WEBVTT 00:01.310 --> 00:04.640 here's tom shankar from the new york 00:04.640 --> 00:06.810 times . I know that every mission is 00:06.820 --> 00:08.709 different but as you describe the 00:08.709 --> 00:10.950 insurgent defenses , their order of 00:10.960 --> 00:13.127 battle , the way they fought and faded 00:13.127 --> 00:14.904 away . I couldn't help but hear 00:14.904 --> 00:16.738 residents of Fallujah , I'm just 00:16.738 --> 00:18.849 curious whether the insurgency you've 00:18.849 --> 00:20.571 faced until offer was the same 00:20.571 --> 00:23.140 insurgency broadly of course , whether 00:23.140 --> 00:25.196 they have grown and learned or doing 00:25.196 --> 00:27.307 something different now and of course 00:27.307 --> 00:29.362 for you , were there things that you 00:29.362 --> 00:31.251 did differently in this operation 00:31.251 --> 00:33.029 because you learned on your own 00:33.029 --> 00:34.751 military lessons of Fallujah ? 00:35.040 --> 00:38.420 Well , I'll say we we always we're 00:38.420 --> 00:40.642 learning every day here . You know , we 00:40.642 --> 00:42.920 learned from our from our fellow units . 00:42.920 --> 00:45.142 We learned from operations . If we read 00:45.142 --> 00:47.309 a lot about that , we read a lot about 00:47.309 --> 00:50.520 previous operations in tula for and uh 00:50.530 --> 00:52.697 you know , it's not the same enemy , I 00:52.697 --> 00:55.260 don't think it's a similar enemy . Um 00:55.340 --> 00:58.130 it's an enemy that has combined uh 00:58.140 --> 01:01.800 radical Islamic extremism and uh and 01:01.800 --> 01:03.890 and influences from transnational 01:03.890 --> 01:06.100 terrorist organizations and and 01:06.110 --> 01:08.110 Saddam's , you know , former regime 01:08.110 --> 01:10.680 elements , um much of the population 01:10.680 --> 01:13.500 here who was complicit with the 01:13.500 --> 01:17.010 terrorists are former members of 01:17.020 --> 01:19.750 of the old regimes , Republican Guard , 01:19.750 --> 01:21.639 maybe their senior warrant senior 01:21.639 --> 01:23.806 warrant officers , for example , which 01:23.806 --> 01:25.917 is equivalent to senior N . C . O . S 01:25.917 --> 01:28.083 in our army . So you have this melding 01:28.083 --> 01:30.470 together of an extremist enemy with a 01:30.470 --> 01:32.192 significant amount of military 01:32.192 --> 01:34.940 experience . I mean basically in a lot 01:34.940 --> 01:36.996 of areas of the city . It was it was 01:36.996 --> 01:39.218 the schoolhouse for the enemy and there 01:39.218 --> 01:41.384 we go in , they took over schools that 01:41.384 --> 01:41.190 were going to , schools have classes on 01:41.200 --> 01:43.200 how to do an I . D . I mean clearly 01:43.200 --> 01:45.089 chalkboards , we've got photos of 01:45.089 --> 01:47.311 students and teachers standing in front 01:47.311 --> 01:49.478 of chalkboards . And in one engagement 01:49.478 --> 01:51.478 we had about a month ago uh we were 01:51.478 --> 01:53.422 able to gain observation of of the 01:53.422 --> 01:55.533 enemy having an I . D . Class outside 01:55.533 --> 01:57.644 of the school with you know 30 people 01:57.644 --> 01:59.930 gathered around digging a hole and 01:59.930 --> 02:02.041 showing how you put it in I . D . Now 02:02.041 --> 02:04.097 we we uh we we disrupted their class 02:04.097 --> 02:06.041 with with an artillery attack that 02:06.041 --> 02:08.152 resulted in 30 the enemy being killed 02:08.152 --> 02:10.310 on on that medication . But it's 02:10.310 --> 02:12.421 another example of what the enemy was 02:12.421 --> 02:14.950 using this area for . Um So we found 02:14.950 --> 02:17.117 this classroom environments , we found 02:17.117 --> 02:18.950 the you know , we found training 02:18.950 --> 02:21.370 ammunition uh for ak 47 sniper manuals , 02:21.370 --> 02:24.950 mortar manuals . Uh And so the function 02:24.960 --> 02:26.793 of this place was different from 02:26.793 --> 02:28.682 Fallujah . The dynamics here were 02:28.682 --> 02:30.738 completely different in terms of the 02:30.738 --> 02:32.904 nature of the operation because we had 02:32.904 --> 02:35.071 the active cooperation of such a large 02:35.071 --> 02:37.293 percentage of the of the population and 02:37.293 --> 02:39.920 that's what really that's where really 02:39.930 --> 02:43.660 uh allowed us to defeat the enemy at 02:43.660 --> 02:46.920 such a low cost was that we had very 02:46.920 --> 02:48.870 precise information so we do what 02:48.870 --> 02:50.926 houses were rigged to explode and we 02:50.926 --> 02:53.092 destroyed them in advance . We do with 02:53.092 --> 02:55.314 defensive positions that were in and we 02:55.314 --> 02:57.314 killed the enemy of those defensive 02:57.314 --> 02:59.370 positions before we close with we do 02:59.370 --> 03:01.703 where their I . D . S were in the roads . 