00:09.410 of operating in the greater Middle East, in your area of 01:00:09.410 --> 01:00:12.820 operational authority, the idea being again to maintain, 01:00:12.820 --> 01:00:15.700 enable us to maintain focus on Iran and terrorists there 01:00:15.700 --> 01:00:19.010 and also to shift attention to a great power conflict. 01:00:19.010 --> 01:00:24.010 Can you tell me about your plans to make operations 01:00:24.485 --> 01:00:27.130 in your area of responsibility more efficient? 01:00:27.130 --> 01:00:28.850 What does that mean, what does that look like? 01:00:28.850 --> 01:00:30.600 Can you give us a tangible sense of it? 01:00:30.600 --> 01:00:32.810 - Certainly, so certainly, one of the areas where we can 01:00:32.810 --> 01:00:35.780 continue to be more efficient is how we operate along our 01:00:35.780 --> 01:00:39.840 seams, our bureaucratic, combatant commander seams. 01:00:39.840 --> 01:00:43.860 With me I share a boundary with EUCOM to the north, 01:00:43.860 --> 01:00:46.350 I share one with AFRICOM to the west, 01:00:46.350 --> 01:00:48.590 and with INDOPACOM to the east. 01:00:48.590 --> 01:00:51.920 So I think it is extraordinarily important as we look 01:00:51.920 --> 01:00:55.510 at managing resources that we look at positioning 01:00:55.510 --> 01:00:58.250 and employing these resources in a way that they can be 01:00:58.250 --> 01:01:02.010 of the maximum utility to multiple combatant commands. 01:01:02.010 --> 01:01:04.002 And today we actually do that with 01:01:04.002 --> 01:01:07.980 some of our resources in the region. 01:01:07.980 --> 01:01:10.740 You might be aware, for example, that AFRICOM supports 01:01:10.740 --> 01:01:14.100 us with basing that we require for our activities 01:01:14.100 --> 01:01:17.278 in the Arabian peninsula and the resources that 01:01:17.278 --> 01:01:20.700 we have there benefit both General Waldhauser 01:01:20.700 --> 01:01:22.830 and his command and they benefit me. 01:01:22.830 --> 01:01:27.070 So I think there are some smarter ways of doing this. 01:01:27.070 --> 01:01:29.930 Certainly the department's focus on dynamic force 01:01:29.930 --> 01:01:34.930 employment where we re-exercise strategic predictability 01:01:35.190 --> 01:01:38.160 but operational unpredictability I think is a good 01:01:38.160 --> 01:01:41.103 concept of this where we are able to move resources in a 01:01:41.103 --> 01:01:46.001 more agile fashion into areas where we see opportunities. 01:01:46.001 --> 01:01:48.254 I think this is another area that 01:01:48.254 --> 01:01:52.072 we need to continue to focus on. 01:01:52.072 --> 01:01:54.930 - In this same vein, we've heard some and I've 01:01:54.930 --> 01:01:56.750 read some about light attack aircraft 01:01:56.750 --> 01:01:58.740 and security force assistance brigades. 01:01:58.740 --> 01:02:02.390 Can you give me your sense about the progress on those 01:02:02.390 --> 01:02:06.770 initiatives and what else you might propose in that vein? 01:02:06.770 --> 01:02:09.310 - On both of those initiatives, the Security Force 01:02:09.310 --> 01:02:12.308 Assistance Brigades, my service, the Army, did us 01:02:12.308 --> 01:02:16.272 a significant service by establishing this organization 01:02:16.272 --> 01:02:19.638 and what this essentially did, we talked about by, with and 01:02:19.638 --> 01:02:22.790 through, but what this really allowed us to do is it gave us 01:02:22.790 --> 01:02:25.590 a purpose built organization that was specifically focused 01:02:25.590 --> 01:02:30.590 on this type of advising and the type of relationship we 01:02:30.920 --> 01:02:34.140 wanted to have with our indigenous partners on the ground. 01:02:34.140 --> 01:02:38.096 And over the deployment of the first Security Force 01:02:38.096 --> 01:02:40.852 Assistance Brigade last year in Afghanistan, we saw 01:02:40.852 --> 01:02:45.852 significant improvement in our ability to do that, 01:02:46.400 --> 01:02:50.435 a higher level of capability, a much more focused 01:02:50.435 --> 01:02:54.240 organization and I think we helped the Army preserve its 01:02:54.240 --> 01:02:57.430 readiness frankly, we didn't take a brigade, break it apart 01:02:57.430 --> 01:02:59.950 just to pull the leaders out to do advise and assist, 01:02:59.950 --> 01:03:02.870 we actually had a purpose built organization that did that. 01:03:02.870 --> 01:03:04.815 So I think this is a very positive thing. 01:03:04.815 --> 01:03:08.755 The light attack aircraft, being able to train our partners 01:03:08.755 --> 01:03:11.561 in terms of employing those things, I think reduces the 01:03:11.561 --> 01:03:15.690 burden on us and it provides self sufficiency for them. 01:03:15.690 --> 01:03:19.830 And it does it without creating a significant logistical 01:03:19.830 --> 01:03:23.540 burden so whether it's A-29s that we see with the Lebanese 01:03:23.540 --> 01:03:26.518 armed forces or A-29s we see with the Afghan Security 01:03:26.518 --> 01:03:30.451 Air Force, these I think are good investments and in 01:03:30.451 --> 01:03:34.714 both cases there we have seen those resources 01:03:34.714 --> 01:03:38.368 be directly responsible to their forces on the ground. 01:03:38.368 --> 01:03:41.329 It's nascent, it is growing, we have to continue 01:03:41.329 --> 01:03:43.544 to support this, but I think this is exactly 01:03:43.544 --> 01:03:47.080 the direction we need to go to really enable our partners. 01:03:47.080 --> 01:03:49.387 - And last question, you're satisfied, General, 01:03:49.387 --> 01:03:52.150 you think that those programs, for example, 01:03:52.150 --> 01:03:53.760 are on track, you think that we're making good 01:03:53.760 --> 01:03:56.470 progress in both of those initiatives? 01:03:56.470 --> 01:03:59.760 - I do, I think both of those are excellent programs. 01:03:59.760 --> 01:04:01.265 - [Senator Hawley] Thank you very much. 01:04:01.265 --> 01:04:02.283 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:04:02.283 --> 01:04:03.284 - [Senator Reed] On behalf 01:04:03.284 --> 01:04:04.440 of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Peters, please. 01:04:04.440 --> 01:04:05.273 - Thank you. 01:04:05.273 --> 01:04:07.590 Thank you, General Votel, thank you for your testimony 01:04:07.590 --> 01:04:10.730 here today and your many years of distinguished service. 01:04:10.730 --> 01:04:13.926 General in your written you described Jordan as "one of our 01:04:13.926 --> 01:04:17.390 "most committed partners in the Middle East and one of the 01:04:18.292 --> 01:04:21.140 "most critical voices of moderate Islam in the region." 01:04:21.140 --> 01:04:23.810 Your testimony goes on to discuss the role that Jordan 01:04:23.810 --> 01:04:27.932 plays in hosting over 750,000 refugees from Syria, Iraq, 01:04:27.932 --> 01:04:31.350 and elsewhere and Jordan's contributions to the fight 01:04:31.350 --> 01:04:33.550 against ISIS and Jordan's role in hosting 01:04:33.550 --> 01:04:36.770 exercise Eager Lion which includes nearly two dozen 01:04:36.770 --> 01:04:39.301 countries training in the counterterrorism mission. 01:04:39.301 --> 01:04:42.920 Today in the Senate, we're debating S1, strengthening 01:04:42.920 --> 01:04:45.277 America's security in the Middle East, it includes 01:04:45.277 --> 01:04:49.581 a United States, Jordan defense cooperation extension act. 01:04:49.581 --> 01:04:52.770 The premise of the legislation is that Jordan is playing 01:04:52.770 --> 01:04:54.940 a critical role in addressing the humanitarian 01:04:54.940 --> 01:04:57.635 crisis in Syria and the fight against ISIS 01:04:57.635 --> 01:05:01.940 and therefore extends our defense cooperation agreement. 01:05:01.940 --> 01:05:04.796 Could you describe and talk a little bit more 01:05:04.796 --> 01:05:07.508 about the contributions that Jordan is making, 01:05:07.508 --> 01:05:11.311 what are some of the challenges Jordan faces in making 01:05:11.311 --> 01:05:16.311 these contributions, and why this extension is important? 01:05:16.970 --> 01:05:20.360 - Thank you, Senator, and I would just share everything 01:05:20.360 --> 01:05:23.260 you just said there about what a great partner they are. 01:05:23.260 --> 01:05:25.710 Certainly Jordan is not a rich country so they face 01:05:25.710 --> 01:05:29.231 economic challenges by virtue of where they are. 01:05:29.231 --> 01:05:32.730 His Majesty is working through that aspect with his 01:05:32.730 --> 01:05:35.447 parliament right now and with the international community 01:05:35.447 --> 01:05:40.447 and I think we should continue to be supportive of that. 01:05:41.141 --> 01:05:45.239 As you've said they, given the chance to say no 01:05:45.239 --> 01:05:49.650 they say yes every time to everything that we seek. 01:05:49.650 --> 01:05:52.128 I would share with you, Senator, last week I was in Jordan. 01:05:52.128 --> 01:05:54.075 I had an opportunity to visit the border, 01:05:54.075 --> 01:05:57.120 up along the border between Jordan and Syria 01:05:57.120 --> 01:06:00.255 and I had an opportunity to witness the investments that 01:06:00.255 --> 01:06:04.163 our country has made in their border security initiatives. 01:06:04.163 --> 01:06:08.100 Equipment, training, command and control for this, 01:06:08.100 --> 01:06:11.060 and what I witnessed there I think would make any member 01:06:11.060 --> 01:06:14.694 of Congress or indeed any American very proud to see. 01:06:14.694 --> 01:06:18.550 It was extraordinarily professional, it was very effective, 01:06:18.550 --> 01:06:20.580 they had very good situational awareness 01:06:20.580 --> 01:06:22.300 and understanding of what was happening along 01:06:22.300 --> 01:06:24.860 their border and everything they were doing was 01:06:24.860 --> 01:06:28.230 sustainable and they've been doing it for several years 01:06:28.230 --> 01:06:32.130 and with the prospect of continuing to do it in the future. 01:06:32.130 --> 01:06:34.573 This is the kind of investments that we need to be making 01:06:34.573 --> 01:06:39.263 in these very good partners right here like Jordan. 01:06:40.136 --> 01:06:40.969 - Thank you, General. 01:06:40.969 --> 01:06:43.450 Today in this bill it also includes 01:06:43.450 --> 01:06:46.420 the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act. 01:06:46.420 --> 01:06:48.780 It's a bill named after a defector from the Syrian 01:06:48.780 --> 01:06:52.257 army who shed light on Assad's atrocities revealing 01:06:52.257 --> 01:06:55.850 photographs of torture and significant human 01:06:55.850 --> 01:06:58.017 rights abuses that I know you're very aware of. 01:06:58.017 --> 01:07:00.420 The legislation imposes sanctions on individuals 01:07:00.420 --> 01:07:02.717 who support Assad's regime in Syria by providing 01:07:02.717 --> 01:07:05.998 financial, material, or technological support. 01:07:05.998 --> 01:07:09.100 And it does include sanctions on those who provide 01:07:09.100 --> 01:07:12.060 aircraft or spare aircraft parts for military purposes, 01:07:12.060 --> 01:07:15.120 sanctions on those who collaborate with mercenaries, 01:07:15.120 --> 01:07:17.632 military contractors, paramilitary forces operating on 01:07:17.632 --> 01:07:22.632 behalf of Syria, Russia, or Iran and sanctions on those 01:07:23.040 --> 01:07:25.820 who help the government of Syria maintain or expand 01:07:26.924 --> 01:07:28.780 its production of natural gas and petroleum. 01:07:28.780 --> 01:07:31.755 Your written testimony describes the Assad regime's use 01:07:31.755 --> 01:07:35.738 of starvation as a weapon of war by denying humanitarian 01:07:35.738 --> 01:07:39.600 aid to be delivered where it is critically needed. 01:07:39.600 --> 01:07:41.550 So my question to you, General, is to what extent do you 01:07:41.550 --> 01:07:44.810 believe imposing additional sanctions on the Assad regime, 01:07:44.810 --> 01:07:47.780 including limiting access to aircraft and aircraft spare 01:07:47.780 --> 01:07:51.010 parts will degrade Assad's ability to attack 01:07:51.010 --> 01:07:53.760 innocent civilians and exert pressure in a positive 01:07:53.760 --> 01:07:55.920 direction towards improving the horrible 01:07:55.920 --> 01:07:58.290 humanitarian situation that we have there? 01:07:58.290 --> 01:08:01.370 - Senator, my belief is history speaks for itself here 01:08:01.370 --> 01:08:05.337 with the Assad regime and we should continue to keep 01:08:05.337 --> 01:08:08.070 the maximum amount of pressure on them to prevent 01:08:08.070 --> 01:08:11.653 them from appropriating the atrocities that they 01:08:11.653 --> 01:08:14.000 have in the past on their own people. 01:08:14.000 --> 01:08:17.643 So I'm supportive of all measures in that regard. 01:08:18.840 --> 01:08:19.850 - The last question, General. 01:08:19.850 --> 01:08:21.550 Last week the committee held a hearing 01:08:21.550 --> 01:08:23.640 on the threats posed by Russia and China. 01:08:23.640 --> 01:08:26.440 You've answered some questions related to what we heard 01:08:26.440 --> 01:08:28.533 as to how we need to have more efficient use of resources 01:08:28.533 --> 01:08:32.106 in the Middle East and what came up was the possibility 01:08:32.106 --> 01:08:35.500 of a review of the use of aircraft like the B-1 and 01:08:35.500 --> 01:08:39.040 the F-22 in Afghanistan where those platforms might be 01:08:39.040 --> 01:08:43.619 better focused on dealing with our near peer competitors. 