WEBVTT 00:01.760 --> 00:03.290 - Good morning ladies, gentleman. 00:03.290 --> 00:05.403 My name is Sergeant Major Jason Wilson. 00:05.700 --> 00:09.170 I am currently the Senior Army Enlisted Representative 00:09.170 --> 00:11.450 for the Close Combat Lethality Task Force. 00:11.450 --> 00:12.830 I've been a member of the Task Force 00:12.830 --> 00:14.633 for approximately two months now. 00:15.110 --> 00:17.070 I have served as an Army Infantry 00:17.070 --> 00:19.683 man for just over 23 years. 00:19.730 --> 00:22.280 Most recently, as the Brigade Command Sergeant Major 00:22.280 --> 00:24.180 for the Second Brigade Combat Team, 00:24.180 --> 00:26.653 101st Airborne Division, Air Assault. 00:27.460 --> 00:28.657 The Secretary of Defense established the 00:28.657 --> 00:30.700 Closed Combat Lethality Task Force 00:30.720 --> 00:32.973 on 16 March 2018. 00:33.290 --> 00:35.050 The directive tasking memo from DOD 00:35.440 --> 00:39.070 stated that through the CCLTF, the DOD will 00:39.070 --> 00:43.810 develop, evaluate, recommend, and implement improvements to 00:43.810 --> 00:46.950 US Squad Infantry Combat formations in order to 00:46.950 --> 00:49.409 achieve overmatch against pacing threats 00:49.409 --> 00:53.563 and strengthen our combat lethality, survivability, 00:53.600 --> 00:57.423 resilience, and readiness of our close combat squads. 00:57.930 --> 01:00.530 The focus of the Task Force is on squad level 01:00.530 --> 01:03.570 infantry in the Army, US Marine Corps, 01:03.570 --> 01:06.083 and United States Army Special Operations Command. 01:06.500 --> 01:09.283 We see ourselves doing this through five methods. 01:09.600 --> 01:12.420 Number one: Accelerate promising service 01:12.420 --> 01:14.293 level close combat initiatives. 01:14.630 --> 01:19.163 Number two: Develop integrated solutions to capability gaps. 01:19.750 --> 01:23.340 Number three: Federate desperate R&D efforts 01:23.420 --> 01:26.920 into the departmental close combat community of practice, 01:26.920 --> 01:30.033 and accelerate innovation and implementation. 01:30.280 --> 01:32.540 Number four: Evaluate solutions 01:32.540 --> 01:35.803 across the DOTMLPF P spectrum. 01:35.950 --> 01:39.640 Number five: Prioritize analysis in a manner 01:39.640 --> 01:42.020 minimizing delays in the fielding of 01:42.020 --> 01:45.453 the most promising approaches and solutions. 01:46.338 --> 01:49.030 The Close Combat Lethality Task Force was established 01:49.030 --> 01:51.380 within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 01:51.380 --> 01:54.240 for Personnel and Readiness, and is currently staffed 01:54.240 --> 01:56.343 with personnel from across the department, 01:56.700 --> 01:59.254 joint staff, and the services working in direct 01:59.254 --> 02:02.143 support of our Task Force Director. 02:02.889 --> 02:05.230 The Close Combat Lethality Task Force 02:05.230 --> 02:08.060 is charged with ensuring US Squad Level Infantry 02:08.300 --> 02:11.070 and select special operations combat formations 02:11.070 --> 02:15.263 achieve overmatch in close combat against pacing threats. 02:15.680 --> 02:17.890 Close combat is an environment characterized 02:17.890 --> 02:20.290 by extreme violence within line of sight 02:20.460 --> 02:23.010 of the enemy, where historically, the vast majority 02:23.010 --> 02:26.410 of military combat casualties occur. 02:26.410 --> 02:28.043 Approximately 90%. 02:28.660 --> 02:33.163 The CCLTF is pursuing promising leads in manpower policy, 02:33.570 --> 02:37.117 focusing on recruiting, developing, and retaining 02:37.117 --> 02:40.330 the individuals with the requisite cognitive capacity, 02:40.330 --> 02:42.900 skills, and trades to excel 02:42.900 --> 02:44.600 within a close combat environment. 02:45.140 --> 02:47.460 We are currently leveraging multiple programs 02:47.460 --> 02:51.920 to identify those attributes best suited for 02:51.920 --> 02:54.560 Infantry Soldiers, which can assist early on 02:54.560 --> 02:57.230 in decision making and selecting the ideal 02:57.433 --> 03:00.933 candidates for our close combat soldiers. 03:01.230 --> 03:05.650 Training: live virtual, constructive and synthetic 03:05.650 --> 03:08.340 capabilities, which will revolutionize the way 03:08.340 --> 03:12.340 soldiers see, process, and understand the battle space 03:12.490 --> 03:14.833 above and beyond what they have now. 03:15.240 --> 03:17.790 In addition to providing soldiers an unparalleled 03:17.790 --> 03:19.353 advantage on the battle field, 03:19.380 --> 03:21.510 it also provides the ability to incorporate 03:21.510 --> 03:23.303 the synthetic training environment, 03:23.380 --> 03:25.610 improving their ability to conduct training 03:25.840 --> 03:28.860 and high fidelity, on the ground rehearsals 03:28.970 --> 03:30.223 no matter where they are. 03:31.090 --> 03:32.803 Human performance initiatives: 03:32.930 --> 03:35.863 Physical, cognitive, and moral aspects. 