WEBVTT 00:00.080 --> 00:02.940 - The House Armed Services committee, subcommittee 00:03.120 --> 00:04.830 on Seapower and Projection Forces, 00:04.830 --> 00:06.820 and today we're gonna meet to discuss 00:06.830 --> 00:07.720 the Department of the Navy's 00:07.720 --> 00:10.120 Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request. 00:10.500 --> 00:13.610 Appearing before us to discuss this important topic 00:13.930 --> 00:17.070 are three esteemed Navy witnesses, Honorable James Geurts, 00:17.070 --> 00:18.640 Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, 00:18.640 --> 00:22.180 Development & Acquisition, Vice Admiral William R. Merz, 00:22.320 --> 00:25.070 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems, 00:25.070 --> 00:28.630 and Lieutenant General Robert S. Walsh, Deputy Commandant 00:28.630 --> 00:30.850 for Combat Development and Integration. 00:31.400 --> 00:33.090 I want to thank all of you for your service 00:33.090 --> 00:36.280 as well as for appearing before our subcommittee today 00:36.790 --> 00:39.900 on the Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request. 00:40.700 --> 00:42.610 Concurrent with the budget request last month 00:42.610 --> 00:44.560 the Secretary of the Navy also released 00:44.610 --> 00:47.770 a 30 year ship building plan that addresses new capabilities 00:47.770 --> 00:50.000 and offers a plan to recapitalize 00:50.000 --> 00:51.400 the current force structure. 00:51.590 --> 00:55.130 While I am pleased that the plan was timely I am concerned 00:55.130 --> 00:56.820 that it does not properly advocate 00:56.820 --> 00:58.880 for the Navy the Nation Needs. 00:59.230 --> 01:01.680 In fact on page eight of the plan it references 01:01.680 --> 01:03.630 the 2016 Force Structure Assessment 01:03.630 --> 01:07.910 in a table clearly identifying a need for 355 ships, 01:08.080 --> 01:10.370 yet on page 12 the 30 year shipbuilding plan 01:10.370 --> 01:14.300 only reaches 342 ships by 2039. 01:14.440 --> 01:16.920 And we've had some great conversations about the context 01:16.920 --> 01:19.480 of that and understanding congress's role. 01:19.620 --> 01:22.000 It's still I think critical to make sure 01:22.000 --> 01:25.730 that we are on the same page with the 355 number. 01:26.210 --> 01:28.170 Critical shortfalls in aircraft carriers, 01:28.170 --> 01:30.360 large deck amphibs and attack submarines 01:30.510 --> 01:32.790 are debilitating to our national security 01:32.980 --> 01:36.300 and only serve to embolden our potential adversaries. 01:36.300 --> 01:38.010 I think that the Navy sometimes misses 01:38.010 --> 01:40.940 the strategic imperative and national urgency 01:40.940 --> 01:42.730 associated with the message 01:42.730 --> 01:44.820 our nation needs to send to the world 01:45.120 --> 01:47.840 when an inadequate shipbuilding budget is proposed. 01:48.440 --> 01:50.700 Shipbuilding is a sign of our nation's resolve, 01:50.700 --> 01:52.250 and a weak shipbuilding request 01:52.380 --> 01:54.610 is carefully watched by our adversaries. 01:54.740 --> 01:57.100 We need to significantly improve our navy shipbuilding 01:57.100 --> 02:01.050 to meet the President's objective of a 355 ship Navy. 02:01.330 --> 02:02.900 As I spoke of the other day, 02:03.040 --> 02:04.890 people will get sick of hearing it from me, 02:04.890 --> 02:08.110 but 26.2 billion and 13 ships is the floor 02:08.200 --> 02:10.680 will be a refrain that you will constantly hear 02:10.860 --> 02:12.580 as to the needs for this nation. 02:12.950 --> 02:15.530 As to the Marine Corps, I'm pleased this committee supported 02:15.530 --> 02:17.840 the authorization of another San Antonio-class 02:17.840 --> 02:21.620 amphibious ship in the FY18 NDAA. 02:21.780 --> 02:23.560 While I continue to hold some concerns 02:23.560 --> 02:25.890 with respect to conducting amphibious operations 02:25.890 --> 02:27.340 in a contested environment, 02:27.640 --> 02:29.870 I understand that the Marine Corps is actively seeking 02:29.870 --> 02:32.170 new strategies to overcome these challenges 02:32.350 --> 02:34.760 through exercises such as Bold Alligator, 02:34.770 --> 02:36.200 and I applaud these efforts. 02:36.390 --> 02:38.900 Lieutenant General Walsh, you and I have talked extensively 02:38.900 --> 02:41.370 about that and I appreciate the innovation and creativity 02:41.370 --> 02:44.470 the Marine Corps is showing in looking at how to operate 02:44.590 --> 02:47.040 in those contested environments to continue to do 02:47.140 --> 02:50.170 forcible entry amphibious operations, those things are key. 02:50.520 --> 02:53.150 Our Marine Corps was created to be an amphibious force, 02:53.150 --> 02:55.850 therefore we must rapidly insert innovation 02:56.030 --> 02:57.770 into the amphibious warfare plan 02:58.020 --> 03:01.130 to ensure we are successful in future conflict. 03:01.430 --> 03:04.040 Additionally I am concerned about the Navy's enabling forces 03:04.040 --> 03:06.980 and specifically the surge sealift forces. 03:07.210 --> 03:10.240 Our inability to provide a more responsive surge sealift 03:10.240 --> 03:13.230 will place soldier's and marine's lives at risk 03:13.230 --> 03:14.410 in a future conflict. 03:15.000 --> 03:17.670 If you can't get to the battle in time, 03:17.940 --> 03:19.500 you need to fight your way in. 03:20.070 --> 03:22.440 We have seen the casualties of such a strategy 03:22.440 --> 03:23.720 in prior conflict. 03:24.360 --> 03:27.720 We do have a better way to support the war fighter. 03:28.120 --> 03:31.150 I am reminded of Winston Churchill, who at the worst times 03:31.150 --> 03:34.550 of World War II remarked, "I never worry about action, 03:35.000 --> 03:36.680 "but only inaction." 03:36.950 --> 03:39.400 Ladies and gentlemen, we have had 70 years 03:39.420 --> 03:41.810 of relative global peace with the absence 03:41.980 --> 03:43.600 of a major world war. 03:43.890 --> 03:46.720 This global peace was secured by the blood and sweat 03:46.720 --> 03:48.430 of our greatest generation. 03:48.810 --> 03:51.010 Our Navy's inability to act and embrace 03:51.010 --> 03:54.280 a bold shipbuilding vision will embolden our adversaries 03:54.340 --> 03:55.900 and risks the global peace 03:55.900 --> 03:58.130 that our father's secured for our future. 03:58.510 --> 04:00.250 Our witnesses today are here today 04:01.310 --> 04:04.680 because they are the best our nation has to create 04:04.770 --> 04:07.280 the bold vision that our nation needs. 04:07.400 --> 04:10.240 Gentlemen, it is time to act and establish 04:10.240 --> 04:12.960 a sustainable upward trajectory for our Navy, 04:12.960 --> 04:15.410 and I'm confident in your ability to do so. 04:15.700 --> 04:18.230 I'd now like to turn to our ranking member, Joe Courtney 04:18.230 --> 04:20.540 for any remarks that he may have, and Joe before you begin, 04:20.540 --> 04:22.480 I want to thank you for your leadership 04:22.480 --> 04:24.660 and what you have done with us to make sure 04:24.660 --> 04:26.590 that this vision for the Navy 04:26.920 --> 04:29.430 not only gets put in place but is sustainable. 04:29.430 --> 04:31.100 So thanks so much for your leadership. 04:31.100 --> 04:34.410 - Right, well thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you 04:34.726 --> 04:36.410 to the witnesses for being here today. 04:36.410 --> 04:37.730 I want to particularly congratulate 04:37.730 --> 04:41.010 the new Assistant Secretary of the Navy, James Geurts. 04:41.270 --> 04:43.860 He was confirmed recently and I can personally attest 04:43.860 --> 04:47.360 to the energetic start that you've begun with your tenure, 04:47.360 --> 04:50.830 we had a great visit up to Groton a couple of weeks ago 04:50.830 --> 04:53.670 to the sub base and to the shipyard at Electric Boat. 04:53.670 --> 04:56.540 So we look forward to working with you and obviously 04:56.960 --> 04:59.850 Admiral Merz and Lieutenant General Walsh. 05:00.740 --> 05:02.750 In December 2016 the Department of the Navy 05:02.750 --> 05:04.730 produced a new force structure assessment 05:04.730 --> 05:07.270 which reviewed and validated military requirements 05:07.270 --> 05:09.020 and determined that the Navy our Nation Needs 05:09.020 --> 05:11.050 is a 355 ship navy. 05:11.620 --> 05:13.470 Listening to this clear demand signal 05:13.520 --> 05:16.140 and responding to a 2018 budget request 05:16.140 --> 05:18.010 that fell far short of this goal, 05:18.180 --> 05:20.860 this subcommittee ultimately authorized nearly double 05:20.860 --> 05:23.510 the number of battle force and non battle force ships 05:23.720 --> 05:26.160 in the 2018 Defense Authorization Bill 05:26.160 --> 05:28.550 signed into law last December. 05:28.900 --> 05:31.730 And again I want to congratulate my colleague Mr. Wittman, 05:31.730 --> 05:33.420 'cause again this subcommittee led the way 05:33.420 --> 05:38.180 in terms of really creating that new goal and standard 05:38.180 --> 05:40.490 that was reflected in the NDAA. 05:41.100 --> 05:43.270 Compared to the budget that we started with last year, 05:43.270 --> 05:46.480 the President's fiscal year '19 budget request for seapower 05:46.480 --> 05:48.550 represents a move in the right direction. 05:48.790 --> 05:51.550 This budget proposes to procure 10 battle force ships 05:51.550 --> 05:54.490 in fiscal year '19, eight non-battle force ships, 05:54.670 --> 05:57.670 and 54 battle force ships over the next five years, 05:57.800 --> 06:01.010 11 more than was planned in the Fiscal Year 2018 Budget. 06:01.010 --> 06:03.140 Obviously that's very positive movement. 06:03.510 --> 06:06.450 In addition the budget proposes a series of life extensions 06:06.450 --> 06:08.840 for ships and submarines to add to our force structure 06:08.840 --> 06:11.640 and to get the most use out of our existing platforms. 06:11.960 --> 06:16.210 However this is still not a plan to achieve a 35 ship Navy, 06:16.210 --> 06:21.120 it is a plan to achieve a 335 ship Navy in 2048. 06:22.250 --> 06:25.090 As the 30 year shipbuilding plan clearly shows 06:25.090 --> 06:28.340 this budget does not achieve the minimum Navy force size 06:28.340 --> 06:31.040 that the Navy says it needs until the 2050s. 06:31.630 --> 06:34.380 Looking closely at the budget and the shipbuilding plan 06:34.510 --> 06:37.460 it is clear that there is substantial meat left on the bone 06:37.470 --> 06:40.300 where industrial base capacity does exist 06:40.300 --> 06:42.850 to add further ships and capabilities to the fleet. 06:43.280 --> 06:45.130 One glaring example of this opportunity 06:45.130 --> 06:46.250 is the under Undersea fleet. 06:46.250 --> 06:48.300 While the budget reflects a sustained two a year 06:48.300 --> 06:50.650 construction rate for Virginia-class submarines 06:50.760 --> 06:54.320 at this rate the force would not achieve the 66 boat level 06:54.430 --> 06:57.320 that was called for in the force structure assessment 06:57.320 --> 07:00.430 until 2048, 30 years from now. 07:00.430 --> 07:02.330 And again we heard from Admiral Harris 07:02.570 --> 07:04.630 just about a week ago about the fact that 07:05.930 --> 07:10.180 the demand signal for submarines in the Pacific area 07:10.810 --> 07:14.420 is barely able to keep up with what's out there, about 50% 07:14.420 --> 07:17.010 and we're projected to see that dip even further, 07:17.010 --> 07:19.410 closer to 40 in the entire fleet. 07:19.410 --> 07:22.500 So we've got to do better and move faster. 07:22.810 --> 07:24.730 The 30 year shipbuilding plan identifies 07:24.730 --> 07:28.410 specific opportunities in 2022 and 2023 07:28.410 --> 07:30.400 where there is industrial base capacity 07:30.740 --> 07:32.730 for a third submarine in each of those years 07:32.730 --> 07:35.000 and within the next five year block contract, 07:35.700 --> 07:38.070 where negotiations are occurring right now 07:38.070 --> 07:39.960 between the Navy and industry. 07:39.960 --> 07:43.500 As I said, led by this panel on a bipartisan basis 07:43.500 --> 07:46.200 congress has already demonstrated it's strong support 07:46.200 --> 07:48.750 for expanding the attack submarine production line. 07:48.930 --> 07:51.240 Specifically we've provided the authority needed 07:51.240 --> 07:53.020 to go beyond two subs a year 07:53.020 --> 07:54.980 in the next five year block contract. 07:55.100 --> 07:57.720 I urge the Navy to take advantage of this opportunity 07:57.720 --> 08:01.360 and others like it that provide a great opportunity 08:01.360 --> 08:03.040 in the years ahead to add on to the plan 08:03.040 --> 08:04.560 presented to us here today. 08:05.170 --> 08:06.750 Achieving a larger fleet will take more 08:06.750 --> 08:08.130 than any one budget year, 08:08.390 --> 08:10.700 and it will take more than just building new ships. 08:10.700 --> 08:12.410 We need to take a comprehensive approach 08:12.410 --> 08:14.410 that includes new construction, extension, 08:14.410 --> 08:16.640 and modernization of existing ships, 08:16.680 --> 08:18.840 repairing our ships on time and without delay, 08:18.840 --> 08:20.540 and incorporating new capabilities 08:20.670 --> 08:23.230 into the current and future ships wherever possible. 08:23.230 --> 08:25.700 I look forward to discussing how the 2019 budget 08:25.700 --> 08:28.050 achieves these goals and where we can work together 08:28.050 --> 08:29.910 on this panel on a bipartisan basis 08:29.910 --> 08:31.230 to improve and expand on it. 08:31.230 --> 08:32.520 Thank you again to our witnesses, 08:32.520 --> 08:34.370 and I look forward to your testimony. 08:34.600 --> 08:36.210 - Joe, thank you so much, we appreciate it. 08:36.210 --> 08:38.870 Now we're gonna turn to our witnesses, 08:38.870 --> 08:40.730 and I understand Mr. Geurts that you will give 08:40.730 --> 08:44.760 the opening statement for all three, so the floor is yours. 08:45.030 --> 08:45.863 - Thank you, sir. 08:45.863 --> 08:47.720 Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Courtney, 08:47.800 --> 08:49.300 distinguished members of the subcommittee, 08:49.300 --> 08:52.010 thanks for the opportunity to appear before you today 08:52.010 --> 08:54.900 and discuss the Department of the Navy acquisition program. 08:54.900 --> 08:56.930 - [Mr. Wittman] Mr. Geurts, if I can get you just real quick 08:56.930 --> 08:58.520 just to put the microphone in front of you. 08:58.520 --> 08:59.353 - Oh better like that? 08:59.353 --> 09:00.950 - Perfect, perfect. - All right. 09:01.020 --> 09:03.910 I'm joined today by Lieutenant General Bob Walsh here. 09:04.110 --> 09:06.330 He's the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development 09:06.330 --> 09:08.830 and Integration, and Vice Admiral Bill Merz, 09:08.830 --> 09:11.670 the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems. 09:11.670 --> 09:14.560 With your permission I intend to provide a brief 09:14.560 --> 09:17.360 joint statement and submit our opening statement 09:17.360 --> 09:18.193 for the record. 09:19.380 --> 09:21.310 First I'd like to thank congress for your support 09:21.310 --> 09:24.670 for the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018. 09:25.500 --> 09:27.890 Enactment of this legislation will help provide 09:27.890 --> 09:29.810 the predictability and stability in funding 09:29.810 --> 09:33.860 that's critical to our success and will support building 09:33.860 --> 09:37.050 the Navy the Nation Needs, and the Marine Operating Concept, 09:37.130 --> 09:39.980 the maritime components of the National Defense Strategy. 09:40.400 --> 09:42.540 Coming out of an era of shrinking resources 09:42.540 --> 09:43.730 and increasing operations 09:43.730 --> 09:46.640 that drove exceedingly difficult choices, 09:46.790 --> 09:48.510 we feel your efforts to put us on a course 09:48.510 --> 09:51.120 for readiness and recovery and growing the fleet 09:51.120 --> 09:54.220 were substantial and significant, thank you. 09:54.900 --> 09:57.980 Secondly I'd like to thank this subcommittee specifically 09:58.210 --> 10:00.110 for your leadership and steadfast support 10:00.110 --> 10:02.070 of the Department of the Navy shipbuilding. 10:02.070 --> 10:04.900 Not only your support of our fiscal requests in 2018 10:05.860 --> 10:09.070 but for the increasing resources you added to our request. 10:10.450 --> 10:12.580 Our sailors and marines are better off 10:12.780 --> 10:15.180 for the great support they get from you, thank you. 10:15.740 --> 10:18.680 The 2018 Defense Authorization Act supports 10:18.740 --> 10:22.140 the Navy's requirement for 355 Battle Force ships. 10:22.410 --> 10:25.270 The 2019 President's Budget request builds towards 10:25.270 --> 10:27.460 this larger and more lethal force 10:27.460 --> 10:30.110 and reflects the continued commitment to produce 10:30.110 --> 10:33.600 a 355 ship Navy with the correct mix of ships 10:33.600 --> 10:36.850 with increasing values of speed, lethality, stealth, 10:36.850 --> 10:40.120 information, design margin, and modernization 10:40.120 --> 10:42.670 as key attributes to ensure we're providing 10:42.670 --> 10:45.520 the war-fighting commanders capabilities 10:45.520 --> 10:47.910 in an increasingly contested environment. 