WEBVTT 00:01.240 --> 00:02.390 - Please come to order. 00:04.730 --> 00:06.260 We welcome back to the committee the commander 00:06.260 --> 00:08.820 of US Central Command General Joseph Votel. 00:09.040 --> 00:10.260 We are particularly interested 00:10.260 --> 00:13.290 in hearing General Votel's views on the changes 00:13.290 --> 00:16.490 that the new National Defense Strategy brings 00:16.490 --> 00:18.990 to his area of responsibility. 00:20.020 --> 00:22.730 The strategies emphasis on strategic competition 00:22.730 --> 00:26.380 has implications for a region where Russian influence 00:26.380 --> 00:28.660 and presence is much greater now 00:28.660 --> 00:31.040 than it was before the Syrian conflict began. 00:31.913 --> 00:33.750 A region that is one of the targets 00:33.750 --> 00:35.880 of the Chinese whole-of-nation effort 00:35.930 --> 00:37.450 to increase its sway, 00:37.850 --> 00:40.820 in a region where the Iranians are aggressively expanding 00:40.820 --> 00:44.870 its wide arc of control to the detriment of its neighbors. 00:46.080 --> 00:49.600 These developments and the continuing threat of terrorism 00:49.650 --> 00:54.170 in and emanating from the CENTCOM region suggests 00:54.170 --> 00:55.890 that the United States cannot afford 00:55.890 --> 00:57.310 to remove our attention, 00:57.350 --> 01:00.520 or our presence from this vital area. 01:01.820 --> 01:04.600 Fortunately, we have a number of strong allies and partners 01:04.600 --> 01:05.640 that are able and willing 01:05.640 --> 01:08.260 to actively defend our joint interests, 01:08.730 --> 01:11.600 but as we have painfully learned in recent years 01:11.600 --> 01:15.160 there is simply no substitute for the United States. 01:15.610 --> 01:18.340 When we withdraw prematurely, the world, 01:18.690 --> 01:20.920 including the threats to our homeland, 01:21.190 --> 01:23.270 can rapidly grow more dangerous. 01:24.500 --> 01:26.350 The challenge however is that CENTCOM 01:26.350 --> 01:27.960 has received the lion's share 01:27.960 --> 01:30.200 of military resources for some time 01:30.790 --> 01:32.290 and while its importance remains, 01:32.290 --> 01:34.790 we have to be more active in other vital areas 01:34.790 --> 01:36.360 of the world at the same time. 01:37.380 --> 01:39.340 The recent budget agreement helps, 01:39.510 --> 01:40.650 but it will take time 01:40.650 --> 01:43.700 to rebuild and field needed capability. 01:44.610 --> 01:48.000 In these circumstances, General Votel has his hands full 01:48.000 --> 01:52.230 in making sure that US national security is protected. 01:52.360 --> 01:54.960 Let me yield to the acting ranking member, 01:54.960 --> 01:56.970 the gentlelady from California, Ms. Davis. 01:56.970 --> 01:58.690 - Thank you, thank you Mr. Chairman. 01:58.690 --> 02:01.360 I ask unanimous consent that the ranking member's statement 02:01.360 --> 02:02.650 be entered into the record. 02:02.650 --> 02:03.550 - [Mac] Without objection. 02:03.550 --> 02:07.460 - Thank you and I would also like to welcome General Votel 02:07.460 --> 02:09.660 and thank him for appearing today. 02:10.090 --> 02:13.250 The Central Command area responsibility remains critical 02:13.630 --> 02:16.700 to our national interest and we have to maintain a focus 02:16.780 --> 02:18.300 on security in the region. 02:18.870 --> 02:20.860 Reports of continued military progress 02:20.860 --> 02:23.110 in the Counter-Isis campaign are encouraging, 02:23.510 --> 02:26.440 but military achievements alone, as I think we all know, 02:26.770 --> 02:29.680 will not guarantee long-term success. 02:30.000 --> 02:31.890 We must work with the international community, 02:31.890 --> 02:34.280 employ a whole government approach to foster 02:34.280 --> 02:37.570 and to sustain political, economic and social conditions 02:37.570 --> 02:39.000 to ensure long-term stability. 02:39.000 --> 02:41.150 We cannot allow the region 02:41.150 --> 02:43.670 to fall into violent extremism again. 02:44.420 --> 02:48.250 To truly defeat ISIS we must be just as determined 02:48.250 --> 02:51.410 to secure a durable peace as we have been 02:51.410 --> 02:53.750 to achieve a decisive military victory. 02:54.510 --> 02:57.820 We have long sought a stable end state in Afghanistan. 02:58.300 --> 03:01.690 For more than 16 years the United States has concentrated 03:01.980 --> 03:03.900 on eliminating terrorist threats 03:04.440 --> 03:06.860 while working closely with our allies and our partners 03:06.860 --> 03:09.840 to train, advise and assist Afghan forces 03:09.990 --> 03:11.500 to secure the country. 03:12.320 --> 03:16.930 Despite significant progress, Afghan forces are still 03:16.930 --> 03:18.030 in need of assistance. 03:18.230 --> 03:19.940 So where are we headed? 03:20.750 --> 03:22.880 Although our commitments to oppose violent extremism 03:22.880 --> 03:25.220 in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan are consuming, 03:25.560 --> 03:26.950 we must also remain alert 03:26.950 --> 03:28.890 to other regional security challenges. 03:29.150 --> 03:32.140 Despite an agreement regarding its nuclear program, 03:32.240 --> 03:36.300 Iran remains a designated state sponsor of terrorism 03:36.500 --> 03:38.795 and it exerts destabilizing influence 03:38.795 --> 03:41.070 in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. 03:41.490 --> 03:43.830 We must deter Iran from precipitating conflict 03:43.830 --> 03:46.950 and dissuade it from engaging in malign activities. 03:46.950 --> 03:48.450 And we must also deter Russia, 03:48.780 --> 03:51.980 that is increasingly involved in the region as well. 03:53.040 --> 03:55.760 Certainly a complex set of issues General 03:56.700 --> 03:58.910 and I look forward to your testimony. 03:59.150 --> 04:00.590 Thank you very much for joining us. 04:00.590 --> 04:01.790 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 04:03.880 --> 04:04.780 - Joe, without objection, 04:04.780 --> 04:07.640 your full written statement will be made part of the record. 04:07.640 --> 04:08.473 Welcome back. 04:08.530 --> 04:09.480 The floor is yours. 04:11.430 --> 04:13.850 - Chairman Thornberry, Congresswoman Davis, 04:14.440 --> 04:16.040 distinguished members of the Committee, 04:16.040 --> 04:17.860 good morning and thank you for the opportunity 04:17.860 --> 04:20.780 to appear today to discuss the current posture 04:20.870 --> 04:23.870 and state of readiness of the United States Central Command. 04:24.050 --> 04:25.880 I come before you today on behalf 04:25.880 --> 04:28.430 of the over 80,000 members of the command. 04:28.940 --> 04:31.550 It is a dedicated team of military service members 04:31.550 --> 04:34.520 and civilians along with our coalition partners 04:34.870 --> 04:36.381 representing 70 nations 04:36.381 --> 04:39.080 and four international organizations, 04:39.510 --> 04:41.550 many of whom are forward-deployed across some 04:41.550 --> 04:43.630 of the most dangerous areas in the world. 04:44.210 --> 04:46.780 They sacrifice and risk on a daily basis, 04:47.090 --> 04:48.710 in many cases for the benefit 04:48.710 --> 04:51.090 of not only American strategic interests, 04:51.410 --> 04:52.590 but also the world's. 04:53.050 --> 04:56.130 Our people are the very best at what they do and they, 04:56.450 --> 04:58.020 and especially their families, 04:58.260 --> 05:00.480 deserve our admiration and gratitude. 05:01.040 --> 05:03.420 It is my sincere honor to lead and be a member 05:03.420 --> 05:05.770 of such a fine team of dedicated professionals. 05:06.083 --> 05:09.240 I am approaching the two-year mark of my time in command. 05:09.770 --> 05:12.320 This period has been both incredibly challenging 05:12.780 --> 05:16.100 and immensely rewarding during what has arguably been one 05:16.100 --> 05:19.840 of the most volatile times in this complex region's history. 05:20.450 --> 05:22.770 It has been 11 months since I last appeared 05:22.770 --> 05:23.820 before this committee 05:24.160 --> 05:27.400 and since then we have made considerable military progress 05:27.430 --> 05:31.390 in Iraq and Syria, Afghanistan, Egypt, Lebanon 05:31.440 --> 05:33.040 and the maritime environment. 05:33.540 --> 05:36.480 However, we remain very clear-eyed regarding 05:36.480 --> 05:38.600 both the permanence of that progress 05:38.950 --> 05:41.250 and the challenges that we face in the future. 05:41.720 --> 05:44.750 In the past year we have achieved incredible success 05:44.750 --> 05:47.410 against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. 05:47.880 --> 05:51.259 The Iraqi security forces and Syrian democratic forces 05:51.259 --> 05:53.950 are operating at their most effective levels 05:54.170 --> 05:56.560 since Operation Inherent Resolve began. 05:57.040 --> 06:01.840 And now over 98% of the territory previously held by ISIS 06:02.190 --> 06:05.600 in Iraq and Syria is no longer under their control. 06:06.050 --> 06:08.830 The destruction of the ISIS physical caliphate 06:09.220 --> 06:11.990 is imminent and millions of displaced persons 06:11.990 --> 06:13.030 are returning home 06:13.370 --> 06:15.620 and beginning the long process of rebuilding. 06:16.080 --> 06:18.910 Now we must consolidate our gains by investing 06:18.910 --> 06:22.501 in the security forces relationships and capabilities 06:22.501 --> 06:26.120 that will hold the territory and keep ISIS from returning. 06:27.080 --> 06:28.520 Based upon that progress, 06:28.940 --> 06:31.270 CENTCOM is conducting an operational alignment 06:31.270 --> 06:34.900 and rebalancing effort to achieve three specific goals. 06:35.410 --> 06:38.270 The first goal is to complete major combat operations 06:38.270 --> 06:41.900 in Iraq and Syria and bring the Defeat-ISIS campaign 06:41.900 --> 06:43.490 to a responsible close. 06:44.060 --> 06:46.920 Military success in the campaign up to this point 06:46.934 --> 06:49.940 presents us an opportunity to reposition some 06:49.940 --> 06:53.550 of our resources from Iraq and Syria to Afghanistan 06:53.990 --> 06:56.480 in a manner that keeps the pressure on ISIS, 06:56.524 --> 07:00.160 but also sets us up to break the stalemate in Afghanistan. 07:00.950 --> 07:02.660 We retain sufficient capability 07:02.660 --> 07:05.430 to continue our efforts against ISIS 07:05.780 --> 07:09.150 despite the increasingly complex situation across Syria 07:09.700 --> 07:12.200 and especially in the northwest province of Afrin. 07:12.650 --> 07:14.580 We are fully engaged with our mission partners 07:14.580 --> 07:15.930 and the Department of State 07:16.050 --> 07:17.940 to carefully balance our objectives. 07:18.420 --> 07:20.120 Our partners on the ground in Syria 07:20.120 --> 07:22.870 have advanced us a long way towards our objectives 07:23.170 --> 07:24.190 and we will stick with them 07:24.190 --> 07:26.040 through the completion of this fight. 07:26.130 --> 07:28.610 In Iraq, the Iraqi security forces 07:28.610 --> 07:30.620 are rapidly consolidating gains 07:30.940 --> 07:33.590 and preparing to support elections later this spring. 07:34.390 --> 07:37.450 The second goal is to prioritize the implementation 07:37.450 --> 07:39.890 of the South Asia strategy in Afghanistan. 07:40.570 --> 07:43.070 This strategy reaffirms the US government's 07:43.070 --> 07:45.000 enduring commitment to Afghanistan 07:45.410 --> 07:48.550 by reinforcing the two complementary military missions: 07:49.070 --> 07:51.800 The NATO-led Train, Advise and Assist Mission 07:51.972 --> 07:54.160 and the US Counter-terrorism Mission. 07:54.685 --> 07:57.093 We are making sure that with our support 07:57.093 --> 08:00.300 the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 08:00.560 --> 08:02.660 are well postured to begin operations 08:02.660 --> 08:06.160 to seize the initiative, expand population control 08:06.510 --> 08:08.440 and secure credible elections. 08:09.350 --> 08:12.740 Part and parcel of this effort is our regionalized approach 08:12.740 --> 08:14.730 to engage all countries with a stake 08:14.730 --> 08:18.090 in Afghanistan's stability, especially Pakistan. 08:18.640 --> 08:21.000 Our goal here is to develop a productive 08:21.040 --> 08:23.780 and trustful relationship that benefits both 08:23.780 --> 08:27.160 of our militaries and supports our objectives in the region. 08:27.970 --> 08:29.750 The third goal is to ensure 08:29.750 --> 08:31.610 that we have aligned our military efforts 08:31.610 --> 08:34.930 with our broader interagency and international efforts 08:35.210 --> 08:37.154 to neutralize, counterbalance 08:37.154 --> 08:40.020 and shape the destabilizing impact 08:40.033 --> 08:42.240 that Iran has across the region. 08:42.770 --> 08:46.330 Make no mistake, while we continue to confront the scourge 08:46.330 --> 08:50.254 of terrorism, Iran's malign activities across the region 08:50.254 --> 08:52.770 pose the long-term threat to stability 08:52.890 --> 08:54.190 in this part of the world. 08:54.580 --> 08:56.340 We view ourselves, the military, 08:56.340 --> 09:00.310 as supporting the many other and more effective resources 09:00.310 --> 09:02.260 and capabilities of the US government 09:02.590 --> 09:04.290 and its partners in this endeavor. 09:04.800 --> 09:07.256 The recently published National Defense Strategy 09:07.256 --> 09:11.230 rightly identifies the resurgence of great power competition 09:11.570 --> 09:14.030 as our principal national security challenge 09:14.350 --> 09:16.610 and we in CENTCOM see the effects 09:16.610 --> 09:18.710 of that competition throughout the region. 09:19.390 --> 09:21.400 Russia's support of the Assad regime 09:21.400 --> 09:22.890 has not only propped them up, 09:23.170 --> 09:26.640 but has also added complexity to the Defeat ISIS Campaign. 09:27.220 --> 09:31.089 Diplomatically and militarily, Moscow plays both arsonist 09:31.089 --> 09:34.630 and firefighter, fueling tensions among all parties 09:34.630 --> 09:38.430 in Syria, the Syrian regime, Iran, Turkey, 09:38.680 --> 09:41.240 the Syrian Democratic Forces, the United States 09:41.240 --> 09:42.690 and other coalition partners, 09:43.050 --> 09:46.510 then serving as an arbiter to resolve disputes attempting 09:46.520 --> 09:50.040 to undermine and weaken each party's bargaining positions. 09:50.590 --> 09:53.250 Despite the key role that our partners on the ground, 09:53.330 --> 09:56.720 the Syrian Democratic Forces and the coalition have played 09:56.726 --> 09:58.900 in dealing defeat to ISIS, 09:59.230 --> 10:01.450 Russia has placed this progress at risk 10:01.450 --> 10:03.730 with their activities which are not focused 10:03.730 --> 10:04.840 on defeating ISIS, 10:05.140 --> 10:07.199 but rather on preserving their own influence 10:07.199 --> 10:10.460 in Kurd control over the outcome of the situation. 10:11.010 --> 10:13.460 It is clear that Russia's interests in Syria 10:13.650 --> 10:14.930 are Russia's interests 10:15.150 --> 10:17.700 and not those of the wider international community. 10:18.420 --> 10:23.420 China is pursuing long-term steady economic growth 10:24.310 --> 10:27.600 in the region through its One Belt One Road policy, 10:28.110 --> 10:30.820 but it is also improving its military posture 10:30.820 --> 10:34.410 by connecting ports such as Gwadar in Pakistan 10:34.410 --> 10:37.600 with its first overseas military base in Djibouti 10:37.990 --> 10:40.310 adjacent to the critical Bab-el-Mandeb. 10:40.740 --> 10:44.530 While Beijing claims both locations support peacekeeping 10:44.860 --> 10:47.990 and humanitarian operations, the new military base 10:47.990 --> 10:51.720 and Port bolsters China's force projection into the region. 10:52.410 --> 10:55.940 Both China and Russia seek to fill in perceived gaps 10:55.940 --> 10:59.080 in US interests by increasing defense cooperation 10:59.080 --> 11:01.780 and sales of their equipment to our regional partners. 11:02.490 --> 11:04.820 They both are also cultivating 11:04.820 --> 11:06.940 multidimensional ties to Iran. 11:07.430 --> 11:08.980 The lifting of UN sanctions 11:08.980 --> 11:11.180 under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 11:11.440 --> 11:14.626 opened the path for Iran to resume membership application 11:14.626 --> 11:17.180 to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 11:17.810 --> 11:20.500 In addition, Russia, supported by Iran, 11:20.830 --> 11:23.860 continues to bolster a friendly regime in Syria, 11:24.350 --> 11:27.640 attempt to limit our US military presence in Iraq 11:27.640 --> 11:31.470 and Afghanistan and creates friction among NATO partners. 11:32.070 --> 11:35.370 Against this backdrop of increasing great power interaction 11:35.740 --> 11:38.030 are the enduring issues of the region: 11:38.410 --> 11:41.060 Social, economic and political challenges, 11:41.380 --> 11:45.590 high unemployment, falling oil prices, a youth bulge, 11:45.960 --> 11:49.200 large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons 11:49.530 --> 11:51.470 and long-standing border conflicts. 11:52.040 --> 11:54.750 We in CENTCOM stand ready with all of our partners 11:54.750 --> 11:57.790 to defend US interests against these and other threats. 11:58.210 --> 12:00.716 Our strategic approach of preparing the environment, 12:00.716 --> 12:02.460 pursuing opportunities 12:02.460 --> 12:05.430 and working to prevail wherever we can is working. 12:05.870 --> 12:07.300 We are postured for purpose, 12:07.600 --> 12:10.760 proactive in pursuing opportunities and resolve to win. 12:11.470 --> 12:13.840 I'd like to close by sharing three dynamics 12:13.840 --> 12:16.740 that we assess are essential to prevailing in this region. 12:17.300 --> 12:20.700 First, as I have previously testified in the conduct 12:20.700 --> 12:23.580 of our campaigns in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, 12:23.990 --> 12:27.010 as well as our operations in places like Yemen, Lebanon 12:27.010 --> 12:31.240 and Egypt, we have adopted a by, with, and through approach 12:31.690 --> 12:33.430 that places a heavy reliance 12:33.430 --> 12:36.640 on indigenous partner nation forces. 12:37.210 --> 12:39.030 Our partners do not always want us 12:39.030 --> 12:40.690 to solve their problems for them, 12:41.060 --> 12:43.110 so we enable them to stand on their own. 12:43.720 --> 12:46.440 And while this approach does present its own challenges 12:46.440 --> 12:47.990 and can be more time-consuming, 12:48.352 --> 12:51.790 it provides local solutions to local problems. 12:52.170 --> 12:54.960 This approach is not without risk as we are seeing unfold 12:54.960 --> 12:58.890 in Syria today, but in general it is proving very effective 12:58.980 --> 13:02.040 and will likely pay significant dividends going forward. 13:02.630 --> 13:05.970 Secondly, successful pursuit of US objectives 13:05.970 --> 13:09.550 in this region only comes from an integrated approach 13:09.550 --> 13:11.970 aligned with interorganizational partners. 13:12.540 --> 13:14.730 Defense of the nation is a team sport. 13:15.180 --> 13:17.340 This applies not just within the command, 13:17.640 --> 13:19.590 but with our fellow combatant commands, 13:19.600 --> 13:22.490 our component commands, our established combined 13:22.490 --> 13:26.960 and joint task forces, the central region's 18 country teams 13:27.300 --> 13:29.970 and other department's agencies and organizations 13:29.970 --> 13:33.680 of the US government who have provided unwavering support 13:33.715 --> 13:36.920 over almost two decades of persistent conflict. 13:37.540 --> 13:38.970 Our allies in the region 13:39.050 --> 13:40.840 and the wider international community 13:40.840 --> 13:43.590 are equally as critical to supporting our mission. 13:44.160 --> 13:46.480 They directly support the CENTCOM headquarters 13:46.480 --> 13:49.200 with more than 200 foreign military officers 13:49.259 --> 13:53.230 from 49 nations, all of whom are part of the success 13:53.230 --> 13:55.670 of CENTCOM and we are grateful for 13:55.710 --> 13:58.050 and largely depend upon their partnership. 13:58.690 --> 14:01.290 As the National Defense Strategy captures clearly, 14:01.730 --> 14:03.760 strengthening existing relationships 14:03.760 --> 14:06.890 and building new ones will be key to our future success. 14:07.300 --> 14:09.310 We are doing this in CENTCOM every day. 14:10.100 --> 14:14.270 Finally, we could not do what we do on a daily basis 14:14.270 --> 14:15.820 without the support of Congress 14:16.120 --> 14:18.170 and by extension, the American people. 14:18.730 --> 14:20.700 We sincerely appreciate this committee's 14:20.700 --> 14:23.280 continued strong support for our operations, 14:23.540 --> 14:25.220 authorities and resources. 14:25.660 --> 14:27.980 And especially the same to the Services, 14:28.110 --> 14:31.670 Special Operations Command and other defense agencies 14:31.670 --> 14:34.980 that we rely upon for our military wherewithal. 14:35.560 --> 14:38.060 Your support will remain important as we contend 14:38.060 --> 14:40.680 with what potentially are generational struggles 14:41.020 --> 14:43.480 to defend our homeland from the threats outlined 14:43.480 --> 14:45.130 in our National Defense Strategy. 14:45.780 --> 14:48.130 US government commitment to the CENTCOM area 14:48.130 --> 14:51.330 of responsibility is more important now than ever. 14:51.790 --> 14:54.630 For our part, we will support the third pillar 14:54.630 --> 14:57.200 of the National Defense Strategy, business reform, 14:57.510 --> 15:00.100 by continuing to be good stewards of the resources 15:00.180 --> 15:02.560 and authorities that Congress provides us. 15:03.190 --> 15:06.160 To close, I want once again thank the outstanding men 15:06.160 --> 15:09.010 and women who comprise the United States Central Command, 15:09.030 --> 15:12.070 easily our finest and most precious resource. 15:12.420 --> 15:15.430 They continue to make great sacrifices and contributions 15:15.430 --> 15:18.720 to ensure the command meets our strategic objectives 15:18.720 --> 15:20.520 and protects our nation's interests. 15:20.860 --> 15:23.100 We must ensure they have everything they need 15:23.100 --> 15:26.860 to do their jobs as effectively and efficiently as possible. 15:27.470 --> 15:28.830 We are also keenly aware 15:28.830 --> 15:31.610 and grateful for the sacrifices made by our families. 15:32.130 --> 15:33.530 They are vital members of the team 15:33.530 --> 15:36.180 and we could not accomplish our mission without them. 15:36.480 --> 15:38.650 They too make important contributions 15:38.650 --> 15:41.830 and tremendous sacrifices every day to support us. 15:42.120 --> 15:45.120 I thank them on behalf of the Command and a grateful nation. 15:45.160 --> 15:48.160 Thank you again and I look forward answering your questions. 15:50.140 --> 15:51.140 - Thank you General. 