03:35.930 --> 03:39.350 The CCLTF is currently seeking to identify 03:39.350 --> 03:44.113 best of breed science and programs that improve screening, 03:44.510 --> 03:47.010 assessment, combat aggressiveness, 03:47.010 --> 03:49.530 situational understanding, and proper 03:49.530 --> 03:52.053 decision making under extreme stress. 03:52.690 --> 03:56.210 Equipping: Improving direct fire weapons, 03:56.210 --> 03:59.710 sensors, situational awareness, communications, 03:59.710 --> 04:02.903 and lightweight protective equipment in the near-term. 04:03.080 --> 04:05.810 As well as identifying new war fighting capabilities 04:05.810 --> 04:09.963 for future investment or existing programs for acceleration. 04:10.270 --> 04:12.640 We will continue to support the exploration 04:12.650 --> 04:15.580 of emerging science and technology efforts 04:15.820 --> 04:18.250 as well as research activities that can 04:18.250 --> 04:20.633 sustain squad overmatch in the future. 04:21.600 --> 04:25.020 To note, the cost assessment and program evaluation 04:25.020 --> 04:28.770 strategic portfolio review resulted in a significant 04:28.770 --> 04:32.220 reprogramming action that has drastically increased 04:32.230 --> 04:34.440 and will continue to increase lethality 04:34.630 --> 04:36.803 across our close combat formations. 04:37.290 --> 04:40.113 We as a task force work off a three phase model. 04:40.180 --> 04:45.170 Phase one: Exploration, fact finding, and problem framing 04:45.170 --> 04:47.383 to identify feasible solutions. 04:48.000 --> 04:49.793 It's an ongoing process. 04:50.090 --> 04:53.420 Phase two: Bringing the most promising solutions 04:53.420 --> 04:56.413 to the Secretary of Defense for guidance and decision. 04:56.810 --> 04:58.960 It started in April and will continue 04:58.960 --> 05:01.393 on for the foreseeable future. 05:02.160 --> 05:05.120 Phase three: Transitioning the Secretary of Defense's 05:05.120 --> 05:07.930 guidance and decisions to the services 05:07.930 --> 05:10.500 and United States Army Special Operations Command 05:10.720 --> 05:14.463 in order to deliver solutions to close combat forces. 05:14.670 --> 05:16.453 Again, an ongoing process. 05:18.290 --> 05:20.510 Over the past few months, we have focused our 05:20.510 --> 05:22.810 efforts on external engagements to understand 05:22.810 --> 05:25.810 industry advances and more fighter equipment 05:25.810 --> 05:28.040 and best practices in respects to 05:28.040 --> 05:31.430 training and doctrine in both US Forces 05:31.430 --> 05:33.923 and our NATO allied military partners. 05:34.180 --> 05:36.280 This has provided the task force the tools 05:36.430 --> 05:38.100 to assist in meeting the first tenet 05:38.100 --> 05:39.720 of our three phase model: 05:39.720 --> 05:43.263 Shaping the problem and identifying the feasible solutions. 05:44.200 --> 05:46.510 Recently, we visited Israel, where the team gained 05:46.510 --> 05:49.010 an appreciation and a different perspective 05:49.010 --> 05:53.013 in the field on leader development, equipment, and policies, 05:53.100 --> 05:54.570 which will potentially enhance our 05:54.570 --> 05:56.593 close combat lethality in the future. 05:57.340 --> 05:59.170 Three weeks ago, we spent a few days 05:59.170 --> 06:01.350 at 29 Palms, California observing 06:01.350 --> 06:04.300 the Squad X experimentation, which showcased some 06:04.300 --> 06:06.430 distinct sensing capabilities designed to be 06:06.430 --> 06:08.593 organic to the close combat formation. 06:08.770 --> 06:10.820 These capabilities are directly linked to the 06:10.820 --> 06:14.980 find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze, 06:14.980 --> 06:17.050 which are designed to allow our close combat 06:17.050 --> 06:20.113 formations to dominate the operational environment. 06:20.760 --> 06:23.293 Finally, we spent time at Fort Benning, Georgia, 06:23.420 --> 06:25.517 visiting the Office of the Chief of Infantry 06:25.517 --> 06:27.270 and the Maneuver Center of Excellence 06:27.270 --> 06:29.370 to better understand enhancements in the 06:29.370 --> 06:32.100 Infantry and Maneuver Tactics currently 06:32.100 --> 06:33.883 being used to train our force. 06:34.360 --> 06:36.770 While there, we took the opportunity to sit down 06:36.770 --> 06:39.000 with leaders of the 75th Ranger Regiment 06:39.370 --> 06:41.650 and to gain and appreciation for the models 06:41.650 --> 06:45.253 they use for selecting their current soldiers. 06:46.010 --> 06:48.430 As it more closely resembles the problem set 06:48.430 --> 06:50.620 that we as the Army face as well 06:50.620 --> 06:52.300 as the United States Marine Corps. 06:52.300 --> 06:53.960 The feedback we received will likely 06:53.960 --> 06:55.573 generate future discussion. 06:56.910 --> 06:59.670 These visits are indicative of how we are operating 06:59.670 --> 07:02.363 and building out the framework of this problem. 07:02.580 --> 07:05.540 Taking lethality and survivability concepts from 07:05.540 --> 07:07.910 various units and looking to apply 07:07.910 --> 07:10.263 them to the conventional infantry forces. 