10:48.870 --> 10:50.840 It similarly supports the Marine Corps' need 10:50.840 --> 10:53.760 for a more lethal resilient force able to contribute 10:53.760 --> 10:57.310 to all domain access, sea control, power projection, 10:57.310 --> 11:00.530 maritime security and deterrence in any environment. 11:01.570 --> 11:04.510 As detailed in the 2018 National Security Strategy 11:04.510 --> 11:06.110 and National Defense Strategy, 11:06.440 --> 11:08.500 it's imperative that we continuously adapt 11:08.500 --> 11:10.370 to the emerging security environment 11:10.630 --> 11:13.000 to retain and expand our competitive advantage, 11:13.000 --> 11:14.840 and do so with a sense of urgency. 11:15.440 --> 11:17.690 This requires the right balance of readiness, 11:17.900 --> 11:19.840 capability, and capacity, 11:20.130 --> 11:22.610 as well as budget stability and predictability. 11:23.020 --> 11:25.690 It also requires a constant focus on 11:25.690 --> 11:28.000 and partnership with the industrial base. 11:28.290 --> 11:30.690 They are a key element to our national security. 11:31.440 --> 11:34.680 Together, we can ensure our military's capability, 11:34.910 --> 11:37.830 capacity, and readiness can continue to deliver 11:38.020 --> 11:40.600 superior naval power around the world 11:40.600 --> 11:41.800 both today and tomorrow. 11:42.430 --> 11:44.930 Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 11:45.030 --> 11:47.400 and we look forward to answering your questions. 11:48.040 --> 11:49.970 - Thank you Deputy Secretary Geurts, thanks again 11:49.970 --> 11:52.160 for all of you all joining us today 11:52.160 --> 11:53.880 and again thanks for your service. 11:54.210 --> 11:57.650 We will begin questions now, I'm gonna turn to Mr. Conaway 11:57.650 --> 11:59.940 to open and then we will go to... 12:00.803 --> 12:01.780 - Ms. Bordallo. - Ms. Bordallo. 12:01.780 --> 12:02.613 Okay, very good. 12:02.613 --> 12:03.710 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 12:04.400 --> 12:06.110 Gentlemen thank you for being here. 12:07.830 --> 12:10.190 As Rambo as my good colleague from Connecticut is 12:10.190 --> 12:12.840 about submarines, I feel the same way about carriers. 12:13.400 --> 12:15.440 Admiral Richardson has said that if we were try to go 12:15.440 --> 12:18.930 to a three to four year increment between carriers 12:18.930 --> 12:21.130 that would get us to a much better position. 12:21.470 --> 12:22.870 The budget does not do that 12:22.870 --> 12:25.600 and we're still in the five year between carriers, 12:25.600 --> 12:28.600 can you speak to us about what's being considered 12:29.200 --> 12:31.900 to try to catch up with respect to the carrier demand? 12:33.170 --> 12:35.820 - Yes sir, I'll start out somewhat with the near term 12:35.900 --> 12:37.790 and then I'll turn to Admiral Merz for a little bit 12:37.790 --> 12:39.340 of the longer term perspective. 12:39.570 --> 12:40.887 In the near term as you know 12:40.887 --> 12:42.950 we're producing forward carriers. 12:43.760 --> 12:47.410 Our near term focus is delivering those carriers on time 12:47.410 --> 12:48.710 and within the budget cap. 12:49.030 --> 12:51.860 A near term opportunity that we're looking at 12:51.860 --> 12:56.280 is can we combine the buys for CVN 80 and 81, 12:56.280 --> 12:58.300 saving money and potentially accelerating 12:58.300 --> 12:59.570 some of that capability. 12:59.800 --> 13:02.870 We're studying that right now, we're not at the point yet 13:02.870 --> 13:04.950 where I'm ready to put that on the table. 13:04.950 --> 13:07.850 We're working with the contractor to sharpen the estimates 13:07.930 --> 13:09.660 and ensure we really understand 13:09.980 --> 13:12.240 what that opportunity provides to us. 13:12.400 --> 13:14.570 I will stay in communication here with the subcommittee 13:14.570 --> 13:17.310 as we work through that so that you can understand 13:17.310 --> 13:18.590 what those savings are. 13:18.880 --> 13:21.680 Because to capitalize that will take some authority 13:21.680 --> 13:24.450 from this committee, and we would look forward 13:24.450 --> 13:25.770 to working with you on that. 13:25.770 --> 13:28.770 That's on the near term, if okay Admiral Merz can address 13:28.770 --> 13:29.820 the longer term look. 13:30.860 --> 13:34.570 - Yes sir, so the carrier procurement profile 13:34.570 --> 13:38.640 actually achieves its objective the slowest 13:38.640 --> 13:41.090 of all the ship classes in the shipbuilding plan. 13:42.520 --> 13:44.520 Secretary Geurts outlined the multi-year 13:44.930 --> 13:46.970 that we're trying to secure 13:47.570 --> 13:49.920 and we're also looking at reducing the centers. 13:50.290 --> 13:51.670 Within the shipbuilding plan we lay out 13:51.670 --> 13:54.640 the program of record but we also put out a timeline 13:54.640 --> 13:56.710 on top of that that shows what it would look like 13:56.710 --> 13:58.430 on three and a half year centers. 13:58.800 --> 13:59.870 A couple reasons for that. 13:59.870 --> 14:03.810 One is to demonstrate our commitment to trying to reach 14:03.810 --> 14:05.580 that three and a half year centers. 14:07.030 --> 14:09.570 I'll tell you that is probably not aggressive enough. 14:09.570 --> 14:12.330 Right now on the four year centers 14:12.840 --> 14:16.170 we achieve the 12 in the 2060 timeframe, 14:16.170 --> 14:17.130 if we go to three and a half, 14:17.130 --> 14:19.580 that's still only moves it up to the early 2050s. 14:20.150 --> 14:21.800 So we're aggressively looking at that. 14:21.800 --> 14:23.480 Frankly we just didn't get there in time 14:23.480 --> 14:27.280 for the Pres Bud '19, but that work is ongoing 14:27.280 --> 14:30.010 and you're gonna see the fruits of that effort 14:30.010 --> 14:32.590 in the next shipbuilding plan that we're putting together, 14:32.590 --> 14:33.423 already started. 14:33.600 --> 14:35.330 - All right, well I appreciate that. 14:35.330 --> 14:39.152 My other cause is auditing Department of Defense. 14:39.152 --> 14:40.830 It starts with auditing the Navy as well, 14:40.830 --> 14:43.180 the Marine Corps has done a terrific job of leading the way. 14:43.180 --> 14:47.380 Can you talk to us about the requested resources, 14:47.750 --> 14:51.300 is that being fully funded for getting the auditors in, 14:51.300 --> 14:52.600 whatever money needs to be done 14:52.600 --> 14:55.570 to fix the things that are a problem. 14:55.660 --> 14:58.160 But to make sure that I've got your commitment Mr. Geurts 14:58.160 --> 15:01.497 to leading from the top on getting the Marine Corps, 15:01.497 --> 15:02.960 I mean, getting the Navy, Department of Navy 15:02.960 --> 15:04.210 and Marine Corps audited? 15:04.830 --> 15:06.460 - Yeah, absolutely sir, that's certainly 15:06.460 --> 15:09.130 a priority of the Secretary, it's a priority of me. 15:09.810 --> 15:12.310 I'm not aware of any resource issues to get there. 15:12.380 --> 15:15.160 Obviously a lot of hard work and it's not just 15:15.160 --> 15:16.540 the financial piece of the audit, 15:16.540 --> 15:18.060 it's auditing all our processes, 15:18.060 --> 15:19.960 property, accountability and all that. 15:20.370 --> 15:23.320 And I'm confident as we work through that we'll find issues 15:23.940 --> 15:25.540 and then those issues are opportunities 15:25.540 --> 15:27.490 for us to work through, correct things, 15:27.730 --> 15:30.380 and again give ourselves and the American people 15:30.380 --> 15:33.460 confidence we've got transparent, 15:33.460 --> 15:36.070 credible and accountable processes. 15:36.490 --> 15:38.640 - One of things I would, I'm a CPA by profession, 15:38.640 --> 15:39.500 by background. 15:40.810 --> 15:42.890 Stealing folks from other agencies who have already 15:42.890 --> 15:44.780 been through this might be particularly helpful. 15:44.780 --> 15:47.870 I know David Norquist is that exact example. 15:48.030 --> 15:50.330 But the more people you can get who've done it 15:50.560 --> 15:53.460 will get you there quicker and so I would encourage you to 15:54.380 --> 15:55.850 be aggressively recruiting from folks 15:55.850 --> 15:56.990 who have already done it. 15:56.990 --> 15:59.500 In our briefing notes we talked about truncating 15:59.500 --> 16:02.890 the Tomahawk program and can you walk us through briefly 16:03.913 --> 16:06.500 the ammunition missile issue that we're gonna have 16:06.500 --> 16:08.940 enough stuff to shoot at people that we need to have? 16:09.600 --> 16:11.820 - Yes sir, I'll address the requirements 16:11.820 --> 16:13.080 on the Tomahawk missile side. 16:13.080 --> 16:16.850 So we're addressing our entire family of systems of missiles 16:17.500 --> 16:20.100 comprehensively and the Tomahawk is a piece of that. 16:20.470 --> 16:22.310 Arguably one of the most important pieces of it, 16:22.310 --> 16:24.110 it's the missile we've used the most 16:24.220 --> 16:25.670 over the last couple decades. 16:25.950 --> 16:28.650 So we're in the process of transitioning 16:28.650 --> 16:30.890 to the next generation Tomahawk, so we are 16:30.890 --> 16:32.220 tailing off the production. 16:32.220 --> 16:34.270 We have what we need on land attack side. 16:34.550 --> 16:36.460 The next generation Tomahawk will be both 16:36.460 --> 16:38.320 a surface strike and a land attack 16:38.910 --> 16:41.480 with the name of the Maritime Strike Tomahawk. 16:42.870 --> 16:44.390 We're fielding that in the early '20s, 16:44.390 --> 16:46.390 we're looking to accelerate that effort. 16:46.460 --> 16:50.320 It'll be a multi-domain, multi-mission Tomahawk missile, 16:50.320 --> 16:52.070 much improved over its predecessor. 16:52.360 --> 16:53.980 - And the same range and payload? 16:53.980 --> 16:55.160 - Same range and same payload. 16:55.160 --> 16:56.650 - Okay. - More targets. 16:56.921 --> 16:59.240 - Thank you, yield back, thank you very much. 16:59.290 --> 17:00.630 - Thank you Mr. Conaway, I do want to just do 17:00.630 --> 17:02.150 a quick follow up Mr. Geurts 17:02.150 --> 17:04.710 with one of Mr. Conaway's questions. 17:05.040 --> 17:08.270 How much do you expect the Navy to be able to save 17:09.310 --> 17:11.320 in buying two aircraft carriers at a time. 17:11.320 --> 17:15.240 So if you block buy 80 and 81, how much do you expect 17:15.240 --> 17:17.760 or would you say is a reasonable expectation. 17:17.760 --> 17:19.940 I know you're trying to get down to the real details, 17:19.940 --> 17:22.000 not just the shipbuilding costs but the systems cost, 17:22.000 --> 17:25.520 but give us an overall expected savings with that 17:26.210 --> 17:28.920 in going to buying two aircraft carriers at a time. 17:29.570 --> 17:31.880 - Yes sir, I would point back historically 17:31.880 --> 17:34.160 when we've done this previously in the Nimitz-class 17:34.160 --> 17:36.540 it was on the order of a 10% savings, 17:37.040 --> 17:39.540 which is a fairly large number on a carrier buy. 17:39.680 --> 17:42.330 The exact savings for this and why we're studying it, 17:43.250 --> 17:45.600 we're kind of half way through the first carrier 17:45.600 --> 17:47.500 so we've got to figure out exactly 17:47.760 --> 17:50.080 what future savings are available there. 17:50.170 --> 17:52.090 I think the other thing that's important 17:52.090 --> 17:55.210 is both from a not just dollar perspective 17:55.210 --> 17:57.000 but level loading the workforce 17:57.260 --> 18:01.260 and if in the future we want to press to a closer 18:02.070 --> 18:05.550 time between carrier buys, getting cost out of the carrier. 18:05.550 --> 18:07.750 And so if you know you're doing two carriers 18:08.190 --> 18:10.940 your return on investment for some of these initiatives 18:11.350 --> 18:14.060 that equation changes, and our hope would be 18:14.060 --> 18:17.130 we could get cost out so that future carriers 18:17.130 --> 18:18.280 would also benefit. 18:18.810 --> 18:20.860 We're working closely with the contractor 18:21.100 --> 18:22.610 to make sure we're sharpening the pencils 18:22.610 --> 18:25.140 and getting the best deal for the tax payer on that. 18:25.140 --> 18:27.550 - Gotcha, so that would be roughly if we purchased two 18:27.550 --> 18:29.950 at a time at $12.5 billion a piece, 18:29.950 --> 18:33.810 it'd be roughly $2.5 billion of minimal expected savings 18:33.810 --> 18:35.160 if we bought two at a time. 18:35.340 --> 18:37.350 - Yes sir, it depends on when we implement it. 18:37.350 --> 18:39.700 I would say somewhere between certainly 18:39.700 --> 18:42.350 over a billion dollars, up to two and a half billion. 18:42.360 --> 18:44.590 And then if you were to do a follow-on carrier buy 18:44.590 --> 18:47.660 and we were able to take cost out of carrier as we expect 18:47.710 --> 18:51.040 you would get follow-on savings to those future carriers. 18:51.180 --> 18:54.369 - Very good, thank you, I now go to Ms. Bordallo. 18:54.369 --> 18:56.119 - Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. 18:56.490 --> 18:59.840 Assistant Secretary Geurts and General Walsh, 18:59.900 --> 19:03.040 and of course Vice Admiral Merz, 19:04.020 --> 19:06.260 I want to thank you all for your service 19:06.260 --> 19:07.790 and being here this afternoon. 19:08.440 --> 19:11.770 My question is for the Assistant Secretary Geurts. 19:12.550 --> 19:17.530 The FY2018 NDAA directed the Secretary of the Navy 19:18.410 --> 19:21.150 to complete a business case analysis 19:21.240 --> 19:25.190 for depot-level ship repair in the Western Pacific Region. 19:25.880 --> 19:30.560 Admiral Harris, in his 2014 Operational Needs Statement 19:30.700 --> 19:35.240 stated, and I quote, "Dry docking on Guam 19:35.400 --> 19:39.670 "is a critical component of depot-level ship repair. 19:40.320 --> 19:44.490 "The capability must be maintained and regularly exercised 19:44.550 --> 19:48.140 "so that capability and expertise are available 19:48.290 --> 19:51.000 "to support ships of the Seventh Fleet 19:51.100 --> 19:54.090 "both in peace and in war," unquote. 19:54.940 --> 19:56.880 I appreciate that you just recently 19:56.880 --> 19:59.630 assumed your responsibilities as the Navy's 19:59.630 --> 20:02.460 Assistant Secretary for Research, Development 20:02.460 --> 20:05.350 and Acquisition, and I hope that you will bring 20:05.350 --> 20:07.680 a fresh perspective to my concerns 20:07.760 --> 20:11.240 regarding the level of ship repair capabilities 20:11.240 --> 20:12.670 in the Western Pacific. 20:13.070 --> 20:17.060 Specifically I am concerned with mixed messages 20:17.180 --> 20:18.620 that I have received. 20:18.920 --> 20:21.320 On one hand there appears to be 20:21.320 --> 20:24.870 a significant maintenance backlog for our fleet. 20:25.180 --> 20:27.930 But when asked here in this committee 20:28.350 --> 20:32.240 whether current depot-level ship repair is insufficient 20:32.400 --> 20:35.410 to meet peacetime and contingency requirements 20:35.520 --> 20:38.950 in the Pacific, I have been told that the Navy 20:39.090 --> 20:43.670 does not agree there is insufficient capacity. 20:44.300 --> 20:48.030 With 60% of our naval fleet operating in the Pacific 20:48.030 --> 20:51.980 and Hawaii's depot-level ship repair already, 20:52.310 --> 20:56.250 already exceeding capacity what is the Navy's plan 20:56.290 --> 20:59.570 for depot-level ship repair in the Western Pacific 20:59.570 --> 21:03.240 in the event of foreign ports currently used, 21:03.360 --> 21:06.660 and these are currently used that are not available, 21:06.660 --> 21:10.070 and how does the Navy plan on funding this plan. 21:11.990 --> 21:13.990 - Yes ma'am, thank you for the question. 21:14.860 --> 21:16.850 I would say overall I would agree 21:16.850 --> 21:19.000 with the combatant commander that obviously 21:19.000 --> 21:20.750 having maintenance and repair capability 21:20.750 --> 21:23.410 both in peace and in war is critical 21:23.410 --> 21:26.550 and critical in the Pacific area of operation. 21:27.510 --> 21:29.530 In our previous studies as I understand them 21:29.530 --> 21:31.860 before I arrived in this position, 21:32.110 --> 21:34.140 I understand the business case did not support 21:34.140 --> 21:37.440 having a dedicated dry dock facility there at Guam. 21:37.440 --> 21:40.210 But as you indicated we are doing another look 21:40.210 --> 21:42.970 at that analysis this year to report out 21:43.290 --> 21:45.320 per the requirements in the NDAA. 21:45.450 --> 21:47.050 You have my personal commitment 21:47.050 --> 21:48.950 that I'll take a look at that and ensure 21:48.950 --> 21:51.617 that it's a balanced report and then we'll look at all 21:51.617 --> 21:56.070 the facts and factors and provide a recommendation 21:56.070 --> 21:57.910 to the committee with that report. 21:57.910 --> 22:00.520 - Well thank you very much for that commitment, and 22:01.750 --> 22:04.550 how 'bout the funding on the plan, is? 22:05.120 --> 22:08.600 - Ma'am, I believe the plan is, the report is funded and I-- 22:08.600 --> 22:09.886 - [Ms. Bordallo] The funding will be part of it. 22:09.886 --> 22:12.050 - Yeah, as part of that report I would expect 22:12.050 --> 22:14.890 if we had recommendations we would include the funding 22:14.890 --> 22:18.250 to implement those recommendations as part of that plan. 22:18.370 --> 22:23.160 As well as considered in our, in PB '20 budget buildup 22:23.450 --> 22:25.760 and compete that amongst all of our other requirements 22:25.760 --> 22:26.730 in our '20 budget. 