15:51.270 --> 15:54.760 Let me remind members that immediately upon conclusion 15:54.920 --> 15:57.750 of this open hearing we will regather 15:57.750 --> 16:01.190 with General Votel upstairs in a classified session. 16:01.550 --> 16:06.550 So be in touch to know exactly when this open hearing ends. 16:07.940 --> 16:11.900 Since Joe Votel and I've had a chance to visit recently, 16:11.900 --> 16:15.060 I'm going to yield five minutes initially 16:15.060 --> 16:17.210 to the gentlelady from Wyoming, Ms. Cheney. 16:18.050 --> 16:19.520 - [Liz] Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. 16:19.520 --> 16:21.530 Thank you General Votel for your service 16:21.530 --> 16:22.780 and for being here today. 16:22.900 --> 16:25.800 I wanted to ask you to elaborate, 16:26.360 --> 16:29.010 in particular, on the threat from Iran. 16:29.105 --> 16:34.105 One of the many grave flaws of the JCPOA 16:34.900 --> 16:36.720 is the fact that it failed 16:36.720 --> 16:39.000 to deal with Iran's ballistic missile threat. 16:39.687 --> 16:43.660 We are now seeing across the region, increasingly, 16:44.220 --> 16:47.440 evidence that Iran is transferring ballistic missiles 16:47.440 --> 16:49.030 and other conventional equipment 16:49.030 --> 16:51.850 to its allies in the region. 16:52.070 --> 16:53.980 Can you talk about exactly what you're seeing 16:53.980 --> 16:57.330 in this regard and what DOD is in a position 16:57.330 --> 16:58.980 to be able to do to defend us 16:58.980 --> 17:00.600 and our allies against that threat? 17:00.600 --> 17:02.460 - Thank you, Congresswoman, I think you've highlighted 17:02.460 --> 17:03.909 one of the principal concerns that we have 17:03.909 --> 17:07.420 in the increasing, not just quantity, 17:07.420 --> 17:11.630 but quality of their ballistic missiles and the export 17:11.630 --> 17:13.470 and movement of those capabilities 17:13.470 --> 17:18.470 to other groups and locations around the region. 17:20.450 --> 17:23.060 Certainly, as we've seen with Ambassador Haley 17:23.060 --> 17:25.250 and her demonstration most recently 17:25.250 --> 17:28.310 with some of the items recovered from Saudi Arabia, 17:28.515 --> 17:33.021 these weapons pose the threat of widening the conflict out 17:33.021 --> 17:38.021 of Yemen and frankly put our forces; our embassy in Riyadh, 17:39.230 --> 17:42.900 our forces in the United Arab Emirates at risk, 17:42.900 --> 17:44.100 as well as our partners. 17:44.330 --> 17:46.950 So I think first and foremost about their threat, 17:46.950 --> 17:48.920 is the quality and the quantity 17:49.113 --> 17:51.780 that they have been pursuing over the last several years, 17:51.780 --> 17:53.480 particularly with respect to this. 17:53.730 --> 17:55.300 Their direct introduction 17:55.300 --> 17:57.690 of asymmetric capabilities concerns me. 17:58.020 --> 18:00.380 As we look at places like the Bab-el-Mandeb 18:00.380 --> 18:02.290 where we see the introduction 18:02.290 --> 18:04.200 of coastal defense cruise missiles, 18:04.246 --> 18:06.030 some that are been modified, 18:06.400 --> 18:09.220 we know these are not capabilities that the Houthis had. 18:09.464 --> 18:12.020 So they have been provided to them by someone. 18:12.160 --> 18:13.210 That someone is Iran. 18:13.680 --> 18:16.170 The presence of explosive boats, 18:16.230 --> 18:18.510 the increased presence of mines in this area 18:18.800 --> 18:22.470 are all very similar to the layered threat 18:22.470 --> 18:25.450 that Iran has posed in the Straits of Hormuz 18:25.660 --> 18:29.020 and we hold them accountable for that. 18:29.020 --> 18:30.720 So that's a second aspect of this. 18:30.790 --> 18:33.240 The third of course is their continuing 18:34.350 --> 18:36.700 and changing power projection model, 18:36.950 --> 18:38.390 not only their own forces, 18:38.390 --> 18:40.660 but their proxies and the partners 18:40.660 --> 18:43.490 that they are attempting to create around the region. 18:43.580 --> 18:46.121 I think these all give us very significant concerns. 18:46.121 --> 18:48.720 With respect to your question about what we are doing. 18:48.720 --> 18:52.050 We are working with Saudi Arabia and some of our partners 18:52.050 --> 18:55.040 to ensure that they are optimizing their capabilities 18:55.040 --> 18:59.100 that they have, many of them US provided capabilities, 18:59.107 --> 19:01.890 to ensure that they can defend themselves. 19:01.890 --> 19:04.290 And I would report to you in this session 19:04.290 --> 19:06.930 that we are seeing some progress in that regard. 19:08.740 --> 19:09.890 - Thank you General. 19:09.890 --> 19:11.750 And in with respect to Syria, 19:12.191 --> 19:15.080 could you talk a little bit about there have been reports 19:15.080 --> 19:17.090 that we've seen facilities, for example, 19:17.090 --> 19:18.450 being built in Syria, 19:18.540 --> 19:22.400 reports in open source Iranian missile facilities, 19:23.110 --> 19:25.050 obviously the threat there is significant, 19:25.050 --> 19:28.610 not just to US interests, but also to allies like Israel. 19:29.022 --> 19:31.740 And could you talk more about what we might be able to do, 19:31.740 --> 19:33.740 particularly on the ground in Syria 19:34.080 --> 19:35.640 as we see the challenge of, 19:36.250 --> 19:38.220 we've been very effective against Isis there, 19:38.220 --> 19:39.640 but obviously our interests 19:39.640 --> 19:41.340 are still significantly threatened 19:41.830 --> 19:44.300 given the failed state situation we're facing. 19:44.540 --> 19:47.710 - Thank you, Congresswoman, as you know, countering Iran 19:47.710 --> 19:50.650 is not one of the coalition missions in Syria. 19:51.140 --> 19:54.050 That said, I think one of the most effective things 19:54.050 --> 19:56.170 that we can do in this particular area 19:56.170 --> 19:57.280 is build strong relationships -- 19:57.280 --> 19:58.640 - General, I'm sorry, could you just, 19:58.640 --> 20:01.630 I understand it's not formally part of the mission, 20:01.630 --> 20:05.220 but it seems to me if we're focused on countering Iran 20:05.220 --> 20:06.053 we need to be doing it 20:06.053 --> 20:07.840 every place our interests are threatened. 20:07.840 --> 20:12.810 - Absolutely and one of the key ways that we are doing 20:12.810 --> 20:15.760 that is through our strong relationships 20:15.760 --> 20:19.040 that we're building with the government of Iraq 20:19.490 --> 20:22.700 military forces that include not only forces 20:22.700 --> 20:25.100 that are in the interior, but certainly along their border. 20:25.100 --> 20:28.410 Our strong relationship with the Syrian democratic forces 20:28.410 --> 20:32.890 in the East and in the northern part of the country put us 20:32.890 --> 20:37.890 in a position where we can impede Iran's objectives 20:39.080 --> 20:41.860 of establishing lines of communication 20:41.860 --> 20:43.100 through these critical areas 20:43.100 --> 20:46.260 and trying to connect Tehran to Beirut for example. 20:46.740 --> 20:48.630 So I think first and foremost, 20:48.710 --> 20:50.080 some of these indirect things we're doing 20:50.080 --> 20:52.930 are very, very important to that. 20:52.930 --> 20:55.710 I think beyond that, I think also continuing 20:55.710 --> 20:58.990 to highlight and illuminate their activities 20:58.990 --> 21:03.990 is extraordinarily important so that they can be addressed, 21:04.740 --> 21:06.230 not just with military means, 21:06.230 --> 21:08.060 but certainly with the other means 21:08.060 --> 21:10.210 that are available to us across government. 21:11.430 --> 21:12.530 - Thank you very much. 21:12.580 --> 21:13.820 I'll yield back the balance of my time 21:13.820 --> 21:15.230 and look forward to discussing this further 21:15.230 --> 21:16.330 in the closed session. 21:17.520 --> 21:18.353 - [Mac] Thank you. 21:18.615 --> 21:19.448 Ms. Davis. 21:19.750 --> 21:22.240 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman and General Votel again, 21:22.240 --> 21:23.850 thank you for joining us. 21:24.270 --> 21:25.920 As you just mentioned 21:26.410 --> 21:28.740 and certainly in your written statement, 21:28.740 --> 21:30.670 the National Defense Strategy stated 21:30.670 --> 21:33.360 that great power competition, not terrorism, 21:33.720 --> 21:37.010 is now the primary focus of US national security. 21:37.390 --> 21:40.470 Could you elaborate for us on those comments 21:40.630 --> 21:44.620 and also talk about the shift in this National Strategy? 21:44.620 --> 21:49.620 How exactly will it impact CENTCOM and what, if any, 21:50.100 --> 21:52.610 significant changes will actually materialize 21:52.610 --> 21:53.960 as the result of the shift? 21:54.170 --> 21:56.660 And how will Central Command's capacity 21:56.660 --> 21:59.190 to perform its mission be affected? 22:00.420 --> 22:02.200 - Thanks Congresswoman. 22:02.200 --> 22:05.070 I think the shifts that are outlined 22:05.070 --> 22:07.200 in the National Defense Strategy are things 22:07.200 --> 22:08.750 that will take place over time. 22:09.320 --> 22:14.090 And so one of the principal ways that we are trying 22:14.390 --> 22:18.720 to manage that, of course, is through the development of 22:18.744 --> 22:21.960 and continued relationship building 22:21.960 --> 22:24.590 that we have in place with partners in the region 22:24.590 --> 22:27.820 and continuing to strengthen those relationships. 22:27.990 --> 22:29.720 One of the things that we have learned through this, 22:29.720 --> 22:31.120 by, with and through approach 22:31.120 --> 22:34.980 is that we can do a lot through our partners 22:34.980 --> 22:37.840 by providing advice, by providing expertise 22:37.840 --> 22:40.950 in areas where we have experience 22:41.150 --> 22:44.030 and we can do that with a smaller footprint 22:44.047 --> 22:48.650 and with correspondingly smaller investment. 22:48.650 --> 22:51.360 So I think one of the principal ways 22:51.360 --> 22:53.290 that we will address this going forward 22:53.290 --> 22:55.910 is continuing to build on the relationships 22:55.910 --> 22:59.080 and continuing to empower our partners in the region. 22:59.080 --> 23:01.930 - Can you just speak to the key challenges in doing that? 23:02.600 --> 23:05.680 - Well I think that certainly one of the key challenges 23:05.680 --> 23:09.550 will be making sure that we don't create the impression 23:09.550 --> 23:11.480 that we are abandoning CENTCOM. 23:11.862 --> 23:15.780 This of course is a key taking, the region, 23:16.080 --> 23:17.980 and so this of course is a key talking point 23:17.980 --> 23:20.370 not only for me, but for all leaders that come in there. 23:20.370 --> 23:23.180 We recognize that the interest that we have, 23:23.180 --> 23:24.410 the national interest that we have 23:24.410 --> 23:27.960 in this region for preventing attacks on the homeland, 23:27.960 --> 23:31.660 for preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 23:31.660 --> 23:34.070 for ensuring freedom of navigation and commerce 23:34.070 --> 23:35.460 through the critical straits, 23:35.460 --> 23:37.750 for ensuring other countries can't destabilize, 23:37.750 --> 23:40.730 those are enduring interests that we will always have 23:40.730 --> 23:42.730 and so this will always require us 23:42.730 --> 23:45.480 to continue to be engaged there to some aspect. 23:45.480 --> 23:48.640 But of the course, the Secretary will make decisions 23:48.640 --> 23:49.770 on shifting resources 23:49.770 --> 23:52.220 in accordance with the National Defense Strategy. 23:52.510 --> 23:53.343 - Thank you. 23:53.420 --> 23:55.390 You also talked about local solutions 23:55.390 --> 23:56.990 and we know how critical that is 23:56.990 --> 23:59.390 and as you've just mentioned, 24:00.700 --> 24:03.400 I wonder if you could also talk about the inclusion of women 24:03.400 --> 24:07.840 as a critical strategy that advances countering terrorism? 24:07.840 --> 24:10.360 National security and democratization 24:10.370 --> 24:12.170 and economic and social development, 24:14.080 --> 24:16.280 some of those programs have been successful, 24:16.430 --> 24:18.070 but there certainly is more to be done. 24:18.070 --> 24:21.250 How can we increase the effectiveness of these programs? 24:21.250 --> 24:24.090 - Well, I think the best way we can do it 24:24.090 --> 24:25.790 is by sharing our experiences with this. 24:25.790 --> 24:30.790 We learned by our inability to include women into many 24:31.420 --> 24:34.540 of our counterterrorism operations back in the beginning 24:34.540 --> 24:37.920 of these of fights that we've been involved in, 24:37.920 --> 24:41.760 that we are missing 50% of the population in doing that. 24:41.760 --> 24:44.178 And when we began to introduce them 24:44.178 --> 24:46.390 into positions where they could have influence, 24:46.390 --> 24:47.540 we learned a lot from that. 24:47.540 --> 24:49.870 So I think one of the key things that we can do 24:49.870 --> 24:52.750 is continue to lead by example in this area 24:53.040 --> 24:55.860 and demonstrate how this is valued by us. 24:56.178 --> 24:58.710 We do see partners in the region doing this. 24:58.710 --> 24:59.910 The Afghans are doing this. 24:59.910 --> 25:01.210 The Iraqis are doing this. 25:01.360 --> 25:03.980 We certainly see this with the Syrian democratic forces 25:03.980 --> 25:07.540 that we're working with in Syria 25:07.540 --> 25:08.760 and I would highlight to you 25:08.760 --> 25:10.930 that one of the principal commanders that they have, 25:10.930 --> 25:13.030 the very successful commander is a female. 25:13.760 --> 25:15.912 And so it is very much recognized 25:15.912 --> 25:20.750 that contributions come from the entirety of the force. 25:22.110 --> 25:22.943 - Thank you. 25:22.943 --> 25:23.776 I appreciate that. 25:23.776 --> 25:25.420 I think that a number of us have participated 25:25.420 --> 25:27.900 in those efforts and I hope 25:27.900 --> 25:29.350 that we can continue to do more of that. 25:29.350 --> 25:30.183 Thank you very much. 25:30.183 --> 25:31.280 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 25:31.620 --> 25:32.453 - Mr. Wilson. 25:34.010 --> 25:35.310 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 25:35.380 --> 25:38.150 General Votel, recently the United Nations released 25:38.150 --> 25:41.774 a remarkably gruesome report outlining North Korea's 25:41.774 --> 25:45.630 ongoing efforts to assist Syria building chemical weapons. 25:46.060 --> 25:47.630 This report states that North Korea 25:47.630 --> 25:50.153 has been shipping supplies to the Syrian government, 25:50.153 --> 25:53.640 including acid-resistant tiles, valves and thermometers. 25:53.950 --> 25:56.880 Additionally, North Korean missile technicians 25:57.150 --> 25:58.471 have been observed working 25:58.471 --> 26:01.700 at chemical weapons and missile facilities in Syria. 26:02.380 --> 26:05.170 Are you able to comment on the UN report and if not, 26:05.170 --> 26:07.680 could you describe the malign and disruptive role 26:08.040 --> 26:10.740 North Korea currently plays in Syria 26:10.750 --> 26:12.250 and whether or not you see their role 26:12.250 --> 26:13.790 expanding in the coming years? 26:14.070 --> 26:16.856 Additionally, what is being done to disrupt this cooperation 26:16.856 --> 26:19.340 between the dictatorships of North Korea 26:19.450 --> 26:20.790 and the Syrian government? 26:21.640 --> 26:24.650 - Congressman, I admit I have not seen that report, 26:24.650 --> 26:27.530 so I can't comment specifically on it. 26:27.530 --> 26:30.490 Obviously, we are concerned about the proliferation 26:30.490 --> 26:33.750 of these types of weapons in Syria with a country 26:33.750 --> 26:36.500 that has demonstrated the intent to use them. 26:36.500 --> 26:37.810 So this will be an area 26:37.810 --> 26:40.210 that we will continue to pay close attention to. 26:40.600 --> 26:41.770 - And of some important note, 26:41.770 --> 26:43.900 I was actually pleasantly surprised 26:44.440 --> 26:46.490 that the New York Times covered it today. 26:47.136 --> 26:49.180 My experience with that newspaper 26:49.180 --> 26:52.670 is they frequently overlook threats to stability 26:52.670 --> 26:56.620 in the world, but I urge your consideration. 26:57.380 --> 27:01.570 Also, a primary concern, for the long-term stability 27:01.570 --> 27:03.520 of the Middle East surrounds the return 27:03.710 --> 27:05.890 of defeated Islamic state fighters 27:06.130 --> 27:08.910 who are returning home from fighting in Iraq and Syria. 27:09.490 --> 27:11.330 An estimate from the Soufan Center 27:11.330 --> 27:15.570 and the Global Strategy Network have tracked 5,600 fighters 27:15.570 --> 27:17.630 who have returned to their home countries, 27:17.630 --> 27:21.440 specifically, sadly, Turkey has 900 returning 27:21.440 --> 27:24.180 and Saudi Arabia has 760 returning. 27:24.670 --> 27:26.840 Could you explain what threat the return 27:26.870 --> 27:29.000 of the defeated Islamic state fighters 27:29.000 --> 27:30.700 to their home country represents 27:30.970 --> 27:33.480 to the long-term stability in the region? 27:33.840 --> 27:36.680 And can you explain the proposed or ongoing efforts 27:36.680 --> 27:38.180 to work with allied nations 27:38.460 --> 27:40.450 in dealing with this flow of fighters? 27:40.800 --> 27:41.880 - Thank you, Congressman. 27:41.880 --> 27:44.930 Well certainly these fighters that are able 27:44.930 --> 27:47.570 to depart these war zones are able 27:47.570 --> 27:50.480 to take with them experiences and tactics 27:50.480 --> 27:54.510 that could potentially be applied to other places. 27:54.510 --> 27:55.810 Additionally, they're radicalized, 27:55.810 --> 27:59.200 so they have the ability to bring others on board with this. 27:59.200 --> 28:01.250 These I think are the principal concerns. 28:01.450 --> 28:04.230 This has been at the forefront of our efforts 28:04.230 --> 28:05.430 from the very beginning. 28:05.730 --> 28:07.440 As you've heard the secretary talk 28:07.440 --> 28:09.820 about our Strategy of Annihilation 28:10.060 --> 28:12.730 in the conduct of our operations we have always attempted 28:12.730 --> 28:15.480 to isolate these areas and prevent the escape 28:15.480 --> 28:17.250 of these fighters so that they're either killed 28:17.250 --> 28:19.560 or captured where we take them on. 28:19.560 --> 28:21.740 And I think we've been successful in that. 28:22.020 --> 28:25.050 Certainly, there are some that have gotten away. 28:25.270 --> 28:28.230 We have, with the support of some of the authorities 28:28.230 --> 28:30.260 that have been provided to us by Congress, 28:30.260 --> 28:32.200 we do have an effective program 28:32.200 --> 28:34.180 to interdict foreign fighters as they attempt 28:34.180 --> 28:35.130 to depart the area. 28:35.460 --> 28:37.810 And we are now working with the Department of State 28:37.810 --> 28:41.600 and the Department of Justice to ensure 28:41.600 --> 28:44.703 that these hundreds that are in the control of our partners 28:44.703 --> 28:49.440 in both Iraq and Syria are moving into a judicial process 28:49.440 --> 28:52.190 that holds them accountable and ultimately returns them 28:52.190 --> 28:54.090 to the countries from which they came. 28:54.570 --> 28:55.940 - And what a challenge that is. 28:55.940 --> 28:58.900 The detainees you're speaking of not just fighters, 28:59.280 --> 29:03.670 but their families and this has just got to be addressed 29:03.670 --> 29:05.870 and I appreciate you bringing that issue up. 29:06.110 --> 29:08.320 Additionally, Turkey has been a valued ally 29:08.420 --> 29:11.620 for nearly a century of the United States, a member of NATO. 29:12.010 --> 29:13.910 Beginning with the Korean War they've been fighting 29:13.910 --> 29:15.980 side-by-side with Americans for freedom. 29:16.530 --> 29:20.130 What is being done to continue our important alliance? 29:21.430 --> 29:23.340 - Thank you and I would just echo your comments. 29:23.340 --> 29:24.940 Turkey has been absolutely vital 29:25.000 --> 29:27.570 throughout the entire campaign plan. 29:27.830 --> 29:31.650 They certainly have serious concerns of PKK terrorism. 29:32.040 --> 29:34.200 Of course, this has created some tension 29:34.200 --> 29:36.380 with some of the partners we have on the ground. 29:36.380 --> 29:40.100 The principle way that we are addressing this Congressman, 29:40.100 --> 29:42.450 is by being as transparent and clear 29:42.450 --> 29:45.190 and candid with Turkey about the things 29:45.190 --> 29:47.890 that we are doing on a day-to-day basis with our partners. 29:47.890 --> 29:49.710 Just this morning I had a conversation 29:49.710 --> 29:51.210 with my counterpart in Turkey, 29:51.420 --> 29:53.200 again, sharing information back and forth, 29:53.200 --> 29:56.180 keeping the communication channels professional 29:56.180 --> 30:01.180 and open as we discuss this very, very difficult challenge 30:03.260 --> 30:04.580 that we're working through. 30:04.600 --> 30:07.770 - And with the multitude of issues you have to face, Yemen, 30:08.260 --> 30:12.190 what's the latest on efforts to provide security 30:12.190 --> 30:13.690 in working with Saudi Arabia? 30:15.180 --> 30:19.160 - I would say our effort in this setting is principally 30:19.160 --> 30:20.688 to help them defend themselves 30:20.688 --> 30:23.540 and I think we have made some very good progress 30:23.540 --> 30:25.550 in this area and I look forward in the closed session 30:25.550 --> 30:27.100 to sharing with you some examples. 30:27.100 --> 30:28.740 - We appreciate your service, thank you. 30:28.740 --> 30:29.573 - [Joseph] Thank you. 30:30.440 --> 30:31.390 - [Mac] Mr. Veasey. 30:31.700 --> 30:32.760 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 30:32.760 --> 30:35.010 I wanted to ask you, there was a column 30:35.010 --> 30:35.920 in the Wall Street Journal, 30:35.920 --> 30:37.950 I believe in their opinion section maybe, 30:37.950 --> 30:40.460 about four days ago that talked about where they allege 30:40.460 --> 30:44.150 there was a Russian attack on US Special Operation Forces 30:44.524 --> 30:47.940 on the evening of February the seventh and eighth. 30:48.300 --> 30:50.810 And I specifically wanted to ask you 30:50.810 --> 30:52.330 what you know about that 30:52.509 --> 30:56.540 and how can CENTCOM prioritize US counterterrorism 30:56.540 --> 30:59.570 objectives while trying to avoid any sort 30:59.570 --> 31:01.390 of dangerous escalation with Russia? 31:02.420 --> 31:04.540 - Thank you, Congressman. 31:04.540 --> 31:06.770 I think we have kind of characterized 31:06.770 --> 31:09.430 that as pro-regime forces. 