01:08:43.619 --> 01:08:47.627 So, my question to you is I've worked to extend and support 01:08:47.627 --> 01:08:52.490 A-10s operating and to make sure that they have the wing 01:08:52.490 --> 01:08:55.571 replacements so that A-10 aircraft can continue to operate. 01:08:55.571 --> 01:08:58.534 To what extent is the A-10 necessary for you 01:08:58.534 --> 01:09:00.760 to conduct your mission in places particularly 01:09:00.760 --> 01:09:05.252 if we look at moving B-1s and F-22s out of theater? 01:09:05.252 --> 01:09:07.493 - Well, Senator, I don't think you're gonna find any Army 01:09:07.493 --> 01:09:12.290 guys or infantrymen that are gonna argue against the A-10. 01:09:12.290 --> 01:09:15.617 It's an incredibly responsive capability that has 01:09:15.617 --> 01:09:20.100 I think served us extraordinarily well in the past. 01:09:20.100 --> 01:09:23.854 I know it is an old airplane and so I share some 01:09:23.854 --> 01:09:28.150 concerns about its sustainability but certainly it has 01:09:28.150 --> 01:09:33.150 definitely proven its worth to us and we will continue to 01:09:33.930 --> 01:09:37.372 require that type of support, some type of very responsive 01:09:37.372 --> 01:09:41.690 close air support capability well into the future. 01:09:41.690 --> 01:09:43.190 - So, you believe Congress should continue 01:09:43.190 --> 01:09:46.010 to support that program in your estimation? 01:09:46.010 --> 01:09:48.970 - I think we should continue to support that program 01:09:48.970 --> 01:09:51.213 and then we should be looking at other programs that 01:09:51.213 --> 01:09:54.650 would provide those capabilities in the future. 01:09:54.650 --> 01:09:56.133 - [Senator Peters] Appreciate it, thank you, General. 01:10:01.850 --> 01:10:03.150 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:10:04.760 --> 01:10:07.000 General, first of all thank you for your service. 01:10:07.000 --> 01:10:08.793 Thank you to your team as well. 01:10:10.610 --> 01:10:13.180 The National Defense Strategy makes clear that the 01:10:13.180 --> 01:10:16.281 Department's focus is preparing to deter, and win if 01:10:16.281 --> 01:10:21.281 necessary, great power conflict with China and Russia. 01:10:24.651 --> 01:10:27.950 But we've also got several partners in the region 01:10:27.950 --> 01:10:30.380 as I think Senator Peters just mentioned. 01:10:30.380 --> 01:10:32.763 Jordan is a great ally, so is Israel. 01:10:34.110 --> 01:10:37.240 Israel has reportedly agreed to allow Chinese government 01:10:37.240 --> 01:10:41.394 connected firm Shanghai International Port Group to run 01:10:41.394 --> 01:10:44.923 commercial operations at the Israeli port of Haifa. 01:10:48.402 --> 01:10:51.109 This port reportedly periodically hosts joint US 01:10:51.109 --> 01:10:56.000 Israeli naval drills and visits from American vessels. 01:10:56.000 --> 01:10:59.699 From a US military perspective, do you have any concerns 01:10:59.699 --> 01:11:03.950 regarding this deal and if this deal goes forward, might it 01:11:03.950 --> 01:11:07.023 impact decisions to have the US Navy vessels visit the port? 01:11:07.920 --> 01:11:11.090 - Senator, Israel resides outside the CENTCOM area of 01:11:11.090 --> 01:11:14.000 responsibility so with regard to that General Scaparrotti 01:11:14.000 --> 01:11:16.610 would probably be the best one to answer that question. 01:11:16.610 --> 01:11:18.860 But I would share with you as I look at the region 01:11:18.860 --> 01:11:21.655 in which I do have military responsibilities in the Gulf, 01:11:21.655 --> 01:11:26.655 in and around the straits, particularly these areas. 01:11:27.210 --> 01:11:31.855 I am concerned about increasing presence of Chinese maritime 01:11:31.855 --> 01:11:36.040 activity in the region and their continued outreach 01:11:36.040 --> 01:11:39.817 to different partners there to secure military access 01:11:39.817 --> 01:11:44.817 that is likely linked to their economic objectives, 01:11:45.160 --> 01:11:48.407 their one belt one road aspects that they propagate 01:11:48.407 --> 01:11:51.720 around the world but in particular in 01:11:51.720 --> 01:11:54.600 the area in which I have military responsibility. 01:11:54.600 --> 01:11:58.100 So, I deeply share your concern. 01:11:58.100 --> 01:12:00.395 The United States and a number of our partners 01:12:00.395 --> 01:12:03.841 have long provided maritime security in this area. 01:12:03.841 --> 01:12:06.739 Frankly I think China has been a free rider 01:12:06.739 --> 01:12:09.423 in this in taking advantage of that and now we see 01:12:09.423 --> 01:12:12.410 them beginning to develop their own infrastructure 01:12:12.410 --> 01:12:14.810 in here principally for their own purposes not for 01:12:14.810 --> 01:12:19.520 the purposes of broader regional security in the region. 01:12:19.520 --> 01:12:20.970 And I'm concerned about that. 01:12:21.810 --> 01:12:25.030 - In terms of how we separate out the different areas 01:12:25.030 --> 01:12:28.030 of responsibility and I respect the fact that you have 01:12:28.030 --> 01:12:32.155 specific areas, most certainly activity, communication with 01:12:32.155 --> 01:12:35.716 our ally Israel is a part of that responsibility though. 01:12:35.716 --> 01:12:40.451 Can you share with regard to how this impacts your 01:12:40.451 --> 01:12:43.980 ability and does it or is it simply a matter of we're 01:12:43.980 --> 01:12:47.445 aware of it and we'll allow other individuals responsible 01:12:47.445 --> 01:12:52.235 in other areas of responsibility to handle it? 01:12:52.235 --> 01:12:56.010 - Senator, as I remarked earlier, we pay particular 01:12:56.010 --> 01:13:00.160 attention to our bureaucratic, geographic seams out 01:13:00.160 --> 01:13:04.040 here and so General Scaparrotti and myself and our 01:13:04.040 --> 01:13:07.940 respective staffs are very closely aligned with this 01:13:07.940 --> 01:13:12.940 and so with his support we maintain a close relationship 01:13:15.700 --> 01:13:20.700 with Israel and we recognize many of their security 01:13:20.789 --> 01:13:25.789 threats reside within the military area in which I have 01:13:26.250 --> 01:13:28.871 responsibility so I think this is another aspect of how 01:13:28.871 --> 01:13:32.035 we cooperate across our combatant command boundaries 01:13:32.035 --> 01:13:37.035 here between sharing responsibilities so I absolutely 01:13:37.367 --> 01:13:41.286 understand what you're saying and I am very confident 01:13:41.286 --> 01:13:44.870 that the mechanisms that we have in place are helping us 01:13:44.870 --> 01:13:49.450 address concerns that all parties have in the region. 01:13:49.450 --> 01:13:52.130 - Let me go to another area of bureaucracy. 01:13:52.130 --> 01:13:54.410 Much has been written about the need 01:13:54.410 --> 01:13:57.637 to streamline DOD's acquisition processes. 01:13:57.637 --> 01:14:01.370 Can you comment on the process and the amount of time 01:14:01.370 --> 01:14:04.990 that it takes to fill validated requirements in 01:14:04.990 --> 01:14:08.890 the CENTCOM area of operations and do you believe that 01:14:08.890 --> 01:14:12.560 we must reform the acquisition process to more quickly 01:14:12.560 --> 01:14:15.783 fill the urgent and operational needs of our war fighters? 01:14:17.050 --> 01:14:18.730 - Senator, I absolutely agree we should continue 01:14:18.730 --> 01:14:21.844 to do everything that we can to address the needs of 01:14:21.844 --> 01:14:26.844 the war fighters and try to do it as fast as we can. 01:14:26.860 --> 01:14:28.940 I am aware of a number of initiatives that are 01:14:28.940 --> 01:14:31.469 under way to address that whether it is rapid 01:14:31.469 --> 01:14:34.304 prototyping or other things that we can do. 01:14:34.304 --> 01:14:38.279 Our view in CENTCOM as we confront emerging threats here 01:14:38.279 --> 01:14:42.040 is that we have tried to be supportive of the Services 01:14:42.040 --> 01:14:46.430 bringing in capabilities, trying them out, recognizing that 01:14:46.430 --> 01:14:49.803 some of these will fail, they will not succeed in the way 01:14:49.803 --> 01:14:53.970 they are, but in the hands of our soldiers, sailors, 01:14:53.970 --> 01:14:56.191 airmen, Marines on the ground, they will begin 01:14:56.191 --> 01:14:58.403 to provide very direct feedback that 01:14:58.403 --> 01:15:02.000 will help these programs move on quicker. 01:15:02.000 --> 01:15:05.210 So, from a CENTCOM standpoint, what we are principally 01:15:05.210 --> 01:15:08.940 concerned about is making sure that we have a system in 01:15:08.940 --> 01:15:11.714 place where we can bring things forward, we can rapidly test 01:15:11.714 --> 01:15:14.670 them, we can get 'em into the hands of our people, they can 01:15:14.670 --> 01:15:17.750 provide feedback, and that goes back into the commercial or 01:15:17.750 --> 01:15:20.069 the industrial base, they make the improvements and then 01:15:20.069 --> 01:15:22.780 bring us the improved product out there that we can use. 01:15:22.780 --> 01:15:25.130 That to me is extraordinarily 01:15:25.130 --> 01:15:27.829 important in an area like CENTCOM. 01:15:27.829 --> 01:15:28.662 - Thank you. 01:15:28.662 --> 01:15:29.495 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:15:29.495 --> 01:15:30.863 - [Senator Reed] Thank you, Senator Rounds. 01:15:33.150 --> 01:15:34.760 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:15:34.760 --> 01:15:37.550 General were you aware of the president's 01:15:37.550 --> 01:15:39.870 intention to order the withdrawal of our troops 01:15:39.870 --> 01:15:43.410 from Syria before that was publicly announced? 01:15:43.410 --> 01:15:48.060 - I was not aware of the specific announcement. 01:15:48.060 --> 01:15:51.150 Certainly we are aware that he had expressed 01:15:51.150 --> 01:15:56.150 a desire and an intent in the past to depart Syria. 01:15:57.275 --> 01:15:58.410 - So, you weren't consulted before 01:15:58.410 --> 01:16:00.150 that decision was announced? 01:16:00.150 --> 01:16:01.343 - I was not consulted. 01:16:02.240 --> 01:16:03.879 - You mentioned in your testimony that, 01:16:03.879 --> 01:16:07.202 you used the word remnant with regard to ISIS, 01:16:07.202 --> 01:16:11.520 can you give us a better number than remnant? 01:16:11.520 --> 01:16:12.920 What are we talking about here? 01:16:12.920 --> 01:16:15.660 Senator Cotton mentioned 20 to 30,000 fighters 01:16:15.660 --> 01:16:17.900 scattered in various places around the world. 01:16:17.900 --> 01:16:19.210 Is that accurate? 01:16:19.210 --> 01:16:21.362 - I think that is approximately what the Intelligence 01:16:21.362 --> 01:16:25.890 Community has estimated that is left behind. 01:16:25.890 --> 01:16:29.743 I think we would generally share with that. 01:16:29.743 --> 01:16:33.900 That includes people of a variety of different characters, 01:16:33.900 --> 01:16:36.910 it includes fighters, it includes supporters, 01:16:36.910 --> 01:16:40.161 it includes facilitators within that. 01:16:40.161 --> 01:16:41.950 - How about in Syria and Iraq? 01:16:41.950 --> 01:16:43.380 What number would you put that? 01:16:43.380 --> 01:16:45.860 - I think that in general from what I have 01:16:45.860 --> 01:16:50.351 seen that is about the number that I have seen. 01:16:50.351 --> 01:16:51.184 - 20 to 30,000? 01:16:51.184 --> 01:16:53.478 - Yes, but Senator, but I think we are, 01:16:53.478 --> 01:16:58.478 this is probably a low to moderate confidence number. 01:17:00.850 --> 01:17:02.180 - Is it a low estimate or? 01:17:02.180 --> 01:17:03.750 I'm sorry you threw me with that. 01:17:03.750 --> 01:17:04.930 Do you think it's a higher number? 01:17:04.930 --> 01:17:07.753 - I think we don't fully know. 01:17:07.753 --> 01:17:08.586 - You don't have a precise? 01:17:08.586 --> 01:17:11.500 - We don't have with any specific accuracy. 01:17:11.500 --> 01:17:13.550 So, it is always going to be a range, 01:17:13.550 --> 01:17:14.560 the number's always going to be a range. 01:17:14.560 --> 01:17:17.762 - One of my concerns with the withdrawal with that many ISIS 01:17:17.762 --> 01:17:20.696 fighters still in the area is that they'll just wait us out. 01:17:20.696 --> 01:17:23.080 The president announces a withdrawal. 01:17:23.080 --> 01:17:25.914 The saying I've heard is the Americans 01:17:25.914 --> 01:17:28.639 have the watches but we have the time. 01:17:28.639 --> 01:17:33.097 Are they just gonna wait and hunker down for a couple of 01:17:33.097 --> 01:17:38.097 years or a couple of months and resuscitate their efforts? 01:17:39.940 --> 01:17:41.280 If you were their military commander 01:17:41.280 --> 01:17:42.400 wouldn't that be what you would you? 01:17:42.400 --> 01:17:47.020 Say these guys are leaving, we'll just bide our time. 01:17:47.020 --> 01:17:51.420 - Well, certainly, Senator, but our approach as I mentioned 01:17:51.420 --> 01:17:54.157 in my opening comments is that as we look to withdraw 01:17:54.157 --> 01:17:59.157 from Syria, we are in a very deliberate planning process 01:17:59.270 --> 01:18:02.400 for how we will work with the international community, 01:18:02.400 --> 01:18:05.230 with our partners on the ground, with rest of the coalition 01:18:05.230 --> 01:18:08.350 to ensure that we can keep pressure on this organization 01:18:08.350 --> 01:18:11.400 to prevent exactly what you are talking about. 