03:01.703 --> 03:01.280 So we exploded those ideas with 03:01.280 --> 03:03.224 helicopter fires . Now we're still 03:03.224 --> 03:05.800 finding more and more of these 03:05.800 --> 03:08.330 positions after the enemy attempted to 03:08.330 --> 03:11.240 retreat out of this area . Um And we're 03:11.240 --> 03:13.184 exploiting those areas now and and 03:13.184 --> 03:15.450 developing a more a more full picture 03:15.460 --> 03:17.720 of what the enemy was about in this 03:17.720 --> 03:20.560 area . But uh but so I would say there 03:20.570 --> 03:22.792 are similarities you know with with the 03:22.792 --> 03:25.900 way the enemy attempted to defend uh 03:25.910 --> 03:27.854 here and and and the way the enemy 03:27.854 --> 03:30.077 defended in Fallujah . But then we just 03:30.077 --> 03:32.132 couldn't get there . They could they 03:32.132 --> 03:34.188 couldn't they couldn't pull it off . 03:34.188 --> 03:36.299 And uh and and and I think that a lot 03:36.299 --> 03:37.799 of that has to do with the 03:37.799 --> 03:39.966 effectiveness of Iraqi security forces 03:39.966 --> 03:42.132 operating with us . And and really the 03:42.132 --> 03:42.110 main issue I I guess the main 03:42.110 --> 03:44.332 difference would be the access to human 03:44.332 --> 03:46.554 intelligence and and the cooperation of 03:46.554 --> 03:50.410 the population . Uh uh can I ask you 03:50.410 --> 03:52.521 indulge with one more question , will 03:52.521 --> 03:54.688 go to the Los Angeles Times journalist 03:54.688 --> 03:56.960 martin with the Los Angeles Times . Um 03:56.970 --> 03:59.260 You said a little while ago that right 03:59.260 --> 04:01.482 now there wasn't enough coalition force 04:01.482 --> 04:03.780 to secure the area permanently . And 04:03.780 --> 04:06.180 I'm wondering whether how long do you 04:06.180 --> 04:07.791 think it will take to really 04:07.791 --> 04:09.847 effectively do the whole part of the 04:09.847 --> 04:11.902 clear and hold operations this month 04:11.902 --> 04:13.958 before Iraqis can actually hold this 04:13.958 --> 04:16.130 territory permanently or what's your 04:16.130 --> 04:19.630 assessment . You know ultimate practice 04:19.630 --> 04:21.741 is difficult to predict how long it's 04:21.741 --> 04:23.852 going to take because there's so many 04:23.852 --> 04:25.908 factors that bear on this thing . It 04:25.908 --> 04:27.797 has , it has to do a lot with how 04:27.797 --> 04:30.019 capable of these forces are as we build 04:30.019 --> 04:29.190 them . You know , so we've got to 04:29.190 --> 04:30.912 really make sure that they can 04:30.912 --> 04:32.968 withstand the enemy's intimidation . 04:32.968 --> 04:35.190 And it has a lot to do with the enemy . 04:35.190 --> 04:37.357 One of the things we wanted to do with 04:37.357 --> 04:37.300 this operation was set conditions for 04:37.300 --> 04:39.300 the establishment of Iraqi security 04:39.300 --> 04:41.680 forces so that they get some get some 04:41.680 --> 04:43.847 time , some breathing space to develop 04:43.847 --> 04:45.910 some confidence and cohesion within 04:45.920 --> 04:48.142 within the police and army formations , 04:48.142 --> 04:50.940 develop leadership and and and and that 04:50.940 --> 04:52.551 they're able to operate more 04:52.551 --> 04:54.329 effectively and more permissive 04:54.329 --> 04:56.680 environment . So I couldn't hazard a 04:56.680 --> 04:58.513 guess because of this continuous 04:58.513 --> 05:00.513 interaction with the enemy . Uh you 05:00.513 --> 05:02.736 know , the progress that we're going to 05:02.736 --> 05:05.013 have in Iraq is not going to be linear . 