WEBVTT 00:00.350 --> 00:03.410 - These are the required eight or nine questions. 00:03.410 --> 00:06.160 Would you answer yes or no audibly to each one, 00:06.160 --> 00:09.090 and have you adhered to applicable laws 00:09.090 --> 00:11.440 or regulations governing conflicts of interest? 00:14.370 --> 00:16.340 - Yes, sir. - Yeah, very good. 00:16.340 --> 00:19.110 Do you agree, when asked to give your personal views, 00:19.110 --> 00:22.920 even if those differ from the administration in power? 00:22.920 --> 00:23.753 - I do, sir. 00:23.753 --> 00:26.430 - Will you ensure your staff complies 00:26.430 --> 00:29.740 with deadlines established for requested communications, 00:29.740 --> 00:32.700 including questions for the record of hearings? 00:32.700 --> 00:33.650 - I will, sir. 00:33.650 --> 00:36.000 - Will you cooperate in providing witnesses 00:36.000 --> 00:40.340 and briefers in response to congressional requests? 00:40.340 --> 00:41.173 - Yes, sir. 00:41.173 --> 00:44.370 - Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal 00:44.370 --> 00:46.700 for their testimony or briefings? 00:46.700 --> 00:47.533 - Yes, they will. 00:47.533 --> 00:48.630 - Do you agree if confirmed, 00:48.630 --> 00:50.920 to appear and testify upon request 00:50.920 --> 00:53.313 before this committee? - [LTG Lyons] I do, sir. 00:53.313 --> 00:54.950 - Do you agree to provide documents, 00:54.950 --> 00:58.970 including copies of electronic forms of communication 00:58.970 --> 01:00.450 in a timely manner when requested 01:00.450 --> 01:02.670 by a duly constituted committee, 01:02.670 --> 01:04.430 or to consult with the committee 01:04.430 --> 01:08.360 regarding the basis for any good faith delay 01:08.360 --> 01:11.980 or denial in providing such documents? 01:11.980 --> 01:12.813 - Yes, sir. 01:12.813 --> 01:14.480 - And finally, have you assumed any duties 01:14.480 --> 01:16.490 or undertaken any actions which would appear 01:16.490 --> 01:20.730 to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? 01:20.730 --> 01:21.563 - I have not. 01:21.563 --> 01:22.396 - Thank you. 01:29.450 --> 01:32.000 General Lyons you've been nominated to lead 01:32.000 --> 01:34.590 Transcom during a critical time in history. 01:34.590 --> 01:39.590 Our capacity to mobilize or deploy forces across the globe 01:39.850 --> 01:43.390 is ever more critical and crucial, 01:43.390 --> 01:46.250 given the contested environment described 01:46.250 --> 01:48.400 in the National Defense Strategy. 01:48.400 --> 01:51.050 In this environment we can no longer assume 01:51.050 --> 01:54.230 that US forces will have uncontested access 01:54.230 --> 01:56.440 to international airspace and sea lanes, 01:56.440 --> 01:59.390 which I'm gonna pursue in a little bit of detail, 02:01.394 --> 02:04.050 in the problems we had in the South China Sea. 02:04.900 --> 02:07.550 If confirmed your job will be to ensure 02:07.550 --> 02:11.480 that our operational plans contain valid assumptions 02:11.480 --> 02:15.670 for how our service members will get to the fight 02:15.670 --> 02:17.220 and how they will be sustained in 02:17.220 --> 02:20.680 a contested forward environment. 02:20.680 --> 02:22.235 In light of your experience serving 02:22.235 --> 02:25.130 as a former deputy commander of Transcom 02:25.130 --> 02:28.320 and director of logistics on the joint staff, 02:28.320 --> 02:31.780 we know you are well qualified to tackle these challenges. 02:31.780 --> 02:34.260 What we ask of you today is an honest assessment 02:34.260 --> 02:39.260 of Transcom's current ability to fulfill co-com requirements 02:41.060 --> 02:45.040 as well as your plans to improve the resiliency 02:45.040 --> 02:47.400 while maintaining efficiency. 02:47.400 --> 02:49.930 We know that you'll have the right responses to that. 02:49.930 --> 02:51.570 Senator Reed. 02:51.570 --> 02:52.980 - Well, thank's very much, Mr. Chairman. 02:52.980 --> 02:54.970 I want to join you in welcoming 02:54.970 --> 02:56.570 General Lyons to the committee 02:56.570 --> 02:59.640 and thank you for your dedicated service in the army 02:59.640 --> 03:01.650 and to the nation in general. 03:01.650 --> 03:04.470 I also wanna thank your family that are here today, 03:04.470 --> 03:07.720 your wife, Maureen, and your children, Karen and Dillon, 03:07.720 --> 03:10.460 for this important sacrifice also. 03:10.460 --> 03:12.270 The men and women of Transcom perform duties 03:12.270 --> 03:14.380 that sustain the whole Department of Defense effort 03:14.380 --> 03:16.882 in protecting our nation's security. 03:16.882 --> 03:19.420 With the competitive edge and its ability to deploy 03:19.420 --> 03:21.040 and sustain America's armed forces, 03:21.040 --> 03:24.540 Transcom provides DOD with unique capabilities 03:24.540 --> 03:27.380 that some may have come to take for granted. 03:27.380 --> 03:29.420 Transcom forces are busy supporting all of 03:29.420 --> 03:30.860 the combatant duties every day, 03:30.860 --> 03:32.880 and without these Transcom forces, 03:32.880 --> 03:35.300 the United States would be at a significant disadvantage 03:35.300 --> 03:37.260 almost everywhere in the world. 03:37.260 --> 03:40.580 Transcom faces a number of daunting tasks. 03:40.580 --> 03:42.270 Given that you, General Lyons, have served for 03:42.270 --> 03:45.340 two years as deputy commander of Transcom, 03:45.340 --> 03:47.750 these are not new issues for you. 03:47.750 --> 03:49.870 One primary concern is addressing a unique set 03:49.870 --> 03:52.430 of cyberthreats, because Transcom must work 03:52.430 --> 03:54.230 extensively with private sector entities 03:54.230 --> 03:56.570 in the transportation and shipping industries 03:56.570 --> 04:00.240 to support DOD deployment operations. 04:00.240 --> 04:02.970 This situation creates increased exposure 04:02.970 --> 04:04.850 of Transcom to the commercial internet, 04:04.850 --> 04:06.910 and creates challenges for operating 04:06.910 --> 04:09.220 our strategic transportation system. 04:09.220 --> 04:10.890 General Lyons, I look forward to your views 04:10.890 --> 04:14.250 on how to ensure that Transcom's network is secure 04:14.250 --> 04:17.010 and that sensitive information is protected, 04:17.010 --> 04:19.090 and indeed, that the commercial networks 04:19.090 --> 04:21.820 that you work with are secure and 04:21.820 --> 04:23.520 will operate during an emergency. 04:24.440 --> 04:27.830 The Ready Reserve Force, a group of cargo ships 04:27.830 --> 04:29.970 held in readiness by the Maritime Administration, 04:29.970 --> 04:32.040 is aging and will need to be modernized 04:32.040 --> 04:33.520 over the next decade. 04:33.520 --> 04:35.250 Last year, the committee authorized the department 04:35.250 --> 04:36.950 to start a program to re-capitalize the 04:36.950 --> 04:38.910 Ready Reserve Force by authorizing DOD 04:38.910 --> 04:42.060 to purchase up to two foreign built vessels. 04:42.060 --> 04:44.390 While the Navy moves forward on a plan to design 04:44.390 --> 04:47.590 a family of auxiliary vessels for a number of issues, 04:47.590 --> 04:52.240 including recapitalization of the Ready Reserve Force. 04:52.240 --> 04:54.180 This year, the administration asked for authority 04:54.180 --> 04:56.830 to purchase up to 24 foreign built vessels 04:56.830 --> 04:58.600 to modernize this force. 04:58.600 --> 05:00.540 The committee is proposing to only increase 05:00.540 --> 05:02.130 the current authorization to allow the 05:02.130 --> 05:03.740 department to procure up to seven 05:03.740 --> 05:05.850 foreign-built vessels for that purpose. 05:05.850 --> 05:07.080 General Lyons, I look forward to hearing 05:07.080 --> 05:09.190 what criteria we should consider 05:09.190 --> 05:12.360 as we undertake this large modernization program, 05:12.360 --> 05:14.040 and also, I think you understand, 05:14.040 --> 05:16.020 we would prefer that it be conducted 05:16.020 --> 05:18.290 by American yards with American workers. 05:19.150 --> 05:20.680 In addition to the Ready Reserve Force, 05:20.680 --> 05:22.270 the Defense Department also needs to ensure 05:22.270 --> 05:24.820 that the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, 05:24.820 --> 05:26.580 or Craft program, 05:26.580 --> 05:28.070 which provides as much as 40 percent 05:28.070 --> 05:29.640 of wartime airlift needs, 05:29.640 --> 05:32.550 remains viable after operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 05:32.550 --> 05:34.140 and will be able to provide 05:34.140 --> 05:36.410 needed search crafts in the future. 05:36.410 --> 05:37.670 General, I'm interested in your views 05:37.670 --> 05:38.780 on the state of this fleet 05:38.780 --> 05:41.870 and if anything needs to be done to ensure their readiness. 05:41.870 --> 05:44.040 In his testimony to the committee earlier this year, 05:44.040 --> 05:46.010 General McDew stated that DOD has been 05:46.010 --> 05:49.200 conducting analysis to assess mobility requirements 05:49.200 --> 05:51.020 for an environment where our mobility forces 05:51.020 --> 05:52.330 would be challenged. 05:52.330 --> 05:54.340 I also understand that the department intends 05:54.340 --> 05:56.920 to share those results later this year. 05:56.920 --> 05:57.980 The committee would appreciate 05:57.980 --> 06:00.940 any update you may have on these analysis. 06:00.940 --> 06:02.770 Thank you again for your decades of service, 06:02.770 --> 06:04.380 and I look forward to your testimony. 06:04.380 --> 06:05.320 Thank you. 06:05.320 --> 06:07.760 - Thank you, Senator Reed. 06:07.760 --> 06:09.780 General Lyons, why don't you go ahead 06:09.780 --> 06:11.320 and give an opening statement 06:11.320 --> 06:14.060 and start by introducing your fine family. 06:14.910 --> 06:16.310 - Senator, thank you. 06:16.310 --> 06:18.570 Centering off, rank member Reed 06:18.570 --> 06:20.990 and distinguished members of the committee, 06:20.990 --> 06:23.620 thank you very much for this opportunity 06:23.620 --> 06:24.960 to appear before you today. 06:24.960 --> 06:26.780 And more importantly, thank you 06:26.780 --> 06:29.240 for what you do every day for our soldiers, 06:29.240 --> 06:31.220 sailors, airmen, and marines. 06:32.510 --> 06:34.170 For your unwavering support. 06:34.170 --> 06:36.490 I wanted to appear before you today 06:36.490 --> 06:38.810 as the President's nominee to be the Commander 06:38.810 --> 06:41.010 of the United States Transportation Command. 06:41.950 --> 06:43.560 I'd also like to thank the president, 06:43.560 --> 06:46.440 Secretary Mattis, Chairman Dunford, 06:46.440 --> 06:47.990 for their trust and confidence. 06:49.366 --> 06:50.199 At the same time, 06:50.199 --> 06:53.470 I'd like to recognize my good friend and former boss, 06:53.470 --> 06:54.760 General Darren McDew who I know 06:54.760 --> 06:57.941 has appeared before you several occasions, 06:57.941 --> 06:59.640 and his wife Evelyn for their extraordinary 06:59.640 --> 07:02.140 contribution to our nation over the last 36 years. 07:03.030 --> 07:05.440 If confirmed I recognize that I indeed 07:05.440 --> 07:06.600 have big shoes to fill. 07:07.810 --> 07:11.230 The Transcom team is absolutely exceptional, 07:11.230 --> 07:12.730 and I have been the beneficiary 07:12.730 --> 07:14.810 of their unparalleled professionalism 07:14.810 --> 07:16.210 throughout my entire career. 