WEBVTT

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- House Armed Services Subcommittee

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on Sea Power and Projection Forces,

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I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today,

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and we're here to discuss the 355 ship Navy,

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and options that Congress may consider

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to deliver the required fleet.

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Appearing before us today to discuss

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this important topic are three esteemed Navy witnesses,

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Honorable James Geurts assistant secretary of the Navy,

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research development and acquisition,

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Vice Admiral William R Merz,

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Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems,

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and Vice Admiral Tom Moore,

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Commander Naval Sea Systems Command.

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I want to thank you all for your service as well

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as for appearing before the subcommittee today

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to discuss the Navy's fleet requirements and various

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options for Congress to pursue to meet the Navy's needs.

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In previous hearings I've expressed my concern

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as to the 30 year shipbuilding plans inability

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to reach the required 355 ship Navy.

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The Navy's plan only reaches 342 ships by 2039,

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critical shortfalls in aircraft carriers,

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large deck amphibs and attack submarines

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will severely challenge future Navy operations,

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and I'm particularly troubled by

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the administration officials who advocate

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as to obtaining the required 355 ship Navy,

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without consideration of other concerns

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expressed by the subcommittee.

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The 355 ship Navy is more than just a slogan,

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it's a requirement that was carefully

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considered by the Navy,

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enacted by Congress and signed into law by

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the commander-in-chief.

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We need both quality and quantity to

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be successful in dissuading potential aggressors.

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After this hearing today I look forward

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to our panel discussing options the Congress may consider

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to fulfill our constitutional duty

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to provide and maintain the Navy,

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I think Congress has a multitude of options that could

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be pursued to limit Navy shortfalls,

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and change the trajectory of our Navy's fleet.

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These options include expanding the Navy

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by building our way to meet the requirement,

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but also I believe the Navy could pursue other options

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to improve maintenance as well as modernize

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and extend the fleet in service today.

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As to aircraft carriers,

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I believe it is imperative that we rapidly

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obtain the required 12 aircraft carriers,

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and pursue a two ship block procurement that has

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the potential to save more than 2.5 billion dollars.

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Furthermore we need to examine options

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to extend the current fleet,

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which should include a careful examination of

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the service life available with Nimitz

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class aircraft carriers.

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Finally I am particularly concerned

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about administrative limitations

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associated with the departments intent

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two shock trial CBN-78,

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I understand that such a decision will delay

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the introduction of the USS Ford by nine months,

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and the delay significant learning

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that can only occur while the ship is underway.

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I'm also concerned about the submarine force structure,

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we currently have 51 attack submarines and are on

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a rapid path to reduce this force structure to 42 submarines

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by 2028.

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This is the exact opposite direction

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to meeting the fleet requirement of 66 submarines.

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Fortunately we have several options to alleviate

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this reduction and I support an innovative effort by

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the Navy and naval reactors to extend the service life

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of five Los Angeles class attack submarines,

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and using existing unused reactor cores.

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I'm also supporting of adding new construction submarines

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in accordance with the Virginia class multi-year

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procurement authorized in fiscal year 2018 and DAA.

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With regards to our larger surface combatants

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this committee was instrumental in reversing

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a prior Navy course to decommission half

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of our existing cruisers,

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I'm glad that we've been able to turn the tide

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on this budget proposal but there's more work to be done,

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many of our older Destroyers have

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not been adequately modernized,

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lack of budget authority stranded many Flight I

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and Flight II Destroyers,

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and imperiled our ability to meet the required service life,

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while the Navy has done a very good job at preparing a plan

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for the service life extensions of cruisers,

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anphibs and submarines,

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I think we need to provide significant emphasis on

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the modernization of the older destroyer fleet.

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Finally our exhilarating Fleet is in need

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of serious upgrades and I don't think anyone

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would agree that a 42-year-old sea fleet is sufficient.

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Army indicated that they faced an unacceptable risk

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in force production beginning in 2024,

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the costs of the deficient surge sea lift fleet,

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the Navy's recapitalization proposal does not meet

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the army timelines is a classic military service Issue,

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we need to close this seam,

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as this is our last hearing before the NDA markup,

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I think it's important to consider the words

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of our first president,

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and in a conversation with Marques de la Viette

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at the conclusion of the Revolutionary War,

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George Washington was attributed to saying,

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"Without a decisive naval force we can

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"do nothing definitive,

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"and with it everything honorable and glorious."

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our forefathers knew the power attributed to

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a standing Navy,

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as we prepare for the testimony of this esteemed panel

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I hope we can remember the importance of our naval forces,

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their deterrent value,

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deterrent value to war,

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I would now like to turn to our ranking member Mr Courtney,

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thank him for his leadership,

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and Joe for your remarks.

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- Thank you Mr Chairman,

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and thank you to our witnesses for once again coming over

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to testify before the subcommittee to discuss

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the future of the Navy size and force structure.

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In 2016 the Department of the Navy produced

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a new force structure assessment which determined

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that the Navy our nation needs is a 355 ship Navy,

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up from the prior 2014 FSA set a target of 308 ships,

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this is not a number that the Navy came to settle because

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it believed it needed a larger force,

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it reviewed and validated the stated requirements

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in the real world demands faced by our combatant commanders,

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and it looks to present challenges

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and those expected in the decades ahead,

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unfortunately as the chairman said the administration's

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last two budget requests have fallen short of

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a plan to achieve the goal of obtaining

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the 355 ship level in a strategically

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meaningful amount of time,

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the latest long-term shipbuilding plans do not achieve

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that level at any time in the next three decades,

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and likely will not under current estimates until

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the 2050's,

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the good news is that the Navy itself has

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made clear in the new shipbuilding plans,

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that there is room to grow our investments in ships

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and submarines above and beyond the plan

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laid out in the 2019 budget.

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Our subcommittee last year worked hard on

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a bipartisan basis to produce a defense bill adding

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new ships provided strong multi-year authorizations

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that made clear that achieving a 355 ship Navy is the law

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of the land and feasible within a shorter timeframe.

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All three of our witnesses have been before our panel

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on public testimony and private meetings regularly

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over the last few weeks and months,

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I hope that you all come away from the sessions with

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a good understanding of how our subcommittee

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works well together,

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to produce a solid bill in support of shipbuilding

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and our at-sea capabilities.

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Above all I hope you've got the message loud

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and clear that we are ready to move ahead in

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a constructive way to do all we can

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to achieve the 355 ship Navy,

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what we need from you as we begin our work in

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the 2019 defense bill is a commitment to work with us

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to utilize all the tools that we have

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available here in Congress,

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and the Navy to get to that target.

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At the same time I think we all understand

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that achieving this higher force is

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not going to happen overnight,

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nor is it something that we can simply build

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our way into in the next five or 10 years,

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we need a comprehensive approach that includes

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not only building new ships,

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but making sure that we maximize the capability

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and availability of our existing fleet,

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a ship in extended dry dock or worse,

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sitting pier side waiting to be dry docked,

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is of no use to our combatant commanders,

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and only puts more strain on an overstretched fleet.

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I've shared with our witnesses my ongoing concern

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about continued delays and shortfalls

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in maintaining our ships,

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particularly with our attack submarine fleet,

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I've seen promising testimony from the Navy

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this year about the recognition for the need of

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a more comprehensive approach that leverages

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available capacity in both our public and private shipyards,

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however we have more work ahead to ensure that

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we are moving ahead in the smartest way possible,

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and I look forward to discussing this issue further

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with our witnesses today.

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Our job in Congress is to deliver

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the authority and resources,

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it's the Navy's job to execute

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those authorities and resources,

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I look forward to discussion with our witnesses today,

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to deliver the right mix of capabilities as

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we drive forward towards growing the fleet

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that the nation needs,

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and with that I yield back Mr Chairman.

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- Thank you Joe,

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thanks again for your leadership,

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I Wanna now turn to our panel,

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and Secretary Geurts,

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I understand that your gonna be making

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the statement for the panel,

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so I will turn the floor to you.

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- Thank you sir,

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Chairman Whitman,

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ranking member Courtney,

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distinguished members of the subcommittee,

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thanks for the opportunity to appear before you today

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to address the Department of Navy's plans to deliver

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the right capabilities for the Navy's 355 ship plan.

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I'm joined here today by Vice Admiral Bill Merz,

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deputy chief of naval operations for warfare systems,

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and Vice Admiral Tom Moore,

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commander of the Naval Sea Systems command.

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With your permission I intend to provide

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brief opening remarks for the three of us

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and submit our statement for the record.

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- [Chairman] Without objection.

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- As detailed in the 2018 national security strategy

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and the 2018 national defense strategy in order

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to retain and expand our competitive advantage

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it's imperative that we continuously adapt

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to the emerging security environment,

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and do so with a sense of urgency,

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this requires the right balance of naval readiness,

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capability and capacity as well

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as budget stability and predictability.

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It requires a navy of at least 355 ships.

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The FY-18 bipartisan budget act

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and the FY-19 President's budget request,

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chart a course to begin building this larger

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more capable battle force our nation needs,

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Strong congressional support in

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the 2018 bipartisan budget act funded 14 ships in 2018,

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an increase of five ships,

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including the lead flight LPD 17 class amphibious ship,

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it also includes strong support for

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the critical industrial base,

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a key element of our national security,

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thank you for that unwavering support.

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The 2019 budget request builds towards this larger

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more capable force and reflects the continuous

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commitment to produce at 355 ship Navy,

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when compared to the 2018 budget request,

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2018 adds 11 more ships for a total of 54 ships,

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with three additional ships in FY 2019,

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as well as advanced procurement for the Columbia SSPN.

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As stated upfront in our FY 19 shipbuilding plan,

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the Navy continues to aggressively pursue options

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to accelerate the achievement of a 355 ship Navy,

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executing the ship construction profiles

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and the shipbuilding plan coupled with extending

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the service life of the DGG-51 class,

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and targeted surface extensions of up to five FSNs,

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this provides an achievable strategy

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to accelerate achieving our goal

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of 355 ships from the 2050's to the 2030's.

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As this service life analysis work continues

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across all classes of ships,

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you'll see adjustments to our timelines

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and subsequent shipbuilding plans,

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as we accelerate growing our Navy to meet

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the 355 ship Navy requirement,

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we'll also be working to ensure we deliver overall

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best mix of naval capabilities to meet

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the national defense strategy,

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including focus on our logistics fleet

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and our hospital ships.

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We look forward to continuing to work closely with

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the subcommittee on the options and opportunities

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to achieve this Navy the nation's needs

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and do so urgently and affordably.

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We thank you for the strong support of the committee

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that's provided the Department of the Navy

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the opportunity to deliver on our 355 ship requirement

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and we look forward to answering your questions.

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- Very good,

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thank you assistant Secretary Geurts,

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appreciate all of your efforts,

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and like I say Admiral Merz,

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and Vice Admiral Moore thank you all so much

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for being with us here today.

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Let me begin quickly and then I want to

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go to my colleagues here,

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to you Vice Admiral Merz,

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and looking at the existing destroyer fleet

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and looking at the modernization plans,

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it does appear as though there is a significant

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gap in modernizing Flight I Destroyers

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and Flight II Destroyers,

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and there are significant gaps there,

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and it seems like a lot of those ships are

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not gonna make it to their expected service life,

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because we are essentially front loading much of

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the modernization on later generation Flight II's

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and Flight II A's,

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and I understand that with upgrading RADARs

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and baseline nine improvements through the EGIS programs,

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but I wanted to get your perspective on how do

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we take advantage of those existing ships to get

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the full service life expectations out of those ships,

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especially with a lot of the technology that's there today,

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Mr Norcross and I had an opportunity to travel to

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the EGIS operational center there where they're bringing

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in some of the new RADARs to test

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up in Moorestown, New Jersey as well as Lockheed,

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and we've been in conversation with Raytheon,

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there's a lot of technology out there that seems

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to me could be put into these Flight I Destroyers

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and Flight II Destroyers that would give us

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the capability that extends well into the years,

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gets us more quickly to the 355 ship number,

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and really modernize these systems as

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the Navy envisions this multi-ship platform

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increased lethality into the future battle space,

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so give me your perspective on how the Navy envisions

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that going into the future?

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- Yes sir Mr Chairman,

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and thank you for that question,

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because it really does tee up a little bit

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larger conversation on how we are approaching

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the DG-51 class,

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so as promised and as stated in the shipbuilding plan,

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we saw a path to accelerate this 355 achievement,

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as quickly as to the 2030s,

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and recently Natesa completed the analysis of that class,

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so we will be in fact extending

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the entire class up to 45 years.

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And this gets directly to your question,

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now what,

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what are we going to do with the ships along the way?

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So there's a couple of types of service life extensions,

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there's individual hull platforms,

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a little bit laborious,

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ship by ship,

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got to figure out how to do it, when to do it,

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and kind of cram it into the plan.

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- Now that part of it,

14:33.910 --> 14:35.090
let me jump in real quick,

14:35.090 --> 14:38.510
at that part of the plan is what the Navy terms

14:38.510 --> 14:41.320
HME, hull, mechanical and electrical and the upgrades

14:41.320 --> 14:43.670
there aside from ship systems upgrades?

14:43.670 --> 14:44.953
- It's typically both,

14:45.520 --> 14:47.330
we'll have to look at the whole envelope of the ship,

14:47.330 --> 14:51.833
and that's how we go through the lens of can we, should we,

14:51.970 --> 14:54.120
the opportunity cost versus buying new,

14:54.120 --> 14:56.793
and it's a pretty structured approach.

14:57.530 --> 14:59.760
The much more productive and helpful extension

14:59.760 --> 15:01.303
is when we extend the entire class,

15:01.303 --> 15:04.713
through the terrific work of the Natesa engineers,

15:05.640 --> 15:08.740
we have come through that I'd say pretty quickly,

15:08.740 --> 15:10.730
unfortunately it's not completed in time

15:10.730 --> 15:12.110
for the current shipbuilding plan,

15:12.110 --> 15:14.883
but it will certainly be reflected in subsequent plans.

15:15.240 --> 15:19.240
So with that now we know the life expectancy of

15:19.240 --> 15:20.240
the entire class,

15:20.240 --> 15:21.860
and then we can roll in the right maintenance

15:21.860 --> 15:24.260
and modernizations much more efficiently,

15:24.260 --> 15:27.483
much more affordably for the entire duration of the class.

15:28.310 --> 15:29.160
The good news is,

15:30.067 --> 15:31.810
there is no destroyer left behind under the old plan,

15:31.810 --> 15:34.233
every destroyer will be modernized,

15:34.538 --> 15:37.370
we talk in terms of baselines,

15:37.370 --> 15:39.290
there's three fundamental baselines

15:39.290 --> 15:40.800
the entire class will end up with,

15:40.800 --> 15:42.963
it will either be 5.4, nine or 10,

15:43.490 --> 15:46.060
all of them provide ballistic missile defense capability,

15:46.060 --> 15:48.810
which is fundamentally the requirement we have to have.

15:49.800 --> 15:52.120
So whether that carries these through the life of the ship,

15:52.120 --> 15:53.343
with the extension,

15:53.570 --> 15:56.667
we have time to work through that and what it will take,

15:56.667 --> 15:59.813
and the threat will be a big vote in how we do that.

