WEBVTT 00:00.760 --> 00:03.570 - My name is Hank Giffin, I'm the East Coast vice president 00:03.570 --> 00:05.730 of the Surface Navy Association. 00:05.730 --> 00:08.090 I have the privilege to be your emcee this morning. 00:08.090 --> 00:11.360 A couple of admin things, please use the microphones 00:11.360 --> 00:13.130 when you're asking questions. 00:13.130 --> 00:16.950 They gave me this, whatever this, I guess it's an iPad, 00:16.950 --> 00:20.090 and I'm the analog guy in a digital world, 00:20.090 --> 00:22.270 so if you see this thing flying across the room 00:22.270 --> 00:24.460 you'll know it didn't work and I got frustrated. 00:24.460 --> 00:28.610 But if you'd like to try that electronic questions, 00:28.610 --> 00:32.240 I'll try to intervene in the manual questions 00:32.240 --> 00:34.020 if you wanna say that. 00:34.020 --> 00:35.980 Giving me this is like giving a football to a monkey, 00:35.980 --> 00:37.196 you know what happens there. 00:37.196 --> 00:38.470 (audience laughs) 00:38.470 --> 00:41.810 Anyway, it's a really great pleasure 00:41.810 --> 00:45.630 for me to introduce Admiral Christopher W. Grady. 00:45.630 --> 00:46.463 I think you all know 00:46.463 --> 00:49.090 he's the commander of US Fleet Forces Command, 00:49.090 --> 00:50.950 and I'm gonna go through his bio, not every word of it, 00:50.950 --> 00:52.010 but I think it's important 00:52.010 --> 00:54.750 for you young officers and midshipmen, if any are left, 00:54.750 --> 00:57.880 or those that'll be watching this later or on videos 00:58.842 --> 01:00.320 to hear how you get to be 01:00.320 --> 01:02.850 a very successful surface warfare officer, 01:02.850 --> 01:04.753 a very successful admiral in the Navy. 01:05.610 --> 01:08.080 Admiral Grady is a native of Newport, Rhode Island, 01:08.080 --> 01:10.672 graduate from Notre Dame. 01:10.672 --> 01:14.777 (sighs) Keep killing us in the damn football. (laughs) 01:14.777 --> 01:16.953 And he went through the NROTC program. 01:17.820 --> 01:22.820 He assumed command of fleet forces in May 4th of 2018. 01:23.360 --> 01:27.520 Most recent assignment was the commander of US Sixth Fleet, 01:27.520 --> 01:30.380 commander of Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO, 01:30.380 --> 01:31.530 which is a great job. 01:31.530 --> 01:33.660 I lived over there for a couple of years. 01:33.660 --> 01:35.370 Additional flag assignments 01:35.370 --> 01:40.370 include the Maritime Ops Center N2, three, five and seven, 01:40.760 --> 01:44.560 Carrier Strike Group One, Carl Vinson battle, 01:44.560 --> 01:47.640 sorry, called them battle groups, carrier strike force now. 01:47.640 --> 01:50.122 He started out on the Moosbrugger, 01:50.122 --> 01:52.840 did a little moose is loose, the Princeton. 01:52.840 --> 01:56.880 He went, commanded, and my favorite here, 01:56.880 --> 02:00.510 Mine Countermeasures Rotational Crew Echo aboard the Chief, 02:00.510 --> 02:03.560 and deployed to the Arabian Gulf 02:03.560 --> 02:06.090 in command of the USS Ardent. 02:06.090 --> 02:08.940 So for those you Mine Force folks, there's hope. 02:08.940 --> 02:13.010 Admiral Grady commanded USS Cole, 02:13.010 --> 02:16.100 deployed as part of NATO Standing Forces Mediterranean, 02:16.100 --> 02:19.140 commander, and he commanded Destroyer Squadron 22. 02:19.140 --> 02:23.210 Ashore, he served on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 02:23.210 --> 02:26.240 naval aide to the Chief of Naval Operations, 02:26.240 --> 02:28.640 he was executive assistant 02:28.640 --> 02:31.330 to the Navy's chief of legislative affairs, 02:31.330 --> 02:33.510 he served as deputy executive secretary 02:33.510 --> 02:36.400 to the National Security Council in the White House, 02:36.400 --> 02:37.233 and then he went on to serve 02:37.233 --> 02:39.230 as executive assistant to the CNO. 02:39.230 --> 02:42.090 So he's kinda been there, done that. 02:42.090 --> 02:44.230 He has a great resume, as you just heard. 02:44.230 --> 02:47.020 He's served all around the world, 02:47.020 --> 02:48.620 and I think it's a great, great pleasure 02:48.620 --> 02:49.570 for us to have him here today, 02:49.570 --> 02:51.369 so please join me in welcoming Admiral Grady. 02:51.369 --> 02:54.369 (audience applauds) 03:00.430 --> 03:01.490 - All right. 03:01.490 --> 03:03.800 I have to say I feel kinda lonely up here, 03:03.800 --> 03:06.092 but there's plenty of water in case I run out of... 03:06.092 --> 03:07.970 (audience laughs) 03:07.970 --> 03:10.360 Well, good morning, everyone, it's a delight to be here. 03:10.360 --> 03:13.833 Hank, thanks for that rather long introduction, 03:14.720 --> 03:17.180 but I do appreciate your continued leadership 03:17.180 --> 03:21.160 and devotion to professional excellence in our Surface Navy. 03:21.160 --> 03:23.370 And once again, to Dave Hart and the team, 03:23.370 --> 03:27.130 thanks for pulling together such a fantastic symposium. 03:27.130 --> 03:28.850 Each one is better than the next, 03:28.850 --> 03:32.110 and I know that this one is certainly in that category. 03:32.110 --> 03:33.970 And I also have to thank Rich Brown. 03:33.970 --> 03:35.890 Rich, well done. 03:35.890 --> 03:38.610 Your energetic leadership of our surface force 03:38.610 --> 03:41.160 over the last year with Ron and with Jesse, 03:41.160 --> 03:43.570 your efforts to rebuild the fleet's readiness, 03:43.570 --> 03:47.380 and this call to turn that readiness into lethality 03:47.380 --> 03:51.740 are undoubtedly making our fleet and our force better. 03:51.740 --> 03:54.470 So it's an honor to be here speaking with you 03:54.470 --> 03:58.460 as the fleet forces commander, and thanks for having me. 03:58.460 --> 04:00.450 And as I said, for over 30 years, 04:00.450 --> 04:03.690 SNA has been a phenomenal opportunity 04:03.690 --> 04:06.880 for our entire surface warfare community and others, 04:06.880 --> 04:10.660 and also supported, to discuss the key matters of the day, 04:10.660 --> 04:13.350 and it's really great to see familiar faces 04:13.350 --> 04:15.660 from around our surface warfare community, 04:15.660 --> 04:20.160 and I'm very encouraged to see representation from the past, 04:20.160 --> 04:23.260 the present, and the future, and I urge all of you 04:23.260 --> 04:26.290 to use this event to expand your network 04:26.290 --> 04:30.800 and perhaps establish some mentoring relationships 04:30.800 --> 04:33.330 that will make our force and our community 04:33.330 --> 04:35.633 and our fleet and navy stronger going forward. 04:36.720 --> 04:39.160 Now I will tell you there has never been 04:39.160 --> 04:40.550 a better time to be in the Navy, 04:40.550 --> 04:42.940 and it is truly an exciting time 04:42.940 --> 04:45.270 for our Surface Navy in particular. 04:45.270 --> 04:48.230 We are in a maritime era, 04:48.230 --> 04:51.610 and we have what is really a maritime strategy 04:51.610 --> 04:54.210 in our national defense strategy 04:54.210 --> 04:56.813 to address the security challenges of this era. 04:57.900 --> 05:02.580 Right now, as much as ever, your navy is critical 05:02.580 --> 05:05.230 to securing America's place in the world. 05:05.230 --> 05:07.330 It is defending far forward, 05:07.330 --> 05:09.710 providing for our common defense, 05:09.710 --> 05:13.040 promoting prosperity and security for our citizens, 05:13.040 --> 05:15.050 our allies, and partners and friends, 05:15.050 --> 05:18.260 and preserving our strategic influence around the globe. 05:18.260 --> 05:22.430 We are truly America's varsity away team 05:22.430 --> 05:25.750 or America's varsity global team. 05:25.750 --> 05:28.450 And I would say, for this audience especially, 05:28.450 --> 05:30.347 and more than any other part of our fleet, 05:30.347 --> 05:33.020 the Surface Navy is out there 05:33.020 --> 05:35.180 performing these vital missions 05:35.180 --> 05:36.540 in service to our great nation, 05:36.540 --> 05:39.030 in fact, it is our defense strategy 05:39.030 --> 05:41.740 that relies on us and the surface fleet 05:41.740 --> 05:46.120 to fill the role of the contact, blunt, and surge forces, 05:46.120 --> 05:48.000 and I can think of no other part of our military 05:48.000 --> 05:51.310 that does that on such a daily basis. 05:51.310 --> 05:53.930 For each of my fellow surface warriors here with us, 05:53.930 --> 05:58.120 you should walk out of this event with a real swagger, 05:58.120 --> 06:00.890 firm in the knowledge that what you deliver 06:00.890 --> 06:04.160 is critical to our nation's security and prosperity, 06:04.160 --> 06:07.210 and that our profession is no doubt 06:07.210 --> 06:10.420 on an upward trajectory heading into the future. 06:10.420 --> 06:12.370 You are making that happen, 06:12.370 --> 06:14.810 your pursuit of a culture of excellence 06:14.810 --> 06:17.200 is driving us to new heights, 06:17.200 --> 06:21.520 and it is you that the Navy and the nation are depending on 06:21.520 --> 06:23.130 to fight and win. 06:23.130 --> 06:24.643 You do own it. 06:26.470 --> 06:28.810 Now the situation demands 06:28.810 --> 06:31.320 that we continue on this upward trajectory 06:31.320 --> 06:34.870 because the world around us is rapidly changing. 06:34.870 --> 06:37.470 We live in an increasingly complex 06:37.470 --> 06:39.600 global security environment, 06:39.600 --> 06:42.350 now characterized by overt challenges 06:42.350 --> 06:44.410 to the free and open order 06:44.410 --> 06:47.934 that has long fostered peace and prosperity, 06:47.934 --> 06:49.090 and because of this, 06:49.090 --> 06:52.870 we are once again in long-term strategic competition 06:52.870 --> 06:55.440 with nations who aim to change 06:55.440 --> 06:57.553 the international order in their favor. 06:58.410 --> 07:02.020 So it is truly an arena of continuous competition 07:02.020 --> 07:05.900 across the diplomatic, informational, military, 07:05.900 --> 07:07.800 and economic elements of national power, 07:07.800 --> 07:11.450 an arena which spans the entire spectrum 07:11.450 --> 07:14.840 from peaceful competition to violent conflict, 07:14.840 --> 07:17.370 and an arena that we must compete 07:17.370 --> 07:20.550 and fight and win in every domain. 07:20.550 --> 07:23.600 For decades we've enjoyed uncontested superiority 07:23.600 --> 07:25.130 in those operating domains. 07:25.130 --> 07:29.390 We could generally deploy and operate our forces 07:29.390 --> 07:32.010 when and where we wanted. 07:32.010 --> 07:35.810 However, now our competitive military advantage 07:35.810 --> 07:39.080 is challenged, our navy faces an ever more lethal 07:39.080 --> 07:40.960 and complex battle space 07:40.960 --> 07:44.000 with effects combined across all of those domains, 07:44.000 --> 07:47.943 and with operations conducted at increasing speed and reach. 07:49.650 --> 07:53.170 And if left unaddressed, our ability to deter aggression 07:53.170 --> 07:56.580 will rapidly become challenged, endangering our ability 07:56.580 --> 07:58.780 to win decisively if deterrence fails, 07:58.780 --> 08:01.560 so we must adapt to this reality 08:01.560 --> 08:05.470 and respond with urgency by maintaining our control 08:05.470 --> 08:07.390 at the high end of maritime conflict. 08:07.390 --> 08:09.750 We must do this while understanding 08:09.750 --> 08:13.540 that the competition extends beyond the maritime domain 08:13.540 --> 08:17.270 into space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum. 08:17.270 --> 08:19.340 We must act aggressively 08:19.340 --> 08:22.270 to remain the preeminent navy in the world 08:22.270 --> 08:24.780 and advance the liberal international order 08:24.780 --> 08:26.890 that is most conducive to that security 08:26.890 --> 08:29.163 and prosperity that we stand for. 08:30.900 --> 08:33.747 So our navy has an imperative to respond to these challenges 08:33.747 --> 08:36.550 and I believe we are doing just that. 08:36.550 --> 08:38.390 As you know, it's been about a year 08:38.390 --> 08:41.240 since the national defense strategy was released, 08:41.240 --> 08:44.213 and since then we've promulgated the Navy strategy 08:44.213 --> 08:47.410 and the CNO's version 2.0 for the design 08:47.410 --> 08:50.920 of maintaining, retaining maritime superiority 08:50.920 --> 08:54.610 to provide more specific Navy guidance. 08:54.610 --> 08:55.710 In fact, I would tell you 08:55.710 --> 08:58.620 I think this is the first time in recent memory 08:58.620 --> 09:03.490 where we have all of the guidance we need from top to bottom 09:03.490 --> 09:05.780 to provide the clarity of purpose, 09:05.780 --> 09:08.510 the alignment and the direction 09:08.510 --> 09:11.203 to win this great power competition. 