07:17.590 --> 07:18.530 As you stated Senator, 07:18.530 --> 07:20.710 my family is with me today. 07:20.710 --> 07:23.000 My wife of nearly 30 years and 07:23.000 --> 07:26.430 16 moves around the globe, Maureen, 07:26.430 --> 07:29.350 my better half who has an infinite appreciation 07:29.350 --> 07:31.150 and love for our military families, 07:32.290 --> 07:35.380 and our children, Kara, who is a middle school 07:35.380 --> 07:38.510 special education teacher here in Virginia, 07:38.510 --> 07:39.460 and our son Dillon, 07:39.460 --> 07:42.830 who's a rising high school junior 07:42.830 --> 07:45.320 that aspires to attend the military academy 07:45.320 --> 07:47.480 at West Point in the future. 07:47.480 --> 07:49.110 While I take my responsibilities as a 07:49.110 --> 07:51.341 flag officer very, very seriously, 07:51.341 --> 07:55.450 they would tell you and remind me routinely 07:55.450 --> 07:58.270 that my most important job, job number one, 07:58.270 --> 08:00.290 is being a good dad and a good husband. 08:01.850 --> 08:04.030 As this committee well understands, 08:04.030 --> 08:06.310 the United States and our global partners 08:06.310 --> 08:09.900 face an increasingly complex security environment 08:09.900 --> 08:12.390 for which we must field a joint force 08:12.390 --> 08:14.410 that's relevant to our times. 08:15.320 --> 08:18.250 One that can compete, deter, 08:18.250 --> 08:21.380 and if necessary respond and win decisively. 08:23.030 --> 08:25.870 Transcom's mission is to project 08:25.870 --> 08:29.270 and sustain military power globally 08:29.270 --> 08:31.670 at our time and place of choosing, 08:31.670 --> 08:34.010 providing an immediate force tonight 08:34.010 --> 08:36.060 and a decisive force when needed. 08:37.680 --> 08:40.210 If confirmed, I look forward to working 08:40.210 --> 08:42.440 with this committee to ensure that 08:42.440 --> 08:45.350 DOD's ability to project power globally 08:45.350 --> 08:47.070 remains a comparative advantage, 08:47.910 --> 08:49.750 capable of providing multiple options 08:49.750 --> 08:51.500 to our national leadership, 08:51.500 --> 08:54.340 and multiple dilemmas to potential adversaries. 08:55.200 --> 08:56.630 And with that, sir, 08:56.630 --> 08:59.360 I look forward to the committee's questions. 08:59.360 --> 09:01.597 - Thank you, General Lyons. 09:01.597 --> 09:03.800 Maureen, I have to say this, 09:03.800 --> 09:07.080 because every time I hear that, 09:07.080 --> 09:10.060 in your case, you've been married 30 years, 09:10.060 --> 09:13.080 and the countless times that you've been moved around, 09:13.970 --> 09:16.270 my wife and I've been married twice that long, 09:17.210 --> 09:19.561 and she actually was born in the house 09:19.561 --> 09:22.030 across the street from we live now. 09:22.030 --> 09:27.030 The furthest she has moved in 60 years is 30 feet. 09:27.497 --> 09:28.330 (everyone laughs) 09:28.330 --> 09:29.170 So, quite a contrast. 09:30.560 --> 09:34.580 Let's start off, I have these, 09:34.580 --> 09:37.380 can you uncover that one over there? 09:37.380 --> 09:38.340 Good. 09:38.340 --> 09:41.040 That's the same as this that you have in front of you. 09:41.990 --> 09:44.240 Those of us who've been over there certainly, 09:45.160 --> 09:47.910 I've been over there with Senator Rounds and 09:47.910 --> 09:50.890 Senator Ernst, and I'm sure some of the 09:50.890 --> 09:53.391 others on this platform have, too, 09:53.391 --> 09:56.770 and we look and see, what is the reason, 09:56.770 --> 09:58.330 we know the reason for this. 09:58.330 --> 10:03.330 We know how aggressive China is in the South China Sea. 10:03.430 --> 10:08.430 We know they have some seven outposts right now, 10:09.450 --> 10:11.810 some 3,000 acres. 10:11.810 --> 10:14.680 Now, they could've put these things anywhere. 10:14.680 --> 10:17.570 I would always hasten to say, it's illegal anyway, 10:17.570 --> 10:19.530 because they don't own that property, 10:19.530 --> 10:21.860 but they could've put them anywhere, couldn't they? 10:21.860 --> 10:25.830 They have put them exactly where they are, 10:25.830 --> 10:27.680 and if you look at that chart there, 10:27.680 --> 10:29.540 look at the one in front of you, 10:29.540 --> 10:32.390 you have to wonder 10:32.390 --> 10:34.450 why they chose those particular areas. 10:34.450 --> 10:36.720 Now, your responsibility is to make sure 10:36.720 --> 10:38.500 our sea lanes are not, 10:41.350 --> 10:43.480 are not going to present a problem in our 10:43.480 --> 10:45.900 being able to defend this country 10:45.900 --> 10:48.850 and move our goods and services around, 10:48.850 --> 10:51.140 and so I'd like to have you look at that 10:51.140 --> 10:53.070 and look at the one in front of you 10:53.070 --> 10:56.680 and try to analyze where is this obstructing 10:56.680 --> 10:58.170 the things that we need the most? 10:58.170 --> 11:00.380 Why did they choose those particular areas. 11:00.380 --> 11:02.130 Have you given any thought to that? 11:05.390 --> 11:09.110 - Senator, we clearly support a free 11:09.110 --> 11:10.720 and prosperous Pacific, 11:11.690 --> 11:13.760 and long term we'd like nothing more than 11:13.760 --> 11:16.110 a military relationship that's transparent 11:16.110 --> 11:18.130 and based on non aggression, 11:18.130 --> 11:20.450 but I think to your point exactly, 11:20.450 --> 11:24.380 we can't ignore that China's military growth 11:24.380 --> 11:27.733 and the use of their military to coerce their neighbors 11:27.733 --> 11:31.460 and to compete in a way that violates 11:31.460 --> 11:33.520 international norms and standards 11:34.430 --> 11:38.290 and what I would characterize as unlawful growth 11:38.290 --> 11:40.850 of these platforms in the South China Sea, 11:40.850 --> 11:42.957 is of great concern, I know, 11:42.957 --> 11:44.810 for the National Security Apparatus, 11:44.810 --> 11:48.350 and specifically, for Admiral Davidson at INDOPACOM. 11:48.350 --> 11:52.225 - You know, probably better than we do, 11:52.225 --> 11:53.200 but over there we, 11:53.200 --> 11:55.200 and of course talking to Admiral Harris, 11:56.670 --> 12:01.670 it's almost as if they're preparing for World War III. 12:01.760 --> 12:04.290 It's having effect on our allies over there, 12:04.290 --> 12:06.090 because as we visit them, 12:06.090 --> 12:08.590 they're not sure which side they're gonna be on, 12:09.540 --> 12:12.190 because China is clearly making much more 12:12.190 --> 12:16.490 aggressive moves in that part of the world, 12:16.490 --> 12:18.290 and I just can't help but think that 12:19.600 --> 12:23.300 it goes beyond just impairing our sea lanes 12:23.300 --> 12:24.910 and creating problems for us. 12:28.320 --> 12:30.060 - Senator, I agree with your assessment. 12:30.060 --> 12:32.510 I think what we see today is 12:32.510 --> 12:33.970 some pretty fierce competition 12:33.970 --> 12:35.800 below the threshold of open-arm conflict. 12:35.800 --> 12:36.700 - [Mr. Inhofe] Yeah. 12:36.700 --> 12:39.300 - We see it in these kinds of areas, 12:39.300 --> 12:40.900 we see it in foreign investment. 12:41.830 --> 12:45.790 We see it in infiltration through subcontractor networks. 12:45.790 --> 12:50.060 We see it in reconnaissance across our cyber networks, 12:50.060 --> 12:53.280 and it's of great concern for all of us. 12:53.280 --> 12:54.113 - Yeah, it is. 12:54.113 --> 12:56.350 Now, you mentioned in your opening statement 12:56.350 --> 12:58.720 your friend General McDew. 12:58.720 --> 13:02.120 He was before this committee not long ago, 13:02.120 --> 13:07.010 and it's really kind of shocking to me, 13:07.010 --> 13:08.960 we went back and studied the history 13:08.960 --> 13:12.740 of all of the flagships that we have had. 13:12.740 --> 13:17.740 Back in the 50s we had 1,288 U.S. flagships, 1,200. 13:20.290 --> 13:23.290 Now that dropped down in the 1990s to 408, 13:23.290 --> 13:27.343 and in 2013 there were 106 and today 82. 13:30.670 --> 13:31.640 How serious is it? 13:31.640 --> 13:33.500 Did we have way too many in the beginning, 13:33.500 --> 13:35.300 or do we just don't have enough now? 13:38.770 --> 13:40.570 - Senator, it's a serious concern, 13:40.570 --> 13:42.030 and I think General McDew talked to you 13:42.030 --> 13:44.050 about whether we were a maritime nation 13:44.050 --> 13:45.350 or not a maritime nation. 13:45.350 --> 13:46.290 - [Mr. Inhofe] That's right, he did. 13:46.290 --> 13:47.570 - I know that collectively, 13:47.570 --> 13:49.620 we believe in this room, we are a maritime nation, 13:49.620 --> 13:50.720 and need to remain so. 13:51.890 --> 13:56.100 The U.S. Flag Fleet has dwindled over time, 13:56.100 --> 13:58.720 and I certainly appreciate that Congress's support 13:58.720 --> 14:00.870 for programs like the Maritime Security Program 14:00.870 --> 14:02.340 has retained that capability, 14:03.190 --> 14:05.610 but without those kinds of programs, 14:05.610 --> 14:08.730 I'm not sure we'd have a Maritime Fleet underneath 14:08.730 --> 14:12.540 the U.S. flag for a very wide number of reasons. 14:12.540 --> 14:14.600 But this is concerning for our national defense 14:14.600 --> 14:17.360 because that not only offers capacity, 14:17.360 --> 14:20.190 it also provides the Merchant Mariners that sail 14:20.190 --> 14:23.370 our Sealift fleets to deliver the search fleet, 14:23.370 --> 14:26.760 and it also provides global international networks 14:26.760 --> 14:30.340 that we routinely use and these partners. 14:31.310 --> 14:33.230 - In his testimony to us, 14:33.230 --> 14:38.230 he recommended that we buy used, 14:38.480 --> 14:43.480 24 additional systems. 14:43.800 --> 14:44.950 Do you agree with that? 14:45.850 --> 14:47.210 - Senator, I do. 14:47.210 --> 14:50.390 I acknowledge the Navy has a plan 14:50.390 --> 14:53.230 to extend the service life of some vessels, 14:53.230 --> 14:54.830 to acquire used vessels, 14:54.830 --> 14:56.670 probably out of the embassy program 14:56.670 --> 14:58.360 but acknowledged many of them have been 14:58.360 --> 14:59.880 built in foreign shipyards, 14:59.880 --> 15:02.000 and then ultimately, in the out years, 15:02.000 --> 15:05.070 procure a new Sealift capability. 15:05.070 --> 15:06.860 But Senator I appreciate your support on that, 15:06.860 --> 15:10.400 because that fleet is aging rapidly, 15:10.400 --> 15:13.860 and most of that fleet, about half that fleet, 15:13.860 --> 15:15.350 will age out by 2028. 15:17.170 --> 15:19.420 - And I agree with that. Senator Reed. 15:19.420 --> 15:21.010 - Thanks very much Chairman, 15:21.010 --> 15:23.980 and thank you again General, for your service. 15:23.980 --> 15:27.340 As we spoke previously at your visit, 15:27.340 --> 15:29.570 one of the major challenges is cyber. 15:31.390 --> 15:34.280 There's a possibility you won't be able to move anything, 15:34.280 --> 15:37.040 not because we don't have ships planes, et cetera, 15:37.040 --> 15:39.960 but there's no way to communicate with them 15:39.960 --> 15:42.420 or they're being misdirected, et cetera, 15:42.420 --> 15:46.312 and your difficulty is you're not just within a .mil, 15:46.312 --> 15:49.320 you have to play in the .com world too, 15:50.645 --> 15:55.645 and can you tell us what we have to do, 15:55.850 --> 15:57.170 I'll say we have to do, 15:58.600 --> 16:01.650 to make you operational in any circumstance. 