22:27.010 --> 22:29.070 - Thank you very much Mr. Secretary, 22:29.070 --> 22:31.370 and I just want you to know the people of Guam 22:31.620 --> 22:32.896 are concerned about this. 22:32.896 --> 22:34.600 - Yes ma'am. - We want to be very secure. 22:34.600 --> 22:36.350 - Yeah, and I look forward actually to getting out there 22:36.350 --> 22:38.457 personally and getting some eyes on out there-- 22:38.457 --> 22:39.290 - You'll love it when you come. 22:39.290 --> 22:40.750 - And understand the situation. 22:40.750 --> 22:44.450 - Thank you very much and I yield back Mr. Chairman. 22:44.450 --> 22:47.240 - Thank you Mrs. Bordallo, we'll now go to Mr. Byrne. 22:47.830 --> 22:49.410 - Thank you Mr. Chairman, gentlemen thank you 22:49.410 --> 22:51.820 for being here today, but just as importantly 22:51.820 --> 22:54.750 thank you for your service to our country, we appreciate it. 22:54.750 --> 22:57.130 Mr. Geurts you made a very important statement 22:57.130 --> 22:58.540 in your opening remarks. 22:58.660 --> 23:01.400 You said that the industrial base is a key element 23:01.450 --> 23:04.080 of the Navy's plan and I appreciate your saying that 23:04.080 --> 23:05.300 'cause it's so true. 23:05.820 --> 23:08.310 I want to talk to you about one particular class of ships. 23:08.310 --> 23:10.530 Now I'm gonna call them the small surface combatants 23:10.530 --> 23:13.300 'cause as you know we're transitioning from the LCS 23:13.300 --> 23:15.910 to the frigate, so when I say small surface combatant 23:15.910 --> 23:17.510 we're talking about all of them. 23:17.710 --> 23:19.750 The plan this year calls for one. 23:20.390 --> 23:24.250 Now both shipyards who presently build the LCS 23:24.400 --> 23:26.900 have released statements that the one requested ship 23:26.900 --> 23:30.380 for FY19 will lead to a gap in production 23:30.380 --> 23:32.700 that will negatively impact their yards, 23:32.740 --> 23:35.880 which will result both in job losses at the yards 23:36.140 --> 23:38.180 and increased cost to the Navy. 23:38.730 --> 23:40.560 Last year Admiral Neagley who was the program 23:40.560 --> 23:43.940 executive officer for LCS testified before this committee 23:44.300 --> 23:46.950 that the optimal sustaining rate for both shipyards 23:46.950 --> 23:50.260 is a total of three ships, not one, three per year 23:50.260 --> 23:52.940 which is where we have authorized and appropriated 23:52.940 --> 23:54.160 for the last few years. 23:54.790 --> 23:57.150 Both the industrial base and the Navy have said 23:57.150 --> 24:00.690 that one ship is not enough to maintain the industrial base 24:00.920 --> 24:02.910 and current cost efficiencies. 24:03.220 --> 24:06.160 Would you agree that one ship would result in a loss 24:06.160 --> 24:09.410 of trained workforce and increased cost in the ships? 24:11.230 --> 24:14.440 - Yes sir, and again as we discussed yesterday, 24:14.810 --> 24:17.160 the industrial base is a critical element 24:17.160 --> 24:20.450 of our national security and we look at that closely 24:20.450 --> 24:22.350 across all of our different shipyards. 24:22.580 --> 24:25.980 Certainly one ship a year is not near the optimal rate. 24:26.150 --> 24:29.570 When we look at the current work out there 24:29.860 --> 24:31.620 we have 18 ships in construction, 24:32.140 --> 24:35.670 we believe 3 ships in '18 and one ship in '19. 24:36.150 --> 24:38.520 And so I look at we'll have four ships 24:38.520 --> 24:39.810 over the next two years. 24:39.940 --> 24:42.010 Certainly not at the optimal level. 24:42.020 --> 24:44.770 I believe it's at the minimum sustained level 24:45.260 --> 24:47.700 so that we will not completely lose the workforce 24:47.700 --> 24:50.280 or the workyard, but I do acknowledge 24:50.680 --> 24:53.640 that will probably cause some work turn down in those yards 24:53.980 --> 24:57.420 as we build back into frigate and execute that down select. 24:57.700 --> 25:00.110 - And you and I discussed, I was involved in helping 25:00.110 --> 25:02.760 to build up that workforce at the shipyard in Mobile. 25:03.330 --> 25:05.450 These workers at that level of expertise, 25:05.450 --> 25:07.600 and certainly at that level of experience takes a, 25:07.600 --> 25:09.550 it takes a very long time to get there. 25:09.700 --> 25:12.260 So it's in the interest of the Navy to have that, 25:12.260 --> 25:16.900 maintain that level of expertise and these shipyard workers. 25:16.900 --> 25:19.300 And we're going to have some pretty substantial losses 25:19.300 --> 25:20.190 at one ship. 25:20.590 --> 25:21.890 Now the problem here, I think you and I 25:21.890 --> 25:24.420 discussed this yesterday, the problem here is that 25:24.420 --> 25:27.440 we were supposed to transition to the frigate this year. 25:27.820 --> 25:29.180 The Navy wasn't ready. 25:29.600 --> 25:32.950 So the present plan is transition next year. 25:33.240 --> 25:35.900 So we've got two shipyards affected here 25:36.120 --> 25:37.810 and this is after years of shipyards, 25:37.810 --> 25:40.510 the numbers of shipyards dropping in the United States 25:40.630 --> 25:42.900 so you the Navy and the Congress, 25:42.900 --> 25:45.270 we got to figure out how together we can work 25:45.270 --> 25:48.040 so that these shipyards don't crumble on us. 25:48.290 --> 25:50.540 Because without that you will not have 25:50.540 --> 25:52.500 an effective competition for the frigate. 25:52.500 --> 25:54.350 I mean, I think we all agree on that. 25:54.550 --> 25:58.830 So I guess I'm asking, is the Navy willing to accept 25:58.830 --> 26:01.730 the risk that these two yards will be effectively crippled 26:01.800 --> 26:04.040 before that frigate contract is awarded? 26:05.689 --> 26:07.670 - Sir, obviously we're tracking that closely 26:07.670 --> 26:10.090 and I would say in that shipyard 26:10.100 --> 26:13.430 and across all our shipyards, the amazing quality, 26:13.690 --> 26:15.940 we are getting ships out of the shipyards now 26:16.390 --> 26:18.810 to your point of having skilled workforce, 26:18.950 --> 26:20.930 with quality and in service scores 26:20.980 --> 26:23.410 that we haven't seen over a long time. 26:23.410 --> 26:25.840 And so that is a very precious resource, 26:25.840 --> 26:27.380 we have to watch that closely. 26:27.660 --> 26:32.270 I don't believe that will threaten the competition itself, 26:32.480 --> 26:36.660 but obviously not operating at optimal production rates 26:36.660 --> 26:38.970 will cause some concerns in workers 26:38.970 --> 26:40.980 and we'll have to spin that workforce, 26:41.450 --> 26:43.620 that workforce'll have to spin back up 26:43.850 --> 26:45.270 as we make this transition. 26:45.730 --> 26:48.700 - Well you used the term spin back up, 26:48.700 --> 26:52.720 and it's not spin back up, it's long periods of time 26:52.720 --> 26:56.510 to get large numbers of people back through a program, 26:56.710 --> 26:59.890 get their level of experience back up to the optimal level, 26:59.890 --> 27:01.180 it will take years. 27:01.700 --> 27:04.910 And whereas some large shipyards might be able 27:04.910 --> 27:07.852 to survive that, these two shipyards are small shipyards, 27:07.852 --> 27:09.730 the one in Marinette, the one in Mobile. 27:09.940 --> 27:12.560 They may not, in fact I think the likelihood 27:12.560 --> 27:14.330 is at least one of them won't survive that 27:14.330 --> 27:16.100 and we're already concerned on this committee 27:16.100 --> 27:17.610 about loss of shipyards. 27:17.920 --> 27:20.070 So we already this discussion, I'm not trying 27:20.070 --> 27:23.380 to beat a dead horse but I think what you and I have said 27:23.380 --> 27:25.930 to one another, and I want to say it publicly here, 27:25.960 --> 27:27.240 is that we're a team. 27:28.370 --> 27:31.210 But we've got to have better communication as a team 27:31.210 --> 27:32.400 about how we're gonna get through this. 27:32.400 --> 27:33.920 We're gonna have to work together, 27:33.920 --> 27:35.650 'cause we're not gonna get there the way we're going. 27:35.650 --> 27:38.160 We're gonna have to make some change here to get there. 27:38.160 --> 27:40.870 Now I'm committed, I think everybody on this committee 27:40.870 --> 27:43.460 is committed to working with y'all to make it happen. 27:43.460 --> 27:46.470 But one ship's not gonna do it, I think that's pretty clear. 27:46.530 --> 27:50.350 How we get from here to that frigate competition next year 27:50.350 --> 27:53.180 is gonna take some really smart people, hard thinking, 27:53.330 --> 27:55.210 but teamwork, and I just wanted to tell you 27:55.210 --> 27:57.260 and Admiral Merz, you heard me yesterday, 27:57.350 --> 27:59.630 that I'm committed to working with you gentlemen 27:59.630 --> 28:01.520 trying to find something that makes sense. 28:01.520 --> 28:02.890 Admiral Merz did you want to say something 28:02.890 --> 28:03.890 in response to that? 28:04.400 --> 28:06.150 - Yes sir, thanks for the question. 28:07.029 --> 28:10.150 And I think you're getting to the heart of the matter 28:10.160 --> 28:13.070 on one of the central themes of the shipbuilding plan. 28:14.120 --> 28:17.660 The first being we have to provide a balanced Navy. 28:19.160 --> 28:22.400 And with that we are unlikely to ask 28:22.400 --> 28:24.010 for ships above our requirement. 28:24.610 --> 28:26.820 However the second theme is the industrial base 28:26.820 --> 28:28.870 which we've never called out specifically 28:30.444 --> 28:33.200 as a key theme to the shipbuilding plan, 28:33.200 --> 28:37.420 we've even used the term our twelfth man as we go forward. 28:38.670 --> 28:41.600 We went to the effort within the shipbuilding plan 28:41.600 --> 28:45.150 to capture unused capacity in the shipyards. 28:45.240 --> 28:49.140 So although I am limited by my validated requirement 28:49.400 --> 28:51.710 I think we have set the environment in the shipbuilding plan 28:51.710 --> 28:54.730 to have the discussion after that requirement's met 28:55.200 --> 28:56.580 how do we work together with congress 28:56.580 --> 28:58.180 to preserve the industrial base. 28:59.530 --> 29:01.690 This is a very historically based shipbuilding plan. 29:01.690 --> 29:05.550 We went back to 1955 to track essentially 29:05.621 --> 29:09.470 the characteristics of shipbuilding over that time frame. 29:10.800 --> 29:12.700 And it was a wild ride for industry. 29:14.220 --> 29:16.780 Marked by significant boom and bust periods, 29:16.780 --> 29:19.610 and every time we went through that cycle we lost shipyards. 29:20.260 --> 29:23.430 We're convinced that we will lose shipyards again 29:23.430 --> 29:24.830 if we go through that cycle. 29:25.280 --> 29:28.740 So with that said, the shipyards that we're saving 29:28.900 --> 29:32.020 we need to work with congress on the best strategy 29:32.020 --> 29:35.160 to do that while maintaining our balance 29:35.160 --> 29:38.100 across the other two key elements of the Navy, 29:38.100 --> 29:40.000 which are the readiness accounts, 29:40.250 --> 29:43.990 operating the ships and sailors out there today, 29:45.100 --> 29:47.750 which we've had some significant operational challenges 29:47.750 --> 29:50.670 as you know, and then the advanced capability. 29:50.670 --> 29:52.350 We cannot grow the Navy quickly, 29:52.350 --> 29:54.530 but we can certainly turn advanced capability 29:54.530 --> 29:57.440 on the navy we have to make it fight more lethally. 29:57.700 --> 30:01.050 With all those dynamics together, I think working with you 30:01.050 --> 30:03.400 there are options for your shipyard. 30:03.400 --> 30:05.810 - Well Admiral, my time's up but I think I can speak 30:05.810 --> 30:07.520 for the committee and say we're not going to do anything 30:07.520 --> 30:09.440 that's gonna hurt readiness for the Navy. 30:09.440 --> 30:12.160 But I think the committee is also committed to making sure 30:12.160 --> 30:13.860 we take care of the industrial base, 30:13.860 --> 30:15.132 so we look forward to working with you. 30:15.132 --> 30:16.440 And with that Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 30:16.440 --> 30:18.080 - Thank you Mr. Byrne, appreciate it, 30:18.080 --> 30:19.380 we now go to Mr. McEachin. 30:19.960 --> 30:21.760 - Thank you Mr. Chairman, and this question 30:21.760 --> 30:24.220 is for you Mr. Secretary, Assistant Secretary. 30:25.340 --> 30:27.830 We talk a lot about using resources wisely, 30:28.140 --> 30:29.790 about making investments up front 30:29.810 --> 30:31.510 that will pay off in the long run. 30:31.510 --> 30:33.410 When it comes to shipbuilding it seems to me 30:33.410 --> 30:36.520 that digi, digita, digi, here we go, 30:36.980 --> 30:39.550 digitation of blueprints for example 30:39.680 --> 30:41.880 and related technologies like 3D modeling 30:41.880 --> 30:44.620 and augmented reality have the potential to deliver 30:44.620 --> 30:48.020 significant efficiencies and cost savings 30:48.230 --> 30:50.530 during build and acquisition, and sustainment. 30:50.560 --> 30:52.130 Can you please speak to the value 30:52.130 --> 30:55.690 of digital in shipbuilding, could expanding the use 30:55.690 --> 30:58.110 of these technologies help us more swiftly reach our goal 30:58.110 --> 31:00.370 of 355 battle force ships 31:00.370 --> 31:02.430 and more effectively sustain that force? 31:02.430 --> 31:07.430 - Yes sir, great question and as I've taken on this new role 31:07.640 --> 31:10.449 some folks have kind of coined my approach 31:10.449 --> 31:13.380 as a 3D approach, right. 31:13.380 --> 31:16.030 So one is decentralize, how do we get the bureaucracy 31:16.170 --> 31:17.420 to operate at speed. 31:17.500 --> 31:20.330 Differentiate, so how do we move those things fast 31:20.390 --> 31:23.000 that need to go fast, move those things that need to be 31:23.000 --> 31:24.890 a little bit more precise at a precise speed. 31:24.890 --> 31:26.530 And my third is digitization. 31:27.100 --> 31:28.211 And for the first time-- 31:28.211 --> 31:29.420 - [Mr. McEachin] You said that so well. 31:29.420 --> 31:30.253 - Yeah. 31:31.210 --> 31:34.340 For the first time, we've got a nuclear submarine 31:34.420 --> 31:37.720 and a nuclear carrier built in the digital environment. 31:38.820 --> 31:41.330 And in the recent visits I've had with the Secretary 31:41.330 --> 31:44.814 down to Newport News looking at that aircraft carrier 31:44.814 --> 31:47.410 and what you could do starting with digital 31:47.620 --> 31:49.710 I think is gonna be one of the fundamental things 31:49.710 --> 31:53.860 that allows us to drive cost out of these programs. 31:53.860 --> 31:56.970 And what's also very interesting is you would think 31:56.970 --> 31:58.810 it would be just the new generation 31:58.810 --> 32:00.980 would be excited about digital. 32:01.890 --> 32:03.640 What's interesting there is you see 32:04.801 --> 32:06.890 folks that have been in the shipyard 20, 30 years, 32:06.890 --> 32:09.500 you hand them these new tools and they are coming up 32:09.500 --> 32:14.230 with ways to do things at a tenth of the time 32:14.570 --> 32:16.940 by using virtual reality to understand 32:16.940 --> 32:18.990 where the pipes are they need to inspect. 32:19.030 --> 32:21.040 Or where are the welds they need to go look at, 32:21.040 --> 32:22.330 how do they schedule their work better. 32:22.330 --> 32:26.530 So I think it is gonna be one of the founding things 32:26.530 --> 32:29.500 we're gonna pivot on to really drive cost out. 32:29.750 --> 32:33.570 Again, I think the 355 plan shows us the way there. 32:34.190 --> 32:36.970 It's got some limitations of funding so as we can reduce 32:36.970 --> 32:39.530 the cost to product that will also allow us 32:39.530 --> 32:41.930 to accelerate into that plan. 32:42.660 --> 32:44.510 - So are there steps congress can take, 32:44.510 --> 32:47.650 investments we can make, or authorities that we can provide 32:47.900 --> 32:50.380 to encourage greater use of these technologies? 32:50.750 --> 32:52.890 - Sir I would say some of the work 32:52.890 --> 32:56.740 that Representative Courtney has done on the submarine fleet 32:56.740 --> 32:58.510 where we've looked at investing, 32:58.760 --> 33:00.620 let's say in the Columbia program in putting 33:00.620 --> 33:05.040 some advanced procurement or economic order quantity funds 33:05.040 --> 33:07.570 early in the program that let's us 33:08.930 --> 33:11.190 explore some of those tools early so we can use them 33:11.190 --> 33:13.160 in the program, that's very useful. 