16:00.172 --> 16:04.973
So how does this affect the 355 ship number is,

16:07.694 --> 16:10.403
as we stated in the shipbuilding plan,

16:11.517 --> 16:15.533
the 355 will now be arriving in the mid-thirties,

16:15.930 --> 16:17.870
and that's only with the DDG extensions,

16:17.870 --> 16:20.660
that does not include candidate options

16:20.660 --> 16:22.253
for three SSNs per year,

16:22.438 --> 16:24.670
or any other service life extensions in

16:24.670 --> 16:26.483
and around that time period,

16:27.290 --> 16:29.740
typically the individual whole life extensions

16:29.740 --> 16:31.360
will only help you smooth the ramp,

16:31.360 --> 16:34.110
they don't really affect the overall number

16:34.340 --> 16:36.420
in the end on when you achieve it,

16:36.420 --> 16:37.988
but a class wide extension does,

16:37.988 --> 16:39.653
and that's what you're seeing.

16:41.070 --> 16:43.180
So with the extension of that class,

16:43.180 --> 16:45.570
with the modernization efforts with that class

16:46.200 --> 16:48.770
we don't get the correct mix in the 2030s

16:48.770 --> 16:49.820
but it's not a bad mix,

16:49.820 --> 16:51.830
if you have to have extra ships,

16:51.830 --> 16:53.533
Destroyers are good ones to have,

16:53.911 --> 16:55.620
then we'll work with Congress on how

16:55.620 --> 16:57.090
we manage that inventory,

16:57.090 --> 16:59.230
because we don't want them to come at the expense

16:59.230 --> 17:00.170
of the new construction,

17:00.170 --> 17:04.640
especially the overall driver of the correct

17:04.640 --> 17:05.880
mix which is the SSN,

17:05.880 --> 17:09.053
so we'll have to manage that very, very quickly.

17:10.440 --> 17:11.590
Right now under the current plan

17:11.590 --> 17:13.180
that's still on a 2048 timeline,

17:13.180 --> 17:16.140
but like I said that does not include

17:16.140 --> 17:18.570
any extra submarines in any particular years,

17:18.570 --> 17:21.140
then of course the CBN plan is also one

17:21.140 --> 17:22.573
of the lengthier ones.

17:24.030 --> 17:24.863
- Very good,

17:24.960 --> 17:25.793
thank you Admiral Merz,

17:25.793 --> 17:27.313
I'll now go to Mr Courtney.

17:28.680 --> 17:29.880
- Thank you Mr Chairman,

17:29.893 --> 17:30.726
well it looks like you guys made a little news

17:30.726 --> 17:32.687
today already by moving the needle from

17:32.687 --> 17:34.360
the 2050s to the 2030s,

17:34.360 --> 17:35.413
so we're on a roll,

17:35.640 --> 17:37.603
let's keep going,

17:39.399 --> 17:41.103
well that's gonna be my next question,

17:41.290 --> 17:42.363
Secretary Geurts,

17:43.460 --> 17:45.410
as I mentioned in my opening statement,

17:45.440 --> 17:49.100
we in Congress want to help you by maximizing

17:49.100 --> 17:50.360
tools to boost shipbuilding,

17:50.360 --> 17:53.140
and in the last NDAA in the Omnibus we provided

17:53.140 --> 17:55.783
the Navy with authority to add more submarines

17:55.783 --> 17:58.570
into the block contract you're negotiating right now.

17:58.570 --> 18:02.100
Last year actually acting assistant secretary

18:02.100 --> 18:04.467
Stiller testified that the Navy quote,

18:04.467 --> 18:07.377
"Has the ability in a multi-year contract to also ask

18:07.377 --> 18:09.750
"for option pricing for additional ships."

18:09.750 --> 18:14.500
And yourself in testimony last month when we asked about

18:14.500 --> 18:17.650
the most efficient way to procure extra submarines

18:17.650 --> 18:19.803
in fiscal year '22 and '23,

18:19.970 --> 18:21.920
stated that the most efficient way will

18:22.150 --> 18:24.550
be able to try to get those into the multi year.

18:25.120 --> 18:28.380
So I guess my question is can you provide an update to

18:28.380 --> 18:31.270
the subcommittee on your efforts to take advantage

18:31.270 --> 18:34.510
of those options that Mr Stiller and you testified

18:34.510 --> 18:37.713
before the committee over the last year or so?

18:38.170 --> 18:39.023
- Yes sir,

18:39.320 --> 18:40.153
I'd appreciate it,

18:40.153 --> 18:41.793
and as Admiral Merz said,

18:42.120 --> 18:44.753
great news working with Admiral Merz team,

18:44.883 --> 18:47.264
getting 355 sooner that doesn't alleviate

18:47.264 --> 18:49.883
the challenges we have on the submarine side,

18:50.660 --> 18:53.303
but gives us something to look at,

18:53.380 --> 18:55.280
so again we're taking a twofold approach,

18:55.280 --> 18:59.173
one is as we spoke about in the last year on submarines,

18:59.280 --> 19:03.033
looking at service life extensions for about five SSNs,

19:03.110 --> 19:03.943
very targeted,

19:03.943 --> 19:07.223
that's a very specific goal analysis,

19:07.550 --> 19:09.330
and we think we are in pretty good shape,

19:09.330 --> 19:11.320
we'll prove it with the first one this year,

19:11.320 --> 19:13.510
and then that will give us a little benefit,

19:13.510 --> 19:14.480
and then the second one is,

19:14.480 --> 19:16.640
where can we accelerate production should

19:17.100 --> 19:19.483
that be affordable and in the budget.

19:19.960 --> 19:21.530
We are looking at adding those

19:21.530 --> 19:26.070
two submarines into the contracting process,

19:26.070 --> 19:28.110
we're working through the mechanics of exactly

19:28.110 --> 19:29.163
how to do that,

19:29.580 --> 19:31.170
we've spoken with your staff of what

19:31.170 --> 19:34.822
that looks like in terms of budget impact,

19:34.822 --> 19:37.065
and we're continuing to refine those numbers,

19:37.065 --> 19:40.311
so I'm still committed to having options in

19:40.311 --> 19:43.590
that contract for additional submarines in '22

19:43.590 --> 19:46.431
and '23 should that be something we jointly decide

19:46.431 --> 19:48.893
to do and can afford.

19:49.100 --> 19:52.800
- Great, as you said our staff and your team are talking

19:52.800 --> 19:56.013
about ways that with the mark we can help facilitate that,

19:56.537 --> 19:58.760
because it is the smartest way to stretch dollars,

19:58.760 --> 20:02.713
and get us again closer to the target.

20:04.182 --> 20:05.643
And one other question,

20:06.160 --> 20:08.720
Admiral Moore in your written testimony

20:08.720 --> 20:09.610
at the Senate yesterday,

20:09.610 --> 20:12.010
which we do actually follow the House of Lords

20:12.010 --> 20:13.213
a little bit over here,

20:13.870 --> 20:15.790
you painted two different pictures for how

20:15.790 --> 20:18.700
the Navy manages private sector ship repair when

20:18.700 --> 20:20.760
you discussed the non-nuclear fleet you stated that

20:20.760 --> 20:22.712
the Navy is committed to working collaboratively

20:22.712 --> 20:24.920
with industry to provide them stable

20:24.920 --> 20:27.130
and predictable workload in a competitive environment

20:27.130 --> 20:29.070
moving forward so that they can hire the workforce

20:29.070 --> 20:30.860
and make the investments necessary to maintain

20:30.860 --> 20:34.180
and modernize a growing non-nuclear fleet,

20:34.180 --> 20:36.340
but then when you discussed the nuclear fleet

20:36.340 --> 20:38.590
you stated only that the Navy would consider private

20:38.590 --> 20:41.620
sector maintenance work during peak periods to ensure

20:41.620 --> 20:44.343
the health of the private sector nuclear base.

20:44.700 --> 20:45.850
You've heard me before,

20:45.850 --> 20:48.813
and we've had this discussion with Secretary Geurts,

20:48.826 --> 20:51.880
it seems the picture that you painted for

20:51.880 --> 20:53.040
the non-nuclear fleet,

20:53.040 --> 20:57.370
about again maximizing speed in terms of getting

20:57.370 --> 20:59.480
the work done as well as leveling off workload,

20:59.480 --> 21:03.113
it really does apply for the nuclear side as well,

21:04.627 --> 21:07.290
and I just wondered if you could describe whether

21:07.290 --> 21:11.180
I'm reading too much into their being a disparity

21:11.180 --> 21:13.663
there in terms of your approach or not?

21:14.310 --> 21:16.210
- Thanks for the question congressmen,

21:16.550 --> 21:18.483
you may be reading a little bit into it,

21:19.330 --> 21:20.440
on the private sector side,

21:20.440 --> 21:23.780
for the non-nuclear ships it's all done by

21:23.780 --> 21:25.790
the private sector, and it's in a competitive base,

21:25.790 --> 21:29.283
so I've got one sector I have to focus on,

21:29.283 --> 21:31.493
then on the nuclear industrial base,

21:31.960 --> 21:36.340
I have both a Electric Boat and Newport News Shipbuilding,

21:36.340 --> 21:38.300
who have the capacity to do repair work

21:38.300 --> 21:39.790
in addition to the new construction,

21:39.790 --> 21:41.160
and then I have naval shipyards,

21:41.160 --> 21:44.530
so I have a responsibility also to maintain

21:44.530 --> 21:47.140
an organic capability to do nuclear repair,

21:47.140 --> 21:51.350
so my comments were really relative to the fact

21:51.350 --> 21:53.650
that I have a responsibility to maintain both,

21:53.650 --> 21:57.453
I've got to maintain a strong healthy industrial base,

21:57.730 --> 22:00.680
and nuclear repair base organically in the naval shipyards,

22:01.106 --> 22:01.939
that's by law,

22:02.278 --> 22:06.187
but I also have to recognize that it is also

22:06.187 --> 22:09.180
very important for us to maintain the health of

22:09.180 --> 22:10.048
the overall nuclear industrial base

22:10.048 --> 22:12.250
at Newport News Shipyard and Electric Boat,

22:12.250 --> 22:14.900
and so where we have fallen short in

22:14.900 --> 22:16.300
the past couple of years is,

22:16.440 --> 22:20.070
we have at the last second decided I don't have

22:20.070 --> 22:21.800
the capacity in the naval shipyards,

22:21.800 --> 22:24.930
so here could you do the submarine work for me,

22:24.930 --> 22:26.300
I think my comments were relative,

22:26.300 --> 22:28.200
we've got to get out in front of that,

22:28.530 --> 22:30.470
we've got to maintain a stable workload in

22:30.470 --> 22:32.350
the naval shipyards for very good reason,

22:32.350 --> 22:34.197
because they do the principal,

22:36.427 --> 22:37.900
they do the principal work in both our carriers

22:37.900 --> 22:39.453
and our submarines,

22:39.700 --> 22:41.693
but you also have to factor in the fact that when

22:41.693 --> 22:44.180
I got workload that I'm going to be challenged on,

22:44.180 --> 22:47.280
I need to give Electric Boat an Newport News Shipbuilding

22:47.630 --> 22:49.790
enough heads up so they can be successful as well,

22:49.790 --> 22:53.263
and if they have periods where they are significantly,

22:54.100 --> 22:55.900
where they don't have a lot of work,

22:56.400 --> 23:00.840
it would make sense for us to make sure we consider them in

23:00.840 --> 23:02.336
the decisions on what we're going to do

23:02.336 --> 23:04.560
in particular for submarine maintenance,

23:04.560 --> 23:08.433
because their health is important to us,

23:08.510 --> 23:10.617
it's hard to expect them to be successful on

23:10.617 --> 23:13.420
the new construction side of the house if they

23:13.420 --> 23:14.990
are in this boom and bust cycle as well,

23:14.990 --> 23:18.640
so it really was meant to point to the fact that

23:19.857 --> 23:23.163
I've got to balance two pieces on the nuclear repair side,

23:23.799 --> 23:25.830
where on the surface sector side I'm really

23:25.830 --> 23:27.483
looking at one component.

23:27.970 --> 23:28.900
- I appreciate that,

23:28.900 --> 23:32.023
and again as you know we want to work with you on that,

23:32.573 --> 23:37.007
given the history with SSN being sort

23:37.560 --> 23:40.383
of the poorer cousin at the public yards,

23:40.760 --> 23:43.360
again we think there really is a sweet spot

23:43.360 --> 23:45.060
here where we can find a solution,

23:45.360 --> 23:46.510
with that I yield back.

23:47.145 --> 23:47.978
- Thank you Mr Courtney,

23:47.978 --> 23:49.310
we'll now go to Mr Conaway.

23:49.400 --> 23:50.233
- Thank you Mr Chairman,

23:50.233 --> 23:53.360
Mr Geurts, Admiral Richardson had a White Paper talking

23:53.420 --> 23:55.910
about carriers that if we bought them on a three

23:55.910 --> 23:58.690
or four year cycle instead of five or more than

23:58.690 --> 24:01.550
we could catch up on the 12 carrier issue,

24:01.550 --> 24:03.493
yet the budget doesn't do that,

24:03.820 --> 24:06.290
and then also can you talk to us about why that's the case,

24:06.290 --> 24:10.060
and then on the block buy for the CD-80

24:10.060 --> 24:12.290
and 81 if we did that,

24:12.290 --> 24:15.093
it would save two and a half plus billion dollars,

24:15.670 --> 24:19.383
is that analysis on that savings ripe and done,

24:19.610 --> 24:21.410
and what are our plans on us trying

24:21.410 --> 24:23.023
to avoid the carrier gaps?

24:24.822 --> 24:26.090
- Yes sir and obviously carriers are

24:26.090 --> 24:27.810
a key component of our national security,

24:27.810 --> 24:29.260
we're watching those closely.

24:29.400 --> 24:32.200
On the timeline that can be an affordability issue

24:32.200 --> 24:36.235
of how quickly can we move those centers together,

24:36.235 --> 24:39.700
and how do we balance that among all the other requirements,

24:39.700 --> 24:42.910
Admiral Merz may want to comment a little bit more on that,

24:42.910 --> 24:45.040
from an overall requirements standpoint,

24:45.040 --> 24:48.577
but yes the number of years and those centers drives

24:48.577 --> 24:53.577
our ability to get to the full FSA requirement for the CVNs.

24:54.780 --> 24:56.090
On the two carrier buy,

24:56.090 --> 24:58.623
I think as we spoke last,

24:59.340 --> 25:01.943
we are asking the shipyard to sharpen a pencil,

25:02.090 --> 25:04.210
we have asked them formally for the cost,

25:04.210 --> 25:08.423
and looking at all the technology available,

25:08.480 --> 25:10.010
all the new ways of building,

25:10.010 --> 25:12.450
and then what cost savings could be get by putting

25:12.450 --> 25:15.000
those two ships together on a block buy,

25:15.000 --> 25:16.900
they're working on that as we speak,

25:16.900 --> 25:20.793
we've already released a formal request for quotes,

25:20.960 --> 25:23.510
and we should have that coming in the early summer,

25:23.631 --> 25:27.903
both their response and our analysis of that response,

25:27.980 --> 25:30.270
it's not quite the same as when we did

25:30.270 --> 25:31.400
it in the Nimitz class,

25:31.400 --> 25:34.830
because we've already started the construction of CVN-80,

25:34.830 --> 25:36.880
so the savings are a little bit dependent

25:37.160 --> 25:40.783
on exactly when we should go into such an agreement,

25:41.150 --> 25:41.983
that will occur,

25:41.983 --> 25:45.273
but I believe there are substantial savings available,

25:45.360 --> 25:47.722
we'll get that refined down to a number we can go

25:47.722 --> 25:52.070
and work with the Congress to understand if

25:52.070 --> 25:54.290
that's something we jointly want to pursue further.