07:10.690 --> 07:12.740 To do that, we must get out in the field 07:12.750 --> 07:15.310 and observe the latest in lethality research 07:15.370 --> 07:18.023 and it's application on today's modern battlefield. 07:18.180 --> 07:21.330 Lastly, we must ensure that any implication is nested 07:21.330 --> 07:23.810 with the needs of the Force and truly enhances 07:23.810 --> 07:26.430 squad lethality that is measurable 07:26.430 --> 07:29.253 and provides overmatch against our adversaries. 07:29.750 --> 07:32.200 The Close Combat Lethality Task Force will continue 07:32.200 --> 07:34.910 to analyze and provide focused recommendations 07:35.020 --> 07:37.960 on Military department and Military service efforts 07:37.960 --> 07:41.270 to achieve overmatch to ensure infantry squads 07:41.270 --> 07:43.683 always have the advantage in a fight through 07:43.683 --> 07:47.283 advanced training, manning, and equipping. 07:47.830 --> 07:51.210 Ensuring mission accomplishment and victory 07:51.210 --> 07:54.323 on any battlefield at any time. 07:54.920 --> 07:56.460 Ladies and gentlemen, I hope this 07:56.460 --> 07:58.647 brief overview provided some insight on 07:58.647 --> 08:01.343 the Close Combat Lethality Task Force. 08:01.360 --> 08:03.283 At this time, is there any questions? 08:03.830 --> 08:04.663 Yes sir. 08:05.580 --> 08:06.413 - Hi, thank you. 08:07.100 --> 08:08.830 Damon Roth with the Washington Post. 08:08.830 --> 08:10.960 I wanted to drill down a bit on the recommendation 08:10.960 --> 08:14.610 piece and, I guess, whatever has been implemented so far 08:14.610 --> 08:16.660 following any recommendations that have been made. 08:16.660 --> 08:18.290 Can you give an example of the things that you've 08:18.290 --> 08:19.995 already recommended as a Task Force 08:19.995 --> 08:21.323 and what that has yielded? 08:22.490 --> 08:24.340 - Yes sir, some of the things that, 08:24.340 --> 08:26.060 you know, we have a task force. 08:26.060 --> 08:28.750 I won't speak on specifics right now 08:28.750 --> 08:30.567 because a lot of things that we have 08:30.580 --> 08:33.743 made recommendations on are still in the works. 08:35.140 --> 08:37.740 Right now, we're looking at a lot of the 08:37.740 --> 08:40.083 synthetic training environment, 08:40.490 --> 08:42.893 and you can see a lot of the stuff. 08:43.610 --> 08:45.000 It's out there. 08:45.000 --> 08:47.460 You can do research on the internet and 08:47.460 --> 08:49.040 find a lot of the stuff that we are, 08:49.040 --> 08:51.023 that we're currently focusing on. 08:51.240 --> 08:53.310 But, a lot of our efforts is with the synthetic 08:53.310 --> 08:56.130 training environment, which can allow 08:56.410 --> 08:59.993 our soldiers to fight the terrain, 09:00.440 --> 09:03.887 fight the enemy, and go into the.. 09:03.910 --> 09:05.660 As the Secretary of Defense stated, 09:05.660 --> 09:09.720 fight the 25 bloodless battles before their first contact 09:09.880 --> 09:12.616 wherever their located, whether that's in their 09:12.616 --> 09:16.003 company operating facilities, back on their installations, 09:16.090 --> 09:17.890 or their fully deployed down range. 09:17.890 --> 09:20.120 That's one of the big ones that we're 09:20.120 --> 09:21.533 focusing on right now sir. 09:21.930 --> 09:23.740 - Okay, alright, if I could follow up. 09:23.740 --> 09:25.880 I recall a General Mattis being very interested 09:25.880 --> 09:29.640 in looking at the size of small caliber ammunition, 09:29.640 --> 09:32.330 whether it was sufficient 556 versus going up 09:32.330 --> 09:34.293 to a 6.8 or something like that. 09:34.390 --> 09:37.193 Is that something that you as a group have considered? 09:37.700 --> 09:39.940 - Yes sir, we have... 09:40.640 --> 09:45.640 We are looking at weapons, different types of munitions, 09:46.460 --> 09:48.900 larger caliber, lighter weight munitions, 09:48.900 --> 09:50.710 but all that is still... 09:51.470 --> 09:55.423 I'm not able to talk about right now sir. 09:55.500 --> 09:57.233 - Matthew Cox from military.com. 09:57.550 --> 10:01.400 You had mentioned an effort to do recruit 10:01.400 --> 10:05.320 and develop and retain individuals that 10:05.320 --> 10:08.113 are suited for close combat operations. 10:08.230 --> 10:11.170 Could you talk about what you've learned so far 10:11.170 --> 10:13.080 or what you're looking at as far as screening 10:13.080 --> 10:17.270 process for young recruits coming in. 10:17.270 --> 10:19.610 I mean, how do you tell who's suited 10:19.610 --> 10:21.533 for close combat and who isn't? 10:22.580 --> 10:26.300 - Well sir, as I stated earlier, I have been 10:26.300 --> 10:29.630 an Infantry man for over 23 years, 10:29.630 --> 10:33.980 and, you know, deployed multiple times, you know, 10:33.980 --> 10:37.250 in support of, you know, in support of, you know, 10:37.250 --> 10:40.150 forces and our Infantry soldiers, 10:40.150 --> 10:45.150 it is a tough job for anybody to be able to, as you know, 10:48.230 --> 10:51.853 primary purpose to close with and destroy the enemy. 