31:09.480 --> 31:13.300 We're certainly aware of the amount of media 31:13.300 --> 31:15.150 that is out there talking about this. 31:15.170 --> 31:18.310 But in this particular instance this was a very clear case 31:18.310 --> 31:23.310 of self-defense on our part and so I frankly am quite proud 31:23.390 --> 31:25.261 of the way the force responded to this, 31:25.261 --> 31:26.800 quickly identified it, 31:26.980 --> 31:30.650 immediately got on the net with our Russian, 31:31.270 --> 31:35.290 through our channel here to talk with them about this. 31:35.290 --> 31:37.990 We're talking with them before, during and after this. 31:38.200 --> 31:41.200 And very effectively brought together the right capabilities 31:41.200 --> 31:44.110 to address this self-defense threat 31:44.110 --> 31:46.240 and so they have continued to do that. 31:46.240 --> 31:48.970 So I think what I would just tell you 31:48.970 --> 31:51.710 is that we retain sufficient capability 31:51.710 --> 31:54.550 to protect ourselves at the same time 31:54.550 --> 31:55.410 that we are pursuing 31:55.410 --> 31:58.000 our counterterrorism objectives in Syria. 31:59.227 --> 32:03.370 - Do you think that Russia is going to want to try 32:03.370 --> 32:06.350 to have more influence or diminish our influence 32:06.350 --> 32:09.470 in the region once we push ISIS out of there, 32:09.960 --> 32:14.960 or how do you see that relationship playing out long-term? 32:15.000 --> 32:17.630 - Well I think what I would say Congressman, 32:17.660 --> 32:21.460 is what we can see is Russian has failed to follow through 32:21.460 --> 32:24.980 on delivering in the regime in a number of different areas. 32:24.980 --> 32:29.240 As we look at the at the UN sanctioned cease-fire 32:29.240 --> 32:32.340 that was put in this place, one that they helped draft 32:33.240 --> 32:38.240 and agreed to implement and to cause the regime 32:39.397 --> 32:42.280 to comply by it, they've failed to do that. 32:42.510 --> 32:45.170 So I think either Russia has to admit 32:45.170 --> 32:46.220 that it's not capable 32:46.530 --> 32:48.470 or it doesn't want to play a role 32:48.510 --> 32:50.800 in ending the Syrian conflict here. 32:51.200 --> 32:52.260 I think their role 32:52.260 --> 32:54.640 is incredibly destabilizing at this point. 32:55.390 --> 32:58.370 - I'd also like to briefly kind of switch here 32:58.370 --> 33:01.220 and ask you just little bit about Afghanistan too. 33:01.540 --> 33:03.550 I know that there have been some that have been concerned 33:03.550 --> 33:08.550 about our deteriorating relationship with the Pakistanis 33:09.160 --> 33:12.780 and was wondering how important do you think it is for us 33:12.780 --> 33:15.847 to continue to have relationships with Pakistan, 33:15.847 --> 33:20.460 keeping routes open so we can adequately supply troops 33:20.480 --> 33:23.140 in Afghanistan, part of the Middle East, 33:23.140 --> 33:25.140 and just what are some of your thoughts 33:25.380 --> 33:26.660 on that whole relationship 33:26.660 --> 33:30.090 and particularly just how it lines up with Afghanistan? 33:30.450 --> 33:33.370 - Congressman, my view is that success in Afghanistan 33:33.370 --> 33:36.965 and South Asia will require a strong relationship 33:36.965 --> 33:39.020 and the cooperation of Pakistan. 33:39.550 --> 33:42.977 And since the announcement of the South Asia Strategy 33:42.977 --> 33:46.400 this has been one of my principal focuses here 33:46.660 --> 33:51.660 is to help Pakistan and us together 33:51.830 --> 33:55.380 achieve the specific things that we require for them, 33:55.470 --> 33:58.640 we have asked them to do in support of our strategy. 33:58.880 --> 34:00.900 And what I would report you and to the committee 34:00.900 --> 34:02.590 is that I do have very frequent 34:02.590 --> 34:07.070 and routine professional communications with my counterpart. 34:07.070 --> 34:08.640 We talk almost weekly. 34:08.640 --> 34:10.720 We meet frequently face-to-face 34:11.056 --> 34:14.620 and I think we are now my goal 34:14.620 --> 34:17.640 is to develop this very productive and trustful relationship 34:18.060 --> 34:19.884 that will help us move forward together. 34:19.884 --> 34:23.410 I can't characterize the relationship 34:23.410 --> 34:25.260 as trustful at this particular point. 34:25.313 --> 34:27.850 There is a lot of history here that has to overcome, 34:27.850 --> 34:29.410 but what I would also tell you 34:29.410 --> 34:33.010 is that we are now beginning to see positive indicators. 34:33.240 --> 34:34.970 They, through their communications, 34:34.970 --> 34:37.650 they're reporting to us some of the actions 34:37.650 --> 34:39.270 that they are taking on the ground. 34:39.270 --> 34:40.660 These are positive indicators 34:40.660 --> 34:42.610 that they are moving in the right direction. 34:42.610 --> 34:45.370 It does not yet equal the decisive action 34:45.370 --> 34:47.350 that we would like to see them take 34:47.400 --> 34:49.150 in terms of a strategic shift, 34:49.450 --> 34:51.050 but they are positive indicators 34:51.180 --> 34:53.980 and it gives me hope that our approach is the right one. 34:54.120 --> 34:55.570 I have confidence in our approach 34:55.570 --> 35:00.460 and it gives me gives me hope that we can begin 35:00.460 --> 35:02.730 to restore this very important relationship. 35:03.050 --> 35:03.883 - Thank you. 35:03.883 --> 35:05.070 Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 35:05.080 --> 35:05.913 - [Mac] Thank you. 35:05.913 --> 35:06.746 Mr. Lamborn. 35:07.090 --> 35:08.000 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman 35:08.000 --> 35:09.950 and General thank you for your service. 35:11.370 --> 35:13.500 You've barely mentioned Lebanon 35:13.500 --> 35:15.810 and we hardly ever talk about Lebanon, 35:15.920 --> 35:17.360 but there are so many problems there 35:17.360 --> 35:19.960 and in any other part of the world it would be front 35:20.010 --> 35:22.370 and center and in the headlines all the time. 35:22.910 --> 35:24.120 But with all the other problems 35:24.120 --> 35:26.630 in CENTCOM it takes a backseat. 35:27.460 --> 35:29.390 But given that Hezbollah 35:29.390 --> 35:32.050 is a US designated terrorist organization 35:32.070 --> 35:35.360 and that the Lebanese President has been very public 35:35.360 --> 35:39.160 in his support of Hezbollah as a military partner 35:39.160 --> 35:41.200 with the Lebanese Armed Forces 35:41.830 --> 35:43.730 and given that we've, in the past anyway, 35:43.730 --> 35:46.240 supplied high quality American arms 35:46.240 --> 35:47.980 to the Lebanese Armed Forces, 35:48.700 --> 35:50.480 do you think we should keep working 35:50.480 --> 35:52.330 with the Lebanese Armed Forces 35:52.330 --> 35:55.710 and giving them high quality American weaponry? 35:55.710 --> 35:57.410 And are they a reliable partner? 35:58.560 --> 36:01.830 - Congressman, I think they are a very reliable partner 36:02.080 --> 36:03.170 and I think the investments 36:03.170 --> 36:05.487 that we have made over the last 10 or 11 years, 36:05.487 --> 36:08.630 very moderate investments in terms of people 36:08.630 --> 36:11.070 and money compared to some of the other things we do 36:11.070 --> 36:14.780 have really paid off and they are helping us develop 36:14.780 --> 36:17.850 a very professional Lebanese Armed Forces 36:17.880 --> 36:19.920 that is beginning to be viewed 36:19.920 --> 36:23.800 as the principal security arm in Afghanistan. 36:24.031 --> 36:26.863 I note your comment here, about it doesn't appear 36:26.863 --> 36:30.630 in the news, but frankly Lebanon is a frequent 36:30.660 --> 36:33.160 stopping place for me and for all of my commanders 36:33.410 --> 36:35.800 and we pay a lot of attention to this relationship. 36:35.800 --> 36:39.030 We have an outstanding ambassador there who is very, 36:39.030 --> 36:43.520 very engaged in the activities and we're very proud 36:43.520 --> 36:45.530 of what the Lebanese Armed Forces are doing. 36:45.530 --> 36:49.790 They very effectively, last fall on their own, 36:50.060 --> 36:54.310 orchestrated a pretty effective operation against ISIS, 36:54.690 --> 36:57.090 but they view us as their most important partner 36:57.230 --> 37:00.490 and I do think it is an investment worth continuing 37:01.340 --> 37:05.980 - Doesn't the relationship between the cozying up 37:05.980 --> 37:07.620 to Hezbollah within Lebanon 37:08.284 --> 37:11.130 to the conventional forces there give you pause? 37:11.200 --> 37:14.350 - Well I tell you I frequently interact 37:14.350 --> 37:16.430 with the Chief of Defense there. 37:16.430 --> 37:18.938 I consider him to be a very professional military officer, 37:18.938 --> 37:22.980 you know this is a multi-confessional arrangement here 37:22.980 --> 37:26.270 in Pakistan that trips, obviously trips over 37:26.270 --> 37:27.510 into the political environment, 37:27.510 --> 37:31.050 but what I observe in Lebanon is a military 37:31.050 --> 37:34.136 that is answerable to the leadership, 37:34.136 --> 37:38.040 is doing a good job at staying apolitical 37:38.040 --> 37:40.140 and is focused on security of the country. 37:40.690 --> 37:44.140 - Okay, shifting gears to Saudi Arabia. 37:44.140 --> 37:46.270 Are we doing enough to help them 37:46.270 --> 37:49.258 and the United Arab Emirates defend themselves 37:49.258 --> 37:51.270 as was discussed a little earlier 37:51.270 --> 37:54.830 from Iranian-supplied missiles to the Houthi rebels? 37:54.980 --> 37:55.980 Are we doing enough? 37:56.960 --> 37:59.560 - In this setting I would say yes we are. 37:59.560 --> 38:02.640 We are definitely focused on this particular threat 38:02.640 --> 38:03.940 right here and I look forward 38:03.940 --> 38:06.110 to sharing a few more comments with you about this 38:06.110 --> 38:07.210 in the closed session. 38:07.230 --> 38:08.080 - Okay thank you. 38:08.570 --> 38:13.100 Now in Yemen the US military has conducted a much higher 38:13.100 --> 38:16.130 number of strikes against terrorist targets last year 38:16.390 --> 38:18.350 than in 2016, the previous year. 38:18.810 --> 38:23.260 What positive impact, if any, have these strikes had 38:23.326 --> 38:26.370 on a AQAP and on ISIS in Yemen, 38:26.480 --> 38:28.330 or excuse me, Islamic State in Yemen? 38:29.060 --> 38:30.400 - Thank you, Congressman. 38:30.780 --> 38:35.280 It has had, I think, a very significant impact on AQAP. 38:37.682 --> 38:40.190 Certainly, it has impacted their ability 38:40.190 --> 38:42.100 to conduct external operations. 38:42.100 --> 38:45.380 It's gone into the areas in which they have had sanctuary 38:45.920 --> 38:49.160 and it has continued to present them with multiple dilemmas 38:49.160 --> 38:50.390 that they have to deal with. 38:50.390 --> 38:52.720 So not only are they contending with our strikes, 38:52.720 --> 38:55.203 but they're also contending with partner operations 38:55.203 --> 38:57.980 that we work with our Arab coalition partners 38:57.980 --> 38:59.830 on the ground and with our Yemeni partners 38:59.830 --> 39:02.550 on the ground and this has become very, very effective. 39:02.550 --> 39:04.860 And I would tell you that we are extending that 39:04.860 --> 39:07.020 to ISIS in Yemen as well. 39:07.230 --> 39:11.000 That is not as well developed as Al Qaeda is, 39:11.000 --> 39:12.570 but a course it is ISIS. 39:12.570 --> 39:13.820 We understand their ideology. 39:13.820 --> 39:15.220 We understand where they're going 39:15.220 --> 39:17.540 and so we're very concerned about them as well. 39:17.540 --> 39:19.140 - Okay thank you and lastly, 39:20.090 --> 39:22.380 I'd like to ask about the fourth infantry division 39:22.380 --> 39:23.870 at Fort Carson in my district. 39:23.870 --> 39:26.750 They're sending a brigade combat team 39:26.750 --> 39:28.230 to Afghanistan this spring 39:29.020 --> 39:33.180 and even though we've had budget shortfalls for the military 39:33.180 --> 39:35.930 in recent years, we've made huge steps 39:35.930 --> 39:38.120 with this latest budget agreement 39:38.196 --> 39:41.830 to beef up military spending which I totally applaud 39:41.830 --> 39:46.830 and support so I think readiness will be less of an issue 39:47.300 --> 39:49.630 in the future, but do you feel good about the current state 39:49.630 --> 39:53.960 of readiness with for instance the brigade combat team 39:53.960 --> 39:56.410 going to Afghanistan this spring? 39:56.650 --> 39:57.760 - Congressman I do. 39:57.760 --> 40:00.760 I haven't had an opportunity to visit that specific brigade, 40:00.760 --> 40:01.910 but I've just had an opportunity 40:01.910 --> 40:03.420 to visit one of the brigades that's coming in, 40:03.420 --> 40:05.320 the Security Force Assistance Brigade. 40:05.470 --> 40:08.480 I'm extraordinarily appreciative of the efforts 40:08.480 --> 40:10.670 that are put forth by the Army, by the Marine Corps, 40:10.670 --> 40:15.020 the Air Force, all the services here that we depend upon 40:15.020 --> 40:16.980 in Afghanistan to give us high quality forces. 40:16.980 --> 40:17.813 - Thank you. 40:18.190 --> 40:19.023 - Ms. Gabbard. 40:19.550 --> 40:20.500 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 40:20.500 --> 40:24.710 Thank you General Votel for your service and for being here. 40:25.890 --> 40:27.210 I'd like to talk a little bit more 40:27.210 --> 40:30.450 about what you began with your opening statements 40:30.450 --> 40:31.700 and some of the comments you've made since 40:31.700 --> 40:35.210 about US military objectives in Syria. 40:36.390 --> 40:41.140 You talked about how you're working to defeat ISIS 40:41.420 --> 40:44.350 and bring that campaign to a responsible close. 40:45.280 --> 40:48.180 Later you mentioned that countering Iran 40:48.180 --> 40:50.810 is not a coalition mission in Syria. 40:51.700 --> 40:53.990 Last month we heard from Secretary Tillerson 40:55.090 --> 40:57.390 about how US military presence in Syria 40:57.390 --> 40:59.640 will remain for an indefinite period of time. 40:59.900 --> 41:03.000 And he went on to list a very expansive list 41:03.000 --> 41:06.260 of strategic objectives of the US military to include; 41:06.690 --> 41:08.010 ensuring the defeat of ISIS, 41:08.010 --> 41:10.400 to include diminishing the influence of Iran, 41:11.430 --> 41:13.890 advancing the UN-led political resolution, 41:14.170 --> 41:15.220 et cetera, et cetera. 41:15.570 --> 41:20.570 So my question is, what is the objective of our US forces 41:20.650 --> 41:24.790 in Syria and under what legal basis 41:26.180 --> 41:30.570 is this indefinite presence in Syria planned under? 41:31.960 --> 41:32.793 - Thank you. 41:32.793 --> 41:36.040 So the principal reason we are in Syria 41:36.040 --> 41:39.640 is to defeat ISIS and that remains are our sole 41:39.710 --> 41:44.500 and single task that we are principally oriented on. 41:44.790 --> 41:48.840 Part of defeating ISIS though is removing their control 41:48.840 --> 41:49.990 of the physical caliphate, 41:49.990 --> 41:52.590 the physical terrain as you're well aware 41:52.940 --> 41:55.980 and in ensuring they can't resurge. 41:56.170 --> 41:58.360 So that means that after we have removed them 41:58.360 --> 42:00.540 from their controlled terrain, 42:00.540 --> 42:03.660 we have to consolidate our gains and we have to ensure 42:03.660 --> 42:06.820 that the right security and stability 42:06.820 --> 42:09.520 is in place so that they cannot resurge. 42:09.520 --> 42:13.330 So that is part of being responsible coalition members 42:13.330 --> 42:17.680 in here and that will take some time beyond all this. 42:17.940 --> 42:20.808 Our legal basis for operating in Syria 42:20.808 --> 42:25.360 was largely driven by the collective self-defense of Iraq 42:25.671 --> 42:30.671 when we first went there, that ISIS being an organization 42:32.090 --> 42:34.890 that did not adhere to sovereign boundaries, 42:34.890 --> 42:36.620 were moving back and forth across here, 42:36.620 --> 42:40.820 and while we were beginning to address ISIS in Iraq 42:40.830 --> 42:45.830 we knew that we also had to address ISIS in Syria. 42:47.200 --> 42:48.970 I would also point out Congresswoman 42:48.970 --> 42:52.370 that the Syrian regime itself has proved unwilling 42:52.620 --> 42:55.480 and unable to address this particular threat. 42:55.770 --> 42:57.710 While they did do some operations down 42:57.710 --> 43:00.380 in the Middle Euphrates Valley here several months ago, 43:00.380 --> 43:02.250 they have largely departed that area 43:02.830 --> 43:05.110 and they have taken the pressure off of ISIS 43:05.110 --> 43:07.330 and created more problems for the coalition 43:07.330 --> 43:08.380 in dealing with this. 43:08.510 --> 43:12.830 So I think those are the principle -- 43:12.830 --> 43:16.710 - So our US forces are still operating under the 2001 AUMF 43:17.070 --> 43:17.903 is that correct? 43:17.903 --> 43:18.736 - [Joseph] We are. 43:19.000 --> 43:22.640 - And how does countering Iran, 43:25.140 --> 43:26.940 I'm just seeing some contradiction between 43:26.940 --> 43:29.110 what the Secretary of State is saying that 43:29.110 --> 43:31.930 that is now going to be a part of the US military objective 43:31.930 --> 43:34.160 in Syria and what you've stated today saying 43:34.160 --> 43:37.160 that countering Iran is not a part of the coalition mission. 43:37.160 --> 43:38.450 - Yeah I, Congresswoman -- - I'm sorry, 43:38.450 --> 43:39.700 just a follow-up to that. 43:40.027 --> 43:43.810 If it is then how does that fall under the 2001 AUMF 43:43.810 --> 43:46.820 that deals directly with countering Al Qaeda 43:46.820 --> 43:47.860 and its affiliates? 43:48.100 --> 43:50.590 - I think what my understanding 43:50.590 --> 43:52.360 as the Secretary of State laid this out, 43:52.360 --> 43:54.990 is he laid it out, not as a US military objective, 43:54.990 --> 43:56.930 but he laid it out as a US objective. 43:57.180 --> 43:59.652 So there are certainly other ways that we can address 43:59.652 --> 44:02.610 Iran's destabilizing activities and other, 44:02.690 --> 44:05.920 though military means. 44:06.170 --> 44:08.770 The fact of the matter as I mentioned a few moments ago, 44:08.770 --> 44:13.710 even though Iran isn't our principal focus here 44:14.430 --> 44:16.400 in this campaign, 44:17.000 --> 44:19.160 our relationship with partners both 44:19.160 --> 44:22.500 in Iraq and in Syria does put us 44:22.500 --> 44:25.950 in the position where we can indirectly have an impact 44:25.950 --> 44:30.690 on the objectives that Iran is pursuing 44:30.690 --> 44:31.720 in this part of the world. 44:31.720 --> 44:35.090 So I think I would characterize it more in that regard 44:35.090 --> 44:40.090 than us actively doing something militarily against Iran. 44:40.320 --> 44:41.153 - Thank you. 44:41.153 --> 44:43.564 I believe secretary Tillerson was quite specific 44:43.564 --> 44:46.490 in speaking about this within the justification 44:46.510 --> 44:49.190 of a maintained US military presence there. 44:49.480 --> 44:51.330 My last quick question is about Yemen 44:51.660 --> 44:55.268 and under what authorization are we providing arms 44:55.268 --> 44:58.830 and direct military support to Saudi Arabia 44:58.910 --> 45:01.410 in what is essentially a proxy war 45:01.410 --> 45:03.160 between Saudi Arabia and Iran? 45:04.510 --> 45:06.770 - Well any arms sales of course go through 45:06.770 --> 45:08.670 our foreign military sales 45:09.530 --> 45:11.370 and foreign military funding process 45:11.370 --> 45:13.100 that's managed by the Department of State 45:13.100 --> 45:16.910 and so they have the principal oversight for that. 45:17.275 --> 45:22.275 The provision of fuel to Saudi aircraft is provided for 45:24.220 --> 45:26.830 under the Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement 45:26.830 --> 45:30.320 that we have in place with Saudi Arabia, 45:30.320 --> 45:31.980 and so that provides us the authority 45:31.980 --> 45:33.580 to provide that support to them. 45:35.010 --> 45:36.010 - [Mac] Mr. Wittman. 45:36.200 --> 45:37.033 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 45:37.033 --> 45:39.370 General Votel, thanks so much for joining us today. 45:39.370 --> 45:42.680 I wanted to begin by getting your perspective. 45:42.680 --> 45:46.400 You speak about Navy presence in the Gulf and the Red Sea 45:46.930 --> 45:49.180 and we think about CENTCOM as being land-centric, 45:49.180 --> 45:52.268 but we also see, as you specifically point out, 45:52.268 --> 45:54.410 the first overseas Navy base put 45:54.410 --> 45:56.210 in place by the Chinese in Djibouti. 45:56.640 --> 46:00.680 We see in Port Doraleh a single berth there 46:00.680 --> 46:02.800 reserved for the Chinese Navy. 46:03.260 --> 46:06.570 We see President Xi Jinping through modernization 46:06.570 --> 46:09.390 of his military looking to very aggressively expand 46:09.390 --> 46:11.620 and sustain operations around the world. 46:12.260 --> 46:17.210 From your perspective there as CENTCOM commander in that AR, 46:17.460 --> 46:20.770 specifically what do you see our US Navy doing 46:20.770 --> 46:23.420 to counter this Chinese expansionism? 46:23.850 --> 46:26.740 And what do you need as far as U S Navy presence there 46:26.740 --> 46:29.900 to make sure that we have what's necessary there 46:30.243 --> 46:35.243 in relation to what we see as Chinese aggressive expansion? 46:36.130 --> 46:36.963 - Thanks. 46:36.963 --> 46:38.360 Thanks Congressman, I appreciate the question 46:38.360 --> 46:40.420 and I would share an Army guy saying this. 46:40.420 --> 46:42.170 I would share that while we do think 46:42.170 --> 46:45.040 about the land territory in CENTCOM, 46:45.040 --> 46:46.900 it very much is a maritime theater 46:47.520 --> 46:49.290 with the three critical choke points 46:49.290 --> 46:51.640 that are so important to us in this area, 46:51.640 --> 46:53.260 so I do recognize that. 46:53.450 --> 46:56.790 I would just tell you that I think certainly the resources 46:56.790 --> 46:59.020 that are being provided to me, the maritime resources, 46:59.020 --> 47:01.680 that are provided to me by the Navy and the Marine Corps, 47:01.680 --> 47:04.480 I think are adequate to the task that we have right now. 47:04.540 --> 47:08.310 I think the principle way that we develop resilience 47:08.310 --> 47:11.090 against these types of great power influences 47:11.090 --> 47:13.680 into this area is through, first of all, 47:13.680 --> 47:15.270 our presence, our constant presence 47:15.270 --> 47:18.540 and we do maintain a constant presence in both the Red Sea, 47:18.540 --> 47:22.550 the Gulf of Aden into the Arabian Gulf 47:22.550 --> 47:24.410 and the Gulf of Oman as well 47:24.819 --> 47:29.600 and through our very close partnership with our partners. 47:30.740 --> 47:34.320 We have three combined maritime task forces 47:34.364 --> 47:37.140 that are led out of our Naval headquarters 47:37.140 --> 47:40.400 in Bahrain that include a variety of different nations. 