25:54.290 --> 25:56.600
So I'll have bottom-line some better numbers

25:57.100 --> 25:58.240
coming here in the next month,

25:58.240 --> 25:59.073
month and a half,

25:59.073 --> 26:01.290
and work closely with the committee on those

26:01.290 --> 26:02.783
and the way forward.

26:03.987 --> 26:07.460
- I met with General McDew on the ready reserve fleet

26:07.460 --> 26:08.903
is 40 plus years old,

26:09.780 --> 26:12.830
any consideration to buying foreign ships and/or use

26:12.830 --> 26:16.993
the ships to shorten the overall life of

26:16.993 --> 26:19.733
the regular reserve fleet?

26:20.040 --> 26:22.250
- Yes sir I think there's a number of options

26:22.250 --> 26:23.693
that are available to us,

26:23.840 --> 26:27.763
some that you've already authorized for a small number,

26:27.950 --> 26:30.050
I think there's probably a larger number where

26:30.050 --> 26:31.813
we could buy used,

26:32.070 --> 26:34.323
they could be foreign built but US flagships,

26:35.060 --> 26:36.533
there's opportunities there,

26:36.810 --> 26:40.490
and then there's opportunities to accelerate design of

26:40.490 --> 26:43.313
a new ship should be want to do a new construction,

26:43.820 --> 26:46.640
so I think there's a couple of different levers we can pull,

26:46.640 --> 26:48.740
one is extend the ships we have to the end

26:48.740 --> 26:50.053
of their service life,

26:51.315 --> 26:53.950
another is buy used to give us some room,

26:53.950 --> 26:56.083
and then third would be new construction,

26:56.740 --> 27:00.398
potentially in a modular way where we can get shared use

27:00.398 --> 27:03.183
of a common hall across many missions.

27:04.770 --> 27:06.000
- It makes me a little nervous when you say redesign

27:06.000 --> 27:10.893
a new ship for it's basically a commercial vessel already,

27:11.263 --> 27:14.180
the commercial side is trying to find out ways

27:14.180 --> 27:16.433
to do that better, quicker fit.

27:16.630 --> 27:20.590
- Yes sir the new piece would be how do we take

27:21.279 --> 27:22.740
what's probably a common hull and be able

27:22.740 --> 27:24.343
to use it in multiple missions.

27:24.950 --> 27:27.450
- [Mr Conaway] Thank you Mr Chairman I yield back.

27:28.156 --> 27:28.989
- Thank you Mr Conaway,

27:28.989 --> 27:30.100
we'll now go to Mr Landsman.

27:30.840 --> 27:33.138
- Thank you Mr Chairman I want to thank

27:33.138 --> 27:33.971
my witnesses for your testimony today,

27:33.971 --> 27:35.930
and thank you for your service to the country.

27:35.930 --> 27:37.500
Admiral Merz if I could start with you,

27:37.500 --> 27:40.228
earlier this week at the sea, air and space

27:40.228 --> 27:42.353
exposition you stated,

27:42.520 --> 27:43.353
and I quote,

27:43.870 --> 27:47.840
capabilities we would really like to put most

27:47.840 --> 27:52.840
of our energy and we can make I quote make our fleet

27:53.760 --> 27:57.733
more lethal much more quickly than just building capacity,

27:57.910 --> 28:00.883
so I agree with enhancing our capabilities is critical,

28:01.290 --> 28:03.260
but more capacity of course is also required

28:03.260 --> 28:04.723
to meet operational demand,

28:05.110 --> 28:07.560
so could you please describe what you think about

28:07.813 --> 28:09.950
the trade-offs between adding capabilities quickly

28:09.950 --> 28:12.913
versus building out the required capacity,

28:13.340 --> 28:14.423
what's the right mix?

28:15.070 --> 28:15.903
- Yes sir,

28:15.903 --> 28:19.750
so the fundamental point in my comments was

28:19.750 --> 28:22.463
that balance that you are alluding to,

28:24.070 --> 28:26.670
we've essentially been surrendering the capability

28:26.670 --> 28:29.330
to keep whatever ships construction going

28:29.330 --> 28:30.683
that we could in the past,

28:32.130 --> 28:33.533
we really need to do both,

28:33.760 --> 28:35.360
as we explain it,

28:35.360 --> 28:38.160
if you just buy ships you get what

28:38.160 --> 28:40.583
we call linear improvement in capability,

28:40.871 --> 28:42.500
you're just buying more of the same without

28:42.500 --> 28:43.900
the capability on top of it,

28:44.410 --> 28:47.317
buying more ships and adding the advanced capability,

28:47.317 --> 28:49.467
you start getting a non-linear improvement,

28:50.081 --> 28:51.440
and then if you start connecting those ships together

28:51.440 --> 28:54.283
then maybe you get an exponential improvement.

28:55.200 --> 28:57.200
We can turn capability typically faster than

28:57.200 --> 28:59.510
we can turn the size of the Navy,

28:59.510 --> 29:02.180
so some of the advanced development efforts

29:02.410 --> 29:04.150
such as hypersonic's,

29:04.150 --> 29:05.223
directed energy,

29:05.760 --> 29:07.053
unmanned vehicles,

29:07.400 --> 29:09.830
we think we have a pretty aggressive

29:09.830 --> 29:14.113
and positive technology vector to field this capability,

29:14.272 --> 29:18.940
and now we're just moving as aggressively as we can

29:18.940 --> 29:22.203
to resource it to bring it in as quickly as we can,

29:22.640 --> 29:25.560
I can do a lot more with the existing fleet using

29:25.560 --> 29:30.560
advanced capability than I can just by capacity alone,

29:30.650 --> 29:34.070
so that's fundamentally what I was referring to,

29:34.070 --> 29:36.560
that got interpreted that we're coming off the 355,

29:36.560 --> 29:41.333
clearly we are accelerating 355 into the thirties now,

29:42.170 --> 29:44.033
we are laser focused on that number,

29:44.959 --> 29:46.250
and if anything that number will probably

29:46.250 --> 29:47.200
grow in the future.

29:47.640 --> 29:49.543
- So as a follow-up,

29:50.214 --> 29:51.047
our competitors obviously continue

29:51.047 --> 29:53.873
to pursue advanced capabilities as well,

29:54.070 --> 29:56.320
so what advanced capabilities or technologies

29:57.031 --> 29:59.683
are you most interested in investing in today,

29:59.847 --> 30:01.350
as well as over the long term,

30:01.350 --> 30:02.975
to increase both survivability and

30:02.975 --> 30:05.563
the lethality that you described?

30:07.040 --> 30:07.873
- So yes sir,

30:08.400 --> 30:10.230
actually the one I just mentioned,

30:10.230 --> 30:12.790
the hypersonic's and the directed energy are probably

30:13.057 --> 30:14.470
the ones that will have the most interest,

30:14.470 --> 30:16.403
there is also enabling technologies,

30:16.600 --> 30:17.760
we're partnering with industries

30:17.760 --> 30:22.083
in artificial intelligence is probably the most important.

30:22.390 --> 30:25.840
And we also have the,

30:25.840 --> 30:28.740
our whole accelerated acquisition board of directors

30:28.740 --> 30:30.650
which is chaired by Secretary Geurts

30:30.650 --> 30:32.350
and the chief of naval operations,

30:32.400 --> 30:34.450
Shepherd's identifies these technologies,

30:34.783 --> 30:35.616
and we'll work closely with the committees

30:35.616 --> 30:37.083
to actually get them funded,

30:37.488 --> 30:39.980
I'll turn over to Secretary Geurts,

30:39.980 --> 30:41.420
he's got a few more of these.

30:41.420 --> 30:42.410
- The only one I would add,

30:42.410 --> 30:45.470
and Admiral Merz has been outspoken about this before,

30:45.470 --> 30:47.553
is networking and network fires.

30:47.790 --> 30:50.810
So there's individual lethality on each of the ships,

30:50.810 --> 30:53.223
hypersonic, directed energy, some of those,

30:53.227 --> 30:55.230
and then there is how do we get

30:55.230 --> 30:57.290
the collective strength of the fleet,

30:57.290 --> 30:59.030
via network fires and network

30:59.030 --> 31:00.903
enabled operations and whatnot,

31:01.400 --> 31:05.163
so we look at capability growth in both of those dimensions.

31:05.760 --> 31:07.810
- Thank you secretary, thank you Admiral,

31:07.990 --> 31:10.300
so increasing the capability and capacity

31:10.300 --> 31:14.360
of our Navy obviously will require nurturing

31:14.360 --> 31:16.283
a more robust industrial base,

31:16.410 --> 31:17.870
and obviously this takes time,

31:17.870 --> 31:22.870
as you can't develop journeyman shipbuilders overnight,

31:23.290 --> 31:25.930
how are you currently working to support the development

31:25.930 --> 31:29.060
and growth of the industrial base and is it sufficient

31:29.060 --> 31:30.680
to meet your specific requirements for

31:30.680 --> 31:33.003
an increase in production today,

31:33.650 --> 31:36.590
in five years, in a decade as we look

31:36.590 --> 31:38.113
out at the outer years?

31:38.250 --> 31:39.703
- Yes sir congressmen,

31:39.854 --> 31:42.604
I think there's some interesting intersections of that,

31:42.730 --> 31:47.640
technology actually in some of the shipyards is enabling us

31:47.640 --> 31:52.640
to more quickly grow experience in the industrial base,

31:53.840 --> 31:55.050
that's not a panacea,

31:55.050 --> 31:57.240
that's not gonna fix things overnight,

31:57.240 --> 32:01.580
but that does help us where we have both a mature workforce

32:01.580 --> 32:03.233
and then a growing workforce.

32:03.410 --> 32:05.640
And then the other piece is how do we try to get out

32:05.640 --> 32:08.510
of these boom and bust cycles so we don't train up

32:08.510 --> 32:11.700
an expert workforce to let them go and then come back

32:11.700 --> 32:14.700
five or 10 years later and then try and train them up again,

32:14.760 --> 32:17.820
that is not a cycle of success for us,

32:17.820 --> 32:22.670
so then to represent Courtney's question,

32:22.670 --> 32:25.510
how do we then link in maintenance and availability

32:25.760 --> 32:28.350
as another enabler to help balance workforce,

32:28.350 --> 32:30.073
to preserve that workforce,

32:30.180 --> 32:32.730
how do we bring in new technology to that workforce

32:32.730 --> 32:34.623
to enable them to be more effective,

32:34.960 --> 32:37.145
both of those I think are opportunities for us

32:37.145 --> 32:40.560
to improve the way we looked at this versus

32:40.560 --> 32:41.910
how we've done in the past.

32:42.640 --> 32:44.210
- Very good, thank you all,

32:44.210 --> 32:45.070
my time has expired,

32:45.070 --> 32:46.450
I have a couple of other questions

32:46.450 --> 32:47.360
I will submit for the record,

32:47.360 --> 32:49.540
and if you could respond to those I would appreciate.

32:49.540 --> 32:50.890
Thank you and I yield back.

32:50.970 --> 32:53.370
- Thank you Mr Landsman will now go to Mr Byrne.

32:53.590 --> 32:54.730
- Good afternoon gentlemen,

32:54.730 --> 32:57.043
for once I'm not gonna talk to you about LCS,

32:58.420 --> 33:01.070
I do want to talk to you about the follow-on frigate,

33:01.140 --> 33:02.163
and obviously,

33:02.762 --> 33:04.910
(audience laughs)

33:04.910 --> 33:06.813
Moving on to more important things,

33:07.690 --> 33:10.150
obviously the concept there is the last 20

33:10.150 --> 33:12.640
small surface combatants are going to be frigates,

33:12.640 --> 33:15.993
and this is part of our distributed lethality concept,

33:16.530 --> 33:18.120
but unlike other navies,

33:18.120 --> 33:20.250
the frigate is not going to be our top

33:20.250 --> 33:21.973
line surface combatant,

33:22.614 --> 33:23.510
it's at the lower end,

33:23.510 --> 33:26.670
and so a part of that mix also is we've got

33:26.710 --> 33:30.033
the bigger ships that can have greater lethality,

33:30.170 --> 33:31.620
this is at the lower end so we get more

33:31.620 --> 33:32.550
of that distribution,

33:32.550 --> 33:35.070
so we've got a trade off their between what they

33:35.070 --> 33:36.828
can do what you're going to put on them

33:36.828 --> 33:37.890
and what they're gonna cost,

33:37.890 --> 33:39.723
so having said all of that Mr Geurts,

33:39.723 --> 33:42.593
what the right target price for the new frigates?

33:43.900 --> 33:48.480
- Sir our current target for the first one is

33:48.560 --> 33:49.890
on the order of 1.2 billion,

33:49.890 --> 33:52.213
and the follow-on 850 million,

33:52.330 --> 33:53.453
is what we set,

33:53.570 --> 33:57.490
that was set prior to our award of down selecting

33:57.490 --> 33:58.983
the five competitors,

33:59.510 --> 34:01.323
that dialogue is going on right now,

34:01.323 --> 34:03.680
that that price may shift depending on where

34:03.680 --> 34:04.890
we get out of those studies.

34:04.890 --> 34:06.090
- [Mr Byrne] Up or down?

34:06.090 --> 34:06.923
- That may shift,

34:06.923 --> 34:09.570
I would expect it to shift down, both from the studies,

34:09.730 --> 34:12.730
I would also expect it to shift down because of competition,

34:12.960 --> 34:15.250
so I would not take the numbers as a given,

34:15.250 --> 34:17.280
that was as we set the program up

34:17.600 --> 34:21.373
where we looked at capability versus costs,

34:21.390 --> 34:24.100
that is gonna be a trade-off of capability versus costs,

34:24.100 --> 34:25.693
it's not a budget,

34:25.873 --> 34:29.083
get the capability at any cost,

34:29.630 --> 34:32.090
and we'll be better informed this year through

34:32.090 --> 34:36.040
those studies that will result in our fee for

34:36.040 --> 34:39.273
our final down select to the final target numbers.

34:39.670 --> 34:41.530
- Well the figure we had heard for a while,

34:41.530 --> 34:43.580
and I know things shifted around was 800,

34:43.730 --> 34:45.850
so obviously if you can get through this competition

34:45.850 --> 34:46.940
and get that number down,

34:46.940 --> 34:49.663
that's important to us and trying to balance this out.

