WEBVTT

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- From September 2013 through
December 2014, Dr. Roberts

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was a consulting professor
and William Perry Fellow

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at the Center for International Security

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and Cooperation at Stanford University,

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where he authored a book entitled

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The Case for U.S. Nuclear
Weapons in the 21st Century.

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Prior to joining the Obama Administration,

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Dr. Roberts was a member
of the research staff

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at the Institute for Defense Analyses,

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and an adjunct professor at
George Washington University.

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Dr. Roberts has a B.A.
from Stanford University,

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M.S. from the London School of Economics

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and Political Science,

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and a P.h.D. from Erasmus
University, Rotterdam.

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His recent publications also include

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Extended Deterrents
and Strategic Stability

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in Northeast Asia, and
On the Strategic Value

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of Ballistic Missile Defense.

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Ladies and Gentlemen, please
welcome our moderator,

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Dr. Roberts, and the
panelists for panel four.

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(audience applause)

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- Thanks everybody, and
let me add my thanks

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and congratulations to
General Hyten and his staff

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for again convening this opportunity

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for all of us to trade notes

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on our deterrence strategies,

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and the ever-evolving security environment

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in policy context.

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As you know our topic for this panel

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is integration with and among U.S. allies.

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And I've had a number
of people comment to me

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on this topic on the agenda, that this is

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a high interest point, that
it's great to hear from allies,

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that there's such
interesting perspectives,

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but I often find my
interactions with my American

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colleagues don't quite
come to the point of,

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the central point of the central place

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of our allies in this security
environment we live in today.

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They are on the front lines in a way

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that we haven't thought of in a long time.

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And they are essential,

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they're not only important,
they're not adjuncts,

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they're not helpful, they are essential

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to sustaining the rules-based
international order,

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which we've referred to
time and again today.

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And this is for the obvious reasons

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that we've discussed so far today,

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let's go back to the start.

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The nature of the problem
of strategic conflict

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and the environment today

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is not the problem of the
old nuclear on nuclear,

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offense-offense, bi-polar world.

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It's a problem in which we face,

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in a more multi-polar world,
a number of adversaries

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who seek to unravel the
regional security orders

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that we have built up
together with our allies

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over the decades.

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And they seek to do so by
pressuring those allies,

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coercing those allies,

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encouraging those allies to be
more congenial and appeasing

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to the interests of
their neighboring powers.

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And they threaten the
United States in the old art

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of trying to decouple us from
the defense of our allies

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so that we will perceive too
much risks, too much risk,

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and our allies will
perceive our reluctance,

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and thus slowly shift
allegiance under the pressure.

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This puts them, as Kim Jong Un would say,

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in the cross hairs.

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And thus if we're to think about the...

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our progress in creating
effective deterrence

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and assurance architectures
for the 21st century

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it must begin with the
question of our allies,

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their role in those
architectures, and the sufficiency

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of those architectures for their purposes.

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This also should give us a
different way of thinking

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about the topic of extended deterrence.

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In that formulation,
deterrence is something

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we the United States
extend to somebody else.

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It's an umbrella we hold over them,

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this is the formulation
we've used all along,

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and it's a misleading formulation

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in this security environment,
and in the context

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of the conflicts we confront.

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Because deterrence isn't
something we give as a gift

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to an ally or that we extend over them,

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it's something we do together.

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We heard it in Rose Gottemoeller's talk,

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the central role of unity in deterrence.

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If the Russian leadership doesn't believe

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that there's a place to
put a wedge politically,

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then it's not going to attempt to divide

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the allies one from another.

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And thus increasingly in both
Europe and Northeast Asia

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we talk about deterrence strategies

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built on the common foundation of the work

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of allies together.

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And I would say that this has been,

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the focus on the regional nature

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of the new problem of strategic conflict

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in the 21st century has been with us,

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really since Saddam
Hussein brought it to us.

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The Cold War ended, yes we
harvested the peace dividend,

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but within a year we faced
a new strategic problem:

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a regional challenger with
WMD and long-range missiles.

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And this began to concentrate
our thinking on the problem,

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the new problem of strategic conflict,

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which in the first QDR, the 1997 QDR,

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was expressed as the
problem of major theater war

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with a WMD dimension, or
with WMD as a condition,

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a likely condition of conflict.

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The Bush Administration, the
George W. Bush Administration

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set out four defense policy
goals, you may recall:

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assure, dissuade, deter, defeat.

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Assure, first on the list.

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It was about assuring
allies that in confronting

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the Axis of Evil they were
going to be safe and secure.

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And the Obama Administration
set out the quote,

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"Comprehensive Strategies
for Strengthening

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Regional Deterrence Architectures",

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which included nuclear
and non-nuclear means,

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political, the full dime spectrum,

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and allies have been an essential part

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of these U.S. efforts all along.

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And it seems to me the
Trump Administration

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has essentially expressed continuity

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of purpose in this regard.

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So we have an approach
to this new problem-set.

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We have some experience, the
question in front of the panel

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is not whether to integrate for deterrence

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and assurance in the
21st century, but how?

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And that discussion of how is readily

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informed by, now a decade
or two of experience

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in trying to come to terms
with this new challenge.

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Because where we are not
integrated is that point

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where that wedge can
go, that our adversaries

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can attempt to separate our allies

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from each other and from us.

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So we have numerous
panelists, as you've observed,

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and one addition to do translation duties.

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And we have been asked
to limit our remarks

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to five minutes each,
you have in front of you

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the booklet with the more
substantial biographies.

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We're just gonna move down in the order

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of the speakers identified on the handout,

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which isn't quite the order on which

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they're seated at the table.

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We'll start with Air Vice
Marshall Andrew Turner,

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who's Assistant Chief of the Defense Staff

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for Operations in the
UK Ministry of Defense,

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then we'll turn to Brigadier
General Christopher Coffelt,

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who's Deputy Director of Nuclear Ops

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here at Strategic Command,

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then we'll turn to Air
Commodore Phil Champion,

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who joins us from U.S.
Indo-pacific Command

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where he is Regional and
Multinational Engagement

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Advisor for Strategic Planning and Policy.

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Then we'll hear from three more allies,

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first Major General Naoiki Kajiwara,

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who's Director General for
Defense Plans and Policy,

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the J-5 on the Joint Staff of Japan,

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then Dr. Jens Ringsmose,
Director of the Institute

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for Military Operations
and Vice Dean of the Royal

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Danish Defense College of Denmark,

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and finally Major General JungWoong Lee,

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who's Director for Strategic Planning

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and Countering WMD for the ROK.

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And I've been asked to remind speakers,

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it's our tendency to turn
and speak to each other

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and to look at the screen behind us,

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but the microphone doesn't follow.

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So please stay focused on the microphone,

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so the room can stay a
part of the conversation.

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Let me turn to Air Vice Marshall Turner

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to get us launched, thank you.

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- Thank you very much, and General Hyten

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many thanks for your
leadership in this domain

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and for your invitation opportunity

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to address this conference.

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I think it's a tremendously powerful need

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for us to share ideas, and generate unity

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and solidarity of spirit
in this idea of deterrence

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across what is a very difficult world.

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And we are unquestionably
challenged by this right now,

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as many of you would have
heard me talk yesterday

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around the failure of
deterrence in the United Kingdom

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on the 4th of March with the use

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of a primary nerve agent
in an English City,

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for which we'll be engaged,
in the armed forces

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for some months through
to at least Christmas,

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excavating and burning soil, vehicles,

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and renovating buildings, trying to remove

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what is essentially an extremely damaging

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and difficult nerve agent.

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We find ourselves though in this sense,

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building a tremendous unity of spirit

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around this particular event.

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No matter how heinous and reckless it was,

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it generated through diplomatic service

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a fantastic array of consensus,

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both in the NACC, in NATO, but also

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amongst a number of allies,
and we managed to generate

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28 different countries
expelling 157 different spies

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from around different
capitals around the world.

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I think that shows a
tremendous unity of spirit.

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But if there are two underlying challenges

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that we feel in London that
are unfolding in front of us,

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it's firstly the sense
that we're being shown

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Cold War geography by
our Russian neighbors.

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They're unpacking into a certain extent

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what has been historically true

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but is no longer true around alliances,

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and spheres of influences,
and spheres of control.

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And secondly we're seeing a insidious

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redefinition of the
rules-based international order

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without consultation, without to a certain

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extent so far, confrontation.

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But both of those two are undoubtedly

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likely to change in the near term.

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So these two angles of
challenge are unquestionably

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going to be in front of us for some years,

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and I don't think that is going to be

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at all varied over time.

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So what do we do about it?

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I mean I'm taken straight to
your National Defense Strategy,

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and a really powerful line, that I think

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should be the spirit, the cri de coeur

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that we should be talking about,

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which is Secretary Mattis's aspiration

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to achieve strategic stability

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and operational unpredictability.

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The idea that nation's
notions will be clear

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to people before they
act, but will be unclear

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how a response might be,

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manifest itself in a post-facto moment.

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This idea of strategic predictability

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and operational unpredictability should be

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at the core of deterrence thinking.

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It picks up on one of the points

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in the last speakers, who
talked of the ambiguity

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of the response about the Isreali approach

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which might be slightly
asymmetric in nature.

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And I think that is part of the remedy.

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So what to do about it?

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Well much like Neil's was
yesterday, giving a report card,

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I have four A's which are the approach

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we might wish to take.

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And they are in essence,
alliances, attributability,

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agility, and all of government.

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That should be the
doctrine of our approach.

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So in the first case, alliances;

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I'm also minded to support the idea

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that bi-lateral alliances aren't as strong

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as multi-lateral alliances,
I think that's self-evident.

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But we cannot build enough alliances,

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no matter how nefarious or difficult

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they may seem to our
adversaries, but we can't build

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enough alliances around the world

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around our endeavors and spirits.

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It would be interesting, would it not,

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for United Kingdom to
be a military observer

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in the Asian loop, where we don't really

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have a significant
territorial sovereignty claim,

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but we have great interest
around UK national interests.

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At the same time we're
very active in FPDA,

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in the Asia environment,
we're big members of NATO,

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we soon won't be a big
part of the European Union,

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but we remain a core part of European

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military strength, and
continuity of intention.

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So alliances I think, are
definitely a key part of that.

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I think the alliances
should also be built around

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what you might refer to
an 8th grade philosophy.

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They should be built around geography,

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history, chemistry, and physics.

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Geography, where are these countries

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that we're aligned with.

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History, where have these
countries come from,

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where is their unique catalytic capability

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to act in this space and place.

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Chemistry, who do these
people that we're allied

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with have specific and
unique relationships.

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And physics, where is the
stuff that is going to act

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in a deterrence mode and modus operandi.

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So there is something about alliances

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which isn't about massive
totemic, historic moments

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from 1949 but might be fleeting,

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and much more agile, and much more adept

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at holding our adversaries to account

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in smaller and shorter areas.

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Attributability's interesting,

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we talked about first to the facts,

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first with the truth,
with a strategic narrative

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and the media environment,
which is challenging

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for all of our nations and
states as it stands today.

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But we should be able to find a way

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that we can have an attributable,

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to attribute an act between our nations,

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between our alliances, quicker and faster

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than we've ever hitherto
been able to achieve.

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This might use retrospective analysis

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and analytical tools like we did in Douma

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with the OPCW around chemical weapons use,

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but it might also be about
a certain degree of trust

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through five-eyes or single-eye
intelligence analysis,

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which has been found wanting

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in the last 10 or 15
years, but might need to be

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the origin and basis around
which we might need to act

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in order to act quicker,
to build consensus,

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build alliances, temporary or
fleeting though they may be,

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around certain heinous contrary acts.

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I think agility's another part of this.

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This is as much about
governmental, intergovernmental

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agility as it is about
strategic military agility.

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Self-evidently, the NATO
Readiness Initiative,

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which I think should be a great means

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of generating pace, and
perhaps pre-Article Five

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or Article Four consensus in the NACC,

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but nevertheless a way in which we can act

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at a different rate, in a different way

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within our alliances
that isn't necessarily

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in a structured alliance, but it is also,

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as I say, around a fleeting engagement.

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And all of government, I've
talked yesterday broadly

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about the United
Kingdom's fusion doctrine,

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the way in which we would act amongst

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our different departments of
state, the levers of power.

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The way we would act,
essentially cognitively,

15:29.170 --> 15:33.230
across the domains, across the
oceans, and the continents.

15:33.230 --> 15:36.260
But this should be predominantly
deterrence based around

15:36.260 --> 15:38.040
the non-military leaders here.

15:38.040 --> 15:40.730
The diplomatic information, and primarily

15:40.730 --> 15:42.860
the economic phases and spheres.

15:42.860 --> 15:44.940
This is the area where
we'll be able to hold those

15:44.940 --> 15:47.610
who are making decisions
more quickly to account,

15:47.610 --> 15:51.290
more penetratingly so, and
actually for a longer period.

15:51.290 --> 15:53.700
Economics is ultimately, as we know

15:53.700 --> 15:56.030
from our defense budget's money, is king,

15:56.030 --> 15:58.370
and that definitely is the case for most

15:58.370 --> 16:00.390
of the strategic leaders that we find

16:00.390 --> 16:04.100
ourselves availed against, so
all of government is crucial.

16:04.100 --> 16:06.570
At the operational level I
think we just need to perhaps

16:06.570 --> 16:09.280
redefine the general's challenge;

16:09.280 --> 16:10.920
getting off the escalation ladder.

16:10.920 --> 16:12.350
I think that's a really interesting point,

16:12.350 --> 16:13.810
but why are we on it?

16:13.810 --> 16:16.770
We should not even be on
it, let alone going up it.

16:16.770 --> 16:19.200
We should find a way to reset the geometry

16:19.200 --> 16:21.440
around what we want to deter,

16:21.440 --> 16:24.410
whether that's geographic,
physical, functional,

16:24.410 --> 16:26.880
or in another domain,
where we don't actually

16:26.880 --> 16:28.880
find ourselves on the escalation ladder.