47:40.400 --> 47:42.900 So when I look at the nations that are on our team 47:43.230 --> 47:45.590 and I look at the nations that are lined up with some 47:45.590 --> 47:47.520 of these others that are entering in the area, 47:47.520 --> 47:48.890 I think our teams are very strong. 47:48.890 --> 47:50.760 And I think this is a very key way for us 47:50.760 --> 47:55.290 to maintain our influence and pursue our interests 47:55.300 --> 47:57.140 in the CENTCOM maritime environment. 47:57.410 --> 47:58.243 - Very good. 47:58.700 --> 48:02.400 Last year the US Naval Office of Intelligence 48:04.760 --> 48:07.410 pointed out some challenges there 48:07.510 --> 48:09.630 with potentially placing the mines 48:09.830 --> 48:13.120 that would put at risk commercial vessels 48:13.850 --> 48:16.450 there near all Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. 48:17.950 --> 48:20.210 Give me your perspective not only on what 48:20.210 --> 48:23.030 that potential threat is, 'cause we see Houthis operating 48:23.030 --> 48:26.090 in the area, obviously shooting at US ships. 48:26.570 --> 48:28.770 Give me your perspective on what we're doing 48:29.410 --> 48:32.610 in mine sweeping operations there looking to counter 48:32.610 --> 48:34.180 that potential threat from mines, 48:34.180 --> 48:36.400 'cause we know that that's a choke point area 48:36.400 --> 48:38.330 that's strategically very important. 48:38.610 --> 48:39.443 - Thank you. 48:39.443 --> 48:41.700 Well we certainly maintain minesweeping capabilities 48:41.700 --> 48:44.480 in the gulf and have for a number of years, 48:44.480 --> 48:45.630 but so do our partners. 48:45.956 --> 48:48.840 And I would just point out some of our partners, 48:48.840 --> 48:51.060 like the Emirates in Saudi Arabia 48:51.060 --> 48:53.940 have some very good capability in this regard. 48:53.940 --> 48:56.390 So one of the things that we do is work with them 48:56.390 --> 48:58.280 to optimize their capabilities. 48:58.420 --> 48:59.460 Again, by, with and through. 48:59.460 --> 49:01.455 Getting them to use their capabilities 49:01.455 --> 49:05.330 and using our intelligence and some of our experience 49:05.570 --> 49:07.480 to help them be more effective at this. 49:07.480 --> 49:10.470 So this I think has been very effective 49:10.470 --> 49:14.930 in preventing a major mine catastrophe if you will 49:14.930 --> 49:16.900 in the in the Bab-el-Mandeb, 49:16.900 --> 49:18.330 one that we are very concerned about. 49:18.330 --> 49:21.480 60 to 70 ships a day go through the Bab-el-Mandeb, 49:21.820 --> 49:23.280 not just ours, everybody's. 49:23.770 --> 49:26.240 So this is a very real, a very real threat 49:26.240 --> 49:27.880 that we have to pay attention to. 49:28.743 --> 49:30.920 - Do you currently have intelligence gathering operations 49:30.920 --> 49:33.690 to look at what's happening in Bab-el-Mandeb Straits 49:34.070 --> 49:36.320 about the activities that are going on there, 49:36.450 --> 49:37.920 what we can do to maybe counter that, 49:37.920 --> 49:39.240 or the things we can do to interdict it, 49:39.240 --> 49:40.990 'cause obviously keeping a mine from being laid 49:40.990 --> 49:42.140 is lot better than having to go in 49:42.140 --> 49:43.410 and sweep those particular areas, 49:43.410 --> 49:44.760 especially from a time perspective. 49:44.760 --> 49:47.160 Give us your perspective on what's happening there. 49:47.160 --> 49:49.570 - Congressman, I would say in this setting we absolutely do, 49:49.570 --> 49:50.403 and I would look forward 49:50.403 --> 49:53.120 to sharing the details with you in a different setting. 49:53.260 --> 49:54.093 - Very good. 49:54.093 --> 49:55.510 Thanks Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 49:56.899 --> 49:58.900 (Mac coughing) 49:58.900 --> 50:00.390 - [Mac] Excuse me, Mr. Carbajal. 50:00.897 --> 50:02.260 - Thank you, Mr. Chair. 50:02.820 --> 50:05.120 General Votel, thank you for being here today. 50:05.770 --> 50:09.300 America has been engaged in Afghanistan for 16 years 50:09.840 --> 50:13.340 and it is difficult to determine what progress we have made. 50:14.040 --> 50:15.690 The administration's new strategy 50:15.720 --> 50:19.300 increased its troop levels to 14,000 troops. 50:20.060 --> 50:22.260 However, unable to learn from history, 50:22.730 --> 50:24.000 we are investing more lives 50:24.000 --> 50:28.020 and resources without a clearly defined benchmarks. 50:28.740 --> 50:30.710 I am extremely concerned about the fact 50:30.710 --> 50:34.040 that significant information is being withheld 50:34.040 --> 50:36.810 from the Office of Inspector General 50:37.310 --> 50:39.250 for Afghanistan's reconstruction 50:39.350 --> 50:41.190 and ultimately the American people. 50:42.160 --> 50:44.290 According to the Inspector General, quote, 50:44.930 --> 50:46.520 "It is hard to make a determination 50:46.520 --> 50:48.710 "of how good a job we're doing 50:48.710 --> 50:53.090 "because of the Afghan military's not fighting that well, 50:53.840 --> 50:57.120 "and there are not many of them, we can't determine fraud, 50:57.560 --> 50:59.950 "waste and abuse in Afghanistan." 51:00.730 --> 51:03.480 Because they can't get basic facts from the department, 51:04.740 --> 51:07.050 how are you measuring progress in Afghanistan? 51:07.800 --> 51:09.410 Please describe the end state, 51:10.140 --> 51:11.970 what does success look like to you? 51:12.980 --> 51:15.650 Currently, what is the amount of territory 51:15.760 --> 51:17.780 under the Afghan government control? 51:19.020 --> 51:22.080 And help me understand how withholding information 51:22.860 --> 51:25.610 has made a difference in our operations in Afghanistan. 51:27.150 --> 51:27.983 - Thank you, Congressman. 51:27.983 --> 51:29.380 Let me take your last one here. 51:29.896 --> 51:32.050 We are aware of that issue 51:32.050 --> 51:33.800 and I think measures are being taken 51:33.800 --> 51:35.100 to address that right now. 51:35.310 --> 51:36.340 Some of that information 51:36.340 --> 51:38.742 is not necessarily US government information. 51:38.742 --> 51:41.800 It is information of the Afghan government 51:41.800 --> 51:44.290 and so they control the release and classification 51:44.290 --> 51:45.123 of that information. 51:45.123 --> 51:46.800 So this is something we have 51:46.800 --> 51:49.580 to continue to work with -- 51:49.610 --> 51:51.660 - General, if I could just interrupt you. 51:52.610 --> 51:54.860 It's great to parley that to the Afghan government, 51:54.860 --> 51:57.350 but we're the ones with resources 51:57.710 --> 51:59.580 and the lives of our military there. 51:59.600 --> 52:03.160 So we gotta be able to get some information from them 52:03.160 --> 52:06.890 to appease those of us that have to make decisions 52:06.890 --> 52:09.270 on what kind of investments we need to make in the area. 52:09.270 --> 52:12.240 - Thank you Congressman and I'm committed 52:12.240 --> 52:14.540 to making sure that you do have those details. 52:14.550 --> 52:17.050 You asked also about kind of 52:17.110 --> 52:19.780 how we're looking at the situation right now. 52:20.040 --> 52:22.140 What I would tell you is the big idea here 52:22.600 --> 52:24.520 with what we're trying to do in Afghanistan right now 52:24.520 --> 52:26.410 is drive towards reconciliation. 52:26.630 --> 52:29.480 This is different than an approach we've had in the past. 52:29.660 --> 52:31.780 And we're trying to do that through creating 52:31.780 --> 52:33.180 not just military pressure 52:33.180 --> 52:35.160 with our military activities on the ground. 52:35.160 --> 52:37.800 But we're trying to do it through creating social pressure 52:37.800 --> 52:39.370 with things that the Afghan government 52:39.370 --> 52:41.760 is doing like credible elections 52:41.760 --> 52:44.170 that they're pursuing this year at the parliamentary level 52:44.170 --> 52:46.100 and the national level next year. 52:46.460 --> 52:48.540 And we're doing it through creating diplomatic 52:48.540 --> 52:49.590 and regional pressure 52:50.024 --> 52:53.950 just as we talked about with Pakistan a few moments ago. 52:54.250 --> 52:56.340 The idea here is that creating pressure 52:56.760 --> 52:59.420 in all those three axis are gonna 52:59.470 --> 53:01.500 create enough pressure on the Taliban 53:01.500 --> 53:02.830 that they come to the table. 53:02.830 --> 53:05.700 What's different this time as we approach this 53:05.700 --> 53:08.580 is that we are taking a conditions-based approach 53:08.580 --> 53:12.480 that is focused on reconciliation as it's end state. 53:12.755 --> 53:16.520 It is a regional focus here and we are engaging the partners 53:16.520 --> 53:17.960 in the region, not just Pakistan, 53:17.960 --> 53:21.700 but the Central Asian states as well who are key to this. 53:21.980 --> 53:24.340 And we have changed the way 53:24.340 --> 53:26.740 that we are working with the Afghan forces. 53:26.957 --> 53:30.660 So we previously had advise down to a very low level 53:30.660 --> 53:33.740 with their Afghan Special Operations Forces. 53:34.760 --> 53:38.570 We are now with the additional enablers 53:38.570 --> 53:39.710 and additional advisors 53:39.710 --> 53:41.830 that the department has approved for us. 53:41.830 --> 53:44.240 We're taking that capability and extending out 53:44.240 --> 53:45.690 to their conventional forces. 53:46.110 --> 53:48.450 We are building out the Afghan Air Force. 53:48.450 --> 53:50.250 We are building, we are doubling the size 53:50.250 --> 53:53.230 of their Afghan Special Operations capability. 53:53.460 --> 53:55.990 So there are a variety of different aspects 53:55.990 --> 53:56.840 to this approach. 53:56.970 --> 54:00.120 This will give us the ability to measure the progress. 54:00.320 --> 54:02.680 You asked about how much of the population 54:02.680 --> 54:05.580 is controlled by the Afghan government. 54:05.580 --> 54:07.950 Today the figure is 64%. 54:09.790 --> 54:12.620 12% of the population is in areas 54:12.620 --> 54:15.630 that are controlled by the Taliban 54:15.630 --> 54:17.980 and the balance of that are in contested areas. 54:18.280 --> 54:20.980 Our focus, the focus of our military operations 54:20.980 --> 54:24.600 is on increasing and expanding population control 54:24.600 --> 54:26.580 by the government of Afghanistan. 54:27.060 --> 54:29.130 And what we are going to do this season 54:29.410 --> 54:31.072 is we are gonna win. 54:31.072 --> 54:33.410 Our intention is to break the stalemate, 54:33.540 --> 54:36.780 grab the initiative, begin to expand population control 54:36.780 --> 54:39.200 in this year and next year and then ensure 54:39.200 --> 54:41.130 that we create an environment here 54:41.130 --> 54:45.890 that allows for credible elections to take place, 54:45.890 --> 54:49.140 one of the most important things that the Afghan people need 54:49.140 --> 54:50.590 to see from their government. 54:50.770 --> 54:51.603 - Running out of time. 54:51.603 --> 54:52.560 What about information, 54:53.600 --> 54:57.400 the sharing of information with the Inspector General? 54:57.400 --> 55:00.750 - As I mentioned Congressman, we will do our very best 55:00.750 --> 55:02.190 to ensure that you have the information 55:02.190 --> 55:05.010 that you need to make the decisions that are necessary. 55:05.400 --> 55:06.233 - Thank you so much. 55:06.233 --> 55:07.220 I yield back Mr. Chair. 55:07.220 --> 55:08.120 - [Mac] Mr. Scott. 55:09.370 --> 55:10.370 - [Austin] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 55:10.370 --> 55:12.070 General, thank you for being here. 55:13.730 --> 55:15.920 I wanna talk with you a little bit about ISR 55:16.010 --> 55:19.390 in the CENTCOM area and I know you've got a lot of partners 55:19.390 --> 55:20.870 in that area, but what percentage 55:20.870 --> 55:23.500 of the ISR does the United States provide? 55:25.660 --> 55:27.030 - I'm not sure I can tell you 55:27.030 --> 55:28.740 what the percentage overall is. 55:28.740 --> 55:32.514 I mean it's very clear that the majority of the ISR 55:32.514 --> 55:36.510 in the region is being provided by the United States. 55:39.404 --> 55:41.740 - What about the deities capacity 55:41.740 --> 55:43.130 to meet the demand for ISR? 55:44.493 --> 55:46.230 Do you have enough ISR currently? 55:46.470 --> 55:48.780 - Well I think, Congressman, I don't think you're gonna find 55:48.780 --> 55:51.583 any commander that's gonna say that he has enough ISR. 55:51.583 --> 55:55.710 We right now today have the largest concentration 55:55.710 --> 55:58.390 of MQ9s down in Kandahar Airfield 55:58.390 --> 56:01.040 designed to support General Nicholson and his forces. 56:01.148 --> 56:05.790 And I know that's adequate for what he needs right now, 56:05.790 --> 56:08.920 but given his own druthers I'm sure he'd want more 56:08.920 --> 56:11.470 and so we would want more in all these areas. 56:12.459 --> 56:16.590 - I understand that the of the Army in some ways 56:16.850 --> 56:19.780 and commanders are agnostic as to the different platforms 56:19.780 --> 56:24.780 that ISR may come from, but I assume that when it comes 56:25.230 --> 56:27.090 to providing additional ISR, 56:27.590 --> 56:29.310 the commanders would not be agnostic 56:29.310 --> 56:33.080 to the timeline to get new SR to the field. 56:33.080 --> 56:34.630 Would that be a fair statement? 56:34.897 --> 56:36.070 - That's right. 56:36.290 --> 56:38.050 I think the faster we can continue 56:38.050 --> 56:39.700 to provide those capabilities, the better. 56:39.700 --> 56:41.560 - So one of my concerns 56:41.560 --> 56:43.750 and I certainly have a tremendous respect 56:43.750 --> 56:46.600 for the Secretary of Defense 56:46.600 --> 56:49.880 and the Secretary of the Air Force as well, 56:51.150 --> 56:53.150 but as they've changed the strategy 56:53.150 --> 56:55.180 to more of a China or Russia strategy, 56:55.950 --> 56:58.080 they are canceling the procurement, 56:58.090 --> 56:59.910 or have proposed to cancel the procurement 56:59.910 --> 57:04.410 of items that are not capable 57:04.410 --> 57:07.480 of flying against the Russians or the Chinese 57:07.480 --> 57:09.840 in a direct conflict with Russians and Chinese. 57:11.220 --> 57:13.670 One of these platforms is the new JSTARS, 57:14.010 --> 57:15.940 the recapitalization of the JSTARS 57:15.960 --> 57:18.590 which we have spent hundreds of millions to develop 57:18.590 --> 57:20.540 and are now currently ready to purchase 57:21.030 --> 57:24.110 and they have proposed to cancel the procurement 57:24.110 --> 57:27.850 of the JSTARS because they've said 57:27.850 --> 57:28.990 that they're gonna use a system 57:28.990 --> 57:31.890 that has not been developed yet, 57:32.480 --> 57:34.570 which obviously changes the timeline 57:34.630 --> 57:38.810 on when we can deliver that system to you. 57:42.460 --> 57:47.460 I guess my question is, do the systems that you use 57:47.500 --> 57:52.500 in Central Command have to be survivable, if you will, 57:53.521 --> 57:57.330 in a conflict that would be as high end as 57:57.820 --> 57:59.460 that between the Russians and the Chinese, 57:59.460 --> 58:00.360 a direct conflict? 58:01.180 --> 58:03.790 - Well they don't necessarily need to be. 58:03.790 --> 58:08.100 I mean the environment is different in parts of CENTCOM 58:08.100 --> 58:09.800 than it might be in other parts of the world. 58:09.800 --> 58:12.250 So you know some of the requirements that I have, 58:12.800 --> 58:15.050 the environment that we operate are probably different 58:15.050 --> 58:16.690 than what Admiral Harris and others 58:16.690 --> 58:18.470 and General Scaparrotti deal with 58:18.470 --> 58:21.050 in PAYCOM AND UCOM respectively here. 58:21.410 --> 58:22.310 - Yes sir. 58:22.310 --> 58:27.160 I would appreciate any advocacy you could have. 58:28.030 --> 58:31.530 I agree with you 100% and I'm not opposed 58:31.530 --> 58:33.030 to the DOD developing the system 58:33.030 --> 58:35.390 that they want for the fight against the Russians 58:35.390 --> 58:36.230 and the Chinese. 58:36.840 --> 58:40.080 But even in developing that system we don't wanna use 58:40.080 --> 58:42.910 that system unless we have to, 58:42.910 --> 58:44.966 because we don't want the Russians and the Chinese 58:44.966 --> 58:47.220 to be able to gather the Intel 58:48.190 --> 58:50.750 that they're gonna gather from it every time we fly it. 58:50.750 --> 58:55.750 So certainly continue to be concerned about as we shift 58:55.870 --> 59:00.280 in strategy to China and Russia abandoning platforms 59:00.280 --> 59:03.100 that work in the other parts of the world 59:03.100 --> 59:05.240 which are very serious fights that we're in 59:05.240 --> 59:08.460 and that your commanding right now. 59:10.600 --> 59:11.930 I'm down to about a minute, 59:11.930 --> 59:13.790 but just briefly if you would again, 59:13.790 --> 59:17.520 I've been on the border of Syria and Israel. 59:20.120 --> 59:21.770 The military objectives in Syria, 59:22.920 --> 59:25.490 can you just outline for us 59:25.490 --> 59:28.030 what they are again very briefly? 59:29.220 --> 59:34.220 - Well principally it's to ensure an enduring defeat of ISIS 59:34.959 --> 59:37.410 is what the principal objective 59:37.410 --> 59:42.410 is of our military campaign right now in in Syria. 59:44.100 --> 59:47.310 You know certainly we're concerned about weapons 59:47.310 --> 59:48.540 of mass destruction in terms 59:48.540 --> 59:50.040 of some of their chemical capabilities. 59:50.040 --> 59:51.660 As you've seen in the past, 59:51.660 --> 59:53.210 we're obviously very concerned 59:53.210 --> 59:55.920 about making sure we can provide the humanitarian aid, 59:55.920 --> 59:57.150 the stability that goes along 59:57.150 --> 59:59.140 with getting people back into their homes. 59:59.140 --> 01:00:01.540 We're concerned about making sure 01:00:01.540 --> 01:00:04.340 that we protect allies that are on the flanks of Syria, 01:00:04.340 --> 01:00:08.350 Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey that all feel the impacts of that. 01:00:08.350 --> 01:00:11.280 And of course, we're very keen to ensure 01:00:11.280 --> 01:00:14.830 that there's a political resolution to all of this. 01:00:14.830 --> 01:00:16.610 Course that's beyond my military -- 01:00:16.610 --> 01:00:19.510 - General my time's expired, but it's a tough situation. 01:00:19.510 --> 01:00:21.390 I'm glad that we have a leader like you over there 01:00:21.390 --> 01:00:22.940 and thank you for your service. 01:00:23.410 --> 01:00:24.310 - [Mac] Mr. Brown. 01:00:24.350 --> 01:00:26.240 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman and General Votel. 01:00:26.240 --> 01:00:27.710 Thank you for your leadership 01:00:27.710 --> 01:00:30.820 and for appearing before the House Armed Services Committee 01:00:31.270 --> 01:00:34.550 to discuss the readiness, the posture 01:00:34.660 --> 01:00:37.670 and the activities within CENTCOM, so thank you. 01:00:38.428 --> 01:00:40.670 I wanna bring your attention back to Iran 01:00:40.670 --> 01:00:42.370 and its activities in Syria, 01:00:43.180 --> 01:00:45.430 perhaps covering some ground that's been covered 01:00:45.430 --> 01:00:48.120 and hopefully clarifying at least one point you made. 01:00:48.770 --> 01:00:51.490 Iran is playing a very large role in Syria, 01:00:51.490 --> 01:00:56.120 providing senior advisers to the Assad regimen, 01:00:57.390 --> 01:01:00.370 delivering weapons, cash, recruiting 01:01:00.470 --> 01:01:02.610 and encouraging foreign fighters. 01:01:03.280 --> 01:01:06.120 Last month Iran launched a drone 01:01:06.780 --> 01:01:09.460 that entered Israeli airspace. 01:01:10.000 --> 01:01:11.560 There's a series of events resulting 01:01:11.560 --> 01:01:13.320 in the downing of an F-16. 01:01:14.040 --> 01:01:19.000 The situation is clearly escalating and at greater risk. 01:01:19.370 --> 01:01:23.570 You mentioned in response to Ms. Cheney's question 01:01:23.810 --> 01:01:26.090 that we can impede Tehran. 01:01:26.846 --> 01:01:31.530 Can you just identify what those strategic 01:01:31.530 --> 01:01:33.800 and/or operational impediments are 01:01:34.370 --> 01:01:37.500 that we are putting in Tehran's way 01:01:37.730 --> 01:01:40.560 and can you evaluate the effectiveness of them? 01:01:40.560 --> 01:01:44.840 - Well I think as I mentioned, I think one of the things 01:01:44.840 --> 01:01:47.255 that we can do is we can build strong 01:01:47.255 --> 01:01:50.190 and resilient partnerships with our partners 01:01:50.190 --> 01:01:52.870 or whether it's the Iraqis on their side of the border, 01:01:52.870 --> 01:01:55.600 or whether it's kind of a Syrian Democratic force. 01:01:55.600 --> 01:01:59.404 At this point, you know, that's our partner on the ground. 01:01:59.404 --> 01:02:04.030 In many regards these partners share 01:02:04.030 --> 01:02:06.730 the same concerns we do with this, 01:02:07.000 --> 01:02:08.670 that they don't want their countries, 01:02:08.670 --> 01:02:11.590 they don't want their areas exploited by others 01:02:11.590 --> 01:02:15.620 for purposes of creating instability in this area. 01:02:15.620 --> 01:02:19.587 So the relationships that we develop with them, 01:02:19.587 --> 01:02:24.170 Iraqi forces, particularly their border control forces, 01:02:24.800 --> 01:02:29.390 I think help aid and prevent the movement 01:02:29.450 --> 01:02:32.150 of these types of activities 01:02:32.150 --> 01:02:34.630 and equipment back and forth across their borders. 01:02:34.630 --> 01:02:36.400 I think the Iraqis are as concerned about 01:02:36.400 --> 01:02:39.470 that as we would be and as most countries would be. 01:02:39.730 --> 01:02:41.670 And certainly, I think in Syria, 01:02:41.680 --> 01:02:44.890 although I do acknowledge our partners 01:02:44.890 --> 01:02:47.510 on the ground are a very indigenous partner, 01:02:47.510 --> 01:02:50.030 they do control very important areas 01:02:50.660 --> 01:02:54.770 along the border between Iraq and Syria 01:02:55.300 --> 01:02:59.995 and so they can as well through their own operations 01:02:59.995 --> 01:03:04.040 make it difficult for Iran 01:03:05.560 --> 01:03:09.790 to pursue their activities through these particular areas. 01:03:09.790 --> 01:03:10.880 So that's why I kind of describe it 01:03:10.880 --> 01:03:12.310 in much more in an indirect way -- 01:03:12.310 --> 01:03:15.110 - If I'm a General, so that sounds a little aspirational 01:03:15.290 --> 01:03:16.390 and I appreciate that. 01:03:16.460 --> 01:03:18.220 Can you evaluate the effectiveness 01:03:18.440 --> 01:03:19.800 of what you just described? 01:03:20.060 --> 01:03:24.120 - Well I think we're working on how we actually do that. 01:03:24.120 --> 01:03:27.010 I mean most of these networks are very resilient. 01:03:27.010 --> 01:03:29.630 They're very savvy in terms of how they are doing things, 01:03:29.650 --> 01:03:32.790 so this is something that we are looking at now, 01:03:33.080 --> 01:03:37.800 how we measure the effectiveness of it. 01:03:37.800 --> 01:03:39.060 I mean we're only in this case 01:03:39.060 --> 01:03:41.280 largely talking about ground routes. 