34:50.050 --> 34:52.950
So Admiral with that in mind from what I'm hearing

34:53.722 --> 34:56.020
it sounds like the piece here where you

34:56.020 --> 34:58.740
can move things around and perhaps get the lower price,

34:58.740 --> 35:00.090
is the number of BLS seals,

35:00.660 --> 35:02.110
my understanding is the Navy is looking

35:02.110 --> 35:03.913
at between 16 and 32,

35:04.080 --> 35:05.853
so being a simpleton,

35:06.170 --> 35:08.450
just let's strike it down the middle,

35:08.450 --> 35:11.250
and 24 BLS sales seems to be about the right number,

35:11.250 --> 35:12.850
do you have any comment on that?

35:14.600 --> 35:15.433
- Yes sir,

35:16.163 --> 35:18.530
I want as many as I can get.

35:18.530 --> 35:20.640
- Remember we have to take into account cost.

35:20.640 --> 35:21.473
- Yes sir,

35:21.880 --> 35:26.473
so the requirements are that lethality is a piece of that,

35:26.473 --> 35:28.813
it's a cost, it's lethality,

35:29.590 --> 35:32.413
and all of those will compete to the final selection.

35:32.960 --> 35:34.820
- But do you have any thoughts about what

35:34.820 --> 35:37.223
the right number of BLS sales will be?

35:37.840 --> 35:40.483
- The right number is 32 or more,

35:41.280 --> 35:44.580
but we are willing to have as part of

35:44.580 --> 35:47.483
the trade space when they make the final selection,

35:48.180 --> 35:50.300
when you compare a frigate to a destroyer which

35:50.300 --> 35:51.553
has over a hundred cells,

35:51.680 --> 35:55.700
you can see the mismatch we're trying to balance here

35:55.780 --> 36:00.600
as we balance distributed lethality and mass lethality,

36:00.600 --> 36:02.450
and we have to bring both to the fight,

36:02.450 --> 36:04.993
and this is very fundamental to an away game Navy,

36:05.030 --> 36:06.690
we pretty much bring what we have,

36:06.690 --> 36:08.760
so how you bring it and how you distribute it,

36:08.760 --> 36:12.733
is very much important to the lethality per ship.

36:13.740 --> 36:15.710
- I'll never forget the testimony

36:15.710 --> 36:17.040
we had from Admiral Harris,

36:17.040 --> 36:20.130
about his early career in the Navy,

36:20.130 --> 36:24.073
when he was looking at the Soviet Union's Corvettes,

36:24.480 --> 36:26.460
and they were much smaller ships,

36:26.460 --> 36:29.040
had not a very large number of missiles on them,

36:29.040 --> 36:31.830
but he had to be worried about every one of them,

36:31.830 --> 36:33.520
and I know that's part of what the Navy is thinking,

36:33.520 --> 36:35.470
there's a lot more platforms out there,

36:36.438 --> 36:37.886
so our adversaries have to be worried about more

36:37.886 --> 36:39.986
of those platforms and what they're doing,

36:40.240 --> 36:42.100
so I would encourage you as we figure out how

36:42.100 --> 36:45.190
to pay for submarines and aircraft carriers,

36:45.190 --> 36:47.820
and Destroyers and amphibs,

36:47.820 --> 36:49.120
and maybe a new type of cruiser,

36:49.120 --> 36:50.563
I just heard that today,

36:51.670 --> 36:54.010
we've got to remember we can spend too much on

36:54.010 --> 36:57.676
this lower end ship so that we balance everything out,

36:57.676 --> 36:59.233
with that Mr Chairman I yield back.

37:00.164 --> 37:02.003
- Thank you Mr Byrne, we'll now go to Ms Bordaila.

37:03.530 --> 37:06.203
- Thank you Mr Chairman and to our witnesses.

37:07.120 --> 37:09.100
I remain a strong advocate for the Navy

37:09.100 --> 37:12.393
to include the modernization and the growth of its fleet,

37:13.731 --> 37:15.060
and I cannot however in good conscience watch

37:15.060 --> 37:17.710
the Navy grow irresponsibly without the critical backbone

37:17.710 --> 37:21.220
of critical ship repair and maintenance capabilities

37:21.320 --> 37:23.493
required to support the current fleet,

37:23.580 --> 37:25.123
let alone a larger one.

37:25.760 --> 37:27.440
So assistant Secretary Geurts,

37:27.440 --> 37:30.970
last month Vice Admiral Lescher told this committee that

37:30.990 --> 37:33.480
the Navy needs to assertively get after

37:33.480 --> 37:37.523
a growing public shipyard nuclear maintenance capability,

37:38.100 --> 37:38.993
or capacity,

37:39.300 --> 37:41.890
I also appreciated your personal commitment before

37:41.890 --> 37:45.105
this committee to ensure the Navy conducts a balanced report

37:45.105 --> 37:48.393
on ship repair capability in the western Pacific,

37:48.790 --> 37:51.520
notwithstanding the soon to be finalized report

37:51.690 --> 37:53.170
on depot level ship repair,

37:53.170 --> 37:55.777
can you please speak to how the Navy is planning

37:55.777 --> 37:59.280
for the increased depot level ship repair requirement

37:59.410 --> 38:01.880
that will go hand in hand with the modernization

38:01.880 --> 38:05.223
and the construction of a 355 ship Navy?

38:06.600 --> 38:08.453
- Yes ma'am as you indicate,

38:08.455 --> 38:12.440
our Navy naval power comes to me from three elements,

38:12.440 --> 38:16.163
that's capacity, that's capability and that's readiness,

38:16.470 --> 38:18.000
and we've got to make sure we're looking

38:18.000 --> 38:19.510
at all three elements of those,

38:19.510 --> 38:22.993
so we don't rapidly build a fleet that we can't support,

38:23.440 --> 38:25.853
and can't support both in peacetime and war,

38:26.090 --> 38:28.223
and so we are looking at both elements,

38:29.400 --> 38:30.920
Admiral Moore can talk specifically to

38:31.302 --> 38:33.020
the public yards and our growth plan there,

38:33.020 --> 38:36.640
but again we have a 20 year growth optimization plan

38:36.640 --> 38:39.640
to get those public yards in the shape that they need to be.

38:39.740 --> 38:42.290
We need to be looking at the private yards,

38:42.290 --> 38:46.210
because that will likely be the next real challenge for us,

38:46.210 --> 38:49.083
in the next 5 to 10 years as availabilities grow,

38:49.290 --> 38:52.710
do we have the capacity and the capability we need

38:52.752 --> 38:56.440
in our private yard fleets to be able to take care of that,

38:56.440 --> 38:58.710
that's certainly an element we're looking at very closely.

38:58.710 --> 39:01.267
- So you're satisfied then with the way

39:01.604 --> 39:02.830
it's going at this point?

39:02.830 --> 39:04.930
- I think we have work to go ma'am I think

39:05.088 --> 39:07.288
we're getting our arms around our immediate,

39:07.480 --> 39:10.730
so I am more comfortable we're taking care

39:10.730 --> 39:14.513
of our immediate and have less loss availability,

39:14.760 --> 39:16.547
than we had two or three years ago thanks to

39:16.547 --> 39:19.423
the work of a lot of folks across the system,

39:19.540 --> 39:21.853
my eye is really in the future,

39:22.570 --> 39:24.863
now that we've caught up to today,

39:24.880 --> 39:27.450
how do we make sure as we build ships

39:27.450 --> 39:31.360
we're building repair capacity both in a distributed

39:31.360 --> 39:34.680
fashion and in the depth we need to be able to handle that,

39:34.680 --> 39:36.990
so we don't build our way into a crisis

39:36.990 --> 39:38.693
five or 10 years from now,

39:38.940 --> 39:41.363
and that's where I think my focus will be,

39:41.990 --> 39:42.900
and I don't know if Admiral Moore wants

39:42.900 --> 39:45.060
to add a little bit more on the public yard.

39:45.060 --> 39:45.893
- Thank you ma'am for the question,

39:45.893 --> 39:48.580
so the naval shipyard right now,

39:48.580 --> 39:50.790
we've had a concerted effort over the last couple of years,

39:50.790 --> 39:52.763
to grow the size,

39:54.027 --> 39:55.670
and ultimately by the end of this fiscal year

39:55.670 --> 40:00.390
will be at 36,100 personnel in the four naval shipyards,

40:00.390 --> 40:02.823
that's where we need to be from strength,

40:03.060 --> 40:07.330
that 46,100 will be sufficient to maintain

40:07.330 --> 40:10.543
the 71 nuclear powered vessels that we have today,

40:10.780 --> 40:12.900
and eventually the 80 nuclear powered vessels

40:12.900 --> 40:15.603
we would have as part of the 355 ship Navy.

40:16.110 --> 40:18.170
An important component of that though as

40:18.170 --> 40:20.470
the secretary alluded to is to all also make

40:20.470 --> 40:22.532
the investments in the naval shipyards themselves

40:22.532 --> 40:26.410
so that we can optimize the work going forward,

40:26.410 --> 40:28.789
so in addition to hiring the people,

40:28.789 --> 40:30.943
we need to upgrade dry docks,

40:31.240 --> 40:33.980
make sure they are available to support the future ships,

40:33.980 --> 40:37.343
CV-78 and block five Virginia class submarines,

40:37.940 --> 40:40.963
and we need to recapitalize the equipment in our shipyards,

40:41.240 --> 40:43.410
and then we really need to make a concerted effort

40:43.410 --> 40:45.453
to optimize the layout of the shipyards,

40:45.600 --> 40:47.370
so the workforce of the future can

40:47.370 --> 40:49.357
be more productive than they are today.

40:49.357 --> 40:51.240
And that gets to an earlier question about

40:51.240 --> 40:54.163
the workforce and how do we maintain them.

40:54.880 --> 40:56.660
- Thank you Admiral I have one quick question

40:56.660 --> 40:58.213
here and it's for you,

40:58.430 --> 41:00.330
I understand that your number one priority

41:00.330 --> 41:04.533
for Natesa is the on-time delivery of ships and submarines,

41:04.720 --> 41:06.480
I admire your focus on the people and

41:06.480 --> 41:09.093
the talent management required to make this happen,

41:09.320 --> 41:11.900
can you provide examples of how you tend to achieve

41:11.900 --> 41:16.430
that priority across a worldwide repair enterprise

41:16.430 --> 41:19.170
and how the strategic placement of ship repair

41:19.170 --> 41:21.530
facilities can help realize your number

41:21.530 --> 41:24.873
two command priority a culture of affordability?

41:25.560 --> 41:27.170
- Well thank you for the question ma'am,

41:27.170 --> 41:29.840
I would go back to some of what I just talked about,

41:29.840 --> 41:33.060
so I think growing the capacity of the four naval

41:34.057 --> 41:37.607
shipyards to 36,100 will achieve the first point,

41:38.140 --> 41:39.880
on-time delivery ships and submarines.

41:39.880 --> 41:41.710
And then it's absolutely critical that we get to

41:41.710 --> 41:43.760
the cultural affordability piece as well,

41:43.960 --> 41:46.650
and not only do we have to deliver them on time,

41:46.650 --> 41:49.023
which by itself will start to drive costs down,

41:49.230 --> 41:51.330
then we've got to start driving the costs down as well,

41:51.330 --> 41:52.990
and the only way we are gonna be able to do that

41:52.990 --> 41:56.485
is to provide an industrial pair base across 21st

41:56.485 --> 41:59.979
century naval shipyards that have new technology,

41:59.979 --> 42:01.730
new layouts,

42:01.730 --> 42:03.297
and is a place that we're gonna be able to hire

42:03.297 --> 42:06.123
and retain the workforce of the future.

42:06.840 --> 42:07.960
- Thank you very much,

42:07.960 --> 42:09.160
and I yield back my time.

42:09.160 --> 42:10.253
- Thanks Ms Bordalia,

42:10.590 --> 42:12.040
we'll now go to Mr Gallagher.

42:13.540 --> 42:14.410
- Thank you Mr Chairman,

42:14.410 --> 42:17.630
I am quite pleased to hear the talk

42:17.630 --> 42:20.330
about accelerating the move to 355,

42:20.330 --> 42:22.880
I would just like to emphasize as we grow I think

42:22.880 --> 42:25.640
we need to be making key investments in newer classes,

42:25.640 --> 42:27.773
in addition to extending service life,

42:27.840 --> 42:30.810
it sounds like you gentlemen have indicated

42:30.810 --> 42:32.000
a similar worldview today,

42:32.000 --> 42:33.010
and I appreciate Admiral Merz,

42:33.010 --> 42:34.440
you're clarifying points on your remarks

42:34.440 --> 42:35.810
from the conference earlier.

42:35.810 --> 42:36.643
This week,

42:37.002 --> 42:38.400
to paraphrase Mr Burnham,

42:38.400 --> 42:40.440
I'm not going to ask about LCS,

42:40.440 --> 42:42.476
I'm just gonna talk about small service combatants,

42:42.476 --> 42:46.487
but I do think we have an opportunity there,

42:46.487 --> 42:49.340
and we certainly have a lot of outside analyses,

42:49.340 --> 42:51.869
that are telling us about the importance of ships like this,

42:51.869 --> 42:56.310
we've had the 2017's CSBA fleet architecture study,

42:56.310 --> 42:58.403
which called for actually more than 70 small

42:58.403 --> 43:00.053
service combatants rather than

43:00.053 --> 43:02.160
the Navy's current requirement of 52,

43:02.160 --> 43:06.100
so I would just ask if we wound up in a world

43:06.100 --> 43:08.360
in which Congress was providing additional small

43:08.360 --> 43:10.943
surface combatants beyond the required 52,

43:11.210 --> 43:13.591
with the Navy able to successfully employ them

43:13.591 --> 43:17.083
in service of combatant commander requirements,

43:17.163 --> 43:19.963
just as you look at the threats and the needs out there?

43:21.940 --> 43:25.290
- Yes sir, that is actually a very healthy discussion

43:25.290 --> 43:26.253
in the Pentagon,

43:27.815 --> 43:31.470
and the short answer is certainly we can use all the ships,

43:31.470 --> 43:36.223
we are low to our 355,

43:36.544 --> 43:40.516
but again I always caution that 355 is not

43:40.516 --> 43:42.840
a number in isolation,

43:42.840 --> 43:46.330
it's a derived number based on the numbers

43:46.330 --> 43:47.980
and the lethality of each class of ship,

43:47.980 --> 43:49.683
add them up and you get to 355,

43:49.930 --> 43:52.483
and you and I have spoken about that.

43:56.030 --> 44:00.450
That number I think is likely to change over time,

44:00.450 --> 44:01.950
I don't think it will go down,

44:02.040 --> 44:03.650
we just went through our series of studies

44:03.650 --> 44:07.113
to evaluate the components of the 355,

44:07.790 --> 44:10.253
there was variance in those numbers,

44:10.430 --> 44:12.043
they all said we needed to grow,

44:13.020 --> 44:17.733
and that 355 was the most lethal mix to get there.