16:28.880 --> 16:32.270
Because our purpose and
intent is so clearly expressed

16:32.270 --> 16:34.140
and our unity of effort and solidarity

16:34.140 --> 16:37.530
is so strong and indivisible that

16:37.530 --> 16:40.540
we aren't already on an escalation ladder.

16:40.540 --> 16:42.760
It, for me, is a
challenge, it's difficult.

16:42.760 --> 16:44.690
But it's one of cognitive maneuver,

16:44.690 --> 16:48.440
and how we might overcome
our approach together.

16:48.440 --> 16:50.550
We must act more together.

16:50.550 --> 16:52.790
We saw through RIMPAC a great

16:52.790 --> 16:53.870
sort of unity of effort,

16:53.870 --> 16:55.810
but we can be demonstrating these effects

16:55.810 --> 16:58.900
in different parts of the
country, continents, and world.

16:58.900 --> 17:01.870
And message them much more
clearly, much more sharply.

17:01.870 --> 17:04.240
Much more apt leadership of the countries

17:04.240 --> 17:06.550
that we're trying to affect their decision

17:06.550 --> 17:08.160
calculus and their perception.

17:08.160 --> 17:10.580
I think in here, the
enhanced forward presence

17:10.580 --> 17:13.620
in the Baltics and Poland, is
a really powerful statement.

17:13.620 --> 17:15.670
Here we have just four battle groups,

17:15.670 --> 17:18.100
they're a mere tactical speed bump

17:18.100 --> 17:20.730
if somebody was to
contain, not be contained

17:20.730 --> 17:22.420
by their intentions.

17:22.420 --> 17:25.300
But what they do do,
is massively complicate

17:25.300 --> 17:27.910
the calculus in Moscow for taking an act

17:27.910 --> 17:29.560
which might trip over a wire

17:29.560 --> 17:31.320
and then lead to something much greater

17:31.320 --> 17:32.780
and much more decisive.

17:32.780 --> 17:35.300
So the ideas around small footprints

17:35.300 --> 17:37.840
that make calculus in capitals difficult,

17:37.840 --> 17:40.300
I think is a really
powerful choice and option

17:40.300 --> 17:43.370
that we should perhaps think
a little bit more about.

17:43.370 --> 17:46.090
Finally I just, what I
would like to just touch on

17:46.090 --> 17:48.760
is some of the fears and difficulties

17:48.760 --> 17:51.930
around deterrence that we
need to navigate around.

17:51.930 --> 17:54.940
It is certainly the case
that if we set out red lines,

17:54.940 --> 17:57.250
as we talked about before,
and fail to follow them,

17:57.250 --> 17:59.180
then we're going to be in a world of hurt.

17:59.180 --> 18:01.330
It's also the case that if we set out

18:01.330 --> 18:04.930
a set of capabilities that
are found hollow or wanting,

18:04.930 --> 18:06.900
then we'll also be found to account.

18:06.900 --> 18:10.360
So this appearance of
fecklessness would be fatal

18:10.360 --> 18:11.490
for any deterrence measure.

18:11.490 --> 18:13.960
Whether it's in the
near-term or the far-term,

18:13.960 --> 18:16.270
or geographically spread,
we need to be extremely

18:16.270 --> 18:20.320
careful around setting a goal
that we then fail to achieve.

18:20.320 --> 18:22.060
And finally I think if we don't

18:22.060 --> 18:25.240
adopt some of these
ideas, if we don't follow

18:25.240 --> 18:28.320
a much more coherent and
integrated deterrence approach

18:28.320 --> 18:30.240
then the two points I
raised at the beginning

18:30.240 --> 18:33.120
will become fact, and not vectors.

18:33.120 --> 18:36.030
These points of being re-educated around

18:36.030 --> 18:39.100
Cold War geography will
become more powerful,

18:39.100 --> 18:41.240
prevalent, and more fact-based.

18:41.240 --> 18:43.650
The second point: the
rules-based international order

18:43.650 --> 18:47.070
will change unless we
lay the track in front

18:47.070 --> 18:49.330
of that change, and then are an actor

18:49.330 --> 18:52.380
rather than a recipient of those changes.

18:52.380 --> 18:53.680
I'll leave my comments there.

18:53.680 --> 18:55.322
- Thanks so much.

18:55.322 --> 18:57.572
(applause)

19:00.290 --> 19:01.123
General Coffelt.

19:02.225 --> 19:03.920
- Good afternoon everybody,
thank you very much.

19:03.920 --> 19:05.027
- Pull in on the mic.

19:05.027 --> 19:06.223
- Roger, thank you.

19:07.550 --> 19:10.320
So I thought what I could
offer for you today,

19:10.320 --> 19:13.380
is kind of a, more of a
practitioner's perspective.

19:13.380 --> 19:16.360
I'm a little closer to
the actual activities

19:16.360 --> 19:19.410
to actually, and do deterrence everyday,

19:19.410 --> 19:20.610
and I thought maybe you'd like a peak

19:20.610 --> 19:21.960
under the tent of kinda
some of the things we do,

19:21.960 --> 19:23.000
and we think we could do better,

19:23.000 --> 19:25.610
and integrate better from
a StratCom perspective.

19:25.610 --> 19:27.240
So I'm gonna kinda walk
you just a little bit,

19:27.240 --> 19:29.140
very briefly from the theory,

19:29.140 --> 19:30.550
and kinda walk ya down a little bit into

19:30.550 --> 19:32.750
really the tactical, practical aspects

19:32.750 --> 19:35.560
of how do we actually do this?

19:35.560 --> 19:37.150
And kinda, what we focus on everyday.

19:37.150 --> 19:39.230
First and foremost, I think
it's important to realize,

19:39.230 --> 19:41.450
and we've talked, several
speakers have mentioned,

19:41.450 --> 19:43.557
we deliberately manufacture deterrence

19:43.557 --> 19:45.430
and assurance effects every day.

19:45.430 --> 19:47.010
This doesn't just happen because we have

19:47.010 --> 19:50.540
a nuclear force, because
we have highly resilient

19:50.540 --> 19:52.560
space forces and cyber forces,

19:52.560 --> 19:56.317
and conventional forces,
and liaison officers.

19:56.317 --> 20:00.410
It is a deliberate effort
to consciously manufacture

20:00.410 --> 20:03.520
those efforts to deter
those select adversaries

20:03.520 --> 20:06.210
and assure those select allies and friends

20:06.210 --> 20:07.510
every single day.

20:07.510 --> 20:09.530
And both of these are really focused

20:09.530 --> 20:11.310
on decision calculus, right?

20:11.310 --> 20:14.230
As we walk down through
the theory just a bit,

20:14.230 --> 20:17.550
we, simply put, in the
decision calculus aspect,

20:17.550 --> 20:18.910
we want our allies and friends

20:18.910 --> 20:21.490
to wake up every single morning and think,

20:21.490 --> 20:24.050
I know they're there, and
I know they will be there.

20:24.050 --> 20:25.690
And equally we want our adversaries

20:25.690 --> 20:28.260
and any potential challengers
to wake up and think,

20:28.260 --> 20:30.440
not today, the costs are too high,

20:30.440 --> 20:32.700
the benefits and objectives
are unachievable,

20:32.700 --> 20:35.290
and the benefits of
restraint are much better.

20:35.290 --> 20:36.690
This is the decision calculus

20:36.690 --> 20:37.920
that we think about every morning,

20:37.920 --> 20:39.800
that I think about every single morning

20:39.800 --> 20:41.960
as I work through the
issues and the operations

20:41.960 --> 20:43.520
of our nuclear forces and the nuclear

20:43.520 --> 20:45.570
command and control
structure, and those other

20:45.570 --> 20:48.370
supporting elements of
deterrence that are under

20:48.370 --> 20:52.010
General Hyten's command and
for his responsibilities.

20:52.010 --> 20:54.640
With respect to deterrence,
an adversary's decision

20:54.640 --> 20:57.170
calculation is a function
of course, many things,

20:57.170 --> 20:59.070
and I won't go into a long laundry list

20:59.070 --> 21:01.500
of things that probably form that calculus

21:01.500 --> 21:02.590
or contribute to it,

21:02.590 --> 21:04.330
but perceptions, I think we've all heard

21:04.330 --> 21:06.730
just a little bit about,
are a central element

21:06.730 --> 21:09.430
of that decision calculus,
and we work to shape those.

21:09.430 --> 21:12.770
The perceptions of our
adversaries are particularly key.

21:12.770 --> 21:16.520
Arguably peace-time is
the most conducive time,

21:16.520 --> 21:19.780
the best time to shape perceptions

21:19.780 --> 21:23.000
of whomever X you want
to deter from doing Y

21:24.030 --> 21:25.450
under condition Z.

21:25.450 --> 21:27.830
I get extra credit with J-5
for citing that formula,

21:27.830 --> 21:30.910
so please thank you for
humoring me, just to that point.

21:30.910 --> 21:33.640
But absolutely, this is the time to do it,

21:33.640 --> 21:34.473
is in peace-time.

21:34.473 --> 21:38.170
It's before you're in conflict
or crisis, it's too late.

21:38.170 --> 21:40.960
The challenge that most
military practitioners

21:40.960 --> 21:43.990
face during peace-time is there's a lack

21:43.990 --> 21:46.740
of a clear and present danger that creates

21:46.740 --> 21:49.140
a compelling call to
action which typically

21:49.140 --> 21:51.120
accompanies a time of crisis.

21:51.120 --> 21:52.780
As well as, there's kind of a concern

21:52.780 --> 21:55.150
about upsetting the current status quo

21:55.150 --> 21:57.030
and of the perception of whatever might be

21:57.030 --> 21:58.830
the relative peace or stability,

21:58.830 --> 22:00.610
and I think that's a valid concern

22:00.610 --> 22:03.410
but oftentimes we end
up doing what we call

22:03.410 --> 22:05.830
self-deterring in those kind of events.

22:05.830 --> 22:09.670
In terms of being
hesitant to take an action

22:09.670 --> 22:13.830
to create a deterrent
effect or work on it.

22:13.830 --> 22:15.900
The problem is, I'm an analogy guy,

22:15.900 --> 22:17.130
cause I'm a simple-minded guy,

22:17.130 --> 22:19.790
but deterrence to me is a lot like air.

22:19.790 --> 22:21.660
How many of you woke up this morning,

22:21.660 --> 22:23.250
looked out the door, stepped outside,

22:23.250 --> 22:24.270
come into the conference, and took

22:24.270 --> 22:26.370
a deep breath and thought,

22:26.370 --> 22:29.980
wow, am I so happy with the quality

22:29.980 --> 22:33.240
and quantity of the air
available to me today.

22:33.240 --> 22:35.340
I mean I bet none of you did.

22:35.340 --> 22:37.110
Probably none of you did.

22:37.110 --> 22:38.580
And the reason you don't,

22:38.580 --> 22:40.120
is you just take it for granted every day.

22:40.120 --> 22:41.880
It's absolutely essential for life,

22:41.880 --> 22:43.760
and your sustainment, right?

22:43.760 --> 22:45.840
But we just take advantage of it.

22:45.840 --> 22:47.843
When do we appreciate air?

22:49.180 --> 22:51.530
This is the you know,
participatory part of this.

22:51.530 --> 22:55.640
Thank you very much, when you
don't have air anymore, right?

22:55.640 --> 22:58.230
You're gasping for it,
and your desperate for it,

22:58.230 --> 23:00.610
and you really reflect back and you wish

23:00.610 --> 23:03.200
if only I had tended to ensuring

23:03.200 --> 23:05.730
I had a sufficient
quantity and quality of air

23:05.730 --> 23:08.010
before this moment of
crisis now where I have

23:08.010 --> 23:10.650
little ability to affect that
and do anything about it.

23:10.650 --> 23:13.020
That's the problem, and
that's where we oftentimes

23:13.020 --> 23:15.600
find ourselves slipping into the realm

23:15.600 --> 23:17.770
of deterrence operations.

23:17.770 --> 23:20.730
So shaping adversary
perceptions pro-actively

23:20.730 --> 23:23.040
in and across all
domains, with all elements

23:23.040 --> 23:25.710
of our national power and
our allies and friends,

23:25.710 --> 23:28.040
is absolutely essential to ensuring

23:28.040 --> 23:30.010
that an adversary's decision calculus

23:30.010 --> 23:32.500
constantly remains, not today.

23:32.500 --> 23:35.160
And stands an exponentially greater chance

23:35.160 --> 23:39.040
of remaining so when
facing two unified allies,

23:39.040 --> 23:42.210
or three, or nine, or 29.

23:42.210 --> 23:43.790
I think we would all agree,

23:43.790 --> 23:46.790
and especially when they see no daylight

23:46.790 --> 23:48.620
between those folks on any issues,

23:48.620 --> 23:50.870
whether they be economic
policy, diplomatic,

23:50.870 --> 23:53.750
military application of power.

23:53.750 --> 23:56.980
Wow, is that a great deterrent posture,

23:56.980 --> 23:59.140
and again check all the
boxes for multi-domain,

23:59.140 --> 24:02.360
and multi-national across
the check sheet as well.

24:02.360 --> 24:04.260
But allies and friends are absolute

24:04.260 --> 24:06.830
game-changers in the deterrence business.

24:06.830 --> 24:09.600
Among the many advantages
that I could also list,

24:09.600 --> 24:11.820
really the thing I think I like most

24:11.820 --> 24:15.130
is they exponentially
increase the complexity

24:15.130 --> 24:18.050
of an adversary's
dilemmas and problem-set.

24:18.050 --> 24:21.250
That is a great thing to
put upon your adversary.

24:21.250 --> 24:23.660
So how do we actually integrate U.S.

24:23.660 --> 24:25.270
and allied approaches
for deterrence assurance,

24:25.270 --> 24:26.710
how do we do better at this?