10:52.130 --> 10:54.613 That is our purpose. 10:55.070 --> 10:57.000 So some of the things that, you know, 10:57.000 --> 11:01.310 that we're looking at sir are the ability to 11:01.310 --> 11:05.260 not only come in, take your ASVAB in high school, 11:05.260 --> 11:07.053 and join the Infantry. 11:07.690 --> 11:11.950 We are looking to get the Infantry to where it is 11:13.152 --> 11:16.690 not a place where we send soldiers that don't 11:16.690 --> 11:19.053 have the mental capacity to do other jobs. 11:19.650 --> 11:23.280 We want the Infantry to get away from... 11:23.290 --> 11:25.140 Not saying that everybody in Infantry is bad, 11:25.140 --> 11:27.770 but we want to get away from our close combat forces 11:30.360 --> 11:32.380 being the place where soldiers that don't 11:32.380 --> 11:35.270 meet the requisite criteria to be an Intel Analyst 11:35.270 --> 11:37.403 or whatever gets sent to sir. 11:38.089 --> 11:41.630 We want to be able to get those soldiers identified 11:41.630 --> 11:45.140 early to find out, do you have the leadership 11:45.550 --> 11:48.980 potential to be in the Infantry? 11:48.980 --> 11:52.210 Do you have the mental stability to be able 11:52.210 --> 11:55.350 to be in the Infantry and do they have the 11:55.350 --> 12:00.350 resilience and the mental capacity to be able to 12:01.018 --> 12:03.180 handle some of the things that they may 12:03.310 --> 12:05.750 see in the Infantry, be able to overcome that 12:05.750 --> 12:08.003 adversity and bounce back sir. 12:08.150 --> 12:11.070 - So, you mentioned going to Fort Benning, 12:11.070 --> 12:13.413 visiting with 75th Ranger Regiment. 12:13.840 --> 12:18.053 Are you looking at some of their selection processes? 12:18.780 --> 12:19.980 - We definitely are sir. 12:20.510 --> 12:22.427 We were able to bring some of the things that we 12:22.427 --> 12:24.763 talked to them, you know, back, 12:25.520 --> 12:29.790 briefed the director and some of things that we discussed. 12:29.790 --> 12:31.260 Some of the things that they talked about 12:31.260 --> 12:33.453 are definitely in the future, sir, 12:33.496 --> 12:36.070 going to get pushed forward for recommendations. 12:36.070 --> 12:37.893 - This is just a quick follow up. 12:38.270 --> 12:42.480 Are you referring to RASP and ROPD and those (inaudible)? 12:42.480 --> 12:46.830 - No sir, no, sir we're looking at... 12:47.500 --> 12:50.814 It's one of the things that the Marine Corps 12:50.814 --> 12:54.223 I know is looking at and the Army is looking at. 12:54.970 --> 12:57.850 We're gonna make recommendations is... 12:59.370 --> 13:01.870 Basic training, the Army's already took the initiative 13:01.870 --> 13:05.300 on basic training, extending it from 14 weeks 13:05.300 --> 13:10.300 to 22 weeks and that way soldiers could go to 13:10.720 --> 13:14.650 more ranges, they could get more land navigation training, 13:14.650 --> 13:17.640 they could get more of the training that their gonna need 13:17.640 --> 13:21.090 when they get to their units, versus the units 13:21.090 --> 13:23.470 having to do all of that once 13:23.470 --> 13:25.363 that young soldier arrives sir. 13:27.600 --> 13:28.433 Yes sir. 13:28.870 --> 13:30.560 - [Female Reporter] (inaudible) Inside the Navy. 13:30.560 --> 13:32.210 Are you seeing things that the Marine Corps 13:32.210 --> 13:33.870 needs that are different than the Army? 13:33.870 --> 13:36.870 And if so, can you talk about what some of those things are? 13:40.068 --> 13:44.650 - Right now, ma'am, what we are looking at 13:44.650 --> 13:47.640 is things that can be... 13:47.640 --> 13:49.300 We're looking at things that can be used 13:49.300 --> 13:52.928 for both Marine, Army, and United States Army 13:52.928 --> 13:56.180 Special Operations Command Close Combat Soldiers 13:56.430 --> 13:59.300 as a whole, ma'am, versus what's going to 13:59.300 --> 14:00.730 work for the Army, what's gonna work for 14:00.730 --> 14:01.930 the Marine Corps, ma'am. 14:03.362 --> 14:04.195 Yes sir. 14:05.400 --> 14:08.000 - Sydney Freebird, Breaking Defense, Sergeant Major. 14:08.950 --> 14:10.300 Let me ask, I understand you can't 14:10.300 --> 14:11.433 speak to recommendations and process, 14:11.433 --> 14:13.883 but just from your perspective as someone who has 14:14.020 --> 14:17.003 done this for 23 years and has seen a lot. 14:17.650 --> 14:20.383 As you're out there looking at new concepts, 14:20.610 --> 14:24.433 new ways of choosing people, new tech, new TTP's, 14:25.100 --> 14:26.437 what has struck going, 14:26.437 --> 14:30.263 "Gosh, we could have used that back in OIF or OAF. 14:30.514 --> 14:33.237 "That is a really cool thing that I personally 14:33.237 --> 14:36.340 "think that we get to actually save lives out there."? 14:36.360 --> 14:40.370 - Sir, I would have to go back to the 14:40.400 --> 14:42.093 synthetic training environment. 