16:05.300 --> 16:06.540 - Senator I would characterize, 16:06.540 --> 16:08.140 and I know General McDew has characterized 16:08.140 --> 16:09.550 this the same way for you, 16:10.480 --> 16:12.980 that the cyber vulnerabilities that we see today 16:12.980 --> 16:16.730 are a significant threat to our strategic logistics, 16:16.730 --> 16:18.430 and frankly our national security. 16:20.200 --> 16:21.400 I would suggest to you that there's 16:21.400 --> 16:23.660 not necessarily a silver bullet here 16:23.660 --> 16:25.790 but that we have to treat the cyber domain as 16:25.790 --> 16:27.320 an operational domain in the most 16:27.320 --> 16:29.620 classic sense of maneuver. 16:29.620 --> 16:31.610 We must understand our adversaries, 16:31.610 --> 16:33.730 their capabilities and intentions. 16:33.730 --> 16:37.220 We must understand our key terrain in the cyber area, 16:37.220 --> 16:40.546 and how to protect it at echelon, 16:40.546 --> 16:42.330 and then we must have an offensive capability 16:42.330 --> 16:46.990 that deters rogue actors from entering our networks. 16:46.990 --> 16:49.580 And so it's a multifaceted problem 16:49.580 --> 16:52.180 for which there's not a single answer, 16:52.180 --> 16:53.790 but it's a layered answer. 16:53.790 --> 16:56.080 It begins with good cyber hygiene, 16:56.080 --> 16:57.890 good infrastructure, 16:57.890 --> 16:59.580 good cyber defense measures, 16:59.580 --> 17:01.190 and ultimately an offensive capability 17:01.190 --> 17:03.640 with the right kind of policy and authorities behind it. 17:03.640 --> 17:05.220 - I think that's a very sound strategy. 17:05.220 --> 17:08.530 I'm beginning to wonder if it's a more specific area. 17:09.490 --> 17:11.800 You deal with lots of commercial entities, 17:13.692 --> 17:15.270 and you have to be able to ensure 17:15.270 --> 17:17.500 that they have good cyber hygiene. 17:17.500 --> 17:20.110 Again, it's a little easier for .mil to look, 17:20.110 --> 17:22.240 you can delegate that, 17:22.240 --> 17:24.300 inspect that, et cetera. 17:24.300 --> 17:27.860 Within your contracts I think you have to start thinking 17:27.860 --> 17:31.380 about much more rigorous requirements 17:31.380 --> 17:33.860 in terms of these private entities, 17:33.860 --> 17:35.630 that they have experts, 17:35.630 --> 17:38.500 that those experts are communicating with their boards, 17:38.500 --> 17:42.110 that they have some red team operation, 17:42.110 --> 17:45.760 which you can look at the results, et cetera. 17:47.650 --> 17:48.990 Is that something that you're gonna 17:48.990 --> 17:50.900 get involved with aggressively? 17:50.900 --> 17:52.330 I hope so. 17:52.330 --> 17:54.100 - Sir I can assure you if confirmed, 17:54.100 --> 17:55.800 that will be a top priority. 17:55.800 --> 17:58.200 I think you know that General McDew 17:58.200 --> 18:00.320 has started that effort with contract language. 18:00.320 --> 18:02.420 This isn't unique to the mobility enterprise, 18:02.420 --> 18:04.290 but I think he's certainly leading the way. 18:05.280 --> 18:09.920 That in my view, is a great first step, 18:09.920 --> 18:12.650 but there's gotta be a much richer dialogue 18:12.650 --> 18:13.770 and information sharing, 18:13.770 --> 18:15.590 and some of our partners, our commercial partners, 18:15.590 --> 18:16.990 are much better prepared, 18:16.990 --> 18:18.490 and are incentivized to be much better prepared, 18:18.490 --> 18:20.340 particularly in the airline side, 18:20.340 --> 18:22.100 than other partners who are less prepared, 18:22.100 --> 18:25.890 and we saw that play out about a year ago in the attack. 18:25.890 --> 18:27.740 - And frankly one of the, 18:27.740 --> 18:29.300 our adversaries are clever. 18:29.300 --> 18:30.660 They go in the back door. 18:30.660 --> 18:32.230 So it might not be that the airline 18:32.230 --> 18:34.160 with all the bells and whistles, 18:34.160 --> 18:36.340 but it's that maintenance company 18:36.340 --> 18:38.170 that's a small local operation, 18:38.170 --> 18:39.840 and they get in there and then suddenly, 18:39.840 --> 18:42.180 they've got the whole system paralyzed. 18:42.180 --> 18:44.160 Again, I think the more you do, 18:44.160 --> 18:45.190 the better off we'll be. 18:45.190 --> 18:47.050 Let me shift gears briefly, as that, 18:47.050 --> 18:49.040 as I mentioned in my opening statement, 18:49.040 --> 18:53.430 there's been a study of the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet. 18:53.430 --> 18:55.650 Can you give us any preliminary conclusions, 18:57.660 --> 18:59.820 a bit of a heads up of what we could expect 18:59.820 --> 19:02.090 to be asked to do over the next several years 19:02.090 --> 19:03.840 to improve the fleet? 19:05.940 --> 19:08.910 - Senator, I think you're referring to the NDAA directed 19:08.910 --> 19:10.850 Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study? 19:10.850 --> 19:12.250 - [Mr. Reed] Yes, sir. 19:12.250 --> 19:14.110 - And sir, that study is ongoing. 19:14.110 --> 19:16.160 I know there's a report out due in the fall. 19:16.160 --> 19:17.910 I haven't seen any initial results. 19:19.570 --> 19:21.130 That will be a phased approach. 19:23.680 --> 19:25.650 They'll look today against the National Defense Strategy, 19:25.650 --> 19:27.300 but the National Defense Strategy 19:28.505 --> 19:29.590 and the planning associated with that 19:29.590 --> 19:30.510 will continue to evolve, 19:30.510 --> 19:32.360 and we'll continue to have to evaluate that. 19:32.360 --> 19:33.570 But what I would point out, though, 19:33.570 --> 19:35.520 is this is the first study that will 19:35.520 --> 19:37.580 consider contested environments 19:37.580 --> 19:39.160 consistent with the national defense strategy, 19:39.160 --> 19:41.210 so we're all eagerly awaiting to see how 19:41.210 --> 19:42.850 we need to emerge the mobility enterprise 19:42.850 --> 19:45.830 to make sure we remain relevant, to your point, 19:45.830 --> 19:47.950 to be able to project power at the end 19:47.950 --> 19:50.390 of very long and contested lines of communication. 19:50.390 --> 19:54.460 - So we would expect the results in the fall, 19:54.460 --> 19:57.830 so that we'd have those ready for at least our next NDAA. 19:58.670 --> 20:01.660 But if anything comes to your attention prior to that, 20:01.660 --> 20:03.300 either through the study or otherwise, 20:03.300 --> 20:06.010 please communicate with the committee. 20:06.010 --> 20:07.000 - Sir, I will, thank you. 20:07.000 --> 20:08.100 - [Mr.Reed] Thank you very much, General. 20:08.100 --> 20:09.600 - Thank you, sir. 20:09.600 --> 20:11.220 - [Mr. Inhofe] Thank you, Senator Reed. 20:11.220 --> 20:12.790 Senator Rounds. 20:12.790 --> 20:14.887 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 20:14.887 --> 20:18.640 General first of all, thank you for you service. 20:18.640 --> 20:22.270 Thank you to your family for their sacrifice, as well. 20:24.180 --> 20:27.070 We're hearing from GAO and others that 20:27.070 --> 20:29.680 decisions about transportation infrastructure, 20:29.680 --> 20:31.730 such as ports, 20:31.730 --> 20:34.210 and equipment, have struggled because of 20:34.210 --> 20:37.840 number one, a lack of prioritization by the services, 20:37.840 --> 20:41.050 and number two, a lack of visibility to Transcom 20:41.050 --> 20:44.620 and the larger community of transportation professionals 20:44.620 --> 20:46.680 where there may be existing issues. 20:46.680 --> 20:49.110 To your knowledge, is DOD working to establish 20:49.110 --> 20:51.670 some sort of internal capability to 20:51.670 --> 20:54.095 expose capability gaps and funding needs 20:54.095 --> 20:56.710 for transportation infrastructure? 20:56.710 --> 20:59.260 We spoke about this in my office a little bit, 20:59.260 --> 21:00.880 with regarding to how we, 21:00.880 --> 21:02.650 there's no reason to have a ship sitting there waiting 21:02.650 --> 21:05.300 if you can't get men and equipment to a port. 21:05.300 --> 21:07.850 At the same time, we have aging infrastructure. 21:07.850 --> 21:10.010 We've talked about an infrastructure bill here, 21:10.010 --> 21:12.730 and I think there's a possibility of 21:12.730 --> 21:14.830 something being put together if we recognize, 21:14.830 --> 21:18.210 for defense purposes, the need to improve 21:18.210 --> 21:20.710 aging infrastructure across this country, 21:20.710 --> 21:22.040 not only transportation systems, 21:22.040 --> 21:23.820 but ports and so forth as well. 21:23.820 --> 21:25.380 Can you talk about that a little bit, 21:25.380 --> 21:27.030 and the challenges that you face? 21:28.710 --> 21:30.530 - Sir, I appreciate that. 21:31.650 --> 21:35.150 There is a program that we discussed briefly in your office. 21:36.350 --> 21:39.490 Highways, railways, seaports for national defense. 21:40.330 --> 21:43.450 Transcom, as the executor for the department 21:43.450 --> 21:45.070 does run and manage that program 21:45.070 --> 21:47.940 through the Transportation Engineering Agency. 21:47.940 --> 21:49.890 I commit to you, as I did in your office, 21:49.890 --> 21:52.180 to go back and look thoroughly, end to end, 21:52.180 --> 21:53.720 to see where that infrastructure may be 21:53.720 --> 21:56.840 lagging behind our power projection needs, 21:56.840 --> 21:58.920 and sir, I'll come back to you on that if that's okay. 21:58.920 --> 22:00.340 - That's fine. 22:00.340 --> 22:01.173 Are you aware, 22:01.173 --> 22:04.380 I think Senator Reed has brought up 22:04.380 --> 22:06.020 a very important part of the discussion 22:06.020 --> 22:08.170 that we have right now with regard to cyber 22:08.170 --> 22:11.210 and threats that cyber creates for us. 22:11.210 --> 22:13.710 Have you had the opportunity to look at 22:13.710 --> 22:16.570 and observe the different types of threats 22:16.570 --> 22:17.403 that have been 22:20.390 --> 22:22.870 to our knowledge, have been attempted to slow down 22:22.870 --> 22:26.270 or to test our capability to deliver men 22:26.270 --> 22:28.290 and equipment within the United States, 22:28.290 --> 22:30.170 within our own borders, by outside, 22:30.170 --> 22:32.680 and in many cases, near peer competitors? 22:34.870 --> 22:39.870 - Sir, we have seen where our adversaries have indeed, 22:40.300 --> 22:43.620 whether intentionally so or collaterally, 22:43.620 --> 22:46.090 affected the ability of our commercial partners. 22:46.090 --> 22:47.590 There is no question about it. 22:48.620 --> 22:51.970 It's a serious vulnerability and a serious threat. 22:54.100 --> 22:55.860 And so we certainly have seen that. 22:55.860 --> 22:59.824 I think you're very familiar with the Maersk incident 22:59.824 --> 23:04.060 and the subsequent FedEx simultaneous attack there. 23:07.081 --> 23:09.020 Fortunately for U.S. Transcom, 23:09.020 --> 23:10.360 they have a very solid working 23:10.360 --> 23:12.100 relationship with those carriers, 23:12.100 --> 23:15.160 and were able to work through that and continue operations, 23:15.160 --> 23:18.610 but I don't wanna for a second dismiss 23:18.610 --> 23:21.570 or diminish the issue at hand. 23:21.570 --> 23:26.570 - I think part of the reason for my question on this 23:26.990 --> 23:29.530 is to bring focus on the fact that 23:29.530 --> 23:30.840 we really don't have the resources 23:30.840 --> 23:32.410 within the Department of Defense. 