24:26.710 --> 24:28.340
This is the part that's typically missing

24:28.340 --> 24:30.610
from most discussions and exercises,

24:30.610 --> 24:32.870
we admire the problem and the scenario

24:32.870 --> 24:36.750
for 59 minutes of the
hour, and then realize

24:36.750 --> 24:38.320
at the end, well what do you do?

24:38.320 --> 24:41.060
I mean what can you actually
go do to affect this.

24:41.060 --> 24:42.580
SO I'm gonna try to kinda lay out

24:42.580 --> 24:44.330
a little bit of the
tactical, practical here,

24:44.330 --> 24:45.980
where how I think we get after this,

24:45.980 --> 24:48.270
and maybe areas we could do better.

24:48.270 --> 24:50.770
To me, for my experience it's really,

24:50.770 --> 24:52.810
I agree with General Hyten's assessment,

24:52.810 --> 24:55.530
this integration is a process.

24:55.530 --> 24:57.800
It's a process about really, to me,

24:57.800 --> 25:00.730
mastering the fundamentals
in order to have

25:00.730 --> 25:03.490
a consistent battle rhythm that's visible

25:03.490 --> 25:04.920
every day to adversaries.

25:04.920 --> 25:07.940
It's a consistent tone
on the line, if you will,

25:07.940 --> 25:09.570
that they know is always there,

25:09.570 --> 25:11.510
from all the allies and friends.

25:11.510 --> 25:14.400
It's a constant reminder
of our capability,

25:14.400 --> 25:17.810
of our readiness, and our
will, and our resolve,

25:17.810 --> 25:19.170
and our solidarity together.

25:19.170 --> 25:21.190
It's got to be there
and present every day.

25:21.190 --> 25:23.280
We must manufacture that delivery

25:23.280 --> 25:24.960
every single day together.

25:24.960 --> 25:27.150
This constant level of effort, operations,

25:27.150 --> 25:29.780
activities, and exercises,
and mission rehearsals

25:29.780 --> 25:32.890
creates a very visible,
understandable, predictable

25:32.890 --> 25:35.430
base-line of messaging, signaling,

25:35.430 --> 25:38.180
such that any adjustment
in the timing, or tempo,

25:38.180 --> 25:41.570
or the intensity of those
activities and operations,

25:41.570 --> 25:44.010
pre-crisis or as your getting into crisis,

25:44.010 --> 25:47.610
is easily detectable, and understandable

25:47.610 --> 25:49.360
to those that we desire to message.

25:49.360 --> 25:53.010
And especially so when we
accompany them and couple them

25:53.010 --> 25:55.350
with great messaging from our

25:55.350 --> 25:59.040
class-act diplomatic corps and others,

25:59.040 --> 26:02.300
and our political elected
leaders, and you name it.

26:02.300 --> 26:04.870
With those type of messaging to complement

26:04.870 --> 26:08.000
the actions they see, is
actually very powerful

26:08.000 --> 26:10.390
across all the elements
of our national power.

26:10.390 --> 26:12.410
This means we must invest
and diligently work

26:12.410 --> 26:14.410
every day as a unified team across

26:14.410 --> 26:16.890
all the elements of our
respective national powers

26:16.890 --> 26:19.830
in peace-time to shape
those adversary perceptions

26:19.830 --> 26:21.770
and ensure we are a constant presence

26:21.770 --> 26:23.350
in their decision calculus.

26:23.350 --> 26:25.340
Time is simply not afforded in crisis

26:25.340 --> 26:27.920
to establish the required processes,

26:27.920 --> 26:30.530
operations, relationships, and all;

26:30.530 --> 26:32.700
that the adversary has already conducted

26:32.700 --> 26:35.480
the cost-benefit analysis
with pre-existing

26:35.480 --> 26:36.630
perceptions and acted.

26:36.630 --> 26:39.640
There just isn't time, it's
a fait accompli at that point

26:39.640 --> 26:41.060
and you're behind the power curve,

26:41.060 --> 26:42.740
if you're trying to shape perceptions

26:42.740 --> 26:45.140
of your adversary once
you've gotten that far.

26:45.140 --> 26:46.100
So how do we do this?

26:46.100 --> 26:48.430
Well first and foremost, I
think General Hyten laid out

26:48.430 --> 26:51.150
a very good description this morning

26:51.150 --> 26:53.030
of what we provide as U.S. StratCom,

26:53.030 --> 26:55.140
in terms of ready weapons
and ready warriors.

26:55.140 --> 26:57.420
That's obviously, I won't
go through the whole list

26:57.420 --> 27:00.720
of capabilities, but obviously
that is an absolutely

27:00.720 --> 27:04.150
essential requirement from
all the allies involved,

27:04.150 --> 27:07.370
to include whatever your
weapons system might be.

27:07.370 --> 27:09.000
If it's an investment weapon system,

27:09.000 --> 27:11.990
if you're a policy, if
you carry a diplomatic pen

27:11.990 --> 27:14.270
or messaging, all those that I consider

27:14.270 --> 27:16.900
weapon systems that couple
together and bring to bear

27:16.900 --> 27:20.650
a readiness of those
elements of national power

27:20.650 --> 27:22.570
for the benefit of deterrence.

27:22.570 --> 27:25.170
Many joint and combined
operations, exercises,

27:25.170 --> 27:28.640
tests, demonstrations of
capability, and common equipment.

27:28.640 --> 27:31.020
We do a lot of bomber assurance
and deterrence missions

27:31.020 --> 27:34.040
as you know, to demonstrate our
power projection capability,

27:34.040 --> 27:35.620
and integration and solidarity

27:35.620 --> 27:38.460
with allied air forces in the regions.

27:38.460 --> 27:40.260
We'll put bombers forward into PACOM,

27:40.260 --> 27:42.670
and then into PACOM we'll
use them very effectively

27:42.670 --> 27:44.340
in a robust program to integrate

27:44.340 --> 27:46.480
with Japanese Defense Force fighters,

27:46.480 --> 27:49.810
and work on their ranges
as well as the ROK fighters

27:49.810 --> 27:52.240
and other aircraft, and work together

27:52.240 --> 27:55.650
to create an assurance
for those allied friends

27:55.650 --> 27:57.980
and forces there as well
as a deterrent effect

27:57.980 --> 27:59.220
for those in the region that we wanna

27:59.220 --> 28:02.230
show our presence and the
solidarity in the region

28:02.230 --> 28:03.983
that we have with those allies.

28:04.890 --> 28:06.870
So the UK hosts bomber and deterrence,

28:06.870 --> 28:08.510
bomb reassurance and
deterrence deployments,

28:08.510 --> 28:10.490
and we push out of there
into the EUCOM theater,

28:10.490 --> 28:12.590
the AFRICOM theater, we put bombers

28:12.590 --> 28:14.270
into CENTCOM and use
them regionally there,

28:14.270 --> 28:16.400
and they're also a
constant presence as well.

28:16.400 --> 28:18.620
And also CONUS to CONUS, where we fly

28:18.620 --> 28:21.270
round trip bombers, typically B-2s,

28:21.270 --> 28:23.130
all the way from
Whiteman, all the way over

28:23.130 --> 28:25.310
to the peninsula, Korean Peninsula,

28:25.310 --> 28:27.010
conduct an operation with the forces

28:27.010 --> 28:29.290
I just talked about in
the region, and back out.

28:29.290 --> 28:31.580
Or UCOM in the same
manner with our European

28:31.580 --> 28:32.850
allies and partners.

28:32.850 --> 28:35.907
So very good, robust program
with bomber deterrence

28:35.907 --> 28:38.730
and assurance missions, assurance
and deterrence missions.

28:38.730 --> 28:40.890
As well as operating
common weapons systems,

28:40.890 --> 28:42.640
this is a great help!

28:42.640 --> 28:44.800
Many people forget, we have a common

28:44.800 --> 28:46.960
submarine ballistic
missile system with the UK,

28:46.960 --> 28:48.150
our Trident weapon system.

28:48.150 --> 28:50.880
That's a great integration aspect

28:50.880 --> 28:54.320
of our operations and
our deterrent operations.

28:54.320 --> 28:56.120
Offering common missile defense systems

28:56.120 --> 28:58.540
like the Aegis system
both afloat and ashore,

28:58.540 --> 29:02.010
or THAAD, our Patriot
missile defense systems.

29:02.010 --> 29:04.390
Coalition space operations
with the agreements

29:04.390 --> 29:06.780
to do common space situational awareness,

29:06.780 --> 29:08.410
capitalizing on opportunities to

29:08.410 --> 29:10.193
leverage each others' capabilities,

29:11.320 --> 29:13.480
and hosted or allied partner senors

29:13.480 --> 29:16.120
that make critical
contributions to those efforts,

29:16.120 --> 29:19.030
like at Fylingdales, and
Thuly, and other places.

29:19.030 --> 29:21.230
Our ballistic missile
submarines do port visits

29:21.230 --> 29:24.480
in other places like
Faslane, Scotland, and Guam.

29:24.480 --> 29:25.960
I could keep going down the list

29:25.960 --> 29:29.470
of those types of things,
but I turn to my last item,

29:29.470 --> 29:32.660
and that's the integrated
exercises we like to conduct.

29:32.660 --> 29:35.300
Our tier one exercises
like Global Thunder,

29:35.300 --> 29:38.060
Global Lightening, which are
just incredibly valuable.

29:38.060 --> 29:40.400
Where we work with the
geographic combat and command

29:40.400 --> 29:42.130
and get real demand
signals, and work through

29:42.130 --> 29:45.420
our real war plans and
crisis and decision.

29:45.420 --> 29:49.630
And we benefit most greatly
by having regional experts

29:49.630 --> 29:51.760
integrated into our team, like we did

29:51.760 --> 29:53.320
during the last Global Lightening.

29:53.320 --> 29:55.960
I was fortunate enough to
work many graveyard shifts

29:55.960 --> 30:00.960
with Colonel, Colonel Kazan,
who's call-sign is Volcano,

30:01.080 --> 30:02.140
it means Volcano.

30:02.140 --> 30:04.400
Colonel Miyaki sat with
us during many hours,

30:04.400 --> 30:06.710
in the wee hours on VTCs with PACOM,

30:06.710 --> 30:09.700
and in that time he educated
me much on the things

30:09.700 --> 30:12.230
that I was missing in my
perceptions of the region.

30:12.230 --> 30:13.390
The perception of the threat,

30:13.390 --> 30:15.680
the assessment of what might work.

30:15.680 --> 30:17.780
He sharpened my thinking, he illuminated

30:17.780 --> 30:21.490
cultural things and history
things that might have

30:21.490 --> 30:24.580
created an asymmetry of
stakes that I wasn't aware of.

30:24.580 --> 30:29.060
Incredible, irreplaceable,
having that capability

30:29.060 --> 30:30.460
you can't get any other way,

30:30.460 --> 30:32.880
but by having a liaison officer like him

30:32.880 --> 30:34.870
present with you, physically working

30:34.870 --> 30:37.420
through these problems
for these types of things.

30:37.420 --> 30:40.590
Better yet is investing in
full-time liaison officers,

30:40.590 --> 30:43.670
and to build that, help us
challenge our assumptions

30:43.670 --> 30:46.330
that we have from our American-centric

30:46.330 --> 30:47.730
kind of viewpoint of things,

30:47.730 --> 30:50.530
and build those relationships
and common understanding

30:50.530 --> 30:52.050
every day in our planning.

30:52.050 --> 30:55.270
It's really hard not to
integrate and plan with somebody

30:55.270 --> 30:57.040
if they work there every day.

30:57.040 --> 30:58.440
It's really hard to ignore them

30:58.440 --> 31:00.840
if they are physically
present in your headquarters

31:00.840 --> 31:03.020
or you're physically present in theirs.

31:03.020 --> 31:04.554
We've done--

31:04.554 --> 31:05.387
- You need to wrap it up.
- We've done a great job.

31:05.387 --> 31:07.460
Yes, sir, wrappin' it up right here.

31:07.460 --> 31:09.160
We've done a great job, we have got

31:09.160 --> 31:12.190
a liaison officer from every country

31:12.190 --> 31:15.140
represented on this panel,
which I think is just amazing.

31:15.140 --> 31:16.820
So that's just a sampling of what we do.

31:16.820 --> 31:18.740
There's nothing cosmic in that,

31:18.740 --> 31:22.640
but overall, this is,
really in sum it's just,

31:22.640 --> 31:24.900
we're open to ideas on
how to integrate better,

31:24.900 --> 31:26.560
but we have integrated significantly

31:26.560 --> 31:28.320
and I don't think we take
credit for that a lot.

31:28.320 --> 31:30.520
But it's a process, I
think, that we just continue

31:30.520 --> 31:32.310
to master the fundamentals
and work together

31:32.310 --> 31:34.440
on these types of things,
and commit to those.

31:34.440 --> 31:37.381
Especially with our game-changing allies,

31:37.381 --> 31:40.100
that's gonna be the most
effective way to do that.

31:40.100 --> 31:41.850
Deterrence is very affordable.

31:41.850 --> 31:44.200
Compare the unacceptable
costs to the alternative,

31:44.200 --> 31:46.230
and that's gonna be what ensures peace

31:46.230 --> 31:47.700
through our collective strength.

31:47.700 --> 31:48.533
Thank you.

31:49.658 --> 31:51.908
(applause)

31:55.120 --> 31:56.750
- Commodore Champion.

31:56.750 --> 31:59.173
- Thanks Brad, I was going to,

31:59.173 --> 32:00.120
they taught me at Staff College to have

32:00.120 --> 32:02.360
a intro, a body, and a conclusion,

32:02.360 --> 32:03.700
but I think I'll go
straight from the intro

32:03.700 --> 32:05.783
to the conclusion and we'll see how we go.

32:06.740 --> 32:10.500
I wanna start with a story,
because I think stories matter,

32:10.500 --> 32:12.280
about allies and partners.