09:12.270 --> 09:15.810 Now of course, we have been busy implementing our strategy 09:15.810 --> 09:19.700 across the DOTMLPF spectrum. 09:19.700 --> 09:21.640 From a doctrine perspective, 09:21.640 --> 09:23.580 we've adapted our theory of the fight 09:23.580 --> 09:26.990 for how we carry out conventional deterrence, excuse me, 09:26.990 --> 09:30.120 by implementing dynamic force employment. 09:30.120 --> 09:32.810 Of course, the Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group 09:32.810 --> 09:35.810 under Admiral Black's leadership demonstrated 09:35.810 --> 09:38.050 how we can deliver more credible deterrence 09:38.050 --> 09:40.480 by thinking and operating differently 09:40.480 --> 09:43.030 by being strategically predictable 09:43.030 --> 09:45.890 and operationally unpredictable. 09:45.890 --> 09:49.040 We've reestablished the United States Second Fleet, 09:49.040 --> 09:52.170 and with continued rapid advances in live, 09:52.170 --> 09:54.050 virtual, and constructive training, 09:54.050 --> 09:55.900 we are transforming how we prepare 09:55.900 --> 10:00.423 how we rehearse our forces for the high-end fight. 10:01.340 --> 10:02.490 To accelerate the pace 10:02.490 --> 10:04.800 of combat power delivery to the fleet, 10:04.800 --> 10:07.340 we are now piloting the Aegis virtual twin, 10:07.340 --> 10:12.150 which is essentially Aegis in a box, employing modern, 10:12.150 --> 10:15.070 easily upgradable computer hardware resident 10:15.070 --> 10:18.560 on just a few servers, while delivering the same 10:18.560 --> 10:23.290 legendary Aegis weapon system lethality. 10:23.290 --> 10:25.120 And as this pilot proves successful, 10:25.120 --> 10:27.040 and I know it will under Ron's leadership, 10:27.040 --> 10:29.690 we will be able to rapidly install 10:29.690 --> 10:32.240 more advanced baseline systems across the fleet 10:32.240 --> 10:37.240 in a fraction of the time and cost it currently takes. 10:37.540 --> 10:38.530 And lest we forget, 10:38.530 --> 10:42.770 to ensure our greatest asymmetric advantage 10:42.770 --> 10:47.770 that is our sailors and Marines, we released version 2.0 10:48.170 --> 10:51.300 of our Navy Leadership Development Framework, 10:51.300 --> 10:54.720 laying the keel to strengthen our continuum 10:54.720 --> 10:55.820 of professional development 10:55.820 --> 10:57.930 throughout all of our sailors' careers. 10:57.930 --> 11:00.970 We continue to modernize the personnel system 11:00.970 --> 11:05.210 through the Sailor 2025 initiative because we understand 11:05.210 --> 11:08.540 that our sailors are truly the center of the universe, 11:08.540 --> 11:12.610 and we are continuously improving how we recruit, 11:12.610 --> 11:16.170 retain, and train the best sailors in the world. 11:16.170 --> 11:19.370 I would point out our Ready, Relevant Learning initiative 11:19.370 --> 11:21.270 that is revolutionizing how we do this. 11:21.270 --> 11:24.380 It gives us the ability and the agility 11:24.380 --> 11:29.120 to rapidly respond faster to changing requirements of war. 11:29.120 --> 11:32.110 It applies the latest scientific understanding of learning 11:32.110 --> 11:35.710 for our sailors by using modern training delivery models 11:35.710 --> 11:38.650 at the right time and the right place. 11:38.650 --> 11:39.573 And of note, 11:41.520 --> 11:44.780 we here in this room should be very proud 11:44.780 --> 11:47.670 of the revolutionary work underway at SWOS, 11:47.670 --> 11:50.500 and I would call that an early paradigm of success 11:50.500 --> 11:53.730 that truly shaped the theory of Ready, Relevant Learning 11:53.730 --> 11:55.680 that's taking the Navy into the future. 11:57.500 --> 11:59.000 Now one significant milestone 11:59.000 --> 12:01.300 in the continuum of strategy and doctrine, 12:01.300 --> 12:03.710 and one of the key messages for you today, 12:03.710 --> 12:06.600 is that the CNO just approved the Navy concept 12:06.600 --> 12:11.180 for Distributed Maritime Operations, or DMO, as we call it. 12:11.180 --> 12:14.020 This concept describes a new operational approach 12:14.020 --> 12:16.200 to winning the high-end fight at sea, 12:16.200 --> 12:19.200 and it builds upon the framework introduced 12:19.200 --> 12:21.150 in our fleet design white paper 12:21.150 --> 12:23.870 to address the fleet's operational-level response 12:23.870 --> 12:28.450 to great power competition, and it is now a foundational 12:28.450 --> 12:31.373 Navy Warfare Development Command operational concept, 12:32.840 --> 12:34.960 which includes an action plan 12:34.960 --> 12:37.430 that will structure future force development, 12:37.430 --> 12:41.280 experimentation, and exercise objectives. 12:41.280 --> 12:44.340 For instance, as you may have read in the design 2.0, 12:44.340 --> 12:47.740 we plan to test the effectiveness of DMO continuously 12:47.740 --> 12:50.090 through our fleet battle problem initiative, 12:50.090 --> 12:52.410 which culminates about every three years 12:52.410 --> 12:53.720 in a large-scale exercise, 12:53.720 --> 12:56.063 the first of which will be in 2020. 12:57.850 --> 13:00.940 I would tell you that I believe that DMO once again delivers 13:00.940 --> 13:04.920 a fleet-centric approach to the maritime fight, 13:04.920 --> 13:07.230 and whereas over the last 18 years or so, 13:07.230 --> 13:09.830 our number of fleet commanders perhaps viewed their role 13:09.830 --> 13:11.240 as that of a force provider 13:11.240 --> 13:13.610 to the geographical combatant commander, 13:13.610 --> 13:15.140 overseeing their sustainment 13:15.140 --> 13:17.700 and enabling their disaggregated operations 13:17.700 --> 13:20.460 across the fleet commander's area of responsibility, 13:20.460 --> 13:22.660 now it is really back to the future, 13:22.660 --> 13:24.570 and by that I mean the primacy 13:24.570 --> 13:27.760 of the numbered fleet commander returns now, 13:27.760 --> 13:32.090 as we did the last time we faced great power competition. 13:32.090 --> 13:35.110 The fleet commander's role is once again 13:35.110 --> 13:36.910 command and control of forces 13:36.910 --> 13:39.303 at the operational level of war. 13:40.600 --> 13:43.840 Now we know that disaggregated and distributed 13:43.840 --> 13:46.850 might seem synonymous, but they are different, 13:46.850 --> 13:48.850 and this is an important doctrinal difference. 13:48.850 --> 13:50.880 Disaggregated forces are generally 13:50.880 --> 13:52.510 conducting separate missions 13:52.510 --> 13:55.170 in support of entirely different objectives, 13:55.170 --> 13:59.970 but with DMO, the fleet commander's role is to integrate 13:59.970 --> 14:02.640 and synergize distributed operations 14:02.640 --> 14:05.850 with the intention of missing, massing, excuse me, 14:05.850 --> 14:09.410 not forces, but their effects in pursuit 14:09.410 --> 14:11.150 of one common theater objective, 14:11.150 --> 14:15.043 perhaps as part of a combatant commander's wire plan. 14:16.400 --> 14:20.360 DMO leverages distribution, integration, 14:20.360 --> 14:24.110 and maneuver to ensure sea control and maritime access 14:24.110 --> 14:26.800 in highly contested environments. 14:26.800 --> 14:29.960 And as you are probably well aware, current fleet doctrine 14:29.960 --> 14:33.530 and capabilities prescribed force concentration 14:33.530 --> 14:36.270 in order to preserve the security afforded 14:36.270 --> 14:39.610 by mutual support, or in defense in depth 14:39.610 --> 14:41.253 as we commonly call it. 14:42.420 --> 14:45.550 But we need to realize that given the growing capacity 14:45.550 --> 14:47.653 and reach of our competitors, 14:49.120 --> 14:53.550 force concentration might be problematic. 14:53.550 --> 14:56.530 It enables an adversary to seize the initiative 14:56.530 --> 14:58.990 should an element of our concentrated forces 14:58.990 --> 15:00.580 be discovered, for example. 15:00.580 --> 15:05.220 So I think it's fair to say, maybe with a little hubris, 15:05.220 --> 15:08.420 that if Clausewitz were alive, he might tell you 15:08.420 --> 15:12.570 that massing effects rather than massing forces 15:12.570 --> 15:15.543 can more readily achieve decisive results. 15:16.500 --> 15:19.920 Distributed forces enabled by the proper degree 15:19.920 --> 15:21.280 and manner of integration 15:21.280 --> 15:23.923 allows the US Navy to take the offensive, 15:25.010 --> 15:27.100 massing overwhelming combat power 15:27.100 --> 15:29.330 at the decisive place and time. 15:29.330 --> 15:32.310 This integration of platforms, weapons, and sensors, 15:32.310 --> 15:35.390 via low probability of intercept and detection networks, 15:35.390 --> 15:38.250 will improve our battlespace awareness 15:38.250 --> 15:41.600 while complicating the enemy's own scouting efforts. 15:41.600 --> 15:44.670 Now you may have heard it called the Navy tactical grid 15:44.670 --> 15:45.980 or the joint tactical grid, 15:45.980 --> 15:49.840 but now we call it the Navy operational architecture, 15:49.840 --> 15:52.010 and that is the capability 15:52.010 --> 15:53.730 that will enable the integration needed 15:53.730 --> 15:57.370 for us to turn DMO into the way we fight. 15:57.370 --> 16:00.610 DMO will more readily utilize maneuver 16:00.610 --> 16:05.230 to apply combat power within and across all domains 16:05.230 --> 16:08.200 in a more flexible manner, allowing our forces 16:08.200 --> 16:11.100 to exploit uncertainty and achieve surprise. 16:11.100 --> 16:14.370 This combination of distribution, integration, 16:14.370 --> 16:17.740 and maneuver will impose operational dilemmas 16:17.740 --> 16:20.510 that may compel the enemy to disperse 16:20.510 --> 16:23.260 or expose its forces to detection, 16:23.260 --> 16:25.810 and this will enable our forces to seize 16:25.810 --> 16:27.930 and maintain the initiative 16:27.930 --> 16:31.643 while also diminishing the enemy's risk tolerance. 16:33.360 --> 16:38.360 Now, to be effective, DMO must be firmly founded 16:38.570 --> 16:40.733 on a confident warfighting culture. 16:41.920 --> 16:45.380 This involves technical mastery of weapons, 16:45.380 --> 16:50.380 sensors, networks, and tactics, a relentless mission focus 16:50.710 --> 16:53.620 by our battle-minded crews and captains, 16:53.620 --> 16:57.790 and the employment of mission command. 16:57.790 --> 16:59.050 So to borrow some words 16:59.050 --> 17:03.117 from former CJCS Martin Dempsey, he says, 17:03.117 --> 17:06.397 "The commander is the central figure in mission command. 17:06.397 --> 17:09.447 "To the commander comes the mission for the unit. 17:09.447 --> 17:11.727 "In the commander resides the authority 17:11.727 --> 17:14.387 "and responsibility to act and to lead 17:14.387 --> 17:17.748 "so that the mission may be accomplished." 17:17.748 --> 17:19.050 Now we in the Navy have understood 17:19.050 --> 17:23.780 that command is the foundation upon which our navy rests, 17:23.780 --> 17:26.710 and we know that trust and confidence 17:26.710 --> 17:29.010 are the two coins of the realm 17:29.010 --> 17:32.780 that enable decentralized command 17:32.780 --> 17:35.543 and Distributed Maritime Operations at sea. 17:36.790 --> 17:38.430 And I am here to tell you that I, 17:38.430 --> 17:42.840 along with my other fellow fleet commanders, 17:42.840 --> 17:45.280 have the utmost trust and confidence 17:45.280 --> 17:46.883 in our commanding officers. 17:48.140 --> 17:50.460 In fact, we build upon that trust daily 17:50.460 --> 17:53.450 through increasingly more widespread usage 17:53.450 --> 17:58.450 of mission command in routine training and exercises. 17:58.480 --> 18:02.280 To win in combat, our people must have a bias for action, 18:02.280 --> 18:05.640 understand commander's intent and be willing to close with 18:05.640 --> 18:08.910 and defeat the enemy with calculated risk, 18:08.910 --> 18:12.640 while dealing with a significant degree of uncertainty. 18:12.640 --> 18:15.960 They must be willing to exploit fleeting opportunities 18:15.960 --> 18:17.810 in pursuit of mission accomplishment. 18:19.120 --> 18:22.520 Adhering to the mission command ethos 18:22.520 --> 18:27.200 under Distributed Maritime Operations, we will gain 18:27.200 --> 18:30.670 advantageous operational tempo over adversaries, 18:30.670 --> 18:34.780 creating a decisive amount of combat power 18:34.780 --> 18:38.090 at the time and tempo of our choosing. 