23:32.410 --> 23:34.450 We rely on outside partners, 23:34.450 --> 23:36.190 and in the case of a major conflict, 23:36.190 --> 23:37.570 we're gonna rely very, very heavily 23:37.570 --> 23:40.350 on outside partners to be able to coordinate 23:40.350 --> 23:43.280 the delivery of men and equipment 23:43.280 --> 23:46.110 to the ports or to overseas destinations, 23:46.110 --> 23:49.310 and those separate independent parties, 23:49.310 --> 23:51.172 those other businesses, 23:51.172 --> 23:54.220 they are subject to the attacks 23:54.220 --> 23:56.470 of outside near peer competitors when it comes to cyber. 23:56.470 --> 23:58.430 If they can slow down and delay those, 23:58.430 --> 24:00.210 that impacts our ability to actually 24:00.210 --> 24:01.860 be successful in a confrontation. 24:03.060 --> 24:04.820 - Sir, I completely agree. 24:04.820 --> 24:07.080 Our ability to project the force is 24:07.080 --> 24:09.540 inexorably linked to our commercial partners. 24:09.540 --> 24:11.760 We've got to make sure that we don't have 24:11.760 --> 24:14.640 a dependency that's unique or a single point of failure, 24:14.640 --> 24:18.590 and that we have sufficient depth and resiliency, 24:18.590 --> 24:20.480 and that is indeed one of the issues 24:20.480 --> 24:21.390 that's gonna be looked at in the 24:21.390 --> 24:23.540 Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study. 24:23.540 --> 24:24.960 - One of the areas that we do not 24:24.960 --> 24:27.210 rely on outside resources to do, 24:27.210 --> 24:30.800 and that's to refuel our aircraft in-flight, 24:30.800 --> 24:33.440 so our in-flight refueling capabilities 24:33.440 --> 24:35.850 are totally held within DOD. 24:35.850 --> 24:37.790 You have a responsibility to making sure 24:37.790 --> 24:39.970 that we have access to the appropriate 24:39.970 --> 24:41.470 number of aircraft that we need in order 24:41.470 --> 24:45.580 to move large numbers of men and equipment by air. 24:45.580 --> 24:47.130 Can you talk a little bit about right now, 24:47.130 --> 24:49.210 what the KC-46 means, 24:49.210 --> 24:52.430 and what happens if we are delayed in the implementation, 24:52.430 --> 24:56.660 or at least the delivery of those in an on-time schedule 24:56.660 --> 24:59.850 with regard to replacing the AGKC-135's? 25:01.120 --> 25:03.880 - Sir, I think you know that our tanker force 25:03.880 --> 25:06.820 is the lifeblood of our ability to project airpower, 25:06.820 --> 25:08.620 no question about it. 25:08.620 --> 25:11.320 I'll defer to the Air Force Programatics 25:11.320 --> 25:12.790 in terms of the cost, schedule, 25:12.790 --> 25:14.100 and performance on the program. 25:14.100 --> 25:16.420 I know they anticipate to take first delivery 25:16.420 --> 25:19.466 sometime in the fall, in the October time frame. 25:19.466 --> 25:22.670 But from a combatant commander's perspective, 25:22.670 --> 25:24.920 we're clearly focused on the requirement 25:24.920 --> 25:26.810 to maintain a viable tanker fleet 25:26.810 --> 25:28.130 that can project power globally 25:28.130 --> 25:29.890 at our time and place of choosing, 25:29.890 --> 25:31.860 and we acknowledge that today, 25:31.860 --> 25:33.060 we're short on that capacity 25:33.060 --> 25:34.360 against our high end requirements, 25:34.360 --> 25:36.420 so we've got some ground to make up, Senator. 25:36.420 --> 25:37.253 - Thank you. 25:37.253 --> 25:38.420 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 25:38.420 --> 25:39.480 - [Mr. Inhofe] Thank you, Senator Rounds. 25:39.480 --> 25:41.110 Senator Peters. 25:41.110 --> 25:42.490 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 25:42.490 --> 25:45.400 and General, thank you for your service 25:45.400 --> 25:50.330 and for your family's sacrifice over these many years. 25:50.330 --> 25:52.600 General Lyons, earlier this week, 25:52.600 --> 25:55.220 the Washington Post published what 25:55.220 --> 25:56.680 I thought was a disturbing article, 25:56.680 --> 25:58.040 and it was under the headline, 25:58.040 --> 25:59.450 and I'll quote here, 25:59.450 --> 26:02.050 "If they needed to fend off war with Russia, 26:02.050 --> 26:04.100 "U.S. military leaders worry they 26:04.100 --> 26:06.850 "might not get there in time." 26:06.850 --> 26:09.740 The article details logistical issues in Europe, 26:09.740 --> 26:13.440 including railroads with different sized track gauge, 26:13.440 --> 26:17.690 limits on when heavy equipment can be moved on public roads 26:17.690 --> 26:19.740 and the customs paperwork requirements 26:19.740 --> 26:22.730 imposed by many of these countries, as well. 26:22.730 --> 26:24.970 And according to the Washington Post, 26:24.970 --> 26:28.000 quote, again, "During at least one White House exercise 26:28.000 --> 26:30.660 "that gamed out a European war with Russia, 26:30.660 --> 26:34.440 "the logistical stumbles contribute to a NATO loss." 26:34.440 --> 26:38.130 Last June, I saw some of this first-hand, 26:38.130 --> 26:40.690 when I traveled to Latvia and Lithuania, 26:40.690 --> 26:41.970 including the Suwalki Gap, 26:41.970 --> 26:45.420 to observe the Saber Strike Exercise, 26:45.420 --> 26:48.590 and after seeing that exercise and asking lots of questions, 26:48.590 --> 26:51.630 I came away concerned that our plans for moving equipment 26:51.630 --> 26:54.030 and personnel in the region will be challenged, 26:54.030 --> 26:54.880 to say the least, 26:55.790 --> 26:58.430 and while the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence missions 26:58.430 --> 27:01.250 in the Baltic's and Poland are a start, 27:01.250 --> 27:02.083 as you're well aware, 27:02.083 --> 27:03.160 the bulk of our equipment 27:03.160 --> 27:05.330 is far away from that site, 27:05.330 --> 27:08.750 and to arrive in time to provide a credible defense 27:08.750 --> 27:11.270 is probably not likely in the short term, 27:11.270 --> 27:13.170 and fighting our way back, 27:13.170 --> 27:15.880 after that gap may be breached, 27:15.880 --> 27:17.450 fighting our way back to support 27:17.450 --> 27:20.430 our allies in the NATO alliance would be more challenging. 27:20.430 --> 27:21.510 The cost would be higher, 27:21.510 --> 27:25.740 both in equipment and in human losses as well, 27:25.740 --> 27:28.260 so it seems that many of the logistics challenges in Europe 27:28.260 --> 27:31.590 remain unimproved from what I had seen. 27:31.590 --> 27:32.970 So I would like you to just comment, 27:32.970 --> 27:34.910 share your views with the committee 27:34.910 --> 27:37.070 on the logistical challenges we face in Europe 27:37.070 --> 27:38.620 and how you plan to address it. 27:40.250 --> 27:43.350 - Senator, those challenges that you articulate 27:43.350 --> 27:46.390 that were laid out in an article are real today. 27:47.560 --> 27:50.600 They range from geo-political access, 27:50.600 --> 27:53.540 in other words, cross-boundary coordination 27:53.540 --> 27:55.000 through the EU and NATO, 27:55.000 --> 27:55.950 though there is a tremendous amount 27:55.950 --> 27:57.820 of work going on in that area, 27:57.820 --> 28:01.210 to some of the infrastructure issues that you alluded to, 28:01.210 --> 28:04.030 to frankly, some transportation capacity issues, 28:04.030 --> 28:05.420 i.e.; for example rail. 28:07.470 --> 28:10.740 So the theater that we grew up in 28:12.140 --> 28:13.800 has changed quite dramatically. 28:14.830 --> 28:16.870 The good news is that the border 28:16.870 --> 28:19.970 has shifted wide to the east, 28:19.970 --> 28:24.420 so it's a much better position to be in. 28:24.420 --> 28:26.480 I won't speak for General SCAP 28:26.480 --> 28:30.070 with regards to whether we're moving fast enough, 28:30.070 --> 28:31.660 at the political level, 28:31.660 --> 28:34.820 to satisfy his appetite. 28:34.820 --> 28:36.520 I know from a military perspective, 28:36.520 --> 28:37.720 the challenges are real. 28:38.640 --> 28:40.720 I've certainly engaged, at my level, 28:40.720 --> 28:42.100 with my NATO counterparts 28:43.260 --> 28:46.010 and the other nations there, as well as EUCOM, 28:46.010 --> 28:47.680 and we'll be prepared, 28:47.680 --> 28:48.840 if confirmed for this job, 28:48.840 --> 28:50.340 to help in any way that I can. 28:51.210 --> 28:52.620 - Appreciate that. 28:52.620 --> 28:54.410 As you know General, autonomous systems 28:54.410 --> 28:57.390 are also advancing quite rapidly, 28:57.390 --> 28:58.800 and to deal with some of the issues 28:58.800 --> 28:59.980 that we have with workforce, 28:59.980 --> 29:01.610 some of my colleagues have already mentioned 29:01.610 --> 29:05.020 workforce issues with pilots, mariners, and truckers. 29:05.020 --> 29:07.700 In fact, your predecessor called it a hurt locker, 29:07.700 --> 29:09.390 in regards to workforce of 29:09.390 --> 29:11.750 what you're dealing with at Transcom. 29:11.750 --> 29:13.640 A great deal of work is being done in autonomy. 29:13.640 --> 29:14.670 Self-driving vehicles, 29:14.670 --> 29:16.500 something I'm very involved in, 29:16.500 --> 29:18.260 on the civilian side, which we're looking 29:18.260 --> 29:21.740 for major, quick advances in the next year or two. 29:21.740 --> 29:24.650 TACOM in Michigan is doing leading work 29:24.650 --> 29:26.710 for the Army on self-driving vehicles, 29:26.710 --> 29:29.220 particularly in logistics operations. 29:29.220 --> 29:30.460 So I just wanted to get your comments. 29:30.460 --> 29:31.830 Where do you see that going, 29:31.830 --> 29:33.550 what do we need to be focused on, 29:33.550 --> 29:35.910 and how do you think it'll improve the situation? 29:36.990 --> 29:40.510 - Senator, I think there are enormous opportunities here. 29:40.510 --> 29:43.640 As you indicated the technology is here today. 29:43.640 --> 29:45.020 Frankly, many of the barriers are 29:45.020 --> 29:47.900 gonna be cultural more so than any technology. 29:49.470 --> 29:52.160 I know Department of Transportation's 29:52.160 --> 29:55.070 working in this area very heavily, as well. 29:55.070 --> 29:56.570 I think it's a tremendous opportunity. 29:56.570 --> 29:58.880 I also think that in the area 29:58.880 --> 30:00.920 of technology and innovation, 30:00.920 --> 30:02.880 when you think about what's going on, 30:02.880 --> 30:06.060 in terms of data analytics and big data 30:06.060 --> 30:07.820 and machine learning and artificial intelligence, 30:07.820 --> 30:09.540 there are enormous opportunities 30:09.540 --> 30:11.360 for the joint logistics enterprise 30:11.360 --> 30:12.800 and mobility enterprise specifically, 30:12.800 --> 30:14.280 and I think there's plenty of opportunities 30:14.280 --> 30:15.650 to work in this area. 30:15.650 --> 30:16.690 - [Mr. Peters] Very good, thank you, General. 30:16.690 --> 30:21.430 - Thank you, sir. 30:21.430 --> 30:22.900 - [Mr. Inhofe] Thank you, Senator Peters. 30:22.900 --> 30:23.840 Senator Ernst. 30:25.390 --> 30:26.223 - Thank you, Mr. Chair. 30:26.223 --> 30:27.550 General, thank you very much, 30:27.550 --> 30:29.650 and thank you to your family as well, 30:29.650 --> 30:31.780 for joining us here today. 30:31.780 --> 30:34.090 And I just wanna echo what Senator Peters 30:34.090 --> 30:36.350 has said about autonomous vehicles. 