05:05.013 --> 05:07.124 And I think everybody wants to , some 05:07.124 --> 05:09.347 people want to to say that , you know , 05:09.347 --> 05:11.291 the enemies , you know , enjoy the 05:11.291 --> 05:13.347 great success somewhere , you know , 05:13.347 --> 05:15.291 because because there's been uh an 05:15.291 --> 05:15.260 effective attack on Iraqi security 05:15.260 --> 05:17.760 forces , for example , But I mean , 05:17.760 --> 05:19.982 that's what the enemy's job is , is the 05:19.982 --> 05:22.150 is the is to come back at us and we've 05:22.150 --> 05:24.261 got to recognize that what we have to 05:24.261 --> 05:26.483 do is we've got we've got to accelerate 05:26.483 --> 05:28.706 our operations against them . We got to 05:28.706 --> 05:30.872 maintain the initiative , we've got to 05:30.872 --> 05:32.983 continue to pursue them . And so , uh 05:32.983 --> 05:35.150 we are we making progress in this area 05:35.150 --> 05:37.490 security wise , definitely definitely 05:37.500 --> 05:40.680 did . We uh severely disrupt this enemy 05:40.680 --> 05:43.480 right here and and deny them their safe 05:43.490 --> 05:47.370 haven . And and uh and uh and sort of 05:47.380 --> 05:49.710 uh atomize their organization , kill 05:49.710 --> 05:51.710 and capture large numbers of them , 05:51.710 --> 05:54.840 kill and capture their leadership . Yes , 05:54.850 --> 05:57.090 we did . Is it over ? No , I mean , the 05:57.090 --> 05:59.146 end is going to try to come back and 05:59.146 --> 06:01.312 you're gonna try to coalesce , they're 06:01.312 --> 06:03.534 going to try to figure out ways to come 06:03.534 --> 06:03.470 back and re establish this intimidation 06:03.470 --> 06:05.637 campaign . But we're not gonna let him 06:05.637 --> 06:07.581 do it . I mean , we're gonna we're 06:07.581 --> 06:09.303 gonna continue to increase our 06:09.303 --> 06:11.359 effectiveness fight . But I thinking 06:11.359 --> 06:13.470 hard about this problem by partnering 06:13.470 --> 06:15.748 effectively with Iraqi security forces . 06:15.748 --> 06:17.859 And so I know it's a non answer , you 06:17.859 --> 06:20.137 know , I'm sorry , but I can't predict , 06:20.137 --> 06:22.137 I can't predict how long it's gonna 06:22.137 --> 06:24.303 take . But I'll say we're committed to 06:24.303 --> 06:26.414 doing it . Our soldiers are committed 06:26.414 --> 06:28.581 to doing it and and the Iraqi soldiers 06:28.581 --> 06:31.350 are committed to doing it . Well , we 06:31.350 --> 06:33.570 wanna thank you for taking the time uh 06:33.580 --> 06:36.060 this evening to be with us . Uh we 06:36.060 --> 06:39.650 appreciate that . You are very busy 06:39.660 --> 06:42.650 and uh but it is very helpful for us 06:42.660 --> 06:45.510 back here to hear from commanders on 06:45.510 --> 06:47.621 the ground that are actually involved 06:47.621 --> 06:49.843 in these operations from time to time . 06:49.843 --> 06:51.954 So we thank you very much and we wish 06:51.954 --> 06:54.010 you the best . Hey thanks and please 06:54.010 --> 06:56.232 everybody just please tell the american 06:56.232 --> 06:58.550 people how great their soldiers are . 06:58.560 --> 07:00.504 You gotta tell him . I mean , it's 07:00.504 --> 07:02.504 unbelievable what they're doing . I 07:02.504 --> 07:04.671 mean , and I know I can't keep you any 07:04.671 --> 07:06.727 longer , but I just want to tell you 07:06.727 --> 07:08.782 they're fighting , they're defeating 07:08.782 --> 07:08.250 the enemy . They are partnered with 07:08.250 --> 07:10.028 Iraqi security forces . They're 07:10.028 --> 07:11.694 building Iraqi security force 07:11.694 --> 07:13.417 capability . They're providing 07:13.417 --> 07:15.306 humanitarian assistance . They're 07:15.306 --> 07:17.417 organizing reconstruction right now . 07:17.417 --> 07:19.417 They are , they are they are taking 07:19.417 --> 07:21.306 care of the people of the city as 07:21.306 --> 07:23.417 they're pursuing the enemy . I mean , 07:23.417 --> 07:25.583 it is extraordinary . Uh , the quality 07:25.583 --> 07:27.694 of of the young men and women that we 07:27.694 --> 07:29.806 have here pursuing the enemies of our 07:29.806 --> 07:32.028 nation and helping to secure the people 07:32.028 --> 07:33.917 to LA from Western . And I was so 07:33.917 --> 07:36.083 you've got to tell them . And uh , and 07:36.083 --> 07:38.083 thanks for this opportunity to talk 07:38.083 --> 07:37.450 with you .