WEBVTT 00:00.790 --> 00:03.390 - Thanks, Rob, and thanks, Chris. 00:03.390 --> 00:07.880 So what I'd like to do for the group is sort of explain 00:07.880 --> 00:11.040 a little bit deeper the strategic rationale 00:11.040 --> 00:14.150 for the additional capabilities that we recommended 00:14.150 --> 00:17.350 in the NPR, and then explain the military rationale 00:17.350 --> 00:20.580 for the actual capabilities that we recommended. 00:20.580 --> 00:24.120 So as Rob said, the Nuclear Posture Review assessed 00:24.120 --> 00:27.800 the implications of Russian nuclear strategy and doctrine 00:27.800 --> 00:31.150 and the growing disparity in non-strategic nuclear 00:31.150 --> 00:33.853 weapons capabilities between Russia and NATO. 00:34.950 --> 00:37.570 And we concluded that the current disparity 00:37.570 --> 00:40.970 in the range of low-yield nuclear options available 00:40.970 --> 00:44.980 to the two sides increases the risk of deterrence failure. 00:44.980 --> 00:47.210 In other words, it increases the risk of the use 00:47.210 --> 00:50.030 of nuclear weapons in a conflict. 00:50.030 --> 00:52.970 And that Russian modernization and expansion 00:52.970 --> 00:55.930 of their non-strategic nuclear weapons capability 00:55.930 --> 00:59.020 is increasing that disparity and thus increasing 00:59.020 --> 01:01.763 the risk of deterrence failure. 01:02.860 --> 01:07.520 So our analysis concluded that there were clear indications 01:07.520 --> 01:11.500 in Russian behavior and statements that our current 01:11.500 --> 01:15.260 strategy, posture, and capabilities are seen by Russia 01:15.260 --> 01:18.000 as potentially inadequate to deter them from doing 01:18.000 --> 01:21.340 two different things that we need to prevent. 01:21.340 --> 01:25.640 The first is initiating limited nuclear strikes 01:25.640 --> 01:29.910 to coerce NATO, if possible; and the second is making 01:29.910 --> 01:32.860 wider use of nuclear weapons to defeat NATO conventional 01:32.860 --> 01:34.793 forces if necessary. 01:35.920 --> 01:38.710 We also concluded that Russia would not be expending 01:38.710 --> 01:42.240 their limited resources to modernize and expand 01:42.240 --> 01:44.820 significantly their non-strategic nuclear weapons 01:44.820 --> 01:47.670 capabilities if they had little or no confidence 01:47.670 --> 01:49.120 in this strategy. 01:49.120 --> 01:52.283 We don't believe that they would pour good money after bad. 01:53.220 --> 01:56.630 So the review concluded that the United States needed 01:56.630 --> 01:59.840 to take steps to reduce Russian confidence 01:59.840 --> 02:02.223 in their course of escalation strategy. 02:03.450 --> 02:07.060 And I want to make one thing particularly clear 02:07.060 --> 02:10.070 to our friends in the room: that we do not believe 02:10.070 --> 02:12.610 that reducing Russian confidence in their strategy 02:12.610 --> 02:15.270 requires us or the NATO alliance to match 02:15.270 --> 02:18.150 Russian non-strategic nuclear capabilities 02:18.150 --> 02:20.263 in either quantity or diversity. 02:21.550 --> 02:24.060 Our strategy does not require nuclear weapons 02:24.060 --> 02:26.580 to compensate for conventional inferiority, 02:26.580 --> 02:30.450 and therefore we don't need to have the kinds of quantities 02:30.450 --> 02:32.840 and range of capabilities that the Russians seem 02:32.840 --> 02:34.750 to believe they need. 02:34.750 --> 02:38.240 However, the US and NATO do require a wider range 02:38.240 --> 02:41.510 of credible low-yield nuclear response options 02:41.510 --> 02:44.700 to convince the Russians that if they initiate limited 02:44.700 --> 02:48.480 nuclear use, our response will deny them the objectives 02:48.480 --> 02:51.750 they seek, and impose costs that far outweigh 02:51.750 --> 02:53.573 those benefits they can achieve. 02:55.230 --> 02:58.970 So let me say that the additional capabilities 02:58.970 --> 03:03.970 we recommended we believe will make the US nuclear response 03:04.070 --> 03:06.640 to Russian limited use more credible, 03:06.640 --> 03:10.900 raising the Russian nuclear threshold, not lowering our own. 03:10.900 --> 03:13.190 The purpose of these capabilities is to make a 03:13.190 --> 03:17.380 US response to first use more credible. 03:17.380 --> 03:21.313 Their purpose is not to make US first use more likely. 03:22.880 --> 03:24.430 They do not, in that sense, 03:24.430 --> 03:27.530 lower our nuclear threshold in any way. 03:27.530 --> 03:31.440 So now let me turn to, very quickly, explaining why we 03:31.440 --> 03:36.440 selected two response options that Rob mentioned earlier. 03:37.010 --> 03:40.170 The recommendation to rapidly field a limited number 03:40.170 --> 03:43.620 of low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads 03:43.620 --> 03:47.670 is designed to provide a near-term, relatively inexpensive 03:47.670 --> 03:50.130 augmentation of our ability to credibly strike 03:50.130 --> 03:54.010 any target in response to Russian limited nuclear use. 03:54.010 --> 03:56.330 A low-yield, submarine-launched ballistic missile 03:56.330 --> 03:59.650 is survivable, prompt, and is able to strike targets 03:59.650 --> 04:02.570 that are heavily defended against air-delivered strikes. 