30:36.350 --> 30:39.250 Dr. Mike Griffin, the Undersecretary of Defense 30:39.250 --> 30:41.680 for Research and Engineering testified 30:41.680 --> 30:43.640 in front of my Emerging Threats 30:43.640 --> 30:45.040 and Capabilities subcommittee, 30:45.040 --> 30:47.930 and he spoke about the potential life saving 30:47.930 --> 30:50.950 use of autonomous trucks and other vehicles 30:50.950 --> 30:53.360 to transport those military supplies, 30:53.360 --> 30:55.310 and I saw that firsthand serving 30:55.310 --> 30:58.770 as a transportation company commander in OIF1, 30:58.770 --> 31:00.840 the dangers that our convoys face 31:00.840 --> 31:02.550 while they're out on the roads, 31:02.550 --> 31:05.360 and I think all of us here on this committee 31:05.360 --> 31:07.460 have seen the devastating injuries 31:07.460 --> 31:10.150 that've been caused by IEDs 31:10.150 --> 31:12.700 while our drivers are out on the roads. 31:12.700 --> 31:16.730 And so I would like to see more opportunity 31:16.730 --> 31:19.020 in leveraging the technology of 31:19.020 --> 31:22.040 autonomous vehicles, where appropriate. 31:22.040 --> 31:23.780 I do think it could be life saving 31:23.780 --> 31:26.470 and very beneficial to our forces, 31:26.470 --> 31:28.960 so thank you for your comments there. 31:28.960 --> 31:30.840 You also mentioned, sir, 31:30.840 --> 31:33.990 artificial intelligence and data, 31:33.990 --> 31:35.610 and I've been working a lot 31:35.610 --> 31:38.610 on artificial intelligence technology, 31:38.610 --> 31:40.190 again, with Senator Peters. 31:40.190 --> 31:43.610 We have some work that we're doing together there as well, 31:43.610 --> 31:46.460 and Transcom inherently deals with 31:46.460 --> 31:50.850 and manages extraordinary amounts of data, 31:50.850 --> 31:54.630 and it will be well served by focusing on AI. 31:54.630 --> 31:55.510 What are your thoughts, 31:55.510 --> 31:59.190 if you could give us just a little bit more on AI, 31:59.190 --> 32:01.490 and if confirmed, how will you use it 32:01.490 --> 32:04.530 to enable Transcom to manage the data 32:04.530 --> 32:07.910 and also improve those logistical networks. 32:10.870 --> 32:13.830 - Well, ma'am, I think you are exactly right, 32:13.830 --> 32:16.000 and every time I scratch on this issue, 32:16.960 --> 32:18.480 I do it from the perspective of, 32:18.480 --> 32:20.940 how are we doing analytics across the enterprise, 32:22.095 --> 32:23.250 and in order to get to just 32:23.250 --> 32:24.970 the basic discussion of analytics, 32:24.970 --> 32:27.180 you've gotta get to the discussion about data 32:27.180 --> 32:29.710 and the infrastructure that provides that data. 32:29.710 --> 32:31.760 And today, we've got a legacy infrastructure, 32:31.760 --> 32:33.390 IT networks and our data networks 32:33.390 --> 32:36.510 that we've just emerged over many, many decades. 32:36.510 --> 32:37.880 It is very, very difficult, 32:37.880 --> 32:40.250 and I applaud General McDew's initiative 32:40.250 --> 32:41.750 to move to a cloud-based solution 32:41.750 --> 32:43.890 to virtualize many of those platforms, 32:43.890 --> 32:45.370 which then moves us in a direction 32:45.370 --> 32:47.040 to be able to leverage the data for 32:47.040 --> 32:48.260 the things like you're describing, 32:48.260 --> 32:50.180 which I think are far more powerful, 32:50.180 --> 32:51.150 which is machine learning, 32:51.150 --> 32:53.450 potentially artificial intelligence, 32:53.450 --> 32:55.450 and I think the logistics enterprise, 32:55.450 --> 32:58.190 because it largely does reside in the unclassified domain, 32:58.190 --> 32:59.405 does offer a tremendous opportunity 32:59.405 --> 33:02.760 to benchmark industry and move in that direction. 33:02.760 --> 33:04.120 And ma'am, if confirmed, 33:04.120 --> 33:07.320 I certainly intend to focus on that. 33:07.320 --> 33:11.100 - Yeah, I will, and I'll assume confirmation for you, 33:11.100 --> 33:15.230 and I do think we need to work a lot more in this area. 33:15.230 --> 33:17.840 We have a number of private industry partners 33:17.840 --> 33:22.840 that are leveraging AI to great use 33:23.230 --> 33:27.489 so I look forward to working with you on that. 33:27.489 --> 33:30.350 Sir, the 2018 National Defense Strategy 33:30.350 --> 33:33.610 prioritizes building new global partnerships 33:33.610 --> 33:36.810 and strengthening our currents relationships. 33:36.810 --> 33:38.410 Can you talk a little bit about the 33:38.410 --> 33:40.510 importance of those global partnerships, 33:40.510 --> 33:42.860 we've already heard discussions about different 33:43.830 --> 33:46.678 transportation lanes, sea lanes and so forth, 33:46.678 --> 33:48.630 but how will you work within the 33:48.630 --> 33:51.000 defense enterprise to increase our access 33:51.000 --> 33:53.560 to those ports and airfields around the globe, 33:53.560 --> 33:55.390 and if you could just in the minute and a half 33:55.390 --> 33:58.630 we have left also maybe tell us strategically 33:58.630 --> 34:01.080 who do you believe is our best partner out there? 34:03.610 --> 34:07.400 - Ma'am, you know from your time in service, 34:07.400 --> 34:08.910 and by the way thank you, 34:08.910 --> 34:10.410 I think our transportation companies are 34:10.410 --> 34:11.880 unsung heroes across the battlefield. 34:11.880 --> 34:12.713 - [Mrs. Ernst] Thank you, I appreciate that. 34:12.713 --> 34:14.680 - I've worked with many of them in my time. 34:15.984 --> 34:18.060 The deployment and distribution enterprise 34:18.060 --> 34:22.440 is a interconnected system of systems if you would, 34:22.440 --> 34:26.320 that ranges from routes to nodes and modes 34:26.320 --> 34:29.610 and access are all part of that. 34:29.610 --> 34:32.840 We cannot assume that we'll have geo access 34:32.840 --> 34:34.730 when we need it unless we work on that 34:34.730 --> 34:37.710 on a day to day basis and so global posture 34:37.710 --> 34:39.940 is extraordinarily important and our parties 34:39.940 --> 34:42.790 and allies around the globe provide that 34:42.790 --> 34:46.100 capability for us to be able to move the force 34:46.100 --> 34:50.090 when and where we would want to. 34:50.090 --> 34:52.749 On the record ma'am, we have so many great 34:52.749 --> 34:56.236 allies and partners if I mentioned one 34:56.236 --> 34:58.740 I'd be in trouble by several other friends 34:58.740 --> 35:01.640 so if you don't mind ma'am I'll defer on that answer. 35:01.640 --> 35:03.740 - It would just be good to have many, many 35:03.740 --> 35:05.720 solid partners around the globe. 35:05.720 --> 35:07.980 I appreciate your time very much sir and 35:07.980 --> 35:09.580 thanks again to your family for being here. 35:09.580 --> 35:10.790 Thank you Mr. Chair. 35:10.790 --> 35:12.060 - [Mr. Inhofe] Thank you Senator Ernst. 35:12.060 --> 35:12.893 - Thank you ma'am. 35:12.893 --> 35:13.980 - [Mr. Inhofe] Senator Blumenthal? 35:14.840 --> 35:16.260 - Thank you Chairman, 35:16.260 --> 35:19.690 thank you for your service Lieutenant Lyons 35:19.690 --> 35:21.040 and to your family as well. 35:23.623 --> 35:26.440 I want to ask you a couple questions about, 35:26.440 --> 35:28.090 first of all, space. 35:30.080 --> 35:34.540 How serious are the current threats from 35:34.540 --> 35:39.540 our adversaries in the space domain to communications 35:39.780 --> 35:44.440 as well as other aspects of the kind of 35:45.610 --> 35:47.860 mobility capabilities that you would command? 35:51.140 --> 35:54.580 - Sir, space is absolutely a contested environment, 35:54.580 --> 35:56.760 I know that you know that. 35:56.760 --> 36:00.000 We see it everyday and it's critical 36:00.000 --> 36:02.160 to the success of the joint force. 36:02.160 --> 36:04.490 I know there's a lot of work going on in this area 36:04.490 --> 36:06.500 for the mobility enterprise specifically. 36:06.500 --> 36:09.040 When we think about global communications. 36:09.040 --> 36:10.460 There's a significant reliance on that. 36:10.460 --> 36:12.680 We've got to look at redundancies as well as 36:12.680 --> 36:15.620 position navigation and timing. 36:15.620 --> 36:17.650 And other capabilities are linked to space 36:17.650 --> 36:19.814 at a higher classification level. 36:19.814 --> 36:21.060 - Do you think there ought to be an 36:21.060 --> 36:25.000 independent space force as has been proposed? 36:25.990 --> 36:29.050 - Senator we've heard the direction of the President, 36:29.050 --> 36:31.040 I know that the secretary has asked 36:31.040 --> 36:33.590 the deputy to form a group to look at that. 36:33.590 --> 36:35.830 I know whatever they work to move in that 36:35.830 --> 36:40.048 direction will include Congressional involvement 36:40.048 --> 36:43.210 to be able to stand up another service. 36:45.370 --> 36:46.850 - What would be the factors that would 36:46.850 --> 36:50.754 argue in favor of it from your standpoint? 36:50.754 --> 36:54.160 - Sir, not having grown up in that community 36:54.160 --> 36:56.130 or looked at it thoroughly I'd be probably 36:56.130 --> 36:59.290 a little bit unfair to comment on that. 37:00.710 --> 37:03.460 - Let me ask you about a separate area, 37:03.460 --> 37:07.062 climate change which affects the movement of 37:07.062 --> 37:11.810 goods and people all around the world under your command. 37:12.920 --> 37:15.710 How significant is climate change as a factor 37:15.710 --> 37:17.740 to be considered by this nation in planning 37:17.740 --> 37:20.670 our future in terms of the mobility enterprise? 37:22.710 --> 37:25.090 - Senator, in terms of the mobility enterprise 37:25.090 --> 37:26.910 I wouldn't say that it's something that we're 37:26.910 --> 37:30.480 integrating into our war planning efforts, per se. 37:30.480 --> 37:32.610 But I think as you elude 37:35.630 --> 37:37.940 there are potential scenarios where 37:37.940 --> 37:39.930 underlying climate change could cause 37:40.810 --> 37:42.820 a great deal of famine and stress, 37:42.820 --> 37:46.370 and a population that could result in conflict 37:46.370 --> 37:47.970 in a region or across the globe. 37:50.750 --> 37:53.090 It's a consideration from that perspective. 37:53.090 --> 37:56.500 - And in terms of rising sea levels that you would 37:56.500 --> 37:59.511 encounter both in this country and elsewhere, 37:59.511 --> 38:02.210 that the United States has facilities, 38:02.210 --> 38:03.930 will it be a potential threat or 38:03.930 --> 38:06.200 at least a factor to be considered? 38:06.200 --> 38:08.340 - Senator I'd have to go back and do some study, 38:08.340 --> 38:10.410 some scientific work to see 38:10.410 --> 38:13.380 the rate of rise over time, 38:13.380 --> 38:14.680 what that would look like and 38:14.680 --> 38:16.650 I'd have to come back to you on that one sir. 38:19.030 --> 38:20.916 - Don't you think it is an appropriate 38:20.916 --> 38:22.610 issue to be considered? 38:24.560 --> 38:25.393 - Senator I do. 38:27.340 --> 38:29.340 In my current position in my previous businesses 38:29.340 --> 38:30.910 it's not something that I've looked at the 38:30.910 --> 38:33.010 science on so it'd be somewhat unfair 38:33.010 --> 38:34.310 for me to comment on that. 38:34.310 --> 38:35.400 - I understand, well, 38:35.400 --> 38:38.680 very respectfully if you could look at it, 38:38.680 --> 38:42.440 I don't mean to add to the work that you have to do 38:42.440 --> 38:45.710 but I think it is a factor that should be 38:45.710 --> 38:49.350 considered in terms of the ports and the facilities. 