01:18:11.400 --> 01:18:13.210 - I think it's very important and perhaps you can share 01:18:13.210 --> 01:18:16.770 with the committee in closed session what the strategy 01:18:16.770 --> 01:18:18.720 is for maintaining that pressure and how its 01:18:18.720 --> 01:18:22.770 success is defined that will allow us to withdraw. 01:18:22.770 --> 01:18:23.893 Let me move on. 01:18:25.270 --> 01:18:28.802 With regard to, again, the withdrawal. 01:18:28.802 --> 01:18:31.743 Senator Heinrich mentioned the danger to the Kurds. 01:18:33.340 --> 01:18:36.410 I sincerely hope that in your exit interview with your 01:18:36.410 --> 01:18:39.036 successor, which will take place very soon if not already, 01:18:39.036 --> 01:18:43.340 that you emphasize the importance of protecting the Kurds. 01:18:43.340 --> 01:18:46.288 If they are slaughtered by the Turks within 01:18:46.288 --> 01:18:50.540 the reasonable proximity of our leaving it will be a stain 01:18:50.540 --> 01:18:52.469 on the honor of this country that will persist not only 01:18:52.469 --> 01:18:57.469 in terms of honor but also in terms of our ability to 01:18:57.662 --> 01:19:02.662 attract allies to assist us in future projects of this kind. 01:19:05.512 --> 01:19:08.467 That's my biggest fear about what's going on 01:19:08.467 --> 01:19:13.093 now and I believe the Turks are waiting. 01:19:16.460 --> 01:19:21.126 - Senator, again, I think this a key task that we are 01:19:21.126 --> 01:19:24.390 looking at right now and that is the protection of those 01:19:24.390 --> 01:19:27.910 who have fought valiantly with us and ensuring that 01:19:27.910 --> 01:19:32.910 they remain safe as our diplomats and United Nations 01:19:33.723 --> 01:19:38.290 and others pursue a political solution here in Syria. 01:19:38.290 --> 01:19:41.534 - I certainly hope that's of the highest priority. 01:19:41.534 --> 01:19:44.250 You mentioned Iran and listed a whole 01:19:44.250 --> 01:19:47.266 series of malign activities in the region. 01:19:47.266 --> 01:19:49.880 Which would you prefer, the current malign Iran 01:19:49.880 --> 01:19:52.883 or the malign Iran with nuclear weapons. 01:19:53.780 --> 01:19:58.780 - Well, certainly I think an Iran with nuclear weapons poses 01:20:00.095 --> 01:20:04.293 a more enduring and serious threat to us long term. 01:20:07.226 --> 01:20:10.171 Our approach to them does need to make sure that we 01:20:10.171 --> 01:20:15.171 deny all paths for them to get to a nuclear weapon. 01:20:15.270 --> 01:20:17.470 - Well, unfortunately we've just abrogated an agreement that 01:20:17.470 --> 01:20:21.063 did just that but we can discuss that in another setting. 01:20:22.530 --> 01:20:24.633 Final question on Afghanistan. 01:20:25.540 --> 01:20:29.797 I don't understand the, we're negotiating unilaterally with 01:20:29.797 --> 01:20:33.228 the Taliban and not involving the government of Afghanistan. 01:20:33.228 --> 01:20:37.323 I don't understand how that is gonna get us 01:20:37.323 --> 01:20:40.486 to a final result if the government of Afghanistan, 01:20:40.486 --> 01:20:43.940 if we give away things they're not willing to give away. 01:20:43.940 --> 01:20:46.988 - Again, Senator, I think, the way I would characterize 01:20:46.988 --> 01:20:51.610 Ambassador Khalilzad's efforts is he's at the beginning 01:20:51.610 --> 01:20:54.182 of a process here to put together a framework that will 01:20:54.182 --> 01:20:58.060 allow the Afghans and Taliban to come together 01:20:58.060 --> 01:21:00.360 at some particular point to conduct some negotiations. 01:21:00.360 --> 01:21:02.016 All of this is being done with 01:21:02.016 --> 01:21:05.820 the knowledge of the government of Afghanistan. 01:21:05.820 --> 01:21:08.740 They understand what he is doing. 01:21:08.740 --> 01:21:13.670 I can't speak for the exact process itself since that is 01:21:13.670 --> 01:21:17.317 Ambassador Khalilzad's but I do know that he is in frequent 01:21:17.317 --> 01:21:20.400 consultation with the government of Afghanistan to ensure 01:21:20.400 --> 01:21:25.140 that they are best informed on the approaches that he 01:21:25.140 --> 01:21:28.540 is taking to continue to get this framework in place. 01:21:28.540 --> 01:21:29.690 - Good, I hope that's the case. 01:21:29.690 --> 01:21:30.600 Thank you, I appreciate it. 01:21:30.600 --> 01:21:32.090 Thank you, General. 01:21:32.090 --> 01:21:33.730 - Thank you, Senator King. 01:21:33.730 --> 01:21:36.419 As a reminder, you made several references to a different 01:21:36.419 --> 01:21:40.470 setting for some of the answers to your questions. 01:21:40.470 --> 01:21:44.341 We will be having a closed meeting at 2:15 in 01:21:44.341 --> 01:21:47.683 the visitor's center so you have that opportunity. 01:21:51.664 --> 01:21:52.600 Senator Sullivan. 01:21:52.600 --> 01:21:55.503 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman and General good to see you again. 01:21:55.503 --> 01:21:58.583 Want to thank you and Sergeant Major for your outstanding 01:21:58.583 --> 01:22:03.160 service to our nation and very, very much appreciate it. 01:22:03.160 --> 01:22:05.740 Wanted to dive in a little bit more. 01:22:05.740 --> 01:22:08.235 We've had this discussion I think on both sides of this 01:22:08.235 --> 01:22:13.235 idea as we're refining our force posture in the region, 01:22:18.150 --> 01:22:23.150 this notion of having a robust counterterrorism force 01:22:23.350 --> 01:22:28.350 that can still focus on US interests whether it's the rise 01:22:30.070 --> 01:22:33.000 of ISIS, whether it's the rise again of Al-Qaeda, 01:22:33.000 --> 01:22:35.570 whether it is the malign activities of Iran, I think 01:22:35.570 --> 01:22:38.080 unfortunately some of my colleagues like to look a blind eye 01:22:38.080 --> 01:22:40.422 and I'm gonna ask you a couple of questions about that. 01:22:40.422 --> 01:22:44.660 What is that concept of, you know, this is something 01:22:44.660 --> 01:22:47.251 the president has talked about but your predecessor, 01:22:47.251 --> 01:22:50.512 a general who I happen to have a lot of respect for, 01:22:50.512 --> 01:22:53.050 General Abizaid has talked a lot about this idea of a raid 01:22:53.050 --> 01:22:58.050 force component, robust CT element in the Middle East that 01:23:00.630 --> 01:23:05.630 can continue to focus on our key strategic interests. 01:23:06.050 --> 01:23:07.903 How would that work and are you thinking through that 01:23:07.903 --> 01:23:12.680 whether it's in Iraq, whether it's in other parts of the 01:23:12.680 --> 01:23:16.730 Middle East and do we have the capability not only to go 01:23:16.730 --> 01:23:21.480 after our counterterrorism goals but say, for example, 01:23:21.480 --> 01:23:24.530 control the air space in northern Syria which a number of us 01:23:24.530 --> 01:23:28.090 think is important even if we're not on the ground there? 01:23:28.090 --> 01:23:31.350 - Senator, I believe that we do and we are in fact 01:23:31.350 --> 01:23:33.618 thinking through the different ways that we would 01:23:33.618 --> 01:23:37.049 continue to address our enduring concern about violent 01:23:37.049 --> 01:23:41.700 extremist organizations operating in this region 01:23:41.700 --> 01:23:44.960 who harbor interests in coming against the homeland. 01:23:44.960 --> 01:23:46.700 - That's our overriding national interest. 01:23:46.700 --> 01:23:51.450 - It is and as we look at all of the activities that 01:23:51.450 --> 01:23:53.790 we are conducting across the region I think 01:23:53.790 --> 01:23:56.299 safeguarding that particular national interest has 01:23:56.299 --> 01:23:59.257 to be among the very top things that we are doing. 01:23:59.257 --> 01:24:01.157 - [Senator Sullivan] Go ahead. 01:24:03.150 --> 01:24:04.270 - You know there are a variety 01:24:04.270 --> 01:24:06.654 of different approaches we can take to this. 01:24:06.654 --> 01:24:09.100 Certainly the by, with, and through approach 01:24:09.100 --> 01:24:11.250 using partners on the ground, enabling them 01:24:11.250 --> 01:24:13.800 to keep pressure on them is one way of doing this. 01:24:13.800 --> 01:24:16.200 In some instances it may require us to have 01:24:16.200 --> 01:24:18.290 some of our capabilities forward in different 01:24:18.290 --> 01:24:21.690 locations to ensure that we can do that. 01:24:25.340 --> 01:24:26.173 - And are we looking at those 01:24:26.173 --> 01:24:27.593 options right now to make sure. 01:24:27.593 --> 01:24:29.300 - We absolutely are looking at a variety 01:24:29.300 --> 01:24:33.441 of different options for how we might address this. 01:24:33.441 --> 01:24:34.980 - And are you confident we can address this 01:24:34.980 --> 01:24:37.260 not only given your role as CENTCOM commander 01:24:37.260 --> 01:24:40.800 but your previous role as SOCOM commander? 01:24:40.800 --> 01:24:44.333 - I am supremely confident in both our SOF 01:24:44.333 --> 01:24:46.840 and conventional forces and the ability to meet 01:24:46.840 --> 01:24:50.690 the missions that our nation has in this area and in others. 01:24:50.690 --> 01:24:52.846 - Let me talk about Iran a little bit. 01:24:52.846 --> 01:24:57.034 You know my colleague from Maine who I consider 01:24:57.034 --> 01:25:00.912 a good friend and deeply respect, he mentioned the Iran 01:25:00.912 --> 01:25:04.180 nuclear deal, the Iran nuclear deal essentially 01:25:04.180 --> 01:25:08.467 gave Iran the freedom to be on the verge of becoming 01:25:08.467 --> 01:25:11.190 a nuclear nation within 10 years anyway so. 01:25:11.190 --> 01:25:13.020 We always forget that, that's a short 01:25:13.020 --> 01:25:15.100 time span in the Middle East. 01:25:15.100 --> 01:25:16.729 That was the agreement. 01:25:16.729 --> 01:25:20.031 Let me just, General Dempsey when he was chairman of 01:25:20.031 --> 01:25:25.031 the Joint Chiefs, testified in front of this committee 01:25:25.627 --> 01:25:30.390 that when the Iranians were supplying the Quds force 01:25:30.390 --> 01:25:34.090 and others, were supplying sophisticated IEDs to 01:25:34.090 --> 01:25:37.730 the Iraqi Shia militias, they were responsible for 01:25:37.730 --> 01:25:42.730 the killing and wounding of over 2,000 American soldiers, 01:25:43.680 --> 01:25:46.423 airmen, Marines, do you agree with that assessment? 01:25:47.430 --> 01:25:50.401 - I do agree that Iran facilitated equipment to 01:25:50.401 --> 01:25:55.157 organizations that caused casualties on Americans. 01:25:55.157 --> 01:25:56.290 - [Senator Sullivan] Massive casualties. 01:25:56.290 --> 01:25:57.290 - Massive casualties. 01:25:57.290 --> 01:26:00.490 - So, it often gets forgotten that Iranians were, 01:26:00.490 --> 01:26:02.682 in my view, directly responsible for killing 01:26:02.682 --> 01:26:05.850 and wounding over 2,000 American soldiers 01:26:05.850 --> 01:26:09.150 and other military members on the ground in Iraq. 01:26:09.150 --> 01:26:10.800 Isn't that correct? 01:26:10.800 --> 01:26:12.252 - That is correct, Senator. 01:26:12.252 --> 01:26:15.119 - So, the Iran nuclear deal, one of the big selling points 01:26:15.119 --> 01:26:19.330 was that it was gonna moderate Iranian activities. 01:26:19.330 --> 01:26:21.468 This was sold by Secretary of State 01:26:21.468 --> 01:26:23.620 John Kerry and even President Obama. 01:26:23.620 --> 01:26:28.233 Have they moderated their malign activities in Syria? 01:26:29.400 --> 01:26:31.130 - Senator, they have not. 01:26:31.130 --> 01:26:33.330 - No, it's gotten worse, isn't that true, General? 01:26:33.330 --> 01:26:35.549 - It's my observation that during the time 01:26:35.549 --> 01:26:38.758 that the agreement was in place, we did not 01:26:38.758 --> 01:26:41.060 see a modification to their behavior. 01:26:41.060 --> 01:26:42.550 - How about with regard to Yemen? 01:26:42.550 --> 01:26:45.240 A lot of people, my colleagues on both sides of 01:26:45.240 --> 01:26:47.570 the aisle forget who started the war in Yemen. 01:26:47.570 --> 01:26:49.023 It wasn't the Saudis was it? 01:26:50.960 --> 01:26:53.960 The Houthis backed by the Iranians? 01:26:53.960 --> 01:26:57.400 - The Saudis were concerned about the presence of an 01:26:57.400 --> 01:27:00.687 Iranian backed organization along their southern border. 01:27:00.687 --> 01:27:02.500 - And with regard to Israel, they certainly haven't 01:27:02.500 --> 01:27:05.860 moderated their malign activities have they, Iran? 01:27:05.860 --> 01:27:08.530 - I think if you talk to the Israelis 01:27:08.530 --> 01:27:09.640 they certainly would agree with that. 01:27:09.640 --> 01:27:11.540 - Let me ask one final question with regard 01:27:11.540 --> 01:27:14.621 to Secretary Pompeo gave a speech in Cairo that was 01:27:14.621 --> 01:27:17.923 laying out what I thought was a very well articulated, 01:27:17.923 --> 01:27:21.140 robust counter Iran strategy. 