33:13.520 --> 33:16.580 Quite frankly having a shipyard plan 33:16.840 --> 33:20.830 that shows serial production and gives the industry 33:20.830 --> 33:23.130 confidence that we are gonna continue to build 33:23.360 --> 33:25.640 allows them to make investment decisions 33:25.910 --> 33:29.370 that bring that digital environment in much more quickly 33:29.550 --> 33:31.820 than if the government funded it. 33:31.980 --> 33:33.980 And then on our side, on the government side 33:33.980 --> 33:36.640 we need to do work to understand how do we use 33:36.640 --> 33:39.510 those digital tools to certify work more quickly, 33:39.900 --> 33:42.530 make sure we can sign off on things more quickly. 33:42.870 --> 33:47.870 So I think general support is key to that. 33:48.310 --> 33:51.380 I think helping us get a serial production flow 33:51.380 --> 33:53.370 in the shipbuilding plan is key 33:53.370 --> 33:56.960 'cause that will then show industry the return on investment 33:56.960 --> 33:59.510 for those digital investments early on 33:59.630 --> 34:02.100 that will pay off through the rest of the program. 34:02.100 --> 34:04.750 - Thank you, and thank you Mr. Chairman I yield back. 34:05.360 --> 34:08.010 - Thank you Mr. McEachin, we'll now go to Mr. Hunter. 34:08.800 --> 34:09.633 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 34:09.633 --> 34:10.810 Gentlemen thank you for being here. 34:10.810 --> 34:14.270 Secretary Geurts, you have my former chief of staff 34:14.270 --> 34:16.580 Joe Casper is working for you and I would say 34:16.650 --> 34:19.560 put him to good use knocking bureaucratic heads together, 34:19.560 --> 34:21.580 he's good for cutting through the baloney. 34:21.580 --> 34:23.110 And, you know, put him to use. 34:23.110 --> 34:25.330 - Yes sir, we're loading him up. 34:25.330 --> 34:26.163 - Great guy. 34:26.330 --> 34:28.920 I want to start by talking about icebreakers. 34:29.670 --> 34:31.580 I know the RFR went out last week 34:32.940 --> 34:34.900 and basically what I'd like to do is talk about 34:34.900 --> 34:38.520 getting funding out of the SCN so it's not just in there 34:38.520 --> 34:40.700 so that takes away the Navy having other people 34:40.700 --> 34:43.000 impede upon its accounts and its shipbuilding. 34:43.100 --> 34:44.750 The Coast Guard probably cannot build 34:44.750 --> 34:47.200 three to six heavy icebreakers, that's not what they do, 34:47.200 --> 34:48.110 that's not what they're good at. 34:48.110 --> 34:50.350 And they have to go through Homeland Security 34:50.350 --> 34:53.210 Acquisition and Procurement, which is ridiculous. 34:53.310 --> 34:55.440 If you talk about weaponizing them or at least 34:55.440 --> 34:57.550 preparing them for weaponization, 34:57.550 --> 35:00.180 which the Commandant of the Coast Guard has talked about. 35:00.340 --> 35:03.660 Going from double hull to single hull and doing block buys. 35:03.660 --> 35:05.970 Just your comments on any and all of those, 35:05.970 --> 35:09.610 or any other way to do it quicker and faster. 35:11.150 --> 35:13.620 - Yes sir, I think this is a great example of 35:13.620 --> 35:16.500 us and the Coast Guard working very closely together. 35:16.790 --> 35:19.240 We've got MOUs, we actually have a joint team. 35:19.430 --> 35:23.590 So the Coast Guard has lead, we have put that joint team 35:23.590 --> 35:26.420 together with Navy experts working full time on that. 35:26.610 --> 35:30.750 I think in the '19 PB the budget has actually been laid into 35:30.750 --> 35:33.980 the DHS budget and so for the first time 35:33.980 --> 35:37.310 they've got the budget in their portion of the '19 budget 35:37.310 --> 35:39.340 to finish out that first icebreaker. 35:39.680 --> 35:41.290 So I believe that's on track. 35:41.640 --> 35:44.240 And then to your point I think again we are gonna share 35:44.240 --> 35:46.780 all our lessons learned, everything we have in the kit bag 35:46.780 --> 35:49.220 about block buys or multiyear buys, 35:49.370 --> 35:53.080 or how to rig for serial production assuming success 35:53.080 --> 35:55.580 in this first icebreaker as we've got it underway. 35:56.850 --> 35:58.990 - We set up that joint program office last year 35:58.990 --> 36:00.500 for this exact thing but the key was 36:00.500 --> 36:02.890 to have the Navy keep control in a way. 36:02.890 --> 36:04.730 Have the Coast Guard build the requirements they need 36:04.730 --> 36:07.700 and the Navy too, but again if you leave this 36:07.700 --> 36:09.600 in the Coast Guard's hand they're not as adept 36:09.600 --> 36:12.150 at building big ships and bidding heavy steel 36:12.150 --> 36:13.090 as the Navy is. 36:13.190 --> 36:15.390 So we want to just make sure that stays on track. 36:15.390 --> 36:19.440 To surface combatants, one easy way that I see 36:19.440 --> 36:22.010 to get the numbers up is to diversify the fleet. 36:22.010 --> 36:24.740 Keep on building the big items that you need, 36:24.740 --> 36:29.550 the carriers, the subs, but also look to like the FRCs. 36:29.870 --> 36:32.380 The FRCs that are being built in Louisiana, 36:32.380 --> 36:35.570 weaponizing those, the offshore patrol cutters. 36:36.210 --> 36:38.170 There's different things out there when you talk about 36:38.170 --> 36:42.170 Marinette, and other small shipyards 36:42.170 --> 36:43.850 simply transitioning to the NSC, 36:43.850 --> 36:47.750 the National Security Cutter is a great small craft 36:47.870 --> 36:49.710 that the Navy could use and in my opinion 36:49.710 --> 36:52.620 it would have been a better LCS than the LCS. 36:52.800 --> 36:55.000 But you have things like that where you can stay hot 36:55.000 --> 36:56.540 and switch to those quickly 36:56.790 --> 36:58.900 and use more small surface combatants. 36:58.900 --> 37:01.190 It seems like right now in the Navy it would be like 37:01.190 --> 37:04.850 the Army and Marine Corps saying we're only gonna focus 37:04.850 --> 37:07.110 on pure threats, we're not gonna do any, 37:07.110 --> 37:10.870 no more force, no more MARSOC, no more Special Operations, 37:10.880 --> 37:12.160 we're just gonna build these big things 37:12.160 --> 37:15.970 and have tanks and people that know how to fight 37:15.970 --> 37:17.750 at the battalion level and higher 37:18.020 --> 37:20.430 as opposed to small unified in which we do too. 37:20.430 --> 37:23.270 We have to do it all, and the Navy's gonna have to do it all 37:23.270 --> 37:26.100 and it's way cheaper and you get those numbers up way faster 37:26.100 --> 37:28.780 if you use the smaller medium sized ships 37:28.920 --> 37:31.530 that can now be weaponized and that have digital 37:31.650 --> 37:33.650 and that have great defense systems 37:33.650 --> 37:36.040 where you offset the actual size of it. 37:36.550 --> 37:39.040 So I would ask your comments on those, 37:39.700 --> 37:41.050 Admiral and Mr. Secretary. 37:41.050 --> 37:44.057 - Yes sir, maybe I'll just talk a little industrial base 37:44.057 --> 37:46.157 and then certainly the Admiral could talk. 37:46.460 --> 37:49.140 We talk a lot about the larger industrial base. 37:49.280 --> 37:52.130 I guess I would also say we're doing specific things 37:52.130 --> 37:54.940 to preserve the mid tier industrial base 37:54.960 --> 37:57.540 as well as the small business industrial base. 37:57.570 --> 37:59.380 So we'll have a number of awards this year 37:59.380 --> 38:02.680 with small business building again smaller vessels 38:02.860 --> 38:05.570 but they'll have full up capability there. 38:05.570 --> 38:08.500 And so to your point there's great industrial base across. 38:08.960 --> 38:10.940 The other piece that's critical 38:10.940 --> 38:12.700 and we see it particularly on the nuke side 38:12.700 --> 38:16.140 but it's critical across everything is the supplier base. 38:16.310 --> 38:18.950 And so we're also not just looking at an end item 38:18.950 --> 38:20.170 but supplier base. 38:20.350 --> 38:24.750 And so when we think the whole industrial base 38:24.750 --> 38:27.100 we think all the way through that, big yards, 38:27.100 --> 38:30.070 mid tier yards, small yards and supplier base. 38:30.070 --> 38:31.110 But I'll turn to Admiral Merz 38:31.110 --> 38:33.071 on the kind of requirement comment. 38:33.071 --> 38:35.000 - [Mr. Hunter] Specifically to diversification. 38:35.000 --> 38:36.060 - Yes sir, yep. 38:36.590 --> 38:38.290 - Looking at the Navy outside the box a little bit 38:38.290 --> 38:39.260 and saying hey we can change the way 38:39.260 --> 38:40.510 that we do things to meet 38:41.625 --> 38:43.220 the threats we see in the world. 38:43.220 --> 38:46.160 - Yes sir, Congressman Hunter, as a native San Diegoan 38:46.160 --> 38:47.730 I'm happy to see you here. 38:49.010 --> 38:51.410 I'll tell you there's also, there's two things mentioned 38:51.410 --> 38:53.640 in the shipbuilding plan that we didn't give 38:53.640 --> 38:55.600 a lot of press to 'cause we're working on it pretty hard. 38:55.600 --> 38:58.180 One is the surface capability evolution plan. 38:58.440 --> 38:59.720 It's mentioned in the same paragraph 38:59.720 --> 39:01.770 as the tactical submarine evolution plan. 39:02.300 --> 39:04.410 And there's a small paragraph on unmanned systems. 39:04.410 --> 39:07.060 And these are actually connected to your question 39:07.400 --> 39:09.870 as we're trying to expand the capability of the ships 39:09.870 --> 39:12.820 that fall outside the 355 Battle Force Navy 39:12.820 --> 39:15.580 but that are enablers or key elements 39:15.580 --> 39:20.210 of specific mission sets, mine warfare, underwater search. 39:20.400 --> 39:23.360 So we do have, we have three efforts underway 39:23.360 --> 39:26.870 in the unmanned surface vehicle area that are varying sizes. 39:26.910 --> 39:28.680 And we're also starting to do studies 39:28.680 --> 39:32.070 on optionally manned smaller combatants. 39:32.070 --> 39:33.850 And I think this is all gonna start playing out 39:33.850 --> 39:36.550 fairly quickly over the next couple shipbuilding plans 39:36.630 --> 39:39.080 as we expand the envelop of the yard as possible. 39:40.480 --> 39:41.860 - Thank you very much, my time's expired. 39:41.860 --> 39:44.450 You have the Sea Hunter in San Diego, in Point Loma, 39:44.450 --> 39:45.680 which is really interesting. 39:45.680 --> 39:46.820 Thank you Mr. Chairman, yield back. 39:46.820 --> 39:48.900 - Thank you Mr. Hunter, and I wanted to mention too, 39:48.900 --> 39:50.940 I think it was very important last year that this committee 39:50.940 --> 39:53.580 as well as the full committee really worked hard 39:53.580 --> 39:54.960 on integrating the different elements 39:54.960 --> 39:57.290 of Title 1 and Title 10 to make sure that we have 39:57.290 --> 40:00.830 a solid track on how to make sure we build icebreakers. 40:00.830 --> 40:03.120 I think there's unanimity across folks here 40:03.120 --> 40:04.640 to make sure we get those things built, 40:04.640 --> 40:07.510 there's $700 million in this year's President's Budget 40:07.510 --> 40:10.060 for building icebreakers so I think that we are 40:10.330 --> 40:11.450 well underway with this, 40:11.450 --> 40:13.690 and Mr. Hunter thank you for all of your efforts. 40:13.690 --> 40:14.990 We'll now go to Ms. Davis. 40:15.640 --> 40:17.970 - Thank you Mr. Chairman, thank you all for your service 40:17.970 --> 40:20.670 and for being with us testifying today. 40:20.840 --> 40:22.940 I wanted to ask you about the Conventional 40:23.060 --> 40:24.650 Prompt Strike program. 40:24.800 --> 40:27.830 And as you know prior to fiscal year '19 40:28.460 --> 40:29.910 it was funded through the defense wide 40:29.910 --> 40:32.990 Research and Development Funding and then going forward now 40:33.210 --> 40:35.210 in the budget request the Navy's been assigned 40:35.210 --> 40:38.550 the lead development efforts in the future. 40:38.840 --> 40:42.910 Because the CPS has, I'm just beginning to understand, 40:43.440 --> 40:45.590 has potential for miscalculation, 40:45.700 --> 40:48.270 what capabilities is this designed to replace 40:48.270 --> 40:50.700 and what new capabilities will it achieve? 40:53.640 --> 40:56.320 - Yes ma'am, so the Conventional Prompt Strike 40:56.320 --> 40:57.510 is a new capability. 40:58.950 --> 41:03.200 The specific capabilities within, in the flight profiles, 41:03.200 --> 41:05.340 that's all classified, but I'm happy to set up 41:05.340 --> 41:08.730 a separate brief for you that addresses those elements. 41:09.660 --> 41:12.020 This has been a developmental effort under the 41:12.320 --> 41:13.620 Secretary of Defense. 41:14.060 --> 41:17.350 The Pres Bud '19 has directed it to transition to the Navy 41:17.350 --> 41:21.140 so we're at the point now where we are intending 41:21.630 --> 41:25.100 to operationalize it with the platform at sea. 41:25.430 --> 41:27.741 Whether it's a submarine or surface ship or both 41:27.741 --> 41:29.540 that is the work to be done. 41:30.560 --> 41:32.940 The funding for '19 is really targeted 41:32.940 --> 41:36.240 just at the transition between Department of Defense 41:36.240 --> 41:37.990 down to the Department of the Navy. 41:38.630 --> 41:40.530 There's substantial money that comes with that 41:40.530 --> 41:43.460 in the follow on years as we move it 41:43.460 --> 41:44.870 to an at-sea capability, 41:44.870 --> 41:47.200 which is the integration costs, the testing costs, 41:47.200 --> 41:49.390 but we've been involved with all the demonstrations 41:49.390 --> 41:51.190 up to this point so we're well suited 41:51.190 --> 41:53.550 and well postured to take this program. 41:53.970 --> 41:56.440 So the intention right now is to establish 41:56.690 --> 42:00.870 a program manager, establish the program structure 42:00.870 --> 42:03.648 so on time it transitions to Navy 42:03.648 --> 42:04.900 and we're marching forward. 42:04.900 --> 42:07.650 And we do intend to provide a report to congress 42:07.770 --> 42:09.290 on how that transition's going to look 42:09.290 --> 42:10.890 and what those capabilities are. 42:11.430 --> 42:14.630 - Okay, thank you, it sounds like you're quite confident 42:14.630 --> 42:17.810 that you're at the position for moving forward with that. 42:17.830 --> 42:20.530 - Yes ma'am, and as Admiral Merz said, 42:20.580 --> 42:23.440 as we kind of work through the details of the hows 42:23.800 --> 42:26.350 we're happy to come brief you in more detail, 42:26.350 --> 42:28.750 both on the capability and then on my side 42:28.750 --> 42:31.500 on the acquisition and how we're gonna set that all up. 42:31.650 --> 42:33.520 For us to talk in more detail. 42:33.940 --> 42:37.830 - Thank you, I wonder if you could discuss a little bit more 42:37.830 --> 42:41.470 maybe with a specific examples of the naval and marine corps 42:41.470 --> 42:44.160 collaboration with academia and universities. 42:44.270 --> 42:48.130 How is that, you know, in this very important time 42:48.130 --> 42:51.650 for key innovation, what's different? 42:52.120 --> 42:55.550 - So ma'am, obviously my time at Special Operations Command, 42:55.550 --> 42:58.710 that was one of our bread and butter was that close, 42:58.950 --> 43:02.570 getting the operators close as we can to the academics, 43:02.570 --> 43:06.070 to the technologists, to the non-traditional suppliers. 43:06.410 --> 43:09.020 And so that's something I'm gonna help drive 43:09.020 --> 43:10.670 within the Department of the Navy 43:11.230 --> 43:13.890 both from the basic research standpoint 43:13.890 --> 43:16.270 where there's always a close tie with academia, 43:16.700 --> 43:20.210 but quite frankly I think there's more opportunity for us 43:20.230 --> 43:24.642 in the experimentation, and problem solving, 43:24.642 --> 43:28.100 and then how do we rapidly introduce new technology. 43:28.100 --> 43:30.010 And so that'll be a theme. 43:30.090 --> 43:31.890 I might turn it over to General Walsh, 43:31.890 --> 43:34.780 'cause they've done some pretty amazing things I would say 43:34.780 --> 43:38.750 in the experimentation realm to bring that practical, 43:38.820 --> 43:42.140 get the marine connected directly to the academics 43:42.140 --> 43:44.040 to see the problem up front. 43:44.930 --> 43:45.763 - Thank you sir. 43:46.100 --> 43:50.010 Ma'am, I would say as Mr. Geurts said 43:50.010 --> 43:51.490 is trying to get the right team together. 43:51.490 --> 43:55.880 So as we look at a problem, we view the problem one way, 43:56.030 --> 43:59.830 but trying to bring in academia, our warfare centers, 43:59.830 --> 44:02.260 and I would also include industry into that, 44:02.830 --> 44:04.940 is a key part that there's a lot of people 44:04.940 --> 44:06.770 approach the problem differently. 44:06.770 --> 44:09.090 So the way we've kind of looked at a lot of this is 44:09.090 --> 44:11.140 just lay the problem out there, 44:11.140 --> 44:13.720 not look at what capability we're trying to get. 44:13.830 --> 44:15.850 Lay the problem out there for the, 44:16.210 --> 44:18.690 and academia has some very unique, 44:18.880 --> 44:21.490 you go school to school, university, you know, 44:21.490 --> 44:24.140 and you find unique capabilities that they have 44:24.360 --> 44:27.190 and when we get them focused on the issues that we have, 44:27.190 --> 44:29.840 like we just did one with a ship to shore maneuver, 44:30.050 --> 44:33.410 and we've got them focused on unmanned systems. 44:33.740 --> 44:35.580 And those sort of things of bringing them in 44:35.580 --> 44:36.930 with the war fighter. 