14:42.530 --> 14:46.940 For us to be able to essentially use the 14:46.940 --> 14:49.890 live, virtual, constructive, and gaming to 14:50.550 --> 14:55.550 provide realistic training for our soldiers. 14:56.230 --> 14:58.483 We just call it, you know, battle-focused training. 14:58.880 --> 15:00.113 Train as you fight. 15:00.510 --> 15:02.430 We can get back to that and we can actually, 15:02.430 --> 15:03.930 as I stated earlier, we can... 15:04.130 --> 15:06.080 There are systems that we're looking at 15:06.100 --> 15:10.023 that can allow the soldiers to train as they will fight, 15:10.220 --> 15:13.240 train where they will fight, and train against 15:13.240 --> 15:17.180 who they will fight while back in the home state's 15:17.180 --> 15:19.300 training environment or forward, which 15:19.300 --> 15:21.923 I think will be a huge win sir. 15:23.020 --> 15:28.020 - Now, let me ask, you and I are not millennials. 15:28.410 --> 15:29.700 We didn't' grow up with the devices 15:29.700 --> 15:31.933 in our hand and the games and so forth. 15:32.280 --> 15:36.040 Is there a generation gap or a culture gap 15:36.040 --> 15:38.500 between the folks like yourself, 15:38.500 --> 15:40.450 who weren't immersed in this digital stuff, 15:40.450 --> 15:41.977 and the folks for whom, you know, 15:41.977 --> 15:44.500 "Sure I have three drones up and I have devices, 15:44.500 --> 15:45.590 and I have a gaming..." 15:45.590 --> 15:47.290 Who might find the hard part being 15:47.300 --> 15:48.900 actually getting out in the mud? 15:51.550 --> 15:52.383 - I don't think, sir. 15:52.383 --> 15:54.250 I don't think you can, no matter how much of this 15:54.250 --> 15:55.830 training that you can do in the 15:55.900 --> 15:58.020 synthetic training environment, you're not gonna 15:58.020 --> 16:01.070 replace a soldier being behind his weapon, 16:01.070 --> 16:03.400 a soldier that is, as you stated sir, 16:03.400 --> 16:05.723 is in the mud training. 16:06.200 --> 16:07.653 That is gonna happen. 16:08.340 --> 16:10.630 There is no doubt it has to happen in order 16:10.970 --> 16:12.720 to effectively prepare our soldiers 16:12.840 --> 16:14.600 to conduct their missions down range. 16:14.600 --> 16:17.740 But, with the things that they can do 16:17.740 --> 16:20.570 before they go out and conduct the training 16:20.690 --> 16:24.030 in a live situation, they can actually 16:24.030 --> 16:27.083 rehearse it through the virtual, sir. 16:29.200 --> 16:30.033 Yes sir. 16:30.120 --> 16:32.933 - Sergeant Major, Jeff Sobel with Task and Purpose. 16:33.710 --> 16:36.210 Is the task force looking at the use, 16:36.210 --> 16:39.080 the increased use of shoot houses so that 16:39.080 --> 16:41.950 soldiers and marines can better learn 16:42.170 --> 16:45.110 to read body language of potential adversaries 16:45.110 --> 16:46.740 to know if they're going for a weapon 16:46.740 --> 16:49.573 or if they're perhaps ready to detonate a suicide vest? 16:50.180 --> 16:53.450 - Sir, we, that is not something that we have 16:53.450 --> 16:55.960 specifically looked at right now. 16:55.960 --> 16:59.573 With what we have been doing in the past, 16:59.800 --> 17:02.863 we did see, when we traveled to Israel, 17:03.030 --> 17:05.230 we did follow the Israeli Defense Forces, 17:05.230 --> 17:06.500 and a little bit of their training and 17:06.500 --> 17:08.563 how they conduct shoot house operations, 17:08.680 --> 17:12.420 but as far as here in this environment, 17:12.420 --> 17:14.563 sir, we have not focused on that. 17:14.590 --> 17:16.750 - Okay, can you talk about what you learned 17:16.750 --> 17:19.260 from the Israelis about how to effectively 17:19.260 --> 17:22.220 combine infantry and armor considering 17:22.220 --> 17:25.133 future adversaries will likely be mechanized. 17:26.160 --> 17:27.503 - We don't (audio skips)... 17:27.720 --> 17:30.550 To fight lethal squads in the future sir. 17:30.550 --> 17:33.050 - Do you expect soldiers to be rotating more through 17:33.050 --> 17:35.350 Fort Erwin and Fort Polk and marines through 17:35.350 --> 17:38.753 29 Palms to get more reps before combat? 17:40.854 --> 17:43.560 - Again sir, that's not something we focused on. 17:43.560 --> 17:47.610 I was a, as my bio states, I was a Task Force Army Major 17:47.610 --> 17:50.480 at GRTC prior to going to Fort Campbell 17:50.480 --> 17:54.480 and I think the reps are going to have to 17:54.480 --> 17:57.210 happen at home station and that's why we're 17:57.210 --> 17:59.430 looking at some of the things they can do 17:59.430 --> 18:01.340 for the home station training environment. 18:01.340 --> 18:06.080 Because, as we all know, Fort Erwin, Fort Polk, 18:06.080 --> 18:11.080 29 Palms, they can only train so many units in a year sir. 18:13.240 --> 18:14.590 There is only so much time. 18:14.882 --> 18:15.715 - [Jeff Sobel] There is no substitute 18:15.715 --> 18:17.501 to being able to blow something up. 18:17.501 --> 18:18.334 - There is sir. 18:18.334 --> 18:20.993 There is not and that's what I stated earlier. 