44:20.035 --> 44:22.873
The real point of your question of can we operate them,

44:23.450 --> 44:24.973
therein lies the challenge,

44:25.280 --> 44:27.410
when we buy ships outside the battle force

44:27.410 --> 44:29.283
that don't make up the composite,

44:30.120 --> 44:31.913
that puts stress on the readiness,

44:32.560 --> 44:34.460
in place of the ships that we do need,

44:36.199 --> 44:38.830
so if we choose to go down that route with Congress,

44:38.830 --> 44:41.160
I would only ask that we continue that discussion

44:41.160 --> 44:42.750
with Congress on the sustainability

44:42.750 --> 44:44.733
of those ships as they come online,

44:45.050 --> 44:46.720
because they do have to be manned,

44:46.720 --> 44:49.893
and typically we use a 70, 30 split,

44:50.820 --> 44:52.260
for the lifetime costs of the ship,

44:52.260 --> 44:54.570
it's about 30 percent to procure and 70 percent

44:54.570 --> 44:56.130
to sustain it over the lifetime of the ship,

44:56.130 --> 44:57.280
it's a little bit lower for the smaller

44:57.280 --> 44:59.463
ones because their lives are a little bit shorter,

44:59.870 --> 45:02.363
but the reality there is a sustainment cost,

45:02.430 --> 45:03.900
and you can see in the shipbuilding plant,

45:03.900 --> 45:04.970
we were absolutely committed to

45:04.970 --> 45:06.420
the small service combatants,

45:06.530 --> 45:09.293
we like to talk in terms of the shiplets,

45:09.408 --> 45:11.763
those shiplets go all the way across the chart,

45:12.240 --> 45:15.650
and there's a sustainment level that indicates that

45:15.650 --> 45:17.680
we see no future where we will not include

45:17.680 --> 45:18.980
a small service combatant.

45:19.070 --> 45:20.480
- On that point and following up

45:20.480 --> 45:22.173
on Mr Burns live questioning,

45:22.430 --> 45:25.480
obviously you're gonna have to make difficult decisions

45:25.480 --> 45:28.510
and trade-offs between cost and capability,

45:28.510 --> 45:32.683
but without getting too far into a hypothetical,

45:33.160 --> 45:34.640
would it be fair to say you wouldn't want

45:34.640 --> 45:36.353
us to do anything that would,

45:36.353 --> 45:37.943
how can I put this,

45:38.640 --> 45:42.480
reduce the robustness of that competition right,

45:42.480 --> 45:45.600
in other words we all want a very open competition

45:45.600 --> 45:47.180
among different designs that will come in

45:47.180 --> 45:49.453
at different levels of cost and capability,

45:50.130 --> 45:51.540
obviously we all have different opinions

45:51.540 --> 45:53.370
on what the selection would be,

45:53.370 --> 45:55.230
but would it be fair to say you wouldn't

45:55.230 --> 45:56.330
want us to do anything

45:56.763 --> 45:59.623
to preclude that competition?

45:59.930 --> 46:02.373
- Yes it's fair to say that,

46:02.560 --> 46:03.810
we have a set of requirements,

46:03.810 --> 46:05.493
we've been transparent on those,

46:05.960 --> 46:09.633
and then we'll run a competition that is fair and equitable,

46:09.890 --> 46:12.820
the more we can keep that fair and equitable

46:12.820 --> 46:16.250
one without trying to intercede

46:16.250 --> 46:17.750
as we're working through that,

46:17.810 --> 46:19.410
I think the better we'll all be.

46:20.316 --> 46:21.430
- And is the Navy thinking through,

46:21.430 --> 46:24.180
I mean obviously the plan is ultimately to down select,

46:25.400 --> 46:28.190
and yet the SECNAV has stated on multiple occasions,

46:28.190 --> 46:30.020
you have all stated on multiple occasions,

46:30.020 --> 46:31.210
given the importance of maintaining

46:31.210 --> 46:32.510
a healthy industrial base,

46:32.530 --> 46:34.813
we don't want to see any yards closing,

46:34.880 --> 46:36.454
have you guys had the discussions about how

46:36.454 --> 46:39.143
to achieve that in a down select environment?

46:40.280 --> 46:41.113
- Sure,

46:41.113 --> 46:41.946
and I think that's something we're gonna continue

46:41.946 --> 46:43.493
to have to dialogue about,

46:43.610 --> 46:45.470
there's a lot of variables to go into play there,

46:45.470 --> 46:47.580
but I think that something where we've got

46:47.580 --> 46:49.030
to continue to work with you,

46:49.240 --> 46:51.483
it's a multi variant type of equation,

46:51.615 --> 46:54.311
and it's something we need to look at closely

46:54.311 --> 46:57.530
to include how do we work repair,

46:57.530 --> 46:59.083
how do we work modernization,

46:59.280 --> 47:02.746
how do we look at the entirety of the requirement,

47:02.746 --> 47:05.000
not solely just new construction,

47:05.000 --> 47:06.321
and quite frankly not just solely

47:06.321 --> 47:09.123
US domestic construction.

47:09.200 --> 47:10.923
- [Mr Gallagher] Sure, thank you gentlemen.

47:12.071 --> 47:12.904
- Thank you Mr Gallagher,

47:12.904 --> 47:13.880
we'll now go to Mr Garamendi.

47:15.750 --> 47:17.930
- I'm gonna go to my favorite subject which

47:17.930 --> 47:19.813
is make it in America,

47:21.746 --> 47:24.440
and we've had increasing discussions about

47:24.770 --> 47:26.263
the sea lift capacity,

47:27.544 --> 47:31.510
and in doing that the question arises from Transcom

47:31.510 --> 47:34.373
that oh my god we've got to have ships right now,

47:35.650 --> 47:37.883
we've not yet seen the proof of that,

47:38.830 --> 47:41.560
but if that is the case then they have determined

47:41.560 --> 47:44.030
the only solution is to buy a foreign ship

47:44.030 --> 47:46.580
and then bring it back and then re-purpose

47:46.580 --> 47:49.183
it here in the United States,

47:49.810 --> 47:51.630
if in fact that is the case then

47:51.690 --> 47:53.853
that's absolutely essential,

47:54.000 --> 47:56.890
we have to have the ships sooner than you could build

47:56.890 --> 47:59.390
from start here in the United States,

47:59.390 --> 48:01.003
maybe we can work with that,

48:01.310 --> 48:05.413
but we must require that all of that repurposing,

48:06.200 --> 48:09.130
Reconstruction the done in American shipyards

48:09.378 --> 48:11.443
with American products.

48:12.600 --> 48:14.723
So just put that out there,

48:14.910 --> 48:18.300
the follow on you mentioned the common hull,

48:18.916 --> 48:21.173
makes sense,

48:21.660 --> 48:24.313
roll on roll off different configurations,

48:24.520 --> 48:25.663
all well and good,

48:26.530 --> 48:28.260
American built,

48:28.260 --> 48:29.803
in American shipyards,

48:30.810 --> 48:35.810
using the national defense sea lift requirements,

48:37.420 --> 48:39.613
in other words engines, anchors,

48:39.629 --> 48:42.593
all the rest of it American made,

48:43.250 --> 48:45.353
many of the foreign engines,

48:45.952 --> 48:50.952
for example in LSCs are foreign-made engines

48:51.200 --> 48:54.100
with companies that actually could make those engines in

48:54.100 --> 48:56.393
the United States if we were to require that.

48:56.970 --> 49:00.380
So as we move forward with this I want to make

49:00.380 --> 49:04.160
it clear that we'll look at least for this person,

49:04.160 --> 49:07.880
and I think I'm in synchronization with the President's

49:07.880 --> 49:11.783
Make it in America program that we actually do that.

49:12.591 --> 49:15.643
And this brings us to the frigate,

49:16.430 --> 49:20.430
one of the designs for the frigate is to use the coastguard,

49:23.270 --> 49:24.543
national defense,

49:24.860 --> 49:25.693
excuse me,

49:27.740 --> 49:30.633
design, all well and good,

49:31.190 --> 49:35.090
however that design was a foreign design and presently

49:35.090 --> 49:38.743
has foreign engines and a lot of foreign equipment in it,

49:39.020 --> 49:42.820
not an acceptable transition from

49:42.820 --> 49:47.713
a coastguard National Security Cutter to a frigate,

49:48.436 --> 49:51.713
and other words where is the by America provision in it,

49:51.810 --> 49:54.450
again the language in the national sea lift

49:54.450 --> 49:57.903
defense fund is restrictive,

49:58.100 --> 50:03.100
I should say proscriptive for American-based ships,

50:03.670 --> 50:05.200
so I want to just put that out there,

50:05.200 --> 50:07.813
it's something I'm not going to let go of,

50:08.711 --> 50:10.850
I'm going to stay with it until we actually succeed,

50:10.850 --> 50:14.460
I do have problems with what the coastguard was able to do,

50:14.460 --> 50:16.410
we are having discussions with them

50:16.700 --> 50:18.163
about their future ships,

50:18.430 --> 50:20.063
so having said that,

50:21.940 --> 50:23.763
I think I said what I needed to say,

50:23.840 --> 50:25.413
I'd like to have your response,

50:27.868 --> 50:30.712
just tell me you agree totally and let us slide it into law.

50:30.712 --> 50:32.310
- Again absolutely,

50:32.310 --> 50:33.310
our industrial base,

50:33.320 --> 50:35.040
we have talked about it on this committee

50:35.040 --> 50:38.417
has been very focused on it,

50:38.417 --> 50:40.143
and for all the right reasons,

50:40.230 --> 50:41.800
our American industrial base

50:41.800 --> 50:43.750
is an element of our national security,

50:43.830 --> 50:46.160
so as we did the frigate competition,

50:46.160 --> 50:47.310
as we've got it set up,

50:47.310 --> 50:49.343
you could use a foreign parent design,

50:49.690 --> 50:51.500
but it had to be built here in America,

50:51.500 --> 50:55.160
and I don't have any issue with the premise

50:55.160 --> 50:58.763
that where we've got American products we can use them,

50:58.890 --> 51:00.760
that will be something we can focus on,

51:00.760 --> 51:02.890
happy to continue to dialogue with you

51:02.890 --> 51:04.940
to get through all the different details,

51:05.150 --> 51:07.277
both with the ready reserve funds--

51:07.335 --> 51:09.785
- I'm quite passed the dialogue into writing law,

51:10.130 --> 51:13.490
and then we can dialogue about how to get it done,

51:13.490 --> 51:16.900
the reality is that the engines that are being

51:17.170 --> 51:20.440
in some of these ships are made overseas,

51:20.440 --> 51:23.350
but the same company has a domestic manufacturing base,

51:23.350 --> 51:26.300
they just decided to do it overseas rather than do it here,

51:26.610 --> 51:29.053
that is not an acceptable situation,

51:29.170 --> 51:32.060
and it's the engines, it's the compressors and the pumps

51:32.060 --> 51:34.200
and the electronic gear and on and on and on,

51:34.200 --> 51:35.603
not just the hull,

51:36.840 --> 51:38.737
with some laws you could just do the hull

51:38.737 --> 51:40.943
and everything else could be somewhere else,

51:41.100 --> 51:42.223
not acceptable,

51:43.060 --> 51:43.893
enough said,

51:43.893 --> 51:44.726
thank you very much.

51:48.450 --> 51:49.480
- Thank you Mr Garamendi,

51:49.480 --> 51:50.920
now we'll go to Doctor Abraham.

51:50.920 --> 51:52.120
- Thank you Mr Chairman,

51:52.420 --> 51:54.420
just for clarification Secretary Geurts,

51:55.291 --> 51:57.743
a follow-up on Mr Gallagher's question,

51:58.320 --> 51:59.860
I've listened to your testimony,

51:59.860 --> 52:01.063
and read your testimony,

52:03.012 --> 52:06.000
and we've seen a couple of reports and that's all they were,

52:06.000 --> 52:11.000
is that maybe the Navy was not committed to the 355 number,

52:11.590 --> 52:12.537
that maybe 342,

52:13.348 --> 52:14.363
343,

52:15.528 --> 52:18.193
but you're telling me we are committed to 355.

52:18.908 --> 52:20.858
- Sir we are committed to 355 at least.

52:21.850 --> 52:23.513
- One quick question,

52:24.300 --> 52:26.210
you were talking about the pencil sharpening,

52:26.210 --> 52:27.671
watching the call switches,

52:27.671 --> 52:30.963
what we ask you to do in your job,

52:31.460 --> 52:34.043
there's an issue right now with the F-35's,

52:34.120 --> 52:37.060
with the DOD maybe delaying some deliveries,

52:37.060 --> 52:39.573
because there is a corrosion with the fasteners.

52:40.460 --> 52:42.453
Lockheed said well it's not our baby,

52:42.690 --> 52:44.103
DOD said it's not ours,

52:44.250 --> 52:48.953
is there something in your documents,

52:49.990 --> 52:53.380
and I know I'm simplifying this on a very elemental

52:53.380 --> 52:57.023
basis because I understand the complexity of these ships,

52:57.921 --> 53:00.713
that says, like a warranty,

53:01.270 --> 53:04.483
first 12 years if everything breaks you fix it,

53:04.610 --> 53:06.504
I mean it seems like it would save so much

53:06.504 --> 53:08.563
back and forth and save money.

53:09.280 --> 53:11.030
- Yes sir I'll answer that quickly,

53:11.030 --> 53:12.560
and ask Admiral Moore if he wants

53:12.560 --> 53:14.193
to add more of the details,

53:14.260 --> 53:16.413
so we do both warranty,

53:16.630 --> 53:18.050
so there are pieces of the ship

53:18.050 --> 53:19.420
that were warranty components

53:19.420 --> 53:21.130
and whatnot for set pieces of time,

53:21.130 --> 53:22.483
depending on the contract,

53:22.760 --> 53:23.870
the other thing is we go through

53:23.870 --> 53:28.320
a very detailed both builders trials and acceptance trials,

53:28.320 --> 53:30.700
were builders trials the builders got to prove

53:30.700 --> 53:34.463
the ship works and be write up anything that doesn't work,

53:34.510 --> 53:36.570
and then acceptance trials is where we formally

53:36.570 --> 53:37.693
test out the ship,

53:37.720 --> 53:39.340
and if there's something that isn't right

53:39.340 --> 53:41.971
or isn't working and we've got those that we work

53:41.971 --> 53:44.683
of before we take formal acceptance of the ship.

53:47.032 --> 53:48.883
- Okay my concern is this,

53:49.150 --> 53:52.133
that even though you test all these things,

53:52.470 --> 53:53.303
it's man-made,

53:53.303 --> 53:54.620
something is going to break eventually,

53:54.620 --> 53:56.320
and I just want to make sure that there's something

53:56.320 --> 53:58.643
in place that we don't have this tit-for-tat,

53:59.150 --> 54:00.550
who's going to pay who's going to pay,

54:00.550 --> 54:02.750
it seemed like that would be simpler to take

54:03.449 --> 54:05.183
on the front side instead of wearing on the backside.

54:05.715 --> 54:06.548
- All our contracts are.

54:06.548 --> 54:08.450
- Thank you that's all I got Mr Chairman.

54:08.990 --> 54:11.687
- Thank you Doctor Abraham will now go to Mr McKeechan.

54:12.587 --> 54:14.223
- Thank you Mr Chairman,

54:15.384 --> 54:19.660
Mr Geurts I guess this question is for you,

54:19.660 --> 54:21.960
but you can pass it off if that's appropriate.

54:22.640 --> 54:26.630
To the extent that we reach a 355 ship battle force

54:26.630 --> 54:28.520
through service life extensions

54:28.520 --> 54:30.313
as opposed to new construction,

54:30.527 --> 54:32.650
are those ships going to have the full range

54:32.650 --> 54:35.240
of capabilities the planners assumed when

54:35.240 --> 54:38.060
they concluded that 355 ships would

54:38.060 --> 54:39.883
be sufficient to meet our needs?