32:12.280 --> 32:14.910
And end with allies and partners as well.

32:14.910 --> 32:16.610
We get a bit of time, I'll
just talk a little bit about

32:16.610 --> 32:19.240
gray zone deterrence in the middle,

32:19.240 --> 32:21.297
because I think that's a unique challenge

32:21.297 --> 32:23.793
that many of us find certainly
impact on this world.

32:24.670 --> 32:28.400
So the fact that we have
myself as an embedded

32:28.400 --> 32:31.140
General Officer, fully integrated in PACOM

32:31.140 --> 32:33.060
is a powerful signal.

32:33.060 --> 32:35.650
And that really speaks to the trust

32:35.650 --> 32:38.020
that we share as an alliance.

32:38.020 --> 32:42.270
So I briefed the PLA
Air Force Staff College,

32:42.270 --> 32:45.890
the PACOM brief when they
visited PACOM last year.

32:45.890 --> 32:47.610
Now they just could not fathom

32:47.610 --> 32:50.350
having an Australian
General Officer embedded,

32:50.350 --> 32:53.640
fully integrated in PACOM
briefing that brief.

32:53.640 --> 32:56.280
They couldn't reconcile it,
couldn't rationalize it.

32:56.280 --> 32:59.200
My simple reply was, we have allies.

32:59.200 --> 33:01.590
And it's a strong and
it's a powerful message.

33:01.590 --> 33:03.340
Now I noticed we've got them, we heard

33:03.340 --> 33:05.250
from the Def-Sec-Gen before as well.

33:05.250 --> 33:08.270
Now I've also spent
time in CCOMC and SHAPE.

33:08.270 --> 33:10.200
Non-NATO country, but fully integrated

33:10.200 --> 33:15.030
in the CCOMC, in the Afghanistan
team, in NATO, and SHAPE.

33:15.030 --> 33:18.240
I found myself at one point on an SBTC

33:18.240 --> 33:20.650
representing NATO, or in Afghanistan

33:20.650 --> 33:23.665
on draw-down and reconstitution,

33:23.665 --> 33:26.180
in transition and to Resolute Support.

33:26.180 --> 33:28.180
I was speaking to an Australian two-star,

33:28.180 --> 33:30.660
at the other end representing CENTCOM.

33:30.660 --> 33:33.560
A little bit weird,
but a powerful message.

33:33.560 --> 33:35.630
A really powerful message.

33:35.630 --> 33:39.150
Now if you subscribe to
the fact that history

33:39.150 --> 33:40.590
is an unending dialogue between

33:40.590 --> 33:42.800
the past and the present,

33:42.800 --> 33:46.210
then history and values really do matter.

33:46.210 --> 33:49.200
So this year the U.S. and Australia share

33:49.200 --> 33:50.950
a hundred years of mateship,

33:50.950 --> 33:55.630
forged at the Battle of Hamel
in 1918, 4th of July in fact.

33:55.630 --> 33:57.990
So commanded by Australian
General John Monash,

33:57.990 --> 34:01.070
and arguably the turning point in the war.

34:01.070 --> 34:04.850
So Gunner Phillip Henry
Champion, my grandfather,

34:04.850 --> 34:06.980
was there at the Battle of Hamel,

34:06.980 --> 34:08.623
a piano tuner from Brisbane.

34:09.940 --> 34:12.680
Needless to say, after
working heavy artillery

34:12.680 --> 34:15.970
his career as a piano tuner
ended when the war finished.

34:15.970 --> 34:17.550
And you can just see the
recruiting sergeant now

34:17.550 --> 34:19.280
when he joined up, piano tuner,

34:19.280 --> 34:21.498
you'll go well in our artillery, son.

34:21.498 --> 34:22.331
(laughter)

34:22.331 --> 34:24.020
So history, the point of that is,

34:24.020 --> 34:27.170
history and values really do matter.

34:27.170 --> 34:29.840
And in some ways the values that we share

34:29.840 --> 34:32.710
as an alliance and partnership actually

34:33.640 --> 34:35.900
are as strong as the technology,

34:35.900 --> 34:38.330
and the technology we
seek to integrate as well,

34:38.330 --> 34:40.430
so we should not forget our shared values.

34:41.480 --> 34:44.120
Now the term deterrence
covers a broad remit,

34:44.120 --> 34:46.380
so I just want to quickly
look at some of the

34:46.380 --> 34:49.000
Indo-PACOM challenges and the emerging

34:49.000 --> 34:51.590
gray power competition in the AOR,

34:51.590 --> 34:53.000
and more specifically how we deal

34:53.000 --> 34:54.700
with the phase zero-one construct.

34:55.620 --> 34:57.880
So we're privileged last Friday

34:57.880 --> 35:01.060
to have Charles Edel, who's in Canberra

35:01.060 --> 35:02.800
he's an American working at the

35:02.800 --> 35:06.050
US Studies Institute in
Canberra, he was a guest speaker.

35:06.050 --> 35:07.880
Now Charlie rightly pointed out that,

35:07.880 --> 35:10.220
at least in terms of great
power and competition,

35:10.220 --> 35:12.640
for the past several decades U.S. policy

35:12.640 --> 35:14.730
has focused on reducing tensions

35:14.730 --> 35:16.733
and narrowing areas of disagreement.

35:17.600 --> 35:20.460
Now arguably, and in
retrospect, by privileging

35:21.830 --> 35:25.110
cooperation and stability above all else,

35:25.110 --> 35:28.733
this has also ceded some
level of strategic initiative.

35:29.590 --> 35:32.260
Gray zone actors have conducted probes

35:32.260 --> 35:33.390
which are specifically designed not

35:33.390 --> 35:37.010
to cross the threshold
of military intervention.

35:37.010 --> 35:38.850
And because most of these
probes have not been met

35:38.850 --> 35:40.980
with counter-pressure, this has allowed

35:40.980 --> 35:43.540
these actors to gradually
and incrementally

35:43.540 --> 35:45.943
in time and space, to secure gains.

35:47.080 --> 35:50.113
Now another U.S. Army War College report,

35:50.980 --> 35:54.640
also contributed to by one H.R. McMaster,

35:54.640 --> 35:56.817
from last year titled Outplayed

35:56.817 --> 35:59.950
concluded the purposeful
gray-zone revisionist actors

35:59.950 --> 36:02.480
are successfully
campaigning, and achieving

36:02.480 --> 36:05.280
war-like objectives
inside the steady-state,

36:05.280 --> 36:07.670
or deterrence phases of the U.S-NATO

36:07.670 --> 36:09.510
joint-phasing model.

36:09.510 --> 36:11.760
Now the study also
concluded that U.S. concepts

36:11.760 --> 36:15.330
for campaign design, the
employment of forces,

36:15.330 --> 36:17.610
and the use of force are not well-adapted

36:17.610 --> 36:21.230
to persistent gray-zone
competition and conflict.

36:21.230 --> 36:22.830
And that's a point well-made,

36:22.830 --> 36:25.920
and the point I would make
there, that is in phase zero-one,

36:25.920 --> 36:28.060
the integration of the inter-agency

36:28.060 --> 36:32.640
is integral and fundamental
to how we go about business.

36:32.640 --> 36:35.200
To the point where,
for example, a commerce

36:35.200 --> 36:38.950
or a treasury sanction
against a revisionist actor

36:38.950 --> 36:41.460
can have far more weight
than what we can do

36:41.460 --> 36:45.390
as a DoD with the authorities
we have in phase zero and one.

36:45.390 --> 36:47.230
So integration with the inter-agency,

36:47.230 --> 36:49.000
and how we go about
business, and with allies

36:49.000 --> 36:51.900
and partners and their
respective inter-agencies as well

36:51.900 --> 36:54.050
is fundamental to phase zero and one

36:54.999 --> 36:56.193
and gray zone competition.

36:57.570 --> 37:00.260
Now while revisionist
actors seem to embrace

37:00.260 --> 37:03.240
a level of ambiguity, we have
arguably remained anchored

37:03.240 --> 37:05.930
in a more binary model of peace and war.

37:05.930 --> 37:09.430
So I think SecDef's message is very clear.

37:09.430 --> 37:11.680
We need to adopt a more integrated concept

37:11.680 --> 37:13.410
for campaigning where we can provide

37:13.410 --> 37:15.940
coherent options short of armed conflict

37:15.940 --> 37:19.150
to achieve policy objectives.

37:19.150 --> 37:23.440
The space between cooperation,
competition, and conflict.

37:23.440 --> 37:27.050
In other words, a renewed
focus on campaigning.

37:27.050 --> 37:28.420
As I said before, that's also where

37:28.420 --> 37:30.960
the inter-agency plays a key role.

37:30.960 --> 37:33.530
Now deterrence in the gray
zone is a fascinating subject,

37:33.530 --> 37:35.080
but I think the real game-changer,

37:35.080 --> 37:37.540
as has been espoused by all speakers,

37:37.540 --> 37:39.030
is allies and partners,

37:39.030 --> 37:42.040
something that revisionist
actors tend to have few of.

37:42.040 --> 37:45.293
Now the Indo-Pacific covers
50% of the Earth's surface.

37:46.420 --> 37:48.770
Strategy requires
aligning our limited means

37:48.770 --> 37:51.720
with our extensive
interests across the region,

37:51.720 --> 37:54.900
that has become a global
center of gravity.

37:54.900 --> 37:57.200
Now this can only be
achieved multi-laterally,

37:57.200 --> 37:58.550
and in partnership.

37:58.550 --> 38:01.300
And despite what actors
like China may perceive,

38:01.300 --> 38:04.750
the Indo-Pacific is too big
for one power to dominate.

38:04.750 --> 38:06.307
It is made for multi-polarity,

38:06.307 --> 38:08.070
and a diversity of partnerships,

38:08.070 --> 38:10.610
and it is here that we have
the deterrent advantage.

38:10.610 --> 38:14.050
Now we're guilty of this in PACOM as well,

38:14.050 --> 38:16.580
we often characterize the
Sino-U.S. relationship

38:16.580 --> 38:18.030
in a binary function.

38:18.030 --> 38:21.760
We look Chinese force structure,
the U.S. force structure,

38:21.760 --> 38:24.630
and projection of Chinese defense spending

38:24.630 --> 38:26.730
outstripping U.S. defense spending by say,

38:26.730 --> 38:30.930
2020, or 2030, or whatever
projection it is this week.

38:30.930 --> 38:33.660
Now this way of
characterization, I believe,

38:33.660 --> 38:36.550
actually plays into the
adversary narrative.

38:36.550 --> 38:38.270
Now if you characterize this across

38:38.270 --> 38:40.950
the entire Allied enterprise in PACOM,

38:40.950 --> 38:45.770
insert Korea, insert Japan,
insert Australia for example.

38:45.770 --> 38:48.840
Then the enterprise actually
far outstrips what China

38:48.840 --> 38:52.430
will ever get to in 2040 in
terms of force structure,

38:52.430 --> 38:54.550
and also in terms of defense spending.

38:54.550 --> 38:56.030
What does that look
like, if defense spending

38:56.030 --> 38:57.925
is not just 2%, what does it look like

38:57.925 --> 38:59.381
if it's two and a half percent?

38:59.381 --> 39:00.730
What does it look like if it's 3%?

39:00.730 --> 39:03.210
Even at 2% it will outstrip what China

39:03.210 --> 39:05.060
can achieve in 2040.

39:05.060 --> 39:07.820
So as a way of highlighting,
and in conclusion,

39:07.820 --> 39:10.020
highlighting the strengths
of the Allied integration

39:10.020 --> 39:12.060
within the overall current framework,

39:12.060 --> 39:13.970
I would challenge everyone in this room

39:13.970 --> 39:15.620
to think multi-laterally,

39:15.620 --> 39:17.530
and to think through the policy settings

39:17.530 --> 39:18.800
that will allow us to do that.

39:18.800 --> 39:22.860
We need 5th gen platforms,
and we need 5th gen policy

39:22.860 --> 39:25.600
to actually integrate
us and pull us together.

39:25.600 --> 39:26.433
Thank you.

39:27.302 --> 39:29.552
(applause)

39:34.240 --> 39:35.913
- General Kajiwara, thank you.

39:36.760 --> 39:37.593
- Thank you.

39:38.910 --> 39:41.670
It is my great honor and pleasure

39:41.670 --> 39:43.480
to be able to be here

39:43.480 --> 39:46.693
representing our Joint Staff
Japan for the first time.

39:48.217 --> 39:51.130
Japan has been facing great changes

39:51.130 --> 39:54.940
in it's strategic environment today.

39:54.940 --> 39:57.660
North Korea now has ballistic missiles

39:57.660 --> 40:00.020
equipped with nuclear warheads.

40:00.020 --> 40:02.030
China has been rigorously building

40:02.030 --> 40:04.300
up its military capability,

40:04.300 --> 40:06.820
both quantitatively and qualitatively,

40:06.820 --> 40:09.513
and continued its maritime advancement.

40:10.360 --> 40:14.500
Russia has been reorganizing
its military capabilities,

40:14.500 --> 40:17.203
and increasing its
activities in the Far East.

40:18.150 --> 40:20.860
In such circumstances the question

40:20.860 --> 40:24.436
of deterrence is serious and urgent,

40:24.436 --> 40:26.313
more than ever for Japan.

40:27.740 --> 40:29.970
And our relationship
with the United States

40:29.970 --> 40:32.620
is absolutely essential when

40:32.620 --> 40:34.920
we think about deterrence and assurance

40:35.840 --> 40:39.283
given the defensive nature
of Japan's defense policy.

40:40.540 --> 40:42.420
With regards to deterrence,

40:42.420 --> 40:44.460
the central question for Japan

40:44.460 --> 40:48.373
is how to cope with the rise of China.

40:49.910 --> 40:52.570
The rapid increase of
its military capability

40:52.570 --> 40:55.850
and its attitude of not to hesitate

40:55.850 --> 40:59.730
to change status quo, backed by force

41:01.070 --> 41:03.423
constitutes serious concern for Japan.