18:38.090 --> 18:41.140 So what I want you to take away from this is that, 18:41.140 --> 18:43.840 first, by adapting how we fight under DMO 18:43.840 --> 18:46.030 we are strengthening our naval power, 18:46.030 --> 18:49.220 leading to a considerably more lethal fleet, 18:49.220 --> 18:52.280 more capable of deterring those who wish to do us harm 18:52.280 --> 18:55.070 and better able to defend US interests. 18:55.070 --> 18:57.910 Secondly, DMO will serve as the framework 18:57.910 --> 19:01.270 for mission command for future wargaming, 19:01.270 --> 19:03.080 experimentation, and exercises, 19:03.080 --> 19:05.760 allowing for refinement along the way 19:05.760 --> 19:07.260 and informing our plans 19:07.260 --> 19:09.967 for winning any potential high-end fight. 19:09.967 --> 19:12.300 And so for you Witties out there, 19:12.300 --> 19:14.150 that's where you should see yourself. 19:15.080 --> 19:20.080 And third, when making future acquisition recommendations, 19:20.510 --> 19:23.060 I'm confident that when I consider the idea 19:23.060 --> 19:24.600 of One Fight, One Navy, 19:24.600 --> 19:28.070 that the three fleet commanders will first consider 19:28.070 --> 19:32.220 how the proposed capabilities contribute to the DMO pillars 19:32.220 --> 19:36.163 of distribution, integration, and maneuver. 19:37.850 --> 19:40.320 We have to have the Navy to do all of this. 19:40.320 --> 19:44.860 So you've heard the CNO discuss many times 19:44.860 --> 19:49.810 that the Navy the nation needs is ready, more capable, 19:49.810 --> 19:53.293 bigger, more talented, more networked, and more agile. 19:54.490 --> 19:56.360 I've already discussed how we're getting 19:56.360 --> 19:59.540 at the more talented, networked, and agile aspects of it, 19:59.540 --> 20:02.490 but many of you here today worked every day 20:02.490 --> 20:06.890 to make us a more capable bigger Navy. 20:06.890 --> 20:10.380 So for example, in '96, Ron and his team 20:10.380 --> 20:12.210 are devising an investment strategy 20:12.210 --> 20:14.530 that sets our course in that direction 20:14.530 --> 20:17.250 by planning combat systems modernization in 20:17.250 --> 20:19.520 from the beginning, the strategy that involves 20:19.520 --> 20:22.390 decoupling hardware and software modernization, 20:22.390 --> 20:24.430 leveraging an open architecture. 20:24.430 --> 20:26.630 The Aegis virtual twin, as we discussed before, 20:26.630 --> 20:29.810 is a major step in that direction, 20:29.810 --> 20:32.920 and we will use these fundamental ideas to move ourselves 20:32.920 --> 20:35.970 toward a single integrated combat system 20:35.970 --> 20:37.373 across the entire fleet. 20:39.910 --> 20:44.170 So across the board, as we build the Navy the nation needs, 20:44.170 --> 20:48.280 I could not be more excited about our way ahead, 20:48.280 --> 20:51.520 especially partnering with the professionals 20:51.520 --> 20:54.410 and patriots and industry academia and beyond, 20:54.410 --> 20:56.033 many of whom are here today. 20:57.800 --> 21:01.360 Now, just as important as building the Navy the nation needs 21:01.360 --> 21:04.320 is fighting with the Navy the nation has, 21:04.320 --> 21:08.780 and the readiness of our industrial base to do both. 21:08.780 --> 21:11.450 In order to fulfill the largely maritime character 21:11.450 --> 21:13.670 of our national defense strategy, 21:13.670 --> 21:15.490 the Navy the nation needs is bigger, 21:15.490 --> 21:18.200 more capable, of, say, 355, 21:18.200 --> 21:22.020 and this expansion of shipbuilding and other new acquisition 21:22.020 --> 21:24.610 has received the majority of public attention 21:24.610 --> 21:27.493 as it relates to expanding our industrial base. 21:28.420 --> 21:31.000 However I think a key theme of our current plan 21:31.000 --> 21:36.000 is that we aim to both build and sustain a lethal force 21:36.360 --> 21:40.180 through balanced investments across capability and capacity, 21:40.180 --> 21:45.000 a balance between future readiness and current readiness, 21:45.000 --> 21:49.290 a balance between modernization and maintenance. 21:49.290 --> 21:53.370 Indeed, a balance between the Navy the nation needs, 21:53.370 --> 21:56.343 and fighting with the Navy the nation has. 21:57.210 --> 21:59.490 So the public conversation about our industrial base 21:59.490 --> 22:01.550 should include more than just building things. 22:01.550 --> 22:03.670 It's equally as important to talk about 22:03.670 --> 22:07.063 the current readiness we need right now. 22:08.390 --> 22:10.180 While we tend to get excited about newer 22:10.180 --> 22:13.433 and more capable platforms, and rightfully so, 22:14.520 --> 22:15.650 we must also remember 22:15.650 --> 22:19.560 that about 75% of our fighting force today 22:19.560 --> 22:22.870 is what we will fight with in 2030. 22:22.870 --> 22:25.590 We must sustain what we have now 22:25.590 --> 22:28.730 to defend our interests in the future. 22:28.730 --> 22:31.040 So the issue for me is that the growth rate 22:31.040 --> 22:33.380 of demand for maintenance is outpacing the rate 22:33.380 --> 22:35.790 at which our industrial base is growing right now. 22:35.790 --> 22:36.860 Why is that? 22:36.860 --> 22:39.020 Following Vietnam and then the Cold War, 22:39.020 --> 22:41.570 industry went through years of optimizing, 22:41.570 --> 22:44.460 consolidating and shedding excess capacity. 22:44.460 --> 22:47.890 Indeed, we now have sole-source providers 22:48.730 --> 22:50.763 in many cases concerning. 22:52.010 --> 22:54.400 Right now our industrial base is optimized 22:54.400 --> 22:58.660 for cost efficiency, which could result, and often does, 22:58.660 --> 23:01.120 in delays when friction is encountered. 23:01.120 --> 23:02.740 Now, make no mistake, 23:02.740 --> 23:06.722 cost efficiency is an appropriate optimization necessary 23:06.722 --> 23:10.620 for survival during downturns, but going forward, 23:10.620 --> 23:13.830 we must reconsider how we are posturing ourselves 23:13.830 --> 23:15.630 in light of the current environment. 23:16.930 --> 23:18.500 After winning the Cold War, 23:18.500 --> 23:21.880 and absent a compelling demand for security 23:21.880 --> 23:23.650 from any strategic competitors, 23:23.650 --> 23:27.800 it's understandable how we moved toward cost efficiency 23:27.800 --> 23:29.610 at the expense of readiness capacity. 23:29.610 --> 23:32.610 But now in an era of renewed great power competition 23:32.610 --> 23:35.163 we need to rethink how we are positioned. 23:36.200 --> 23:38.060 That issue is how we grow our capacity 23:38.060 --> 23:40.460 for both maintenance and modernization, 23:40.460 --> 23:43.250 including an ability to surge when necessary 23:43.250 --> 23:45.740 without becoming cost-ineffective 23:45.740 --> 23:49.973 or exposing our industrial base to excessive risk. 23:51.410 --> 23:53.860 This is challenging because I think things have changed 23:53.860 --> 23:56.700 in a few significant ways since we last mobilized 23:56.700 --> 23:59.880 our navy and our nation's industrial base 23:59.880 --> 24:03.750 for a major power conflict, say, in World War II. 24:03.750 --> 24:07.560 First, we are no longer the world's largest manufacturer. 24:07.560 --> 24:09.590 China now holds the world's largest share 24:09.590 --> 24:11.930 of manufacturing output at 26%. 24:11.930 --> 24:14.690 We were surpassed in 2010 in this. 24:14.690 --> 24:18.220 So for example, we now have significantly less capacity 24:18.220 --> 24:21.280 in warship construction than our principal competitors. 24:21.280 --> 24:24.000 We may be able to engage other industries to assist 24:24.000 --> 24:26.690 to put the cost and the time required 24:26.690 --> 24:29.920 to realize such potential is daunting. 24:29.920 --> 24:32.840 Second, the nature of modern warfare has changed, 24:32.840 --> 24:36.140 and with long-range precision weaponry 24:36.140 --> 24:39.350 and sensors concentrated on multi-mission platforms, 24:39.350 --> 24:43.050 everything about our modern equipment is complex. 24:43.050 --> 24:47.270 It simply takes more time and superior craftsmanship 24:47.270 --> 24:50.540 to build a fifth-generation fighter like the F-35 24:50.540 --> 24:53.300 than it took to crank out P-51 Mustangs, 24:53.300 --> 24:54.410 and the same can be said 24:54.410 --> 24:57.300 for things like nuclear-powered aircraft carriers 24:58.470 --> 25:01.130 and high-end guided missile destroyers. 25:01.130 --> 25:04.020 And lastly, the phenomenal advances that we have made 25:04.020 --> 25:07.130 in just-in-time logistics and game changers, 25:07.130 --> 25:09.970 creating efficiency and profitability 25:09.970 --> 25:12.620 in all business sectors, the defense sector included. 25:13.470 --> 25:16.100 That has removed excess capacity. 25:16.100 --> 25:18.460 We have eliminated costs. 25:18.460 --> 25:21.400 However, an unintended consequence 25:21.400 --> 25:24.400 was that aforementioned narrowing of our supplier base. 25:24.400 --> 25:27.510 This smaller base is unlikely to keep up 25:27.510 --> 25:30.433 with the surge in demand related to a wartime buildup. 25:32.220 --> 25:33.560 Military mobilization thus 25:33.560 --> 25:35.630 will have a much different character 25:35.630 --> 25:37.440 than what we saw during World War II, 25:37.440 --> 25:40.110 in fact, I contend that the factors of capacity, 25:40.110 --> 25:44.070 complexity, and streamlined supplier base lead us to place 25:44.070 --> 25:47.240 an even greater emphasis on current readiness. 25:47.240 --> 25:49.740 We simply must be able to fight 25:49.740 --> 25:52.083 with the Navy the nation has now. 25:53.790 --> 25:56.920 Over the last few years, we leveraged increased budgets 25:56.920 --> 26:00.440 to make readiness investments across a number of key areas. 26:00.440 --> 26:03.140 We are attempting to squeeze every ounce of readiness 26:03.140 --> 26:05.920 out of every dollar provided by Congress 26:05.920 --> 26:10.320 by improving our analytical rigor, data-driven assessments, 26:10.320 --> 26:13.000 and how we assess our current procedures, 26:13.000 --> 26:15.110 and what our outcomes are. 26:15.110 --> 26:17.470 We've implemented a Perform to Plan initiative 26:17.470 --> 26:20.630 aimed at getting our ships out of depot maintenance on time 26:20.630 --> 26:24.343 with maintenance completed in full, on time, in full. 26:26.000 --> 26:27.430 Maintenance phase completion 26:27.430 --> 26:29.080 has been a significant undertaking 26:29.080 --> 26:31.060 and a big challenge for us because we know 26:31.060 --> 26:33.810 that delayed maintenance compresses training events, 26:33.810 --> 26:36.950 impairs our ability to generate forces 26:36.950 --> 26:38.780 for our forward deployed commanders 26:38.780 --> 26:41.087 and takes time away from our COs. 26:42.690 --> 26:45.060 To further improve our fleet's current readiness, 26:45.060 --> 26:47.000 we are considering innovative ways 26:47.000 --> 26:51.223 to make ourselves better partners with the industrial base. 26:52.400 --> 26:55.260 We are rethinking things like our contracting strategy 26:55.260 --> 26:58.100 and things like small-value change, and one area 26:58.100 --> 27:00.980 where I know we can collaborate is on discovering ways 27:00.980 --> 27:03.910 to increase the skilled workforce capacity 27:03.910 --> 27:05.950 in all of our maintenance activities. 27:05.950 --> 27:10.010 We have a nationwide shortage of highly qualified welders, 27:10.010 --> 27:14.020 pipe fitters, marine engineers, and other skilled artisans. 27:14.020 --> 27:16.310 So to address this, I'm working with my team 27:16.310 --> 27:19.890 to elevate the sense of importance, the gravitas even, 27:19.890 --> 27:23.423 with which we associate these types of critical professions. 27:25.560 --> 27:27.780 I'm doing my best to shine a light on those 27:27.780 --> 27:29.100 who do this vital work, in fact, 27:29.100 --> 27:32.180 I recently spoke at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard's 27:32.180 --> 27:34.190 apprentice program graduation, 27:34.190 --> 27:36.450 and let those journeymen know 27:36.450 --> 27:38.050 that they are well on their way 27:38.050 --> 27:40.550 to becoming craftsmen of the highest order, 27:40.550 --> 27:43.180 and that what they do is absolutely vital 27:43.180 --> 27:46.410 to our national security, just as important as the sailors 27:46.410 --> 27:48.610 and Marines at the forward end of the spear. 27:49.980 --> 27:51.830 Another avenue we are currently exploring 27:51.830 --> 27:55.010 is how we can remove barriers to entry 27:55.010 --> 27:56.300 for those in private industry 27:56.300 --> 27:59.713 who currently choose not to compete for ship repair work. 28:00.650 --> 28:04.050 One example could be perhaps we should consider, 28:04.050 --> 28:06.110 what if we built a floating dry dock 28:06.110 --> 28:09.180 which we would somehow lease to industry to utilize 28:09.180 --> 28:11.340 in conjunction with maintenance availabilities? 