01:03:41.410 --> 01:03:45.010 Certainly, Iran has the ability to use air routes as well 01:03:45.310 --> 01:03:48.380 to basically go over or around all of that. 01:03:48.380 --> 01:03:50.400 They have the ability to use maritime routes. 01:03:50.400 --> 01:03:52.610 They have the ability to go through Africa 01:03:53.210 --> 01:03:54.750 to get to these areas as well. 01:03:54.750 --> 01:03:58.640 So you know we have to look at this holistically 01:04:00.690 --> 01:04:02.540 as we try to address this. 01:04:02.540 --> 01:04:03.990 - So let me ask one other question, 01:04:03.990 --> 01:04:06.290 perhaps the last in the time I have remaining. 01:04:06.530 --> 01:04:09.840 I understand that Israel's in the Yukon AOR, 01:04:10.010 --> 01:04:12.990 but conflict in that region doesn't necessarily respect 01:04:13.990 --> 01:04:16.840 the area of operations of our different commands. 01:04:17.070 --> 01:04:20.020 Can you talk about in the event, 01:04:20.033 --> 01:04:21.890 regardless of the likelihood, 01:04:22.290 --> 01:04:25.930 of a conflict between Iran and Israel, 01:04:26.150 --> 01:04:27.520 regardless of how it's provoked, 01:04:27.520 --> 01:04:30.310 can you just comment on what our readiness 01:04:30.580 --> 01:04:32.960 in this setting perhaps it's best 01:04:32.960 --> 01:04:34.310 for the classified setting, 01:04:34.400 --> 01:04:38.340 our readiness and posture to come to the aid of Israel? 01:04:39.378 --> 01:04:42.190 - Again, I that's probably a question 01:04:42.260 --> 01:04:45.350 that's best suited for General Scaparrotti, 01:04:45.350 --> 01:04:46.500 but what I would tell you -- 01:04:46.500 --> 01:04:49.890 - The readiness and posture that wouldn't involve CENTCOM? 01:04:50.717 --> 01:04:53.660 - Right, given that it is in his area 01:04:53.660 --> 01:04:56.290 and he has a principal responsibility for that relationship. 01:04:56.290 --> 01:04:58.173 What I would tell you is this, is that you know, 01:04:58.173 --> 01:05:02.880 the CENTCOM area not just on the Israeli border 01:05:02.880 --> 01:05:05.310 but certainly on the border of Egypt with Libya, 01:05:05.610 --> 01:05:07.460 on the border of Pakistan with India, 01:05:07.660 --> 01:05:09.990 to the north of the Central Asian states with Russia, 01:05:09.990 --> 01:05:11.340 it's a tough neighborhood. 01:05:11.720 --> 01:05:14.430 And so it is imperative for the combatant commanders 01:05:14.430 --> 01:05:16.880 to be very well nested across all of these areas. 01:05:16.976 --> 01:05:19.990 I think under the leadership of our Chairman 01:05:19.990 --> 01:05:21.740 and with the National Defense Strategy 01:05:21.740 --> 01:05:24.070 that the Secretary has put in place 01:05:24.280 --> 01:05:27.980 that we are improving significantly our ability 01:05:27.980 --> 01:05:31.680 to operate in cooperation with each other 01:05:31.950 --> 01:05:33.950 and in many cases very, very seamlessly. 01:05:34.170 --> 01:05:37.110 So it's not unusual for General Scaparrotti 01:05:37.110 --> 01:05:39.110 and I to have a lot of coordination 01:05:39.110 --> 01:05:43.130 in talking across our common areas of concern. 01:05:43.360 --> 01:05:45.700 Just like it's not uncommon for General Waldhauser 01:05:45.700 --> 01:05:49.320 in AFRICOM and I to talk, or Admiral Harris and I 01:05:50.564 --> 01:05:51.540 to talk about the things on his side. 01:05:51.540 --> 01:05:54.760 So this is an area where we have really got to continue 01:05:54.760 --> 01:05:55.660 to pay attention 01:05:55.730 --> 01:06:00.150 and I think we're doing a much, much better job of this. 01:06:00.150 --> 01:06:00.983 - Thank you General. 01:06:00.983 --> 01:06:01.940 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:06:02.190 --> 01:06:03.190 - [Mac] Ms. McSally. 01:06:04.650 --> 01:06:07.030 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Joe Votel, good to see you again. 01:06:07.030 --> 01:06:08.470 I have three important questions. 01:06:08.470 --> 01:06:09.890 I'll be as fast as I can. 01:06:10.010 --> 01:06:13.490 The first is about this attack on US forces in Syria, 01:06:13.663 --> 01:06:17.760 media reports alleging it's by Russian mercenaries. 01:06:17.804 --> 01:06:20.070 Can you comment at all if we have confirmation 01:06:20.070 --> 01:06:23.140 that in fact those were Russian mercenaries? 01:06:23.140 --> 01:06:25.940 Number one, how many you think were killed 01:06:26.320 --> 01:06:29.440 and do we have any confirmation that that was approved 01:06:29.440 --> 01:06:32.200 or ordered by the Kremlin or Putin 01:06:32.200 --> 01:06:34.800 and what do you think their objective might've been? 01:06:35.900 --> 01:06:37.920 - Congresswoman, I'm not sure I can report 01:06:37.920 --> 01:06:40.920 anything different than you have seen in the media 01:06:40.970 --> 01:06:43.547 and in the press on this right now in terms of numbers 01:06:43.547 --> 01:06:47.080 and attribution of who this is. 01:06:47.419 --> 01:06:50.670 What I can tell you is that throughout this entire event 01:06:50.920 --> 01:06:54.260 we were in communications on our communication channel 01:06:54.260 --> 01:06:56.388 with the Russians before, during, after 01:06:56.388 --> 01:06:59.220 and what they told us was these were not their forces 01:06:59.220 --> 01:07:01.070 and not their military forces. 01:07:01.453 --> 01:07:06.453 So you know, I think that kind of speaks for itself here 01:07:07.004 --> 01:07:08.910 in terms of what they are. 01:07:08.910 --> 01:07:10.480 And then of course we've seen all the media 01:07:10.480 --> 01:07:11.800 that has come out after this. 01:07:11.800 --> 01:07:16.530 So to me it highlights, again, the unwillingness, inability 01:07:16.530 --> 01:07:18.350 of the regime and pro-regime forces 01:07:18.350 --> 01:07:20.210 to take seriously the ISIS threat, 01:07:20.410 --> 01:07:24.994 particularly if there's apparent contracted forces 01:07:24.994 --> 01:07:26.970 in the area attempting to do this. 01:07:26.970 --> 01:07:29.960 - So do you believe they were not Russian mercenaries 01:07:29.960 --> 01:07:32.570 and do we have any intelligence to corroborate 01:07:32.580 --> 01:07:33.770 or confirm or deny that? 01:07:33.770 --> 01:07:34.940 - [Joseph] None that I would discuss 01:07:34.940 --> 01:07:36.290 in this particular setting. 01:07:36.290 --> 01:07:38.650 - Okay so could we maybe discuss in the follow on setting? 01:07:38.650 --> 01:07:40.050 - Be happy to talk with you. 01:07:40.100 --> 01:07:41.540 - Okay, but do you personally believe 01:07:41.540 --> 01:07:43.680 that they were not Russian mercenaries at this point, 01:07:43.680 --> 01:07:45.610 or can you not even say that? 01:07:45.610 --> 01:07:48.770 - We have characterized them as pro-regime forces 01:07:48.770 --> 01:07:49.603 at this point. 01:07:49.603 --> 01:07:50.700 - Okay, I look forward to following up 01:07:50.700 --> 01:07:51.900 in a classified setting. 01:07:52.100 --> 01:07:56.040 Second topic is A-10 Warthog was back in Afghanistan, 01:07:56.450 --> 01:07:58.570 kickin' butt in January. 01:07:58.570 --> 01:08:01.230 Can you comment on the types of missions that they're doing, 01:08:01.230 --> 01:08:03.150 and I know it's a little specific, 01:08:03.150 --> 01:08:05.790 but as part of the shift in strategy 01:08:05.790 --> 01:08:07.790 it seems like we're now going after more 01:08:08.154 --> 01:08:11.211 of the sources of revenue perhaps overall 01:08:11.211 --> 01:08:14.280 in attacking the you know, poppy industry 01:08:14.280 --> 01:08:17.560 and the drug making facilities 01:08:17.560 --> 01:08:19.700 and how is the A-10 doing over there? 01:08:19.700 --> 01:08:20.630 - A-10s are doing great. 01:08:20.630 --> 01:08:22.870 They were in action within 24 hours 01:08:22.870 --> 01:08:24.780 of being on the ground here and I've had an opportunity 01:08:24.780 --> 01:08:26.830 to visit the squadron and meet the squadron commander 01:08:26.830 --> 01:08:28.940 and we're very very proud of what they're doing. 01:08:28.940 --> 01:08:30.020 And they are doing the things 01:08:30.020 --> 01:08:31.620 we would expect the A-10s to do. 01:08:32.100 --> 01:08:35.040 Part of our concept and why we're pushing advisor teams down 01:08:35.040 --> 01:08:36.620 to a lower level is so 01:08:36.620 --> 01:08:38.780 that we can bring capabilities like the A-10 01:08:38.780 --> 01:08:40.920 to bear very effectively in support 01:08:40.920 --> 01:08:43.470 of the Afghan National Defense Forces 01:08:43.470 --> 01:08:45.880 and so that's what we expect they're doing. 01:08:46.160 --> 01:08:48.770 You are correct, one of things that has been successful, 01:08:48.770 --> 01:08:52.990 and we've tried to carry over from our Defeat ICIS Campaign 01:08:53.040 --> 01:08:55.390 is going after the revenue generation. 01:08:55.730 --> 01:08:57.870 And in this case the narcotrafficking 01:08:57.870 --> 01:08:59.790 that fuels the Taliban 01:08:59.790 --> 01:09:03.520 and so this is a key focus for General Nicholson 01:09:03.520 --> 01:09:04.890 and our forces at this point. 01:09:04.890 --> 01:09:05.723 - Great, thanks. 01:09:05.723 --> 01:09:07.700 I do wanna note, if the last administration got their way 01:09:07.700 --> 01:09:09.590 all the A-10s would be in the boneyard by now 01:09:09.590 --> 01:09:11.400 and as I told this President, 01:09:11.400 --> 01:09:14.100 you're gonna have to pry them outta my cold dead hands 01:09:14.160 --> 01:09:16.050 because it's such a critical war fighting capability 01:09:16.050 --> 01:09:18.460 and I appreciate this committee and leadership working 01:09:18.460 --> 01:09:21.440 to keep that asset, so we can be doing missions like this. 01:09:22.040 --> 01:09:24.956 Last topic is I'm really concerned about the buildup 01:09:24.956 --> 01:09:29.340 on Israel's northern border, so Southern Syria, 01:09:29.690 --> 01:09:31.450 of Iranian backed militias 01:09:31.450 --> 01:09:34.100 and forces, Kurds force commanding that 01:09:34.830 --> 01:09:38.120 and the increased aggression we're seeing from there 01:09:38.601 --> 01:09:43.601 as the Assad regime seems to be shoring up controlling 01:09:44.310 --> 01:09:47.390 that area and the potential for escalation 01:09:47.510 --> 01:09:49.180 of a crisis with Israel. 01:09:49.180 --> 01:09:50.960 Again, I know that you can't say, but Syria's yours, 01:09:50.960 --> 01:09:53.300 so can you speak to what you're seeing in the trends 01:09:53.300 --> 01:09:55.940 in the Golan areas and whether there's a threat there? 01:09:56.380 --> 01:09:58.680 - I think we share the same concerns 01:09:58.680 --> 01:10:00.790 that you've just highlighted right here 01:10:00.790 --> 01:10:03.990 and what this is you know very effectively 01:10:03.990 --> 01:10:08.990 in this southwestern corner of Syria we've been able 01:10:10.610 --> 01:10:12.800 to diplomatically begin to address that 01:10:12.800 --> 01:10:16.410 and so working with the Special Presidential Envoy, 01:10:16.410 --> 01:10:17.530 Mr. McGurk and others, 01:10:17.530 --> 01:10:19.660 we're continuing to keep focus on that. 01:10:19.660 --> 01:10:21.990 Again, Russia is a party to this 01:10:21.990 --> 01:10:24.110 and they have responsibilities to ensure 01:10:24.110 --> 01:10:29.110 that the detractable partners that may be in this area 01:10:29.640 --> 01:10:30.540 are under control. 01:10:30.540 --> 01:10:32.930 And so they have to take responsibility for this 01:10:32.930 --> 01:10:35.130 and be held accountable not just the Iranians, 01:10:35.130 --> 01:10:36.830 but the others that are down there 01:10:37.130 --> 01:10:38.940 that are much more akin 01:10:38.940 --> 01:10:41.210 to the violent extremists down there. 01:10:41.210 --> 01:10:42.660 So I think we have to continue 01:10:42.660 --> 01:10:45.370 to address that in this particular -- 01:10:45.370 --> 01:10:47.200 - Can you share any of the trends that you're seeing? 01:10:47.200 --> 01:10:49.820 An increase in military capability we've seen again 01:10:49.820 --> 01:10:52.190 with escalation over the last few weeks 01:10:52.330 --> 01:10:54.430 and any concerns you have about that escalating 01:10:54.430 --> 01:10:56.200 into a full-blown crisis with Israel? 01:10:56.200 --> 01:10:58.060 - Well I think what I'm concerned about 01:10:58.060 --> 01:11:01.370 is in these places down in the Southwest, 01:11:01.370 --> 01:11:03.170 and particularly up in places like Idlib. 01:11:03.170 --> 01:11:06.020 These are becoming collection zones for a lot 01:11:06.020 --> 01:11:10.320 of unsavory organizations right here 01:11:10.320 --> 01:11:12.780 and eventually they're going to have to be dealt with. 01:11:12.890 --> 01:11:16.460 So I am concerned that left unaddressed 01:11:17.640 --> 01:11:19.590 that they will become bigger problems. 01:11:20.010 --> 01:11:21.530 In terms of trends and stuff like this, 01:11:21.530 --> 01:11:23.230 I can't tell you in the southwest, 01:11:23.230 --> 01:11:24.530 particularly in this setting, 01:11:24.530 --> 01:11:27.040 that we've seen anything specific here in terms of this, 01:11:27.040 --> 01:11:28.620 but obviously there's some concerns. 01:11:28.620 --> 01:11:30.630 But what we have seen in places like Idlib 01:11:30.630 --> 01:11:32.740 and others is where these groups 01:11:32.740 --> 01:11:36.140 that have come together do potentially 01:11:37.087 --> 01:11:40.420 pose long-term challenges for security 01:11:40.420 --> 01:11:43.360 of the region above and beyond Syria. 01:11:43.470 --> 01:11:44.303 - Great thanks. 01:11:44.303 --> 01:11:45.380 I'm over my time, but I look forward 01:11:45.380 --> 01:11:47.040 to discussing further in the closed session. 01:11:47.040 --> 01:11:47.873 Thanks. 01:11:47.873 --> 01:11:48.830 - [Mac] Mr. Langevin. 01:11:49.060 --> 01:11:50.070 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:11:50.070 --> 01:11:52.000 General, great to see you again. 01:11:52.080 --> 01:11:53.590 Thank you for your great service to the nation. 01:11:53.590 --> 01:11:55.110 It's a pleasure to have you back 01:11:55.110 --> 01:11:56.710 before the Committee once again. 01:11:57.140 --> 01:12:01.090 I'd like to continue on the Iran topic as well 01:12:01.770 --> 01:12:05.380 and do a deeper dive on this topic. 01:12:05.380 --> 01:12:10.380 So Iran supports numerous proxies in Hezbollah, in Israel, 01:12:11.390 --> 01:12:16.390 Lebanon and Syria, Houthis in Yemen and militias in Iraq. 01:12:16.688 --> 01:12:19.880 Iran is using its militias and insurgents abroad 01:12:19.880 --> 01:12:23.690 to upset the existing order and sow chaos obviously. 01:12:23.690 --> 01:12:28.070 In addition to proxies, Iran uses other asymmetric means 01:12:28.070 --> 01:12:31.380 like cyber operations and information warfare 01:12:31.380 --> 01:12:33.810 to expand its influence in the region. 01:12:34.440 --> 01:12:38.780 So can you explain how you've seen Iran 01:12:38.780 --> 01:12:41.070 utilize these techniques during your tenure 01:12:41.070 --> 01:12:45.270 as CENTCOM Commander to create a land bridge through Iraq 01:12:45.270 --> 01:12:49.570 and Syria to Lebanon and if you think they've been effective 01:12:49.570 --> 01:12:52.170 in increasing their influence through this strategy? 01:12:54.120 --> 01:12:56.930 - Thanks, some of some of this discussion probably I think 01:12:56.930 --> 01:13:00.030 is best set for a closed session here, 01:13:00.030 --> 01:13:04.560 but you know I think what Iran attempts to do 01:13:04.560 --> 01:13:06.940 is by creating proxy organizations that can go out there 01:13:06.940 --> 01:13:09.090 and do their bidding, they can operate in areas 01:13:09.090 --> 01:13:10.270 in which they have interests. 01:13:10.270 --> 01:13:11.970 I think they are attempting to do that. 01:13:11.970 --> 01:13:13.980 I do think we see some instances 01:13:13.990 --> 01:13:15.740 of that as we look at some 01:13:15.740 --> 01:13:19.520 of the undisciplined Shia militia organizations 01:13:19.520 --> 01:13:21.390 that are here that are much more beholden 01:13:21.390 --> 01:13:24.740 to Iran than they are to say the government of Iraq. 01:13:25.130 --> 01:13:27.130 This is very concerning to us. 01:13:27.130 --> 01:13:28.620 And I think this gives us indications 01:13:28.620 --> 01:13:31.530 that they're acting not on behalf of the government 01:13:31.597 --> 01:13:34.210 they say they're representing, 01:13:34.210 --> 01:13:36.080 but on behalf of another party. 01:13:38.190 --> 01:13:39.960 - Okay, I voted following up 01:13:39.960 --> 01:13:42.460 on that question too once we're in the closed session. 01:13:43.680 --> 01:13:48.680 So the war in Syria has left hundreds of thousands dead, 01:13:49.330 --> 01:13:52.240 millions either internally displaced, 01:13:52.240 --> 01:13:55.230 or seeking asylum as refugees, 01:13:55.720 --> 01:13:59.240 but as the fight against ISIL transitions 01:13:59.240 --> 01:14:02.160 to consolidating gains and building stability, 01:14:02.220 --> 01:14:04.040 it seems as if some of the groups 01:14:04.220 --> 01:14:07.120 that have formed partnerships of convenience 01:14:07.480 --> 01:14:08.660 may now turn their attention 01:14:08.660 --> 01:14:10.930 towards fighting each other instead. 01:14:11.416 --> 01:14:14.579 So how do you see these various elements aligning themselves 01:14:14.579 --> 01:14:17.640 in Syria and you worry about a potential 01:14:17.980 --> 01:14:19.830 shifting regional balance of power 01:14:19.830 --> 01:14:23.740 and you feel the Syrian Kurds might feel slighted 01:14:23.740 --> 01:14:25.460 by recent events and align more closely 01:14:25.460 --> 01:14:27.630 with Iran to ward off threats? 01:14:28.797 --> 01:14:30.970 - Yeah so first off Congressman, 01:14:31.030 --> 01:14:33.140 what I would say is with the partners that we operate, 01:14:33.140 --> 01:14:35.330 the Syrian Democratic Forces, we have not necessarily 01:14:35.330 --> 01:14:39.030 seen infighting among themselves here in terms of that. 01:14:39.030 --> 01:14:42.560 I mean it is a large organization, roughly half Kurd, 01:14:42.560 --> 01:14:46.370 half Arab with some others so thrown in there, 01:14:46.390 --> 01:14:50.100 Yazidis and others, Turkmen that are involved in this group. 01:14:50.280 --> 01:14:52.770 But frankly, they have in my estimation, 01:14:52.770 --> 01:14:55.720 have continued to be pretty coherent 01:14:55.720 --> 01:14:58.090 in terms of how they are doing this. 01:14:58.174 --> 01:15:00.090 I guess the way I would describe it 01:15:00.090 --> 01:15:04.720 is that as we are completing the defeat of ISIS, 01:15:04.960 --> 01:15:06.620 I think what we are now beginning to see 01:15:06.620 --> 01:15:09.930 is the reemergence of many of the underlying issues 01:15:09.930 --> 01:15:11.930 that have always been in place in Syria. 01:15:12.180 --> 01:15:15.020 And as we have converging forces in the area, 01:15:15.020 --> 01:15:17.030 we are now seeing diverging interests. 01:15:17.360 --> 01:15:21.080 I think we see this down in the Middle Euphrates Valley 01:15:21.091 --> 01:15:23.660 between the focus of the coalition 01:15:23.660 --> 01:15:24.820 and our partners on the ground 01:15:24.820 --> 01:15:28.261 and what the pro-regime element is focused on. 01:15:28.261 --> 01:15:31.810 They are less concerned about rooting out the ISIS 01:15:31.810 --> 01:15:34.440 than they are about going in and addressing some 01:15:34.440 --> 01:15:36.890 of the opposition elements to the regime. 01:15:37.180 --> 01:15:40.100 So I think what we have to be mindful 01:15:40.100 --> 01:15:44.260 of is that as the caliphate goes away 01:15:44.260 --> 01:15:48.380 and as the threat of ISIS is removed we will begin 01:15:48.380 --> 01:15:51.440 to see more of a return to the underlying challenges 01:15:51.440 --> 01:15:54.173 that really gave birth to many of these, 01:15:54.173 --> 01:15:58.140 to this problem and other problems in the country 01:15:58.470 --> 01:16:00.200 and that those are ultimately gonna have 01:16:00.200 --> 01:16:03.210 to be addressed through some type of Geneva process 01:16:03.210 --> 01:16:06.960 that brings the parties together to establish some kind 01:16:06.960 --> 01:16:10.200 of process and arrangement 01:16:10.200 --> 01:16:15.070 that allows Syria to be the country that it should be. 01:16:15.450 --> 01:16:17.350 - Yeah, it seems that we're right more 01:16:17.833 --> 01:16:19.010 at that tipping point right now 01:16:19.204 --> 01:16:20.920 where our State Department has to play a stronger role 01:16:20.920 --> 01:16:25.920 in working with the powers that have interest there 01:16:25.930 --> 01:16:28.240 and try to bring about a political solution. 01:16:28.250 --> 01:16:31.720 So I hope we're gonna be pursuing that on dual tracks. 01:16:31.898 --> 01:16:35.700 I see my time's about to run out. 01:16:35.700 --> 01:16:40.250 So I'll hold my questions for the closed session, 01:16:40.250 --> 01:16:42.920 but again, thank you for your service General 01:16:42.920 --> 01:16:43.920 and I'll yield back. 01:16:45.010 --> 01:16:45.843 - Mr. Russell. 01:16:46.460 --> 01:16:47.360 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman 01:16:47.360 --> 01:16:51.120 and thank you General Votel for your testimony today. 01:16:51.740 --> 01:16:55.080 A couple of areas that I've not heard discussed. 01:16:55.164 --> 01:16:58.230 Could you give us your thoughts on Turkish operations 01:16:58.230 --> 01:17:02.420 in Afrin and its partnering with Al Qaeda affiliates, 01:17:02.610 --> 01:17:05.440 its attack on US backed forces 01:17:05.880 --> 01:17:09.480 and how that will impact the By, With and Through Strategy 01:17:09.480 --> 01:17:11.730 to make a stable border security force? 01:17:12.080 --> 01:17:13.090 - Congressman, I think some 01:17:13.090 --> 01:17:16.160 of that will probably be reserved for a closed session here, 01:17:16.160 --> 01:17:19.380 but you know I think we have acknowledged 01:17:19.380 --> 01:17:21.220 that turkey has some concerns along there, 01:17:21.220 --> 01:17:23.140 has some significant concerns along their border 01:17:23.140 --> 01:17:25.810 with long-standing PKK interests. 01:17:27.410 --> 01:17:30.230 Our concern of course is that this activity 01:17:30.230 --> 01:17:34.170 in Afrin is detracting from our efforts against ISIS. 01:17:34.760 --> 01:17:37.490 - And then kind of a broader scope on that, 01:17:38.140 --> 01:17:41.720 what actions you think are needed to prevent this mixture 01:17:41.720 --> 01:17:43.700 of (mumbles) Putin counterefforts 01:17:44.290 --> 01:17:47.350 to secure the hard-fought gains against ISIS.? 01:17:48.530 --> 01:17:50.600 - Well I think as I mentioned in my opening statement 01:17:50.600 --> 01:17:52.250 as I've said a couple times here, 01:17:52.320 --> 01:17:55.760 I really view Russia as being at the heart 01:17:55.760 --> 01:17:57.390 of many of these issues here 01:17:57.390 --> 01:18:00.490 and I'm not being very serious when I say they play the role 01:18:00.490 --> 01:18:03.880 of both arsonists and firemen, fueling tensions 01:18:03.880 --> 01:18:06.310 and then trying to resolve them in their favor 01:18:06.930 --> 01:18:10.180 and manipulating all the parties they can 01:18:10.750 --> 01:18:13.890 to try to achieve their objectives. 