01:27:21.140 --> 01:27:23.904 How are you looking as a CENTCOM commander to execute 01:27:23.904 --> 01:27:26.340 this strategy which I think is one of the most 01:27:26.340 --> 01:27:29.453 important things we can be doing in the Middle East? 01:27:31.040 --> 01:27:33.527 - Well, Senator, I have responsibility for helping 01:27:33.527 --> 01:27:37.294 put together the Department's global campaign, 01:27:37.294 --> 01:27:40.094 the military global campaign for Iran and so as 01:27:40.094 --> 01:27:43.320 I look at that I look at a variety of different 01:27:43.320 --> 01:27:45.140 things that we have to do as part of that. 01:27:45.140 --> 01:27:47.998 We have to assure our partners, we have to challenge Iran 01:27:47.998 --> 01:27:50.977 in the areas where they're trying to exert their 01:27:50.977 --> 01:27:55.415 malign influence, we have to be prepared to deter them, 01:27:55.415 --> 01:27:58.212 we have to be prepared to delay and respond to their 01:27:58.212 --> 01:28:01.652 activities in the region so as I look at the planning 01:28:01.652 --> 01:28:04.689 that we are doing against that those are the types 01:28:04.689 --> 01:28:07.345 of things that I am trying to incorporate into a 01:28:07.345 --> 01:28:11.930 comprehensive plan to address the threat of Iran. 01:28:11.930 --> 01:28:12.763 - Thank you. 01:28:12.763 --> 01:28:13.907 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:28:18.676 --> 01:28:19.970 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank 01:28:19.970 --> 01:28:21.130 you General for being here. 01:28:21.130 --> 01:28:25.160 I also want to recognize that your Command Sergeant Major 01:28:25.160 --> 01:28:26.689 is here, Sergeant Major Thetford, thank you for all 01:28:26.689 --> 01:28:29.713 of your years of work as well on behalf of our nation. 01:28:30.561 --> 01:28:33.527 General I want to go back to, there's a theme that 01:28:33.527 --> 01:28:36.234 you talked about a lot in terms of relationship building 01:28:36.234 --> 01:28:40.340 and setting the ground work with our partners beforehand 01:28:40.340 --> 01:28:44.129 in the region and the like and you and I touched 01:28:44.129 --> 01:28:47.890 a little bit on some of the programs that exist that allow 01:28:47.890 --> 01:28:50.900 us to do that, to build these habitual relationships. 01:28:50.900 --> 01:28:55.320 I know that the ranking member talked about IMET programs. 01:28:55.320 --> 01:28:56.540 I'd like to touch on the state 01:28:56.540 --> 01:28:58.170 Partnership for Peace programs. 01:28:58.170 --> 01:29:01.300 You know this is a program where when I was serving from 01:29:01.300 --> 01:29:03.060 the time I was a second lieutenant, I had a partner nation, 01:29:03.060 --> 01:29:07.377 in Illinois' case Poland, that we trained and worked with 01:29:07.377 --> 01:29:10.920 and so I grew up in the military along with my Polish 01:29:10.920 --> 01:29:15.120 counterpart from being young second lieutenants all 01:29:15.120 --> 01:29:17.473 the way up through our command time and that developed 01:29:17.473 --> 01:29:21.950 a relationship and an understanding of how that worked. 01:29:21.950 --> 01:29:24.420 Can you speak a little bit about the different types of US 01:29:24.420 --> 01:29:27.660 funded exchange programs that you see implemented in the 01:29:27.660 --> 01:29:30.493 CENTCOM region and talk about the values of those programs 01:29:30.493 --> 01:29:33.860 to contributing to our war fighting capabilities? 01:29:33.860 --> 01:29:35.420 - Thank you and Senator let me just start 01:29:35.420 --> 01:29:37.610 the talk about the state partnership program. 01:29:37.610 --> 01:29:38.890 This is an excellent program. 01:29:38.890 --> 01:29:42.290 We have four or five states that are partnered with 01:29:42.290 --> 01:29:45.175 countries across our region and in almost every case 01:29:45.175 --> 01:29:49.530 these are deeply valued programs by our partners in the 01:29:49.530 --> 01:29:52.916 region and I believe by the states that orchestrate them. 01:29:52.916 --> 01:29:55.440 We get a lot of benefit out of that, not just in 01:29:55.440 --> 01:29:58.713 the countries in the region but by again by people 01:29:58.713 --> 01:30:02.425 from those countries coming back to America to participate 01:30:02.425 --> 01:30:06.030 in exercises to build the relationships back here and I 01:30:06.030 --> 01:30:09.321 think this is an extraordinary program, it's long term, 01:30:09.321 --> 01:30:13.220 it's enduring, and I think it serves us particularly well. 01:30:13.220 --> 01:30:15.547 You've already talked about the impact of IMET, this is an 01:30:15.547 --> 01:30:19.100 extraordinarily important program, I won't belabor that. 01:30:19.100 --> 01:30:23.673 I also think that the program of exercises that we continue 01:30:23.673 --> 01:30:28.673 to orchestrate across the region are extraordinarily 01:30:29.490 --> 01:30:32.200 important in terms of building interoperability, 01:30:32.200 --> 01:30:34.864 in terms of building readiness, and in terms of building 01:30:34.864 --> 01:30:39.163 reliability in our partners and as we have kind of continued 01:30:39.163 --> 01:30:42.840 to move forward I think this will be, again, 01:30:42.840 --> 01:30:45.910 continuing investments that we'll want to make. 01:30:45.910 --> 01:30:48.266 For example, with Egypt, we have restarted the Bright 01:30:48.266 --> 01:30:52.260 Star exercise but we've changed it more to deal with 01:30:52.260 --> 01:30:55.097 the contemporary threats that we are dealing with 01:30:55.097 --> 01:30:58.922 and that Egypt is dealing with in the terrorism realm as 01:30:58.922 --> 01:31:02.760 opposed to perhaps the sweeping tank battles of the past. 01:31:02.760 --> 01:31:04.060 That's not what we're doing. 01:31:04.060 --> 01:31:06.840 So, I think we, to our exercise programs, 01:31:06.840 --> 01:31:09.550 we have the ability to make these very specific 01:31:09.550 --> 01:31:14.550 to the needs of the region and adjust it. 01:31:15.090 --> 01:31:17.799 I would add final program that I think is extraordinarily 01:31:17.799 --> 01:31:21.756 valuable and it is our Combined Maritime Force 01:31:21.756 --> 01:31:26.756 where we invite different partners in the region, 01:31:28.077 --> 01:31:30.735 some from outside of the region, to come in 01:31:30.735 --> 01:31:33.652 and participate as part of our Combined Maritime Forces 01:31:33.652 --> 01:31:38.050 operating in the Gulf and in the waters of the region. 01:31:38.050 --> 01:31:41.733 These are extraordinarily important and we see 01:31:41.733 --> 01:31:45.650 countries like Pakistan who step forward, 01:31:45.650 --> 01:31:48.423 provide significant resources in this and provide 01:31:48.423 --> 01:31:51.505 leadership to these organizations and this allows 01:31:51.505 --> 01:31:55.433 us to make sure that we share the burden, we leverage 01:31:55.433 --> 01:31:59.588 the capabilities that everybody brings and it adds to 01:31:59.588 --> 01:32:03.200 a much more collective approach to security in the region. 01:32:03.200 --> 01:32:06.992 So, those are just four key programs of probably 01:32:06.992 --> 01:32:10.250 several others that could be discussed as well. 01:32:10.250 --> 01:32:11.630 - Thank you, General. 01:32:11.630 --> 01:32:13.420 That last point speaks a little bit 01:32:13.420 --> 01:32:16.520 to my logistical officer heart. 01:32:16.520 --> 01:32:18.770 When I look at a map of the CENTCOM region I can't help 01:32:18.770 --> 01:32:22.630 but wonder how your J4 is able to transport people, 01:32:22.630 --> 01:32:24.770 equipment, and supplies throughout the theater 01:32:24.770 --> 01:32:26.673 especially in light of great power competition 01:32:26.673 --> 01:32:28.921 and the changing environment as it is. 01:32:28.921 --> 01:32:31.840 It becomes even more salient when I think about 01:32:31.840 --> 01:32:34.700 the potential for Iranians to close the Strait 01:32:34.700 --> 01:32:37.377 of Hormuz and restrict movement in the Arabian Gulf. 01:32:37.377 --> 01:32:40.355 Going back to the exercises that you just mentioned, 01:32:40.355 --> 01:32:43.116 do you regularly exercise against this threat 01:32:43.116 --> 01:32:45.430 and how confident are you that our logistical 01:32:45.430 --> 01:32:47.700 supply chain will not be gravely impacted should 01:32:47.700 --> 01:32:50.570 conflict with the Iranians escalate in the region? 01:32:50.570 --> 01:32:51.690 - Certainly we do. 01:32:51.690 --> 01:32:53.810 I mean one of the principle concerns we have is 01:32:53.810 --> 01:32:57.370 the mining of the straits and the impact that that would 01:32:57.370 --> 01:33:02.370 have and so we do regularly exercise, mining exercises, 01:33:03.518 --> 01:33:07.100 counter mining exercises in the maritime environment here. 01:33:07.100 --> 01:33:11.330 We have a big exercise planned later this fall with 01:33:11.330 --> 01:33:13.370 a number of different countries that will come in but 01:33:13.370 --> 01:33:16.398 this is certainly something that we are focused on. 01:33:16.398 --> 01:33:19.798 You are really hitting on the resiliency of our logistics 01:33:19.798 --> 01:33:24.798 networks in the region and I do think that our command, 01:33:26.750 --> 01:33:28.626 our components out there and our 01:33:28.626 --> 01:33:30.940 partners have really begun to address this. 01:33:30.940 --> 01:33:32.850 Certainly you're familiar with the northern 01:33:32.850 --> 01:33:34.470 distribution network that kind of goes 01:33:34.470 --> 01:33:36.120 up through the central Asian states. 01:33:36.120 --> 01:33:37.460 That has been important for us, 01:33:37.460 --> 01:33:39.620 we continue to exercise that. 01:33:39.620 --> 01:33:43.483 It certainly does have some influence from Russia and that. 01:33:44.990 --> 01:33:47.890 It is a more difficult network to orchestrate 01:33:47.890 --> 01:33:49.600 but it is not impossible and we do continue 01:33:49.600 --> 01:33:54.600 to move materials across that across that area. 01:33:55.000 --> 01:33:57.360 Across the Arabian peninsula, we have what we refer 01:33:57.360 --> 01:33:59.949 to as the trans Arabian network that links a variety 01:33:59.949 --> 01:34:03.262 of ports and cities and airports, not only in the Arabian 01:34:03.262 --> 01:34:06.661 Gulf but down in the Gulf of Oman and over to the Red Sea. 01:34:06.661 --> 01:34:09.812 It gives us extreme resiliency in terms of how we can 01:34:09.812 --> 01:34:14.812 move material, men, forces into the region to respond 01:34:15.500 --> 01:34:18.290 to capabilities so we're very much focused on that. 01:34:18.290 --> 01:34:20.690 And in fact as we look at implementing the National 01:34:20.690 --> 01:34:23.871 Defense Strategy and what that might mean for CENTCOM, 01:34:23.871 --> 01:34:26.744 our focus on these logistic networks and our ability 01:34:26.744 --> 01:34:30.160 to have agreements, basing, and other things in here, 01:34:30.160 --> 01:34:32.040 I think even become more important than they 01:34:32.040 --> 01:34:36.236 already have and we have tried to prioritize that 01:34:36.236 --> 01:34:38.960 and we will continue to do that as we move forward. 01:34:38.960 --> 01:34:40.530 - Thank you, vitally important indeed. 01:34:40.530 --> 01:34:41.730 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:34:45.200 --> 01:34:46.210 - Thank you, Mr. Chair. 01:34:46.210 --> 01:34:50.120 And first Sergeant Major thank you for your wonderful years 01:34:50.120 --> 01:34:52.830 of service and commitment to our great United States. 01:34:52.830 --> 01:34:54.553 We certainly appreciate that. 01:34:57.410 --> 01:35:00.865 Major Votel, many years ago a number of your 01:35:00.865 --> 01:35:04.040 colleagues and your soldiers believed that you 01:35:04.040 --> 01:35:07.240 would become a great leader and I have to say 01:35:07.240 --> 01:35:11.240 General that they were correct all those years ago. 01:35:11.240 --> 01:35:12.300 Thank you so much for your 01:35:12.300 --> 01:35:14.493 wonderful service, appreciate that. 01:35:15.390 --> 01:35:18.550 One of our most effective resources for building 01:35:18.550 --> 01:35:22.240 partnerships in capacity while maintaining the pressure 01:35:22.240 --> 01:35:25.190 that we have on those violent extremist organizations 01:35:25.190 --> 01:35:29.020 is done obviously through our special operators 01:35:29.020 --> 01:35:31.880 and you are intimately familiar with that. 01:35:31.880 --> 01:35:34.190 How do you see the role of our special operators 01:35:34.190 --> 01:35:37.830 evolving across the CENTCOM AOR with regard to 01:35:37.830 --> 01:35:42.020 counterterrorism and capacity building as well as their role 01:35:42.020 --> 01:35:46.260 more broadly nested within the National Defense Strategy? 01:35:46.260 --> 01:35:47.830 If you can talk a little bit about 01:35:47.830 --> 01:35:50.730 that role, how we're developing them? 01:35:50.730 --> 01:35:51.922 - Thank you. 01:35:51.922 --> 01:35:56.080 Senator, as you suggest, special operations forces will 01:35:56.080 --> 01:35:58.438 continue to play a key role in the CENTCOM area of 01:35:58.438 --> 01:36:02.620 responsibility as we confront violent extremism here. 01:36:02.620 --> 01:36:04.741 They have developed a level of expertise 01:36:04.741 --> 01:36:07.204 and proficiency in this that is certainly 01:36:07.204 --> 01:36:12.204 unmatched anywhere else and so we will depend on that. 01:36:12.680 --> 01:36:16.010 I would add this that one of things that I am most proud 01:36:16.010 --> 01:36:18.535 of as CENTCOM commander and as a former SOCOM commander is 01:36:18.535 --> 01:36:22.560 how well our special operations forces and our conventional 01:36:22.560 --> 01:36:26.230 forces are integrated in the areas in which we operate. 01:36:26.230 --> 01:36:29.490 In many cases it is almost indistinguishable. 