28:11.340 --> 28:15.350 So these are evolving ideas, and at this point 28:15.350 --> 28:20.350 about how we can expand capacity in a sustainable way, 28:20.510 --> 28:23.600 and that is sustainable for both the Navy 28:23.600 --> 28:25.990 and for our industrial base. 28:25.990 --> 28:28.920 And I'm confident that the SNA community is capable 28:28.920 --> 28:32.390 of generating many, many, many more innovative ideas 28:32.390 --> 28:34.890 to help us revolutionize readiness, 28:34.890 --> 28:36.670 and I am confident because I know 28:36.670 --> 28:39.620 that we have an industrial base of true patriots 28:40.610 --> 28:42.640 which continues to live up to its moniker 28:42.640 --> 28:44.400 of freedom's foundry, 28:44.400 --> 28:47.210 which will give our sailors all they need to win, 28:47.210 --> 28:51.320 both now and then in this era of great power competition 28:51.320 --> 28:52.760 and in times of war. 28:52.760 --> 28:56.103 So in the end, in all of this, 28:56.970 --> 29:00.233 as we respond to a return to great power competition, 29:02.170 --> 29:04.050 as we realize the lethality 29:04.050 --> 29:06.613 of Distributed Maritime Operations, 29:07.650 --> 29:12.650 as we inculcate mission command demanded by DMO, 29:13.200 --> 29:16.020 and as we build the Navy the nation needs 29:16.020 --> 29:18.450 and fight with the Navy the nation has, 29:18.450 --> 29:20.743 we do so with great urgency, 29:21.600 --> 29:25.873 as if every day was the last day of peace. 29:27.280 --> 29:29.460 So again, I'm honored to be speaking with you today 29:29.460 --> 29:32.940 and I look forward to any questions that you might have. 29:32.940 --> 29:35.282 Thank you and keep your cutlass sharp. 29:35.282 --> 29:38.282 (audience applauds) 29:44.440 --> 29:46.800 - [Hank] I'll kick off the questions. 29:46.800 --> 29:48.080 This is a two-part question, 29:48.080 --> 29:52.200 and it refers to the problems, the challenges, 29:52.200 --> 29:55.640 and the two collisions that Surface Navy had 29:55.640 --> 29:57.480 out in the WestPac last year. 29:57.480 --> 30:02.320 And basically, two parts as I said, the first one is, 30:02.320 --> 30:06.010 what actions or metrics have you put in place 30:06.010 --> 30:10.410 to keep your finger on the pulse of readiness 30:10.410 --> 30:14.030 to prevent something like that in the future, hopefully? 30:14.030 --> 30:16.330 And then secondly, were the other warfare areas, 30:16.330 --> 30:17.650 the submariners and the aviators, 30:17.650 --> 30:20.710 experiencing somewhat similar problems or was it 30:20.710 --> 30:24.910 a uniquely surface-warfare-area challenge and issues? 30:24.910 --> 30:25.743 Thank you. 30:25.743 --> 30:26.840 - Hank, say the last one again. 30:26.840 --> 30:28.660 So what's the specific question and the last one? 30:28.660 --> 30:29.800 - [Hank] The second part was, 30:29.800 --> 30:31.510 were the submariners and the aviators 30:31.510 --> 30:36.510 also experiencing readiness, leadership, whatever, 30:37.720 --> 30:42.720 challenges as the Surface Navy appears to have experienced 30:42.880 --> 30:44.930 that led up to those collisions? 30:44.930 --> 30:48.450 - So to the first question, I think it's the job 30:48.450 --> 30:51.060 of the fleet commander to put in place 30:51.060 --> 30:53.280 that battle rhythm that allows him to keep his finger 30:53.280 --> 30:55.900 on the pulse of readiness, 30:55.900 --> 30:58.050 and I would tell you that when we speak 30:58.050 --> 30:59.520 about One Fight, One Navy, 30:59.520 --> 31:01.120 the three fleet commanders do that. 31:01.120 --> 31:05.070 They firmly recognize that it is their job to ensure 31:05.070 --> 31:08.170 that all the forces that go forward are truly ready. 31:08.170 --> 31:10.820 So for instance, we're out of the waiver business now. 31:10.820 --> 31:12.900 There's no reason to do that. 31:12.900 --> 31:13.890 All three fleet commanders 31:13.890 --> 31:16.950 have made tough operational decisions about units 31:16.950 --> 31:18.220 that may or may not have been ready, 31:18.220 --> 31:20.480 and made the right call that if you're not ready, 31:20.480 --> 31:24.670 if you're not fully trained, then we're gonna mitigate that 31:24.670 --> 31:26.470 before we send you over the horizon. 31:27.980 --> 31:30.230 And so the battle rhythm by which we look at 31:30.230 --> 31:33.910 and keep our finger on the pulse of that is pretty robust, 31:33.910 --> 31:37.710 and so the measures of effectiveness that we look for are, 31:37.710 --> 31:38.960 and I'll tell you how I look at it, 31:38.960 --> 31:40.690 and then I'll let Lung speak to his, 31:40.690 --> 31:44.030 but I am very focused on phase transition. 31:44.030 --> 31:46.290 So are you ready to enter the maintenance phase? 31:46.290 --> 31:48.370 Are you ready to enter the basic phase? 31:48.370 --> 31:51.130 Are you ready to go into the advanced and integrated phase? 31:51.130 --> 31:53.440 That's where I think the fleet commander 31:53.440 --> 31:55.540 can provide significant value. 31:55.540 --> 31:56.880 So the metrics and the data 31:56.880 --> 31:59.610 that the type commander puts forward to me, 31:59.610 --> 32:02.543 my key question is readiness for phase transition, 32:03.470 --> 32:06.150 with enough decision space to apply the resources 32:06.150 --> 32:08.030 that the commanding officer, 32:08.030 --> 32:10.430 who is kinda the supported in this, I would say, 32:12.300 --> 32:14.850 that we have thus set up enough time. 32:14.850 --> 32:15.840 So that's hard to do, 32:15.840 --> 32:18.010 so that's a force-generation battle rhythm process 32:18.010 --> 32:20.420 that's really important to us, 32:20.420 --> 32:22.590 and I think we have the right metrics in place now 32:22.590 --> 32:26.200 that support a very in-depth waterfront look at, 32:26.200 --> 32:28.560 are you ready to move on to the next phase 32:28.560 --> 32:30.630 of the operation, of the OFRP? 32:30.630 --> 32:33.190 And I'm confident that we're doing that. 32:33.190 --> 32:34.740 Now the true measure of effectiveness 32:34.740 --> 32:38.420 when you think about things like the CR and the RROC, 32:38.420 --> 32:41.970 and what we've been doing as we're about 72% of the way 32:41.970 --> 32:44.090 across all of those actions, 32:44.090 --> 32:46.820 very confident that we are moving forward on that 32:46.820 --> 32:50.740 in the right way, and I think the key measure for me 32:50.740 --> 32:52.820 is exactly what Rich is talking about, 32:52.820 --> 32:53.700 and that is 32:55.470 --> 32:57.480 the transition, again, 32:57.480 --> 33:00.320 from a culture of compliance to a culture of excellence, 33:00.320 --> 33:03.500 and I think we're cresting that wave to get there right now. 33:03.500 --> 33:05.740 And when we're talking about culture of excellence, 33:05.740 --> 33:09.900 and to me, you inspect for compliance, 33:09.900 --> 33:11.770 you incentivize for excellence. 33:11.770 --> 33:13.520 And when we're talking about excellence 33:13.520 --> 33:15.170 as opposed to checking the block, 33:16.070 --> 33:18.290 when COs are gonna come forward and say, 33:18.290 --> 33:20.070 I am not ready to move forward, commodore, 33:20.070 --> 33:23.030 to the next phase, or I cannot get underway, 33:23.030 --> 33:25.500 that the trust and transparency is there to support that. 33:25.500 --> 33:27.190 That's the real measure of effectiveness 33:27.190 --> 33:29.360 on the readiness piece, and I think we are, 33:29.360 --> 33:32.570 under Rich's leadership, Jesse's leadership, we are there. 33:32.570 --> 33:35.430 Now that same thought, that culture of excellence, 33:35.430 --> 33:37.940 I think pertains to the other type commanders, 33:37.940 --> 33:40.880 and so when I look at what Bullet Miller is doing, 33:40.880 --> 33:43.310 and what Chas Richard is doing, 33:43.310 --> 33:46.760 I'm equally as excited about the work that they are doing. 33:46.760 --> 33:48.770 That same force-generation process 33:48.770 --> 33:51.070 where we look at the key telling metrics, 33:51.070 --> 33:52.820 are they ready to move forward, 33:52.820 --> 33:55.303 happen for the other type commanders. 33:56.140 --> 33:59.707 Sadly, we do work in a very dangerous environment 33:59.707 --> 34:04.707 and so accidents will happen, but we need to remember 34:04.780 --> 34:07.560 that it's all about giving our sailors what they need 34:07.560 --> 34:09.350 and setting them up for success 34:10.400 --> 34:14.090 so that we can forestall any problems that may come. 34:14.090 --> 34:16.110 So I think across all of the type commanders too, 34:16.110 --> 34:19.720 including NECC and the others and IFOR, 34:19.720 --> 34:22.330 this idea of a culture of excellence is pervading, 34:22.330 --> 34:26.290 and I'm pretty excited about the trend. 34:26.290 --> 34:27.123 - [Hank] Thanks. 34:33.600 --> 34:35.930 Admiral, as a young junior officer 34:35.930 --> 34:37.760 on his first division officer tour, 34:37.760 --> 34:42.040 can you give him some words of wisdom as far as leadership 34:42.040 --> 34:46.700 and some of the values that you stuck to through your career 34:46.700 --> 34:48.610 to make you obviously successful? 34:48.610 --> 34:49.443 - Sure. 34:50.728 --> 34:51.790 I'm not sure who asked that question, 34:51.790 --> 34:53.790 we probably oughta have a cup of coffee. 34:55.100 --> 34:58.710 So I would say the first thing for a JO, 34:58.710 --> 35:03.050 I'll give you my pitch that I would tell a junior officer 35:03.050 --> 35:04.733 walking aboard a destroyer. 35:05.600 --> 35:09.340 Actually, this came from my son, who is a JO, 35:09.340 --> 35:11.300 and he goes, "I think 35:12.237 --> 35:16.610 "that I get about five months, right?" 35:16.610 --> 35:18.950 And then after that, Ensign Schmotz, Ensign Grady, 35:18.950 --> 35:21.380 you don't get a pass after five months. 35:21.380 --> 35:24.190 You may not be fully qualified, I got that, 35:24.190 --> 35:26.800 but you're smart enough, we've given you all the tools 35:26.800 --> 35:28.940 to do what you need to do, but after about five months, 35:28.940 --> 35:30.080 you should know stem to stern, 35:30.080 --> 35:31.400 you should know what your job is, 35:31.400 --> 35:33.380 and by God, you better know your job. 35:33.380 --> 35:34.423 So there's that. 35:35.640 --> 35:37.993 So don't be a victim, you gotta lean into it. 35:40.200 --> 35:43.840 The next thing is use the people around you. 35:43.840 --> 35:48.840 So clearly, the number one tool at your disposal, 35:48.930 --> 35:50.950 both from a getting-the-job-done perspective, 35:50.950 --> 35:53.710 whether it's maintenance or leadership or management, 35:53.710 --> 35:56.430 as well as your own personal development as a leader, 35:56.430 --> 35:57.660 that's your chief petty officer. 35:57.660 --> 36:02.220 So lean on the mess, and demand the mastery 36:02.220 --> 36:03.570 that should come out of that mess 36:03.570 --> 36:06.390 to make your sailors better, but to make you better 36:06.390 --> 36:09.690 because the mess has that, if you ask me, 36:09.690 --> 36:13.930 they have that sacred right to not only lead the ship, 36:13.930 --> 36:16.727 but to develop the younger sailors, 36:16.727 --> 36:20.310 but the future officer corps, so lean on that. 36:20.310 --> 36:23.163 And then I think the final thing is own it. 36:24.570 --> 36:27.340 What a great time to be a junior officer 36:27.340 --> 36:29.620 on a ship enlisted in today's Navy. 36:29.620 --> 36:33.080 So if you wanna be the guy or gal that writes the next page 36:33.080 --> 36:36.450 of Distributed Maritime Operations, that helps contribute 36:36.450 --> 36:39.760 to the iterative fleet battle problem construct 36:39.760 --> 36:42.160 that leads to the large-scale exercise, 36:42.160 --> 36:45.545 if you are that weapons tactics instructor 36:45.545 --> 36:48.430 that SMTC and others have developed, 36:48.430 --> 36:52.470 then own it and step forward and be part of the solution, 36:52.470 --> 36:54.840 and I'm pretty confident that the officer corps 36:54.840 --> 36:56.540 that I see coming in now 36:57.500 --> 36:59.780 is ready to step up to that challenge. 36:59.780 --> 37:00.613 Okay. 37:05.070 --> 37:06.500 Go ahead. 37:06.500 --> 37:08.000 - [Hank] Oh good, please, Robbie. 37:08.000 --> 37:11.270 - [Robbie] Sir, Robbie Harris, a former naval person. 