01:18:15.356 --> 01:18:17.840 Their objectives are not necessarily the broader objectives 01:18:17.840 --> 01:18:19.600 of the international community here. 01:18:19.600 --> 01:18:23.650 So I think there certainly has to be more accountability 01:18:23.650 --> 01:18:25.490 and pressure put on Russia 01:18:25.490 --> 01:18:27.640 to do what they said they were going to do. 01:18:27.930 --> 01:18:29.771 - Do you think that that pressure 01:18:29.771 --> 01:18:32.520 could come from the other instruments 01:18:32.520 --> 01:18:34.320 of national power from United States 01:18:34.320 --> 01:18:36.470 on our NATO ally in Turkey? 01:18:37.151 --> 01:18:39.440 - I think they can come from a variety 01:18:39.580 --> 01:18:41.310 of different sources Congressman. 01:18:41.550 --> 01:18:46.550 - And then I guess can you speak also to the need 01:18:46.790 --> 01:18:50.370 to interdict the ISIS Al Qaeda migration 01:18:50.500 --> 01:18:55.500 into sub-Saharan Africa AQ Maghreb, Boko Haram, others, 01:18:57.060 --> 01:19:00.650 see a lot of that now that as they've been pushed out 01:19:00.650 --> 01:19:03.450 of one area that they may drift over to the other 01:19:03.450 --> 01:19:07.030 and how that would cooperate between the combatant commands? 01:19:08.210 --> 01:19:10.590 - Well certainly we're very cognizant 01:19:10.590 --> 01:19:12.750 of what AFRICOM is dealing with, 01:19:12.750 --> 01:19:15.890 with their partners on the ground in Sahil 01:19:15.890 --> 01:19:18.740 and the Maghreb here and very, very concerned about that. 01:19:18.820 --> 01:19:20.300 I think one of the principal things 01:19:20.300 --> 01:19:22.090 that we can do is continue 01:19:22.090 --> 01:19:23.820 to share information back and forth. 01:19:23.820 --> 01:19:28.440 Frankly we're not seeing mass migration of these fighters. 01:19:28.440 --> 01:19:30.950 I won't tell you that their probably not getting out 01:19:30.950 --> 01:19:33.700 with refugees and others that are doing that, 01:19:33.700 --> 01:19:35.050 that probably is occurring. 01:19:35.570 --> 01:19:39.340 But certainly, this is a concern long-term 01:19:39.340 --> 01:19:40.870 and so I think one of the things 01:19:40.870 --> 01:19:42.461 that we are attempting to do is, 01:19:42.461 --> 01:19:45.420 particularly now that we have so many foreign fighters 01:19:45.420 --> 01:19:47.880 that have been captured and are in some level 01:19:47.880 --> 01:19:49.460 of detention with our partners here, 01:19:49.460 --> 01:19:52.430 is try to get the international community engaged 01:19:52.430 --> 01:19:54.410 in taking responsibility for their people 01:19:54.410 --> 01:19:57.510 and bringing them to some level of justice. 01:19:57.510 --> 01:19:58.770 There's a lot that can be learned 01:19:58.770 --> 01:20:01.680 from these foreign fighters as we have to make sure 01:20:01.680 --> 01:20:02.930 that we've exploited that 01:20:02.930 --> 01:20:05.420 and learned as much as we can so we can prevent it. 01:20:05.420 --> 01:20:06.620 But we also need to make sure 01:20:06.620 --> 01:20:09.390 that they're put back into the judicial process, 01:20:09.390 --> 01:20:11.190 so they can be dealt with by their countries 01:20:11.190 --> 01:20:12.240 from which they came. 01:20:13.010 --> 01:20:15.550 - Then I guess the last question I have would be, 01:20:16.580 --> 01:20:20.663 could you give your assessment of Egyptian and Saudi, 01:20:20.663 --> 01:20:25.240 combined efforts on Yemen and the status of Yemen? 01:20:29.240 --> 01:20:31.480 - With respect to the status of Yemen, 01:20:31.519 --> 01:20:36.519 obviously Yemen is very destabilized 01:20:37.470 --> 01:20:38.380 at this particular point. 01:20:38.380 --> 01:20:40.220 Not only do they have a civil war going on, 01:20:40.220 --> 01:20:43.330 they have kind of a proxy war plane out here 01:20:43.330 --> 01:20:45.170 between Iran and Saudi Arabia 01:20:45.660 --> 01:20:48.810 with Iran introducing advanced technology into there. 01:20:48.810 --> 01:20:52.710 We see the enabled Houthis trying 01:20:52.710 --> 01:20:57.440 to challenge a navigation in the Bab-el-Mandeb 01:20:57.440 --> 01:21:00.290 and of course they have a counterterrorism problem 01:21:00.450 --> 01:21:02.650 that we are very focused on. 01:21:02.960 --> 01:21:06.570 So, you know, I think from the counterterrorism standpoint 01:21:06.570 --> 01:21:08.740 I think we are making very good progress 01:21:08.740 --> 01:21:09.940 in this particular area. 01:21:10.153 --> 01:21:15.153 I don't see significant changes in the civil conflict 01:21:18.430 --> 01:21:20.763 that's taking place that's largely being orchestrated 01:21:20.763 --> 01:21:23.440 by the Arab Coalition that's on the ground there. 01:21:23.440 --> 01:21:27.650 They certainly need to put some more effort into that. 01:21:28.008 --> 01:21:31.640 We're paying attention to the efforts by our diplomats 01:21:31.640 --> 01:21:34.190 and others here to try to address this politically. 01:21:34.410 --> 01:21:37.280 There has been some opportunities in the past, 01:21:37.280 --> 01:21:38.650 they have not come to fruition yet 01:21:38.650 --> 01:21:42.010 and I think we still have to continue on in this area. 01:21:42.010 --> 01:21:43.970 But I think Yemen is an area 01:21:43.970 --> 01:21:45.650 that we should all be concerned about, 01:21:45.650 --> 01:21:47.750 because we're seeing all kinds of problems 01:21:48.130 --> 01:21:49.180 in that particular area, 01:21:49.180 --> 01:21:51.800 and on top of it huge humanitarian issues. 01:21:51.800 --> 01:21:53.450 The people are suffering greatly. 01:21:54.080 --> 01:21:55.780 - Thank you and thank you Mr. Chairman. 01:21:55.880 --> 01:21:56.780 - [Mac] Ms. Rosen. 01:21:58.090 --> 01:21:58.923 - Thank you. 01:21:59.080 --> 01:22:01.070 I wanna thank the General for being here today, 01:22:01.070 --> 01:22:02.270 thank the ranking member 01:22:02.440 --> 01:22:05.220 and the Chairman for this important hearing. 01:22:05.246 --> 01:22:09.060 I'd like to speak a little bit about sanctions on Iran 01:22:09.190 --> 01:22:11.880 and Russia and what's your opinion 01:22:11.990 --> 01:22:13.887 and how would implementing sanctions, 01:22:13.887 --> 01:22:16.070 or what level of sanctions, if any, 01:22:16.070 --> 01:22:20.290 do you think would influence activities in the Middle East, 01:22:20.290 --> 01:22:21.790 specifically Russian and Iran? 01:22:22.940 --> 01:22:27.940 - Well Congresswoman, we don't really manage those 01:22:28.070 --> 01:22:29.130 within the Department of Defense 01:22:29.130 --> 01:22:31.550 and certainly not within CENTCOM. 01:22:31.550 --> 01:22:35.300 I do know that the Secretary has recently provided 01:22:35.300 --> 01:22:38.710 some information to Senator Corker and others 01:22:38.710 --> 01:22:40.780 on with regards to CATSA 01:22:40.840 --> 01:22:44.470 and some of the other things regarding sanctions out here 01:22:44.470 --> 01:22:48.000 and I think of those kind of represent his interest. 01:22:49.359 --> 01:22:52.920 I think sanctions are a very important part of this. 01:22:53.240 --> 01:22:56.930 In most of these threats, because I tried to mention 01:22:56.930 --> 01:23:00.020 in my opening comments this is a team sport 01:23:00.380 --> 01:23:02.460 and so we can do things militarily, 01:23:02.460 --> 01:23:05.780 but we also need the other instruments of our national power 01:23:06.030 --> 01:23:07.980 whether it's diplomatic, whether it's economic, 01:23:07.980 --> 01:23:09.280 whether it's informational 01:23:09.350 --> 01:23:11.570 to really kick in on these things. 01:23:11.710 --> 01:23:14.720 And when we are able to bring all of those together 01:23:14.970 --> 01:23:16.570 to include things like sanctions 01:23:16.780 --> 01:23:18.830 I think we often have the best of facts 01:23:19.110 --> 01:23:23.800 and so I think there are certainly some very good areas 01:23:23.800 --> 01:23:26.000 here sanctions will make a difference. 01:23:26.000 --> 01:23:29.040 We do have to look at the impact of those 01:23:29.040 --> 01:23:31.930 on some of our partners and we have to be mindful of that. 01:23:32.020 --> 01:23:34.670 I do think granting waiver authority 01:23:34.670 --> 01:23:37.220 to the Secretary of State with regard 01:23:37.220 --> 01:23:39.480 to some of these things is a good approach 01:23:39.480 --> 01:23:43.040 and gives us the flexibility that we need in these regards, 01:23:43.650 --> 01:23:46.950 but I look at it as a key part 01:23:46.950 --> 01:23:48.750 of the whole of government approach. 01:23:48.750 --> 01:23:51.698 - So you feel you're getting enough support in this regard? 01:23:51.698 --> 01:23:56.698 - I do and I certainly know this is a continuing area 01:23:57.080 --> 01:23:59.180 of topic in other parts of the government. 01:23:59.310 --> 01:24:00.143 - Thank you. 01:24:00.476 --> 01:24:03.426 I also wanna switch over and talk about Syria a little bit, 01:24:03.540 --> 01:24:06.580 And so where does the communication stand 01:24:06.580 --> 01:24:08.540 after Russian-aligned troops of course 01:24:08.540 --> 01:24:12.010 attacked our partner forces in Syria in early February? 01:24:12.010 --> 01:24:15.380 So how are things going there and our strategy 01:24:15.380 --> 01:24:18.290 of deconfliction with Russian mechanisms, 01:24:18.550 --> 01:24:19.540 has that been helpful? 01:24:19.540 --> 01:24:21.490 - Congresswoman, there's been no change 01:24:22.184 --> 01:24:23.690 in the communication channel that we have had. 01:24:23.690 --> 01:24:26.340 Our deconfliction channel remains a very professional 01:24:26.340 --> 01:24:30.600 military discussion, it was before and it has been since. 01:24:30.600 --> 01:24:34.630 And so it remains an effective way to deconflict our forces 01:24:34.630 --> 01:24:37.010 and make sure our airmen stay safe 01:24:37.010 --> 01:24:38.810 and our people on the ground are safe. 01:24:39.120 --> 01:24:40.910 - [Jacky] Thank you, I yield back my time. 01:24:41.811 --> 01:24:42.644 - [Mac] Mr. Gallagher. 01:24:43.950 --> 01:24:45.010 - [Mike] Just to follow up briefly 01:24:45.010 --> 01:24:46.450 on something Mr. Russell said. 01:24:46.450 --> 01:24:49.540 What do we say to our NATO allies in Ankara 01:24:49.540 --> 01:24:52.860 regarding our support for Kurdish elements in Syria, 01:24:52.920 --> 01:24:54.590 the YPG and other elements? 01:24:55.020 --> 01:24:57.005 What message do we communicate to them? 01:24:57.005 --> 01:25:00.380 - The message that I have conveyed 01:25:00.380 --> 01:25:03.220 is that our Kurdish partner's, 01:25:03.220 --> 01:25:05.870 part of the Syrian Democratic Forces, 01:25:05.870 --> 01:25:09.640 a multiethnic force that consists in equal measures, 01:25:09.640 --> 01:25:10.900 and actually in greater measures 01:25:10.900 --> 01:25:15.230 of Arabs than in Kurds has been the most effective force 01:25:15.230 --> 01:25:17.310 on the ground in Syria against ISIS 01:25:17.710 --> 01:25:20.920 and we need them to finish this fight. 01:25:21.670 --> 01:25:23.880 So I think that's the first thing, 01:25:23.960 --> 01:25:25.490 and really one of the principal things 01:25:25.490 --> 01:25:27.200 we have to acknowledge to them. 01:25:27.660 --> 01:25:29.270 I think we also have to acknowledge 01:25:29.270 --> 01:25:30.640 their concerns about this. 01:25:30.640 --> 01:25:34.200 And so our attempts to try to be as transparent 01:25:34.200 --> 01:25:36.390 and clear in terms of what we are doing 01:25:36.600 --> 01:25:39.280 and our way forward I think are things we have 01:25:39.280 --> 01:25:40.930 to continue to emphasize to them. 01:25:41.000 --> 01:25:42.930 - And do they simply make no distinction between the PKK 01:25:42.930 --> 01:25:45.480 and the elements we support on the ground in Syria? 01:25:45.640 --> 01:25:47.700 - Well they don't draw that distinction 01:25:48.140 --> 01:25:50.160 and of course that's the tension. 01:25:50.660 --> 01:25:53.460 - To follow up on something Ms. Cheney said earlier 01:25:53.550 --> 01:25:56.010 or that you said in response to her question, 01:25:56.110 --> 01:25:58.690 it is not part of the coalition effort 01:25:58.690 --> 01:26:01.040 to counter Iran in Syria. 01:26:01.710 --> 01:26:03.560 How would you characterize our strategy 01:26:03.560 --> 01:26:05.210 in Syria vis-a-vis Iran? 01:26:06.220 --> 01:26:09.800 What are we trying to do to Iran in Syria? 01:26:10.380 --> 01:26:15.230 - Well I think our broad US government objective here 01:26:15.230 --> 01:26:20.230 is to limit Iran's influence in Syria, 01:26:21.170 --> 01:26:26.170 because as we've seen they are attempting to arm 01:26:27.670 --> 01:26:31.100 and motivate fighters that could pose threats 01:26:31.100 --> 01:26:34.600 to our other vital partners here 01:26:35.170 --> 01:26:39.130 and so I think as a government we have interest 01:26:39.130 --> 01:26:42.160 in trying to limit their influence 01:26:42.160 --> 01:26:44.500 and activities in this part of the region. 01:26:44.760 --> 01:26:46.480 - And I don't wanna spend my remaining time 01:26:46.480 --> 01:26:48.720 on a semantic debate, but I just would say, 01:26:49.120 --> 01:26:52.050 if their influence is gaining in Syria and we need 01:26:52.050 --> 01:26:54.670 to limit that, I sort of think 01:26:54.670 --> 01:26:55.760 that necessarily involves us 01:26:55.760 --> 01:26:58.320 countering their gains in Syria. 01:26:58.320 --> 01:26:59.480 So perhaps some clarity. 01:26:59.480 --> 01:27:03.040 Or let me rather say, what is our strategy, 01:27:03.040 --> 01:27:04.830 how would you characterize our strategy vis-a-vis Iran 01:27:04.830 --> 01:27:06.530 throughout the rest of the region? 01:27:06.940 --> 01:27:09.130 - I would characterize our strategy 01:27:09.130 --> 01:27:12.810 as deter, assure and compete. 01:27:13.100 --> 01:27:18.050 We have to have capabilities in place to deter Iran's use 01:27:18.050 --> 01:27:20.380 of ballistic missile capability against our partners 01:27:20.380 --> 01:27:23.510 and we have to ensure that we can deter their ability 01:27:23.510 --> 01:27:26.840 to race to a nuclear weapons capability. 01:27:27.080 --> 01:27:29.930 We have to always assure our partners in the region. 01:27:30.093 --> 01:27:33.620 I think I've said several times here, our partnerships, 01:27:33.620 --> 01:27:36.320 when you line up our coalition versus their coalition, 01:27:36.360 --> 01:27:37.660 ours is much more capable. 01:27:37.980 --> 01:27:40.818 So continuing to develop those relationships 01:27:40.818 --> 01:27:43.640 is really very important in ensuring our partners 01:27:43.640 --> 01:27:45.030 that we're gonna be there with them. 01:27:45.030 --> 01:27:47.930 And then we have to compete with them, not just militarily, 01:27:47.930 --> 01:27:49.970 but with our other instruments of power 01:27:50.200 --> 01:27:54.600 in the areas that we can and this is pushing back, 01:27:54.910 --> 01:27:56.250 rolling back on their influence, 01:27:56.250 --> 01:27:58.990 pushing back on their narrative where we can 01:27:58.990 --> 01:28:00.790 and then in the areas where we must, 01:28:01.210 --> 01:28:05.010 preventing them from moving their weapons 01:28:05.010 --> 01:28:06.900 and other things around the theater 01:28:06.900 --> 01:28:09.230 that pose threats to our partners. 01:28:09.290 --> 01:28:11.440 - But does that rollback, that competition, 01:28:11.440 --> 01:28:13.880 sort of reach a limit in Syria? 01:28:13.880 --> 01:28:17.210 Is there some reason we're being less aggressive there? 01:28:17.470 --> 01:28:19.220 You sort of mention Iraq as an area 01:28:19.964 --> 01:28:22.203 where we're competing more effectively with them. 01:28:22.203 --> 01:28:26.940 - Well my point is only that as we form the coalition, 01:28:26.940 --> 01:28:30.970 the Defeat ISIS Coalition that has both a military 01:28:30.970 --> 01:28:34.670 and a political component to it, one of the objectives 01:28:34.670 --> 01:28:37.830 that has not been assigned to us is countering Iran. 01:28:38.130 --> 01:28:40.980 It has specifically been focused on the ISIS mission. 01:28:40.980 --> 01:28:42.980 So I think that's what I'm trying to emphasize. 01:28:42.980 --> 01:28:45.980 - And then in Iraq, do you think we're actively 01:28:46.170 --> 01:28:48.460 or effectively competing with them? 01:28:48.630 --> 01:28:52.450 I'm thinking specifically of one of the biggest phenomena 01:28:52.460 --> 01:28:54.710 in the last year has been the rise of the PMF 01:28:54.910 --> 01:28:57.030 and some of these groups may be able to be incorporated 01:28:57.030 --> 01:28:59.640 in the ISF, but others are terrorists, 01:28:59.640 --> 01:29:01.239 you know, taking orders from the 01:29:01.239 --> 01:29:02.072 (coughing drowns out speaker). 01:29:02.090 --> 01:29:05.210 - Well I think, certainly addressing the PMF 01:29:05.300 --> 01:29:07.720 is something that the Prime Minister will have to do 01:29:07.720 --> 01:29:09.600 and in many regards he has done that. 01:29:09.980 --> 01:29:14.030 But again, I think one of the best things we can do 01:29:14.030 --> 01:29:16.150 on the ground in Syria is being a really good 01:29:16.150 --> 01:29:19.160 and valued partner to the Iraqi Security Forces 01:29:19.160 --> 01:29:21.220 and I think the assistance that the United States 01:29:21.220 --> 01:29:23.770 and the Coalition did I think demonstrated that. 01:29:23.840 --> 01:29:27.600 And in my engagements with the Security Force leaders 01:29:27.600 --> 01:29:29.318 that I talk to on a regular basis, 01:29:29.318 --> 01:29:32.310 I think they deeply value that and they appreciate it 01:29:32.398 --> 01:29:34.790 and they look forward to maintaining 01:29:34.790 --> 01:29:36.390 that relationship in the future. 01:29:36.580 --> 01:29:37.413 - I've run out of time. 01:29:37.413 --> 01:29:38.246 Thank you, sir. 01:29:39.110 --> 01:29:40.060 - [Mac] Mr. Suozzi. 01:29:41.220 --> 01:29:43.200 - General I wanna thank you so much for your service 01:29:43.200 --> 01:29:45.720 and the great work of everyone under your command 01:29:45.850 --> 01:29:48.760 throughout the regions that are under your command. 01:29:49.330 --> 01:29:51.290 My particular concerns are about Afghanistan 01:29:51.290 --> 01:29:54.234 that I briefly discussed with you before the hearing began. 01:29:54.234 --> 01:29:56.776 The special Inspector General's report 01:29:56.776 --> 01:29:59.540 on Afghan reconstruction reports 01:29:59.540 --> 01:30:03.930 that we're not making progress as far as population centers 01:30:03.930 --> 01:30:04.763 and how much we control. 01:30:04.763 --> 01:30:06.130 In fact, we lost a little bit, 01:30:06.958 --> 01:30:09.160 a little bit of ground from the last report. 01:30:09.650 --> 01:30:12.620 And I support what the military's doing. 01:30:12.620 --> 01:30:14.390 I supported the effort to increase the number 01:30:14.390 --> 01:30:16.850 of troops recently and I think 01:30:16.850 --> 01:30:18.930 that you have a very clear strategy 01:30:18.930 --> 01:30:22.030 as far as the five points of helping Afghan army, 01:30:22.030 --> 01:30:25.600 helping the Afghan Special Forces to increase their size 01:30:25.600 --> 01:30:29.250 and effectiveness, increase the collaboration 01:30:29.250 --> 01:30:31.420 between the Afghan Air Force and the army, 01:30:31.420 --> 01:30:35.300 as well as replace their platforms with American equipment 01:30:35.300 --> 01:30:36.900 as opposed to Russian equipment, 01:30:37.150 --> 01:30:40.030 help the police and put more pressure on Pakistan. 01:30:40.030 --> 01:30:41.680 It's a clear five-point strategy 01:30:41.680 --> 01:30:43.010 that makes tremendous sense 01:30:43.010 --> 01:30:44.860 and you're doing a very effective job 01:30:44.980 --> 01:30:46.530 of clearing and holding area. 01:30:47.120 --> 01:30:48.520 The problem is the backfilling 01:30:48.520 --> 01:30:51.187 and in your prepared testimony you talked about 01:30:51.187 --> 01:30:55.320 how Kabul's uncertain political situation 01:30:55.320 --> 01:30:57.130 remains the greatest risk of stability. 01:30:57.130 --> 01:30:59.750 And you went on to say that the government 01:30:59.750 --> 01:31:02.550 of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 01:31:02.550 --> 01:31:05.680 continues to suffer from a professional, governmental, 01:31:05.680 --> 01:31:09.260 capacity deficit, competing interests and corruption. 01:31:10.100 --> 01:31:13.780 My concern is that your colleagues on the civilian side 01:31:13.780 --> 01:31:17.580 do not have a clear plan the way that the military has. 01:31:18.460 --> 01:31:20.520 So I wanna ask you, who you see 01:31:20.520 --> 01:31:23.330 as being your clearest partners with General Nicholson 01:31:23.360 --> 01:31:25.930 on the civilian side in this effort 01:31:26.210 --> 01:31:29.760 and what do you perceive their strategy 01:31:29.760 --> 01:31:31.950 to be if you could put it in a succinct way? 01:31:31.950 --> 01:31:33.580 Because I don't see them putting out 01:31:33.580 --> 01:31:36.850 a clear succinct plan on the civilian side. 01:31:37.020 --> 01:31:38.470 So your clearing and holding, 01:31:38.650 --> 01:31:40.670 but when it comes rebuilding and transitioning, 01:31:40.670 --> 01:31:42.780 they're not laying out a clear plan. 01:31:43.060 --> 01:31:45.440 So I just wanna ask you to comment on that please General. 01:31:45.440 --> 01:31:48.540 - Thank you, Congressman, I think that the principal partner 01:31:48.540 --> 01:31:50.520 that we would look to on the US side certainly 01:31:50.520 --> 01:31:53.180 is the Ambassador in the country team 01:31:53.180 --> 01:31:56.940 and I do think we have a very outstanding Ambassador 01:31:56.940 --> 01:31:57.773 on the ground. 01:31:57.773 --> 01:31:59.070 I think he is very engaged in this 01:31:59.450 --> 01:32:03.390 and I think we are beginning to address many 01:32:03.390 --> 01:32:05.230 of these things that you have talked about. 01:32:05.230 --> 01:32:09.510 As I mentioned to you, in many regards the military missions 01:32:09.510 --> 01:32:12.110 in many of these countries really are the easy part 01:32:12.110 --> 01:32:14.610 of addressing the situation. 01:32:14.610 --> 01:32:17.880 And the more difficult part is the political resolution 01:32:17.880 --> 01:32:19.410 that has to take place afterwards, 01:32:19.410 --> 01:32:20.800 'cause this is when you have to address 01:32:20.800 --> 01:32:24.580 the deep underlying issues that oftentimes gave way 01:32:24.580 --> 01:32:27.640 to the conflict that we just resolved. 