54:40.540 --> 54:44.272
- Yes sir I'll start and then ask my compatriots

54:44.272 --> 54:45.573
here to jump in,

54:45.890 --> 54:47.593
so again when we extend either through

54:47.593 --> 54:51.023
a service life extension or a class extension of the ship,

54:51.420 --> 54:53.520
that gives us more time,

54:53.520 --> 54:57.140
but doesn't necessarily change the capability of the ship,

54:57.140 --> 54:59.110
nor fix things for the long term.

54:59.110 --> 55:01.400
So as Admiral Mercer said,

55:01.400 --> 55:03.550
when we do a classic extension that's good,

55:04.275 --> 55:06.490
because then we can plan for every ship in that,

55:06.490 --> 55:08.230
but that it seems we both maintain

55:08.230 --> 55:10.173
the ship and keep it modernized,

55:10.380 --> 55:14.540
I think as we look at the FSA in the future,

55:14.540 --> 55:18.060
we'll want to make sure the capability we extend provides

55:18.060 --> 55:20.330
the capability we were looking for

55:20.330 --> 55:22.053
in that class requirement,

55:22.370 --> 55:24.870
and if not then that would be factored into analysis,

55:24.870 --> 55:26.320
but Bill I'll turn it to you.

55:27.432 --> 55:29.182
- Yes Sir thanks for that question,

55:29.670 --> 55:33.293
again I guess to a lot of dynamics in the shipbuilding plan,

55:34.510 --> 55:39.360
how we determine the rate of build to 355 when

55:39.360 --> 55:40.740
we combine all the classes together,

55:40.740 --> 55:43.680
we assume that we're already at 355 and how many ships

55:43.680 --> 55:45.933
we have to build per year to sustain that,

55:46.080 --> 55:47.400
so as long as you're below that number

55:47.400 --> 55:48.850
that will grow you over time,

55:49.230 --> 55:52.080
that was to ensure that we can set the floor that we can

55:52.080 --> 55:54.290
no longer ever go below if we want

55:54.290 --> 55:56.563
to sustain a 355 ship Navy.

55:57.372 --> 55:59.930
I give you that explanation because that's

55:59.930 --> 56:02.510
absolutely fundamental as you bring in

56:02.510 --> 56:03.993
the service life extensions,

56:05.497 --> 56:06.810
the assumption is you are doing both,

56:06.810 --> 56:09.410
you cannot do one in place of the other,

56:09.410 --> 56:11.870
or when the service lives tap out you're going

56:11.870 --> 56:14.313
to be in a worse spot than when you started.

56:14.720 --> 56:16.143
So it's a combined effort,

56:16.700 --> 56:18.210
we think we make that very clear,

56:18.210 --> 56:21.113
we're very committed to that new construction plan,

56:21.190 --> 56:23.500
if we can accelerate to our goal using service

56:23.500 --> 56:26.090
life extensions as we advertised in the plan,

56:26.090 --> 56:27.350
we had work to do on that,

56:27.350 --> 56:28.460
we have done that work we have shown

56:28.460 --> 56:29.620
that we're able to do it,

56:29.620 --> 56:31.170
but the premise is that we continue

56:31.170 --> 56:33.333
to build new underneath as the foundation.

56:34.700 --> 56:36.550
- Thank you Mr Chairman I yield back.

56:37.370 --> 56:38.470
- Thank you Mr McKeechan,

56:38.470 --> 56:39.870
we'll now go to Mr Norcross.

56:41.140 --> 56:43.040
- Thank you Chairman and the witnesses

56:43.040 --> 56:46.163
for being here today and addressing some of the questions.

56:46.580 --> 56:49.653
How can we not talk about capacity at this point,

56:49.900 --> 56:53.083
except I don't have the base that I have to take care of,

56:53.090 --> 56:56.423
I have the entire world so to speak to take care of.

56:59.320 --> 57:02.410
When we start talking about some of the conversation

57:02.410 --> 57:03.313
we had here today,

57:03.540 --> 57:05.923
critical industrial base,

57:06.020 --> 57:09.623
stable predictable workforce and base.

57:11.380 --> 57:13.820
When we look at the way that we are trying

57:13.820 --> 57:15.743
to anticipate capacity,

57:15.800 --> 57:18.843
of shipbuilding industry here in the United States,

57:20.010 --> 57:21.573
many factors go into that.

57:22.810 --> 57:24.840
Certainly you talked about the capacity

57:25.701 --> 57:26.823
and capabilities and readiness,

57:27.086 --> 57:29.936
and we talked about from the sense of what's being ready,

57:30.160 --> 57:31.710
you have the physical structures

57:31.710 --> 57:33.640
as regards to our workforce,

57:33.640 --> 57:35.063
the experience of that,

57:35.370 --> 57:37.023
the suppliers and materials,

57:37.070 --> 57:40.020
those are things that you would normally take into account,

57:40.230 --> 57:41.930
when you're trying to determine whether

57:41.930 --> 57:44.453
or not there is capacity in the future,

57:44.810 --> 57:47.830
do you look at acquisition reform and some of the things

57:47.830 --> 57:50.790
we can do and the mistakes we've made in the past,

57:50.790 --> 57:52.163
how do we make that better?

57:52.590 --> 57:55.420
- Yes sir and again I think it's incumbent

57:55.420 --> 57:57.810
that we are always looking at that,

57:57.810 --> 58:00.897
and that the solution to this isn't just more money

58:00.897 --> 58:03.983
or just doing more of the things we've always done,

58:04.400 --> 58:07.540
so my job within the Navy is to continue

58:07.540 --> 58:09.133
to drive affordability,

58:09.420 --> 58:11.992
some of that is through tool mechanisms like block buys

58:11.992 --> 58:14.640
or multi year programs as we're talking

58:14.640 --> 58:15.990
about doing on the carrier,

58:17.651 --> 58:18.760
some of that is properly setting up incentives,

58:18.760 --> 58:21.310
so we can work directly with the shipyards

58:21.610 --> 58:23.940
to drive costs out of programs like you're seeing

58:23.940 --> 58:25.920
us drive costs out of the carrier program

58:25.920 --> 58:27.833
and some of these other programs,

58:28.270 --> 58:31.791
because ultimately my goal is how can I deliver the most

58:31.791 --> 58:35.310
for the dollar that the taxpayer puts towards this problem,

58:35.310 --> 58:37.410
and we've got to continually work on that.

58:37.620 --> 58:39.960
Another opportunity space I would say sir

58:39.960 --> 58:41.523
is on the readiness side,

58:41.620 --> 58:44.900
how do we drive the cost to keep these ships ready

58:44.900 --> 58:47.330
and available is another key component

58:47.330 --> 58:48.830
that we are going to focus on.

58:49.270 --> 58:51.950
- That combines when you're looking at are

58:51.950 --> 58:55.073
we going to make it in a reasonable amount of years,

58:55.110 --> 58:56.973
technology, innovation, drive,

58:57.540 --> 58:59.833
but also supplier base,

59:02.124 --> 59:04.920
and there are many other parts of the military

59:04.920 --> 59:07.840
that is going to the same bucket of wealth for that,

59:08.428 --> 59:09.530
do you take that into consideration,

59:09.530 --> 59:12.550
because they are building up just like we

59:12.550 --> 59:14.090
are in a different way,

59:14.090 --> 59:15.540
but the suppliers are common.

59:15.570 --> 59:16.403
- Yes sir,

59:16.403 --> 59:21.143
and I would say the suppliers are the golden pivot

59:23.339 --> 59:25.651
point with which we are really gonna get speak

59:25.651 --> 59:27.563
and drive affordability down.

59:27.570 --> 59:30.570
- I like to think it's the workforce that is that key,

59:30.570 --> 59:33.563
because that's the one the takes to so long to develop,

59:33.770 --> 59:36.373
which brings me to one of the points,

59:36.920 --> 59:40.103
if you ever lost faith in America,

59:40.610 --> 59:42.320
and this industrial base,

59:42.320 --> 59:44.223
go up to Electric Boat where we were,

59:44.550 --> 59:47.560
it gives you the face that when we set our minds to it,

59:47.560 --> 59:48.743
we can do anything,

59:49.460 --> 59:53.160
the problem is trying to maintain that facility at

59:53.160 --> 59:55.410
a common pace that you're not gonna lose

59:55.530 --> 59:57.723
that workforce or get taken by another,

59:58.267 --> 01:00:02.380
what mechanism do you have in place to continue that,

01:00:02.380 --> 01:00:04.720
we have tried to fit in some programs to keep

01:00:04.720 --> 01:00:05.993
a stable workplace,

01:00:06.280 --> 01:00:08.823
but it's coming from somebody else's workforce,

01:00:08.850 --> 01:00:10.123
how do you address that?

01:00:11.080 --> 01:00:12.670
- Sir a couple of different areas,

01:00:12.670 --> 01:00:16.263
one is the 10 ship multi year buy,

01:00:16.520 --> 01:00:19.870
so now that workforce knows they've got both

01:00:19.870 --> 01:00:21.333
at Newport and at EB,

01:00:21.340 --> 01:00:24.240
they know they've got a stable set

01:00:24.240 --> 01:00:25.743
of work coming through there,

01:00:25.870 --> 01:00:27.970
another opportunity is looking at where

01:00:27.970 --> 01:00:29.583
we've common suppliers,

01:00:29.800 --> 01:00:33.350
between Fort class, Colombia and Virginia,

01:00:33.350 --> 01:00:36.420
and treating those suppliers outside of just

01:00:36.420 --> 01:00:38.570
our individual program looking at them as

01:00:38.570 --> 01:00:40.823
a supply base supporting all three,

01:00:40.960 --> 01:00:42.313
that's another area,

01:00:42.620 --> 01:00:45.110
and then again how do we leverage technology

01:00:45.360 --> 01:00:50.360
to enable us to continually rejuvenate that workforce

01:00:50.460 --> 01:00:52.980
and get them trained up as quickly as we can,

01:00:52.980 --> 01:00:55.623
especially where we're growing the workforce.

01:00:56.040 --> 01:00:58.220
- Is there a number you'd put on it that we are going

01:00:58.220 --> 01:01:02.090
to increase capacity by 20 percent, 15, five,

01:01:02.090 --> 01:01:03.793
what number do you have right now?

01:01:04.740 --> 01:01:06.840
- I would say it depends on which segment,

01:01:07.240 --> 01:01:09.820
but our biggest probably challenge area is going

01:01:09.820 --> 01:01:11.830
to be in the submarine force specifically,

01:01:11.830 --> 01:01:14.390
at EB with Colombia and us maintaining

01:01:14.390 --> 01:01:17.073
at least two Virginias per year,

01:01:17.190 --> 01:01:20.310
that is probably the largest looming workforce

01:01:20.960 --> 01:01:22.380
growth that we're going to see,

01:01:22.380 --> 01:01:26.143
but it kind of develops in each individual yard and program.

01:01:27.710 --> 01:01:28.543
- Thank you,

01:01:28.543 --> 01:01:29.376
I yield back.

01:01:30.254 --> 01:01:31.454
- Thank you Mr Norcross,

01:01:31.830 --> 01:01:32.917
Secretary Geurts,

01:01:33.057 --> 01:01:36.300
I want to get your viewpoint on hospital ships,

01:01:36.300 --> 01:01:37.480
we talk about support ships,

01:01:37.480 --> 01:01:38.853
we talk about lift,

01:01:39.730 --> 01:01:42.767
but I think looking at the future and what

01:01:42.767 --> 01:01:44.193
the Navy needs to do,

01:01:44.690 --> 01:01:45.990
hospital ships are key,

01:01:45.990 --> 01:01:49.090
and we see what they do not only for our services,

01:01:49.090 --> 01:01:51.020
but also what it allows us to do during

01:01:51.020 --> 01:01:52.733
times of humanitarian need,

01:01:53.000 --> 01:01:54.990
and the Navy's plan to essentially do

01:01:54.990 --> 01:01:56.990
a service life extension on the comfort,

01:01:57.280 --> 01:02:01.250
I think becomes more of a challenge than what

01:02:01.250 --> 01:02:03.190
I think this nation is willing to accept

01:02:03.190 --> 01:02:05.470
as far as the risk that it poses to us,

01:02:05.470 --> 01:02:06.770
can you give us your perspective,

01:02:06.770 --> 01:02:09.610
has the Navy re-looked at how they're going

01:02:09.610 --> 01:02:12.960
to recapitalize our hospital ships and what do you think

01:02:12.960 --> 01:02:15.390
the future is for that capacity which

01:02:15.390 --> 01:02:19.400
is maybe not as a direct strategic capacity,

01:02:19.400 --> 01:02:22.210
but I think it's a very, very necessary support

01:02:22.210 --> 01:02:23.667
capacity for this Navy,

01:02:23.667 --> 01:02:26.023
and a humanitarian capacity for this nation.

01:02:26.380 --> 01:02:27.563
- Yes sir,

01:02:27.767 --> 01:02:29.170
and I'll turn over to Admiral Merz,

01:02:29.170 --> 01:02:30.580
on the requirements that we're thinking

01:02:30.580 --> 01:02:32.180
about requirement in the future,

01:02:32.530 --> 01:02:34.900
my first point was in the shipbuilding plan,

01:02:34.900 --> 01:02:37.430
we're showing one of those ships right now

01:02:37.476 --> 01:02:39.693
without anything will go away,

01:02:39.730 --> 01:02:41.380
we're not gonna let that go away,

01:02:42.012 --> 01:02:43.840
so I want to assure the committee there is no plan

01:02:43.840 --> 01:02:47.863
to erode any of the hospital ship capacity that we have,

01:02:47.970 --> 01:02:50.870
we are really looking out into the future,

01:02:50.870 --> 01:02:53.100
is that adequate and is there perhaps

01:02:53.100 --> 01:02:54.640
a different way to look at that,

01:02:54.640 --> 01:02:56.840
and again hospital ships has different rules

01:02:56.840 --> 01:02:58.313
and different levels of care,

01:02:58.550 --> 01:03:00.410
and I would press Admiral Merz to talk a little bit

01:03:00.410 --> 01:03:02.560
to talk about how we're thinking of it from

01:03:02.808 --> 01:03:04.270
a requirements standpoint and what's

01:03:04.270 --> 01:03:06.470
our look at that requirement for the future.

01:03:07.340 --> 01:03:08.443
- Yes Mr Chairman,

01:03:09.060 --> 01:03:12.020
so clearly how we handle our casualties

01:03:12.020 --> 01:03:14.533
has been a hallmark of the entire US military,

01:03:14.730 --> 01:03:18.360
not specifically to the Marines Army Navy or Air Force,

01:03:18.360 --> 01:03:19.663
or even the coastguard,

01:03:21.330 --> 01:03:23.483
so we had made plans,

01:03:25.391 --> 01:03:26.740
to do a service life extension of both ships,

01:03:26.740 --> 01:03:28.440
that's I roll three level capability,

01:03:28.440 --> 01:03:30.053
those are floating hospitals,

01:03:30.920 --> 01:03:33.370
the problem with those ships is that only

01:03:33.370 --> 01:03:34.760
two of them and their big,

01:03:34.760 --> 01:03:36.800
and we are moving to a more distributed

01:03:37.250 --> 01:03:39.263
maritime operation construct.