44:36.930 --> 44:38.550 And our Marine Corps Warfighting Lab 44:38.550 --> 44:41.670 is a very unique capability we have to connect-- 44:41.800 --> 44:45.463 - Are there challenges with sharing in regard to that 44:45.463 --> 44:48.860 and having really access to the advanced instrumentation? 44:49.091 --> 44:51.530 - I don't think so, at the levels we typically 44:51.530 --> 44:54.720 try to work with them at from a technology standpoint, 44:54.720 --> 44:58.150 research, information, trying to build a capability 44:58.150 --> 45:00.360 into the operational concept we're trying, 45:00.380 --> 45:03.960 at that level I find it very easy to bring them in. 45:04.270 --> 45:06.440 And the more we connect them to the war fighter, 45:06.440 --> 45:09.440 the more interested they are in helping out of our problems. 45:09.810 --> 45:11.320 - And ma'am just one other piece, 45:11.320 --> 45:14.660 again some of my experience from the last 12 years at SOCOM 45:14.660 --> 45:17.840 was as the military over time has gotten smaller, 45:18.050 --> 45:20.090 there's a larger percentage of the country 45:20.090 --> 45:22.790 that doesn't have the same touch with the military 45:22.790 --> 45:25.570 it once had, and so what I found a lot of the time 45:25.570 --> 45:28.250 was there were solutions to our problems 45:28.250 --> 45:31.660 we didn't know to ask for and they had other ideas 45:31.660 --> 45:33.110 we didn't even know we had the problem 45:33.110 --> 45:33.943 until we talked to them. 45:33.943 --> 45:37.300 So making that connection, you can really do that 45:37.300 --> 45:39.700 without having to worry too much 45:39.700 --> 45:41.090 about the classification piece 45:41.090 --> 45:43.950 when you talk about it at the problem level 45:43.950 --> 45:47.100 as opposed to the specific technology level. 45:47.290 --> 45:48.830 - [Mrs. Davis] Thank you. 45:48.830 --> 45:49.663 - [Mr. Wittman] Thank you Mrs. Davis, 45:49.663 --> 45:51.060 we'll now go to Mr. Gallagher. 45:51.240 --> 45:53.310 - Thank you Mr. Chairman, thank you all gentlemen 45:53.310 --> 45:54.143 for being here today. 45:54.143 --> 45:56.470 Mr. Geurts congratulations on this position, 45:56.470 --> 45:57.920 it's a critical one at a critical time, 45:57.920 --> 45:59.370 we're happy to see you there. 45:59.740 --> 46:01.200 I just would like to follow up on something 46:01.200 --> 46:04.180 my colleague Mr. Byrne said about this notion 46:04.180 --> 46:05.140 of spinning back up. 46:05.140 --> 46:07.390 For what it's worth, in my neck of the woods, 46:07.930 --> 46:08.970 there's no such thing. 46:08.970 --> 46:12.620 I mean, it's not as if that ship worker that gets laid off 46:12.620 --> 46:14.630 if one of these shipyards goes under can go down the street. 46:14.630 --> 46:16.650 We just don't have the same level of shipbuilding. 46:16.650 --> 46:19.380 So once you lose that guy who may have been educated 46:19.590 --> 46:22.480 through a partnership we have with Northeast Wisconsin 46:22.480 --> 46:25.360 Technical College, you're losing him or her for good. 46:25.360 --> 46:28.240 So spinning back up is not necessarily 46:28.460 --> 46:31.640 as easy as flipping a switch for what it's worth. 46:31.740 --> 46:32.980 And I think we all want the same thing, right, 46:32.980 --> 46:34.370 we want to, as you've laid out, 46:34.370 --> 46:36.210 preserve the defense industrial base, 46:36.210 --> 46:38.700 we want to make sure we have as robust of a competition 46:38.700 --> 46:40.600 for the frigate as humanly possible. 46:40.600 --> 46:44.280 Learning lessons from the past mistakes that we've made, 46:44.380 --> 46:48.500 and also get to 355 in as expeditious 46:48.500 --> 46:50.780 but also sustainable of a manner as possible, 46:50.780 --> 46:52.310 and we stand ready to work with you on that. 46:52.310 --> 46:55.140 But I'd like to zoom back out and ask a little bit about, 46:55.140 --> 46:57.280 you know, we throw this 355 number around, 46:57.410 --> 47:01.270 but we sometimes forget that it came from a December 2016 47:01.270 --> 47:03.980 force structure assessment of the previous administration. 47:03.980 --> 47:05.230 And since then a lot's changed, right, 47:05.230 --> 47:06.530 we have a new president, 47:06.530 --> 47:09.080 we have a new national security strategy, 47:09.080 --> 47:12.190 and national defense strategy, the big move of which 47:12.190 --> 47:15.320 is to prioritize great power competition 47:15.320 --> 47:19.240 or to suggest we need to de-emphasize counter terrorism, 47:19.360 --> 47:21.930 and move towards a reorientation of great power competition. 47:21.930 --> 47:23.620 I take my colleague Mr. Hunter's point 47:23.620 --> 47:25.620 that you don't want to neglect those missions, 47:25.620 --> 47:26.940 I just would add if we go with the cutter 47:26.940 --> 47:28.760 then we're going from seven to five shipyards 47:28.760 --> 47:29.593 and we may have undermined 47:29.593 --> 47:31.300 the defense industrial base argument. 47:31.300 --> 47:32.133 That's neither here nor there, 47:32.133 --> 47:33.630 that's an argument for a different day. 47:34.110 --> 47:37.080 But given this change in our overall orientation, 47:37.080 --> 47:40.430 which has been met with sort of unanimous applause 47:40.430 --> 47:42.280 from the national security community, 47:43.690 --> 47:46.937 it strikes me as odd that we didn't look at that 30 year, 47:46.937 --> 47:49.240 that the 30 shipbuilding plan, the new one, 47:49.300 --> 47:51.660 didn't go back and revisit the assumptions 47:51.800 --> 47:54.590 underpinning the 2016 FSA. 47:54.660 --> 47:56.340 So can you talk about the role 47:56.340 --> 47:58.830 that the National Defense Strategy played 47:58.830 --> 48:01.070 in crafting the 30 year shipbuilding plan. 48:01.560 --> 48:04.250 - Yes sir, I'll start quickly 48:04.250 --> 48:06.150 and then turn it over to Admiral Merz. 48:06.230 --> 48:09.210 And again, my comment on spin up, I take your point, 48:09.240 --> 48:11.960 and I didn't, I certainly didn't mean that was a, 48:12.000 --> 48:13.840 you know, you can do it over a week, a month, 48:13.840 --> 48:15.410 or even a year in many cases. 48:15.590 --> 48:19.020 Which again is part of why in our shipbuilding plan 48:19.020 --> 48:21.920 the industrial base played such a prominent role 48:22.320 --> 48:24.660 in that plan, and so working together 48:24.660 --> 48:27.410 we've got to figure out how to preserve critical skills 48:27.530 --> 48:29.680 whether it's at public yards or private yards, 48:29.680 --> 48:31.370 so we've got the capacity. - Perfect. 48:31.370 --> 48:33.420 - In terms of the 30 shipbuilding plan I'll turn it over 48:33.420 --> 48:36.090 to Admiral Merz and he can talk about that, 48:36.090 --> 48:39.210 recognizing that's a point in time living document 48:39.960 --> 48:42.510 and Bill if you want to share a little bit more 48:42.510 --> 48:44.510 of kind of what you think going forward. 48:44.610 --> 48:46.760 - Yes sir, I appreciate the question. 48:47.500 --> 48:50.150 Because this gets down to the fundamentals of the 355 48:50.460 --> 48:53.120 and what constitutes it, which is essentially 48:53.660 --> 48:56.760 a requirements based approach for each type of ship, 48:56.760 --> 48:58.730 add those all up, and you get the 355. 49:01.600 --> 49:03.740 We intend to do another FSA with the new 49:03.740 --> 49:05.260 national defense strategy. 49:05.470 --> 49:07.330 There is a series of events that have to happen 49:07.330 --> 49:10.560 before we do the FSA starting with the combatant commanders 49:10.560 --> 49:12.430 all the way down to the defense planning guidance 49:12.430 --> 49:15.020 that leads us to the scenarios we need to plan for. 49:16.370 --> 49:20.040 We have done multiple studies on the architecture 49:20.040 --> 49:22.000 of the Navy, and the size of the Navy. 49:22.050 --> 49:24.350 Every single one of them says we have to grow. 49:25.230 --> 49:27.830 And we have to grow with these fundamental types of ships. 49:27.830 --> 49:31.930 So we don't expect much of that to change with the next FSA. 49:32.920 --> 49:34.280 There may be some changes on the margin, 49:34.280 --> 49:36.640 there may be another number that we're shooting for, 49:36.640 --> 49:38.370 but it's gonna be bigger than we are today, 49:38.370 --> 49:41.320 so we have to move out and we have to move out aggressively 49:42.021 --> 49:43.570 as we go forward. 49:43.800 --> 49:45.430 The small surface combatants in particular, 49:45.430 --> 49:48.090 which is the area of concern for your shipyard, 49:49.580 --> 49:51.330 I mean there was a lethality aspect of that 49:51.330 --> 49:55.190 that brought us to the mix between frigates and LCS 49:55.190 --> 49:59.360 that we are definitely going to revisit on the next FSA 49:59.360 --> 50:02.840 based on the key elements of the National Defense Strategy. 50:04.180 --> 50:07.550 This will probably be done sometime over the next year, 50:07.550 --> 50:09.220 as soon as we can, we are eager to get 50:09.220 --> 50:10.920 this new FSA completed. 50:11.930 --> 50:15.280 But the undeniable fact is we still need to get bigger, 50:15.280 --> 50:17.130 and it's still gonna be some combination of these ships. 50:17.130 --> 50:18.250 - Well can I, you referenced sort of 50:18.250 --> 50:19.940 the multiple studies that have been done, 50:19.940 --> 50:22.490 and of the outside studies that we've commissioned, 50:22.700 --> 50:26.200 only one seems to have the same explicit focus 50:26.320 --> 50:29.830 on great power competition that the NDS has. 50:29.830 --> 50:31.340 They seem to mirror each other in that respect, 50:31.340 --> 50:35.330 and that is the CSBA study, and in that it calls for growing 50:35.330 --> 50:38.830 small surface combatants from 52 to 71 I believe, 50:38.830 --> 50:40.550 if I'm getting that correct. 50:41.890 --> 50:44.220 Have you given any thoughts to, I mean, what role does that, 50:44.220 --> 50:46.800 sort of the CSBA worldview play 50:46.800 --> 50:48.780 as you guys think about a new FSA. 50:49.040 --> 50:50.670 We're going crazy with these acronyms by the way. 50:50.670 --> 50:53.550 - Yes sir, so the CSBA was one of the three 50:54.270 --> 50:56.120 initial studies we did, CSBA, the MITRE, 50:56.120 --> 50:58.840 and then the Navy FSA as we came through it. 50:58.840 --> 51:01.510 And the Navy FSA did use the great power competition 51:01.510 --> 51:04.470 approach also to determine the proper mix of ships. 51:05.470 --> 51:07.950 We are very focused on the small surface combatant. 51:08.280 --> 51:10.180 I don't expect that number to go down. 51:11.740 --> 51:14.370 I do expect maybe the composition to change 51:14.750 --> 51:16.730 just based on the lethality aspects 51:16.730 --> 51:18.730 driven by the National Defense Strategy. 51:19.362 --> 51:21.370 But there are a lot of, as I'm sure you can appreciate, 51:21.370 --> 51:25.140 competing factors that go into that type of study 51:27.068 --> 51:30.040 and we plan to initiate and complete that as soon as we can. 51:30.040 --> 51:31.670 - Thank you gentlemen, I'm out of time. 51:31.670 --> 51:32.710 - [Mr. Wittman] Thank you Mr. Gallagher, 51:32.710 --> 51:34.180 and we'll now go to Mr. Langevin. 51:34.620 --> 51:36.540 - Thank you Mr. Chairman and thank you 51:36.540 --> 51:38.530 to all of our witnesses for your testimony today 51:38.530 --> 51:40.290 and for your service to the country. 51:40.290 --> 51:42.830 So our competitors are steadily pursuing 51:43.050 --> 51:44.740 advanced capabilities and technologies, 51:44.740 --> 51:47.500 and I too believe that we have to continue to invest 51:47.500 --> 51:49.100 in both research and development 51:49.230 --> 51:52.360 of advanced technologies and transitioning them 51:52.360 --> 51:54.640 as soon as possible to the war fighter. 51:55.180 --> 51:58.110 But it seems that both China and Russia 51:58.110 --> 51:59.300 continue to do just that. 51:59.300 --> 52:02.200 Last month China appeared to mount 52:02.200 --> 52:06.820 an electromagnetic railgun on board a new ship. 52:07.480 --> 52:09.620 And last week Russia announced a quote 52:09.800 --> 52:12.630 "invincible hypersonic cruise missile." 52:12.950 --> 52:16.190 So would you agree that hypersonic technology such as 52:16.970 --> 52:20.130 electromagnetic railgun have the potential 52:20.130 --> 52:22.880 to be game changing in the hands of our war fighters 52:23.550 --> 52:27.650 helping the United States maintain its edge in this domain. 52:27.990 --> 52:32.380 And we've researched these technologies for some time 52:32.740 --> 52:34.490 but at what point will the Navy transition them 52:34.490 --> 52:35.440 to the war fighter? 52:37.290 --> 52:39.990 - Yeah maybe I'll have the two gentlemen 52:39.990 --> 52:41.507 give their perspectives from the service 52:41.507 --> 52:43.930 and then I'll provide a kind of technology overlay 52:43.930 --> 52:46.656 on the how and when perspective, so Admiral Merz. 52:46.656 --> 52:49.220 - [Mr. Gallagher] Fair enough, Admiral. 52:49.320 --> 52:50.290 - Yes sir, thank you Congressman, 52:50.290 --> 52:53.270 and that just reminded me of my negligence 52:53.270 --> 52:56.900 to thank the committee on the hard work behind the scenes 52:56.900 --> 53:00.150 on the bipartisan Budget Act that is probably gonna get us 53:00.150 --> 53:02.030 finally on track to be able to pursue 53:02.030 --> 53:04.330 a lot of these advanced capabilities robustly. 53:05.803 --> 53:08.050 And for the greater congress. 53:08.050 --> 53:12.240 Hypersonics and railgun are high interest items 53:12.240 --> 53:13.073 for the Navy. 53:13.470 --> 53:15.930 We intend to do actually a 10 round per minute 53:15.930 --> 53:18.610 test of the railgun later on this year 53:18.810 --> 53:22.060 and we have a series of hypersonic efforts underway. 53:22.060 --> 53:24.970 And again, this is a little bit of a delicate discussion 53:24.970 --> 53:27.800 before I run off into the classification realm. 53:27.800 --> 53:31.540 So I'm certainly happy to set up a classified brief for you 53:31.750 --> 53:33.390 but I do believe they're game changers. 53:33.390 --> 53:36.020 This is the family of capabilities 53:37.260 --> 53:39.180 that we can get off of what we call 53:39.180 --> 53:40.870 the linear capability improvement 53:40.870 --> 53:42.670 and get into a geometric improvement 53:43.240 --> 53:45.340 with the existing platforms we have today. 53:46.400 --> 53:49.110 So we're very excited and enthusiastic to 53:49.850 --> 53:52.240 field these capabilities as soon as we can 53:52.570 --> 53:55.280 in concert with growing the size of the navy. 53:56.840 --> 53:58.430 - If I could follow up with Admiral Merz. 53:58.430 --> 54:00.010 Interesting his point he brought up 54:00.010 --> 54:04.140 was the ability to give us stability in the budget. 54:04.390 --> 54:06.290 And allowing us to be able to do that, 54:06.290 --> 54:08.810 'cause what we're seeing is that stability in the budget 54:08.810 --> 54:12.670 is allowing us to put the right S&T investments 54:12.670 --> 54:14.130 in where we need to go. 54:14.540 --> 54:17.340 We also see it helping industry understand that stability 54:17.340 --> 54:19.820 and they're putting the right investment in there. 54:19.820 --> 54:22.840 So as we look at things like hypersonics, 54:23.000 --> 54:25.760 also I'd throw in high velocity projectiles, 54:26.710 --> 54:29.870 potentially game-changing investments in capabilities 54:29.870 --> 54:32.330 where we make that linear high velocity learning 54:32.330 --> 54:34.980 an increase that will leap ahead of the threat. 54:35.070 --> 54:37.550 And in many ways as the Cold War was where we were able 54:37.550 --> 54:41.430 to invest our S&T or our industry research and development 54:41.430 --> 54:43.860 into areas where we could leap ahead of the threat 54:43.860 --> 54:45.350 and stay ahead of the threat. 54:45.540 --> 54:48.440 The money that we're now seeing from a predictable budget 54:48.440 --> 54:51.220 that you're giving us is allowing us to invest 54:51.220 --> 54:53.930 in areas that are now starting to move very quickly 54:53.930 --> 54:56.370 and are gonna give us that advantage into the future. 54:56.390 --> 54:58.610 - And sir maybe I just want to follow up again, 54:58.610 --> 55:01.060 coming from my heritage at SOCOM, 55:01.260 --> 55:03.180 I am all about transition speed 55:03.180 --> 55:05.780 and taking what's good enough, 55:05.780 --> 55:07.370 getting it in the hands of the war fighter, 55:07.370 --> 55:09.450 and so as you're seeing now with lasers, 55:09.580 --> 55:12.070 I think you'll see with some of these other areas, 55:12.070 --> 55:13.970 we're not gonna wait 'til it's perfect 55:14.340 --> 55:17.470 before we go get it in an operational environment. 55:17.580 --> 55:21.460 We're fielding directed energy on a number of our systems 55:21.460 --> 55:23.130 in different phases. 55:23.480 --> 55:25.550 Happy to run through that with you in more detail 55:25.550 --> 55:28.980 but the way I see it is we've got to grow both 55:30.070 --> 55:32.860 capacity, so we talked a lot about 355, 55:33.050 --> 55:34.830 but then how do we lay on top of that 55:34.830 --> 55:37.520 our ability to rapidly grow capability. 