37:11.270 --> 37:13.230 Subject is readiness, 37:13.230 --> 37:16.293 which you spoke a lot about this morning, rightfully so, 37:17.860 --> 37:21.900 and the readiness trough that our Navy found itself in. 37:21.900 --> 37:25.090 I suppose maybe the largest cause 37:25.090 --> 37:28.433 of that readiness trough was the Budget Control Act of 2011. 37:29.820 --> 37:32.880 But it's also said that another reason 37:32.880 --> 37:37.170 is the pace of operations, the tempo of operations, 37:37.170 --> 37:39.550 the number of ships that we have kept deployed 37:39.550 --> 37:42.890 while the number of ships in the fleet has declined. 37:42.890 --> 37:45.930 And it's also said that perhaps we deployed 37:45.930 --> 37:48.170 just for the sake of deploying, 37:48.170 --> 37:50.640 and by operating our ships so hard, 37:50.640 --> 37:53.340 that's one of the reasons that readiness has declined. 37:54.180 --> 37:58.010 Now, I also understand that the area's Truman deployment 37:58.010 --> 38:03.010 is now the model for deploying and maintaining presence. 38:03.800 --> 38:05.523 Could you speak a bit about that? 38:07.860 --> 38:09.290 What should be our policy? 38:09.290 --> 38:13.010 What should be Navy's policy on maintaining presence? 38:13.010 --> 38:16.920 What should deployments look like, and how do we ensure 38:16.920 --> 38:20.313 that we remain operationally unpredictable? 38:21.250 --> 38:23.310 - Let me go back to the early part of your comments, 38:23.310 --> 38:24.430 wasn't really part of your question, 38:24.430 --> 38:26.960 but I wanna go back to the early part of your comments. 38:26.960 --> 38:29.500 And certainly Budget Control Act 38:29.500 --> 38:32.380 and sequestration is a contributor, 38:32.380 --> 38:35.680 and so the number one comment I would make to that, 38:35.680 --> 38:38.920 and I know that our friends in Congress 38:38.920 --> 38:42.750 truly understand this, but that the most important thing 38:42.750 --> 38:45.423 is sustainable, predictable budgets, 38:46.280 --> 38:48.280 and so we have to have that every year. 38:48.280 --> 38:50.770 So one of the great things about this year 38:50.770 --> 38:52.770 is we've got a budget on time for the first time ever, 38:52.770 --> 38:54.640 and I really applaud the Congress for doing that. 38:54.640 --> 38:56.510 - [Robbie] I hear they're closing CRs. 38:56.510 --> 38:59.990 - That's exactly right, so this is first time without a CR, 38:59.990 --> 39:01.560 hence why we got it on time. 39:01.560 --> 39:04.990 And so sequestration, the Budget Control Act, 39:04.990 --> 39:06.143 are dangerous, I think. 39:07.210 --> 39:09.120 I understand the rationale behind them, 39:09.120 --> 39:10.500 but for the Department of Defense 39:10.500 --> 39:13.410 and the readiness to build both the Navy the nation needs 39:13.410 --> 39:15.450 and maintain the Navy the nation has, 39:15.450 --> 39:17.450 it's that constant predictable strain 39:17.450 --> 39:20.310 of budgets that are super important to us, 39:20.310 --> 39:21.600 and that would be a big message 39:21.600 --> 39:23.550 that I would offer to Congress. 39:23.550 --> 39:26.610 Secondly, it wasn't just 2011, though, right? 39:26.610 --> 39:28.920 So there was a long period, 39:28.920 --> 39:31.210 for all the decisions taken for all the right reasons, 39:31.210 --> 39:33.980 I don't impugn those, but there were a series of decisions 39:33.980 --> 39:35.280 that led to the readiness trough 39:35.280 --> 39:37.600 that we are just now working our way out of. 39:37.600 --> 39:39.730 So two great budgets that have helped us with that, 39:39.730 --> 39:41.160 and we hope to sustain that now, 39:41.160 --> 39:42.260 but it's gonna take some time 39:42.260 --> 39:44.060 to get out of that readiness trough. 39:46.344 --> 39:47.870 I'm not quite so certain I agree with you 39:47.870 --> 39:49.760 that it's the op tempo that led to that. 39:49.760 --> 39:51.590 I think op tempo is part of that, 39:51.590 --> 39:53.210 but I don't think it was the contributor. 39:53.210 --> 39:55.740 So to your question about HST, 39:55.740 --> 40:00.600 I would caution the HST's DFE is not the model, 40:00.600 --> 40:03.260 it is a model of doing it. 40:03.260 --> 40:04.690 And so the presence question 40:06.650 --> 40:08.370 that gets to strategically predictable 40:08.370 --> 40:10.470 and operationally unpredictable is an important one. 40:10.470 --> 40:13.590 I would tell you that before Lisa Franchetti 40:13.590 --> 40:18.360 took over for me at Sixth Fleet and went on to great things, 40:18.360 --> 40:20.650 my best day, this is your presence question, 40:20.650 --> 40:22.190 was when I had someone in the High North, 40:22.190 --> 40:24.860 someone in the Black Sea, someone in the Baltic, 40:24.860 --> 40:26.890 someone in the East Med, and if I was really good, 40:26.890 --> 40:28.410 somebody in the Gulf of Guinea. 40:28.410 --> 40:31.490 That's why presence matters, 40:31.490 --> 40:34.470 because that allows us to turn the rheostat up 40:34.470 --> 40:36.143 at our timing and tempo, 40:37.610 --> 40:39.750 and so numbers matter in that regard. 40:39.750 --> 40:42.250 So DFE, or dynamic force employment 40:42.250 --> 40:44.240 like Harry S. Truman did, is a model, 40:44.240 --> 40:45.690 and we will continue to leverage that, 40:45.690 --> 40:47.960 and I would tell you here in this room 40:47.960 --> 40:52.710 that the Navy gives the most options to the chairman 40:52.710 --> 40:55.940 and the SecDef on how to execute dynamic force employment. 40:55.940 --> 40:59.410 Take that to the bank and be proud of that. 40:59.410 --> 41:02.340 So that is a model, but that presence matters as well, 41:02.340 --> 41:05.220 which is why when we talk about the Navy the nation needs 41:05.220 --> 41:07.640 and building a bigger navy, 355 matters, 41:07.640 --> 41:09.140 it's why LCS matters, 41:09.140 --> 41:12.450 that's why getting to large surface combatant matters, 41:12.450 --> 41:14.530 that's why 38 amphibs matters, 41:14.530 --> 41:16.860 so that we can be forward where we need to be 41:16.860 --> 41:19.920 to be that contact and blunt force. 41:19.920 --> 41:22.350 Does that mean that we have to deploy every time 41:22.350 --> 41:23.410 under a six-month period? 41:23.410 --> 41:24.243 No. 41:24.243 --> 41:25.440 So when we build the OFRP, 41:25.440 --> 41:27.800 you might go as scheduled during that time, 41:27.800 --> 41:29.700 but you could go during that 22 months, 41:29.700 --> 41:31.330 which is both deployment and sustainment. 41:31.330 --> 41:33.550 That's the operationally unpredictable piece. 41:33.550 --> 41:34.960 HST knocked it out of the park, 41:34.960 --> 41:37.180 proved that we could do that. 41:37.180 --> 41:38.810 The subsequent carriers may not do that. 41:38.810 --> 41:41.720 The subsequent ARGs may not do that, but they can, 41:41.720 --> 41:43.610 and they provide that option because we buy 41:43.610 --> 41:47.890 that operational flexibility over 22 months of the OFRP. 41:49.268 --> 41:50.623 - Thank you very much. - Thanks. 41:58.110 --> 41:59.350 - Admiral. - Yes, sir. 41:59.350 --> 42:00.200 Oh, very good, thank you. 42:00.200 --> 42:01.033 - [Tom] Good morning, Admiral. 42:01.033 --> 42:02.630 Tom Moninger, Desron 22. 42:02.630 --> 42:05.890 Sir, you spoke extensively about building the capacity 42:05.890 --> 42:09.410 to get to 355 ships, and then maintain them. 42:09.410 --> 42:11.510 Sir, do you have any concerns about manning those ships 42:11.510 --> 42:13.600 and getting to the numbers we need there? 42:13.600 --> 42:14.433 - Thanks, Tom. 42:14.433 --> 42:15.920 Fighting Double Deuce. 42:15.920 --> 42:16.924 - Sir. - There you go. 42:16.924 --> 42:19.757 (audience laughs) 42:23.420 --> 42:24.790 Manning and manpower, 42:24.790 --> 42:29.790 I think manpower is maybe your question, 42:29.820 --> 42:32.930 and that's always of concern to us. 42:32.930 --> 42:36.430 And so the first thing I would tell you is 42:36.430 --> 42:40.670 as I look at what CNO and Admiral Burke are doing 42:40.670 --> 42:45.460 to get us back to filling the sea billets, 42:45.460 --> 42:47.780 getting out of the 8,000-person hole, 42:47.780 --> 42:49.960 the sailor hole that we have, 42:49.960 --> 42:53.100 I'm very encouraged on the trajectory of that, 42:53.100 --> 42:57.050 and this may be the bottom of where we are now, 42:57.050 --> 42:58.500 so when Abe heads out, 42:58.500 --> 43:00.380 she'll have a bunch of TYCOM manning actions 43:00.380 --> 43:01.740 that Jesse is working through, 43:01.740 --> 43:03.660 that Trigger is working through. 43:03.660 --> 43:05.120 That will probably be the bottom of it, 43:05.120 --> 43:07.490 and we'll start climbing out of the manpower hole 43:07.490 --> 43:10.430 that we have now to start eliminating 43:10.430 --> 43:12.190 some of those TYCOM manning actions 43:12.190 --> 43:14.890 that are destructive in some cases. 43:14.890 --> 43:16.573 They're hard to work through. 43:20.480 --> 43:22.360 Now the key for us in that regard though, 43:22.360 --> 43:25.670 is to continue those accessions as we get bigger. 43:25.670 --> 43:27.900 So get the 8,000 back, and so now here we are, 43:27.900 --> 43:29.550 that's what we need for the Navy we have now, 43:29.550 --> 43:31.060 but if we're gonna build the 355, 43:31.060 --> 43:32.940 we're gonna have to continue the accession process. 43:32.940 --> 43:34.653 So Brendan, get busy. 43:36.560 --> 43:38.750 So we'll have to have that debate 43:38.750 --> 43:42.130 across those consistent budgets that we talked about before 43:42.130 --> 43:45.260 about continuing to build to the Navy the nation needs 43:45.260 --> 43:47.093 and on the 355. 43:47.960 --> 43:49.620 But what can we do now? 43:49.620 --> 43:51.890 Let's not be a victim, what can we do now? 43:51.890 --> 43:53.470 Well, we can look very hard 43:53.470 --> 43:57.500 at how we man the ships that we have now. 43:57.500 --> 43:59.780 We use a kind of a condition III watch structure 43:59.780 --> 44:02.450 to define what the manning is. 44:02.450 --> 44:04.220 And so as I think back to the COs 44:04.220 --> 44:07.873 and to maybe even you to decide, how am I set up well? 44:07.873 --> 44:09.560 Is this how I need to do it 44:09.560 --> 44:10.990 and what kinda training do we need? 44:10.990 --> 44:14.490 So when I think about the training perspective then, 44:14.490 --> 44:15.420 that's why the value 44:15.420 --> 44:17.200 of Ready, Relevant Learning is so important. 44:17.200 --> 44:18.520 We're gonna give you those sailors, 44:18.520 --> 44:21.440 what you want is for them to be superbly trained 44:21.440 --> 44:23.870 at the right time and the right place 44:25.270 --> 44:28.260 such that you don't need more bodies to do the job, 44:28.260 --> 44:31.330 you have the best bodies to do the job at that time, 44:31.330 --> 44:33.280 and so the great promise of Ready, Relevant Learning 44:33.280 --> 44:34.490 is that you're gonna get sailors 44:34.490 --> 44:36.990 who are already well on their way 44:36.990 --> 44:41.240 from apprentice through journeyman to supervisor to master 44:41.240 --> 44:42.770 because we're gonna give them the right training 44:42.770 --> 44:45.010 delivered with the right methods at the right time 44:45.010 --> 44:48.900 to a ship CO who can then work with the crew size 44:48.900 --> 44:51.340 that he has, knowing that he has the best-trained people, 44:51.340 --> 44:53.680 and that's what I think we can do at the fleet level 44:53.680 --> 44:57.940 as we work with Ech 1 on the manpower side of the house. 44:57.940 --> 44:58.773 Thanks, Tom. 45:00.490 --> 45:01.943 - I've got a question. - Sure. 45:04.100 --> 45:05.980 - [Admiral Hogg] Great comments, Chris, and thank you. 45:05.980 --> 45:08.140 Thank you from SNA for your support. 45:08.140 --> 45:08.973 - Thanks. 45:09.926 --> 45:11.630 - [Admiral Hogg] A lot of activities going on now 45:11.630 --> 45:14.940 at Naval Warfare Development Command. 45:14.940 --> 45:16.680 Could you give us sort of an overview 45:16.680 --> 45:18.600 of where it's all headed? 45:18.600 --> 45:19.433 - Sure, thanks. 45:19.433 --> 45:21.180 And for those of you who haven't had a chance 45:21.180 --> 45:23.650 to come up and shake Admiral Hogg's hand, 45:23.650 --> 45:24.483 you should do that. 45:24.483 --> 45:26.420 A true icon of the Navy and the service force, 45:26.420 --> 45:28.305 so a round of applause for Admiral Hogg. 45:28.305 --> 45:29.138 (audience applauds) 45:29.138 --> 45:31.030 Thanks for being here, sir. 45:36.680 --> 45:40.420 I'm very excited about the work at NWDC 45:40.420 --> 45:42.230 down there in Norfolk. 