41:04.580 --> 41:07.723
As for China, there are
two challenges for Japan.

41:08.720 --> 41:11.230
One is challenge against Japan's

41:11.230 --> 41:15.000
territorial integrity
in the East China Sea.

41:15.000 --> 41:17.800
Another is challenge against maritime

41:17.800 --> 41:21.720
and international order
over the Indo-Pacific region

41:21.720 --> 41:23.373
including the South China Seas.

41:26.660 --> 41:29.010
The first challenge, the challenge against

41:29.010 --> 41:31.170
territorial integrity, is related

41:31.170 --> 41:33.483
to the Senkaku Islands near Taiwan.

41:34.490 --> 41:36.710
Japan's government, Japanese government

41:36.710 --> 41:38.730
does not acknowledge the existence

41:38.730 --> 41:42.770
of the territorial dispute
because there is no room

41:42.770 --> 41:46.430
for question, both
historically and legally,

41:46.430 --> 41:51.430
and Japan exercise effective
control over the island.

41:52.500 --> 41:55.380
However Chinese military build-up

41:55.380 --> 41:58.870
and active operation in recent years

41:58.870 --> 42:00.920
have raised serious concern.

42:02.267 --> 42:05.697
Since this issue is for the first-hand,

42:05.697 --> 42:08.770
about Japan's own sovereignty,

42:08.770 --> 42:11.570
it is Japanese
responsibility to strengthen

42:11.570 --> 42:12.933
its military capability.

42:14.512 --> 42:19.512
Having said that, from deterrence
and assurance perspective,

42:19.550 --> 42:22.483
the following three points are important.

42:23.360 --> 42:26.890
The first is coordinated bi-lateral

42:26.890 --> 42:29.290
strategic communication about

42:29.290 --> 42:32.430
the U.S. commitment to the defense

42:32.430 --> 42:36.133
of Senkaku Island based on the
U.S.-Japan security treaty.

42:37.760 --> 42:41.520
The second is to maintain
common understanding

42:41.520 --> 42:44.080
through strategic discussions

42:44.080 --> 42:47.523
at all levels between the
United States and Japan.

42:49.090 --> 42:51.940
And the third is bi-lateral coordination

42:51.940 --> 42:55.533
of our activities such
as combined exercises,

42:56.450 --> 42:58.463
presence operations, and so on.

43:00.470 --> 43:03.700
It is essential for us not let China

43:03.700 --> 43:07.783
make strategic miscalculation
through such effort.

43:09.520 --> 43:11.960
At the same time, it is also important

43:11.960 --> 43:15.122
to maintain necessary
communication channels

43:15.122 --> 43:18.090
with China to prevent unwanted

43:18.090 --> 43:21.030
escalation in contingency.

43:21.030 --> 43:23.820
The recent agreement
between Japan and China

43:23.820 --> 43:27.030
over maritime and air
communication mechanism

43:27.030 --> 43:29.353
is a first step, I think.

43:31.000 --> 43:33.000
The second challenge is about

43:33.000 --> 43:35.023
maritime and international order.

43:35.900 --> 43:38.370
Japan has been advocating the free

43:38.370 --> 43:41.347
and open Indo-Pacific strategy,

43:41.347 --> 43:44.270
and the guiding idea is a maritime

43:44.270 --> 43:48.500
and international order
based on the rule of law.

43:48.500 --> 43:52.160
From that viewpoint, Chinese action

43:52.160 --> 43:55.930
which contradicts with international norms

43:55.930 --> 44:00.633
over the region is also
to be deterred or checked.

44:02.459 --> 44:04.420
It is important to make China aware

44:04.420 --> 44:06.830
of the cost of such actions,

44:06.830 --> 44:09.490
and in addition it is also important

44:09.490 --> 44:11.943
to let countries in the region

44:11.943 --> 44:14.940
recognize that there is potential risk

44:14.940 --> 44:16.943
in their relationship with China,

44:17.996 --> 44:21.440
and that that is a choice for them

44:21.440 --> 44:23.123
other than depending on China.

44:24.600 --> 44:27.780
To make such effort
effective and efficient,

44:27.780 --> 44:31.010
allies and like-minded countries

44:31.010 --> 44:34.230
need to collaborate and cooperate

44:34.230 --> 44:36.810
closely in order to consolidate

44:36.810 --> 44:39.730
diplomatic, economic, and military efforts

44:39.730 --> 44:40.960
across the country.

44:42.450 --> 44:45.640
Well finally, I'd like to add one thing.

44:45.640 --> 44:48.810
In executing this approach, we need to

44:48.810 --> 44:52.400
be careful not to force countries

44:52.400 --> 44:55.793
to choose either China or the other,

44:56.670 --> 45:00.050
because such attitudes
could be counter-productive

45:00.050 --> 45:03.053
given their current
relationship with China.

45:04.070 --> 45:06.290
In the area like Indo-Pacific,

45:06.290 --> 45:09.000
it is more to do when you say,

45:09.000 --> 45:11.690
if you are in a hurry, go around.

45:11.690 --> 45:12.523
Thank you.

45:13.388 --> 45:15.638
(applause)

45:20.236 --> 45:22.235
- Dr. Ringsmose.

45:22.235 --> 45:23.222
- Thank you very much.

45:23.222 --> 45:24.740
Thank you, and let me start out

45:24.740 --> 45:27.710
by thanking General Hyten and StratCom

45:27.710 --> 45:29.740
for giving me the opportunity to present

45:29.740 --> 45:31.590
some thoughts and ideas here

45:31.590 --> 45:33.910
at the deterrence symposium.

45:33.910 --> 45:35.570
I've very much been looking
forward to this event,

45:35.570 --> 45:38.210
and to discussing issues that I think

45:38.210 --> 45:41.403
are crucial to the security of the west.

45:42.240 --> 45:44.320
My take will be a Danish perspective,

45:44.320 --> 45:47.170
and it'll focus on how
to enable U.S. allies

45:47.170 --> 45:49.660
and partners in the Baltic Sea region

45:49.660 --> 45:52.560
to more credibly deter Russia.

45:52.560 --> 45:54.380
My main argument will be that

45:54.380 --> 45:58.460
we need a new Baltic
Sea deterrent initiative

45:58.460 --> 46:01.040
that will focus and
integrate the deterrence

46:01.040 --> 46:04.160
efforts of the United
States, and in particular

46:04.160 --> 46:06.060
its allies and partners in the region.

46:06.980 --> 46:09.930
But let me also commence by emphasizing

46:09.930 --> 46:12.110
that the thoughts and ideas that I'll

46:12.110 --> 46:15.420
be presenting here over
the next 40 minutes...

46:15.420 --> 46:16.620
That was a joke.
- Yes.

46:18.270 --> 46:19.880
But you're the only guy
who was within reach.

46:19.880 --> 46:23.143
- I know, that is deterring.

46:23.143 --> 46:25.050
(laughter)

46:25.050 --> 46:26.593
Over the next four minutes,

46:27.471 --> 46:29.020
- Thank you.

46:29.020 --> 46:31.680
- These thoughts and ideas are entirely

46:31.680 --> 46:33.030
of my own making.

46:33.030 --> 46:35.550
I will not speak on behalf
of the Danish Defense,

46:35.550 --> 46:38.000
or even on behalf of the Royal Danish

46:38.000 --> 46:41.400
Defense College, where I
toil for my daily bread.

46:41.400 --> 46:43.113
Last time I forgot to say that,

46:43.113 --> 46:44.300
I got into a bit of trouble,

46:44.300 --> 46:46.763
so these are my own thoughts.

46:47.960 --> 46:50.000
A final note, before I present

46:50.000 --> 46:51.690
my argument to you;

46:51.690 --> 46:53.550
I'm a Scandinavian Protestant.

46:53.550 --> 46:55.880
My ancestors were German and I work

46:55.880 --> 46:57.260
in a military organization,

46:57.260 --> 46:59.393
and I will finish within the five minutes.

47:00.268 --> 47:01.690
(moderator laughs)

47:01.690 --> 47:03.473
My argument is the following:

47:04.700 --> 47:08.120
since 2014 and the Wales Summit,

47:08.120 --> 47:11.310
NATO has quite successfully, I believe,

47:11.310 --> 47:13.560
put in place initiatives that appears

47:13.560 --> 47:15.850
to be deterring Russia, and reassuring

47:15.850 --> 47:18.080
allies and partners in the region.

47:18.080 --> 47:20.130
An impressive number of measures,

47:20.130 --> 47:22.410
including the Readiness Action Plan

47:22.410 --> 47:23.883
launched in 2014,

47:24.860 --> 47:27.860
the enhanced forward presence from 2016,

47:27.860 --> 47:31.000
and in particular
perhaps, the U.S-European

47:31.000 --> 47:32.760
deterrence initiative has sent

47:32.760 --> 47:35.440
a clear message to Moscow and to the most

47:35.440 --> 47:37.540
vulnerable allies and partners

47:37.540 --> 47:39.700
in the Baltic Sea region.

47:39.700 --> 47:41.270
In fact there are good reasons

47:41.270 --> 47:43.940
to be impressed with the swiftness

47:43.940 --> 47:46.270
and the quality of NATO's adaptation

47:46.270 --> 47:48.580
to Russia, as well as the alliance's

47:48.580 --> 47:51.700
relearning of the deterrence game.

47:51.700 --> 47:53.720
We can discuss whether
we've been very good

47:53.720 --> 47:57.800
at re-learning or learning
how to deter threats

47:57.800 --> 48:00.570
below the threshold of armed conflict.

48:00.570 --> 48:03.200
I'm not so sure we've
been good at that so far.

48:03.200 --> 48:04.800
But when it comes to the kinetic parts

48:04.800 --> 48:07.063
and above the threshold, so far so good.

48:08.400 --> 48:10.700
I also believe, however, that more

48:10.700 --> 48:12.660
could and should be done to make

48:12.660 --> 48:15.793
deterrence in the Baltic
Sea region credible.

48:16.690 --> 48:18.500
This should be done by integrating

48:18.500 --> 48:22.810
and coordinating the efforts
made by regional powers.

48:22.810 --> 48:26.040
For sure, the Western oriented
nations in the region,

48:26.040 --> 48:28.260
and those are the Nordic states,

48:28.260 --> 48:30.710
the Baltic states, Germany, and Poland,

48:30.710 --> 48:32.700
they have significantly enhanced

48:32.700 --> 48:34.417
their cooperation in matters of security

48:34.417 --> 48:37.020
and defense over the last decade

48:37.020 --> 48:40.520
by developing a complex
web of security structures

48:40.520 --> 48:44.270
and relationships including NORDEFCO,

48:44.270 --> 48:47.713
the Northern Group, and
the Nordic-Baltic Eight.

48:48.660 --> 48:51.460
Yet there's still much
room for improvement.

48:51.460 --> 48:54.900
Critically, only the most informal

48:54.900 --> 48:56.680
of these existing structures,

48:56.680 --> 48:58.840
the so-called Northern Group,

48:58.840 --> 49:02.130
include all 10 Western-oriented nations

49:02.130 --> 49:03.200
in the region.

49:03.200 --> 49:06.150
And the existing structures
haven't facilitated

49:06.150 --> 49:08.520
the crafting of a more integrated

49:08.520 --> 49:11.143
and a coherent approach
to deterring Russia.

49:12.410 --> 49:14.920
Taking steps to improve
the regional powers'

49:14.920 --> 49:17.510
ability to deter in an integrated

49:17.510 --> 49:20.510
and coherent fashion also makes sense,

49:20.510 --> 49:22.920
as several European NATO members

49:22.920 --> 49:25.090
particularly in southern Europe,

49:25.090 --> 49:27.170
are increasingly showing signs

49:27.170 --> 49:29.470
of being reluctant to endorse new

49:29.470 --> 49:33.610
allied deterrence
initiatives vis a vis Russia.

49:33.610 --> 49:35.890
Some in NATO headquarters even talk

49:35.890 --> 49:39.770
of a building initiative-fatigue.

49:39.770 --> 49:42.800
Hence allies and partners
in the Baltic Sea region

49:42.800 --> 49:46.200
have a strong incentive
to do more on their own,

49:46.200 --> 49:50.423
and outside the membership
circles of NATO.

49:51.670 --> 49:53.210
For these reasons I believe it's time

49:53.210 --> 49:56.990
to consider a new Baltic
Sea deterrence initiative

49:56.990 --> 49:59.000
that would involve all
the allies and partners

49:59.000 --> 50:01.363
in the region, as well
as the United States.

50:02.210 --> 50:04.750
The major contributions
to such an initiative

50:04.750 --> 50:07.323
should be made by the
regional states themselves,

50:08.320 --> 50:11.780
but to assure integration,
and increase the chances

50:11.780 --> 50:13.840
of buy-in from all of the states

50:13.840 --> 50:15.730
bordering the Baltic Sea,

50:15.730 --> 50:18.560
it's important that the U.S. is part

50:18.560 --> 50:20.250
of the initiative.

50:20.250 --> 50:23.050
Without U.S. participation and leadership

50:23.050 --> 50:25.963
in some form, such an
initiative will falter.

50:27.370 --> 50:29.190
A Baltic Sea deterrence initiative

50:29.190 --> 50:31.500
should first and foremost facilitate

50:31.500 --> 50:35.190
integration and coordination
of the Nordic-Baltic,

50:35.190 --> 50:38.140
German, and Polish efforts,
as well as their possible

50:38.140 --> 50:40.623
responses in case of crisis with Russia.