04:02.570 --> 04:06.070 And this was an important piece of thinking 04:06.070 --> 04:08.960 behind selection of this option because all of our 04:08.960 --> 04:12.410 current low-yield options in the US arsenal 04:12.410 --> 04:13.423 are air-delivered. 04:15.240 --> 04:17.590 Fielding this capability, as I said, won't lower 04:17.590 --> 04:19.800 the threshold at which the United States would deploy 04:19.800 --> 04:22.290 nuclear weapons, rather it will raise the nuclear 04:22.290 --> 04:24.850 threshold of potential adversaries. 04:24.850 --> 04:27.490 Fielding this capability won't increase the number of 04:27.490 --> 04:31.620 nuclear weapons deployed on US ballistic missile submarines. 04:31.620 --> 04:34.100 The low-yield warheads that we are pursuing 04:34.100 --> 04:36.100 would replace higher-yield warheads that are 04:36.100 --> 04:38.340 already deployed on those submarines, 04:38.340 --> 04:39.890 and within the new start limits. 04:39.890 --> 04:43.580 And when we replace those weapons with lower-yield warheads 04:43.580 --> 04:45.730 we will remain within the new start limits. 04:47.950 --> 04:52.510 And let me just address one argument that critics have made 04:52.510 --> 04:53.840 about this proposal. 04:53.840 --> 04:56.340 Some critics contend that the launch of a single 04:56.340 --> 04:59.520 submarine-launched ballistic missile would be ill-advised 04:59.520 --> 05:02.300 as it would reveal the location of the submarine 05:02.300 --> 05:05.810 that launched it, putting a much larger number of weapons 05:05.810 --> 05:08.410 at risk, and being destabilizing. 05:08.410 --> 05:10.040 And let me just make clear, we've planned for 05:10.040 --> 05:12.410 the potential launch of a single submarine-launched 05:12.410 --> 05:14.150 ballistic missile for decades, 05:14.150 --> 05:16.470 and the Navy has developed tactics, techniques, 05:16.470 --> 05:18.870 and procedures to ensure the continued survivability 05:18.870 --> 05:21.580 of the submarine post-launch. 05:21.580 --> 05:24.050 Now let me turn to the second capability. 05:24.050 --> 05:26.140 The recommendation to pursue a nuclear armed 05:26.140 --> 05:28.720 sea-launched cruise missile is designed to provide 05:28.720 --> 05:32.330 a longer-term response to Russia's continuing expansion 05:32.330 --> 05:35.290 of their non-strategic nuclear forces to further enhance 05:35.290 --> 05:37.170 deterrence in the future. 05:37.170 --> 05:39.040 A nuclear sea-launched cruise missile's also 05:39.040 --> 05:42.500 inherently survivable, and would provide a future 05:42.500 --> 05:45.360 US president with a wide range of credible options 05:45.360 --> 05:48.160 to respond to Russian limited nuclear use. 05:48.160 --> 05:50.710 Let me emphasize that in the Nuclear Posture Review 05:50.710 --> 05:53.250 it's made very clear that were Russia to agree 05:53.250 --> 05:55.950 to return to verifiable arms control measures 05:55.950 --> 06:00.930 to redress the imbalance in non-strategic nuclear forces 06:00.930 --> 06:03.450 through reductions, the US might agree to limit 06:03.450 --> 06:06.503 or forego acquiring a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile. 06:08.850 --> 06:11.600 Let me just make one final point, and then we'd love 06:11.600 --> 06:13.800 to be able to answer any questions you have. 06:16.510 --> 06:19.230 The determination of the force structure required 06:19.230 --> 06:22.910 for effective deterrence is an art, not a science. 06:22.910 --> 06:25.840 There's no way to objectively determine the forces 06:25.840 --> 06:28.350 required to deter any particular adversary 06:28.350 --> 06:31.250 under any particular set of conditions. 06:31.250 --> 06:34.150 And anyone that tells you that that is derivable, 06:34.150 --> 06:37.553 somehow objectively or quantitatively is an amateur. 06:38.710 --> 06:41.210 We believe that it's prudent to err on the side 06:41.210 --> 06:43.350 of having more rather than less capability 06:43.350 --> 06:46.860 to ensure deterrence remains effective as long as, 06:46.860 --> 06:48.780 and this is a really important caveat, 06:48.780 --> 06:52.460 as long as in doing so we don't create new counterproductive 06:52.460 --> 06:55.150 threat perceptions on the part of adversaries. 06:55.150 --> 06:57.440 We believe that the additional capabilities 06:57.440 --> 07:00.000 that we recommended in the Nuclear Posture Review, 07:00.000 --> 07:02.950 and that we're now pursuing, don't do that. 07:02.950 --> 07:07.070 They aren't destabilizing, they don't pose any new threat 07:07.070 --> 07:10.770 of large-scale preemptive attack on Russia 07:10.770 --> 07:15.770 that they don't face in any other way already. 07:16.000 --> 07:20.210 And so we think this is a stabilizing move. 07:20.210 --> 07:22.810 We think it's a modest improvement in our capabilities 07:22.810 --> 07:25.260 that's required by Russian behavior. 07:25.260 --> 07:26.093 Thanks. 07:27.463 --> 07:29.963 - [Man] Thank you very much Greg, and Rob as well.