01:36:29.490 --> 01:36:31.740 There is very little concern with who gets 01:36:31.740 --> 01:36:36.140 the credit or who is calling the shots here. 01:36:36.140 --> 01:36:38.305 It is an extraordinarily collaborative 01:36:38.305 --> 01:36:41.210 environment between all of our forces on 01:36:41.210 --> 01:36:44.420 the ground and this will be essential as we move forward. 01:36:44.420 --> 01:36:48.300 As you know our special operations capability are limited, 01:36:48.300 --> 01:36:51.730 they are in great demand not just in CENTCOM 01:36:51.730 --> 01:36:54.318 but in other areas and that will be brought 01:36:54.318 --> 01:36:59.050 out as we fully implement the National Defense Strategy. 01:36:59.050 --> 01:37:02.860 So reliance on our conventional forces beginning to do some 01:37:02.860 --> 01:37:06.571 of these things and to develop the same methodologies that 01:37:06.571 --> 01:37:10.420 our special operators have developed over the course of many 01:37:10.420 --> 01:37:14.270 years will become very, very important as we move forward. 01:37:14.270 --> 01:37:17.645 - And General as we're drawing down the number of troops 01:37:17.645 --> 01:37:22.596 that we have whether it's Syria, Afghanistan, elsewhere, 01:37:22.596 --> 01:37:27.430 we do continue to maintain a train, advise, assist 01:37:27.430 --> 01:37:31.039 and at times accompany missions, do you see that 01:37:31.039 --> 01:37:35.358 continuing forward as a force multiplier with partners 01:37:35.358 --> 01:37:40.358 in that region and what more can we do in that area? 01:37:41.110 --> 01:37:44.360 - I do, Senator, I think this idea of by, with, 01:37:44.360 --> 01:37:48.021 and through and focused on training, advising, assisting, 01:37:48.021 --> 01:37:52.090 enabling our partners is a proven method for us 01:37:52.090 --> 01:37:54.382 and I think it works extraordinarily well in 01:37:54.382 --> 01:37:59.382 this particular region so I do see that moving forward. 01:37:59.636 --> 01:38:01.840 Going forward it will be important for us 01:38:01.840 --> 01:38:03.396 to maintain these relationships. 01:38:03.396 --> 01:38:07.918 The relationships that we depend on in this region are not 01:38:07.918 --> 01:38:12.260 those that can be put together in the course of a crisis, 01:38:12.260 --> 01:38:14.608 they have to be developed and they have to be 01:38:14.608 --> 01:38:17.530 nurtured over time as Admiral McRaven often reminded 01:38:17.530 --> 01:38:20.809 us when he was the SOCOM commander, you cannot surge 01:38:20.809 --> 01:38:24.807 trust in times of crisis that has to be done in advance. 01:38:24.807 --> 01:38:27.684 I think the lifeblood of what we do out 01:38:27.684 --> 01:38:30.482 here will be the development of resilient, 01:38:30.482 --> 01:38:34.500 trustful relationships across our region. 01:38:34.500 --> 01:38:36.880 - I appreciate that and I appreciate 01:38:36.880 --> 01:38:39.361 the comments made by colleagues about the state 01:38:39.361 --> 01:38:44.361 partnership programs, the IMET programs and so on. 01:38:44.730 --> 01:38:46.520 Those are very, very important 01:38:46.520 --> 01:38:48.710 in developing that level of trust. 01:38:48.710 --> 01:38:52.570 Just very briefly because I am running out of time, General. 01:38:52.570 --> 01:38:57.180 Of course we do have some other big players in the region. 01:38:57.180 --> 01:39:01.450 We see Russia, of course, in Syria. 01:39:01.450 --> 01:39:04.050 We see China's investments in Pakistan. 01:39:04.050 --> 01:39:07.802 And where else do you assess that China and Russia are 01:39:07.802 --> 01:39:12.253 involved in that AOR and what is the extent of that 01:39:12.253 --> 01:39:15.160 and what are their intentions from your perspective? 01:39:15.160 --> 01:39:16.010 - Thanks. 01:39:16.010 --> 01:39:18.088 Well, starting with Russia, certainly Russia has 01:39:18.088 --> 01:39:22.574 extraordinary interests in the central Asian states, 01:39:22.574 --> 01:39:26.366 these being former Soviet republics, they maintain 01:39:26.366 --> 01:39:31.330 a long term relationship there and so this will 01:39:31.330 --> 01:39:33.530 always continue to be something that we will have 01:39:33.530 --> 01:39:36.848 to contend with in this particular region. 01:39:36.848 --> 01:39:40.554 You know, we have seen in the past Russia working 01:39:40.554 --> 01:39:44.595 with countries like Egypt and others to potentially 01:39:44.595 --> 01:39:47.474 fill in voids there so we have to be 01:39:47.474 --> 01:39:51.976 mindful of those relationships as well. 01:39:51.976 --> 01:39:56.350 When you look at China, I think their motivations 01:39:56.350 --> 01:40:00.157 are principally driven by their economic objectives. 01:40:00.157 --> 01:40:03.750 Again really driven by the one belt one road approach that 01:40:03.750 --> 01:40:08.534 they are taking to link trade routes back to China and I 01:40:08.534 --> 01:40:13.534 think the thing we have to continue to be watchful of is 01:40:15.356 --> 01:40:19.780 their developing relationships with other partners across 01:40:19.780 --> 01:40:22.087 the region, particularly in the maritime environment, and 01:40:22.087 --> 01:40:27.000 the countries that are along the waterways in the region 01:40:27.000 --> 01:40:31.331 whether they are some of the Gulf states or whether they are 01:40:31.331 --> 01:40:36.331 some that are on the African continent but which certainly 01:40:36.683 --> 01:40:41.683 give them good access into the CENTCOM waters here. 01:40:42.393 --> 01:40:44.850 These are the areas I think we will 01:40:44.850 --> 01:40:47.010 have to pay attention to in the future. 01:40:47.010 --> 01:40:48.570 - Absolutely, they have a long game 01:40:48.570 --> 01:40:50.480 and we do need to pay attention. 01:40:50.480 --> 01:40:52.386 My time is expired but General my best to you 01:40:52.386 --> 01:40:56.994 and your beautiful family, thank you so very much. 01:40:56.994 --> 01:41:01.994 - Thank you, Senator. 01:41:02.735 --> 01:41:04.140 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:41:04.140 --> 01:41:08.631 I join my colleagues in thanking you for your service and 01:41:08.631 --> 01:41:13.631 thanks for your very forthright and helpful answers today. 01:41:13.720 --> 01:41:16.493 I want to come back to a line of questioning 01:41:16.493 --> 01:41:21.493 that Senator Reed began about the $331 million 01:41:21.710 --> 01:41:24.639 that we are owed by the Saudis for aerial refueling. 01:41:24.639 --> 01:41:27.500 Have we made a demand to the Saudis 01:41:27.500 --> 01:41:29.426 that they pay that money? 01:41:29.426 --> 01:41:32.716 - Senator, we have presented all those bills to 01:41:32.716 --> 01:41:37.416 the Saudi led coalition, they have them, they are in 01:41:37.416 --> 01:41:40.235 receipt of them, they acknowledge that and we are 01:41:40.235 --> 01:41:45.235 working through to ensure that the products that 01:41:46.190 --> 01:41:49.100 we have given to them are, they understand what 01:41:49.100 --> 01:41:51.790 that is and they will be able to respond to us. 01:41:51.790 --> 01:41:54.010 They have given us every indication that they intend to meet 01:41:54.010 --> 01:41:58.460 the requirements for reimbursement that we have asked for. 01:41:58.460 --> 01:42:00.587 - There's no question in your mind is there 01:42:00.587 --> 01:42:05.453 that $331 million is owed to our country? 01:42:06.716 --> 01:42:10.897 - That is reimbursement for fuel that we provided 01:42:10.897 --> 01:42:13.643 for them and it is reimbursement for the flight hours 01:42:13.643 --> 01:42:18.643 associated with the aircraft that provided that fuel. 01:42:19.260 --> 01:42:21.830 - When will they make that payment of reimbursement? 01:42:21.830 --> 01:42:26.030 - We expect that in terms of the flying hours, the bills 01:42:26.030 --> 01:42:31.030 have been presented to both Saudi Arabia and to the Emirates 01:42:31.045 --> 01:42:34.642 that we will, for flying hours, will see responses as early 01:42:34.642 --> 01:42:39.642 as March and then likely for the fuel by the May time frame. 01:42:40.180 --> 01:42:42.512 The ACSA requires that they provide 01:42:42.512 --> 01:42:47.512 reimbursement within 90 days of notification. 01:42:47.890 --> 01:42:50.010 - These are US taxpayer dollars that they 01:42:50.010 --> 01:42:53.709 owe us to put it most simply correct? 01:42:53.709 --> 01:42:55.760 - Yes, Senator. 01:42:55.760 --> 01:42:59.015 - And you mentioned I may have misheard you that there 01:42:59.015 --> 01:43:02.909 is the possibility of other instances where they 01:43:02.909 --> 01:43:07.909 or other countries owe us for similar kinds of expenses? 01:43:09.540 --> 01:43:12.590 - I don't think we've identified any other than that. 01:43:12.590 --> 01:43:15.700 I think the question was have we looked more broadly across 01:43:15.700 --> 01:43:18.900 the region to ensure that we don't have this problem with 01:43:18.900 --> 01:43:22.150 others and we are in the process of doing that, Senator. 01:43:22.150 --> 01:43:23.910 - You are reviewing? 01:43:23.910 --> 01:43:25.490 - Exactly, to make sure that we have 01:43:25.490 --> 01:43:28.040 not had an oversight on this. 01:43:28.040 --> 01:43:30.151 - And have you found any indications that 01:43:30.151 --> 01:43:34.306 there have been other failures to repay? 01:43:34.306 --> 01:43:38.203 - I have not been notified of any thus far, Senator. 01:43:40.033 --> 01:43:45.033 - I'd like to ask you about the special operators 01:43:48.257 --> 01:43:53.257 and Senator Ernst asked you a number of questions. 01:43:54.930 --> 01:43:59.930 Can they operate as effectively from bases in Iraq 01:44:00.270 --> 01:44:02.863 as they can from where they are located now? 01:44:04.080 --> 01:44:05.900 - Senator, I think our special 01:44:05.900 --> 01:44:08.120 operators are extraordinarily capable. 01:44:08.120 --> 01:44:13.120 In the beginning of our operations in both Iraq and Syria 01:44:14.040 --> 01:44:16.636 there was a time when we did not have anybody on the ground 01:44:16.636 --> 01:44:19.340 and yet we were able to have a relationship with our 01:44:19.340 --> 01:44:22.185 partners on the ground in Syria and we were able to do that 01:44:22.185 --> 01:44:25.540 from remote locations and we do that in other places. 01:44:25.540 --> 01:44:28.712 They are extraordinarily innovative and so we 01:44:28.712 --> 01:44:33.712 will look at all options that we can use here. 01:44:34.730 --> 01:44:38.080 - I guess my question just to rephrase it was not 01:44:38.080 --> 01:44:43.080 whether they can operate at all but whether they 01:44:45.210 --> 01:44:49.360 can operate as effectively if they are based remotely? 01:44:49.360 --> 01:44:53.350 Aren't they more effective if they are in effect in 01:44:53.350 --> 01:44:57.860 the combat area where they're supposed to operate? 01:44:57.860 --> 01:45:02.070 - Senator, I would agree with you that it's always best 01:45:02.070 --> 01:45:05.242 to be with your partner and to be sharing everything that 01:45:05.242 --> 01:45:08.773 they're experiencing so I think that's optimum but certainly 01:45:08.773 --> 01:45:13.463 I think we have demonstrated in a variety of different 01:45:13.463 --> 01:45:17.979 areas here that through some level of remote location 01:45:17.979 --> 01:45:22.979 we can achieve the objectives that we're focused on. 01:45:23.860 --> 01:45:27.700 - Well, knowing how skilled and effective our special 01:45:27.700 --> 01:45:30.599 operators are I have no doubt that they can operate 01:45:30.599 --> 01:45:35.599 from very remote locations but I take it you would agree 01:45:35.870 --> 01:45:40.870 with me that the optimum situation from the standpoint 01:45:41.620 --> 01:45:46.333 of military impact would be to have them actually on 01:45:46.333 --> 01:45:51.115 the ground where they're supposed to do their work. 01:45:51.115 --> 01:45:52.497 - Senator, I would agree, I think it's 01:45:52.497 --> 01:45:55.600 always best to be with your partners. 01:45:55.600 --> 01:45:57.063 - Thank you. 01:45:57.063 --> 01:45:58.527 Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. 01:46:01.130 --> 01:46:02.670 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:46:02.670 --> 01:46:04.590 General thank you for your career 01:46:04.590 --> 01:46:06.350 and dedication and sacrifices. 01:46:06.350 --> 01:46:09.920 Sergeant Major, thank you for 38 years. 01:46:09.920 --> 01:46:11.830 Don't ever think it was ever taken for granted, 01:46:11.830 --> 01:46:13.250 it won't ever be forgotten. 01:46:13.250 --> 01:46:14.740 God bless you. 01:46:14.740 --> 01:46:18.699 General, I'm concerned, in your AOR you have all five 01:46:18.699 --> 01:46:22.690 threats if you assume that and believe that North Korea 01:46:22.690 --> 01:46:27.010 and Iran have a particularly good relationship and across 01:46:27.010 --> 01:46:29.120 at least three domains, probably four domains, 01:46:29.120 --> 01:46:32.761 so the question I have is relative to what China 01:46:32.761 --> 01:46:34.940 and Russia are doing longer term particularly 01:46:34.940 --> 01:46:37.270 as we think about our future in Afghanistan. 01:46:37.270 --> 01:46:40.850 What China's done in the China Pakistan economic 01:46:40.850 --> 01:46:43.990 corridor is basically handcuffing Pakistan. 01:46:43.990 --> 01:46:46.120 As you said earlier, Pakistan is a major player 01:46:46.120 --> 01:46:48.090 in determining the long term future of Afghanistan. 01:46:48.090 --> 01:46:50.770 I would argue that India as well and the Stans and other 01:46:50.770 --> 01:46:53.154 players in the region are because of the Pashtun problem. 