38:49.350 --> 38:54.150 In fact the availability of the kind of 38:54.150 --> 38:57.980 assistance that my colleagues have eluded to. 38:57.980 --> 39:01.010 Finally, I want to return to cyber. 39:02.650 --> 39:07.143 This issue of the potential intrusion or invasion 39:09.990 --> 39:12.190 of our adversary, particularly the Russians, 39:13.570 --> 39:17.030 has been well known publicly for some time. 39:17.030 --> 39:20.340 In fact earlier this year reports indicated 39:20.340 --> 39:23.780 that the Russian hacking group known as Fancy Bear, 39:23.780 --> 39:27.490 also responsible for interfering in our 2016 elections, 39:27.490 --> 39:31.880 targeted 87, that's 87 United States 39:31.880 --> 39:35.050 defense contractors who work on weapons systems 39:35.050 --> 39:37.530 critical to our national security. 39:38.820 --> 39:40.620 They use the same phishing techniques 39:40.620 --> 39:44.170 that they employed in the 2016 election. 39:44.170 --> 39:46.427 They hacked emails, seeking to collect 39:46.427 --> 39:49.760 classified information and I know you are 39:49.760 --> 39:52.790 familiar with the report the Associated Press 39:52.790 --> 39:54.760 report February of this year. 39:57.960 --> 40:02.960 How can we support companies as we mentioned 40:04.780 --> 40:08.810 that are working with us, in fact have access to 40:08.810 --> 40:11.730 some of the most highly classified and important 40:11.730 --> 40:16.730 information to avoid these kinds of attacks? 40:20.340 --> 40:21.870 - Sir I wish I had the answer for that. 40:21.870 --> 40:24.800 This is an enormous problem facing us 40:24.800 --> 40:27.100 today and the implications to our 40:27.100 --> 40:29.410 national security are significant. 40:29.410 --> 40:30.731 I don't know that there's one answer here 40:30.731 --> 40:33.580 but clearly there are tiers and clear defense 40:33.580 --> 40:36.700 contractors that you may be speaking of, 40:37.880 --> 40:40.030 we need to be clear about the standards 40:41.210 --> 40:42.880 in terms of cyber hygiene, 40:42.880 --> 40:44.380 defense, et cetera, et cetera. 40:45.800 --> 40:49.060 There is enormous competition going on this space. 40:49.060 --> 40:50.500 Intellectual property theft, 40:52.130 --> 40:54.410 cyber econo sense, et cetera. 40:54.410 --> 40:57.710 So I don't have a single answer but I can 40:57.710 --> 41:00.030 tell you that in a mobility enterprise 41:00.030 --> 41:01.920 I'm certainly committed, if confirmed, 41:01.920 --> 41:04.820 to work on that with Cyber Com a well as 41:05.850 --> 41:08.640 Department of Homeland Securities and many others. 41:08.640 --> 41:10.080 But to your point Senator, 41:10.080 --> 41:12.240 this is much bigger than just the 41:12.240 --> 41:14.750 logistics or the mobility enterprise. 41:16.390 --> 41:18.210 - It is much bigger and we need answers. 41:18.210 --> 41:19.240 Thank you Mr. Chairman. 41:19.240 --> 41:21.030 - [Mr. Inhofe] Thank you Senator Blumenthal, 41:21.030 --> 41:21.880 Senator Tillis? 41:22.800 --> 41:24.260 - Thank you Mr. Chairman, 41:24.260 --> 41:25.750 General Lyons thank you for being here, 41:25.750 --> 41:28.580 congratulations to your family and thank you both, 41:28.580 --> 41:30.880 you and your family for your years of service. 41:32.861 --> 41:35.300 I want to get to the business component 41:35.300 --> 41:37.830 of your job and look ahead. 41:38.800 --> 41:42.930 We've had a good opportunity over this 41:42.930 --> 41:46.370 Congress to provide funding that gives you 41:46.370 --> 41:48.570 some certainty over the next two years and 41:48.570 --> 41:50.610 then zero certainty after that. 41:51.910 --> 41:55.702 If we have to deal with sequestration 41:55.702 --> 42:00.370 in two years how does that affect your job? 42:00.370 --> 42:01.420 What are the first things that are 42:01.420 --> 42:03.190 going to be directly affected by having to 42:03.190 --> 42:04.990 deal with the sequestration cuts? 42:08.640 --> 42:12.880 - Senator the first impact directly is on readiness, 42:12.880 --> 42:14.980 is on war fighting readiness. 42:14.980 --> 42:18.340 The services will see it first and 42:18.340 --> 42:21.230 we'll see it secondarily in the mobility enterprise 42:21.230 --> 42:23.330 largely because the service is from the mobility 42:23.330 --> 42:26.370 enterprise through a reimbursable baseline. 42:28.665 --> 42:31.330 So I want to thank this committee for the last 42:31.330 --> 42:35.480 two years of budgets which have been very very helpful. 42:35.480 --> 42:36.820 But I think to your point Senator, 42:36.820 --> 42:38.810 it's really really important that we have 42:38.810 --> 42:41.550 steady and predictable long terms approach 42:41.550 --> 42:43.930 to modernization and readiness. 42:43.930 --> 42:47.240 - I think what we could hope for the best 42:47.240 --> 42:50.170 but plan for the worst if we're dealing 42:50.170 --> 42:51.780 with those sorts of cuts. 42:51.780 --> 42:53.570 What sorts of things do you think you 42:53.570 --> 42:57.840 can focus on to possibly fund resources 42:57.840 --> 42:59.680 within the enterprise or within the current 42:59.680 --> 43:01.790 expected funding streams to weather some of that? 43:01.790 --> 43:03.130 I'll give you one example, 43:03.130 --> 43:05.750 I think General McDew mentioned a 43:05.750 --> 43:08.690 requirement for some 22 or 24 ships, 43:08.690 --> 43:09.930 I don't remember the exact number, 43:09.930 --> 43:13.260 transport ships that he had identified 43:13.260 --> 43:15.330 sources existing capabilities. 43:15.330 --> 43:17.000 I think the number was somewhere around 43:17.000 --> 43:18.900 20, 25 million dollars per ship, 43:20.500 --> 43:22.760 but we have some hesitance about authorizing 43:22.760 --> 43:25.630 that in favor of spending 800 million dollars 43:25.630 --> 43:28.090 per ship and taking whatever length of time 43:28.090 --> 43:30.070 it would take to produce those. 43:30.070 --> 43:31.260 Are those the sorts of things that you 43:31.260 --> 43:33.100 think are worth looking at to free up 43:33.100 --> 43:35.230 resources so you can still complete your mission 43:35.230 --> 43:37.720 and maybe deal with the bubble that we have, 43:37.720 --> 43:40.980 if we have a shortfall in funding in two years? 43:40.980 --> 43:43.750 - Senator, absolutely, I absolutely agree. 43:44.600 --> 43:47.600 I know the Navy's got to balance that. 43:47.600 --> 43:49.530 They've got some enormous recapitalization 43:49.530 --> 43:53.980 efforts on the horizon as well as the Sealift 43:53.980 --> 43:55.370 and the useful life issue that their 43:55.370 --> 43:58.070 contending with and so I think it's reasonable 43:58.070 --> 44:02.160 if you could come up with a much less expensive 44:02.160 --> 44:03.660 option like the one you eluded to 44:03.660 --> 44:05.680 which is acquiring used vessels off 44:06.540 --> 44:09.080 perhaps the Maritime Security Program under 44:09.080 --> 44:11.390 U.S. flag but have been built perhaps 44:11.390 --> 44:13.400 in a foreign shipyard which would take 44:13.400 --> 44:16.110 Congressional approval might be a better way 44:16.110 --> 44:18.470 to depressurize the Navy's challenge 44:19.900 --> 44:22.680 in order to spend 30 million dollars per ship, 44:22.680 --> 44:24.550 or 25 million dollars per ship, 44:24.550 --> 44:26.920 as opposed to 750 million dollars per ship. 44:26.920 --> 44:29.310 That's a rather significant trade 44:29.310 --> 44:31.740 although I think we would all acknowledge 44:31.740 --> 44:34.740 the need to continue to maintain a healthy 44:34.740 --> 44:36.590 industrial base in the United States of America 44:36.590 --> 44:37.730 as well for ship building. 44:37.730 --> 44:40.040 - Maybe it doesn't need to be all or nothing. 44:40.040 --> 44:43.000 Maybe it could be immediate needs based on 44:43.000 --> 44:45.810 resources available out your needs so that you 44:45.810 --> 44:49.600 are maintaining the industrial base but I think 44:49.600 --> 44:51.550 that it's important when you get into this role, 44:51.550 --> 44:54.330 I'm obviously going to support your nomination 44:54.330 --> 44:57.810 that you do a top to bottom review of the 44:57.810 --> 45:01.270 programs and recognize all of them probably 45:01.270 --> 45:03.560 were founded in some rational basis 45:03.560 --> 45:06.430 on business case but when you have to deal with 45:06.430 --> 45:09.040 less than ideal circumstances of sequestration 45:09.040 --> 45:10.540 you've got to make some tough choices 45:10.540 --> 45:13.120 and I think it'd be very helpful for this committee 45:13.120 --> 45:16.160 to know what those tough choices may have to be 45:16.160 --> 45:18.660 to maybe give us more incentive to do our jobs. 45:18.660 --> 45:20.880 Repeal sequestration and actually start funding 45:20.880 --> 45:22.830 on a consistent out year basis. 45:22.830 --> 45:23.920 Thank you I'll look forward to 45:23.920 --> 45:25.540 supporting your nomination. 45:25.540 --> 45:27.540 - Thank you sir, I'll certainly do that. 45:29.190 --> 45:31.410 - [Mr. Inhofe] Thank you Senator Tillis, 45:31.410 --> 45:32.243 Senator Kane. 45:33.250 --> 45:34.680 - Thank you Mr. Chair and General Lyons, 45:34.680 --> 45:37.460 congratulations to you and to your family. 45:37.460 --> 45:38.990 I would like to ask you a little more about 45:38.990 --> 45:41.570 the KC-46 which you've talked about 45:41.570 --> 45:43.670 and then an additional question. 45:44.530 --> 45:47.530 Transcom currently has 450 strategic tankers 45:47.530 --> 45:50.610 and I think the newest of those are 30 years old. 45:50.610 --> 45:53.110 The total buy of the KC-46 program 45:53.110 --> 45:55.930 is scheduled to be 180 aircraft. 45:55.930 --> 45:57.990 I guess I wanted to ask you, 45:57.990 --> 46:01.130 even if we provide the budgetary resources to do that, 46:01.130 --> 46:04.324 is that sufficient given the switch in 46:04.324 --> 46:06.940 national defense strategy toward more focus 46:06.940 --> 46:08.590 on great power competition, 46:09.984 --> 46:12.340 does the 180 give us the capacity that we need? 46:15.840 --> 46:17.150 - Senator, that's one of the issues 46:17.150 --> 46:18.830 that'll be looked at in the ongoing 46:18.830 --> 46:21.370 Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study is 46:21.370 --> 46:25.620 to validate the area refuel requirement baseline. 46:25.620 --> 46:27.280 I would confess to you though that that 46:27.280 --> 46:29.400 will probably take a couple turns 46:29.400 --> 46:32.430 because the global war plans, 46:32.430 --> 46:34.240 defense planning scenarios are still in 46:34.240 --> 46:36.710 development consistent with the strategy. 46:36.710 --> 46:39.480 So we'll look at the current set and we'll 46:39.480 --> 46:40.920 take a look and see what that looks like. 46:40.920 --> 46:45.200 Today the objective is 479 airplanes, 46:45.200 --> 46:46.470 we're not there today. 