18:21.023 --> 18:24.250 You can't replace getting out and training 18:24.250 --> 18:26.500 and getting in the dirt, but units have 18:26.500 --> 18:28.410 the ability to do that at their 18:28.670 --> 18:31.373 home station, sir, without going to GRTC. 18:32.180 --> 18:33.013 Yes sir. 18:33.013 --> 18:33.846 - Thanks Sergeant Major. 18:33.846 --> 18:35.480 Corey Dickstein with Stars and Stripes. 18:35.480 --> 18:38.970 I've seen in the past a little bit of the synthetic 18:38.970 --> 18:42.380 training environment stuff, but I'm not exactly 18:42.380 --> 18:44.970 certain I understand what all you guys 18:44.970 --> 18:45.803 are kinda looking at. 18:45.803 --> 18:47.710 Could you kind of describe what... 18:47.710 --> 18:51.983 Are we looking at squad level things or platoon level? 18:52.220 --> 18:54.630 Can you give us some examples of what this thing 18:54.670 --> 18:58.230 actually would like that you guys are working on? 18:58.530 --> 19:00.071 - The things that we've looked at, sir, 19:00.071 --> 19:05.071 it's for individuals, but it can tie in to the squad. 19:07.530 --> 19:10.623 It can tie in to the platoon, it can tie in to a company. 19:10.810 --> 19:15.603 It can tie in to all the way up to a BCT, sir. 19:16.760 --> 19:19.800 That's the one that we are currently looking at, 19:19.800 --> 19:21.600 that we're assessing right now, sir. 19:23.930 --> 19:24.763 Yes sir. 19:24.880 --> 19:27.613 - I just wanted to follow up what I asked earlier. 19:27.810 --> 19:31.293 So getting back to recruiting individuals. 19:31.530 --> 19:34.333 So, the Marine Corps, the Army, and Army Special Ops, 19:34.461 --> 19:36.343 they're all trying to get the same, 19:36.580 --> 19:38.440 they're all recruiting from the same pool. 19:38.440 --> 19:40.140 They're all trying to, you know... 19:40.300 --> 19:44.550 So, each service is gonna, or each part is gonna 19:44.650 --> 19:48.010 drill down and the pool is gonna get smaller now 19:48.010 --> 19:50.400 because for individuals for close combat... 19:51.160 --> 19:52.500 Are you all talking about that? 19:52.500 --> 19:54.250 What are some of the things that... 19:55.010 --> 19:56.390 How can you... 19:56.880 --> 19:58.863 Is there any way to make the pool bigger? 19:59.241 --> 20:01.315 How do you solve that problem? 20:01.315 --> 20:03.560 I mean, it doesn't seem like there 20:03.620 --> 20:04.770 is enough to go around. 20:06.500 --> 20:08.870 - That's one of the things that we do discuss, sir. 20:08.870 --> 20:11.470 I don't think there is a way of making the pool bigger. 20:11.470 --> 20:13.240 Especially when it comes to recruitment. 20:13.240 --> 20:17.193 As we start to recruit out of high school and those things. 20:17.520 --> 20:22.263 That's why the retention part is gonna play such a key role. 20:22.370 --> 20:24.633 It's when we get soldiers that, 20:25.062 --> 20:28.620 in the close combat forces, we get those soldiers 20:28.620 --> 20:33.620 trained up, and I said it as a first son of a 20:33.660 --> 20:35.730 Battalion Sergeant Major or Brigade Sergeant Major, 20:35.730 --> 20:38.450 if we get those soldiers, we get them in our formations, 20:38.450 --> 20:40.590 we get them trained up, we need to do 20:40.590 --> 20:43.240 everything we can do to hang on to those soldiers 20:43.462 --> 20:47.260 to help train the new soldiers when 20:47.260 --> 20:49.140 they come in to our formations. 20:49.140 --> 20:50.730 And I think it's gonna be... 20:51.730 --> 20:52.790 Number one, its gonna be better 20:52.790 --> 20:54.420 and it's gonna cheaper in the long run 20:54.420 --> 20:56.010 because you've already invested the time 20:56.010 --> 20:58.943 and the money into these soldiers and leaders. 20:59.380 --> 21:01.260 - Great, right now when you have... 21:02.420 --> 21:04.750 So right now, when you have an individual 21:04.750 --> 21:07.213 that's in an infantry unit, light infantry unit, 21:07.549 --> 21:10.713 or they're a Sergeant and they really excel at it, 21:10.840 --> 21:12.320 maybe more than others as far as 21:12.320 --> 21:15.793 the leadership, the land navigation, everything like that. 21:17.203 --> 21:19.700 A lot of times they just move on to Special Ops. 21:19.700 --> 21:21.500 They don't stay in the conventional. 21:22.508 --> 21:25.030 Are you looking at any kind of bonuses 21:25.710 --> 21:30.710 or putting forward money from Defense Department 21:31.270 --> 21:32.940 to the Army and Marine Corps, you know, 21:32.940 --> 21:35.003 more money for bonuses, things like that? 21:35.120 --> 21:38.730 - Yes sir, we have talked about, you know... 21:38.800 --> 21:41.050 And it's, again, it's putting out feelers 21:41.050 --> 21:42.650 on things that we as a task force... 21:42.650 --> 21:46.820 Because, again, we're still in kind of the shaping 21:46.820 --> 21:49.600 phase of everything, but that is definitely 21:49.600 --> 21:50.690 something we're looking at, sir, 21:50.690 --> 21:54.563 and things that we ask each other on a daily basis. 21:54.850 --> 21:58.530 How do we keep good soldiers and good leaders 21:58.530 --> 22:02.263 in the conventional infantry forces? 