01:46:53.154 --> 01:46:55.320 But this debt problem is up to I think 01:46:55.320 --> 01:46:58.360 it's $23 billion now, could grow to $62 billion 01:46:58.360 --> 01:47:01.960 and there's $90 billion committed there in that effort. 01:47:01.960 --> 01:47:03.744 That's huge in terms of Pakistan. 01:47:03.744 --> 01:47:06.319 What I'm concerned about is what Pakistan 01:47:06.319 --> 01:47:09.070 is also representing to China with regard 01:47:09.070 --> 01:47:11.640 to what China's done with their BRI across that area. 01:47:11.640 --> 01:47:16.640 You just mentioned the maritime interest with Bentota. 01:47:16.670 --> 01:47:19.960 Bentota is just south of Colombo in Sri Lanka 01:47:19.960 --> 01:47:23.440 and they have already foreclosed on their partner there. 01:47:23.440 --> 01:47:25.470 It's a proprietary debt situation. 01:47:25.470 --> 01:47:28.287 They've done the same thing in 31 other places around 01:47:28.287 --> 01:47:31.620 the coast of Africa and you just mentioned that. 01:47:31.620 --> 01:47:35.120 The question is how are we as a military, I understand 01:47:35.120 --> 01:47:37.928 as a diplomatic issue as well, how are you in the military 01:47:37.928 --> 01:47:40.560 dealing with China's effort to develop this string 01:47:40.560 --> 01:47:43.150 of pearls, particularly in the perspective that Russia 01:47:43.150 --> 01:47:48.150 with (mumbles) with China at Djibouti in this area as we 01:47:48.700 --> 01:47:52.190 consider our future in both Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan? 01:47:52.190 --> 01:47:55.130 How are we addressing that China and Russia threat 01:47:55.130 --> 01:47:58.473 relative to their permanent strategy in that area? 01:48:00.030 --> 01:48:01.440 - Thanks, Senator, and I think you 01:48:01.440 --> 01:48:03.740 highlighted a real challenge for us. 01:48:03.740 --> 01:48:06.072 I think as we look at great power competition I think 01:48:06.072 --> 01:48:10.174 we have to recognize, and I believe we do, that the threat 01:48:10.174 --> 01:48:15.174 of Russia or that China poses to us isn't limited to 01:48:15.280 --> 01:48:17.648 a particular geographic area but in fact it is global 01:48:17.648 --> 01:48:20.870 with these partners so as we look at our plans 01:48:20.870 --> 01:48:24.559 to compete with these partners to pursue our national 01:48:24.559 --> 01:48:28.649 interests we have to look in all areas where we do 01:48:28.649 --> 01:48:32.820 this to include the CENTCOM area of responsibility. 01:48:32.820 --> 01:48:36.062 There will be things that we can do in CENTCOM that 01:48:36.062 --> 01:48:39.957 can contribute to a broader campaign to compete 01:48:39.957 --> 01:48:43.338 with China and Russia and so I think as we look 01:48:43.338 --> 01:48:46.900 at this we have to look for opportunities where we 01:48:46.900 --> 01:48:51.900 can do that and how we integrate into a broader plan. 01:48:51.940 --> 01:48:55.420 More specifically though what I would tell you, I think 01:48:55.420 --> 01:48:58.640 one of the most important things, and I mentioned this 01:48:58.640 --> 01:49:01.840 a little bit earlier, for us to do is to continue to be 01:49:01.840 --> 01:49:05.290 seen by our partners in the region as a valued partner. 01:49:08.248 --> 01:49:12.323 You know, as I look at the recent Iraqi elections I 01:49:12.323 --> 01:49:16.315 noted that the presence of US and coalition forces on 01:49:16.315 --> 01:49:20.400 the ground was not an election issue there and I think that 01:49:20.400 --> 01:49:23.470 is because of the manner in which we presented ourselves, 01:49:23.470 --> 01:49:25.700 it was the manner in which we conducted our activities 01:49:25.700 --> 01:49:29.265 there and so I think preserving our relationships and 01:49:29.265 --> 01:49:33.920 continuing to be seen as reliable partners is perhaps one 01:49:33.920 --> 01:49:37.215 of the best defenses that we have against the influence 01:49:37.215 --> 01:49:41.920 of great power actors particularly in the CENTCOM region. 01:49:41.920 --> 01:49:46.920 And to the extent that we can continue to do 01:49:47.080 --> 01:49:49.260 that in the future, I think that will continue 01:49:49.260 --> 01:49:54.260 to be a key factor in CENTCOM as we move forward. 01:49:55.880 --> 01:49:58.570 - Well, I think after 17 years we certainly earned that 01:49:58.570 --> 01:50:00.990 right and I hope we will continue to do that relative 01:50:00.990 --> 01:50:03.660 to getting our allies to help us in that region and 01:50:03.660 --> 01:50:07.010 specifically you mentioned the parliament there in Iraq. 01:50:07.010 --> 01:50:09.540 I have a question about a specific garrison, 01:50:09.540 --> 01:50:11.656 the Al Tanf garrison in southern Syria. 01:50:11.656 --> 01:50:15.290 We've had a request from Prime Minister Netanyahu 01:50:15.290 --> 01:50:17.430 to consider keeping a permanent presence there 01:50:17.430 --> 01:50:19.860 because of where it's strategically located on 01:50:19.860 --> 01:50:22.087 the supply route between Iran and Hezbollah. 01:50:22.087 --> 01:50:25.000 There's a 34 mile exclusion area there. 01:50:25.000 --> 01:50:27.330 What are the rules of engagement that we currently 01:50:27.330 --> 01:50:30.506 have with our garrison there and is this currently 01:50:30.506 --> 01:50:34.253 being considered as a longer term installation? 01:50:36.270 --> 01:50:39.157 - This is a key part of the ongoing planning that we have 01:50:39.157 --> 01:50:42.852 going here so I won't comment publicly about what we might 01:50:42.852 --> 01:50:47.610 do there but we certainly understand the impact of that. 01:50:47.610 --> 01:50:50.694 Our reason for being at Al Tanf is principally driven 01:50:50.694 --> 01:50:55.694 by our defeat ISIS mission, that's what brought us there, 01:50:56.320 --> 01:50:59.240 that is what's kept us there, we continue to confront it, 01:50:59.240 --> 01:51:03.125 it's located in an area where we do see routine traffic 01:51:03.125 --> 01:51:05.730 from ISIS as they move from the middle Euphrates 01:51:05.730 --> 01:51:08.680 Valley to the western part of the country. 01:51:08.680 --> 01:51:13.680 It is a very good operational location from that standpoint. 01:51:14.170 --> 01:51:17.490 It does have the derivative value of being along 01:51:17.490 --> 01:51:21.400 a principle line of access, line of communication 01:51:21.400 --> 01:51:26.400 that Iran and her proxies would like to exploit. 01:51:26.610 --> 01:51:29.030 So while that isn't our mission we do recognize 01:51:29.030 --> 01:51:33.210 the indirect impact that we have with that. 01:51:33.210 --> 01:51:37.460 As we move forward, Senator, the disposition of Al Tanf will 01:51:37.460 --> 01:51:42.040 certainly be something that we consider very, very carefully 01:51:42.040 --> 01:51:46.003 as we look at our overall withdrawal plans from Syria. 01:51:47.250 --> 01:51:48.527 - Thank you, sir. 01:51:48.527 --> 01:51:49.360 Thank you. 01:51:52.100 --> 01:51:53.220 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 01:51:53.220 --> 01:51:55.820 and thank you General Votel for being here. 01:51:55.820 --> 01:51:58.493 I appreciated the chance to meet with you last week. 01:51:58.493 --> 01:52:02.330 As you know I have serious concerns about our support to 01:52:02.330 --> 01:52:06.320 the Saudi led coalition and its military campaign in Yemen 01:52:06.320 --> 01:52:10.460 and at a hearing like this last year I asked you if the US 01:52:10.460 --> 01:52:13.120 government knew where the coalition jets went and what 01:52:13.120 --> 01:52:17.800 targets they bombed after receiving fuel from US tankers 01:52:17.800 --> 01:52:21.970 and you said that CENTCOM does not track that information. 01:52:21.970 --> 01:52:25.520 In late December the New York Times reported that American 01:52:25.520 --> 01:52:28.520 military personnel assigned to the coalition's headquarters 01:52:28.520 --> 01:52:33.520 in Saudi Arabia readily had access to a "database that 01:52:34.057 --> 01:52:37.657 "detailed every air strike, war plane, target, 01:52:37.657 --> 01:52:42.657 "munitions used, and a brief description of the attack." 01:52:43.810 --> 01:52:47.280 So, let me just ask you, does this database exist? 01:52:47.280 --> 01:52:51.029 - Today we do have a database that does have that 01:52:51.029 --> 01:52:54.570 information and we have the ability to see that. 01:52:54.570 --> 01:52:57.400 - And CENTCOM has access to this database? 01:52:57.400 --> 01:53:00.410 - We do have access to it today. 01:53:00.410 --> 01:53:02.261 - This is troubling information because it suggests 01:53:02.261 --> 01:53:06.530 we could determine retroactively if coalition warplanes 01:53:06.530 --> 01:53:11.530 that bombed civilians did so with American assistance. 01:53:12.086 --> 01:53:14.970 There's clear evidence that we enable 01:53:14.970 --> 01:53:18.204 and support the Saudi led coalition in Yemen. 01:53:18.204 --> 01:53:21.078 Until recently we refueled their jets, we provide 01:53:21.078 --> 01:53:24.624 military advice and intelligence support, we continue 01:53:24.624 --> 01:53:27.372 to sell them American made bombs, bombs that 01:53:27.372 --> 01:53:32.372 public reports indicate kill Yemeni civilians. 01:53:32.480 --> 01:53:34.690 We provide their air force with sustainment 01:53:34.690 --> 01:53:38.340 and logistics support for their American made fires. 01:53:38.340 --> 01:53:41.980 So, I want to ask some questions about the details of 01:53:41.980 --> 01:53:44.976 the help we give the Saudis because they continue to conduct 01:53:44.976 --> 01:53:49.030 bombing runs, they continue to perpetuate one of 01:53:49.030 --> 01:53:53.498 the worst man made humanitarian disasters in the modern era. 01:53:53.498 --> 01:53:57.310 During this civil war more than 85,000 children 01:53:57.310 --> 01:53:59.980 under the age of five have starved to death 01:53:59.980 --> 01:54:02.857 and tens of thousands of civilians have been killed. 01:54:02.857 --> 01:54:05.659 This military engagement is not authorized, 01:54:05.659 --> 01:54:09.373 we need to end US support for this war now. 01:54:10.628 --> 01:54:13.360 So, let me ask you about detainee abuse. 01:54:13.360 --> 01:54:18.360 In Section 1274 of the FY 19 NDAA required the Secretary 01:54:20.862 --> 01:54:24.753 of Defense to review whether members of the armed forces 01:54:24.753 --> 01:54:28.934 or coalition partners of the US abused or witnessed 01:54:28.934 --> 01:54:33.385 abuse of detainees during operations in Yemen. 01:54:33.385 --> 01:54:36.310 DOD submitted this report to Congress last month 01:54:36.310 --> 01:54:38.906 and in the unclassified summary concluded that 01:54:38.906 --> 01:54:43.431 "DOD has determined that DOD personnel have 01:54:43.431 --> 01:54:48.431 "neither observed nor been complicit in any cruel, 01:54:48.997 --> 01:54:52.967 "inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees in Yemen." 01:54:54.010 --> 01:54:56.330 Can you just say a brief word, I just have a little 01:54:56.330 --> 01:55:00.400 bit of time, about how DOD reached this conclusion? 01:55:00.400 --> 01:55:02.710 - We principally derived that based on 01:55:02.710 --> 01:55:05.540 discussions and the reports from the people that 01:55:05.540 --> 01:55:07.960 we do have on the ground and what they have seen. 01:55:07.960 --> 01:55:11.353 We obviously take this very seriously, Senator, 01:55:11.353 --> 01:55:15.597 and our individuals that are in positions where they might 01:55:15.597 --> 01:55:19.470 see some of this are under the obligation to report this. 01:55:19.470 --> 01:55:24.470 And I do routinely receive reports, many of them 01:55:25.440 --> 01:55:30.440 unsubstantiated, not just linked to Yemen but to other 01:55:30.700 --> 01:55:33.734 areas in which we operate where our people have received 01:55:33.734 --> 01:55:36.870 a report of abuse and we have a reporting mechanism 01:55:36.870 --> 01:55:40.120 for that and so we do take that extraordinarily serious. 01:55:40.120 --> 01:55:43.568 - But this report says neither observed or been complicit 01:55:43.568 --> 01:55:46.600 in any cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 01:55:46.600 --> 01:55:49.660 The Associated Press, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 01:55:49.660 --> 01:55:52.719 International, and the United Nations all conducted their 01:55:52.719 --> 01:55:57.410 own investigations and came to a very different conclusion. 01:55:57.410 --> 01:55:59.374 They determined that our Emirati partners 01:55:59.374 --> 01:56:02.358 oversaw a network of detention centers that 01:56:02.358 --> 01:56:06.720 regularly engaged in torture and other abuse. 01:56:06.720 --> 01:56:08.428 Now, does DOD find these 01:56:08.428 --> 01:56:12.310 independent investigations credible? 01:56:12.310 --> 01:56:14.750 - Well, we certainly take all of these independent 01:56:14.750 --> 01:56:19.750 investigations seriously, Senator, but I think what 01:56:20.463 --> 01:56:24.960 I'm saying to you is we have no observations of our 01:56:24.960 --> 01:56:27.610 own from our people that have actually seen this. 01:56:27.610 --> 01:56:29.200 - Fair enough, then let me ask it this way. 01:56:29.200 --> 01:56:31.870 Has DOD reached any conclusions about whether 01:56:31.870 --> 01:56:35.450 or not our Emirati partners are engaging in detainee 01:56:35.450 --> 01:56:38.523 abuse when DOD personnel are not present? 