45:42.230 --> 45:46.810 First, the ecosystem that the team there is building 45:46.810 --> 45:49.710 with the other warfare development centers 45:49.710 --> 45:54.380 is really powerful, and so the ability to synchronize 45:54.380 --> 45:56.260 and align all the work that's being done 45:56.260 --> 45:59.430 across those various domains is headed up at NWDC, 45:59.430 --> 46:01.210 so great work being done there. 46:01.210 --> 46:03.880 They were the drafters and the primary authors 46:03.880 --> 46:06.750 of the Distributed Maritime Operations concept 46:06.750 --> 46:08.560 that I talked about, that seminal document 46:08.560 --> 46:11.710 that goes from the NDS through the NMS Design 2.0, 46:11.710 --> 46:16.150 now down to DMO, and that should give you an example 46:16.150 --> 46:20.940 of the true talent of the folks that are working at NWDC. 46:22.560 --> 46:24.640 And so across the board then, 46:24.640 --> 46:27.640 they are ramping up their ability to synergize the efforts 46:27.640 --> 46:30.100 to give us the doctrine, the TTPs and others 46:30.100 --> 46:31.510 with the warfare development commanders, 46:31.510 --> 46:35.160 so that we really need to get to this culture of excellence 46:35.160 --> 46:36.750 where it's about warfighting first, 46:36.750 --> 46:39.230 and I think NWDC is doing that. 46:39.230 --> 46:40.100 I'll give you another example 46:40.100 --> 46:41.690 of what I'm really excited about, 46:41.690 --> 46:46.100 and that is they are embarking on, at my direction, 46:46.100 --> 46:48.930 but under Admiral Hitchcock's leadership, they are embarking 46:48.930 --> 46:52.000 on an operational level of war training compendium. 46:52.000 --> 46:54.710 And so for everyone here in this room 46:54.710 --> 46:57.218 from strike group commanders on down, 46:57.218 --> 47:00.440 the fleet commanders on down, for that matter, 47:00.440 --> 47:02.410 we are now going to take seriously 47:02.410 --> 47:05.530 how we train not just our officer corps 47:05.530 --> 47:08.610 at the division officer department head or even PCO level, 47:08.610 --> 47:11.630 but how do we train major warfare commanders who go out? 47:11.630 --> 47:13.850 How do we train strike group commanders 47:13.850 --> 47:16.010 before they head out at the operational level of war? 47:16.010 --> 47:20.030 How to help them understand and then realize the benefits 47:20.030 --> 47:23.180 of mission command within DMO, and then just as importantly, 47:23.180 --> 47:25.440 how do we train fleet commanders? 47:25.440 --> 47:28.370 So we have developed a continuum of training 47:28.370 --> 47:29.940 across the operational level of war 47:29.940 --> 47:32.270 from the numbered fleet commander on down, 47:32.270 --> 47:34.460 and NWDC is leading that, 47:34.460 --> 47:36.930 and I think that will make us much more effective 47:36.930 --> 47:41.420 to execute DMO in a great power competition era. 47:41.420 --> 47:43.240 So lots of great work ongoing there. 47:43.240 --> 47:44.440 Thanks for the question. 47:45.900 --> 47:47.010 Yes sir. - Good morning, Admiral. 47:47.010 --> 47:49.230 I'm Matt Gratias, I'm a former cryptologic technician 47:49.230 --> 47:53.130 in the Navy Direct Support, so subsurface ships and the NSW. 47:53.130 --> 47:56.780 But now I work for MD5, which is an office of innovation 47:56.780 --> 47:57.920 and the Under Secretary of Defense 47:57.920 --> 47:59.370 for Research and Engineering, 47:59.370 --> 48:01.010 and I'm getting to my question. 48:01.010 --> 48:02.780 We spoke a lot about industry outreach, 48:02.780 --> 48:05.210 but how can we connect a surface fleet 48:05.210 --> 48:08.030 to a key dynamic part of our economy, 48:08.030 --> 48:11.150 which is startups and the key ecosystems? 48:11.150 --> 48:13.220 And there's certain challenges, it seems, 48:13.220 --> 48:15.020 to be able to connect the surface fleet, 48:15.020 --> 48:18.770 which is obviously being deployed quite frequently, 48:18.770 --> 48:21.220 with those types of talent that exist 48:21.220 --> 48:23.440 in the startup ecosystems, so I was just wondering 48:23.440 --> 48:25.350 if there may be, if you have any insight 48:25.350 --> 48:26.780 how best we could do that 48:26.780 --> 48:29.270 perhaps in different transition phases, 48:29.270 --> 48:32.070 and second, are there any efforts underway 48:32.070 --> 48:34.010 within the Navy that would be similar to what we see 48:34.010 --> 48:36.100 with the Army and Army Futures Command 48:36.100 --> 48:38.330 and their outreach and engagement with startups, 48:38.330 --> 48:39.937 or the Air Force and AFWERX? 48:41.930 --> 48:44.160 - So first of all, you're doing it right now. 48:44.160 --> 48:47.540 So fora like this give you the opportunity, I think, 48:47.540 --> 48:50.500 to have that exchange of ideas, 48:50.500 --> 48:53.440 and for us to learn from you and for you to learn for us 48:53.440 --> 48:55.160 what you're doing in the startup field 48:55.160 --> 48:56.680 and how that might pertain 48:56.680 --> 49:01.150 to advancing our analytical agenda and where we need to go. 49:01.150 --> 49:04.320 Now this is more appropriately an Echelon I question, 49:04.320 --> 49:06.750 as they build the Navy the nation needs, 49:06.750 --> 49:08.640 as they do the force development, 49:08.640 --> 49:10.550 but I think what the fleet owes you though, 49:10.550 --> 49:13.090 is what's the requirement? 49:13.090 --> 49:14.950 So let's use an example then 49:17.021 --> 49:20.370 of one that I think is really important, 49:20.370 --> 49:22.080 and that's unmanned systems. 49:22.080 --> 49:24.160 We'll use that as an example, right? 49:24.160 --> 49:27.300 So starting with the surface, 49:27.300 --> 49:28.610 your question was about the surface, 49:28.610 --> 49:30.230 having a good understanding then, 49:30.230 --> 49:31.600 you having a good understanding 49:31.600 --> 49:33.420 of where the Navy wants to take, 49:33.420 --> 49:35.464 or the Surface Navy wants to take unmanneds 49:35.464 --> 49:38.044 and how we can leverage 49:38.044 --> 49:41.235 the great promise of unmanned systems. 49:41.235 --> 49:42.440 It's absolutely critical as you think about, 49:42.440 --> 49:44.200 where do I wanna do the next startup? 49:44.200 --> 49:46.350 Where does that next infusion of cash go to 49:47.530 --> 49:49.520 to support building the Navy the nation needs? 49:49.520 --> 49:51.620 And similarly, for Ron and his team, 49:51.620 --> 49:52.470 for Rich and his team, 49:52.470 --> 49:54.890 he has to have an understanding of what's out there. 49:54.890 --> 49:56.360 What is The Art of the Possible? 49:56.360 --> 49:59.790 And so the exchanges that happen 49:59.790 --> 50:01.870 at the acquisition side of the house 50:01.870 --> 50:03.080 and on the secretariat side of the house 50:03.080 --> 50:04.090 are really, really important, 50:04.090 --> 50:07.460 and people like Admiral Hahn at CNR and others 50:07.460 --> 50:09.410 try to cast a wide net on that. 50:09.410 --> 50:12.710 So I'll expand the unmanned systems a little bit further, 50:12.710 --> 50:14.985 and that would be on counter-UAS, 50:14.985 --> 50:18.750 so a very interesting and problematic 50:20.190 --> 50:23.870 threat set that I have now is within my role as a ATFP. 50:23.870 --> 50:26.300 So how do we get after what is the theory, 50:26.300 --> 50:30.350 what is out there to help us counter unmanned aerial systems 50:30.350 --> 50:33.573 at sea, ashore, 50:35.430 --> 50:37.040 kind of across the spectrum? 50:37.040 --> 50:38.310 It's interesting, I just took a brief on that, 50:38.310 --> 50:39.963 it was a fantastic brief, 50:41.810 --> 50:45.700 and the feeling that I got from that was that that synergy 50:45.700 --> 50:48.140 between the folks giving me the brief 50:48.140 --> 50:49.970 on here's how we're gonna attack this 50:49.970 --> 50:52.140 and industry was quite good, 50:52.140 --> 50:55.000 and so somehow they have been able to cast that net wide. 50:55.000 --> 50:59.130 So I think the acquisition community does a very good job 50:59.130 --> 51:00.870 of reaching out, but they could probably, 51:00.870 --> 51:03.390 we could both probably do better understanding 51:03.390 --> 51:06.040 what you have available and what your thoughts are 51:06.040 --> 51:08.890 and where the great technology is taking us, 51:08.890 --> 51:10.800 but then you understanding the demand signal 51:10.800 --> 51:11.633 and what we need. 51:11.633 --> 51:14.230 And I think it's the fleet's job, as opposed to Ech 1, 51:14.230 --> 51:16.770 to establish very clearly, I need this, 51:16.770 --> 51:18.140 and then over to you guys to figure out 51:18.140 --> 51:20.570 how to get it with your partnership. 51:20.570 --> 51:21.470 All right, thanks. 51:28.440 --> 51:32.820 - [Man] This question is concerning the DMO 51:32.820 --> 51:37.420 and a shared responsibility with allies and partner nations 51:38.480 --> 51:42.660 who are probably not as flexible as we may be, 51:42.660 --> 51:46.640 so has this complicated your relationships 51:46.640 --> 51:49.860 and getting support from our allies and partner nations? 51:49.860 --> 51:51.270 - No, yeah, thanks. 51:51.270 --> 51:56.080 So we know for a fact that we will never fight alone, 51:56.080 --> 51:58.620 and that the strength, we're stronger together 51:58.620 --> 52:01.500 and so the strength of our ability, 52:01.500 --> 52:04.680 the strength of our ability to execute DMO will be, 52:04.680 --> 52:07.000 in part, a function of how well we are able 52:07.000 --> 52:10.090 to bring our allies and partners along, 52:10.090 --> 52:11.060 how we can take advantage 52:11.060 --> 52:12.800 of the great capability that they bring, 52:12.800 --> 52:15.560 learn from their great warfighting capability as well, 52:15.560 --> 52:19.933 and synergize that within our teams. 52:20.830 --> 52:23.083 So I'm not too worried about it, 52:23.083 --> 52:25.230 and I say that knowing that Admiral Wade 52:25.230 --> 52:28.230 and the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group 52:28.230 --> 52:30.800 are gonna head out here on just the next 52:30.800 --> 52:32.650 of a series of cooperative deployments, 52:32.650 --> 52:35.210 this time with the Spanish Aegis destroyer, 52:35.210 --> 52:36.500 the Mendez Nunez. 52:36.500 --> 52:40.220 And so we bring our partners with us, 52:40.220 --> 52:43.760 we would be stupid not to because we learn a lot from them 52:43.760 --> 52:45.170 and we hope that they learn something from us 52:45.170 --> 52:47.210 and that we know that we are stronger together, 52:47.210 --> 52:50.080 and I don't see DMO as precluding that 52:50.080 --> 52:50.970 or making that harder. 52:50.970 --> 52:53.040 In fact, I think it opens more contact surface 52:53.040 --> 52:54.620 to make it easier. 52:54.620 --> 52:56.170 - [Man] Thanks. 52:56.170 --> 52:57.390 - Good morning, Admiral. - Hi. 52:57.390 --> 53:00.060 - [Ben] Ben Sharp, former SWO. 53:00.060 --> 53:03.160 We're hearing the term 'killer robots.' 53:03.160 --> 53:05.720 We don't want our people to be robots, 53:05.720 --> 53:08.960 so Admiral, what books, podcasts, movies, 53:08.960 --> 53:11.500 have shaped you over the years that you'd recommend 53:11.500 --> 53:13.740 to become a thoughtful warrior? 53:13.740 --> 53:15.060 - Killer robots? 53:15.060 --> 53:15.893 Really. 53:16.970 --> 53:17.803 Okay. 53:19.039 --> 53:20.120 I got it, thanks, Matt. 53:20.120 --> 53:23.110 So I'm gonna take off the classics, right? 53:23.110 --> 53:24.418 Caddyshack and-- 53:24.418 --> 53:25.530 (audience laughs) 53:25.530 --> 53:26.430 Does this come up? 53:27.360 --> 53:29.723 - [Man] Sure, we got that going for us, which is nice. 53:29.723 --> 53:32.780 (audience laughs) 53:32.780 --> 53:36.610 - Well, if anybody knows me, I'm a big movie buff, 53:36.610 --> 53:38.510 and so we could go on forever, 53:38.510 --> 53:40.330 but that's probably more a conversation at the pub 53:40.330 --> 53:41.200 than it is here 53:44.204 --> 53:45.310 on movies. 53:45.310 --> 53:46.570 I'll give you a couple of books though 53:46.570 --> 53:49.320 that I think are worth looking at. 53:50.940 --> 53:51.920 The first is 53:54.420 --> 53:56.030 The Wright Brothers, 53:56.030 --> 53:57.800 and I really like that book 53:57.800 --> 54:01.560 because that gets to what a true professional is. 54:01.560 --> 54:03.720 And when you read that book, 54:03.720 --> 54:05.910 and what those two bicycle makers did 54:05.910 --> 54:09.460 to revolutionize the world, and how they attacked it, 54:09.460 --> 54:11.614 it wasn't just all emotion. 