01:03:40.390 --> 01:03:42.580
So we have recently commissioned what we call

01:03:42.580 --> 01:03:44.170
a requirements evaluation team to look

01:03:44.170 --> 01:03:45.710
at intra-theater missions,

01:03:45.710 --> 01:03:47.520
and there's a whole collection of missions

01:03:47.520 --> 01:03:49.570
that we're trying to get our arms around,

01:03:49.610 --> 01:03:54.610
one of them is a distributed hospital capability,

01:03:55.550 --> 01:03:59.720
and these are going to be very challenging requirements,

01:03:59.720 --> 01:04:02.994
it's gonna have to be able to support V-22 for instance,

01:04:02.994 --> 01:04:04.196
somehow you manage the size of that

01:04:04.196 --> 01:04:05.983
and the speed and how it's going to go.

01:04:06.010 --> 01:04:07.550
So there's no lack of commitment,

01:04:07.550 --> 01:04:10.710
as a matter of fact we're taking a broader look

01:04:10.710 --> 01:04:12.640
at the capabilities on whether or not they

01:04:12.640 --> 01:04:14.230
are aligned with the way we plan

01:04:14.230 --> 01:04:17.113
to fight our future battles.

01:04:17.320 --> 01:04:18.820
So you're gonna see our requirement probably

01:04:18.820 --> 01:04:20.100
surface here this year,

01:04:20.100 --> 01:04:21.450
and then will start the process

01:04:21.450 --> 01:04:23.700
and how we're going to fill that requirement.

01:04:25.330 --> 01:04:26.560
- Thank you I know there's been a lot

01:04:26.560 --> 01:04:27.393
of discussion about it,

01:04:27.393 --> 01:04:29.790
as you said one large ship multiple smaller

01:04:29.790 --> 01:04:30.720
ships as you said,

01:04:30.720 --> 01:04:34.180
with capability of landing aircraft

01:04:34.180 --> 01:04:36.683
that could be bringing in the wounded,

01:04:36.970 --> 01:04:39.620
have you all looked at some of the existing platforms,

01:04:39.620 --> 01:04:41.180
maybe something like JHSV,

01:04:42.101 --> 01:04:45.960
or a joint high-speed vessel, JHSV I should say,

01:04:45.960 --> 01:04:47.610
or EPF as it's termed now,

01:04:47.610 --> 01:04:49.309
expeditionary fast transport as

01:04:49.309 --> 01:04:51.093
a potential within that realm?

01:04:52.430 --> 01:04:53.263
- Yes sir,

01:04:53.263 --> 01:04:54.270
everything is a potential,

01:04:54.430 --> 01:04:58.263
when we levy the requirements,

01:04:59.010 --> 01:05:00.560
actually that's not even a good word,

01:05:00.560 --> 01:05:03.240
because we're probably gonna follow the model

01:05:03.240 --> 01:05:04.760
usually with the frigate where industry

01:05:04.760 --> 01:05:07.210
was actually part of the requirements discussion,

01:05:08.282 --> 01:05:11.593
which we think is already bearing fruit with

01:05:11.593 --> 01:05:16.063
the spectrum of designs that we get to work through,

01:05:16.550 --> 01:05:20.640
so whether a shipbuilder wants to attack

01:05:20.640 --> 01:05:23.330
these requirements from a new platform perspective

01:05:23.330 --> 01:05:24.690
or modifications for an existing,

01:05:24.690 --> 01:05:25.940
that's really up to them,

01:05:26.877 --> 01:05:28.263
and we'll compete that accordingly.

01:05:28.550 --> 01:05:29.383
- Thanks,

01:05:29.720 --> 01:05:33.150
Admiral Moore I want to pick your brain about how

01:05:33.150 --> 01:05:37.890
we address the drop in SSN's that's gonna

01:05:37.890 --> 01:05:40.093
occur in 2029 down to 42,

01:05:40.680 --> 01:05:43.640
obviously we on the committee have addressed going

01:05:43.640 --> 01:05:46.190
to three submarines per year starting in 2020,

01:05:47.380 --> 01:05:50.150
but that only brings us an additional three ships before

01:05:50.150 --> 01:05:52.610
we get into Virginia payload module construction,

01:05:52.610 --> 01:05:55.010
so we go down from 42 to 45,

01:05:55.010 --> 01:05:58.210
which while good is not the significant

01:05:58.210 --> 01:05:59.363
increase that we need,

01:05:59.620 --> 01:06:02.050
there has been a proposal laid out their

01:06:02.050 --> 01:06:06.910
to take five existing nuclear plants that

01:06:06.910 --> 01:06:09.143
are right now in reserve,

01:06:09.610 --> 01:06:12.420
and putting them into Los Angeles class submarines

01:06:12.420 --> 01:06:15.490
to give them significant service life extension,

01:06:15.490 --> 01:06:18.310
can you give us perspective on where the Navy is with that,

01:06:18.310 --> 01:06:19.560
is that just a concept,

01:06:19.560 --> 01:06:21.700
is it at the point were you all are pursuing that,

01:06:21.700 --> 01:06:22.850
I know we've had some conversation

01:06:22.850 --> 01:06:25.870
with Admiral Caldwell from naval reactors,

01:06:25.870 --> 01:06:28.620
but I wanted to get your perspective on how you see it,

01:06:28.960 --> 01:06:30.133
at NAVSEA,

01:06:30.920 --> 01:06:32.570
and where you are in the process,

01:06:32.970 --> 01:06:34.190
is it just a concept that is being floated,

01:06:34.190 --> 01:06:39.190
are you pursuing this is an operational effort,

01:06:39.410 --> 01:06:41.410
give us perspective on where things are?

01:06:41.654 --> 01:06:42.487
- Thanks for the question sir,

01:06:42.487 --> 01:06:43.943
no it's not just a concept,

01:06:44.590 --> 01:06:47.163
we are actively pursuing that,

01:06:47.350 --> 01:06:48.700
I think it's in the budget,

01:06:48.970 --> 01:06:52.380
we have done technical work on these five submarines

01:06:53.463 --> 01:06:56.413
to allow us to get the additional service life out of them,

01:06:56.580 --> 01:06:59.500
submarines pose a little bit more of

01:06:59.500 --> 01:07:01.610
a challenge in terms of a class extension,

01:07:01.610 --> 01:07:04.310
because of the fact that they submerge and there

01:07:04.310 --> 01:07:06.390
are some technical issues associated with

01:07:06.390 --> 01:07:07.670
them but we don't have in surface ships,

01:07:07.670 --> 01:07:10.545
so I don't know that we're gonna get beyond from

01:07:10.545 --> 01:07:14.090
a class extension standpoint beyond about

01:07:14.090 --> 01:07:16.440
the 35 years that the Virginia class

01:07:16.440 --> 01:07:18.763
and the Los Angeles class are today,

01:07:18.920 --> 01:07:20.730
we'll continue to look at this on a hull by hull,

01:07:20.730 --> 01:07:22.880
and this particular case we have five additional

01:07:22.880 --> 01:07:25.890
cores available that presented us with an opportunity

01:07:25.890 --> 01:07:28.633
to get some SSN accelerated back into the fleet,

01:07:29.100 --> 01:07:31.790
so between naval reactors and NAVSEA,

01:07:31.790 --> 01:07:33.380
we went and found some hulls that

01:07:33.380 --> 01:07:34.620
we could sharpen our pencils on,

01:07:34.620 --> 01:07:37.410
and we are confident tactically that they can get to

01:07:37.410 --> 01:07:39.060
the extended service life that they have

01:07:39.060 --> 01:07:40.137
been asked to get to.

01:07:40.350 --> 01:07:41.680
- Very good thank you,

01:07:41.680 --> 01:07:44.670
Secretary Geurts I wanted to follow up on a visit

01:07:44.670 --> 01:07:45.730
we had earlier in the week,

01:07:45.730 --> 01:07:47.020
at Bath iron Works,

01:07:47.020 --> 01:07:49.190
we talked to them about the multi

01:07:49.190 --> 01:07:52.063
year procurement for Destroyers,

01:07:52.310 --> 01:07:55.503
and it seems that the Navy is still in the paradigm

01:07:55.503 --> 01:07:58.503
that they pursued with the previous acquisition,

01:07:59.918 --> 01:08:00.800
and have not really followed up on

01:08:00.800 --> 01:08:05.700
the additional authorities that were given in the FY 18,

01:08:05.700 --> 01:08:07.960
and I wanted to get your perspective because from what

01:08:07.960 --> 01:08:10.670
we are seeing the layout is

01:08:10.670 --> 01:08:15.103
a 10 ship purchase combination between HII and Bath,

01:08:15.380 --> 01:08:16.313
five, five,

01:08:16.349 --> 01:08:17.182
six, four,

01:08:17.207 --> 01:08:18.040
four, six,

01:08:18.076 --> 01:08:19.360
and all those different scenarios,

01:08:19.360 --> 01:08:20.900
and then the additional five that

01:08:20.900 --> 01:08:23.233
are authorized will essentially be one offs,

01:08:23.410 --> 01:08:26.403
and we understand that when you do multi ship procurement

01:08:26.403 --> 01:08:28.210
I think it's everybody's intention,

01:08:28.210 --> 01:08:30.740
and certainly our intention is to do the full 15,

01:08:30.740 --> 01:08:32.903
rather than 10 and then one off,

01:08:33.070 --> 01:08:34.838
because we think the 10 and one off actually

01:08:34.838 --> 01:08:36.560
adds additional cost,

01:08:36.560 --> 01:08:38.220
we know the greater certainty you have there

01:08:38.220 --> 01:08:39.773
the better it is for the yards,

01:08:39.920 --> 01:08:41.580
and we all know about the ship yards,

01:08:41.580 --> 01:08:43.180
you talked about the rollercoaster ride

01:08:43.180 --> 01:08:44.233
that they go through,

01:08:44.570 --> 01:08:46.150
and the uncertainty it creates for both yards,

01:08:46.150 --> 01:08:47.470
so give me your perspective,

01:08:47.470 --> 01:08:51.180
is there any additional work the Navy's gonna do,

01:08:51.180 --> 01:08:53.890
in looking at the 15 authorization that we gave

01:08:53.890 --> 01:08:56.420
in last year's NDAA and reflect

01:08:56.420 --> 01:08:58.070
that in the acquisition strategy?

01:08:58.430 --> 01:08:59.283
- Yes sir,

01:08:59.582 --> 01:09:02.750
I would say generically the more you can put

01:09:02.750 --> 01:09:05.530
the requirements up front into the multi year the better,

01:09:05.530 --> 01:09:07.310
I would say this is unique because it's

01:09:07.310 --> 01:09:09.083
a competitive situation,

01:09:09.670 --> 01:09:12.973
so to put options in that which is,

01:09:13.010 --> 01:09:17.480
if we're not careful you could have so many different

01:09:17.480 --> 01:09:20.310
options it would be hard to get a good competition,

01:09:20.310 --> 01:09:23.590
so we felt the best balance was compete

01:09:23.590 --> 01:09:25.253
the 10 in a multi year,

01:09:25.660 --> 01:09:29.140
and then put in price options for those ships

01:09:29.140 --> 01:09:31.090
so that gives us some flexibility,

01:09:31.090 --> 01:09:33.973
and then compete each of those as individual options,

01:09:34.100 --> 01:09:36.910
we felt that was the best balance to strike with

01:09:36.910 --> 01:09:39.359
the two since we were in a competitive,

01:09:39.359 --> 01:09:42.770
a rolling competitive multi year,

01:09:42.770 --> 01:09:45.040
a little bit different than say when you're

01:09:45.040 --> 01:09:48.223
doing a multi year with the sole source provider,

01:09:48.270 --> 01:09:50.760
and so I would say the unique of

01:09:52.366 --> 01:09:53.199
that competition drove a little bit different

01:09:53.199 --> 01:09:55.996
thinking than the way we traditionally approach adding

01:09:55.996 --> 01:09:59.853
more ships as a potential option in multi year.

01:10:01.140 --> 01:10:02.437
- With that decision have anything to do with

01:10:02.437 --> 01:10:04.340
the different elements on the platform,

01:10:04.340 --> 01:10:06.880
I know we talked about different radars,

01:10:06.880 --> 01:10:09.530
the upgraded AMDR by six radar and the things

01:10:09.530 --> 01:10:10.405
that go in with the design on

01:10:10.405 --> 01:10:14.793
Flight II A's versus Flight III's,

01:10:14.870 --> 01:10:17.350
is that any element of that decision?

01:10:17.350 --> 01:10:19.110
- No sir because these are all Flight III's

01:10:19.110 --> 01:10:20.960
so they are all constant ships,

01:10:20.960 --> 01:10:25.377
and I think again we've got a little unique situation

01:10:25.377 --> 01:10:29.673
trying to do this in a competitive situation,

01:10:29.770 --> 01:10:30.603
but we'll look at it closely,

01:10:30.603 --> 01:10:33.140
we're getting feedback from the shipbuilders,

01:10:33.140 --> 01:10:36.710
and we'll take lessons learnt and apply those

01:10:36.710 --> 01:10:38.483
as we look at future situations.

01:10:38.670 --> 01:10:40.240
- I just want to make sure we were firm and knowing

01:10:40.240 --> 01:10:43.780
that its 15 Flight III's very good thanks.

01:10:43.780 --> 01:10:44.613
- Yes sir.

01:10:44.800 --> 01:10:45.633
- Mr Milton?

01:10:46.690 --> 01:10:48.390
- Mr Chairman thank you very much,

01:10:48.770 --> 01:10:51.543
gentleman my questions are a bit more high-level,

01:10:52.050 --> 01:10:54.070
just about how you came up with

01:10:54.070 --> 01:10:57.713
this requirement for a 355 ship Navy,

01:10:58.210 --> 01:11:00.010
we are fond of saying here in Congress

01:11:00.010 --> 01:11:01.970
that we're trying to go back to the Reagan

01:11:02.170 --> 01:11:05.403
days when that's the number that was out there,

01:11:07.000 --> 01:11:10.640
that strikes me as an interesting comparison

01:11:10.640 --> 01:11:13.730
given that technology has changed quite a bit,

01:11:13.730 --> 01:11:16.740
so can you give me just a quick insight

01:11:16.890 --> 01:11:18.743
into why that number makes sense?

01:11:19.740 --> 01:11:22.580
- Yes there's a pretty rigorous process that

01:11:22.580 --> 01:11:26.543
we go through when we do a force structure assessment.

01:11:26.700 --> 01:11:28.491
It typically starts with the combatant commanders

01:11:28.491 --> 01:11:29.780
what their needs are,

01:11:29.780 --> 01:11:32.420
and that is balanced against the war plans

01:11:32.420 --> 01:11:33.720
that they have to execute,

01:11:34.630 --> 01:11:37.913
then we apply a broad range of risk factors,

01:11:38.120 --> 01:11:40.900
we can't fight every place in the world at the same time,

01:11:40.900 --> 01:11:45.323
so we start shrinking it down to an acceptable risk level,

01:11:46.810 --> 01:11:47.643
and then we study it,

01:11:47.643 --> 01:11:48.660
and this particular case there were

01:11:48.660 --> 01:11:49.620
three independent studies,

01:11:49.620 --> 01:11:51.860
that went against the 355,

01:11:51.860 --> 01:11:54.483
and then we red teamed it,

01:11:54.550 --> 01:11:59.113
and in the end that is the number that held.