01:32:27.881 --> 01:32:30.456 As I think I mentioned to you beforehand, 01:32:30.456 --> 01:32:34.150 tomorrow in Kabul the President Ghani 01:32:34.420 --> 01:32:36.190 and certainly with the support of our embassy 01:32:36.190 --> 01:32:38.750 will be hosting the Kabul Process Conference 01:32:38.750 --> 01:32:42.340 that will address both reconciliation and counterterrorism 01:32:42.340 --> 01:32:44.560 and will be an opportunity with 25 nations 01:32:44.560 --> 01:32:46.570 brought in to help do that. 01:32:46.810 --> 01:32:49.170 There are efforts underway 01:32:49.193 --> 01:32:53.060 with our Department of State interlocutors 01:32:53.060 --> 01:32:58.060 to help devise ways to move forward with reconciliation. 01:32:58.650 --> 01:33:01.110 It is extraordinarily complex. 01:33:01.580 --> 01:33:05.530 The Taliban is not a singular contiguous group to deal with. 01:33:05.530 --> 01:33:06.363 It is broken. 01:33:06.363 --> 01:33:07.196 It is fractured. 01:33:07.800 --> 01:33:11.320 And so not only do we have to look at reconciliation, 01:33:11.320 --> 01:33:14.030 we have to look at things like reintegration as well. 01:33:14.030 --> 01:33:17.200 So you know the task in front of our diplomats 01:33:17.200 --> 01:33:18.080 to solve this, I think, 01:33:18.080 --> 01:33:21.400 is an extraordinarily complex one as they move forward. 01:33:21.672 --> 01:33:25.250 And I do think this certainly is a challenge here, 01:33:25.487 --> 01:33:30.487 but I do think that they are moving forward in ways 01:33:30.590 --> 01:33:33.580 to begin to address this effectively here 01:33:33.580 --> 01:33:37.380 as we apply military, social and diplomatic pressure 01:33:37.415 --> 01:33:39.600 to bring the Taliban to the table. 01:33:39.940 --> 01:33:41.590 - So General, in your testimony you, 01:33:41.994 --> 01:33:42.827 also thank you very much for that by the way, 01:33:42.827 --> 01:33:45.690 in your testimony you talked about how Pakistan 01:33:45.690 --> 01:33:47.370 is starting to share more information 01:33:47.370 --> 01:33:50.530 and collaborate more than they had historically. 01:33:50.530 --> 01:33:53.290 What's your prognosis with Pakistan? 01:33:53.290 --> 01:33:55.650 What do you see happening in real time 01:33:55.650 --> 01:33:57.160 other than the sharing of information 01:33:57.160 --> 01:34:00.990 and what can we hope to expect as far as progress 01:34:00.990 --> 01:34:03.390 regarding the governing of the ungoverned areas? 01:34:03.670 --> 01:34:07.860 - Well I would say that first off, I think it's important 01:34:07.860 --> 01:34:09.249 to recognize that Pakistan as a country 01:34:09.249 --> 01:34:14.200 has suffered greatly from terrorism, 01:34:14.770 --> 01:34:16.810 perhaps as much as anybody in the region 01:34:16.810 --> 01:34:19.480 and maybe as many as much as anybody around the world. 01:34:19.480 --> 01:34:22.000 And they have taken a number of measures 01:34:22.000 --> 01:34:26.690 to address terrorism within their borders 01:34:26.740 --> 01:34:29.739 and that has contributed over the years 01:34:29.739 --> 01:34:34.739 to some increased security in the area 01:34:35.716 --> 01:34:40.070 and we have to recognize that upfront. 01:34:40.210 --> 01:34:42.620 So our approach I think is to continue 01:34:42.620 --> 01:34:44.133 to be engaged with them. 01:34:44.133 --> 01:34:47.160 We wanna have a candid discussion, I think I do. 01:34:47.430 --> 01:34:48.910 We wanna have frequent communication. 01:34:48.910 --> 01:34:51.400 We want to build trust in this relationship. 01:34:51.498 --> 01:34:54.050 The history of the United States and Pakistan 01:34:54.050 --> 01:34:56.690 is a very long history here. 01:34:56.950 --> 01:35:01.530 We do share many interests and they share many things 01:35:01.530 --> 01:35:04.550 in common with us culturally, militarily, politically 01:35:05.150 --> 01:35:06.030 in terms of what we're doing, 01:35:06.030 --> 01:35:08.120 but we have to continue to work with them 01:35:08.120 --> 01:35:10.930 to move them in directions that cause them 01:35:10.930 --> 01:35:13.850 to make strategic changes in their approach 01:35:13.850 --> 01:35:15.560 and that's really what we're aimed at. 01:35:15.560 --> 01:35:18.510 I don't know that we can put a time limit on that, 01:35:18.690 --> 01:35:21.040 but as I mentioned to you we are seeing 01:35:21.319 --> 01:35:24.350 some positive indicators and we have to ensure 01:35:24.350 --> 01:35:27.550 that we don't overlook these as we move forward 01:35:27.550 --> 01:35:28.900 and we continue to build on these. 01:35:28.900 --> 01:35:32.470 This is what my objective is with my counterparts. 01:35:32.810 --> 01:35:33.643 - Thank you General. 01:35:33.643 --> 01:35:34.510 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:35:34.860 --> 01:35:35.760 - [Mac] Mr. Gaetz. 01:35:36.030 --> 01:35:36.880 - [Matt] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:35:36.880 --> 01:35:39.490 Thank you General for your service and for being here. 01:35:39.840 --> 01:35:41.120 There is no place in the world 01:35:41.120 --> 01:35:43.267 where Iranian backed proxy forces 01:35:43.267 --> 01:35:47.550 are a stabilizing feature of the terrain is there? 01:35:49.920 --> 01:35:52.810 - I would not characterize it that way Congressman. 01:35:52.980 --> 01:35:57.610 - So in July of 2015 we have the birth of the JCPOA. 01:35:58.510 --> 01:36:01.220 From that point in time until today would we say 01:36:01.220 --> 01:36:03.930 that Iran has made the same investment 01:36:04.110 --> 01:36:06.850 in their proxy forces, or reduced investment 01:36:06.860 --> 01:36:09.080 in their proxy forces, or an enhanced investment 01:36:09.080 --> 01:36:10.180 in their proxy forces? 01:36:11.130 --> 01:36:12.750 - I think I would characterize it 01:36:12.750 --> 01:36:15.900 as an enhanced investment in their proxies and partners. 01:36:16.620 --> 01:36:20.820 - So since the JCPOA, we've got Iran putting more money 01:36:20.870 --> 01:36:23.430 behind proxy forces that are destabilizing 01:36:23.430 --> 01:36:25.350 in literally 100% of the circumstances 01:36:25.350 --> 01:36:26.350 in which they exist. 01:36:26.830 --> 01:36:29.390 In August of 2017, the Iranian parliament votes 01:36:29.390 --> 01:36:31.190 to increase their military spending. 01:36:31.710 --> 01:36:33.243 Are there particular capabilities 01:36:33.243 --> 01:36:36.600 that we think may emerge from that particular tactics 01:36:36.790 --> 01:36:41.200 that Iran is investing in as they use more of the cash 01:36:41.200 --> 01:36:44.700 that they now have access to, to be a destabilizing hegemon? 01:36:46.190 --> 01:36:48.780 - Well Congressman, as I mentioned earlier, 01:36:48.780 --> 01:36:50.360 I think as we look at the Iranian threat 01:36:50.360 --> 01:36:51.720 I think what we've seen is not only 01:36:51.720 --> 01:36:53.780 an increase quantitatively, 01:36:53.780 --> 01:36:56.290 but in some cases an increase qualitatively 01:36:56.290 --> 01:36:59.690 in some of the capabilities that they have developed. 01:36:59.910 --> 01:37:04.670 They are using the opportunity of things like Yemen to like, 01:37:04.670 --> 01:37:09.050 we go out to China Lake to test our weapon systems, 01:37:09.050 --> 01:37:11.750 they go to Yemen to test their weapon systems. 01:37:11.750 --> 01:37:14.540 So they're taking advantage of these opportunities 01:37:14.540 --> 01:37:17.370 to improve their capabilities around the world. 01:37:17.370 --> 01:37:21.280 So I definitely am concerned about this. 01:37:21.850 --> 01:37:24.610 - You also test some great weapon systems off my district 01:37:24.610 --> 01:37:26.690 in Northwest Florida we're very proud of. 01:37:26.690 --> 01:37:27.560 My district's also home 01:37:27.560 --> 01:37:28.980 to the the Seventh Special Forces Group. 01:37:28.980 --> 01:37:31.660 They do a great deal of work in the CENTCOM AOR 01:37:31.660 --> 01:37:33.210 and frequently they return home 01:37:33.290 --> 01:37:35.580 and then deploy to SOUTHCOM AOR 01:37:35.790 --> 01:37:38.840 to find themselves fighting a very similarly flavored enemy 01:37:39.190 --> 01:37:43.490 in radical Islamic extremists funded 01:37:43.570 --> 01:37:46.695 in many circumstances by Iran through their terror proxies. 01:37:46.695 --> 01:37:49.580 Are there areas within CENTCOM's AOR 01:37:49.860 --> 01:37:51.460 where there are training activities, 01:37:51.460 --> 01:37:53.970 where recruits are being brought in from other parts 01:37:53.970 --> 01:37:56.260 of the world, particularly the Western Hemisphere, 01:37:56.260 --> 01:37:58.370 and then essentially redeployed 01:37:58.730 --> 01:38:00.930 after receiving training in the CENTCOM AOR? 01:38:01.645 --> 01:38:04.650 - I'm not sure I can answer that 01:38:04.650 --> 01:38:06.065 in this particular setting here. 01:38:06.065 --> 01:38:08.750 I'm sure that there probably are. 01:38:08.750 --> 01:38:11.600 - Okay, we may chat about that a little later today then. 01:38:11.680 --> 01:38:16.070 Are there particular capabilities in the development 01:38:16.220 --> 01:38:18.030 of Iran's terror proxies 01:38:18.170 --> 01:38:20.370 that we find them particularly investing in, 01:38:20.690 --> 01:38:22.410 whether that's drone technology, 01:38:22.620 --> 01:38:24.880 whether that's guerrilla capability, 01:38:25.360 --> 01:38:27.710 the development of explosives? 01:38:30.120 --> 01:38:31.770 - Yeah, I think all of the above. 01:38:32.380 --> 01:38:35.650 I think these are all tactics that we've seen in the past. 01:38:35.650 --> 01:38:38.280 Certainly, we're concerned about the increasing use 01:38:38.280 --> 01:38:41.390 of missiles of all short-range, medium-range missiles. 01:38:42.010 --> 01:38:44.110 And that type of stuff is very concerning. 01:38:44.290 --> 01:38:49.290 Their use of UASs is a particular concerning emerging threat 01:38:50.700 --> 01:38:53.620 for us here that we're concerned about, 01:38:54.030 --> 01:38:55.770 but I think, you know, the other things 01:38:55.770 --> 01:39:00.770 is that I think if we look at what it took Iran to do, 01:39:01.710 --> 01:39:03.950 it took 20 years for Iran to do 01:39:04.240 --> 01:39:06.370 in Lebanon with the Lebanese Hezbollah, 01:39:06.600 --> 01:39:08.360 their attempting to do in about five years 01:39:08.360 --> 01:39:10.280 with the Houthis in Yemen. 01:39:10.660 --> 01:39:12.590 This is very concerning to us. 01:39:12.740 --> 01:39:15.750 So I think they're accelerating their pace 01:39:15.770 --> 01:39:17.170 and their ability to do this 01:39:17.190 --> 01:39:20.040 and this is something we have to be very concerned about. 01:39:20.118 --> 01:39:24.180 - I completely agree, and I would add to the list activities 01:39:24.180 --> 01:39:27.070 in the Western Hemisphere where that very same game plan 01:39:27.250 --> 01:39:29.520 that we've seen around Iran and Syria, 01:39:29.940 --> 01:39:31.400 then on the Arabian Peninsula 01:39:31.490 --> 01:39:33.890 and now in our own backyard would continue 01:39:33.890 --> 01:39:35.870 that troubling trend line with an increase both 01:39:35.870 --> 01:39:37.710 in volume and in quality. 01:39:37.772 --> 01:39:40.600 As we look at the particular missile systems 01:39:40.600 --> 01:39:43.380 that you mentioned and the areas where they may be used, 01:39:43.380 --> 01:39:46.140 I look particularly to our ally Israel 01:39:46.280 --> 01:39:48.000 as a point of vulnerability. 01:39:48.197 --> 01:39:52.340 In what capacity do we see the Iranians 01:39:52.340 --> 01:39:54.940 hardening their positions in southern Syria 01:39:55.320 --> 01:39:58.900 and what feedback have we gotten at the mil to mil level 01:39:59.120 --> 01:40:01.820 from our ally Israel about their discomfort with that? 01:40:02.340 --> 01:40:04.990 - In this setting I would just say I think we've seen 01:40:05.426 --> 01:40:10.426 in public media releases here, Israel has struck at some 01:40:12.120 --> 01:40:13.340 of these locations here 01:40:14.010 --> 01:40:17.420 that they have posed a threat to them. 01:40:17.679 --> 01:40:21.202 So I think in this setting I think I would leave it at that. 01:40:21.202 --> 01:40:23.852 That there certainly is international concerns there. 01:40:24.110 --> 01:40:25.500 - Great, well thank you Mr. Chairman. 01:40:25.500 --> 01:40:26.800 I look forward to our next setting. 01:40:26.800 --> 01:40:27.633 I yield back. 01:40:27.910 --> 01:40:28.910 - [Mac] Mr. Gallego. 01:40:32.301 --> 01:40:33.134 - Thank you General. 01:40:33.134 --> 01:40:34.200 We recently heard from Admiral Harris 01:40:34.200 --> 01:40:37.079 and munitions have been a great concern for him in PATCOM. 01:40:37.079 --> 01:40:39.800 CENTCOM has obviously been using a lot of munitions 01:40:39.800 --> 01:40:41.310 in the Counter ISIL fight, 01:40:41.700 --> 01:40:44.370 so please describe for me the state of our current munitions 01:40:44.670 --> 01:40:47.810 in CENTCOM and are you getting what you currently need? 01:40:49.280 --> 01:40:52.110 - Congressman, we are, and I'd be happy 01:40:52.110 --> 01:40:54.340 to take it for record and give you some more detail on this, 01:40:54.340 --> 01:40:57.080 but what we did in CENTCOM here over the last, 01:40:57.080 --> 01:40:58.650 with the support of the department, 01:40:58.650 --> 01:41:03.190 was put in control supply rates for our key munitions here 01:41:03.190 --> 01:41:05.340 and we've been managing that for some time. 01:41:05.371 --> 01:41:08.360 Certainly, the success we've had in Iraq 01:41:08.360 --> 01:41:12.400 and Syria has resulted in a lowered use of that 01:41:12.400 --> 01:41:15.270 which has allowed us to cross-level within the theater 01:41:15.370 --> 01:41:17.570 to Afghanistan to address our issues. 01:41:17.794 --> 01:41:22.794 I won't comment on the broader departmentwide challenge 01:41:23.360 --> 01:41:24.660 with this, but I think we are 01:41:24.660 --> 01:41:26.930 being well-supported right now in CENTCOM. 01:41:27.260 --> 01:41:29.399 - Good, so follow up a little on that then. 01:41:29.399 --> 01:41:33.600 From what I understand are the other combatant commands, 01:41:33.600 --> 01:41:35.530 Special EUCOM, are they keeping their stocks 01:41:35.530 --> 01:41:37.260 at the appropriate levels they need, 01:41:37.260 --> 01:41:38.690 anticipating with the kind adversaries-- 01:41:38.690 --> 01:41:39.970 - Congressman, I think that's probably 01:41:39.970 --> 01:41:41.170 a better question for them. 01:41:41.170 --> 01:41:43.150 I can't comment on their stockages. 01:41:44.020 --> 01:41:45.390 - Okay, switching gears then. 01:41:45.390 --> 01:41:47.590 Would you call Qatar a dependable partner? 01:41:49.280 --> 01:41:51.620 - I think Qatar has been a dependable partner to us. 01:41:51.620 --> 01:41:54.630 Certainly we have, you know my forward headquarters 01:41:54.630 --> 01:41:55.790 is located in Qatar. 01:41:56.150 --> 01:41:58.440 We have our Air Operations Center there. 01:41:58.820 --> 01:42:01.311 I think they've been good partners to us in the past. 01:42:01.311 --> 01:42:05.720 - Is the discord between our GCC other partners outside 01:42:05.720 --> 01:42:09.490 of Qatar and especially between the Saudi and Qatar's push 01:42:09.490 --> 01:42:10.850 in regards the block; 01:42:11.770 --> 01:42:14.060 has that affected any of our operations in CENTCOM? 01:42:14.060 --> 01:42:15.940 - It has not had a significant impact 01:42:15.940 --> 01:42:17.190 on our military activities 01:42:17.190 --> 01:42:19.640 and we've made this very clear from the beginning 01:42:19.640 --> 01:42:20.610 that we would not allow that, 01:42:20.610 --> 01:42:22.760 and I think we've largely been successful 01:42:22.760 --> 01:42:24.110 in mitigating most of that. 01:42:25.490 --> 01:42:26.610 - Thank you. 01:42:26.770 --> 01:42:27.603 I yield back. 01:42:29.020 --> 01:42:29.920 - [Mac] Mr. Banks. 01:42:30.530 --> 01:42:32.120 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman and General, 01:42:32.120 --> 01:42:33.670 thank you for being here today. 01:42:33.980 --> 01:42:35.950 Can we go back to Afghanistan for a moment 01:42:35.950 --> 01:42:37.780 and could you comment more specifically 01:42:37.780 --> 01:42:42.490 on how tenuous is our 39-member nation coalition? 01:42:42.660 --> 01:42:44.460 Is it continuing to weaken, 01:42:44.770 --> 01:42:47.590 or do you have more of an optimistic outlook 01:42:47.590 --> 01:42:49.840 on where our coalition is heading forward? 01:42:49.870 --> 01:42:51.300 - I think our coalition remains 01:42:51.300 --> 01:42:53.350 very, very strong in Afghanistan. 01:42:53.790 --> 01:42:55.020 You know, one of the things 01:42:55.020 --> 01:43:00.020 that underpins the President's roadmap 01:43:01.170 --> 01:43:04.090 for the Afghan National Defense Security Forces 01:43:04.380 --> 01:43:06.880 was the commitment made by the NATO nations, 01:43:06.880 --> 01:43:08.750 and the partner nations at the Brussels Conference 01:43:08.750 --> 01:43:13.750 in Warsaw to make sure that the support would be continued 01:43:14.080 --> 01:43:16.760 and so we have seen the partner nations continue 01:43:16.760 --> 01:43:20.602 to sustain and in many cases increase their contributions 01:43:20.602 --> 01:43:21.710 to the effort. 01:43:21.900 --> 01:43:24.220 - So just to repeat, so we're seeing 01:43:24.270 --> 01:43:25.440 in some places an increase. 01:43:25.440 --> 01:43:27.010 Can you mention which nations 01:43:27.010 --> 01:43:28.610 are increasing their commitment? 01:43:28.840 --> 01:43:31.260 - I think the UK is an example. 01:43:31.400 --> 01:43:35.380 They've increased some of their recent contributions. 01:43:35.490 --> 01:43:36.323 - Okay thank you. 01:43:36.323 --> 01:43:40.680 A moment ago you said in addressing Mr. Suozzi's comments 01:43:40.680 --> 01:43:44.490 that Pakistan has paid a significant price, 01:43:46.860 --> 01:43:48.900 "has suffered greatly" was your quote. 01:43:50.040 --> 01:43:52.780 In your testimony though, you quote, say: 01:43:53.760 --> 01:43:57.040 "The Taliban and Haqqani leadership and fighters continue 01:43:57.319 --> 01:43:59.230 "to find sanctuary in Pakistan." 01:43:59.440 --> 01:44:00.273 Unquote. 01:44:00.964 --> 01:44:04.250 And then on the next page you talk about our discontinuing 01:44:04.250 --> 01:44:07.600 of IMET FMF support to Pakistan. 01:44:08.570 --> 01:44:10.770 Could you dig a little bit deeper into that? 01:44:10.770 --> 01:44:14.810 What is working to bring Pakistan back to the table 01:44:14.810 --> 01:44:19.500 to thwart the Taliban and other like-minded groups 01:44:19.500 --> 01:44:21.500 in providing them sanctuary in Pakistan? 01:44:22.130 --> 01:44:24.780 - I think certainly the pressure 01:44:24.780 --> 01:44:28.110 that our government put on Pakistan 01:44:28.110 --> 01:44:30.480 as we brought out the strategy 01:44:30.480 --> 01:44:31.880 I think contributed to that. 01:44:32.250 --> 01:44:34.090 I think what is also working right now 01:44:34.090 --> 01:44:36.420 is the approach that we have in place with them. 01:44:36.460 --> 01:44:38.310 I think we have tried to be very clear 01:44:38.310 --> 01:44:42.870 in terms of the things that we need Pakistan to do for us. 01:44:43.880 --> 01:44:47.080 What I have endeavored to do, not always in a public way, 01:44:47.620 --> 01:44:50.040 but in a private way, is develop a relationship 01:44:50.040 --> 01:44:54.490 that allows us to provide feedback both ways. 01:44:54.490 --> 01:44:55.490 There are things, frankly, 01:44:55.490 --> 01:44:57.250 that Pakistan has asked of us as well. 01:44:57.250 --> 01:45:00.350 So this is a two-way street here 01:45:00.350 --> 01:45:02.740 and so it's my responsibility I think 01:45:02.740 --> 01:45:05.468 to make sure that we have feedback loops in place 01:45:05.468 --> 01:45:08.490 that go back and forth between the things we're doing 01:45:08.490 --> 01:45:11.270 to try to support each other 01:45:11.640 --> 01:45:15.440 in moving forward in that regard. 01:45:15.440 --> 01:45:18.290 And so I'd be happy to talk a little bit more about this 01:45:18.509 --> 01:45:20.260 perhaps in a closed session here, 01:45:20.260 --> 01:45:22.220 but that really was what this was about, 01:45:22.220 --> 01:45:25.410 is about building a bridge back, 01:45:25.460 --> 01:45:29.260 building the trust that has to underpin this relationship 01:45:29.260 --> 01:45:32.160 that has been missing from it for a long time. 01:45:32.620 --> 01:45:35.480 - Has there been a plan to re-continue FMF 01:45:35.480 --> 01:45:37.430 and IMET support to Pakistan? 01:45:38.430 --> 01:45:41.350 - I don't think we have addressed 01:45:41.350 --> 01:45:42.570 that at this particular point. 01:45:42.570 --> 01:45:46.760 - So we remain in a posture of discontinuing that support? 01:45:46.850 --> 01:45:47.700 Pakistan is obviously -- 01:45:47.700 --> 01:45:48.533 - That's the current posture 01:45:48.533 --> 01:45:50.260 and I would imagine hopefully 01:45:50.260 --> 01:45:52.300 in the future we'll have an opportunity to -- 01:45:52.300 --> 01:45:53.990 - Has that been beneficial? 01:45:55.410 --> 01:45:58.350 - Again, I think it's created some of the pressure on this. 01:45:58.350 --> 01:46:02.420 In many regards Pakistan isn't necessarily looking 01:46:02.420 --> 01:46:04.390 for our equipment in all these cases. 01:46:04.390 --> 01:46:05.860 They are looking for our understanding 01:46:05.860 --> 01:46:08.610 and respect in terms of what they've accomplished here. 01:46:08.920 --> 01:46:11.960 So again, this is really about relationship building 01:46:11.990 --> 01:46:16.340 and that's principally my focus here with my counterpart. 01:46:16.780 --> 01:46:19.520 - Pakistan continues to provide a very important 01:46:20.368 --> 01:46:21.868 and strategic logistical route 01:46:22.054 --> 01:46:25.090 for our efforts into Afghanistan. 01:46:25.090 --> 01:46:28.830 Have you seen those logistical roots continue 01:46:28.830 --> 01:46:31.100 to operate fully as they've had? 01:46:31.150 --> 01:46:31.983 - [Joseph] I Have. 01:46:31.983 --> 01:46:32.816 - For the past decade? 01:46:32.816 --> 01:46:33.649 - I have. 01:46:33.649 --> 01:46:35.050 Ground lines of communication, air lines of communication. 01:46:35.050 --> 01:46:36.150 It is absolutely vital to us 01:46:36.150 --> 01:46:38.130 and they have continued to sustain that. 01:46:38.130 --> 01:46:38.980 - Okay, thank you very much. 01:46:38.980 --> 01:46:39.813 I yield back. 01:46:39.813 --> 01:46:40.646 - [Joseph] Thank you. 01:46:41.497 --> 01:46:42.710 - [Mac] Mr. O'Rourke. 01:46:42.710 --> 01:46:44.010 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:46:44.770 --> 01:46:48.090 General, could you tell us how many US forces we have 01:46:48.090 --> 01:46:49.340 in Afghanistan right now? 01:46:49.610 --> 01:46:52.510 How many servicemembers are deployed there 01:46:52.710 --> 01:46:53.610 as of this moment? 01:46:54.394 --> 01:46:59.394 - We generally don't talk numbers in public here. 01:47:00.520 --> 01:47:01.818 Congressman, I'd be happy to -- 01:47:01.818 --> 01:47:04.710 - What can you say that we can say in a pubic setting? 