50:41.780 --> 50:43.690
The regional deterrence initiative

50:43.690 --> 50:46.330
could include concrete initiatives,

50:46.330 --> 50:48.010
numerous concrete initiatives,

50:48.010 --> 50:49.940
but just to mention a few:

50:49.940 --> 50:53.000
regular table-top exercises, small-scale

50:53.000 --> 50:57.210
combined joint exercises,
perhaps the development

50:57.210 --> 51:00.062
of a combined A2AD capability

51:00.062 --> 51:03.110
with the capacity to close the Baltic Sea

51:03.110 --> 51:05.480
and the Danish Straits for Russia

51:05.480 --> 51:06.730
or setting up a blockade,

51:07.770 --> 51:10.517
Integration of situational
awareness systems

51:10.517 --> 51:12.690
and regional military schema

51:12.690 --> 51:14.430
in the Baltic Sea region,

51:14.430 --> 51:16.180
integration of air defense systems.

51:17.720 --> 51:19.990
Besides making deterrence more credible

51:19.990 --> 51:23.200
and integrated, in an
integrated and coherent

51:23.200 --> 51:25.020
regional approach to Russia would also

51:25.020 --> 51:28.520
be beneficial at the
political-strategic level.

51:28.520 --> 51:31.390
First, a Baltic Sea deterrence initiative

51:31.390 --> 51:33.450
would draw Sweden and Finland

51:33.450 --> 51:34.773
even closer to NATO.

51:35.610 --> 51:38.720
In some respects, the
two non-aligned states

51:38.720 --> 51:43.100
are already functional
members of the alliance.

51:43.100 --> 51:44.670
But a deepening of the relationships

51:44.670 --> 51:46.960
with card-carrying NATO members,

51:46.960 --> 51:50.350
including the U.S. would
consolidate the impression

51:50.350 --> 51:53.053
of two nations solidly
anchored in the West.

51:54.060 --> 51:57.490
Second, U.S. support
of regional deterrence

51:57.490 --> 52:00.060
initiative could potentially facilitate

52:00.060 --> 52:02.150
the development of a more mature

52:02.150 --> 52:05.500
and self-reliant approach
to security issues

52:05.500 --> 52:06.493
in Northern Europe.

52:07.460 --> 52:09.570
For too long, policy-makers in some

52:09.570 --> 52:13.490
European capitals have
perceived of their security

52:13.490 --> 52:17.223
solely in the shape of
American security guarantees.

52:18.200 --> 52:19.690
A regional deterrence initiative

52:19.690 --> 52:22.260
could perhaps persuade more policy-makers

52:22.260 --> 52:25.100
in the region that their countries could

52:25.100 --> 52:27.460
and should make a real difference

52:27.460 --> 52:29.873
vis a vis Russia on their own.

52:31.840 --> 52:34.420
I realize that resources are scarce,

52:34.420 --> 52:35.740
but there will always be more

52:35.740 --> 52:38.420
good ideas than there's time and budget

52:38.420 --> 52:41.110
to execute, but I genuinely believe

52:41.110 --> 52:43.290
that a more integrated and coherent

52:43.290 --> 52:45.160
approach to deterrence of Russia

52:45.160 --> 52:47.940
anchored in a U.S.-supported Baltic Sea

52:47.940 --> 52:50.340
deterrence initiative would significantly

52:50.340 --> 52:52.290
improve the regional allies' and partners'

52:52.290 --> 52:55.100
ability to deter Russia by themselves.

52:55.100 --> 52:56.214
Thank you.

52:56.214 --> 52:57.455
- Thank you so much.

52:57.455 --> 52:59.705
(applause)

53:03.160 --> 53:03.993
General Lee.

53:05.737 --> 53:08.413
- Thank you Dr. Roberts and General Hyten.

53:09.490 --> 53:11.827
Each version of approaches for deterrence

53:11.827 --> 53:14.660
and assurance is a priority task

53:14.660 --> 53:17.053
for managers of an alliance.

53:18.220 --> 53:21.890
As you all know, in 2018 the ROK

53:21.890 --> 53:24.579
and United States together embarked

53:24.579 --> 53:28.400
on an effort to establish a new detent

53:28.400 --> 53:29.683
on the Korean Peninsula.

53:31.030 --> 53:32.780
Two rounds of Summit meetings

53:32.780 --> 53:35.480
between the ROK and the DPRK,

53:35.480 --> 53:38.000
along with the first-ever summit

53:38.000 --> 53:40.630
between the United States and DPRK

53:40.630 --> 53:44.240
has created a window of opportunity

53:44.240 --> 53:48.780
to realize the denuclearization
of North Korea,

53:48.780 --> 53:51.700
to establish an enduring peace

53:51.700 --> 53:53.110
on the Korean Peninsula,

53:53.110 --> 53:56.923
and to advance security in Northeast Asia.

53:57.910 --> 54:01.830
The vision and rigor
of both President Moon

54:01.830 --> 54:04.510
and President Trump has pushed

54:04.510 --> 54:07.840
our countries toward, together,

54:07.840 --> 54:12.830
freeing ourselves from past
rivalry and confrontation

54:12.830 --> 54:16.400
and starting us on a process of peace

54:16.400 --> 54:19.083
and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula.

54:20.310 --> 54:23.310
I provide this context, because while

54:23.310 --> 54:27.090
we remain in the early
stages of this process

54:27.090 --> 54:29.780
all of work to the deterrence posture

54:29.780 --> 54:32.647
has been inspired of this effort.

54:33.920 --> 54:36.940
The ROK military is working to ensure

54:36.940 --> 54:39.660
the ROK and U.S. go together.

54:39.660 --> 54:42.720
I believe this integration
and the alliance

54:42.720 --> 54:45.280
is critical to deterrence.

54:45.280 --> 54:48.670
Further integration through the alignment

54:48.670 --> 54:51.480
of our approaches to deterrence

54:51.480 --> 54:55.280
is also an important factor in assurance

54:55.280 --> 54:57.363
within the security partnership.

54:58.628 --> 55:01.690
As part of this, I believe work across

55:01.690 --> 55:04.500
the following three lines of effort

55:04.500 --> 55:08.790
are particularly important
for the alliance.

55:08.790 --> 55:12.230
First, making our combined defense posture

55:12.230 --> 55:13.440
more adaptive.

55:13.440 --> 55:16.278
Second, adjusting our traditional roles

55:16.278 --> 55:19.300
to reflect future-oriented-based

55:19.300 --> 55:20.503
strategic thinking.

55:21.427 --> 55:25.770
Third, building confidence
within the alliance,

55:25.770 --> 55:29.450
among partners, and with
neighboring countries.

55:29.450 --> 55:31.190
I would like to highlight again

55:31.190 --> 55:33.760
that it is a strong defense posture

55:33.760 --> 55:37.630
based on deterrence,
assurance, and reassurance

55:37.630 --> 55:41.950
that serves as a foundation
as part of diplomacy

55:41.950 --> 55:44.350
among leaders from the ROK,

55:44.350 --> 55:46.313
the U.S., and DPRK.

55:47.280 --> 55:50.580
As South Korea prioritizes peace

55:50.580 --> 55:52.950
it is working hard to overcome

55:52.950 --> 55:55.110
the traditional security dilemma

55:56.240 --> 55:57.580
on the Korean Peninsula.

55:57.580 --> 56:00.500
It is working together
to manage the security

56:00.500 --> 56:03.233
and preserve peace through strength.

56:04.100 --> 56:06.520
To elaborate on the three requirements

56:06.520 --> 56:09.260
I see for better integration

56:09.260 --> 56:12.183
in the alliance's deterrence posture,

56:13.290 --> 56:16.300
I recommend first that we advance

56:16.300 --> 56:18.923
our alliance's crisis
management mechanism.

56:19.840 --> 56:21.490
In the face of various unknown

56:21.490 --> 56:25.000
security threats and contingencies,

56:25.000 --> 56:27.480
the U.S. and ROK needs to be more

56:27.480 --> 56:30.933
agile and flexible in this
combined defense posture.

56:31.920 --> 56:34.450
It must strengthen each capacity

56:34.450 --> 56:36.823
to regularly respond to a crisis.

56:37.660 --> 56:40.550
Strength and readiness,
or being prepared for

56:40.550 --> 56:43.660
if deterrence fails is
one of the best ways

56:43.660 --> 56:45.423
to strengthen deterrence.

56:46.807 --> 56:49.200
It is important also to recognize that

56:49.200 --> 56:53.252
an effective crisis response will rely on

56:53.252 --> 56:56.637
combinedness, not only
between the ROK and U.S.,

56:56.637 --> 56:59.523
but across all inter-agencies.

57:00.840 --> 57:03.360
The ability of ROK and U.S. militaries

57:03.360 --> 57:05.930
to work in support of diplomatic

57:05.930 --> 57:08.380
information and economic effort

57:08.380 --> 57:11.443
will allow our alliance to be more agile.

57:12.840 --> 57:16.000
Such holistic crisis management mechanism

57:16.000 --> 57:19.200
will give our alliance more flexible

57:19.200 --> 57:21.650
response options, and thus strengthen

57:21.650 --> 57:24.790
our ability to persuade adversaries

57:24.790 --> 57:26.533
not to take certain actions.

57:27.710 --> 57:31.260
Operationally these
highlight the importance

57:31.260 --> 57:34.690
of devising joint threat-assessment

57:34.690 --> 57:36.770
response strategy concepts

57:37.640 --> 57:42.640
and inter-operable systems for operations.

57:42.650 --> 57:46.690
Finally another underappreciated

57:46.690 --> 57:48.950
but critical effort for the alliance

57:48.950 --> 57:52.360
is to raise understanding about embedded

57:52.360 --> 57:55.570
differences in political and/or military

57:55.570 --> 57:59.440
circumstances between the ROK and the US.

57:59.440 --> 58:02.960
Second, we need to take
into account the changes

58:02.960 --> 58:05.710
in the security landscape and adjust

58:05.710 --> 58:08.110
the role within the alliance.

58:08.110 --> 58:12.750
We need to discuss how we see
future security requirements,

58:12.750 --> 58:15.910
and upgrade to a combined defense posture,

58:15.910 --> 58:18.883
redefine the roles each of us plays.

58:20.210 --> 58:23.560
The objective of this should be pragmatic,

58:23.560 --> 58:26.360
to increase efficiency and effectiveness

58:26.360 --> 58:30.040
in responding to border threats in an

58:30.040 --> 58:34.313
increasingly-complex
geo-strategic environment.

58:35.340 --> 58:36.910
The US will and it's strong

58:36.910 --> 58:39.280
strategic deterrence capabilities,

58:39.280 --> 58:41.670
and sophisticated weapons systems

58:41.670 --> 58:46.670
could be compared to Poseiden's
trident in Greek mythology.

58:47.870 --> 58:52.300
While the alliance boasts a
strong and rigorous force,

58:52.300 --> 58:55.290
from US contributions the ROK armed forces

58:55.290 --> 58:59.450
can provide a more
tailored force for regional

58:59.450 --> 59:02.333
security threats
surrounding the Peninsula.

59:03.780 --> 59:07.180
If one compares the ROK to the US

59:07.180 --> 59:09.460
then we may see the ROK military

59:09.460 --> 59:12.130
are as the Roman Gladius,

59:12.130 --> 59:16.220
a menacing sword used by Roman soldiers.

59:16.220 --> 59:18.550
In this way the ROK and US should work

59:18.550 --> 59:21.220
together to complement each other's

59:21.220 --> 59:23.620
capabilities and strengths to realize

59:23.620 --> 59:27.403
great benefits from our
security partnership.

59:29.150 --> 59:31.870
Complementing each other in an intuitive

59:31.870 --> 59:34.950
and combined posture will allow us to have

59:34.950 --> 59:37.090
a seamless deterrence posture

59:37.090 --> 59:40.760
in the face of an uncertain
security landscape

59:40.760 --> 59:44.610
both on the Korean Peninsula,
and Northeast Asia.

59:44.610 --> 59:47.410
To make progress in this area,

59:47.410 --> 59:51.630
the ROK and the US must
strengthen interoperability.

59:51.630 --> 59:54.500
Also the US must maintain it's focus

59:54.500 --> 59:57.010
and strong initiative to facilitate

59:58.130 --> 01:00:01.700
DPRK denuclearization while the ROK

01:00:01.700 --> 01:00:05.113
supports these efforts
from various angles.

01:00:05.960 --> 01:00:09.120
For instance, the ROK
must contain it's work

01:00:09.120 --> 01:00:10.697
only to defense reform 2.0

01:00:11.620 --> 01:00:15.170
and preparedness for
wartime OPCON transition

01:00:15.170 --> 01:00:18.970
that will guarantee enduring
bridging capabilities

01:00:18.970 --> 01:00:20.683
to each US counterpart,

01:00:22.090 --> 01:00:25.760
while efforts to take
on great responsibility

01:00:25.760 --> 01:00:29.480
should also be seen from
an alliance perspective,

01:00:29.480 --> 01:00:31.400
and the ROK working to share

01:00:31.400 --> 01:00:34.660
a great portion of the defense burden.

01:00:34.660 --> 01:00:38.870
ROK adoption of lead roles
in reducing dependence

01:00:38.870 --> 01:00:42.770
on the US reflect a rise in maturity

01:00:42.770 --> 01:00:45.670
not the alliance weakening.

01:00:45.670 --> 01:00:50.670
The ROK Army has
designated 2.4% of it's GDP

01:00:51.190 --> 01:00:53.610
to the defense budget to strengthen

01:00:53.610 --> 01:00:56.893
various areas related to national defense.

01:00:58.160 --> 01:01:00.610
Efforts are also not restricted

01:01:00.610 --> 01:01:03.500
to just increases in the defense budget,

01:01:03.500 --> 01:01:06.750
but in, on other areas of national power

01:01:06.750 --> 01:01:09.610
where the ROK desire to be more active,

01:01:09.610 --> 01:01:12.303
engaging, and take greater leadership.

01:01:15.250 --> 01:01:18.020
And third, the ROK and US must build

01:01:18.020 --> 01:01:20.410
mutual trust within the alliance,

01:01:20.410 --> 01:01:24.297
and partners, and with the
neighboring countries also.