55:37.890 --> 55:40.280 A lot like the submarine force has done 55:40.460 --> 55:43.430 so that you get an exponential growth in power 55:43.790 --> 55:46.130 which is some combination of both of those. 55:46.260 --> 55:48.520 - So let me ask you this and it dovetails 55:48.520 --> 55:51.600 into my first question, so the laser weapon system 55:51.740 --> 55:54.520 LaWS on board the USS Ponce has been a great success 55:54.520 --> 55:56.900 since it was installing in 2014 55:56.900 --> 55:59.070 and in the FY19 budget request 55:59.070 --> 56:01.250 we have a additional opportunity to put 56:01.250 --> 56:03.300 the laser weapons system demonstrator on board 56:03.300 --> 56:06.890 the USS Portland for a shipboard demonstration. 56:06.990 --> 56:09.790 However I understand that this budget was constructed 56:09.790 --> 56:12.190 before we knew which ship technology, 56:13.690 --> 56:15.980 which ship this technology would be placed on, 56:15.980 --> 56:18.770 so without additional funds in FY19 56:18.770 --> 56:21.380 what risks may befall this critical demonstration. 56:21.810 --> 56:23.410 Is this gonna still be on track? 56:25.460 --> 56:27.670 - No sir, I think in the laser family 56:27.670 --> 56:28.770 we're actually in pretty good shape. 56:28.770 --> 56:31.690 It was designated as an accelerated acquisition program 56:31.750 --> 56:35.470 by the Navy Board of Directors so that means 56:35.470 --> 56:38.290 the Secretary of the Navy and representatives 56:38.290 --> 56:41.470 and the CNO both agreed that this is a CNO priority 56:41.470 --> 56:43.020 and we're moving forward on it. 56:43.560 --> 56:46.540 Portland was chosen simply because it's much more 56:46.540 --> 56:50.690 straightforward integration effort to test the technology. 56:51.850 --> 56:54.220 Long term we are looking to bring this onto our combatants. 56:54.220 --> 56:57.400 Integration's a little bit more complex and more expensive 56:57.610 --> 57:01.300 so for testing out the demonstration Portland is actually 57:01.300 --> 57:04.390 a very suitable platform to get this to sea first. 57:04.762 --> 57:07.050 - All right, thanks. - And sir, I add 57:07.190 --> 57:09.310 the other directed energy systems, 57:09.310 --> 57:12.860 we are putting both first onshore and then on the DDGs. 57:13.170 --> 57:15.930 So we're gonna have a smaller 60 kilowatt laser 57:15.930 --> 57:20.270 going on the DDGs, we've got optical dazzlers and whatnot 57:20.270 --> 57:21.470 going on the DDGs. 57:21.470 --> 57:25.580 So our whole approach is I'll say a family approach. 57:25.740 --> 57:28.950 We're building the technology path and then we are 57:28.950 --> 57:31.500 putting together systems as that technology matures 57:32.540 --> 57:34.620 both onto the naval components 57:34.620 --> 57:36.680 as well as on the marine corps components 57:36.910 --> 57:39.290 as that technology is ready to go into the field. 57:39.290 --> 57:41.380 - Okay, thank you, just before I yield back 57:41.380 --> 57:43.990 I wanted to mention, I was out at Dahlgren and I was there 57:43.990 --> 57:47.190 for that first multi-shot test they did on the railgun. 57:47.190 --> 57:50.190 It was very, from everything that I saw was very successful. 57:50.850 --> 57:53.280 I'm anxious for them to get to that 10 multi-shot test, 57:53.280 --> 57:55.920 I just hope we're not going to let this technology 57:55.920 --> 57:56.980 sit on the shelf. 57:56.980 --> 57:59.610 And if China's advancing this technology 58:00.080 --> 58:01.810 we shouldn't be just looking at the projectile 58:01.810 --> 58:03.810 but looking at this as a holistic system 58:03.840 --> 58:07.410 that we put on a ship at some point 58:07.440 --> 58:09.140 in the very near future, okay. 58:09.140 --> 58:10.890 Thank you Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back. 58:10.890 --> 58:13.160 - Thank you Mr. Langevin, we'll now go to Mr. Courtney. 58:13.160 --> 58:14.830 - Thank you Mr. Chairman, and 58:18.150 --> 58:19.900 Admiral Merz when you appeared before 58:19.900 --> 58:22.580 the shipbuilding caucus, again you did a nice job of sort of 58:22.580 --> 58:24.640 explaining the 30 year shipbuilding plan 58:24.640 --> 58:27.310 which again as I mentioned in my opening remarks, 58:27.310 --> 58:31.140 I mean, if you do the math it shows 335 by 2048. 58:31.140 --> 58:33.800 However as you pointed out, I mean there's sort of 58:35.130 --> 58:38.110 an optional sort of path 58:38.780 --> 58:41.520 that I think was sort of built into the system, 58:41.520 --> 58:43.960 and maybe you could talk about that a little bit. 58:44.690 --> 58:46.380 - Yes sir, I'd be happy to. 58:47.040 --> 58:48.670 There are a lot of competing variables 58:48.670 --> 58:52.000 in the shipbuilding plan which I tried to frame 58:52.000 --> 58:55.940 in the brief discussion we had at the shipbuilding caucus 58:57.570 --> 58:58.930 as we come through this. 58:59.110 --> 59:04.050 One of the dynamics we're challenged with is just beyond 59:04.050 --> 59:07.810 the future year's defense plan is a massive period 59:07.810 --> 59:12.440 of retirements where I lose essentially 50 attack submarines 59:12.440 --> 59:15.810 and destroyers over about a seven year period. 59:16.750 --> 59:18.860 Now we're going to aggressively attack that 59:18.860 --> 59:23.190 with service life extensions to help smooth out that divot, 59:23.570 --> 59:26.070 but that will not get us to 355 any faster, 59:26.070 --> 59:27.790 it just moves the ramp. 59:29.690 --> 59:33.610 I really want everyone to focus on the shipbuilding plan 59:33.610 --> 59:35.430 as the opportunity to grow, 59:36.750 --> 59:39.220 which was the purpose of identifying 59:39.220 --> 59:41.280 the available industrial capacity. 59:41.280 --> 59:44.180 And as we take advantage of a steady funding stream 59:44.180 --> 59:47.040 over time one of the key elements 59:47.040 --> 59:51.200 is incentivizing industry to invest also along with us 59:51.830 --> 59:54.730 so we can grow that unused capacity over time 59:54.730 --> 59:56.370 and then obviously take advantage of it 59:56.370 --> 59:57.900 so we can get there faster. 59:58.410 --> 01:00:00.540 There was also the dynamic of overshoot. 01:00:01.110 --> 01:00:03.710 Although we want to get to 355 as soon as we can 01:00:04.110 --> 01:00:05.950 we have to work closely with congress 01:00:05.950 --> 01:00:07.700 on what do we do when we get there. 01:00:08.400 --> 01:00:10.080 If we get there very aggressively 01:00:10.800 --> 01:00:14.260 and stop, then we immediately create another bust period 01:00:14.260 --> 01:00:18.170 for industry and with the fragility of the base now 01:00:18.850 --> 01:00:22.750 very concerning for the Navy as we come through that. 01:00:23.000 --> 01:00:25.780 So we think we have options to get there much faster. 01:00:26.720 --> 01:00:30.730 We laid out a steady state profile that took advantage 01:00:30.730 --> 01:00:33.330 of the resources we have and that is simply 01:00:33.330 --> 01:00:35.750 projected out at the '19 level. 01:00:36.370 --> 01:00:39.120 We do know there are gonna be additional builds outside 01:00:39.460 --> 01:00:41.680 the five year plan when Columbia-class 01:00:41.680 --> 01:00:43.130 comes into serial production, 01:00:43.160 --> 01:00:45.690 another variable we'll have to manage. 01:00:45.850 --> 01:00:47.560 But there's a couple ways to do that 01:00:47.560 --> 01:00:49.430 besides just additional resources. 01:00:50.743 --> 01:00:54.010 We discussed the audit, well one of the objectives 01:00:54.120 --> 01:00:57.910 of the audit is for some acquisition reform 01:00:57.910 --> 01:00:59.910 so we can better with the money we have. 01:01:01.070 --> 01:01:03.190 We have to be very very careful that we don't get complacent 01:01:03.190 --> 01:01:05.000 just because the budget is growing, 01:01:05.000 --> 01:01:06.710 that business as usual is gonna get us there, 01:01:06.710 --> 01:01:07.630 we know it's not. 01:01:07.630 --> 01:01:09.830 We know we are going to need more resources. 01:01:10.200 --> 01:01:13.720 Whether it's 26 billion per year or 26 to 30 billion a year 01:01:13.720 --> 01:01:16.470 depending on what the challenges are beyond the fit up, 01:01:16.630 --> 01:01:17.920 we attempted to capture that, 01:01:17.920 --> 01:01:19.330 but we do know it's looming out there 01:01:19.330 --> 01:01:21.140 and we want to start the discussion now 01:01:21.140 --> 01:01:26.070 so it's not a panic today and we can put strategies in place 01:01:26.070 --> 01:01:30.300 so we're ready for that extra load on the shipbuilding plan. 01:01:30.740 --> 01:01:33.840 So we know it's an unsatisfying ramp, 01:01:33.900 --> 01:01:36.140 but in the balance of the Navy 01:01:36.180 --> 01:01:37.780 of our readiness and capability 01:01:38.530 --> 01:01:41.220 we felt we've hit the mark on what we have to do 01:01:41.220 --> 01:01:44.260 to set a base profile that we cannot go below 01:01:44.260 --> 01:01:45.820 or we will not grow at all. 01:01:46.020 --> 01:01:49.060 And we have to protect that and then take advantage of 01:01:49.060 --> 01:01:52.090 any aggressive growth that we might be able to support 01:01:52.090 --> 01:01:54.420 with congress's help going forward. 01:01:54.980 --> 01:01:59.040 One final piece of that is the operating cost of the Navy. 01:01:59.260 --> 01:02:01.820 So what you'll see in the next shipbuilding plan 01:02:01.820 --> 01:02:04.000 is an appendix dedicated just to 01:02:04.450 --> 01:02:07.780 hey this is what it's gonna take to build a 355 ship navy, 01:02:08.040 --> 01:02:11.280 this is what it's gonna cost to operate that 355 ship navy, 01:02:11.280 --> 01:02:13.030 and we're going to have to work closely with congress 01:02:13.030 --> 01:02:15.860 to make sure that paces the delivery of the ships. 01:02:15.860 --> 01:02:19.130 And that's the personnel, that's the maintenance plans, 01:02:19.480 --> 01:02:21.070 the ordinance, the et cetera. 01:02:21.430 --> 01:02:22.310 Does that, does that answer? 01:02:22.310 --> 01:02:24.710 - It does, and again just to sort of complete the, 01:02:24.710 --> 01:02:28.700 I think the picture, I mean literally you had a visual aid 01:02:28.700 --> 01:02:31.130 as part of the shipbuilding plan 01:02:31.130 --> 01:02:33.870 which had the colored boxes and the white boxes 01:02:33.870 --> 01:02:36.990 and again the white boxes are really where 01:02:36.990 --> 01:02:38.800 again you have these options 01:02:39.600 --> 01:02:42.230 that I think were specifically identified 01:02:42.230 --> 01:02:43.830 in terms of specific classes. 01:02:43.830 --> 01:02:46.280 Again, can you just kind of walk us through that? 01:02:47.120 --> 01:02:50.880 - Yes sir, so it's also important to understand 01:02:50.880 --> 01:02:53.730 on that shipbuilding plan we are not talking in generalities 01:02:53.730 --> 01:02:55.900 we're not talking in sand charts. 01:02:56.560 --> 01:02:57.840 Each one of those colored blocks 01:02:57.840 --> 01:02:59.420 is on the 30 year shipbuilding plan 01:02:59.420 --> 01:03:01.630 is to the best of our ability identifying a ship 01:03:01.630 --> 01:03:04.740 we need to buy in that year or in that timeframe. 01:03:05.310 --> 01:03:09.400 The white blocks on top of that do identify the capacities. 01:03:09.400 --> 01:03:12.560 The goal is to not just fill in the white blocks, 01:03:13.010 --> 01:03:16.490 but to create more white blocks that we can fill in. 01:03:16.520 --> 01:03:18.520 I'll turn it over to Secretary Geurts. 01:03:18.520 --> 01:03:20.140 - Yeah that was gonna be my point. 01:03:20.140 --> 01:03:22.140 The white blocks are what we know today. 01:03:22.140 --> 01:03:25.090 That's not where I believe we're gonna be three, four, 01:03:25.090 --> 01:03:29.170 five years down the road as we drive cost out of, 01:03:29.170 --> 01:03:31.720 you know, through serial production drive cost out, 01:03:31.920 --> 01:03:34.260 and quite frankly as we get more efficient 01:03:34.260 --> 01:03:37.540 at building ships, we should within the industrial base 01:03:37.540 --> 01:03:40.810 create more opportunities as we go forward. 01:03:40.810 --> 01:03:43.080 So I look at it again as Admiral Merz says, 01:03:43.080 --> 01:03:46.020 I look at that shipbuilding plan as the starting point. 01:03:47.070 --> 01:03:48.740 It's a framework we can all work from 01:03:48.740 --> 01:03:50.390 and at least start communicating. 01:03:50.790 --> 01:03:53.620 It will continue to move and adapt 01:03:53.954 --> 01:03:58.954 as I try and drive out cost in the backend of things, 01:03:59.040 --> 01:04:02.140 and as the operations commands here understand 01:04:02.140 --> 01:04:03.680 what do we need in the future. 01:04:04.360 --> 01:04:07.850 We've got it kind of binned, but there's a lot of 01:04:08.860 --> 01:04:10.970 thought going into what do we do next. 01:04:10.970 --> 01:04:12.590 We don't want to wait 'til we have a crisis 01:04:12.590 --> 01:04:15.280 to be thinking about what's next down the road 01:04:15.880 --> 01:04:17.610 in any of these ship classes. 01:04:18.210 --> 01:04:22.500 - So does, pin point a couple of those white boxes 01:04:22.500 --> 01:04:23.333 if I could for a minute. 01:04:23.333 --> 01:04:27.170 Again, in '22 and '23 Virginia-class program, 01:04:27.170 --> 01:04:29.930 there's two white boxes, you know, one for each year. 01:04:29.930 --> 01:04:34.330 And so as we're in the midst of block five negotiation 01:04:34.330 --> 01:04:39.110 which obviously extends through those 2022 and 2023 01:04:40.400 --> 01:04:43.050 I guess I'm trying to understand what's the signal 01:04:43.050 --> 01:04:47.150 that the Navy wants to send in terms of is it in tandem 01:04:47.150 --> 01:04:49.110 with what this subcommittee did last year, 01:04:49.110 --> 01:04:54.110 which is to authorize a bigger block buy than 10 subs. 01:04:55.340 --> 01:04:57.730 If you could just sort of explain how that sort of 01:04:57.730 --> 01:05:00.710 fits into again the process that's underway right now. 01:05:02.110 --> 01:05:04.573 - Yes sir, I'd say there's a couple critical things 01:05:04.573 --> 01:05:05.673 coming in front of us. 01:05:05.910 --> 01:05:08.110 Columbia is coming in front, and as you know 01:05:08.470 --> 01:05:10.620 that's our number one program and we've got to make sure 01:05:10.620 --> 01:05:11.720 we're ready for that. 01:05:12.350 --> 01:05:14.570 I think the good news is we've been working very close, 01:05:14.570 --> 01:05:16.530 Virginia has paved the way a lot of it. 01:05:16.870 --> 01:05:18.870 And quite frankly the authorities this committee 01:05:18.870 --> 01:05:21.910 and congress has given us has really brought down 01:05:22.520 --> 01:05:24.190 the risk on that program. 01:05:24.760 --> 01:05:26.220 We're saving over a billion dollars 01:05:26.220 --> 01:05:27.940 by continuous production there. 01:05:28.350 --> 01:05:32.170 As we look to the potential for filling in those white boxes 01:05:32.170 --> 01:05:37.170 a key element is how do we both maintain and grow 01:05:37.670 --> 01:05:41.355 the supplier base and as well as facilities 01:05:41.355 --> 01:05:43.430 at the final assembly yards. 01:05:43.740 --> 01:05:45.240 But quite frankly, supplier base. 01:05:45.240 --> 01:05:48.240 So we've have an activity where we look at all the suppliers 01:05:48.890 --> 01:05:53.180 between the Ford carriers, the Columbia and Virginia 01:05:53.310 --> 01:05:56.490 to understand that supply base and some of the things 01:05:56.540 --> 01:05:59.820 in '18, those funds that you had identified there 01:05:59.820 --> 01:06:01.970 are critical to get those suppliers 01:06:03.320 --> 01:06:04.730 up and ready and ramped up. 01:06:04.730 --> 01:06:07.090 We wanted to make sure they're healthy so they'll be there. 01:06:07.090 --> 01:06:08.960 And then two that they'll be able to produce 01:06:08.960 --> 01:06:11.590 at the rates we need them to. 01:06:11.900 --> 01:06:14.300 And then as we do a better job 01:06:14.300 --> 01:06:17.010 of synchronizing in maintenance availabilities 01:06:17.300 --> 01:06:20.850 in planning for maintenance and major repair, 01:06:20.980 --> 01:06:24.470 I think that will again give us a better composite picture 01:06:24.470 --> 01:06:26.610 so we can really understand our needs. 01:06:26.760 --> 01:06:30.500 And then show industry here's the predictable work 01:06:30.500 --> 01:06:33.550 that's coming so that they can do what industry does well 01:06:33.550 --> 01:06:36.190 when they have predictable work that they can plan for, 01:06:36.190 --> 01:06:38.200 they can be very effective and efficient 01:06:38.440 --> 01:06:39.860 and make the investments now 01:06:39.860 --> 01:06:41.900 that will enable us to execute then. 01:06:42.900 --> 01:06:44.750 - Thank you to all the witnesses for really creating 01:06:44.750 --> 01:06:47.200 a great record today, and with that I yield back. 01:06:47.510 --> 01:06:48.760 - Thank you Mr. Courtney. 01:06:49.790 --> 01:06:51.390 Gentlemen again, thanks for joining us today. 01:06:51.390 --> 01:06:52.880 Thanks so much for your perspective, 01:06:52.880 --> 01:06:54.640 I think it's extraordinarily important. 