46:47.470 --> 46:49.750 The KC-46 will move us in that direction, 46:49.750 --> 46:51.990 I know the Air Force would very much like to 46:51.990 --> 46:56.830 retire the KC-10 at some point to recoup that. 46:56.830 --> 46:58.060 I'll defer to the Air Force, 46:58.060 --> 46:59.520 I can just say that clearly from a 46:59.520 --> 47:01.890 combatant commander perspective, if confirmed, 47:01.890 --> 47:04.630 that we continue to watch that very, very closely 47:04.630 --> 47:07.380 because that's linked to our immediate force tonight 47:07.380 --> 47:09.230 and our global strike capability. 47:09.230 --> 47:10.930 - I want to ask you about something that 47:10.930 --> 47:14.450 General McDew used to always just suggest to us 47:14.450 --> 47:17.920 was a point of analysis that he was engaged in 47:17.920 --> 47:19.380 and I imagine you'll grapple with it too, 47:19.380 --> 47:22.080 and that is how much to rely in the entire 47:22.080 --> 47:24.820 work of Transcom in our own organic capacity 47:24.820 --> 47:27.930 versus how much to rely on a surge capacity 47:27.930 --> 47:30.750 that we could get through contracting with 47:30.750 --> 47:34.150 private sector transportation, air or waterborne, 47:34.150 --> 47:35.750 talk a little bit about how you approach 47:35.750 --> 47:38.460 that issue of balancing at what we need in 47:38.460 --> 47:42.700 organic and contracting on the private sector side. 47:44.240 --> 47:47.190 - Senator I think there has to be a balance. 47:47.190 --> 47:50.040 We do rely on the commercial sector for a 47:50.040 --> 47:53.240 considerable amount of capability for their networks, 47:53.240 --> 47:55.240 for their mariners, et cetera. 47:56.270 --> 47:58.390 But we don't want to be in a position 47:58.390 --> 48:00.180 where we're so reliant where that becomes 48:00.180 --> 48:03.180 a single point of failure so from a 48:03.180 --> 48:05.280 philosophical perspective I think we need to look at 48:05.280 --> 48:07.750 all those portfolios and make sure we're balanced, 48:07.750 --> 48:10.140 that we have sufficient organic capability 48:10.140 --> 48:14.780 to operate in contested environments and then 48:14.780 --> 48:17.030 not be at all dismissive of the power 48:17.030 --> 48:18.370 that industry does bring because 48:18.370 --> 48:19.670 they bring in enormous capability 48:19.670 --> 48:21.570 as well as networks to the enterprise. 48:22.600 --> 48:25.260 - One of the risks is if you get too reliant 48:25.260 --> 48:26.960 on the private sector then depending when 48:26.960 --> 48:28.950 you might need them for some surge capacity 48:28.950 --> 48:31.560 if their already contracted up or it's difficult 48:31.560 --> 48:34.950 to access the supply that they can give you. 48:34.950 --> 48:36.970 So that's part of the balancing equation 48:36.970 --> 48:38.170 that you have to strike. 48:39.040 --> 48:40.340 - Yes sir, that's correct. 48:41.212 --> 48:42.840 When I was there the Transcom philosophy 48:42.840 --> 48:44.740 was more was better. 48:44.740 --> 48:45.840 So you had, 48:46.870 --> 48:50.640 inside the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program, 48:50.640 --> 48:52.480 underneath that contract you had 48:52.480 --> 48:54.910 25 different carriers so you weren't reliant 48:54.910 --> 48:57.440 on just one sole source condition. 48:57.440 --> 48:59.920 Same thing on the Sealift side so it's important 48:59.920 --> 49:01.616 that you have that level of resiliency 49:01.616 --> 49:03.630 inside your vendor base as well. 49:03.630 --> 49:04.590 - All right, thank you, 49:04.590 --> 49:06.390 Mr. Chair that's all the questions that I have, 49:06.390 --> 49:07.223 thank you. 49:11.400 --> 49:13.680 - Thank you Senator Kane, Senator King. 49:15.640 --> 49:16.890 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 49:17.750 --> 49:19.750 It seems to me that given the new 49:19.750 --> 49:21.700 national defense strategy and the new reality 49:21.700 --> 49:23.590 that the defense strategy recognizes, 49:24.910 --> 49:26.430 your job has fundamentally changed 49:26.430 --> 49:29.100 because we've been working in uncontested 49:29.100 --> 49:32.650 transportation carters for a long time, 49:32.650 --> 49:34.530 20, 30, 40 years. 49:34.530 --> 49:38.294 How do you view the change in that circumstances 49:38.294 --> 49:43.294 that me may face contested transportation carters 49:44.270 --> 49:46.320 in order for you to fulfill your mission? 49:49.320 --> 49:52.160 - Well Senator I think you described it exactly right. 49:53.360 --> 49:57.460 For many decades we had dominance in those domains. 49:57.460 --> 50:00.020 We could deploy when we wanted. 50:00.020 --> 50:02.700 We could assemble where we wanted. 50:02.700 --> 50:04.200 We could employ the force on a that 50:04.200 --> 50:05.460 timeline that we desired. 50:07.390 --> 50:08.850 As we look to the future and the emerging 50:08.850 --> 50:11.130 joint operating environment we can no longer 50:11.130 --> 50:14.570 make any of those assumptions and we clearly expect, 50:14.570 --> 50:18.050 and we are, contested in all five domains. 50:19.430 --> 50:22.490 Land, maritime, air, cyber, and cyberspace. 50:22.490 --> 50:25.890 So that requires a different perspective 50:25.890 --> 50:28.060 of the mobility enterprise. 50:28.060 --> 50:33.060 Today our mobility enterprise which is quite capable 50:33.320 --> 50:35.880 generally tends towards efficiency. 50:37.220 --> 50:41.510 But as you might appreciate large nodes with 50:41.510 --> 50:43.600 large infrastructure and large stockpiles 50:43.600 --> 50:46.130 of munition and fuel, et cetera, 50:46.130 --> 50:48.660 may also present a viable target for an 50:48.660 --> 50:50.450 adversary on the high end. 50:50.450 --> 50:54.560 So we've got to re-look the way we sustain 50:54.560 --> 50:57.580 and generate combat power on a global scale. 50:57.580 --> 50:59.086 And sir, if confirmed, that's certainly 50:59.086 --> 51:02.570 my focus as job one is war fighting. 51:02.570 --> 51:04.345 - It seems to me that this really requires a 51:04.345 --> 51:07.020 whole new way of thinking and you're going 51:07.020 --> 51:10.460 to have to turn a culture and a 51:10.460 --> 51:13.150 thought process rather substantially. 51:15.570 --> 51:18.010 - Sir I agree but I would confess to you 51:18.010 --> 51:20.820 from my two years at Transcom as a deputy 51:21.700 --> 51:24.750 they have war force phenomenal people. 51:24.750 --> 51:26.610 I think they're up to the challenge but 51:26.610 --> 51:29.560 we certainly must adapt the way we think 51:29.560 --> 51:30.750 about the mobility enterprise, 51:30.750 --> 51:31.940 I agree with you Senator. 51:31.940 --> 51:35.340 - Going back in time the U.S. Merchant Marine Fleet 51:35.340 --> 51:38.700 of the early '50's was almost 1300 ships, 51:38.700 --> 51:40.020 we're now down to 80. 51:41.320 --> 51:44.130 Is this a concern, a problem, 51:44.130 --> 51:46.750 how do we deal with that reality? 51:46.750 --> 51:49.870 - Senator it's a significant concern. 51:49.870 --> 51:52.140 I work closely with the Maritime Administrator 51:52.140 --> 51:55.140 on this and they count the numbers on qualified 51:55.140 --> 51:57.770 merchant mariners that could meet the surge 51:57.770 --> 51:59.920 requirements and the way I think 52:01.230 --> 52:02.880 Administrator Buzby would describe it is 52:02.880 --> 52:05.380 that we're probably on the ragged edge 52:05.380 --> 52:07.150 of having sufficient numbers of mariners 52:07.150 --> 52:09.220 without having to rely upon 52:10.610 --> 52:12.497 a foreign flag capability which is, 52:12.497 --> 52:15.510 none of us want that in our future. 52:16.370 --> 52:17.580 That is of concern, 52:19.210 --> 52:21.660 the number of vessels that are out there today 52:21.660 --> 52:26.010 are at an all time low and the amount of cargo 52:26.010 --> 52:30.892 moving on the U.S. Flag is also at a low. 52:30.892 --> 52:32.460 - How about the Maritime Security Program 52:32.460 --> 52:33.730 in the Department of Transportation? 52:33.730 --> 52:35.990 Is that important, is that something we 52:35.990 --> 52:37.430 should be focusing more attention on, 52:37.430 --> 52:38.640 perhaps more funds? 52:39.900 --> 52:42.380 - Sir I appreciate Congress's support for the 52:42.380 --> 52:46.970 Maritime Security Program and the approval of the 52:46.970 --> 52:50.140 authorized money to sustain that program. 52:50.140 --> 52:51.890 That program is critical to national defense 52:51.890 --> 52:53.610 because without Maritime Security Program 52:53.610 --> 52:55.920 I don't know that you'd have a U.S. Flag Fleet. 52:55.920 --> 52:57.830 Without the U.S. Flag Fleet you wouldn't have 52:57.830 --> 53:00.240 the capacity or the mariners to serve as the 53:00.240 --> 53:03.680 U.S. Navy Sealift Fleet and so they're inexorably linked. 53:03.680 --> 53:05.210 - I view it as an insurance policy, 53:05.210 --> 53:06.890 is that the way you would look at it? 53:06.890 --> 53:09.890 - Sir, absolutely and I would confess to you that 53:09.890 --> 53:12.220 if you had to procure that type of capacity 53:12.220 --> 53:13.560 inside the department we're really 53:13.560 --> 53:15.360 talking about pennies on the dollar. 53:16.670 --> 53:18.790 - Or pennies on the billions of dollars. 53:18.790 --> 53:20.680 - $300 million, yes sir. 53:24.320 --> 53:26.740 - What are the greatest risks that you see to Transcom? 53:26.740 --> 53:28.520 We've talked about some of them but as you 53:28.520 --> 53:30.200 go into this new job and, by the way, 53:30.200 --> 53:34.860 I don't want to leave this hearing without rendering 53:34.860 --> 53:36.910 a compliment to your predecessor who I think 53:36.910 --> 53:39.840 is one of the most capable officers I've ever met. 53:39.840 --> 53:42.655 He's done a superb job and I want the record 53:42.655 --> 53:45.970 to show that at least from myself. 53:45.970 --> 53:48.230 What are the risks that you see? 53:48.230 --> 53:51.860 What are your biggest priorities going in 53:51.860 --> 53:54.420 and looking at the future of Transcom? 53:55.980 --> 53:58.650 - Well sir, first thanks for pointing out 53:58.650 --> 54:00.420 the leadership of General McDew. 54:00.420 --> 54:01.850 As I was a deputy out there he was 54:01.850 --> 54:03.150 my commander for two years and I 54:03.150 --> 54:05.570 completely agree with you on his leadership, 54:05.570 --> 54:06.780 he's an exceptional individual. 54:06.780 --> 54:08.400 - And by the way, his character was built 54:08.400 --> 54:10.060 by his first assignment in the Air Force, 54:10.060 --> 54:12.110 was at Loring Air Force Base in northern Maine 54:12.110 --> 54:14.907 so I'm sure that has something to do with it. 54:14.907 --> 54:17.700 - As a tanker pilot, yes sir that's correct. 54:17.700 --> 54:19.110 He remembers it well, he can tell you 54:19.110 --> 54:21.119 exactly the number of winters he spent up there. 54:21.119 --> 54:23.384 (everyone laughs) 54:23.384 --> 54:25.310 But sir I think you pointed out 54:25.310 --> 54:27.080 the challenges very well. 54:27.080 --> 54:30.320 As we look at emerging environment of contested 54:30.320 --> 54:33.580 environments as well as strategic competition, 54:33.580 --> 54:35.660 great power in competition, 54:35.660 --> 54:40.250 we must reevaluate and ensure that we can 54:40.250 --> 54:42.470 continue to project power at 54:42.470 --> 54:44.650 our time and place of choosing. 54:44.650 --> 54:48.160 That is the role of U.S. Transcom and that is 54:48.160 --> 54:50.290 a strategic comparative advantage I would argue 54:50.290 --> 54:53.780 that no other nation in the world enjoys. 