54:11.614 --> 54:14.230 It was we have a plan, we're on-plan, we're off-plan, 54:14.230 --> 54:15.720 we need a new plan. 54:15.720 --> 54:17.410 They moved out and... 54:19.980 --> 54:21.860 To me, if you wanna read a book 54:21.860 --> 54:23.920 about what a true professional is, 54:23.920 --> 54:25.310 one who has passion and commitment, 54:25.310 --> 54:26.540 who is not a killer robot 54:26.540 --> 54:29.670 and has a vision of what they wanna achieve, read that. 54:29.670 --> 54:31.240 From a teamwork perspective, 54:31.240 --> 54:33.473 you might consider reading Boys in the Boat, 54:34.460 --> 54:37.320 which is about the rowing team at University of Washington, 54:37.320 --> 54:38.720 a really great book. 54:38.720 --> 54:42.370 And I think that gets to the import 54:44.770 --> 54:46.080 of building teams, 54:46.080 --> 54:47.360 and you've heard CNO talk about that 54:47.360 --> 54:49.120 for all of the right reasons, 54:49.120 --> 54:51.400 how important teamwork is and building teams, 54:51.400 --> 54:52.990 and if you read that, I think you'll get a good sense 54:52.990 --> 54:57.010 of that from Boys in the Boat. 54:57.010 --> 54:58.160 Most recent book I read, 54:58.160 --> 55:00.560 and this is gonna come out of left field on you, 55:01.670 --> 55:05.093 but is I just read a book called Cattle Kingdom, 55:06.836 --> 55:10.950 and Cattle Kingdom talks about the great cattle boom 55:10.950 --> 55:15.820 of the 1860s to 1880s, with all kinds of cautionary tales 55:15.820 --> 55:18.380 about culture, about 55:19.300 --> 55:21.350 investments, about risk, 55:21.350 --> 55:22.790 and I found the parallels 55:22.790 --> 55:26.520 to what we do now to be exceptional. 55:26.520 --> 55:29.560 And then finally, right down to the core of what we do, 55:29.560 --> 55:32.160 I think I would be remiss if I didn't mention, 55:32.160 --> 55:35.280 gotta read Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors 55:35.280 --> 55:37.610 or any of that entire series. 55:37.610 --> 55:39.800 If you wanna get a good idea 55:39.800 --> 55:42.270 of what combat is going to be like, 55:42.270 --> 55:44.530 and I don't care whether it's in the modern era or that, 55:44.530 --> 55:45.750 you gotta read that book, 55:45.750 --> 55:48.250 and so I would encourage you to do that. 55:49.582 --> 55:51.050 So that's just some starters for you. 55:51.050 --> 55:53.826 And of course, memorize Caddyshack, that's good. 55:53.826 --> 55:55.437 (audience laughs) 55:55.437 --> 55:56.270 - Thank you. - Thanks. 55:56.270 --> 55:57.103 Sir. 55:57.103 --> 55:58.154 - [Steve] Good morning, Admiral. 55:58.154 --> 56:00.263 Aging former naval person, Steve Woodall. 56:01.660 --> 56:05.350 You mentioned when you talked about counter-UAVs, 56:05.350 --> 56:06.897 relationships with industry, 56:06.897 --> 56:11.330 and I wonder what your view of an ideal relationship 56:11.330 --> 56:14.720 with industry in your current job would be, 56:14.720 --> 56:16.820 should be, including NDIA. 56:16.820 --> 56:17.923 Thank you, sir. 56:19.120 --> 56:20.170 - I would actually answer that 56:20.170 --> 56:23.060 as not a relationship, but a partnership. 56:23.060 --> 56:24.770 So as I talked about in my remarks 56:24.770 --> 56:26.820 about the industrial base, 56:26.820 --> 56:30.150 to me it's about being good partners both ways. 56:30.150 --> 56:34.300 So for industry, having an understanding of what makes sense 56:34.300 --> 56:36.483 from a national defense perspective, 56:38.840 --> 56:41.730 and how to go about that, and then for us, 56:41.730 --> 56:44.920 to remove barriers for folks to be involved in that. 56:48.940 --> 56:51.190 That's pretty hard, I mean, that's tough work. 56:51.190 --> 56:52.930 So I think the ideal relationship is one 56:52.930 --> 56:56.250 where we can get to the table, we can compare notes, 56:56.250 --> 56:57.950 we can understand the different perspectives 56:57.950 --> 56:59.740 that each of us bring to that. 56:59.740 --> 57:01.120 One might be a profit motivation, 57:01.120 --> 57:03.200 although there are great patriots in the industry, 57:03.200 --> 57:04.330 the other might be, hey, I gotta get 57:04.330 --> 57:06.100 the best of the center-of-the-universe of our sailors 57:06.100 --> 57:07.930 to do the fight, and we meet somewhere in the middle, 57:07.930 --> 57:10.020 and it has to be an open and transparent dialogue, 57:10.020 --> 57:11.540 and I do think it has to be one that's built 57:11.540 --> 57:13.803 and recognizes that competition is important. 57:16.320 --> 57:17.153 I think we can do that, 57:17.153 --> 57:19.280 and I think we do that in many respects now, 57:19.280 --> 57:22.050 but it's really less a relationship and more a partnership. 57:22.050 --> 57:23.430 What can we do for each other 57:23.430 --> 57:24.960 to do what's right for the nation? 57:24.960 --> 57:28.223 So, partnership, I think, is the takeaway in that regard. 57:29.220 --> 57:30.053 Sir. 57:30.053 --> 57:30.886 - [Admiral Hogg] We don't wanna lose you, 57:30.886 --> 57:32.693 so I've got another question for you. 57:32.693 --> 57:34.293 Can I come across now? 57:37.460 --> 57:38.487 - I'll repeat it. 57:38.487 --> 57:39.850 It's all right, Admiral, I'll repeat it. 57:39.850 --> 57:41.140 - [Admiral Hogg] The subject, got it, 57:41.140 --> 57:45.425 the subject is additive manufacturing, 57:45.425 --> 57:49.980 of which 3D printing is a very successful subset. 57:49.980 --> 57:51.350 Are we getting that out? 57:51.350 --> 57:53.230 I know that it's on a couple of carriers. 57:53.230 --> 57:58.230 I know that a rather innocuous small part for an F-35 57:58.470 --> 58:01.350 was fabricated onboard the Wasp 58:02.760 --> 58:05.600 to get the aircraft back online. 58:05.600 --> 58:09.550 So of course, my push is to have 3D printing 58:09.550 --> 58:12.560 onboard every ship that has the space 58:12.560 --> 58:14.343 and capacity to deal with it. 58:16.150 --> 58:16.983 - May I? 58:16.983 --> 58:20.283 I think there is great promise in adaptive manufacturing, 58:21.280 --> 58:24.950 and I think we're making great strides there. 58:24.950 --> 58:29.520 So certainly we can make key components. 58:29.520 --> 58:32.070 The example that you gave is a good one. 58:32.070 --> 58:33.530 The question though is can we make them 58:33.530 --> 58:35.940 as something other than plastic? 58:35.940 --> 58:37.380 So they're gonna have to be made, 58:37.380 --> 58:39.140 it's something that is sustainable 58:40.635 --> 58:43.723 in a high-pressure, high-temperature environment. 58:44.737 --> 58:45.730 - [Admiral Hogg] We already have those now. 58:45.730 --> 58:48.660 - We are indeed, and so I was gonna talk about that. 58:48.660 --> 58:50.260 So we are moving out in that, 58:50.260 --> 58:51.890 and that gives us great promise, 58:51.890 --> 58:54.330 because then we can think about 58:54.330 --> 58:56.130 what we don't have to have in the stock bin 58:56.130 --> 58:58.413 because we can then just make it. 58:58.413 --> 59:01.603 It's really kinda the ultimate example of on-time delivery. 59:02.580 --> 59:04.560 And so the way I would attack that 59:04.560 --> 59:06.280 is to continue the research and development 59:06.280 --> 59:10.310 that'll allow us to get to the more durable components, 59:10.310 --> 59:12.500 but look at all of the low-hanging fruit 59:12.500 --> 59:14.683 that we can go after now that we can print, 59:16.106 --> 59:20.110 and thus save room in the store room down below. 59:20.110 --> 59:22.590 It's a little bit like getting to directed energy, 59:22.590 --> 59:26.260 where every drop of fuel is a weapon 59:26.260 --> 59:27.630 that ultimately that comes out the end. 59:27.630 --> 59:30.580 So that's the great promise, and it's more than just 59:30.580 --> 59:32.600 what goes on ships or airplanes. 59:32.600 --> 59:36.870 So the team in NECC, Brian Brakke and his team, 59:36.870 --> 59:41.870 are doing additive manufacturing with concrete, 59:42.760 --> 59:44.400 and their ability to, they're up to 59:44.400 --> 59:46.800 about a nine-by-nine square building 59:46.800 --> 59:48.207 that they have a machine that has the plans in it, 59:48.207 --> 59:49.040 and it goes out 59:49.040 --> 59:51.070 and it builds a nine-by-nine square building. 59:51.070 --> 59:52.800 So you can imagine what that would bring 59:52.800 --> 59:54.770 to our expeditionary forces, 59:54.770 --> 59:57.200 given that they are such critical enablers 59:57.200 --> 59:58.530 of what we do around the world, 59:58.530 --> 01:00:02.280 you can imagine what that brings to the fight as well. 01:00:02.280 --> 01:00:04.530 So great promise across the board there, 01:00:04.530 --> 01:00:06.570 there's some challenges I think we need to make, 01:00:06.570 --> 01:00:11.070 and it's not just in small or shipboard airborne parts, 01:00:11.070 --> 01:00:12.220 it's in other things too. 01:00:12.220 --> 01:00:13.053 So, thanks. 01:00:13.053 --> 01:00:14.440 Yes, ma'am. 01:00:14.440 --> 01:00:15.830 - [Mallory] Hi, sir, thank you for being here. 01:00:15.830 --> 01:00:17.780 Mallory Shelbourne with Inside Defense. 01:00:19.390 --> 01:00:21.540 You mentioned the reactivation of Second Fleet, 01:00:21.540 --> 01:00:24.590 and also generally the importance of presence, 01:00:24.590 --> 01:00:27.070 and I'm wondering if you could talk more 01:00:27.070 --> 01:00:29.340 with those two things in mind 01:00:29.340 --> 01:00:32.860 what this means for the US strategy in the Arctic, 01:00:32.860 --> 01:00:35.010 especially in light of the emphasis now 01:00:35.010 --> 01:00:38.060 on great power competition with Russia and China. 01:00:38.060 --> 01:00:39.363 - Thanks for the question. 01:00:40.330 --> 01:00:43.887 Yeah, I mentioned the standup of Second Fleet, 01:00:43.887 --> 01:00:46.450 and that is a direct response 01:00:46.450 --> 01:00:48.523 to the return of great power competition. 01:00:49.470 --> 01:00:53.150 We have recognized that the environment has changed 01:00:53.150 --> 01:00:55.980 so significantly given the return of great power competition 01:00:55.980 --> 01:00:58.660 that what Second Fleet brought to us in the past 01:00:58.660 --> 01:01:00.110 is what we need to have now. 01:01:00.110 --> 01:01:01.783 And I would tell you too, 01:01:02.790 --> 01:01:04.730 that the most important part of this 01:01:04.730 --> 01:01:09.700 is that it's the Second Fleet of about 2003 and back. 01:01:09.700 --> 01:01:11.677 So when we went back, whenever Lewis went back and said, 01:01:11.677 --> 01:01:13.470 "Okay, we need to talk to all the graybeards," 01:01:13.470 --> 01:01:15.557 and said, "Okay, tell me how Second Fleet worked for you, 01:01:15.557 --> 01:01:17.460 "and what was important for you." 01:01:17.460 --> 01:01:19.810 The epiphany that he and I had was, 01:01:19.810 --> 01:01:23.110 the great work that happened after we stood down, 01:01:23.110 --> 01:01:25.370 just before we stood down Second Fleet 01:01:25.370 --> 01:01:28.383 with fantastic Americans like Mel Wilson or Dan Holloway, 01:01:29.641 --> 01:01:32.410 it was different than the work that Cutler Dawson was doing 01:01:32.410 --> 01:01:34.280 as the Second Fleet commander. 01:01:34.280 --> 01:01:36.220 And the significant difference 01:01:36.220 --> 01:01:39.630 was their warfighting emphasis, 01:01:39.630 --> 01:01:42.460 because we were still kind of in a great power competition, 01:01:42.460 --> 01:01:45.740 so the model that we looked at was to steal all the, 01:01:45.740 --> 01:01:47.840 or take all the good things from that intermediate period, 01:01:47.840 --> 01:01:50.920 but to go back to the era when Second Fleet 01:01:50.920 --> 01:01:54.350 was also Strike Fleet Atlantic. 01:01:54.350 --> 01:01:56.870 And that's the model that we have gone back to 01:01:56.870 --> 01:02:00.930 as an expression of how important Second Fleet is 01:02:00.930 --> 01:02:03.700 to this response to great power competition. 01:02:03.700 --> 01:02:06.160 And so lo and behold, the Second Fleet commander 01:02:06.160 --> 01:02:11.140 will also be dual-hatted as Joint Forces Commander Norfolk. 01:02:11.140 --> 01:02:11.973 The 01:02:13.110 --> 01:02:14.880 equal, 01:02:14.880 --> 01:02:16.140 I guess three and four stars aren't equal, 01:02:16.140 --> 01:02:18.990 but the equal to Admiral Foggo 01:02:18.990 --> 01:02:21.530 as Joint Forces Command Norfolk, his NATO hat, 01:02:21.530 --> 01:02:24.413 and then Joint Forces Command Brunssum, 01:02:25.310 --> 01:02:29.390 which I think is critical to the strength of the alliance. 01:02:29.390 --> 01:02:33.630 So that's a direct response to great power competition, 01:02:33.630 --> 01:02:36.403 and why Second Fleet is so important. 01:02:37.400 --> 01:02:39.440 I think another big takeaway in that 01:02:39.440 --> 01:02:41.380 is that Second Fleet's mission 01:02:41.380 --> 01:02:43.140 could very well be over there. 