01:01:24.297 --> 01:01:27.760
The more uncertainty we
may face in the future,

01:01:27.760 --> 01:01:30.010
the more important it will become that

01:01:30.010 --> 01:01:32.330
we share similar national values,

01:01:32.330 --> 01:01:37.330
such as liberal democracy,
free market economy.

01:01:37.790 --> 01:01:39.920
The shared understanding of these values

01:01:39.920 --> 01:01:42.290
will facilitate effort to keep

01:01:42.290 --> 01:01:44.600
the international order intact.

01:01:44.600 --> 01:01:48.580
At times these systems,
institutions, and perspectives

01:01:48.580 --> 01:01:52.120
make alliance management and integration

01:01:52.120 --> 01:01:53.253
more challenging.

01:01:54.148 --> 01:01:56.340
But in respecting them and respecting

01:01:56.340 --> 01:01:57.933
them each in each other,

01:01:59.260 --> 01:02:03.600
they make our partnership more cohesive

01:02:03.600 --> 01:02:06.140
and strategically durable.

01:02:06.140 --> 01:02:09.530
In this way, this too is an important way

01:02:09.530 --> 01:02:11.203
to strengthen deterrence.

01:02:12.172 --> 01:02:14.630
Ultimately it is decisive effort

01:02:14.630 --> 01:02:17.890
are critical to advancing
alliance integration

01:02:17.890 --> 01:02:18.793
and deterrence.

01:02:19.730 --> 01:02:24.000
Ongoing political developments
on Korean Peninsula,

01:02:24.000 --> 01:02:26.250
reflect the close relationship

01:02:26.250 --> 01:02:30.290
between the deterrence,
defense, and diplomacy.

01:02:30.290 --> 01:02:32.740
Maximum pressure, and maximum engagement

01:02:32.740 --> 01:02:35.960
supported by strong deterrence, assurance,

01:02:35.960 --> 01:02:38.930
and a combined alliance
posture has enabled

01:02:38.930 --> 01:02:43.630
recent history, historical
talks with the DPRK.

01:02:43.630 --> 01:02:46.520
Alignments of interest and shared values

01:02:46.520 --> 01:02:49.763
will be important to
continue making progress.

01:02:50.790 --> 01:02:53.950
If the alliance continues to work together

01:02:53.950 --> 01:02:57.503
I believe we can shape a
new strategy environment,

01:02:58.710 --> 01:03:03.330
and avoid the perspective
of a dangerous security trap

01:03:03.330 --> 01:03:04.303
with the DPRK.

01:03:06.528 --> 01:03:09.940
In the military, I must remember

01:03:09.940 --> 01:03:12.940
the lessons of history
that is how challenge

01:03:12.940 --> 01:03:16.170
a task denuclearization is.

01:03:16.170 --> 01:03:20.840
With this history, history
should inform our approaches,

01:03:20.840 --> 01:03:22.730
not restrict them.

01:03:22.730 --> 01:03:25.630
In this way the alliance must advance

01:03:25.630 --> 01:03:28.470
our posture to be adaptive.

01:03:28.470 --> 01:03:33.150
This will enable the ROK and
US to support as possible,

01:03:33.150 --> 01:03:37.080
as possibly our shared
goal for great security,

01:03:37.080 --> 01:03:41.120
peace on the Peninsula,
and civility in the region.

01:03:41.120 --> 01:03:42.120
Thank you very much.

01:03:43.120 --> 01:03:45.370
(applause)

01:03:50.230 --> 01:03:51.670
- Thank you, those were very thoughtful

01:03:51.670 --> 01:03:54.940
and extremely
thought-provoking contributions

01:03:54.940 --> 01:03:57.110
from each of you, thank you.

01:03:57.110 --> 01:04:00.293
The first question goes
to the topic of assurance.

01:04:01.260 --> 01:04:04.530
And for those of you
who are not connisseurs

01:04:04.530 --> 01:04:05.973
of this particular subject,

01:04:06.950 --> 01:04:10.920
most people who are
associate the term assurance

01:04:10.920 --> 01:04:13.940
with a former British Defense Minister,

01:04:13.940 --> 01:04:17.730
Dennis Healy, who
famously asked in the 19,

01:04:17.730 --> 01:04:20.600
who famously argued in the 1960's

01:04:20.600 --> 01:04:23.690
that effective deterrence
of the Soviet Union

01:04:23.690 --> 01:04:27.638
required that we only
be five or 10% credible

01:04:27.638 --> 01:04:28.520
because the cost to the Soviet Union

01:04:28.520 --> 01:04:31.163
of getting it wrong was so catastrophic.

01:04:32.270 --> 01:04:34.710
But effective assurance
of our allies required

01:04:34.710 --> 01:04:37.900
95% credibility or more because,

01:04:37.900 --> 01:04:40.590
again if it went wrong the price to them

01:04:40.590 --> 01:04:41.773
was catastrophic.

01:04:42.640 --> 01:04:45.150
So he pointed out this distinction between

01:04:45.150 --> 01:04:47.740
assurance and deterrence
and their different

01:04:47.740 --> 01:04:49.813
political threshold requirements.

01:04:50.680 --> 01:04:52.890
And the question, which
is probably best answered

01:04:52.890 --> 01:04:56.563
by somebody who offered a
strong disclaimer up front,

01:04:57.411 --> 01:04:59.870
and may be difficult for others to answer

01:04:59.870 --> 01:05:01.760
but I welcome comments, the question

01:05:01.760 --> 01:05:02.760
is how are we doin'?

01:05:04.160 --> 01:05:07.840
How assured are US allies today,

01:05:07.840 --> 01:05:11.660
and particularly in light
of an administration

01:05:11.660 --> 01:05:14.530
that has, shall we say, shown different

01:05:14.530 --> 01:05:17.440
strains of thinking on the topic of

01:05:17.440 --> 01:05:19.610
the importance of assuring allies.

01:05:19.610 --> 01:05:22.210
Would you like to start the conversation?

01:05:22.210 --> 01:05:23.043
- Yeah.

01:05:24.290 --> 01:05:26.090
Well let me start out by saying that

01:05:28.240 --> 01:05:31.400
I'm absolutely confident that in Europe

01:05:31.400 --> 01:05:36.210
and all nations in Europe,
European NATO members

01:05:36.210 --> 01:05:38.440
agree that there's no alternative

01:05:38.440 --> 01:05:41.170
to a trans-atlantic alliance.

01:05:41.170 --> 01:05:43.700
There simply isn't, there
is no European alternative,

01:05:43.700 --> 01:05:46.020
there's no Nordic alternative.

01:05:46.020 --> 01:05:49.150
So if you go back to
Lord Ismay's old formula,

01:05:49.150 --> 01:05:50.670
what is NATO there for?

01:05:50.670 --> 01:05:53.097
To keep the Russians
out, the Germans down,

01:05:53.097 --> 01:05:55.340
and the Americans in, the one thing

01:05:55.340 --> 01:05:57.730
that Europeans can agree on is we need

01:05:57.730 --> 01:05:58.980
to keep the Americans in.

01:06:00.164 --> 01:06:02.650
But I think also that there is a concern

01:06:02.650 --> 01:06:07.650
in Europe that the Americans might be

01:06:08.380 --> 01:06:11.363
walking the walk, but
perhaps not talking the talk.

01:06:12.600 --> 01:06:14.113
At least not all Americans.

01:06:15.060 --> 01:06:16.900
I think there are those who argue

01:06:16.900 --> 01:06:19.420
that European deterrence initiative

01:06:19.420 --> 01:06:22.780
is a clear signal, and very assuring.

01:06:22.780 --> 01:06:25.000
But there are also those who argue that

01:06:25.000 --> 01:06:30.000
assurance also comes in the shape of talk,

01:06:30.120 --> 01:06:33.420
and of course with the
present administration

01:06:34.270 --> 01:06:35.103
I think it would be fair to say

01:06:35.103 --> 01:06:38.300
that in some quarters in
Europe there has been concern.

01:06:38.300 --> 01:06:40.630
And this concern has...

01:06:42.690 --> 01:06:47.613
To a small extent started
sort of, hedging behavior.

01:06:49.570 --> 01:06:52.750
You see new initiatives with the EU,

01:06:52.750 --> 01:06:56.660
you see PESCO, you see French, German,

01:06:56.660 --> 01:06:59.630
European intervention initiatives.

01:06:59.630 --> 01:07:02.167
Let's see what becomes of that.

01:07:02.167 --> 01:07:05.050
But you see an increased collaboration

01:07:05.050 --> 01:07:09.470
and cooperation in the Nordic area,

01:07:09.470 --> 01:07:11.590
so some nations are starting to think,

01:07:11.590 --> 01:07:13.700
well what if?

01:07:13.700 --> 01:07:17.520
And that has led to some hedging

01:07:18.470 --> 01:07:22.120
in terms of looking out for possible,

01:07:22.120 --> 01:07:24.830
not alternatives, because
there's no alternatives perhaps,

01:07:24.830 --> 01:07:27.043
but supplementing arrangements.

01:07:28.170 --> 01:07:30.390
- Let me offer the opportunity to respond

01:07:30.390 --> 01:07:32.070
if anyone else would like to do so.

01:07:32.070 --> 01:07:33.663
Would you like to Air Marshall?

01:07:34.707 --> 01:07:36.320
- Yes, so the second-most fearsome thing

01:07:36.320 --> 01:07:37.920
about Denis Healy, apart from his brain,

01:07:37.920 --> 01:07:42.070
was his eyebrows, so he was
really famous for those two.

01:07:42.070 --> 01:07:44.389
But now I think, you
know without commenting

01:07:44.389 --> 01:07:45.720
on the politics of this, at
the military strategic level

01:07:45.720 --> 01:07:48.240
there's absolutely no
wavering in our sense

01:07:48.240 --> 01:07:52.300
of the United States' commitment
to its responsibilities,

01:07:52.300 --> 01:07:55.410
to itself, and its
relationships with its allies.

01:07:55.410 --> 01:07:58.740
There's no sense whatsoever
of any strategic wobble,

01:07:58.740 --> 01:08:02.760
and we remain as assured
in the United Kingdom

01:08:02.760 --> 01:08:04.890
as we ever have been.

01:08:04.890 --> 01:08:08.050
I think you've got a most
spectacular Secretary of Defense

01:08:08.050 --> 01:08:10.810
and Chairman, and I think
those in whom we trust,

01:08:10.810 --> 01:08:13.530
you know are powerful,
powerful both within

01:08:13.530 --> 01:08:16.020
your nation as voices, but also powerful

01:08:16.020 --> 01:08:17.700
in their intellect and their connections.

01:08:17.700 --> 01:08:22.010
So there is no sense of a wobble
felt in the United Kingdom.

01:08:22.010 --> 01:08:23.230
- Thank you.

01:08:23.230 --> 01:08:27.260
- I would also add that
I don't necessarily

01:08:27.260 --> 01:08:29.710
subscribed to the fact
at all that assurance

01:08:29.710 --> 01:08:33.463
is questionable, or to use
a technical term, wobbly.

01:08:34.650 --> 01:08:37.280
In any case, even if it was, the alliances

01:08:37.280 --> 01:08:40.040
and partnerships we have would transcend

01:08:40.040 --> 01:08:44.320
and go beyond any one
political administration.

01:08:44.320 --> 01:08:47.350
The presence in the
Indo-Pacific in particular

01:08:47.350 --> 01:08:51.000
has been robust and strong from POTUS,

01:08:51.000 --> 01:08:53.970
through the Asian regional
forum with SecState,

01:08:53.970 --> 01:08:56.790
through SecDef at the ADMN++.

01:08:56.790 --> 01:08:59.480
Reinforcing the centrality of Asia,

01:08:59.480 --> 01:09:01.703
establishment of the US Asian mission,

01:09:02.850 --> 01:09:06.200
and also recognizing that the area

01:09:06.200 --> 01:09:08.490
is becoming a center of gravity.

01:09:08.490 --> 01:09:11.940
So this narrative that
the US is pulling out

01:09:11.940 --> 01:09:12.993
is a false narrative.

01:09:13.900 --> 01:09:16.480
The Asia-Pacific, or
Indo-Pacific as we call it now,

01:09:16.480 --> 01:09:19.100
will be a center of
gravity into the future

01:09:19.100 --> 01:09:21.780
and the US will be strong
and robust in that area.

01:09:21.780 --> 01:09:24.430
The US also has a great story to tell

01:09:24.430 --> 01:09:27.632
in the Indo-Pacific,
and it's not often told.

01:09:27.632 --> 01:09:29.810
We look at Chinese investment through

01:09:29.810 --> 01:09:32.710
the BRI initiative, or one belt, one road

01:09:32.710 --> 01:09:35.120
as command of PACOM likes to call it,

01:09:35.120 --> 01:09:38.360
because there's an
exclusivity with that term.

01:09:38.360 --> 01:09:41.380
But foreign direct investment by the US

01:09:41.380 --> 01:09:45.140
significantly outweighs China's
investment in the region.

01:09:45.140 --> 01:09:47.140
And this is a narrative
that we don't always tell,

01:09:47.140 --> 01:09:51.080
the US is very, very engaged both through

01:09:51.080 --> 01:09:53.490
military mechanisms,
through economic mechanisms,

01:09:53.490 --> 01:09:55.970
and private enterprise investment as well.

01:09:55.970 --> 01:09:58.050
So I don't subscribe to the narrative

01:09:58.050 --> 01:10:00.080
that the assurance of US presence

01:10:00.080 --> 01:10:01.863
is in any way in question.

01:10:03.246 --> 01:10:05.420
- I'm happy to move on
to the next question,

01:10:05.420 --> 01:10:07.840
but I'm happy to give the
opportunity to anyone else.

01:10:07.840 --> 01:10:09.471
General, please.