01:56:38.523 --> 01:56:42.380 - I have not reached any kind of conclusion 01:56:42.380 --> 01:56:45.154 that they are conducting these activities. 01:56:45.154 --> 01:56:48.360 Certainly in our interaction with all of our partners 01:56:48.360 --> 01:56:51.470 in this conflict and across the region we continue 01:56:51.470 --> 01:56:54.850 to emphasize the obligations under the law 01:56:54.850 --> 01:56:57.255 of armed conflict and the proper detention 01:56:57.255 --> 01:57:01.230 and treatment of detainees across the board. 01:57:01.230 --> 01:57:03.090 - I appreciate you walking me through your 01:57:03.090 --> 01:57:06.960 assessment of these independent reports but 01:57:06.960 --> 01:57:11.000 I remain very concerned about abuses in the region. 01:57:11.000 --> 01:57:13.550 Turning a blind eye is not acceptable 01:57:13.550 --> 01:57:16.105 and I'm gonna keep asking questions, thank you. 01:57:16.105 --> 01:57:17.150 - Senator, I'm in receipt of letter 01:57:17.150 --> 01:57:18.545 and we will put out a response to you. 01:57:18.545 --> 01:57:19.548 - Thank you. 01:57:19.548 --> 01:57:20.548 - Thank you. 01:57:23.260 --> 01:57:25.371 - Thank you Mr. Chairman and thank you General 01:57:25.371 --> 01:57:29.860 for your time and to your team who is with you. 01:57:29.860 --> 01:57:33.203 We appreciate your service and your time. 01:57:34.037 --> 01:57:36.870 I do have some questions I want to ask you this 01:57:36.870 --> 01:57:39.500 afternoon when we're in closed session dealing with 01:57:39.500 --> 01:57:44.500 the NDS and the competition with Russia and China 01:57:44.800 --> 01:57:48.618 maintaining the right balance in the Middle East 01:57:48.618 --> 01:57:53.180 but also being aware of the competition that is there. 01:57:53.180 --> 01:57:57.141 I think you're so right as you've said in your comments. 01:57:57.141 --> 01:57:59.713 This is something we cannot lose sight of. 01:58:02.290 --> 01:58:03.313 Let me go to Syria. 01:58:04.470 --> 01:58:08.070 I will tell you that I think the administration really 01:58:08.070 --> 01:58:11.565 has sent some mixed messages about the terms of US 01:58:11.565 --> 01:58:16.109 withdrawal from Syria and whether there is protection 01:58:16.109 --> 01:58:20.190 for the Syrian Kurds, whether there's the total 01:58:20.190 --> 01:58:23.500 defeat of ISIS or the establishment of a safe 01:58:23.500 --> 01:58:27.593 zone with Turkey and what's a prerequisite. 01:58:30.416 --> 01:58:33.000 And Senator Duckworth and I just recently sent a letter 01:58:33.000 --> 01:58:38.000 pertaining to the Kurds because Nashville has the largest 01:58:40.537 --> 01:58:45.537 Kurdish population in the US and it is for this reason 01:58:46.750 --> 01:58:50.060 in addition to their partnership in the global coalition 01:58:50.060 --> 01:58:54.717 to defeat ISIS that protection of the Kurds is very 01:58:54.717 --> 01:58:59.717 important to me and to a lot of Tennesseans and I believe 01:59:02.770 --> 01:59:07.770 that any withdrawal from Syria must be conditions based 01:59:08.650 --> 01:59:13.650 and clearly there has to be a plan to protect the Kurds. 01:59:14.032 --> 01:59:18.091 And any plan to protect the Kurds must 01:59:18.091 --> 01:59:23.091 clearly outline our expectations of Turkey. 01:59:23.800 --> 01:59:26.530 So, I'd like to just hear from you, 01:59:26.530 --> 01:59:30.200 the withdrawal from Syria, is is calendar based? 01:59:30.200 --> 01:59:32.850 Is it conditions based? 01:59:32.850 --> 01:59:36.333 If it is conditions based, what are those conditions going 01:59:36.333 --> 01:59:41.076 to be there on the ground and what has been communicated 01:59:41.076 --> 01:59:46.076 to the Turks and what has been communicated to the Kurds? 01:59:46.960 --> 01:59:50.030 - Thank you, Senator and I look forward to talking 01:59:50.030 --> 01:59:52.040 a little bit more about this with you in a closed 01:59:52.040 --> 01:59:54.549 session but I would just say I don't consider 01:59:54.549 --> 01:59:59.060 this to be either time based or conditions based. 01:59:59.060 --> 02:00:02.387 The fact is the president made a decision and we are going 02:00:02.387 --> 02:00:07.387 to execute his orders here to withdraw forces from Syria. 02:00:08.650 --> 02:00:10.090 And as we do that, we are going 02:00:10.090 --> 02:00:12.040 to do that in a very deliberate manner. 02:00:12.040 --> 02:00:14.363 We are going to do that in conjunction with our campaign 02:00:14.363 --> 02:00:19.060 plan and we are going to consider things like protection 02:00:19.060 --> 02:00:21.632 of our partners, the Kurds, we are going to consider 02:00:21.632 --> 02:00:26.632 the concerns that Turkey has along their border and we 02:00:27.031 --> 02:00:31.390 are going to consider how we keep pressure on ISIS. 02:00:31.390 --> 02:00:34.253 And all of that is taking place right now. 02:00:36.775 --> 02:00:39.709 I am not under pressure to be out by a specific date 02:00:39.709 --> 02:00:44.709 and I have not had any specific conditions put upon me. 02:00:44.790 --> 02:00:47.083 I look at this as an additional task within 02:00:47.083 --> 02:00:50.080 the confines of the current campaign plan that we're 02:00:50.080 --> 02:00:53.040 operating and that's how we're approaching it. 02:00:53.040 --> 02:00:57.704 - We recently, in the January 16th attack, we lost 02:00:57.704 --> 02:01:01.630 a Chief Warrant Officer, Jonathan Farmer who was 02:01:01.630 --> 02:01:06.630 a Fort Campbell soldier and that was, I will tell you, 02:01:07.750 --> 02:01:11.500 in Montgomery County Tennessee and Clarksville Fort 02:01:11.500 --> 02:01:15.817 Campbell, this is something that really, it was noted 02:01:18.690 --> 02:01:23.690 with great sorrow by so many that are there at the post. 02:01:25.520 --> 02:01:30.520 And one of the questions that comes up from Tennesseans who 02:01:31.940 --> 02:01:35.510 are involved in defense of our nation is, did we 02:01:35.510 --> 02:01:40.510 underestimate the power and the threat of ISIS in Syria? 02:01:42.110 --> 02:01:44.811 - Senator, I don't think we do. 02:01:44.811 --> 02:01:47.149 I think that those of who've had the opportunity 02:01:47.149 --> 02:01:49.869 to be involved in this in a long time 02:01:49.869 --> 02:01:52.714 develop a respect for our enemies. 02:01:52.714 --> 02:01:55.320 We don't agree with the things that they're doing but 02:01:55.320 --> 02:01:58.727 we certainly have to respect the capabilities that they 02:01:58.727 --> 02:02:01.479 bring and we have always recognized that ISIS is a savvy 02:02:01.479 --> 02:02:06.479 organization and they will look for ways to harm us, 02:02:07.160 --> 02:02:10.930 to hurt us, in the conduct of our normal operations 02:02:10.930 --> 02:02:14.680 or certainly in the conduct of operations that we 02:02:14.680 --> 02:02:17.600 have coming up as we get ready to depart Syria. 02:02:17.600 --> 02:02:20.058 So, I don't think we underestimate their 02:02:20.058 --> 02:02:25.058 capabilities to exact a toll against us. 02:02:27.210 --> 02:02:28.620 - I appreciate that. 02:02:28.620 --> 02:02:30.730 I've got a couple questions on Yemen, 02:02:30.730 --> 02:02:32.533 I'll save those for the afternoon. 02:02:33.372 --> 02:02:34.503 I yield back my time. 02:02:39.550 --> 02:02:42.870 - Thank you Mr. Chairman, am I to interpret after six 02:02:42.870 --> 02:02:45.050 years on the committee anything negative from the fact 02:02:45.050 --> 02:02:47.833 that I've been moved to a chair without my own microphone? 02:02:49.400 --> 02:02:51.260 General Votel, thank you for your great service. 02:02:51.260 --> 02:02:53.090 You're a wonderful public servant 02:02:53.090 --> 02:02:55.030 and we're gonna miss you on the committee. 02:02:55.030 --> 02:02:58.100 I want to ask you about an interview that President 02:02:58.100 --> 02:03:01.370 Trump gave on Face the Nation on February 3rd, 02:03:01.370 --> 02:03:04.396 a couple of comments that he made dealing with Iran. 02:03:04.396 --> 02:03:08.730 He indicated "One of the reasons I want to keep it," 02:03:08.730 --> 02:03:12.327 it referring to a base in Iran, an air base, "is because I 02:03:12.327 --> 02:03:15.160 "want to be looking a little bit," I'm sorry a base in Iraq, 02:03:15.160 --> 02:03:18.267 an air base in Iraq, "is because I want to be looking a 02:03:18.267 --> 02:03:21.380 "little bit at Iran because Iran is a real problem." 02:03:21.380 --> 02:03:23.357 He was asked a question by Margaret Brennan, he said 02:03:23.357 --> 02:03:26.200 "No, because I want to be able to watch Iran." 02:03:26.200 --> 02:03:28.270 So, I'm on the Armed Services and the Foreign 02:03:28.270 --> 02:03:32.190 Relations committees and I have not had a briefing 02:03:32.190 --> 02:03:33.900 in open or classified, neither committee, 02:03:33.900 --> 02:03:36.380 during my time in the Senate suggesting that we 02:03:36.380 --> 02:03:39.750 are currently in Iraq primarily to watch Iran. 02:03:39.750 --> 02:03:42.720 My understanding is that we're in Iraq right now to help 02:03:42.720 --> 02:03:45.560 Iraq defeat ISIS is that your understanding as well? 02:03:45.560 --> 02:03:47.900 - That is exactly my understanding, Senator. 02:03:47.900 --> 02:03:50.444 - And as far as you know there is not 02:03:50.444 --> 02:03:52.422 a change in the definition of the mission 02:03:52.422 --> 02:03:53.470 at least as far as the Pentagon is concerned? 02:03:53.470 --> 02:03:55.467 - I have no additional tasks that have 02:03:55.467 --> 02:03:57.960 been given to me with regard to that. 02:03:57.960 --> 02:04:00.582 - If the US were to change its definition of the mission 02:04:00.582 --> 02:04:03.127 in Iraq to be a mission about watching Iran, 02:04:03.127 --> 02:04:07.200 wouldn't it be pretty important to have Iraq agree that 02:04:07.200 --> 02:04:09.810 that would be the focus of the mission if we were to be 02:04:09.810 --> 02:04:13.065 having troops in their country to carry out such a mission? 02:04:13.065 --> 02:04:14.630 - Senator, we are in Iraq at the invitation 02:04:14.630 --> 02:04:17.050 of the government so, yes, I agree. 02:04:17.050 --> 02:04:19.060 - And we were invited in in the summer 02:04:19.060 --> 02:04:21.617 of 2014 to help them defeat ISIS, correct? 02:04:21.617 --> 02:04:23.720 - That's right, Senator. 02:04:23.720 --> 02:04:25.790 - Mr. Chair, I'd like to put into the record an article 02:04:25.790 --> 02:04:28.217 from the New York Times this morning, "Trump's Plan for US 02:04:28.217 --> 02:04:32.330 "Forces in Iraq Met With Unified Rejection in Baghdad." 02:04:32.330 --> 02:04:35.050 General Votel mentioned that one of the great things 02:04:35.050 --> 02:04:37.277 about the recent elections in Iraq was US presence was 02:04:37.277 --> 02:04:40.660 not a political issue but the recent statements of the 02:04:40.660 --> 02:04:44.017 president, "The problem for Mr. Trump was that the unity 02:04:44.017 --> 02:04:46.812 "was a collective rejection of his proposal and added 02:04:46.812 --> 02:04:50.194 "momentum to proposed legislation that could hamper 02:04:50.194 --> 02:04:52.660 "American troop's ability to operate in Iraq." 02:04:52.660 --> 02:04:54.410 I'd like to put this in the record. 02:04:55.460 --> 02:04:58.856 Second General Votel, President Trump said as follows, 02:04:58.856 --> 02:05:01.977 "I'm gonna trust the intelligence that I'm putting 02:05:01.977 --> 02:05:04.797 "there but I will say this, my intelligence people, 02:05:04.797 --> 02:05:07.807 "if they said in fact Iran is a wonderful kindergarten, 02:05:07.807 --> 02:05:11.340 "I disagree with them 100%." 02:05:11.340 --> 02:05:14.365 Are you aware of a single US intelligence 02:05:14.365 --> 02:05:19.365 official of any position who has told 02:05:19.893 --> 02:05:23.523 President Trump that Iran is a kindergarten? 02:05:25.060 --> 02:05:27.300 - No, Senator, I'm not aware of that. 02:05:27.300 --> 02:05:28.133 - Nor am I. 02:05:28.133 --> 02:05:29.750 Again I've been on this committee and the Foreign 02:05:29.750 --> 02:05:31.650 Relations committee over the last years we've 02:05:31.650 --> 02:05:33.837 heard open and classified testimony again 02:05:33.837 --> 02:05:38.268 and again and again about dangers that Iran poses. 02:05:38.268 --> 02:05:40.420 We've not heard a single intelligence 02:05:40.420 --> 02:05:43.020 official say Iran is a kindergarten. 02:05:43.020 --> 02:05:46.704 We have had General Dunford and Secretary Mattis before 02:05:46.704 --> 02:05:51.080 us saying that the Iran nuclear deal was in America's 02:05:51.080 --> 02:05:54.270 national interest and that Iran was complying with the deal. 02:05:54.270 --> 02:05:56.860 The House heard testimony in open session last week 02:05:56.860 --> 02:05:59.414 from a variety of intelligence officials saying 02:05:59.414 --> 02:06:02.663 that Iran was still complying with the nuclear deal 02:06:02.663 --> 02:06:06.490 that the United States unilaterally withdrew from. 02:06:06.490 --> 02:06:08.810 I worry and I'm not asking you this question, 02:06:08.810 --> 02:06:11.231 I worry that the president hears testimony like that 02:06:11.231 --> 02:06:14.839 and equates it with officials saying Iran is like 02:06:14.839 --> 02:06:19.780 a kindergarten which I find completely illogical. 