54:53.780 --> 54:57.300 But I think you would expect that as adversaries 54:57.300 --> 55:00.020 look at centers of gravity and advantages 55:00.020 --> 55:02.150 and comparative advantages they look 55:02.150 --> 55:04.230 to seek where they can find potential weakness. 55:04.230 --> 55:06.097 If confirmed, my job we're to make sure 55:06.097 --> 55:09.490 shored up and retain that strength for the nation. 55:09.490 --> 55:11.273 - Thank you General, thank you for your service. 55:11.273 --> 55:16.273 - [LTG Lyons] Thank you sir. 55:21.536 --> 55:24.260 - Let me just make a comment about this. 55:24.260 --> 55:26.740 One of the problems that Senator Reed and I have 55:26.740 --> 55:30.410 is that we have so many members who will come and go, 55:30.410 --> 55:32.860 which I was guilty before I was chairing this, 55:34.750 --> 55:37.850 but what we're going to attempt to do is 55:37.850 --> 55:40.500 encourage people to be here on time to 55:40.500 --> 55:43.790 benefit from all the testimony and 55:43.790 --> 55:48.100 I'll just serve notice now that while 55:48.100 --> 55:50.130 I'm chairing these committees that I'm not 55:50.130 --> 55:53.900 going to hold it open for people who come in late. 55:53.900 --> 55:56.340 I don't mean that critically because we did 55:56.340 --> 55:59.090 wait for you and I'm happy to have you here. 56:01.470 --> 56:03.040 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 56:03.040 --> 56:05.520 So in this committee we often talk about the need 56:05.520 --> 56:07.580 for the United States to be on the cutting edge 56:07.580 --> 56:12.580 of innovation so that we can meet 21st century threats. 56:12.780 --> 56:15.660 Now in an article that you wrote last year 56:15.660 --> 56:19.920 you said, "Innovations such as autonomous technologies, 56:19.920 --> 56:22.650 "artificial intelligence, and smart data will 56:22.650 --> 56:27.350 "clearly play larger roles in the wars of tomorrow." 56:27.350 --> 56:29.450 But of course none of us want innovation 56:29.450 --> 56:31.750 just to be a bunch of buzz words. 56:31.750 --> 56:33.650 We have to walk the walk. 56:33.650 --> 56:34.700 I just want to make sure, 56:34.700 --> 56:35.930 I just want to try to get this 56:35.930 --> 56:38.130 on the record at this point, 56:38.130 --> 56:39.840 do you believe it should be a priority 56:39.840 --> 56:42.380 for the United States to make significant 56:42.380 --> 56:44.840 and sustained investments in research and 56:44.840 --> 56:49.750 development in leap ahead technologies in order 56:49.750 --> 56:51.870 to maintain our competitive advantage 56:51.870 --> 56:54.950 in a rapidly changing operating environment? 56:57.270 --> 56:58.950 - Yes ma'am, yes ma'am I do. 56:58.950 --> 57:00.520 - Then let me follow up on that. 57:00.520 --> 57:03.620 Your a former deputy commander at Transcom, 57:03.620 --> 57:07.190 you know the command pretty well so 57:07.190 --> 57:09.430 what are some ideas you have for putting 57:09.430 --> 57:13.690 innovation into practice at Transcom and how 57:13.690 --> 57:16.750 are you going to make sure that those innovations 57:16.750 --> 57:19.760 that you have in mind actually come to fruition? 57:20.900 --> 57:22.460 - Ma'am, fair question, 57:22.460 --> 57:27.430 I would offer to you two thoughts on this. 57:27.430 --> 57:30.250 There is what you described as leap ahead 57:31.310 --> 57:35.470 so in my current position as the Joint Staff J4 57:35.470 --> 57:37.390 the trends that I see across the globe 57:37.390 --> 57:41.270 and across the joint force are increasing demands. 57:41.270 --> 57:43.730 Largely based on consumption failure damage, 57:43.730 --> 57:45.720 destruction in the battle space 57:45.720 --> 57:48.287 and the envisioned battle space and so 57:48.287 --> 57:50.290 if we're not careful we will find ourselves 57:50.290 --> 57:51.670 on the wrong end of the cost curve and 57:51.670 --> 57:53.860 sometimes we often do and so when I think about 57:53.860 --> 57:55.140 leap ahead as you described it, 57:55.140 --> 57:57.940 I'm thinking about ways in which our joint force 57:57.940 --> 58:01.170 can be bring lethal effects without the enormity 58:01.170 --> 58:03.670 of the logistics apparatus that it requires today. 58:05.300 --> 58:07.850 That I do see in the future. 58:07.850 --> 58:09.480 In the current force structure which is what 58:09.480 --> 58:13.080 we'll contend with in our present timeframe. 58:14.240 --> 58:18.350 I believe that as you look at the potential 58:18.350 --> 58:21.803 for leveraging data and when we think about 58:21.803 --> 58:25.410 the basic baselines of data analytics and 58:25.410 --> 58:28.810 machine learning we keep coming back to you 58:28.810 --> 58:32.550 got to have the data that's accurate relevant and timely, 58:32.550 --> 58:34.070 you got to have he data structures, 58:34.070 --> 58:35.370 you got to have the infrastructure and 58:35.370 --> 58:36.708 so you keep coming back and I think 58:36.708 --> 58:39.920 that's largely why General McDew has moved out 58:39.920 --> 58:42.040 on the cloud initiative to begin to move 58:42.040 --> 58:43.690 to a virtualized environment where he can 58:43.690 --> 58:46.630 leverage that and information to get to a 58:46.630 --> 58:48.950 higher level which I believe will be 58:48.950 --> 58:50.760 machine learning across the joint 58:50.760 --> 58:53.126 logistics enterprise and I think that's 58:53.126 --> 58:56.160 extraordinarily powerful as you move in that direction. 58:57.650 --> 58:59.820 So ma'am if confirmed, I'm certainly 58:59.820 --> 59:01.250 committed to pushing that direction. 59:01.250 --> 59:04.140 - Well I appreciate that, you know I think 59:04.140 --> 59:06.750 you've expressed before a real sense of 59:06.750 --> 59:09.360 urgency about prioritizing innovation. 59:10.380 --> 59:12.670 You wrote, "The nations future adversaries 59:12.670 --> 59:15.410 "are becoming more advanced and more deadly. 59:15.410 --> 59:17.970 "The DOD must face difficult truths and 59:17.970 --> 59:20.460 "understand potential weaknesses so they 59:20.460 --> 59:23.460 "can be fixed now not later." 59:23.460 --> 59:25.290 I think you're right and I just want to 59:25.290 --> 59:27.460 make sure we're making more robust, 59:27.460 --> 59:30.900 more sustained investments in innovation 59:32.490 --> 59:34.280 so that we really are able to 59:34.280 --> 59:36.170 hold our own against our adversaries. 59:36.170 --> 59:37.890 I appreciate that. 59:37.890 --> 59:39.767 One other thing I wanted to ask you 59:39.767 --> 59:42.060 about cyber security. 59:42.060 --> 59:44.190 I know that Senator Reed and Senator Rounds 59:44.190 --> 59:46.530 and Blumenthal all touched on this but I 59:46.530 --> 59:49.570 have a little different question I want to ask. 59:49.570 --> 59:51.830 Transportation command is necessarily 59:51.830 --> 59:55.170 interconnected with commercial providers and 59:55.170 --> 59:57.390 the movement of information across 59:57.390 --> 01:00:00.680 unclassified commercial networks. 01:00:00.680 --> 01:00:03.920 The commander you're nominated to replace, 01:00:03.920 --> 01:00:07.470 General McDew, took steps to strengthen Transcom's 01:00:07.470 --> 01:00:12.210 cyber security in coordination with commercial partners. 01:00:12.210 --> 01:00:14.120 He told this committee that Transcom 01:00:14.120 --> 01:00:17.900 has the authority to conduct onsite visits 01:00:17.900 --> 01:00:21.190 or request third party assessments to check 01:00:21.190 --> 01:00:24.030 whether industry partners are actually fulfilling 01:00:24.030 --> 01:00:27.080 their contractual obligations to upgrade 01:00:27.080 --> 01:00:30.680 their cyber security systems and report cyber threats. 01:00:30.680 --> 01:00:33.260 So can I just ask General Lyons, 01:00:33.260 --> 01:00:36.830 is Transcom actually conducting these assessments 01:00:36.830 --> 01:00:38.730 and could you just say a brief word about 01:00:38.730 --> 01:00:40.020 what you've found so far? 01:00:42.120 --> 01:00:44.680 - Ma'am from my experience in the command 01:00:45.540 --> 01:00:48.660 I think their relationship with their providers 01:00:48.660 --> 01:00:51.640 on the commercial side is probably a model 01:00:51.640 --> 01:00:55.518 for many organizations to look like to look at. 01:00:55.518 --> 01:00:58.830 It's very interactive, it's rich in information. 01:00:58.830 --> 01:01:00.710 I would suggest though that, 01:01:00.710 --> 01:01:04.750 and I fully applaud General McDew's initiatives 01:01:04.750 --> 01:01:08.530 to include a basic cyber hygiene and contractual 01:01:08.530 --> 01:01:11.640 relationships and frankly I think our vendors 01:01:11.640 --> 01:01:14.460 ought to be incentivized to do that on their own. 01:01:14.460 --> 01:01:17.304 So basic standard and so forth and so on 01:01:17.304 --> 01:01:21.850 are a first step 01:01:21.850 --> 01:01:24.930 but this is an operational domain. 01:01:24.930 --> 01:01:26.120 This is a war fighting domain. 01:01:26.120 --> 01:01:28.030 We must be prepared to maneuver. 01:01:28.030 --> 01:01:31.870 Our adversaries are capable and have shown intent. 01:01:31.870 --> 01:01:35.380 They maneuver, we must be able to counter 01:01:35.380 --> 01:01:38.750 both defensively and sufficiently offensively 01:01:38.750 --> 01:01:42.060 to deter their activities in the cyber domain. 01:01:42.970 --> 01:01:45.850 So on the commercial provider side 01:01:45.850 --> 01:01:47.120 this is a real challenge. 01:01:49.080 --> 01:01:51.040 Just for a number of reasons and some companies 01:01:51.040 --> 01:01:53.450 because their incentivized to invest in that 01:01:53.450 --> 01:01:56.480 are much better than others and others are lagging. 01:01:57.330 --> 01:01:59.250 I think having a minimum standard and 01:01:59.250 --> 01:02:01.600 contractual language is a first step to a lot 01:02:01.600 --> 01:02:03.040 of work that we have to do in the future. 01:02:03.040 --> 01:02:04.000 - Well as you rightly say, 01:02:04.000 --> 01:02:06.620 first step but then we really have to enforce it. 01:02:06.620 --> 01:02:09.580 Given Transcom's disproportionate reliance on 01:02:09.580 --> 01:02:12.830 unclassified commercial networks our partners 01:02:12.830 --> 01:02:15.130 need to understand, these commercial partners 01:02:15.130 --> 01:02:17.870 need to understand they're going to be consequences 01:02:17.870 --> 01:02:22.840 for failing to implement strong cyber security standards. 01:02:22.840 --> 01:02:25.580 The logistics chain is just too important 01:02:25.580 --> 01:02:28.500 for cyber vulnerabilities to go unchecked. 01:02:28.500 --> 01:02:30.250 So, thank you, thank you General, 01:02:30.250 --> 01:02:31.100 thank you Mr. Chair. 01:02:31.100 --> 01:02:32.350 - Thank you ma'am. 01:02:32.350 --> 01:02:34.410 - Thank you Senator Warren. 01:02:36.080 --> 01:02:37.930 Senator Reed, any further comments. 01:02:37.930 --> 01:02:39.060 - No sir. 01:02:40.590 --> 01:02:42.440 - All right then, with that we appreciate 01:02:42.440 --> 01:02:46.410 very much your participation here and the excellent 01:02:46.410 --> 01:02:49.310 answers and excellent questions I might add. 01:02:49.310 --> 01:02:51.360 Thank you very much and we are adjourned. 01:02:52.250 --> 01:02:53.740 - [LTG Lyons] Thank you Senator.