01:11:59.860 --> 01:12:01.250
There were other numbers in the mix,

01:12:01.250 --> 01:12:02.883
they were all around that level,

01:12:03.585 --> 01:12:04.557
but it's important to understand that

01:12:04.557 --> 01:12:07.163
the 355 is a derived number,

01:12:07.389 --> 01:12:09.090
we look at each type of ship,

01:12:09.090 --> 01:12:10.280
the lethality it needs to bring,

01:12:10.280 --> 01:12:11.430
the numbers it needs to bring,

01:12:11.430 --> 01:12:13.070
we add those all up and that's how you get it.

01:12:13.070 --> 01:12:16.000
- So in that analysis how many autonomous ships

01:12:16.000 --> 01:12:17.570
do you calculate that we need?

01:12:17.570 --> 01:12:21.770
- So currently we do not count autonomous

01:12:21.770 --> 01:12:23.783
ships against the ship count,

01:12:24.030 --> 01:12:25.550
the 355 ships.

01:12:25.550 --> 01:12:27.630
- But all the experts say that's the kind

01:12:27.630 --> 01:12:30.410
of warfare that we will be fighting in a few years,

01:12:30.410 --> 01:12:32.560
so why would you not include those in the current?

01:12:32.560 --> 01:12:34.743
- So we actually will in the future,

01:12:35.416 --> 01:12:36.440
we actually stayed in the shipbuilding

01:12:36.640 --> 01:12:38.153
plan but we're studying them closely,

01:12:38.580 --> 01:12:41.490
we do account for them in the sensors and weapons arenas,

01:12:41.490 --> 01:12:43.570
but we do not account for them yet in the ship count.

01:12:43.570 --> 01:12:45.610
- How soon do you think we'll have autonomous

01:12:45.610 --> 01:12:46.993
ships in our Navy?

01:12:49.083 --> 01:12:50.267
- Well there's a--

01:12:52.997 --> 01:12:53.940
- Autonomous ships, autonomous vehicles

01:12:53.940 --> 01:12:55.490
whatever you want to call them.

01:12:55.601 --> 01:12:57.100
How soon do you think will have them.

01:12:57.100 --> 01:12:58.453
- You finish my sentence,

01:12:58.453 --> 01:12:59.420
that's exactly what I was moving towards,

01:12:59.420 --> 01:13:03.070
so it really just depends on when we start fielding them,

01:13:03.070 --> 01:13:05.960
we have three pretty solid candidates for

01:13:05.960 --> 01:13:07.833
the autonomous surface fleet,

01:13:08.120 --> 01:13:11.170
we have a family of four different sized

01:13:11.170 --> 01:13:12.693
undersea vehicles,

01:13:12.930 --> 01:13:14.920
all of these are still to be employed in the fleet,

01:13:14.920 --> 01:13:19.760
as a matter of fact we're looking at moving the,

01:13:19.760 --> 01:13:21.840
the most mature service vehicle from San Diego out

01:13:21.840 --> 01:13:23.450
to what we call the rent pack exercise

01:13:23.450 --> 01:13:24.340
this year to see how--

01:13:24.340 --> 01:13:26.610
- Would you say the next five years,

01:13:26.610 --> 01:13:28.020
the next 10 years,

01:13:28.020 --> 01:13:29.950
I mean my understanding is that China and Russia

01:13:29.950 --> 01:13:33.040
are every bit on par with us in terms

01:13:33.040 --> 01:13:36.393
of fielding these types of vehicles or ships.

01:13:36.830 --> 01:13:39.150
- So five to 10 years I think is definitely

01:13:39.218 --> 01:13:40.940
in the target range,

01:13:40.940 --> 01:13:42.000
of what we are--

01:13:42.000 --> 01:13:44.963
- Right so we are building at 355 ship Navy,

01:13:45.210 --> 01:13:47.690
that doesn't include these autonomous ships,

01:13:47.690 --> 01:13:51.090
which will be a clear component of our Navy

01:13:51.090 --> 01:13:53.653
war fighting machine in the next five to 10 years,

01:13:53.680 --> 01:13:57.040
is not that these 355 ships have a five to 10 year lifespan.

01:13:57.040 --> 01:13:58.620
- So to be clear they are included

01:13:58.620 --> 01:14:01.350
in the Navy capability envelope,

01:14:01.350 --> 01:14:04.773
they're just not accountable 355 battle force ships,

01:14:05.020 --> 01:14:05.853
so you've got to remember,

01:14:05.853 --> 01:14:07.933
we have 355 battle force ships,

01:14:08.080 --> 01:14:10.233
we have 15 MSC ships,

01:14:11.210 --> 01:14:12.210
we have unmanned vehicles,

01:14:12.210 --> 01:14:14.041
we have a lot of ships that fall outside

01:14:14.041 --> 01:14:16.773
the accountable 355 battle force,

01:14:16.950 --> 01:14:17.990
it doesn't mean we're not interested,

01:14:17.990 --> 01:14:19.440
it doesn't mean you are not investing in them,

01:14:19.440 --> 01:14:21.740
it's just they don't count against the numbers

01:14:22.490 --> 01:14:23.949
of lethality that we have set.

01:14:23.949 --> 01:14:26.670
- But how can it not count against those numbers

01:14:26.670 --> 01:14:30.410
when they're going to be a clear component of our lethality,

01:14:30.410 --> 01:14:32.310
I make this a big difference between--

01:14:32.350 --> 01:14:33.183
- There going today,

01:14:33.183 --> 01:14:34.016
there are not yet.

01:14:34.120 --> 01:14:36.780
- Okay but the disconnect here to me

01:14:38.031 --> 01:14:40.263
is we're building a 355 ship Navy today,

01:14:40.270 --> 01:14:42.530
those 355 ships are going to last us

01:14:42.700 --> 01:14:44.840
much longer than the next five to 10 years,

01:14:44.840 --> 01:14:47.361
I don't understand how you cannot account for

01:14:47.361 --> 01:14:49.990
these advancements in technology which

01:14:49.990 --> 01:14:52.613
will necessarily replace some of these ships,

01:14:52.720 --> 01:14:55.900
it strikes me it's like saying that the Reagan years,

01:14:55.900 --> 01:14:57.494
the glory years and our defense,

01:14:57.494 --> 01:15:00.143
we had X number of computers,

01:15:00.730 --> 01:15:01.640
so therefore we should have

01:15:01.640 --> 01:15:03.507
the same numbers of computers today,

01:15:03.507 --> 01:15:07.403
but we all know computers do vastly different jobs,

01:15:07.550 --> 01:15:09.430
and we need vastly different numbers

01:15:09.430 --> 01:15:12.053
of computers to compete in today's world.

01:15:13.020 --> 01:15:14.210
- If I could interject here,

01:15:14.210 --> 01:15:15.870
actually the three studies that were done,

01:15:15.870 --> 01:15:16.703
the ninth study,

01:15:16.703 --> 01:15:19.220
this ESBA study and the Navy study included

01:15:19.220 --> 01:15:21.680
in-depth analysis of all these unmanned platforms,

01:15:21.680 --> 01:15:25.640
so the Navy plan and the 355 to include that

01:15:25.640 --> 01:15:27.480
as a tool Navy force structure,

01:15:27.480 --> 01:15:29.810
so the element of what you count as a warship,

01:15:29.810 --> 01:15:31.650
and what you count as an unmanned platform

01:15:31.650 --> 01:15:34.270
and how those are deployed from those other

01:15:34.270 --> 01:15:37.360
manned platforms is how you integrate that particular force,

01:15:37.360 --> 01:15:39.580
so we can make sure we get you a brief on these

01:15:39.580 --> 01:15:41.680
three other independent studies that went

01:15:41.680 --> 01:15:43.410
into length about how you integrate

01:15:43.410 --> 01:15:46.393
these unmanned systems into the existing force structure,

01:15:46.430 --> 01:15:49.290
and again it's tangential to the 355 ship Navy,

01:15:49.290 --> 01:15:51.290
that's a support element of what happened

01:15:51.290 --> 01:15:52.460
with these unmanned platforms.

01:15:52.460 --> 01:15:54.370
- Mr Chairman I would be very interested in seeing that,

01:15:54.370 --> 01:15:56.410
because my understanding is that China and Russia

01:15:56.410 --> 01:15:58.240
are not just looking at integrating these

01:15:58.240 --> 01:16:02.053
new technologies into their existing old-fashioned Navy,

01:16:02.190 --> 01:16:03.910
but rather they're looking at the availability

01:16:03.910 --> 01:16:05.900
of these technologies to replace them,

01:16:05.900 --> 01:16:08.927
to make them more lethal and more effective at lower cost.

01:16:08.927 --> 01:16:10.590
- And we already have one at sea right now,

01:16:10.590 --> 01:16:12.060
Sea Hunter right now is at sea,

01:16:12.060 --> 01:16:12.910
it's a surface ship,

01:16:12.910 --> 01:16:14.720
it's an unmanned surface ship its operating

01:16:14.720 --> 01:16:17.400
autonomously in the Pacific as we speak today.

01:16:17.400 --> 01:16:18.280
- And that's my point,

01:16:18.280 --> 01:16:19.921
this stuff is happening quickly,

01:16:19.921 --> 01:16:21.825
so to be looking at,

01:16:21.825 --> 01:16:25.240
our goal is to have a Navy that looks like

01:16:25.240 --> 01:16:27.420
the 1980s when already our Navy

01:16:27.420 --> 01:16:29.000
is looking very different from that,

01:16:29.000 --> 01:16:34.000
strikes me as a little bit of a disconnect in our research.

01:16:36.030 --> 01:16:36.863
Thank you Mr Chairman.

01:16:36.863 --> 01:16:37.723
- Thank you,

01:16:39.140 --> 01:16:40.222
and we'll make sure we get you that,

01:16:40.222 --> 01:16:41.390
I think there is some great information out

01:16:41.390 --> 01:16:42.550
there on how this is integrated,

01:16:42.550 --> 01:16:45.370
and I would ask to Admiral Merz,

01:16:45.370 --> 01:16:48.423
if he would make sure to that we can get Mr Moulton a brief,

01:16:48.690 --> 01:16:49.933
because I think you'll be interested,

01:16:50.079 --> 01:16:52.326
especially the real details we need to get you in

01:16:52.326 --> 01:16:55.100
the classified brief there's a lot of really

01:16:55.100 --> 01:16:56.460
good stuff that is going on out there.

01:16:56.460 --> 01:16:59.443
- Thank you Mr Chairman, and look,

01:16:59.493 --> 01:17:03.060
the message I have not been in every classified brief,

01:17:03.060 --> 01:17:04.360
I've been at many of them,

01:17:04.410 --> 01:17:06.490
the message I have taken away from them is

01:17:06.490 --> 01:17:09.593
this technology is advancing very, very rapidly,

01:17:09.800 --> 01:17:11.529
and in order to be competitive with

01:17:11.529 --> 01:17:13.503
our peer adversaries,

01:17:13.530 --> 01:17:15.550
we've got to be on the cutting edge of that,

01:17:15.550 --> 01:17:20.070
and sometimes it might take sacrificing the money

01:17:20.070 --> 01:17:22.010
that would go to a traditional ship in order

01:17:22.010 --> 01:17:25.050
to give us the capability and the numbers required

01:17:25.050 --> 01:17:27.560
to compete on this new battlefield,

01:17:27.560 --> 01:17:29.020
but I'll be very interested in the studies,

01:17:29.020 --> 01:17:31.244
and I appreciate your leadership Mr Chairman.

01:17:31.244 --> 01:17:32.810
- Admiral Merz I think you wanted to add something?

01:17:32.810 --> 01:17:35.190
- Yes sir I was just going to follow up on that remark,

01:17:35.190 --> 01:17:36.880
we actually have significant investment

01:17:36.880 --> 01:17:38.190
across all the unmanned vehicles,

01:17:38.190 --> 01:17:41.120
and we are happy to bring you a brief

01:17:41.323 --> 01:17:45.133
on all those capabilities that we are bringing forward.

01:17:45.170 --> 01:17:46.003
- No I appreciate it,

01:17:46.003 --> 01:17:49.683
because ultimately as with all of this it's a trade-off,

01:17:50.380 --> 01:17:52.573
I was very, very low-tech military,

01:17:53.160 --> 01:17:55.010
just ground pounding in the infantry,

01:17:55.400 --> 01:17:58.607
but just like we gad to think about every piece

01:17:58.607 --> 01:18:01.053
of gear that we would like to have,

01:18:01.530 --> 01:18:03.100
how much did it cost to get it,

01:18:03.100 --> 01:18:05.017
how much did it cost and weight to carry it,

01:18:05.017 --> 01:18:07.360
we had to be very careful about which pieces

01:18:07.360 --> 01:18:09.280
of gear we actually chose to get.

01:18:09.280 --> 01:18:11.623
- Sir we share your enthusiasm,

01:18:12.028 --> 01:18:15.020
and even infantry guys have unmanned systems now,

01:18:15.020 --> 01:18:17.083
so we are moving on.

01:18:17.660 --> 01:18:19.040
- I know you share my enthusiasm,

01:18:19.040 --> 01:18:21.290
I also know that there is not a combatant commander

01:18:21.290 --> 01:18:23.710
in history that when told he could have more ships

01:18:23.710 --> 01:18:26.763
or fewer ships would ever say fewer ships off the bat,

01:18:26.910 --> 01:18:29.200
but if really given the big budgetary picture

01:18:29.570 --> 01:18:30.770
might make a different decision,

01:18:30.770 --> 01:18:32.200
so thank you for this discussion,

01:18:32.200 --> 01:18:33.610
I appreciate it, and thank you Mr Chairman.

01:18:33.610 --> 01:18:34.610
- Thanks Mr Moulton,

01:18:34.650 --> 01:18:35.483
I appreciate it,

01:18:35.560 --> 01:18:37.360
any further questions for the panel?

01:18:38.410 --> 01:18:39.320
Well gentlemen thanks again,

01:18:39.320 --> 01:18:40.440
thanks so much for joining us today,

01:18:40.440 --> 01:18:42.290
thank you for your input and your thoughts,

01:18:42.290 --> 01:18:43.913
we'll make sure we continue this dialogue

01:18:43.913 --> 01:18:47.080
as were on the path to a 355 ship Navy,

01:18:47.080 --> 01:18:49.360
which includes a very robust element

01:18:49.360 --> 01:18:51.103
of unmanned systems also,

01:18:51.230 --> 01:18:54.008
and we appreciate all that you provide to us,

01:18:54.008 --> 01:18:56.840
your thoughts and your guidance and the cooperation

01:18:56.840 --> 01:18:59.763
it's gonna take for us to get there as quickly as we can.

01:19:00.160 --> 01:19:02.047
With that, there are no further questions,

01:19:02.047 --> 01:19:03.803
we stand adjourned.