02:06:19.780 --> 02:06:23.127 Third, President Trump said this, "When I came in as 02:06:23.127 --> 02:06:25.027 "president of the United States my first year I went to 02:06:25.027 --> 02:06:27.838 "the Pentagon two weeks after I came in, a short time after, 02:06:27.838 --> 02:06:31.687 "because I wanted to know what's going on with Iran. 02:06:31.687 --> 02:06:33.907 "We were in so many locations 02:06:33.907 --> 02:06:36.087 "in the Middle East in huge difficulty. 02:06:36.087 --> 02:06:39.717 "Every single one of them was caused by the number 02:06:39.717 --> 02:06:42.720 "one terrorists nation in the world which is Iran." 02:06:42.720 --> 02:06:45.821 We did not go into Afghanistan with US military forces 02:06:45.821 --> 02:06:49.890 in 2001 because of Iran did we, General Votel? 02:06:49.890 --> 02:06:51.749 - No, Senator, we did not. 02:06:51.749 --> 02:06:53.374 - We did not go into Iraq in March 02:06:53.374 --> 02:06:56.826 of 2002 because of Iran did we General Votel? 02:06:56.826 --> 02:06:58.390 - We did not, Senator. 02:06:58.390 --> 02:07:00.234 - We did not go into Iraq in August 02:07:00.234 --> 02:07:04.473 of 2014 because of Iran did we General Votel. 02:07:04.473 --> 02:07:05.320 - We did not, Senator. 02:07:05.320 --> 02:07:07.830 - So, in terms of where our troops are positioned in 02:07:07.830 --> 02:07:10.050 the Middle East overwhelmingly now, there are some 02:07:10.050 --> 02:07:15.050 in Syria also fighting ISIS, not Iran, the places where US 02:07:15.080 --> 02:07:20.080 troops are in your AOR, we're not there because of Iran. 02:07:20.102 --> 02:07:22.744 And so when the president says this, "We're in the Middle 02:07:22.744 --> 02:07:24.954 "East because of Iran," it causes me grave concern. 02:07:24.954 --> 02:07:29.100 Together with other statements made by this president, 02:07:29.100 --> 02:07:31.310 other members of the administration, I worry that 02:07:31.310 --> 02:07:33.760 the president is thinking about military action 02:07:33.760 --> 02:07:35.973 against Iran as something that would be a good idea. 02:07:35.973 --> 02:07:38.468 Let me just put this on the record, in the current 02:07:38.468 --> 02:07:41.730 state of affairs I think it would be a horrible idea. 02:07:41.730 --> 02:07:43.190 I think it would be a horrible idea. 02:07:43.190 --> 02:07:44.937 In classified I'm gonna ask you a few questions 02:07:44.937 --> 02:07:47.549 about A, what planning has been done, and what could 02:07:47.549 --> 02:07:52.050 potentially be a legal rationale for such a thing. 02:07:52.050 --> 02:07:54.460 But to think that we're in the Middle East because 02:07:54.460 --> 02:07:56.550 of Iran when in these three areas we're clearly 02:07:56.550 --> 02:07:59.460 not there because of Iran causes me grave concern. 02:07:59.460 --> 02:08:00.767 Thank you, Mr. Chair. 02:08:04.430 --> 02:08:05.610 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 02:08:05.610 --> 02:08:07.213 Good to see you General Votel. 02:08:08.051 --> 02:08:11.383 Thanks to you for your service and sacrifice over the years. 02:08:12.285 --> 02:08:16.075 Very extensive testimony on a lot of issues as someone like 02:08:16.075 --> 02:08:19.610 many of you and those with you today, who's been to your 02:08:19.610 --> 02:08:24.390 regions many times, six deployments in my time in uniform. 02:08:24.390 --> 02:08:26.654 It's a very complex region as you've talked about and I 02:08:26.654 --> 02:08:30.109 appreciate in your testimony with the National Defense 02:08:30.109 --> 02:08:34.180 Strategy kind of bringing us back home as to why are we 02:08:34.180 --> 02:08:36.360 there and what are our vital national interests in the 02:08:36.360 --> 02:08:39.934 region because our longer term threats per the NDS are more 02:08:39.934 --> 02:08:43.916 of the great state competition and potential conflict. 02:08:43.916 --> 02:08:46.870 But many of us, many of you, we've spent our 02:08:46.870 --> 02:08:49.140 entire military careers deploying to the Middle East. 02:08:49.140 --> 02:08:51.510 Like this is all we know, this is all we know 02:08:51.510 --> 02:08:53.771 is dealing with Desert Storm and Northern 02:08:53.771 --> 02:08:57.690 Watch and Southern Watch and OEF and OAF. 02:08:57.690 --> 02:08:59.927 We've invested so much into this as you know. 02:08:59.927 --> 02:09:02.117 A lot of blood and treasure, a lot of sacrifice. 02:09:02.117 --> 02:09:05.170 And it's part of our nature I think to just, 02:09:05.170 --> 02:09:06.880 give us a little more time, just give us a little 02:09:06.880 --> 02:09:10.220 more resources, and we can fix this situation. 02:09:10.220 --> 02:09:12.663 And I'm particularly thinking about Afghanistan. 02:09:13.670 --> 02:09:15.590 It's just our nature, right, that we want to just, 02:09:15.590 --> 02:09:16.940 we're almost there, we're almost gonna 02:09:16.940 --> 02:09:18.660 have this where we want it to be. 02:09:18.660 --> 02:09:20.840 But I think it's very important and I appreciate that 02:09:20.840 --> 02:09:23.530 the administration and as you testified today, 02:09:23.530 --> 02:09:25.630 we're kind of coming back to what are we doing there? 02:09:25.630 --> 02:09:27.860 What are our vital national interests in the Middle East? 02:09:27.860 --> 02:09:30.049 There has been tremendous drain on our military over 02:09:30.049 --> 02:09:32.995 the last 30 years in that region and we gotta get back 02:09:32.995 --> 02:09:36.570 to the core of we have to make sure there's no safe 02:09:36.570 --> 02:09:38.950 haven for jihadists and terrorists that are gonna 02:09:38.950 --> 02:09:42.660 come kill Americans and we've gotta make sure 02:09:42.660 --> 02:09:44.140 that there isn't a hostile power in the region, 02:09:44.140 --> 02:09:45.860 that's in your testimony, right? 02:09:45.860 --> 02:09:48.180 So, that's a generational fight against terrorism, it 02:09:48.180 --> 02:09:51.030 started before us, it's gonna continue on, we gotta make 02:09:51.030 --> 02:09:54.190 sure there's no safe havens in all of these countries. 02:09:54.190 --> 02:09:56.040 You squeeze 'em one place, they'll go to another place, 02:09:56.040 --> 02:09:57.548 we'll find them in other regions as you know. 02:09:57.548 --> 02:09:59.900 And then we want to make sure there's 02:09:59.900 --> 02:10:03.630 not a hostile power which is Iran right now. 02:10:03.630 --> 02:10:05.640 So, I just want to bring it kind of back home 02:10:05.640 --> 02:10:07.550 and I think it's hard for us, those who served, 02:10:07.550 --> 02:10:09.280 because we're like what are we doing there, 02:10:09.280 --> 02:10:12.070 we want to make sure, we gotta build more schools. 02:10:12.070 --> 02:10:14.100 I think there's been a lot of mistakes over the years. 02:10:14.100 --> 02:10:16.520 We gotta build more schools in America. 02:10:16.520 --> 02:10:17.780 We don't necessarily need to bring some of these 02:10:17.780 --> 02:10:20.170 countries to be thriving 21st century democracies, 02:10:20.170 --> 02:10:22.660 we may hope that happens for them, but that's not 02:10:22.660 --> 02:10:26.060 our vital national interest, it's to keep America safe. 02:10:26.060 --> 02:10:28.360 So, as we're thinking of that and as you've testified 02:10:28.360 --> 02:10:31.360 about that, when you look at Afghanistan and when you 02:10:31.360 --> 02:10:33.662 look at still the safe haven they have in Pakistan, 02:10:33.662 --> 02:10:35.560 last time I was there three years ago, there was 02:10:35.560 --> 02:10:37.830 12 different terrorist organizations there. 02:10:37.830 --> 02:10:40.150 Our military's hands were tied, they weren't able 02:10:40.150 --> 02:10:42.380 to go after a lot of the terrorist organizations. 02:10:42.380 --> 02:10:45.240 How can we now moving forward with everything you've 02:10:45.240 --> 02:10:48.173 talked about in accordance with the National 02:10:48.173 --> 02:10:51.320 Defense Strategy, how can we make sure that we 02:10:51.320 --> 02:10:53.410 achieve that mission in Afghanistan and what does 02:10:53.410 --> 02:10:56.289 that look like to keep America safe and focusing on 02:10:56.289 --> 02:11:00.390 our draw down there while we still make sure that we keep 02:11:00.390 --> 02:11:03.550 America safe and it's not a safe haven for terrorism? 02:11:03.550 --> 02:11:04.793 - Senator, thank you, thank you very much. 02:11:04.793 --> 02:11:08.243 I think when I look at what winning and what prevailing in 02:11:08.243 --> 02:11:12.120 Afghanistan looks like, it looks like two things to me. 02:11:12.120 --> 02:11:14.929 It looks like a negotiated settlement and it looks like 02:11:14.929 --> 02:11:19.048 safe guarding our national interests and I think as you 02:11:19.048 --> 02:11:23.250 very clearly said here we have to stay focused on those 02:11:23.250 --> 02:11:25.796 particular things and our efforts need to be, 02:11:25.796 --> 02:11:28.968 all our efforts at this point need to be focused on 02:11:28.968 --> 02:11:33.968 those particular objectives and paths to those objectives. 02:11:35.443 --> 02:11:40.412 And I think that is certainly my approach on this 02:11:40.412 --> 02:11:43.280 and I believe it is the approach of General Miller, 02:11:43.280 --> 02:11:45.100 our commander on the ground as well as we try 02:11:45.100 --> 02:11:47.660 to support this and so I think the strategy that 02:11:47.660 --> 02:11:49.739 we have in place is the right one, focused on this. 02:11:49.739 --> 02:11:52.753 We've gotta stay focused on that and I think we 02:11:52.753 --> 02:11:57.753 will meet our requirements if we can get a negotiated 02:11:58.800 --> 02:12:01.727 settlement that addresses the instability of that region 02:12:01.727 --> 02:12:06.540 and we can continue to safeguard our national interests. 02:12:06.540 --> 02:12:07.964 - Great, thanks. 02:12:07.964 --> 02:12:08.797 And then on to Iran. 02:12:08.797 --> 02:12:11.400 This is the largest state sponsor of terror. 02:12:11.400 --> 02:12:13.610 This is the one that has maligned activity in the region, 02:12:13.610 --> 02:12:16.158 great destabilization, killing of American troops. 02:12:16.158 --> 02:12:21.158 What is the focus there as we're kind of keeping our eye on 02:12:21.706 --> 02:12:24.866 the ball of this region and the National Defense Strategy, 02:12:24.866 --> 02:12:28.750 because this is the biggest threat and you talked a lot 02:12:28.750 --> 02:12:31.360 about working with partnerships but what else can we do and 02:12:31.360 --> 02:12:35.210 what else are you doing in order to counter that threat? 02:12:35.210 --> 02:12:38.270 - Certainly I think one of the most important things 02:12:38.270 --> 02:12:40.600 to do is continue to build partnerships and begin 02:12:40.600 --> 02:12:43.760 to build interoperability across the region. 02:12:43.760 --> 02:12:46.680 And whether we look at integrated air and missile 02:12:46.680 --> 02:12:50.390 defense to ensure that we can address the increasing 02:12:50.390 --> 02:12:53.095 ballistic missile capability that is coming 02:12:53.095 --> 02:12:55.580 out of Iran, that is an important aspect that we do. 02:12:55.580 --> 02:12:59.534 Whether we address maritime security issues that allow not 02:12:59.534 --> 02:13:03.090 just the United States but the countries of the region to 02:13:03.090 --> 02:13:06.483 better patrol their own waters and prevent the movement of 02:13:06.483 --> 02:13:10.060 illicit goods and weapons and other things through there, 02:13:10.060 --> 02:13:14.990 I think these are the types of things that we can do. 02:13:14.990 --> 02:13:18.860 They are very attainable to us as we move forward 02:13:18.860 --> 02:13:21.790 to not only optimize the capabilities that we 02:13:21.790 --> 02:13:25.030 remain in place but more importantly make sure 02:13:25.030 --> 02:13:28.181 that our partners are bearing the burden and taking 02:13:28.181 --> 02:13:30.910 responsibility for their own security as well. 02:13:30.910 --> 02:13:31.810 - Exactly, thanks. 02:13:31.810 --> 02:13:32.670 I am out of time. 02:13:32.670 --> 02:13:34.801 I want to say I'm grateful for Senator Peters' 02:13:34.801 --> 02:13:39.030 statements about the A-10 warthog as well. 02:13:39.030 --> 02:13:40.790 I don't think we should be using fifth generation 02:13:40.790 --> 02:13:43.240 fighters to chase around jihadists on mopeds. 02:13:43.240 --> 02:13:45.020 We gotta make sure that we have the right tools 02:13:45.020 --> 02:13:47.541 for that mission while we're using our next generation 02:13:47.541 --> 02:13:50.010 to deal with the larger threats that are out there. 02:13:50.010 --> 02:13:52.070 So, I found a new wingman here for fighting 02:13:52.070 --> 02:13:54.292 for the A-10 and the re-winging. 02:13:54.292 --> 02:13:55.919 Thank you, Mr. Chair, I appreciate it. 02:13:55.919 --> 02:13:56.921 I yield back. 02:13:56.921 --> 02:13:58.375 - Thank you, Senator. 02:13:58.375 --> 02:14:01.969 We will recess the meeting until we get back together at 02:14:01.969 --> 02:14:06.969 2:15, that's going to be in the visitor's center, room 217. 02:14:07.780 --> 02:14:09.677 We thank you very much for a long 02:14:09.677 --> 02:14:14.403 meeting and for your attentive answers. 02:14:18.236 --> 02:14:20.136 So, we will reconvene at 2:15 in 02:14:20.136 --> 02:14:23.510 the visitor's center and we will recess this meeting. 02:14:23.510 --> 02:14:24.380 Thank you very much. 02:14:24.380 --> 02:14:26.480 - [General Votel] Thank you, Mr. Chairman.