01:02:43.140 --> 01:02:44.930 So I talked about defending far forward 01:02:44.930 --> 01:02:46.110 and you could see Second Fleet 01:02:46.110 --> 01:02:50.300 as the maneuver arm for Admiral Foggo with his US hat on, 01:02:50.300 --> 01:02:52.290 and then at some point switching his ball cap around 01:02:52.290 --> 01:02:55.160 to be Joint Forces Command Norfolk. 01:02:55.160 --> 01:02:59.770 Or similarly, he could work for me as Nav North, 01:02:59.770 --> 01:03:01.350 depending on the threats to the homeland, 01:03:01.350 --> 01:03:02.610 and I am a firm believer 01:03:02.610 --> 01:03:04.670 that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary 01:03:04.670 --> 01:03:06.370 and that the oceans are no longer moats, 01:03:06.370 --> 01:03:08.050 and that the standup of Second Fleet 01:03:08.050 --> 01:03:10.820 in response to the great power competition 01:03:10.820 --> 01:03:15.820 gives Nav North that maneuver arm to defend the homeland. 01:03:16.520 --> 01:03:19.880 The threats can be named Maria and Florence 01:03:19.880 --> 01:03:22.253 or they can be named Vladimir too, right? 01:03:23.361 --> 01:03:25.530 So the ability then of Second Fleet to be this maneuver arm 01:03:25.530 --> 01:03:27.710 where the lines in the ocean mean nothing, 01:03:27.710 --> 01:03:30.390 they really don't, they will be able to go forward, 01:03:30.390 --> 01:03:32.490 and that's what navies do, the inherent mobility 01:03:32.490 --> 01:03:35.600 and flexibility of naval forces allow Second Fleet 01:03:36.640 --> 01:03:38.340 to go where and when we need them, 01:03:38.340 --> 01:03:39.830 whether it's working for Admiral Foggo, 01:03:39.830 --> 01:03:42.910 working side by side with Admiral Franchetti, 01:03:42.910 --> 01:03:45.350 or with our allies with the JFC Norfolk hat on, 01:03:45.350 --> 01:03:46.790 or retrograding back here 01:03:46.790 --> 01:03:50.080 to support the defense of the homeland. 01:03:50.080 --> 01:03:52.390 So a very significant development, 01:03:52.390 --> 01:03:54.170 we've got the right person in charge, 01:03:54.170 --> 01:03:55.740 and the trajectory is really good 01:03:55.740 --> 01:03:58.390 as we look forward to them running BALTOPS this year. 01:03:59.320 --> 01:04:00.153 Thanks. 01:04:05.853 --> 01:04:06.686 - [Hank] Do you have time for a few more, Admiral? 01:04:06.686 --> 01:04:07.519 - Sure. 01:04:07.519 --> 01:04:08.451 - [Hank] Good. 01:04:08.451 --> 01:04:09.284 Yes, sir. 01:04:09.284 --> 01:04:11.640 - [Man] Is there a mismatch between ends, ways, and means 01:04:11.640 --> 01:04:16.410 with respect to DMO Design 2.0 and the maritime strategy 01:04:16.410 --> 01:04:18.490 when looking at current budget reality 01:04:18.490 --> 01:04:20.940 and our increasing national debt challenges? 01:04:20.940 --> 01:04:22.969 - I don't think there's a mismatch, 01:04:22.969 --> 01:04:24.269 I think there's a tension, 01:04:25.286 --> 01:04:27.440 and I think it's a healthy tension. 01:04:27.440 --> 01:04:31.300 It does kinda get down to the discussion that I had 01:04:31.300 --> 01:04:32.830 about building the Navy the nation needs 01:04:32.830 --> 01:04:34.800 and fighting with the Navy the nation has. 01:04:34.800 --> 01:04:37.750 There's always that constructive tension 01:04:39.520 --> 01:04:41.440 between kinda how the Pentagon looks at things 01:04:41.440 --> 01:04:44.030 as they look to modernize and build that Navy, 01:04:44.030 --> 01:04:45.670 and how the fleet looks to provide 01:04:45.670 --> 01:04:46.780 the demand signal for that, 01:04:46.780 --> 01:04:48.190 but yet knowing they have to fight with it. 01:04:48.190 --> 01:04:50.410 So I don't think there's a mismatch, 01:04:50.410 --> 01:04:51.850 I just think there's tension, 01:04:51.850 --> 01:04:56.693 and so trying to achieve that balance is my job. 01:04:59.120 --> 01:05:01.820 The key takeaway for you in this though, 01:05:01.820 --> 01:05:05.263 is that while we have that tension, 01:05:06.130 --> 01:05:09.290 we have a One Fight, One Navy perspective 01:05:10.160 --> 01:05:11.870 that helps us with that tension, 01:05:11.870 --> 01:05:14.720 such that the voice of the fleet that comes forward 01:05:14.720 --> 01:05:18.090 is fully coordinated across Fleet Forces Command, 01:05:18.090 --> 01:05:21.200 across Pac Fleet and across CNE-CNA. 01:05:21.200 --> 01:05:23.160 So it's One Fight, One Navy. 01:05:23.160 --> 01:05:26.790 It's one fight because it's a single standard 01:05:26.790 --> 01:05:30.930 of readiness and policy and how we do the business, 01:05:30.930 --> 01:05:35.483 and it's one Navy because it's a global fight. 01:05:37.010 --> 01:05:38.150 At any rate, that tension is there, 01:05:38.150 --> 01:05:39.960 I think it's a constructive tension. 01:05:39.960 --> 01:05:42.940 It's a balance though, and I don't think it's a mismatch, 01:05:42.940 --> 01:05:45.233 it's just one that we have to continually work through. 01:05:49.890 --> 01:05:51.780 Okay, got one more? 01:05:51.780 --> 01:05:52.613 Okay. 01:05:54.590 --> 01:05:55.423 Well, he's got one. 01:05:55.423 --> 01:05:56.563 Let's leave it in. 01:05:57.470 --> 01:06:00.110 - [Man] Admiral, can you talk about the logistic challenges 01:06:00.110 --> 01:06:02.890 of the DMO, and what are we doing 01:06:02.890 --> 01:06:04.453 to actively work that problem? 01:06:05.460 --> 01:06:08.421 - So now that DMO is on the street, the hard work begins, 01:06:08.421 --> 01:06:11.910 and that is operationalizing that. 01:06:11.910 --> 01:06:16.600 And so combat logistics will be absolutely critical 01:06:16.600 --> 01:06:17.780 to how we think about it. 01:06:17.780 --> 01:06:19.560 Can we, let me see if I can get it, 01:06:19.560 --> 01:06:24.560 can we rearm, reman, revive, resupply? 01:06:24.710 --> 01:06:25.850 Think I got them. 01:06:25.850 --> 01:06:30.373 Can we do all of that in a distributed nature? 01:06:31.300 --> 01:06:32.563 Absolutely critical, 01:06:33.650 --> 01:06:34.650 so we have to rethink 01:06:34.650 --> 01:06:38.590 how we logistically support distribution. 01:06:38.590 --> 01:06:41.290 We're making great strides in that, and in fact, 01:06:41.290 --> 01:06:44.180 every time that we work in areas 01:06:44.180 --> 01:06:45.340 that we're not used to working, 01:06:45.340 --> 01:06:46.750 we start to advance that cause. 01:06:46.750 --> 01:06:47.920 So Gene Black would tell you 01:06:47.920 --> 01:06:50.000 as he was up in the High North there 01:06:51.100 --> 01:06:52.810 working with Admiral Franchetti, 01:06:52.810 --> 01:06:54.520 there are things that have to be done 01:06:54.520 --> 01:06:57.130 to set the theater to support DMO, 01:06:57.130 --> 01:06:58.680 and that's kinda the global piece of it. 01:06:58.680 --> 01:07:00.490 So how do we think about setting the theater 01:07:00.490 --> 01:07:02.870 from a logistics perspective to do all the rearm, 01:07:02.870 --> 01:07:05.863 resupply, revive, reman that we talk, repair, 01:07:06.855 --> 01:07:07.905 that we talked about? 01:07:08.770 --> 01:07:12.550 And this is work that certainly needs to be done, 01:07:12.550 --> 01:07:13.970 and I would tell you that it also pertains 01:07:13.970 --> 01:07:15.700 to the defense of the homeland as well, 01:07:15.700 --> 01:07:19.790 but significant challenges there. 01:07:19.790 --> 01:07:22.139 We're gonna need really good people 01:07:22.139 --> 01:07:25.230 to put their minds to this, 01:07:25.230 --> 01:07:27.890 and it will have both an acquisition piece to it. 01:07:27.890 --> 01:07:30.010 Do we have the right kit that we have to move it? 01:07:30.010 --> 01:07:32.060 It will have a tactics, techniques, and procedures, 01:07:32.060 --> 01:07:34.730 if you will, in how we we execute that. 01:07:34.730 --> 01:07:36.940 We'll have to think about our contracting strategy. 01:07:36.940 --> 01:07:41.940 So is it a good idea that we rely on contractors 01:07:44.846 --> 01:07:46.530 when the war is on? 01:07:46.530 --> 01:07:48.830 Will those contracting relationships be there? 01:07:50.640 --> 01:07:53.610 How much of our logistics capability do we have 01:07:53.610 --> 01:07:56.550 that rides on secure networks? 01:07:56.550 --> 01:07:58.290 We've got to get our logistics capability 01:07:58.290 --> 01:07:59.550 on secure networks. 01:07:59.550 --> 01:08:01.500 So there's a lot of work to be done there. 01:08:01.500 --> 01:08:03.490 It's not insurmountable, it's just a lot, 01:08:03.490 --> 01:08:05.690 and we have to get after it, 01:08:05.690 --> 01:08:07.060 and I'm excited that we'll be able to do it. 01:08:07.060 --> 01:08:08.600 Sir. 01:08:08.600 --> 01:08:10.740 - [Otto] Otto Kreischer, Seapower Magazine. 01:08:10.740 --> 01:08:12.770 Turning to great power competition, 01:08:12.770 --> 01:08:16.550 some people are thinking that we may need to go back 01:08:16.550 --> 01:08:19.590 before the Cold War to World War II, 01:08:19.590 --> 01:08:21.590 the need to escort our supply ships. 01:08:21.590 --> 01:08:25.320 You talk about logistics, we've gotta get things overseas, 01:08:25.320 --> 01:08:28.270 particularly the expeditionary forces and that sorta thing. 01:08:30.140 --> 01:08:35.140 We need to train and be prepared to escort our supply ships 01:08:35.140 --> 01:08:37.910 against anti-submarine and ballistic missiles, 01:08:37.910 --> 01:08:39.760 and the rest of the things that could interfere 01:08:39.760 --> 01:08:42.493 with our ability to sustain the force overseas. 01:08:43.980 --> 01:08:47.000 - So how do you get the gear from the rear, right? 01:08:47.000 --> 01:08:48.610 I mean, how do you move it across? 01:08:48.610 --> 01:08:50.910 And so that'll be a big part 01:08:50.910 --> 01:08:52.650 of the challenge that we face. 01:08:52.650 --> 01:08:54.370 So back to Admiral Hogg's question, 01:08:54.370 --> 01:08:56.360 this is one of the seminal questions 01:08:56.360 --> 01:08:58.550 that NWDC is working on. 01:08:58.550 --> 01:09:00.520 I would tell you though, that some of the wargaming suggests 01:09:00.520 --> 01:09:02.820 that it isn't a convoy that's the right answer. 01:09:02.820 --> 01:09:05.630 It's distributing the big decks that go across. 01:09:05.630 --> 01:09:08.610 So there's probably not one single model to that, 01:09:08.610 --> 01:09:12.680 but that there are several which could include 01:09:12.680 --> 01:09:17.680 what is pushed forward from kind of a presence perspective. 01:09:17.690 --> 01:09:19.913 So if you do believe, though, 01:09:21.020 --> 01:09:22.820 I believe we have sea control now, 01:09:22.820 --> 01:09:25.170 but that sea control is not guaranteed, 01:09:25.170 --> 01:09:27.300 then part of the sea control mission will be 01:09:27.300 --> 01:09:31.400 how do you support and move the gear from the rear? 01:09:31.400 --> 01:09:33.860 So JFC Norfolk then, back to Second Fleet, 01:09:33.860 --> 01:09:35.880 one of their first evolutions, 01:09:35.880 --> 01:09:40.830 exercises with their NATO hat on, might be a convoy exercise 01:09:40.830 --> 01:09:44.120 from the East Coast to the West Coast, 01:09:44.120 --> 01:09:45.980 and that's already kinda in the offing. 01:09:45.980 --> 01:09:47.380 So I think there's great recognition 01:09:47.380 --> 01:09:50.893 that this is part of the challenge. 01:09:52.000 --> 01:09:55.150 Do we go all the way back where our default answer is 01:09:55.150 --> 01:09:56.880 just a convoy op and ring of steel? 01:09:56.880 --> 01:09:59.550 Maybe not, but that could be an option. 01:09:59.550 --> 01:10:01.983 And key to that, though, 01:10:02.970 --> 01:10:06.240 is the great work that the Military Sealift Command is doing 01:10:06.240 --> 01:10:10.940 under Admiral Dee Mewbourne as he operationalizes his fleet 01:10:10.940 --> 01:10:13.270 in response to great power competition. 01:10:13.270 --> 01:10:15.790 The ability of his mariners to plug in 01:10:15.790 --> 01:10:17.973 with whomever it is that's protecting them, 01:10:20.140 --> 01:10:22.570 and beyond just the unclassified level, 01:10:22.570 --> 01:10:26.750 their own warfighting ethos that will help integrate 01:10:27.800 --> 01:10:30.150 under a Distributed Maritime Operation concept 01:10:30.150 --> 01:10:32.210 with those forces that are gonna take them over there, 01:10:32.210 --> 01:10:33.900 he is doing remarkable things 01:10:33.900 --> 01:10:35.790 at the Military Sealift Command, 01:10:35.790 --> 01:10:38.770 and that trajectory must continue 01:10:38.770 --> 01:10:40.290 if we're gonna win that fight. 01:10:40.290 --> 01:10:41.640 So thanks for the question. 01:10:45.070 --> 01:10:45.903 Okay. 01:10:49.290 --> 01:10:50.620 All right, I think... 01:10:50.620 --> 01:10:55.620 - Really, really great-- (audience applauds) 01:10:58.950 --> 01:11:00.440 - Take care. - All right.