22:02.800 --> 22:05.453 And I dealt with it, again, as well. 22:05.530 --> 22:07.780 You know, soldier if you go to Ranger School, 22:08.480 --> 22:10.477 they would come back and be immediately like, 22:10.477 --> 22:13.803 "As soon as I do my 12 months here, I'm going SL. 22:14.617 --> 22:17.427 "I wanna drop a RASP packet and go to Ranger Battalion." 22:17.490 --> 22:21.673 So, then that's where the leadership has to come in, 22:22.410 --> 22:24.240 from the squad level all the way up, 22:24.240 --> 22:27.700 is talking to these kids trying to get them to 22:27.850 --> 22:30.970 stay on board to provide that good leadership 22:31.307 --> 22:34.323 for our close combat and our infantry forces. 22:36.090 --> 22:36.923 Yes ma'am. 22:36.970 --> 22:39.790 - Sergeant Major, just a follow up on my question earlier. 22:39.790 --> 22:42.030 I know you said that you're looking at lethality 22:42.030 --> 22:44.410 across the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Ops, 22:44.410 --> 22:46.120 but can you talk a little bit more about 22:46.120 --> 22:48.829 how the coordination has been with each service 22:48.829 --> 22:50.660 throughout this process and as you 22:50.890 --> 22:53.823 try to both do research and execute on these, 22:54.210 --> 22:55.293 eventually on this? 22:57.150 --> 22:58.920 - You heard earlier the things that I said. 22:58.920 --> 23:00.620 Kind of the outreach that we've done 23:00.620 --> 23:03.680 with going to Israel, going to 29 Palms, 23:03.680 --> 23:05.160 going to Fort Benning and things. 23:05.160 --> 23:07.173 Everything that we do in the task force, 23:07.640 --> 23:12.640 it is a joint task force and so, 23:12.740 --> 23:15.573 when we go somewhere, we don't just, 23:15.640 --> 23:18.980 we don't send the Marines, just the Marines to 29 Palms. 23:18.980 --> 23:21.560 We send a Marine and an Army Contingent. 23:21.560 --> 23:23.000 Same thing when we went to Fort Benning. 23:23.000 --> 23:25.510 We took a Marine Contingent and an Army Contingent, 23:25.510 --> 23:28.850 and that way you're getting both sides while you're there. 23:28.850 --> 23:31.470 Because I think the Army can gain some, 23:31.470 --> 23:34.700 definitely gain some insight from the Marine Corps 23:34.700 --> 23:36.550 and some of the things their looking at 23:36.550 --> 23:39.220 as well as the Marine Corps pulling some of the things 23:39.220 --> 23:41.173 that the Army is looking at, ma'am. 23:42.580 --> 23:43.413 Yes sir. 23:43.760 --> 23:44.640 - Thanks Sergeant Major. 23:44.640 --> 23:46.463 Jim Garamone with DOD News. 23:49.720 --> 23:51.960 The services still have men trained 23:52.120 --> 23:55.140 and equipped for mission, and just sort of to 23:55.970 --> 23:59.393 build on the young lady's question over there, 23:59.814 --> 24:02.170 what sort of reception are you getting 24:02.170 --> 24:04.830 from the leadership of the services 24:06.156 --> 24:10.070 in putting forth these recommendations? 24:10.070 --> 24:13.890 And how confident are you that they may be accepted 24:14.140 --> 24:17.473 and transitioned into it, and just, 24:17.870 --> 24:22.280 since Vietnam, infantry men have been complaining about 24:22.460 --> 24:26.763 the small caliber weapon, the 5.56. 24:27.140 --> 24:30.850 If you made the recommendation to go to a larger caliber, 24:30.850 --> 24:32.763 do you think it would be accepted? 24:36.688 --> 24:39.803 - I can't say that it wouldn't, sir. 24:41.080 --> 24:43.870 But I know that as we start to... 24:43.970 --> 24:47.950 As we're looking at weapon systems, we're looking at... 24:47.950 --> 24:52.200 Things have changed since I was a young soldier. 24:52.200 --> 24:55.343 I mean, yeah, you still carry and I carried an M16A2. 24:56.430 --> 24:57.810 - [Jim Garamone] The M16 hasn't really changed. 24:57.810 --> 25:01.360 - Right, right, I mean you went from M16A2 25:01.360 --> 25:02.610 to and M4 to, you know... 25:05.040 --> 25:08.220 So, I think they are definitely, 25:08.220 --> 25:12.680 we are definitely looking at different things for the future 25:12.680 --> 25:14.860 and I know that there's some... 25:15.990 --> 25:19.250 Again, as I said earlier, you can research 25:19.250 --> 25:22.920 and see what the services are looking at right now. 25:22.920 --> 25:24.860 But, kind of some of what we're looking at 25:24.860 --> 25:29.860 for the short term is, how do we adjust what we have 25:33.630 --> 25:37.693 right now until something else comes along, sir. 25:39.860 --> 25:41.230 - [Timekeeper] We just got time for one more. 25:41.230 --> 25:42.913 So, we'll go with Sydney. 25:43.160 --> 25:46.260 - Yeah, on STE, you mentioned it 25:46.260 --> 25:49.160 could go up to BCT level training. 25:49.160 --> 25:50.610 Are you actually talking about a massively 25:50.610 --> 25:52.270 multi-player kind of thing where there are thousands 25:52.270 --> 25:55.460 of real people online directing at once, 25:55.460 --> 25:58.300 or do somebody have a real squad of people is 25:58.300 --> 25:59.760 plugged into their VR goggles, 25:59.760 --> 26:01.563 but everybody else is simulated? 