01:06:54.640 --> 01:06:56.170 As you all have pointed out, 01:06:56.580 --> 01:06:59.000 a tremendously challenging environment for us. 01:06:59.000 --> 01:07:00.620 I think we have our path laid out 01:07:00.620 --> 01:07:02.410 through both the National Security Strategy 01:07:02.410 --> 01:07:03.910 and National Defense Strategy. 01:07:04.480 --> 01:07:07.150 Food for thought with the 30 year shipbuilding plan, 01:07:07.240 --> 01:07:08.910 force structure assessment coming out too 01:07:08.910 --> 01:07:11.640 I think is also going to challenge all of us 01:07:11.640 --> 01:07:15.200 to make sure that we are on path to build a 355 ship navy. 01:07:15.560 --> 01:07:17.280 I do want to drill down a little bit 01:07:17.280 --> 01:07:19.640 first with you Lieutenant General Walsh. 01:07:19.640 --> 01:07:21.940 First of all thanks so much for your diligence 01:07:22.090 --> 01:07:25.980 and all of your efforts in looking at surge sealift 01:07:25.980 --> 01:07:29.040 as a component of how the Marine Corps 01:07:29.520 --> 01:07:32.200 will pursue the fight when asked to do so. 01:07:32.200 --> 01:07:33.840 And I really appreciate all that you've done there 01:07:33.840 --> 01:07:36.630 to really understand that and look at that top to bottom. 01:07:36.630 --> 01:07:39.300 We understand that one of the important elements 01:07:39.300 --> 01:07:41.760 of being able to project power for the Marine Corps 01:07:41.760 --> 01:07:44.670 is the logistics associated with getting there 01:07:44.730 --> 01:07:46.290 and sustaining the fight, 01:07:46.290 --> 01:07:48.840 and I think you all have really laid that out well. 01:07:49.010 --> 01:07:52.280 One of the key components there that I think is concerning 01:07:52.510 --> 01:07:55.860 is surge sealift, you know, we have an RRF today, 01:07:55.860 --> 01:07:59.910 a ready reserve fleet that is 46 ships 01:08:00.140 --> 01:08:02.570 that average in age 43 years. 01:08:02.810 --> 01:08:06.980 Old ships, very challenging to maintain. 01:08:07.100 --> 01:08:12.100 In fact by the end of this year we will be the only 01:08:12.200 --> 01:08:14.450 country on the face of the Earth that will continue 01:08:14.450 --> 01:08:18.420 to maintain and operate steam plants in ships. 01:08:18.770 --> 01:08:21.720 Now, old technology sometimes has an advantage, 01:08:21.720 --> 01:08:23.670 I would argue in this case it does not. 01:08:23.800 --> 01:08:27.820 So what we've got to look at is how does that limitation 01:08:29.050 --> 01:08:32.780 straddle us in things like pursuing an operations plan. 01:08:32.780 --> 01:08:36.370 General Dunford laid out, said that the big challenge 01:08:36.370 --> 01:08:40.370 for executing the Korean Peninsula OPLAN 01:08:40.810 --> 01:08:43.270 is logistics in surge. 01:08:43.320 --> 01:08:45.790 So I want to ask you from the Marine Corps standpoint 01:08:45.790 --> 01:08:49.600 and looking at your part of that strategy and the 01:08:51.290 --> 01:08:53.580 mission that you will have to prosecute, 01:08:53.690 --> 01:08:57.380 how does this aging surge sealift affect you. 01:08:57.540 --> 01:09:01.400 Secondly, in looking at what is proposed by the Navy 01:09:01.690 --> 01:09:04.900 in decommissioning one of the two hospital ships, 01:09:05.100 --> 01:09:08.200 how does that affect you in your ability 01:09:08.200 --> 01:09:12.560 to respond to casualties in a battle situation 01:09:12.560 --> 01:09:14.900 where the marines are gonna be at the tip of the spear. 01:09:14.900 --> 01:09:18.260 And what risk does the Marine Corps take on 01:09:19.050 --> 01:09:23.100 with this antiquated and insufficient surge sealift force 01:09:23.100 --> 01:09:26.370 as well as taking away one of the hospital ships 01:09:26.760 --> 01:09:30.900 in a situation that I would argue would create a significant 01:09:31.530 --> 01:09:34.040 increase in casualties without that capacity there. 01:09:34.040 --> 01:09:36.300 So I want to get your perspective on that. 01:09:37.090 --> 01:09:39.200 - Thanks Mr. Chairman for that question. 01:09:39.200 --> 01:09:40.572 You know, I think if you kind of look back, 01:09:40.572 --> 01:09:42.550 Admiral Merz talked about history and how we went back 01:09:42.550 --> 01:09:44.470 in the shipbuilding plan and looked at history. 01:09:44.470 --> 01:09:47.920 I think we've been here before with the ready reserve force 01:09:47.920 --> 01:09:50.170 in the past and I think we had some lessons learned 01:09:50.170 --> 01:09:52.590 from where we were after Desert Storm 01:09:53.070 --> 01:09:57.020 and how we fixed some of those problems going into OIF1 01:09:58.624 --> 01:10:00.300 and the force continues to get old. 01:10:00.300 --> 01:10:02.580 I think if you look at our requirements 01:10:02.580 --> 01:10:05.880 we have a two MEB amphibious taskforce requirement 01:10:06.330 --> 01:10:10.770 which is very closely tied to our maritime pre-positioning 01:10:10.770 --> 01:10:12.590 squadron force that we've got in 01:10:13.640 --> 01:10:16.420 Guam and Diego Garcia. 01:10:17.440 --> 01:10:22.420 That along with our two MEBs that are from the 01:10:22.840 --> 01:10:25.220 maritime pre-positioning force, 01:10:25.220 --> 01:10:27.480 that surge sealift that you're talking about 01:10:27.650 --> 01:10:29.610 is what we're seeing right now is if 01:10:29.610 --> 01:10:33.390 we look at our contingency plans, our operational plans, 01:10:33.450 --> 01:10:36.170 that we're really kind of getting to that ragged edge 01:10:36.170 --> 01:10:38.190 of being able to support that. 01:10:39.220 --> 01:10:42.800 That we feel pretty tight with our MPSRON supporting our 01:10:44.510 --> 01:10:46.400 forward amphibious task force, 01:10:46.400 --> 01:10:48.490 and that capability tied very close to that, 01:10:48.490 --> 01:10:52.010 but that assault follow on capability, that flow in forces, 01:10:52.010 --> 01:10:55.220 the surge forces that you read about in the NDS 01:10:55.320 --> 01:10:57.670 I think that's that area where you talked about 01:10:58.010 --> 01:11:00.500 the age of the force is I think 01:11:00.500 --> 01:11:02.520 what we've got ourselves really concerned with. 01:11:02.520 --> 01:11:06.880 And taking a hard look at that within Admiral Merz 01:11:06.880 --> 01:11:08.620 and also over on the N4 side, 01:11:08.620 --> 01:11:10.460 I think that's gonna take a lot of focus 01:11:10.460 --> 01:11:12.930 from both the Navy and the Marine Corps to be able 01:11:12.930 --> 01:11:14.430 to look at that long term investment 01:11:14.430 --> 01:11:16.980 'cause I think right now with the age of the force, 01:11:17.160 --> 01:11:19.150 right now we're probably at a point where we can meet 01:11:19.150 --> 01:11:22.700 what we need, but it's slowly gonna degrade over time, 01:11:22.700 --> 01:11:25.310 and if with the average age of the ships that you just said, 01:11:25.310 --> 01:11:27.740 that probably by the mid-20s we're not gonna be able 01:11:27.740 --> 01:11:29.490 to meet the requirements we've got. 01:11:29.550 --> 01:11:32.070 On the side of the hospital ships, 01:11:32.330 --> 01:11:35.030 you talk about that at two ships isn't a lot of ships. 01:11:36.210 --> 01:11:39.250 And that's a capability that I think the marines, 01:11:39.360 --> 01:11:40.570 certainly the sailors too, 01:11:40.570 --> 01:11:42.760 that have deployed into Iraq and Afghanistan, 01:11:42.760 --> 01:11:45.790 they've learned a lot about the type of care 01:11:45.790 --> 01:11:48.240 that we're used to and accustomed to get, 01:11:48.340 --> 01:11:50.150 and to survive on the battlefield. 01:11:50.150 --> 01:11:54.270 It's something that our armed forces have learned to say 01:11:54.270 --> 01:11:56.250 that we're gonna be taken care of. 01:11:56.320 --> 01:11:58.940 And you can look back over a number of conflicts, 01:11:58.940 --> 01:12:02.110 and a lot of times militaries have quit fighting 01:12:02.110 --> 01:12:04.640 because they didn't have the proper care to fight. 01:12:05.650 --> 01:12:08.150 And you could take a look at that in the past. 01:12:08.150 --> 01:12:10.530 So as hospital ships of having that capability 01:12:10.530 --> 01:12:13.040 that we're used to is a critical component of that. 01:12:13.040 --> 01:12:15.290 And I think it probably will take a deep look 01:12:15.670 --> 01:12:16.890 by the Navy and the Marine Corps 01:12:16.890 --> 01:12:18.500 on what that real requirement is. 01:12:18.500 --> 01:12:20.610 And I'd ask Admiral Merz if he's got anything 01:12:20.610 --> 01:12:21.443 to add to that. 01:12:21.443 --> 01:12:22.910 - [Mr. Wittman] Sure, Admiral Merz? 01:12:23.630 --> 01:12:25.730 - Yes sir, thank you Mr. Chairman. 01:12:26.380 --> 01:12:27.510 Thanks General Walsh. 01:12:27.950 --> 01:12:31.040 So this is an area we need to spend more work on. 01:12:32.660 --> 01:12:35.430 Today's force does meet the 15 million square foot 01:12:35.430 --> 01:12:37.060 lift requirement, however as you said 01:12:37.060 --> 01:12:38.430 it needs to be recapitalized, 01:12:38.430 --> 01:12:40.730 and it needs to be aggressively recapitalized. 01:12:40.990 --> 01:12:43.940 So we exercise three levers to do that. 01:12:43.940 --> 01:12:46.700 We do service life extensions on the existing ships, 01:12:46.700 --> 01:12:47.920 so you're taking an old ship 01:12:47.920 --> 01:12:49.520 and trying to get it even older. 01:12:50.870 --> 01:12:53.810 Buy used, and I appreciate the authority we received 01:12:53.810 --> 01:12:57.540 to buy the foreign built ships. 01:12:57.700 --> 01:13:00.720 We are also aggressively looking for US built ships, 01:13:00.720 --> 01:13:03.750 however due to market dynamics of previous decades 01:13:04.953 --> 01:13:06.303 there's very few out there. 01:13:06.360 --> 01:13:10.210 And then of course the long term recap plan of building new. 01:13:11.434 --> 01:13:14.384 And we are initiating an effort to see if we can accelerate 01:13:15.140 --> 01:13:17.190 the CHAMP, the common hull platform 01:13:17.190 --> 01:13:20.190 that we'll ultimately use to replace the lift fleet. 01:13:20.480 --> 01:13:22.950 And some other capabilities 01:13:24.040 --> 01:13:27.420 such as submarine tenders and command ships. 01:13:28.330 --> 01:13:30.410 And notwithstanding the hospital ship. 01:13:30.490 --> 01:13:32.360 We're gonna have to do something with the hospital ship. 01:13:32.360 --> 01:13:36.300 The replacement's not ready so we are evaluating 01:13:36.300 --> 01:13:38.750 what it would take to do a life extension on her. 01:13:39.530 --> 01:13:41.410 Her sister ship is in good shape, 01:13:41.410 --> 01:13:43.390 she'll be around for quite a while. 01:13:43.390 --> 01:13:48.190 And there may be other opportunities to fill in the 01:13:49.391 --> 01:13:53.180 sea-based medical support that we need to provide. 01:13:53.440 --> 01:13:56.010 So we're casting a wide net 01:13:56.120 --> 01:13:58.780 on how to meet that specific capability, 01:13:59.430 --> 01:14:01.390 but the other three levers are what we're gonna pull 01:14:01.390 --> 01:14:05.810 very firmly to move out on recapitalizing this force. 01:14:06.660 --> 01:14:09.490 - Very good, I appreciate your perspective on that. 01:14:09.890 --> 01:14:12.990 It's very tempting to only talk about 01:14:13.370 --> 01:14:16.710 what our Navy and Marine Corps need as far as warships. 01:14:16.970 --> 01:14:18.780 It's not in the headlines to say 01:14:18.780 --> 01:14:20.750 we need support ships and hospital ships, 01:14:20.750 --> 01:14:23.580 but I would argue is history is any lesson to us 01:14:23.670 --> 01:14:26.900 that the support element of the Navy is as critical 01:14:27.150 --> 01:14:29.880 as the warship component, and especially 01:14:29.880 --> 01:14:31.290 in the contested environment today, 01:14:31.290 --> 01:14:33.650 which creates a whole 'nother challenge for us. 01:14:33.650 --> 01:14:37.080 You know, making sure that we have a modernized 01:14:37.340 --> 01:14:39.724 sealift fleet is gonna be key as well as, 01:14:39.724 --> 01:14:42.350 and General Walsh I think you hit the nail on the head, 01:14:42.350 --> 01:14:44.710 and that is the expectation today 01:14:45.040 --> 01:14:48.840 for all of our fighters, whether they are soldiers, marines, 01:14:48.840 --> 01:14:52.990 sailors, or airmen, is that we provide the best for them. 01:14:53.290 --> 01:14:57.110 What we do to train Navy corpsmen and Army medics 01:14:57.140 --> 01:14:59.300 so on the battlefield they get the best. 01:14:59.320 --> 01:15:01.530 Survivability rates have gone sky high, 01:15:01.530 --> 01:15:05.360 we see what happens in exercises for those great caregivers 01:15:05.360 --> 01:15:07.630 on the battlefield, they are pretty doggone efficient 01:15:07.630 --> 01:15:09.560 in making sure that men and women 01:15:09.560 --> 01:15:11.150 that are injured there survive. 01:15:11.740 --> 01:15:13.700 Having the conduit, so once we get them 01:15:13.700 --> 01:15:15.910 out of that battle space and make sure we support them 01:15:15.910 --> 01:15:17.180 on that hospital ship, 01:15:17.430 --> 01:15:20.100 I argue is equally as important. 01:15:20.310 --> 01:15:22.820 It is also a measure of this nation's commitment 01:15:22.820 --> 01:15:24.180 to taking care of them. 01:15:24.370 --> 01:15:26.840 So I would urge you on the hospital ship side 01:15:26.840 --> 01:15:28.380 to do everything we can. 01:15:28.540 --> 01:15:30.130 While that doesn't make the headlines 01:15:30.130 --> 01:15:31.940 as far as a shipbuilding number 01:15:32.150 --> 01:15:34.100 or an aircraft carrier, or a submarine, 01:15:34.100 --> 01:15:37.370 I would argue it is as if not more important 01:15:37.870 --> 01:15:40.460 as a measure of our nation's commitment 01:15:40.710 --> 01:15:42.730 to the men and women that serve in uniform. 01:15:42.730 --> 01:15:46.240 It sends a signal, not just to them, but their families 01:15:46.390 --> 01:15:48.410 to say we are gonna do everything we can. 01:15:48.410 --> 01:15:51.320 So I would urge you with all due diligence to make sure 01:15:51.320 --> 01:15:54.030 we take care of that as well as the support that they need, 01:15:54.030 --> 01:15:56.330 'cause it's great to give them great training, 01:15:56.450 --> 01:15:58.900 but if they're out there at the tip of the spear 01:15:59.120 --> 01:16:02.000 and for the first 30 days they've got everything they need 01:16:02.000 --> 01:16:04.010 but after that things start to tail off, 01:16:04.200 --> 01:16:07.810 that really becomes an issue, and Mr. Geurts I know you know 01:16:07.810 --> 01:16:10.800 that being there in SOCOM, and sustainment for that. 01:16:10.800 --> 01:16:13.160 As you know our special operators get a lot 01:16:13.160 --> 01:16:14.510 of what they need but the key 01:16:14.510 --> 01:16:17.210 to their success is sustainment. 01:16:17.210 --> 01:16:18.850 So I don't know if you have anything that you want to add, 01:16:18.850 --> 01:16:20.790 I've been lecturing here for too long, so go ahead. 01:16:20.790 --> 01:16:23.640 - Sir, I completely agree with everything you said there. 01:16:23.750 --> 01:16:26.024 And it's something in this year's shipbuilding plan 01:16:26.024 --> 01:16:28.680 and our budget bill will look very closely at. 01:16:28.900 --> 01:16:32.730 But I completely agree with your perspective on the issues. 01:16:32.730 --> 01:16:36.320 - Mr. Chairman, if I could, just to add to that piece is 01:16:36.320 --> 01:16:40.060 sometimes, I think Admiral Merz mentioned the seabase, 01:16:40.280 --> 01:16:42.810 and sometimes I think we look at a specific capability 01:16:42.810 --> 01:16:45.600 of how to replace that like one for one. 01:16:47.100 --> 01:16:49.080 But some of the things we've looked at is like 01:16:49.080 --> 01:16:53.010 looking at the ESBs, which congress has been 01:16:53.010 --> 01:16:56.870 very helpful with us in getting the float staging bases, 01:16:56.870 --> 01:16:59.180 and we've got polar out right now in CENTCOM. 01:16:59.360 --> 01:17:01.480 But a lot of the modular capabilities 01:17:01.480 --> 01:17:04.670 to reconfigure packages, medical packages 01:17:04.670 --> 01:17:07.270 to be able to go aboard those kind of ships, 01:17:07.270 --> 01:17:08.680 there's lots of opportunities. 01:17:08.680 --> 01:17:10.070 When you talk about industrial base, 01:17:10.070 --> 01:17:14.060 and continuing to build ships that it isn't always 01:17:14.060 --> 01:17:15.150 build the exact same thing, 01:17:15.150 --> 01:17:17.810 it's how do you repurpose what you already have. 01:17:17.920 --> 01:17:21.040 And I look at opportunities there in the ESBs, 01:17:21.070 --> 01:17:24.680 along with the ESFs, our joint high speed vessels. 01:17:24.700 --> 01:17:27.810 Tremendous capacity and capability in both those ships 01:17:27.810 --> 01:17:29.640 to be able to use them for a lot of different reasons. 01:17:29.640 --> 01:17:31.310 And certainly on a medical side it's very clear 01:17:31.310 --> 01:17:33.930 to bring packages onto there in an expeditionary way 01:17:33.930 --> 01:17:35.410 to give increased capacity. 01:17:35.690 --> 01:17:37.550 - I think that's a great point and that provides 01:17:37.550 --> 01:17:39.320 a lot of flexibility to the force too, 01:17:39.320 --> 01:17:42.300 to be able to move and to surge medical capacity 01:17:42.300 --> 01:17:44.170 when necessary and do that pretty quickly. 