01:10:09.471 --> 01:10:11.523
- From a Japanese point of view,

01:10:12.900 --> 01:10:17.900
international security, there
is a fear of abandonment,

01:10:18.240 --> 01:10:20.530
a fear of entrapment.

01:10:20.530 --> 01:10:25.530
But from what I observed
in my current job,

01:10:26.975 --> 01:10:31.975
for me, I feel very much
assured by our alliance.

01:10:34.120 --> 01:10:36.670
Let me give some perspective.

01:10:36.670 --> 01:10:41.670
First, the relationship among leaders,

01:10:42.350 --> 01:10:46.260
between the leaders of the
US and Japan is very strong.

01:10:46.260 --> 01:10:47.200
When I see the...

01:10:49.350 --> 01:10:53.250
Secretary Mattis and the
Defense Minister's relationship,

01:10:53.250 --> 01:10:57.820
and also when I see
the strong ties between

01:10:57.820 --> 01:11:02.820
the Chairman and our Chief Kawano.

01:11:05.614 --> 01:11:10.614
I feel very strong ties between them.

01:11:12.683 --> 01:11:16.190
And the secondly, when I see, observe...

01:11:18.120 --> 01:11:22.587
Job weakness done around me,

01:11:22.587 --> 01:11:24.627
as the the joint staff you know,

01:11:24.627 --> 01:11:27.403
I really feel strong assurance,

01:11:29.534 --> 01:11:31.513
feel very much assured.

01:11:34.119 --> 01:11:37.170
And I feel that what is
being done with regards

01:11:37.170 --> 01:11:40.510
to the combined planning or something.

01:11:40.510 --> 01:11:43.753
One example is that last year,

01:11:44.630 --> 01:11:49.360
we, Japan had an air review

01:11:50.490 --> 01:11:52.820
in the end of October.

01:11:52.820 --> 01:11:57.170
At that time we planned to, we...

01:12:00.681 --> 01:12:04.120
We coordinated with StratCom

01:12:04.120 --> 01:12:06.920
to send their strategic asset,

01:12:06.920 --> 01:12:08.920
fly over the air review.

01:12:08.920 --> 01:12:12.577
But unfortunately that flight was canceled

01:12:12.577 --> 01:12:14.440
due to the typhoon coming,

01:12:14.440 --> 01:12:19.440
but if that fly-by was realized, that must

01:12:20.930 --> 01:12:25.480
have shown very strong commitment and...

01:12:27.832 --> 01:12:31.807
Of the US side and that
gave Japanese people

01:12:32.810 --> 01:12:35.863
a great sense of assurance, I guess.

01:12:38.788 --> 01:12:40.960
And as the subject develops,

01:12:40.960 --> 01:12:44.490
ground self defense,
maritime self defense forces,

01:12:44.490 --> 01:12:46.470
air self defense forces,

01:12:46.470 --> 01:12:51.470
they have been growing very strong ties

01:12:52.500 --> 01:12:53.773
with their counterpart.

01:12:56.779 --> 01:12:59.751
That's why I feel very
much assured, thank you.

01:12:59.751 --> 01:13:00.970
- Thank you so much.

01:13:00.970 --> 01:13:04.530
So my most important role is
to have us finished on time,

01:13:04.530 --> 01:13:07.820
we have five more minutes in this session,

01:13:07.820 --> 01:13:11.810
a list of nearly 20
questions, I apologize,

01:13:11.810 --> 01:13:13.840
and I'm not sure if the
people standing on the sides

01:13:13.840 --> 01:13:15.110
are waiting to ask questions,

01:13:15.110 --> 01:13:19.050
but I'm gonna ask one last
question of the group,

01:13:19.050 --> 01:13:21.870
and ask you each please
for a brief response,

01:13:21.870 --> 01:13:25.010
which is from a deterrence perspective

01:13:25.010 --> 01:13:27.143
what's your number one capability gap,

01:13:28.342 --> 01:13:31.580
and is that gap something that you close

01:13:31.580 --> 01:13:35.590
in partnership with the
United States or another ally,

01:13:35.590 --> 01:13:38.013
or that you can close yourself?

01:13:39.040 --> 01:13:41.220
And why don't I start at the far end

01:13:41.220 --> 01:13:42.420
of the table down there.

01:13:44.090 --> 01:13:44.973
General Coffelt.

01:13:47.495 --> 01:13:52.300
- I would have to say
time, and that's time to,

01:13:52.300 --> 01:13:54.210
it takes a great amount of effort and time

01:13:54.210 --> 01:13:57.470
to coordinate across all our own agencies,

01:13:57.470 --> 01:14:02.470
department functions, let
alone across other capitals.

01:14:03.300 --> 01:14:06.720
And so, as General Hyten
says, go fast in acquisition,

01:14:06.720 --> 01:14:08.650
I think we also need to learn to go fast

01:14:08.650 --> 01:14:11.040
in the coordination, and
maybe have preplanned options

01:14:11.040 --> 01:14:13.280
and things that we could do to respond

01:14:13.280 --> 01:14:14.880
more decisively, and quickly,

01:14:14.880 --> 01:14:16.770
and rapidly, and these kind of things.

01:14:16.770 --> 01:14:17.603
- Thank you.

01:14:20.050 --> 01:14:23.320
- I'll go a little bit
tactical-operational here,

01:14:23.320 --> 01:14:25.620
but I would say alignment.

01:14:25.620 --> 01:14:28.400
That alignment, and as I mentioned before

01:14:28.400 --> 01:14:31.200
5th gen platforms, 5th gen policy,

01:14:31.200 --> 01:14:33.610
5th gen mission partner environments.

01:14:33.610 --> 01:14:36.030
We can't fight together whatsoever

01:14:36.030 --> 01:14:37.160
it's just not possible.

01:14:37.160 --> 01:14:39.290
So we need those alignment between

01:14:39.290 --> 01:14:41.790
the platforms, the F35's
and everything else

01:14:41.790 --> 01:14:43.800
we're requiring as an allied enterprise,

01:14:43.800 --> 01:14:48.040
the policy structures,
including security policies,

01:14:48.040 --> 01:14:50.270
and also the mission partner environment

01:14:50.270 --> 01:14:52.380
that we can connect with through C2.

01:14:53.799 --> 01:14:55.150
- Excellent, thank you.

01:14:55.150 --> 01:14:57.665
- So I think it's probably political

01:14:57.665 --> 01:14:58.850
and military strategic agility.

01:14:58.850 --> 01:15:02.550
Our ability to read and
understand what might be

01:15:02.550 --> 01:15:04.370
about to happen before it occurs,

01:15:04.370 --> 01:15:07.090
to be ready for that when it has happened,

01:15:07.090 --> 01:15:08.840
and to have the capacity to respond

01:15:09.698 --> 01:15:12.080
en masse together in an aligned sense

01:15:13.060 --> 01:15:15.120
that is decisive.

01:15:15.120 --> 01:15:18.400
I fear that we are trying to deter

01:15:18.400 --> 01:15:20.230
where we might be wanting to disrupt

01:15:20.230 --> 01:15:22.191
before we need to deter.

01:15:22.191 --> 01:15:23.140
But there's a sort of
philosophical approach

01:15:23.140 --> 01:15:25.680
that we should be ahead of this wave

01:15:25.680 --> 01:15:27.280
before it comes across us,

01:15:27.280 --> 01:15:29.920
so I think it's something to do with

01:15:29.920 --> 01:15:31.980
political and military strategic agility,

01:15:31.980 --> 01:15:35.390
is our significant gap.

01:15:35.390 --> 01:15:36.757
- Thank you, General Lee?

01:15:39.971 --> 01:15:43.888
(speaking in foreign language)

01:16:24.194 --> 01:16:25.457
- There will be multiple occasions where

01:16:25.457 --> 01:16:27.600
the capability gap could be happening,

01:16:27.600 --> 01:16:31.120
but for the case of the Republic of Korea,

01:16:31.120 --> 01:16:32.750
I think the major characteristic lies

01:16:32.750 --> 01:16:35.111
on the geopolitical position that the

01:16:35.111 --> 01:16:35.944
Republic of Korea is in.

01:16:35.944 --> 01:16:38.390
And that actually leads to the difference

01:16:38.390 --> 01:16:40.270
in the employment of strategic concepts,

01:16:40.270 --> 01:16:42.660
at the same time, the way we characterize

01:16:42.660 --> 01:16:44.640
the threats could be changed as well

01:16:44.640 --> 01:16:46.270
depending on the geopolitical position

01:16:46.270 --> 01:16:49.010
of each country and within the alliance.

01:16:49.010 --> 01:16:50.850
For the case of ROK and US alliance,

01:16:50.850 --> 01:16:55.658
the US holds or posses a lethal force

01:16:55.658 --> 01:17:00.420
that could be targeting
the massive threats.

01:17:00.420 --> 01:17:02.250
At the same time for
the Republic of Korea,

01:17:02.250 --> 01:17:05.110
we are specialized in the
threat of North Korea.

01:17:05.110 --> 01:17:08.210
So the most important gap to be filled in

01:17:08.210 --> 01:17:10.320
from now on would be the maintaining

01:17:10.320 --> 01:17:12.470
the interoperability
between the two forces,

01:17:12.470 --> 01:17:14.420
and that will be the key in the success

01:17:15.368 --> 01:17:16.201
of our deterrence in the region.

01:17:17.060 --> 01:17:18.060
- Thank you.

01:17:19.011 --> 01:17:20.428
General Kajiwara?

01:17:21.762 --> 01:17:24.525
- With regard to capability gap,

01:17:24.525 --> 01:17:29.130
I think the US forces and
Japanese self-defense forces

01:17:29.130 --> 01:17:33.500
are seeking to go to the same direction.

01:17:33.500 --> 01:17:36.050
I mean they are realizing the capability

01:17:36.050 --> 01:17:40.760
of fighting multi-domain operations.

01:17:40.760 --> 01:17:45.580
But due to the size, due to
some various constraints,

01:17:45.580 --> 01:17:47.843
including budget constraints and so on,

01:17:48.750 --> 01:17:52.711
the capability gap for Japan...

01:17:52.711 --> 01:17:57.038
is kind of difficult to keep up with

01:17:57.038 --> 01:18:02.038
the pace of the force-building
between the US forces

01:18:02.770 --> 01:18:06.020
and the Japanese self-defense forces.

01:18:06.020 --> 01:18:07.020
- Thank you.

01:18:08.060 --> 01:18:10.900
- Well I think when it
comes to deterring Russia,

01:18:10.900 --> 01:18:14.860
I think we're fairly close
to having the capabilities.

01:18:14.860 --> 01:18:18.270
Of course one could want
more maritime capability,

01:18:18.270 --> 01:18:20.570
more follow-on forces,
more readiness, and so on.

01:18:20.570 --> 01:18:23.800
But I think what really,
where we're really challenged

01:18:23.800 --> 01:18:27.090
is when it comes to our
ability to determine

01:18:27.090 --> 01:18:29.260
malicious activities below the threshold

01:18:29.260 --> 01:18:30.223
of armed conflict.

01:18:31.210 --> 01:18:35.010
So far we've been relying
very much on resilience.

01:18:35.010 --> 01:18:37.230
Bouncing back, recovering.

01:18:37.230 --> 01:18:40.698
Which is basically a strategy,

01:18:40.698 --> 01:18:43.750
it's a strategy of deterrence by denial.

01:18:43.750 --> 01:18:45.570
But I think we should still,

01:18:45.570 --> 01:18:47.810
we should keep doing
that, but supplement it

01:18:47.810 --> 01:18:51.760
with picking initiatives from a more

01:18:51.760 --> 01:18:53.943
deterrence-by-punishment
oriented approach.

01:18:54.790 --> 01:18:58.210
It should have costs, it must
have costs for the Russians

01:18:58.210 --> 01:19:00.320
when they do these menacing activities

01:19:00.320 --> 01:19:02.300
below the threshold of armed conflict,

01:19:02.300 --> 01:19:04.930
and I don't believe that we are really

01:19:04.930 --> 01:19:07.333
putting costs off on them at the moment.

01:19:10.750 --> 01:19:12.780
- Well I should have invited the audience

01:19:12.780 --> 01:19:16.280
to answer the question for
yourself ahead of time.

01:19:16.280 --> 01:19:18.570
I think from an American set of ears,

01:19:18.570 --> 01:19:21.950
that was an interesting
and not full-anticipated

01:19:21.950 --> 01:19:24.670
set of responses to the question.

01:19:24.670 --> 01:19:27.440
We didn't hear about gaps
in the nuclear umbrella,

01:19:27.440 --> 01:19:29.010
we didn't hear about missile defense,

01:19:29.010 --> 01:19:32.570
we heard about a variety of
concerns at other levels.

01:19:32.570 --> 01:19:34.773
That was interesting, thank you.

01:19:35.922 --> 01:19:38.020
I apologize to all of the many questioners

01:19:38.020 --> 01:19:40.228
who didn't get the opportunity
to put their question

01:19:40.228 --> 01:19:41.690
in front of the full group,

01:19:41.690 --> 01:19:44.170
but the entire panel will be here

01:19:44.170 --> 01:19:46.060
for the remainder of the proceeding,

01:19:46.060 --> 01:19:48.750
so please find them
somewhere along the way.

01:19:48.750 --> 01:19:51.370
In the meantime though, in
addition to thanking them

01:19:51.370 --> 01:19:54.370
let's also thank
Lieutenant Park for his job

01:19:54.370 --> 01:19:56.144
in translating for us.

01:19:56.144 --> 01:19:57.395
Thanks so much.

01:19:57.395 --> 01:19:59.645
(applause)

01:20:05.710 --> 01:20:07.554
- Thank you Dr. Roberts, and
thank you to our panelists.

01:20:07.554 --> 01:20:11.126
This concludes the day
portion of today's events.

01:20:11.126 --> 01:20:15.216
We'd like to invite you to
a reception in the foyer,

01:20:15.216 --> 01:20:18.353
followed by dinner at 6:30.