26:02.800 --> 26:03.633 - No sir. 26:05.349 --> 26:09.350 With the simulated training, it is able to do 26:09.590 --> 26:12.763 multi-echelon and multi-domain. 26:13.470 --> 26:15.653 Put you into those situations. 26:15.790 --> 26:18.502 And again, it can... 26:18.502 --> 26:21.080 A squad can put it on, actually an individual 26:21.080 --> 26:24.283 can put it on and immerse hisself into that environment. 26:24.390 --> 26:27.800 Or a squad can put it on and be able to actually 26:27.841 --> 26:31.270 conduct training on the same terrain 26:31.270 --> 26:34.270 that they are about to go out into the field 26:34.690 --> 26:37.173 or to deploy and conduct a training on. 26:37.820 --> 26:39.720 So units will be able to conduct 26:40.226 --> 26:44.900 rehearsals like live rehearsals before they step off 26:44.900 --> 26:47.564 and do it on the same terrain 26:47.564 --> 26:49.423 that they're gonna be fighting on. 26:49.950 --> 26:51.830 - How many people are we talking about 26:51.830 --> 26:53.733 plugged in at once interacting? 26:54.611 --> 26:56.300 - I don't know the exact number, sir, 26:56.300 --> 26:58.393 on how much that the system can, 26:58.540 --> 27:01.140 how much the system can hold. - Kay. 27:02.790 --> 27:05.593 - (inaudible) Inside the Army, (inaudible) 27:06.877 --> 27:09.210 (inaudible) 27:13.852 --> 27:15.980 - (clears throat) Excuse me, Maximilian Kwiatkowski 27:15.980 --> 27:17.443 with Inside the Army. 27:18.520 --> 27:20.340 I understand you're working with a lot of 27:20.340 --> 27:22.720 the different groups, but I was curious 27:22.720 --> 27:24.403 specifically on the Army side, 27:24.540 --> 27:26.140 there's these cross-functional teams 27:26.140 --> 27:28.240 focusing on different modernization areas. 27:28.440 --> 27:30.260 How closely are you working with them 27:30.260 --> 27:31.390 to see what kind of technologies 27:31.390 --> 27:34.183 you can leverage for close combat? 27:34.200 --> 27:35.250 - Very close sir. 27:35.250 --> 27:37.740 We actually as part of the Fort Benning visit, 27:37.740 --> 27:38.920 I didn't mention it in here, but 27:38.920 --> 27:40.620 as part of the Fort Benning visit, 27:40.680 --> 27:44.970 we were actually tied in with the CFT for lethality 27:45.230 --> 27:47.080 for the entire time that we were down there, 27:47.080 --> 27:49.330 so they were, they went to all the briefings 27:49.330 --> 27:53.740 that we went to, the 75th Ranger Reg at the MCOE, 27:53.740 --> 27:54.970 everything, so... 27:54.970 --> 27:57.860 And while we are here in DC and they're 27:57.860 --> 28:01.740 down at Fort Benning, we stay very close connected 28:02.000 --> 28:05.130 with all the CFT's from across the Army, sir. 28:05.130 --> 28:07.730 So, that way we can make sure that we're all focused 28:07.750 --> 28:10.130 on the same thing and we're not focused 28:10.130 --> 28:11.240 on one thing and then they're 28:11.240 --> 28:14.183 focused on something totally different, sir. 28:14.580 --> 28:16.540 - Are you working with any specific one 28:16.540 --> 28:20.170 more closely than another like lethality 28:20.170 --> 28:21.603 or maybe synthetic training environment? 28:21.603 --> 28:25.120 Sir, right now, sir, we're working 28:25.400 --> 28:27.723 with the CFT for lethality, sir. 28:29.600 --> 28:30.433 Yes sir. 28:30.650 --> 28:33.170 - (inaudible) Missed your main objective 28:33.170 --> 28:34.160 you mentioned that we've been talking 28:34.160 --> 28:35.840 a lot of questions about the personnel issues 28:35.840 --> 28:38.840 with potential readiness for recruiting and also the STE's. 28:38.840 --> 28:40.910 Do you have some timelines on those? 28:40.910 --> 28:42.230 It sounds like there's fact finding going on, 28:42.230 --> 28:43.980 but when does this go to Sec Def's desk? 28:43.980 --> 28:44.813 When will it be a decision? 28:44.813 --> 28:46.983 And when could the forces see these changes? 28:47.630 --> 28:51.380 - Sir, I don't know what the timeline is. 28:51.380 --> 28:54.230 I can tell you there's forward momentum on it. 28:54.230 --> 28:56.080 I don't know when it will be ready to 28:56.670 --> 29:01.670 go to the Sec Def, but in the very foreseeable future, sir. 29:02.700 --> 29:04.743 - A year, six months? 29:04.870 --> 29:05.850 - I'm not gonna... 29:05.970 --> 29:08.817 Like I said, I personally don't know the timeline 29:08.817 --> 29:12.136 associated with it, but like it said, 29:12.136 --> 29:14.257 there is forward momentum with 29:14.257 --> 29:18.113 some of the recommendations, sir, as they're going forward. 29:24.520 --> 29:27.310 - Alright, well we appreciate Sergeant Major Jason Wilson 29:27.310 --> 29:29.460 coming on board to give us an update this morning 29:29.460 --> 29:32.653 and we appreciate the Press Corps for attending as well. 29:32.840 --> 29:34.430 This concludes today's briefing. 29:34.430 --> 29:35.263 Thank you. 29:35.310 --> 29:36.703 - [Press Corps] Thanks a lot.