01:17:44.170 --> 01:17:46.710 So I appreciate you looking outside the box 01:17:46.710 --> 01:17:48.810 from the existing platforms to leverage 01:17:48.810 --> 01:17:50.410 the other assets that are there. 01:17:50.717 --> 01:17:53.380 One element that I did want to get 01:17:53.380 --> 01:17:55.760 some additional reflection on and then I'll go back 01:17:55.760 --> 01:17:57.550 to our other members if they have any other questions, 01:17:57.550 --> 01:18:00.720 and that is in the shipbuilding plan both 01:18:00.720 --> 01:18:04.180 for our warships and our ready reserve force, 01:18:04.440 --> 01:18:07.620 there is not an element of those plans 01:18:07.620 --> 01:18:09.130 that addresses attrition. 01:18:09.660 --> 01:18:12.180 And we all know in a great power competition, 01:18:12.370 --> 01:18:14.680 I suspect that there's gonna be some attrition there. 01:18:14.680 --> 01:18:18.420 We talk about operating in contested space 01:18:18.710 --> 01:18:21.230 and looking at where we are, and again if history 01:18:21.230 --> 01:18:24.770 is any lesson to us in a highly contested environment 01:18:24.770 --> 01:18:26.570 we see what happens. 01:18:26.570 --> 01:18:28.990 So I'd like to get your reflection on how do we make sure 01:18:28.990 --> 01:18:31.410 we properly address attrition 01:18:31.410 --> 01:18:33.220 in all the elements of shipbuilding, 01:18:33.220 --> 01:18:36.560 both in our warships and our ready reserve force 01:18:36.620 --> 01:18:39.310 in making sure that we understand 01:18:39.590 --> 01:18:42.110 what the outcome would be in that situation. 01:18:42.900 --> 01:18:45.950 - Yes sir, and Admiral Merz can cover how we think about it. 01:18:46.480 --> 01:18:47.900 But I would also broaden that thought 01:18:47.900 --> 01:18:49.530 at least in our thinking is, 01:18:49.780 --> 01:18:52.120 is how do we think about resilience 01:18:53.700 --> 01:18:56.340 and not just in terms of attrition of the thing, 01:18:56.340 --> 01:18:58.260 but in terms of cyber protection 01:18:58.500 --> 01:19:00.260 and all the other forms of resilience 01:19:00.260 --> 01:19:01.710 to include medical and all that. 01:19:01.710 --> 01:19:05.370 So I think our thinking is resilience in the broadest sense 01:19:06.840 --> 01:19:09.740 not just in the attrition in a kinetic sense. 01:19:09.940 --> 01:19:12.640 But I'll turn it to Admiral Merz to talk about that element 01:19:12.640 --> 01:19:13.780 specifically, just wanted to let you know 01:19:13.780 --> 01:19:16.440 we're thinking of resilience both from a network, 01:19:16.440 --> 01:19:20.090 from a cyber, from a people perspective 01:19:20.560 --> 01:19:22.530 not just a platform perspective. 01:19:22.530 --> 01:19:25.200 Bill I don't know if you want to share on the plan itself. 01:19:25.550 --> 01:19:27.940 - Thanks Mr. Chairman, great point. 01:19:28.350 --> 01:19:30.540 So the battle force ships, 01:19:30.540 --> 01:19:33.430 the 355 actually do account for attrition. 01:19:34.290 --> 01:19:35.940 The ready reserve force does not. 01:19:36.280 --> 01:19:37.850 So as we come out of this era 01:19:37.850 --> 01:19:39.500 of very compressed requirements 01:19:39.500 --> 01:19:43.190 where we would shift the attrition is to more risk. 01:19:44.080 --> 01:19:47.350 So this will give us the opportunity to reevaluate 01:19:47.350 --> 01:19:50.070 those assumptions and then reevaluate 01:19:50.070 --> 01:19:51.520 the requirements behind them. 01:19:52.290 --> 01:19:54.080 So work to be done there. 01:19:54.350 --> 01:19:57.610 Very insightful question on how we approach this 01:19:57.790 --> 01:20:00.410 but you're exactly right, this is warfare. 01:20:01.340 --> 01:20:02.940 It's only fair they shoot at us. 01:20:03.822 --> 01:20:06.440 And there be some success there that we have to account for. 01:20:07.890 --> 01:20:10.040 - Thank you, I'm gonna go down to Mr. Hunter. 01:20:10.890 --> 01:20:12.670 - Hey thanks Mr. Chairman for your indulgence. 01:20:12.670 --> 01:20:16.250 By the way General McDew is bringing that in, 01:20:16.253 --> 01:20:18.710 he's calculating attrition, trying to 01:20:18.750 --> 01:20:20.460 for the first time ever, which is crazy. 01:20:20.460 --> 01:20:22.950 About eight years ago, this just kind of blew my mind, 01:20:22.950 --> 01:20:24.380 I was looking at the transcripts going back 01:20:24.380 --> 01:20:27.420 to this same hearing going back eight or nine years. 01:20:27.700 --> 01:20:30.250 We would spend a quarter of a hearing talking about 01:20:30.300 --> 01:20:32.350 AAVs or expeditionary fighting vehicles, 01:20:32.350 --> 01:20:33.950 and I remember when General Dunford, 01:20:33.950 --> 01:20:35.470 he might have been a Lieutenant General at that point 01:20:35.470 --> 01:20:37.900 if I forget which star he skipped at what point, 01:20:38.135 --> 01:20:40.150 but he came up and he said this is the Marine Corps' 01:20:40.150 --> 01:20:42.410 number one thing, it's the Navy's number one thing, 01:20:42.410 --> 01:20:45.730 ship to shore, General Nellers put out 01:20:45.730 --> 01:20:47.950 fight to get to the fight, how do we do it, 01:20:47.950 --> 01:20:49.220 that was one of his directives. 01:20:49.220 --> 01:20:51.030 We didn't talk about it at all today. 01:20:51.030 --> 01:20:53.480 I just kind of caught that as we're sitting here. 01:20:54.100 --> 01:20:57.275 I've seen different prototypes that MCCDC is looking at 01:20:57.275 --> 01:20:59.570 and I'm sure the Navy's looking at stuff too, 01:20:59.570 --> 01:21:02.190 so what is your, we did bring it up. 01:21:02.410 --> 01:21:03.890 So is it no longer a big deal? 01:21:03.890 --> 01:21:06.890 Have we figured that out so well that we're just good on it, 01:21:06.970 --> 01:21:10.780 or we've admitted that we can't do it anymore in terms of 01:21:11.620 --> 01:21:15.000 anti-access aerial denial, is that an admittance of ours 01:21:15.020 --> 01:21:17.090 or we're just working it behind the scenes 01:21:17.090 --> 01:21:17.990 and it's a secret? 01:21:19.050 --> 01:21:21.820 - I'll start and then turn it over to Admiral Merz. 01:21:22.990 --> 01:21:25.630 We are working it very hard behind the scene 01:21:25.630 --> 01:21:27.680 and it's probably our highest priority 01:21:27.680 --> 01:21:31.420 because as you know better than anybody Congressman, 01:21:32.410 --> 01:21:35.020 where we've been focused in Iraq and Afghanistan 01:21:36.160 --> 01:21:38.740 and where that is is now with the clear guidance 01:21:38.740 --> 01:21:41.200 we've got in the National Defense Strategy 01:21:41.200 --> 01:21:43.180 to focus on pure competition. 01:21:43.360 --> 01:21:44.980 That's a completely different game 01:21:44.980 --> 01:21:47.420 than we've been dealing with for a long time. 01:21:47.500 --> 01:21:51.810 So as we look at that as a force that does, 01:21:51.880 --> 01:21:55.340 that concentrates on the threat and a threat that deals with 01:21:55.340 --> 01:21:57.990 our concepts and a concepts-based requirement system, 01:21:58.150 --> 01:22:00.610 dealing with that threat as we look at that, 01:22:00.790 --> 01:22:02.770 and we get questioned all the time, 01:22:02.770 --> 01:22:05.570 and a lot of it by smart congressional 01:22:05.970 --> 01:22:07.950 professional staff members asking us, 01:22:07.950 --> 01:22:10.750 how are you gonna operate in this contested environment. 01:22:10.830 --> 01:22:13.530 And we've been working this problem very hard 01:22:13.530 --> 01:22:18.030 with the Navy at all levels from the Commandant and the CNO 01:22:18.030 --> 01:22:21.330 on down all the way out into the operating forces. 01:22:21.400 --> 01:22:24.590 A lot of work done on our concepts. 01:22:24.710 --> 01:22:27.290 Littoral operations in a contested environment, 01:22:27.720 --> 01:22:29.610 distributed maritime operations, 01:22:29.610 --> 01:22:31.650 expeditionary advanced base operations, 01:22:31.840 --> 01:22:36.290 all of those I would say have done multiple war games 01:22:37.100 --> 01:22:39.320 on how we're gonna conduct those operations. 01:22:39.550 --> 01:22:43.990 Along with the fleet exercises that Congressman Wittman 01:22:44.230 --> 01:22:46.760 mentioned, Bold Alligator and Dawn Blitz. 01:22:46.920 --> 01:22:49.070 One of the other things that we did out at Camp Pendleton 01:22:49.070 --> 01:22:50.570 out in your neck of the woods, 01:22:50.930 --> 01:22:54.690 last year we conducted a ship to shore maneuver 01:22:55.874 --> 01:22:58.940 task force and advanced naval technology experiment. 01:22:59.720 --> 01:23:01.100 Going back to that problem solving, 01:23:01.100 --> 01:23:02.900 bringing everybody in from industry, 01:23:02.900 --> 01:23:04.360 the warfare centers, and going 01:23:04.360 --> 01:23:07.340 how are we gonna get ashore differently in the future 01:23:07.340 --> 01:23:08.750 than we've done in the past? 01:23:09.530 --> 01:23:12.240 We had written concepts, our Marine Corps Operating Concept. 01:23:12.240 --> 01:23:15.240 We had a video on that that showed a lot 01:23:15.240 --> 01:23:18.140 of unmanned systems, sensing, pulsing, 01:23:19.130 --> 01:23:21.950 deception to get ashore differently. 01:23:21.950 --> 01:23:23.150 Different types of maneuvering 01:23:23.150 --> 01:23:24.780 than we've ever done in the past. 01:23:24.780 --> 01:23:27.340 When we did that exercise out in Camp Pendleton, 01:23:27.340 --> 01:23:29.750 probably the first 15 to 20 minutes 01:23:29.930 --> 01:23:33.080 was all unmanned systems coming ashore in advance, 01:23:33.080 --> 01:23:36.190 sensing the environment, deceiving in the environment, 01:23:36.220 --> 01:23:37.870 and going where the enemy is not. 01:23:37.870 --> 01:23:40.120 So a lot of effort is going into this, 01:23:40.120 --> 01:23:41.720 we're spending an awful lot of time 01:23:41.720 --> 01:23:43.380 with the Navy working this hard. 01:23:43.870 --> 01:23:46.990 We see it as a long term problem but we're getting after it 01:23:46.990 --> 01:23:50.150 very hard to determine how we're gonna do this differently. 01:23:50.150 --> 01:23:53.970 It's not gonna be how we did it at Iwo Jima or Incheon 01:23:54.130 --> 01:23:55.980 or some of the other exercises we've done 01:23:55.980 --> 01:23:56.860 in the recent and past, 01:23:56.860 --> 01:23:59.050 this is gonna be a completely different operation 01:23:59.050 --> 01:24:02.070 that's really gonna lie on the joint force 01:24:02.090 --> 01:24:03.590 and certainly the naval force. 01:24:03.590 --> 01:24:07.380 I think too many times folks look at the amphib force 01:24:07.380 --> 01:24:09.490 and how are we gonna do this as an amphib force, 01:24:09.490 --> 01:24:13.250 it's not it's a naval campaign just like it was in other 01:24:13.890 --> 01:24:15.790 contested environment where we've been in the past 01:24:15.790 --> 01:24:18.600 where we need submarines, we need cruisers and destroyers, 01:24:18.600 --> 01:24:21.090 we need carriers out there supporting us. 01:24:21.090 --> 01:24:23.870 So I think that's a key part of we're part of the problem, 01:24:23.870 --> 01:24:25.950 we're helping to solve the problem as part of that. 01:24:25.950 --> 01:24:29.050 And that's why I think we are so focused on the sea control 01:24:29.050 --> 01:24:31.180 as General Neller says, we have to fight 01:24:31.180 --> 01:24:32.410 to get to the fight. 01:24:32.500 --> 01:24:35.700 We bring a lot of capabilities with F-35s 01:24:35.700 --> 01:24:38.170 on big deck amphibs and a lot of other capabilities 01:24:38.170 --> 01:24:40.170 and how do we contribute to that naval campaign 01:24:40.170 --> 01:24:42.170 of getting to the fight and the sea control, 01:24:42.170 --> 01:24:44.620 sea denial mission that we're being tasked to do. 01:24:47.370 --> 01:24:51.750 - Yes sir, so there's a lot of effort going on in this area 01:24:51.830 --> 01:24:54.420 and this is where the details of the shipbuilding plan 01:24:54.420 --> 01:24:55.470 are very important. 01:24:56.443 --> 01:24:58.840 So when you look at the amphib line 01:24:58.930 --> 01:25:01.420 it appears to be one of the lines that's closest 01:25:01.420 --> 01:25:03.500 to its requirement, which naturally has us focused 01:25:03.500 --> 01:25:06.010 more on the destroyers and the attack submarines, 01:25:06.010 --> 01:25:08.580 which are quite a distance from their requirement. 01:25:08.580 --> 01:25:11.310 The problem with the amphib, it's not the correct mix 01:25:11.310 --> 01:25:14.200 of amphibs that we need for the lethality standpoint. 01:25:14.480 --> 01:25:16.870 So we have put a lot of effort into the LXR 01:25:16.870 --> 01:25:20.150 on what those capabilities will mean to the Navy 01:25:20.150 --> 01:25:22.330 and the Marine Corps, and Secretary Geurts will attest 01:25:22.330 --> 01:25:23.740 that we dug in pretty firmly 01:25:23.740 --> 01:25:25.800 on surrendering any of those capabilities 01:25:26.670 --> 01:25:29.610 before we sent it out for competition. 01:25:29.940 --> 01:25:32.330 There's also the ship to shore connector piece to this, 01:25:32.330 --> 01:25:34.960 the LCAC replacement that a year ago I would tell you 01:25:34.960 --> 01:25:36.690 we were in a crisis with that program, 01:25:36.690 --> 01:25:40.200 but again thanks to the increased top line 01:25:40.200 --> 01:25:42.030 we were able to shore that program up, 01:25:42.030 --> 01:25:44.310 competed very well against, even though it's not 01:25:44.310 --> 01:25:46.540 an accountable ship in the 355, 01:25:46.980 --> 01:25:48.900 as Chairman Wittman said we have this whole family 01:25:48.900 --> 01:25:51.880 of enablers underneath it that have to be tended to 01:25:52.680 --> 01:25:53.660 and that was one of them. 01:25:53.660 --> 01:25:56.300 And then of course I certainly agree with General Walsh 01:25:56.300 --> 01:25:57.880 on the whole unmanned side of that. 01:25:57.880 --> 01:26:00.010 And then there's the whole mine warfare piece to that 01:26:00.010 --> 01:26:02.810 where the threat is much easier to advance 01:26:02.820 --> 01:26:05.130 ahead of the ability to counter that threat. 01:26:05.850 --> 01:26:07.850 A lot of work going on in there as well. 01:26:08.010 --> 01:26:10.310 - If I could just follow up with one point is, 01:26:10.450 --> 01:26:13.720 you know, over the last few year we focused on readiness, 01:26:13.760 --> 01:26:16.660 are the shipyards manned correctly for maintenance 01:26:16.760 --> 01:26:18.410 to get the wholeness of the ships we need. 01:26:18.410 --> 01:26:20.630 Are they coming in on time, are we pulling them out. 01:26:20.630 --> 01:26:24.280 We focused on the optimized fleet response plan. 01:26:24.810 --> 01:26:25.710 Doing much better at that. 01:26:25.710 --> 01:26:28.170 We then focused on capacity and I think 01:26:28.190 --> 01:26:29.710 this shipbuilding plan starts moving us 01:26:29.710 --> 01:26:31.460 in the right direction on capacity. 01:26:31.670 --> 01:26:33.820 From an amphib side I would say the next thing 01:26:33.820 --> 01:26:35.910 that we've got to really focus on from our side 01:26:35.910 --> 01:26:39.000 is along with the other battle force ships, 01:26:39.000 --> 01:26:41.900 is capability on those ships. 01:26:42.090 --> 01:26:44.290 So for us to be able to stand in and operate 01:26:44.290 --> 01:26:47.140 in a contested environment those ships need to be 01:26:47.140 --> 01:26:49.780 part of that battle force, so we start talking about 01:26:49.780 --> 01:26:52.750 ability to detect, control, engage, 01:26:52.850 --> 01:26:54.580 self-defense capabilities, 01:26:54.580 --> 01:26:57.030 strike and missile defense capabilities. 01:26:57.030 --> 01:26:59.610 When you start bringing a fifth generation capability 01:26:59.610 --> 01:27:02.210 into that amphibious task force, 01:27:02.240 --> 01:27:05.840 we need the same type of capabilities to be able to operate 01:27:05.920 --> 01:27:08.930 within that battle force and be able to network 01:27:08.930 --> 01:27:12.780 into the fleet tactical grid just like those other ships do. 01:27:13.080 --> 01:27:14.250 - [Mr. Hunter] Very good. 01:27:15.500 --> 01:27:16.333 - Thank you Mr. Hunter. 01:27:16.333 --> 01:27:19.860 Gentlemen, thanks again, this was a great and exhaustive 01:27:20.170 --> 01:27:22.870 addressing of the challenges that we face. 01:27:23.120 --> 01:27:25.710 As you've heard from other members, this is a team effort 01:27:25.710 --> 01:27:29.200 and it's a bipartisan effort, bicameral effort to make sure 01:27:29.200 --> 01:27:32.730 we get our Navy and Marine Corps team where they need to be. 01:27:33.520 --> 01:27:35.440 The Secretary of Defense I think has laid out 01:27:35.440 --> 01:27:37.890 very eloquently where we are today 01:27:37.890 --> 01:27:40.220 in the era of great power competition. 01:27:40.570 --> 01:27:44.180 And I will close with this, with the words of a former 01:27:44.180 --> 01:27:46.790 Admiral of the Navy, David Farragut, 01:27:46.920 --> 01:27:49.320 there at the Battle of Mobile Bay, gentlemen, 01:27:49.580 --> 01:27:51.850 damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead. 01:27:52.100 --> 01:27:54.500 Thank you, with that we adjourn. 01:27:54.628 --> 01:27:55.461 Thank you.