01:47:05.630 --> 01:47:07.420 There's lots of reporting on this. 01:47:07.580 --> 01:47:09.530 What's a ballpark you could talk about? 01:47:11.650 --> 01:47:15.740 - We are at the level that the Department of Defense 01:47:16.429 --> 01:47:19.550 has approved for us in this area 01:47:19.560 --> 01:47:21.630 and we'll maintain that going forward. 01:47:21.690 --> 01:47:22.900 - Is that public information? 01:47:22.900 --> 01:47:24.300 The level that the defense -- 01:47:24.300 --> 01:47:27.600 - [Joseph] I think that the Office of Secretary of Defense 01:47:28.291 --> 01:47:29.250 has put some numbers out. 01:47:29.250 --> 01:47:31.490 I don't recall what their most recent one is, 01:47:31.490 --> 01:47:34.200 but I'd be happy to follow up on that with you. 01:47:34.650 --> 01:47:37.500 - Okay, and so I'd like to ask you 01:47:37.500 --> 01:47:39.650 how many US servicemembers are in Syria 01:47:39.800 --> 01:47:40.900 or operating in Syria? 01:47:41.410 --> 01:47:43.150 I'm expecting to get a similar answer. 01:47:43.150 --> 01:47:44.460 Are you able to tell me? 01:47:44.770 --> 01:47:47.330 - Right, I think you know the Department of Defense 01:47:47.330 --> 01:47:52.330 I think has basically said around 1,700 have been there, 01:47:52.700 --> 01:47:56.430 but again, I would offer the same response to you on these. 01:47:57.080 --> 01:47:59.290 - And in answer to to Ms. Gabbard's question 01:47:59.320 --> 01:48:01.420 about what our purpose is, 01:48:01.790 --> 01:48:04.820 you responded that the sole and single task 01:48:05.170 --> 01:48:06.500 is to defeat ISIS. 01:48:07.390 --> 01:48:10.040 Is that in fact the reason for our military presence? 01:48:10.520 --> 01:48:12.040 - That is the reason for our military -- 01:48:12.040 --> 01:48:13.760 - And with the defeat of ISIS 01:48:13.760 --> 01:48:16.930 will we no longer have a military presence in Syria? 01:48:17.790 --> 01:48:22.790 - Well when we have completed our mission here in Syria, 01:48:25.240 --> 01:48:29.930 it involves not only kicking ISIS out of the areas 01:48:29.930 --> 01:48:30.780 in which they occupy, 01:48:30.780 --> 01:48:33.570 but it also includes the consolidation 01:48:33.570 --> 01:48:35.920 and the consolidation of gains in the stability 01:48:36.330 --> 01:48:39.340 that allows us to move forward 01:48:39.444 --> 01:48:41.850 with a political resolution to this. 01:48:41.850 --> 01:48:46.630 So that's been defined for us by our leadership here 01:48:46.630 --> 01:48:50.860 and so that's how we are gauging our military support. 01:48:50.870 --> 01:48:52.220 That's part of the mission. 01:48:52.760 --> 01:48:54.390 - The first part of your answer's clear to me. 01:48:54.390 --> 01:48:58.210 If there are no longer ISIS combatants on the battlefield, 01:48:58.210 --> 01:49:00.030 if we no longer have a threat from them, 01:49:00.030 --> 01:49:01.570 I think that's probably something we can measure. 01:49:01.570 --> 01:49:03.130 The second part sounds little mushy. 01:49:03.130 --> 01:49:05.210 Could you define that in terms 01:49:05.210 --> 01:49:07.780 that I and my constituents can understand, 01:49:07.780 --> 01:49:09.600 so we will know when we have won 01:49:09.600 --> 01:49:11.820 and when servicemembers can come back from Syria. 01:49:11.820 --> 01:49:14.650 - Right, so what we will continue to do 01:49:14.650 --> 01:49:16.050 is support our partners on the ground 01:49:16.050 --> 01:49:19.450 to ensure that the areas we can consolidate are gains, 01:49:19.740 --> 01:49:21.100 we can stabilize the area, 01:49:21.100 --> 01:49:25.140 we can ensure that international organizations, 01:49:25.140 --> 01:49:27.450 humanitarian aid organizations can come back, 01:49:27.450 --> 01:49:30.060 and people get into their homes. 01:49:30.230 --> 01:49:32.425 This is about creating the security environment 01:49:32.425 --> 01:49:37.425 that allows that and provides the time for our diplomats 01:49:39.390 --> 01:49:41.900 to pursue the solution 01:49:43.380 --> 01:49:47.410 that we are seeking through the United Nations in Syria. 01:49:50.050 --> 01:49:53.580 - So even after ISIS is gone there's an indefinite 01:49:53.580 --> 01:49:56.230 military commitment from the United States of America 01:49:57.680 --> 01:49:59.400 from the description you just gave me. 01:49:59.494 --> 01:50:01.720 What is the legal justification 01:50:01.720 --> 01:50:03.820 to be there after ISIS is no longer there? 01:50:04.290 --> 01:50:08.460 - Well, the fact is ISIS is still there 01:50:08.460 --> 01:50:09.760 and that's what we're dealing with right now. 01:50:09.760 --> 01:50:11.960 - But the question I asked you is after ISIS 01:50:12.531 --> 01:50:13.364 is defeated and you've accomplished -- 01:50:13.364 --> 01:50:14.197 - [Joseph] Well part of our -- 01:50:14.197 --> 01:50:16.600 - What is the legal justification for US service members 01:50:16.600 --> 01:50:17.800 to be deployed in Syria? 01:50:18.160 --> 01:50:22.150 - Well the principle thing will be 01:50:22.150 --> 01:50:24.780 to ensure that ISIS does not reemerge 01:50:24.780 --> 01:50:25.770 in this particular area. 01:50:25.770 --> 01:50:27.910 Even though where they have been eliminated 01:50:27.910 --> 01:50:30.510 from controlling terrain does not mean 01:50:30.510 --> 01:50:32.410 that ISIS is not present in this area. 01:50:32.670 --> 01:50:34.050 I think we've been very clear on that. 01:50:34.050 --> 01:50:36.900 So we have to ensure that ISIS 01:50:36.900 --> 01:50:39.400 isn't given the opportunity to resurge here. 01:50:39.670 --> 01:50:44.670 With regard to your question on the legal authority of this. 01:50:45.730 --> 01:50:50.090 Again, I would cite that the principle legal authority here 01:50:50.090 --> 01:50:53.060 was self-defense of Iraq in terms of this 01:50:53.330 --> 01:50:57.220 and the unwillingness and inability of the Syrian regime 01:50:57.530 --> 01:51:02.530 to address this particular threat that posed a threat 01:51:02.920 --> 01:51:05.830 to not just the country of Syria and Iraq, 01:51:06.060 --> 01:51:09.350 but really to a much broader group 01:51:09.350 --> 01:51:11.150 of countries around the world. 01:51:11.540 --> 01:51:12.940 - My understanding is that the administration 01:51:12.940 --> 01:51:16.160 has used the 2001 authorization 01:51:16.160 --> 01:51:17.660 for the use of military force, 01:51:18.360 --> 01:51:22.790 whose justification is premised on the attacks of 9/11 01:51:22.828 --> 01:51:27.230 and stopping those who attacked this country 01:51:27.230 --> 01:51:29.200 from being able to do so again. 01:51:29.200 --> 01:51:31.640 And I think the logical conclusion of your answer 01:51:31.640 --> 01:51:33.690 to my question about our presence after ISIS 01:51:33.690 --> 01:51:36.210 is defeated is that the US military can be 01:51:36.210 --> 01:51:37.940 in any and every country 01:51:37.940 --> 01:51:39.630 that there was ever an ISIS presence, 01:51:39.630 --> 01:51:40.640 just so that there will not be 01:51:40.640 --> 01:51:42.190 an ISIS presence going forward, 01:51:42.450 --> 01:51:44.400 and I think that is a recipe for disaster. 01:51:44.400 --> 01:51:47.420 We will not have successful oversight, or accountability, 01:51:47.420 --> 01:51:48.520 or prosecution of that war 01:51:48.520 --> 01:51:52.070 because we cannot define its goals or the strategy. 01:51:52.350 --> 01:51:53.183 I yield back. 01:51:56.640 --> 01:51:59.270 - [Mac] General, what happened when we left Iraq completely 01:51:59.270 --> 01:52:03.250 in 2009 after we had supposedly defeated Al Qaeda in Iraq? 01:52:04.770 --> 01:52:07.530 - Well Chairman, we saw the rise of ISIS 01:52:07.530 --> 01:52:10.290 and we was the inability of the Iraqi Security Forces 01:52:10.290 --> 01:52:13.030 to effectively address it as it was growing. 01:52:14.987 --> 01:52:15.820 - Okay, Mr. Hice. 01:52:17.230 --> 01:52:18.530 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:52:19.690 --> 01:52:22.980 General, according to the worldwide threat assessment, 01:52:22.980 --> 01:52:25.630 the most recent one, Director Coats 01:52:26.240 --> 01:52:29.510 in the intelligence community assessed 01:52:29.510 --> 01:52:33.240 that Iran's support for the popular mobilization committee 01:52:33.240 --> 01:52:36.700 and Shia militants remain the primary threat 01:52:37.160 --> 01:52:39.520 to US personnel in Iraq. 01:52:39.640 --> 01:52:41.340 Do you agree with that assessment? 01:52:42.390 --> 01:52:46.077 - Congressman, I do think they certainly could pose a threat 01:52:46.077 --> 01:52:49.700 to our forces on the ground. 01:52:49.815 --> 01:52:52.450 This is something we are very vigilant for 01:52:52.607 --> 01:52:55.000 and are paying very, very close attention to. 01:52:55.000 --> 01:52:57.420 We have not seen that threat manifest itself 01:52:57.420 --> 01:52:58.670 at this particular point, 01:52:58.910 --> 01:53:02.240 but it's certainly something that we are very cognizant of. 01:53:03.090 --> 01:53:07.810 - How is CENTCOM working with the Iraqi government 01:53:07.810 --> 01:53:11.320 and other regional partners to try to address this? 01:53:13.050 --> 01:53:18.050 - Well you know certainly the Iraqi government has a law 01:53:18.050 --> 01:53:20.580 in place that addresses paramilitary forces 01:53:20.642 --> 01:53:23.510 and what we are doing as part 01:53:23.510 --> 01:53:26.730 of our broader security sector reform support 01:53:26.730 --> 01:53:30.450 that we provide to the government of Iraq 01:53:30.450 --> 01:53:32.300 is encouraging them to take the steps 01:53:32.450 --> 01:53:35.360 to bring those forces to the right size 01:53:35.640 --> 01:53:37.639 and to ensure they have the right leadership 01:53:37.639 --> 01:53:41.640 and they are beholden to the government of Iraq. 01:53:41.640 --> 01:53:44.040 So the principle way that we will do this 01:53:44.040 --> 01:53:47.852 is through our advice and where necessary our assistance 01:53:47.852 --> 01:53:50.180 to the government of Iraq. 01:53:51.120 --> 01:53:51.953 - Okay. 01:53:52.477 --> 01:53:53.310 I'd like to follow up a little bit 01:53:53.310 --> 01:53:56.680 on Mr. Gallagher's questions a little while ago 01:53:57.570 --> 01:54:00.420 and just kind of an overall perspective. 01:54:00.453 --> 01:54:05.410 What is CENTCOM's role in trying to curb Iranian influence, 01:54:05.410 --> 01:54:08.510 particularly in Iraq, but in the entire region? 01:54:09.637 --> 01:54:12.920 - Well I think one of the principal roles 01:54:12.920 --> 01:54:16.940 that we have, as I mentioned, is assuring our partners 01:54:16.940 --> 01:54:19.410 and building partnerships around the region 01:54:19.410 --> 01:54:21.270 and helping our partners be resilient 01:54:21.270 --> 01:54:22.760 against this particular threat 01:54:22.760 --> 01:54:24.733 and making sure that they have the wherewithal 01:54:24.733 --> 01:54:27.240 to protect themselves. 01:54:27.240 --> 01:54:29.350 So certainly, developing partnerships 01:54:29.350 --> 01:54:31.770 and assuring our partners is a key piece of this. 01:54:31.770 --> 01:54:33.400 Another key piece of this is making sure 01:54:33.400 --> 01:54:35.310 that we have the right military capabilities 01:54:35.310 --> 01:54:38.450 in place to deter Iran from taking action, 01:54:38.680 --> 01:54:40.440 particularly with their growing 01:54:40.735 --> 01:54:43.640 and increasingly capable missile capability 01:54:43.640 --> 01:54:46.520 that they're developing, so we have a deterrence role. 01:54:46.830 --> 01:54:48.960 And then finally I think we have a competition role. 01:54:48.960 --> 01:54:51.690 We have to challenge them for some of the things 01:54:51.690 --> 01:54:55.260 that they are doing and we certainly can do that militarily, 01:54:55.550 --> 01:54:57.990 but we can also do that with our other instruments 01:54:57.990 --> 01:55:01.410 of national power that we have available for us. 01:55:01.960 --> 01:55:05.050 - Okay, thank you and that actually raises some questions 01:55:05.050 --> 01:55:06.750 that I think would probably more appropriate 01:55:06.750 --> 01:55:08.310 in our next session. 01:55:08.310 --> 01:55:10.310 But with that Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back. 01:55:10.310 --> 01:55:11.143 Thank you. 01:55:11.530 --> 01:55:12.363 - Mr. Bacon. 01:55:13.300 --> 01:55:15.600 - General Votel, thank you for your leadership 01:55:15.750 --> 01:55:17.830 and I appreciate and thank the men 01:55:18.583 --> 01:55:20.270 and women who are serving the United States Central Command. 01:55:20.270 --> 01:55:22.260 I was a four-time deployed veteran 01:55:22.260 --> 01:55:24.110 of the Command and I'm proud of that. 01:55:24.352 --> 01:55:25.680 I'd like to drill a little more 01:55:25.871 --> 01:55:27.971 into the Iranian influence in Syria itself 01:55:28.270 --> 01:55:29.770 and that specific problem set. 01:55:30.320 --> 01:55:32.320 Iran has propped up Assad, 01:55:32.670 --> 01:55:34.100 I think maybe more so than Russia, 01:55:34.100 --> 01:55:36.900 but the two together have clearly been working together. 01:55:37.120 --> 01:55:38.240 They've got advisors. 01:55:38.530 --> 01:55:40.410 They have sent fighters to Syria. 01:55:40.977 --> 01:55:43.910 The Kurdish Hezbollah to be supportive. 01:55:44.470 --> 01:55:47.240 Shia militants from other countries have been sent there. 01:55:47.240 --> 01:55:49.480 They've sent weapons cache, petroleum. 01:55:50.710 --> 01:55:53.080 They recently launched a drone it appears. 01:55:53.889 --> 01:55:55.660 I think it was an Iranian drone versus a Syrian drone. 01:55:55.660 --> 01:55:57.450 So what I'm hearing from you, 01:55:57.450 --> 01:55:59.190 and please correct me if I'm wrong, 01:55:59.190 --> 01:56:00.940 if my characterization's not right, 01:56:01.120 --> 01:56:02.700 that we do have a grander strategy 01:56:02.700 --> 01:56:05.280 that focuses on Iran in your AOR, 01:56:05.280 --> 01:56:09.640 but in Syria itself we really don't have a strategy 01:56:09.640 --> 01:56:11.840 that limits Iran's influence in Syria. 01:56:11.840 --> 01:56:13.450 Is that a true characterization? 01:56:14.900 --> 01:56:18.060 - I'm not sure I would necessary characterize it that way. 01:56:18.106 --> 01:56:21.150 There are things that are appropriate for the military 01:56:21.150 --> 01:56:24.400 to do and that's the angle though that I talk about, 01:56:24.400 --> 01:56:26.690 but there are certainly other parts of our government 01:56:26.690 --> 01:56:27.900 and other capabilities 01:56:27.900 --> 01:56:31.130 that we have within our national resources 01:56:31.460 --> 01:56:35.515 that can address Iran's malign activities, 01:56:35.515 --> 01:56:37.900 whether they're in Syria or other places. 01:56:38.130 --> 01:56:41.590 - But you would agree, it would be unacceptable for Iran 01:56:41.590 --> 01:56:44.940 to have a long-term presence in Western Syria? 01:56:46.300 --> 01:56:48.890 - It would unacceptable if that presence resulted 01:56:48.890 --> 01:56:51.980 in threats to our other partners 01:56:51.980 --> 01:56:56.250 or in further destabilization of the region. 01:56:56.550 --> 01:56:58.970 - Would you say it's acceptable or unacceptable for Iran 01:56:58.970 --> 01:57:02.360 to build a land bridge from Iran through Iraq, Syria, 01:57:02.360 --> 01:57:03.610 to the borders of Israel? 01:57:03.950 --> 01:57:05.160 - I would say it's unacceptable 01:57:05.160 --> 01:57:06.550 if the purpose of that land bridge 01:57:06.550 --> 01:57:09.610 is to move lethal technologies and advanced capabilities 01:57:09.610 --> 01:57:13.340 into the hands of other fighters who may use those 01:57:13.340 --> 01:57:15.050 to attack their neighbors. 01:57:15.550 --> 01:57:17.240 - What would you say was the purpose 01:57:17.240 --> 01:57:19.950 of Iran launching that drone into Israel? 01:57:19.950 --> 01:57:22.500 Was that indeed Iran, or could it have been Syrian? 01:57:23.609 --> 01:57:25.140 - You know I'm not sure. 01:57:25.140 --> 01:57:26.840 I think that's probably a better question 01:57:26.840 --> 01:57:29.480 for the Iranians here in terms of that. 01:57:34.080 --> 01:57:35.730 - There seems to be a recent decline 01:57:35.730 --> 01:57:37.550 in Iranian harassment of our ships 01:57:37.680 --> 01:57:39.630 in the Persian Gulf and in the straits. 01:57:39.850 --> 01:57:42.782 Is that true and why do you think that may be? 01:57:42.782 --> 01:57:44.170 - It is true. 01:57:44.170 --> 01:57:46.630 We have seen a decrease in some of the interactions 01:57:46.630 --> 01:57:47.463 that we've seen. 01:57:47.463 --> 01:57:49.829 I think this is principally because of some 01:57:49.829 --> 01:57:52.130 of the strong rhetoric, 01:57:52.199 --> 01:57:55.710 the strong discussion we have had about the lack 01:57:55.710 --> 01:57:58.960 of professionalism of Iranian Maritime Forces 01:57:58.960 --> 01:58:00.880 and how they operate in this region. 01:58:00.880 --> 01:58:02.890 I think that has got their attention. 01:58:03.520 --> 01:58:07.850 I also do think they are perhaps concerned 01:58:07.850 --> 01:58:10.830 about our stronger position 01:58:10.830 --> 01:58:13.490 on some of Iran's activities 01:58:13.490 --> 01:58:16.530 beyond just their nuclear weapons program here, 01:58:16.530 --> 01:58:18.120 so they're paying attention to that. 01:58:18.120 --> 01:58:20.670 I would tell you Mr. Congressman, 01:58:20.670 --> 01:58:22.780 that one of the things we are concerned about 01:58:22.780 --> 01:58:24.670 is their increasing use of UAVs. 01:58:25.730 --> 01:58:30.710 So while we may see decreases with some of their activities 01:58:30.710 --> 01:58:32.900 in this area, I'm equally concerned 01:58:32.900 --> 01:58:34.740 about their increasing use of UAVs 01:58:35.047 --> 01:58:37.200 that could pose a threat 01:58:37.200 --> 01:58:40.380 to our maritime activities in the region. 01:58:40.590 --> 01:58:41.423 - Thank you. 01:58:41.520 --> 01:58:43.440 Are we actively interdicting shipments 01:58:43.440 --> 01:58:46.880 to the Hezbollah in Lebanon from Iran? 01:58:49.100 --> 01:58:51.860 - I think that's probably beyond the discussion 01:58:53.014 --> 01:58:53.847 in this room. 01:58:53.900 --> 01:58:56.310 - Going back to a previous question on Joint STARS. 01:58:56.310 --> 01:58:57.480 We're being asked by the Air Force 01:58:57.480 --> 01:59:01.420 to determine should we recapitalize the Joint STARS 01:59:01.420 --> 01:59:03.110 of the new airframe 01:59:03.260 --> 01:59:06.270 or let that go away and go to some new capabilities? 01:59:06.450 --> 01:59:09.770 And we're getting conflicting advice and counsel on that. 01:59:10.240 --> 01:59:11.940 I'd love to have your perspective. 01:59:11.940 --> 01:59:14.500 Do you need more Joint STAR capabilities, or less? 01:59:14.920 --> 01:59:16.500 Do you (mumbles). 01:59:17.112 --> 01:59:19.910 - You know as a combatant commander, 01:59:21.701 --> 01:59:23.350 I'm very dependent upon the services 01:59:23.350 --> 01:59:25.074 to provide us the right capabilities 01:59:25.074 --> 01:59:29.680 and they always do and we're very, very satisfied with that. 01:59:29.680 --> 01:59:31.780 So I'm less concerned about which platform 01:59:31.920 --> 01:59:35.190 is on and more concerned with the capability 01:59:35.190 --> 01:59:36.490 that's coming our way. 01:59:36.490 --> 01:59:39.650 Certainly the Joint STARS provides not only ground movement 01:59:39.650 --> 01:59:41.680 targeting indicator capability, 01:59:41.680 --> 01:59:44.660 that's very important in my theater and other theaters, 01:59:44.730 --> 01:59:49.360 but it also provides battle space management command 01:59:49.360 --> 01:59:51.500 and control that comes along with these. 01:59:51.600 --> 01:59:53.040 These are key capabilities. 01:59:53.210 --> 01:59:54.510 What I'm trying to achieve 01:59:54.840 --> 01:59:58.950 with our use of ISR is layered ISR. 01:59:58.950 --> 02:00:01.540 I wanna be able to draw all these capabilities 02:00:01.561 --> 02:00:05.530 into an ISR scheme that meets my requirements, 02:00:05.530 --> 02:00:08.160 or meets our requirements in this particular theater. 02:00:08.160 --> 02:00:09.390 - Well again, thank you for being here today 02:00:09.390 --> 02:00:10.470 and answering our questions. 02:00:10.470 --> 02:00:11.570 We're grateful to you. 02:00:11.620 --> 02:00:12.453 - [Joseph] Thank you. 02:00:12.453 --> 02:00:13.286 - Yield back. 02:00:13.293 --> 02:00:14.126 - Thank you. 02:00:14.126 --> 02:00:15.230 - [Mac] Mr. Hunter. 02:00:15.230 --> 02:00:16.063 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 02:00:16.063 --> 02:00:17.450 General, thank you for being here. 02:00:17.450 --> 02:00:19.080 This just proves if you stick around long enough 02:00:19.080 --> 02:00:19.970 you get to ask a question, 02:00:19.970 --> 02:00:22.070 whether you're good or not, if you're there. 02:00:22.440 --> 02:00:24.030 I guess the first question is, 02:00:24.450 --> 02:00:26.900 we've been working on getting some kinds of UAVs, 02:00:27.115 --> 02:00:30.240 whether they're predators, or they're whatevers 02:00:30.240 --> 02:00:33.560 to our allies in the Middle East, whether it's Saudi Arabia, 02:00:34.740 --> 02:00:38.270 the Emirates, UAE and we been stopped. 02:00:38.330 --> 02:00:42.060 We've even offered them the ability to use US contractors 02:00:42.060 --> 02:00:46.030 to do it so that they can prosecute their own targets 02:00:46.660 --> 02:00:49.210 and we can use them instead of using our own. 02:00:49.230 --> 02:00:52.960 So the question is, can we tolerate a reality where because 02:00:52.960 --> 02:00:57.210 of self-imposed constraints we can't sell our allies 02:00:57.210 --> 02:01:00.660 our UAV technology, but the Chinese can. 02:01:01.340 --> 02:01:03.350 And you've already spoken to that point, 02:01:03.610 --> 02:01:04.900 but when it comes to technology 02:01:04.900 --> 02:01:07.470 I think we're missing a big advantage there. 02:01:07.750 --> 02:01:09.050 Could you comment on that? 02:01:09.820 --> 02:01:13.910 - I think it's, as your alluding to here, 02:01:13.910 --> 02:01:15.170 I think the opportunity for us 02:01:15.170 --> 02:01:18.480 to improve our interoperability through common systems, 02:01:18.480 --> 02:01:21.690 whether it's ISR, or other systems we have out here, 02:01:21.980 --> 02:01:23.640 I think these are always opportunities 02:01:23.640 --> 02:01:26.030 that we'll have to pursue wherever we can. 02:01:27.288 --> 02:01:30.250 - Do you support us sharing our UAV technology 02:01:30.250 --> 02:01:31.083 with our allies? 02:01:31.180 --> 02:01:33.920 - I certainly think it deserves serious consideration. 02:01:34.220 --> 02:01:35.053 - Thank you. 02:01:35.221 --> 02:01:40.221 The second question is, in terms of Iran and a ratline 02:01:41.840 --> 02:01:44.290 that goes from Iran through Syria down to Israel, 02:01:44.930 --> 02:01:47.130 I've got big poster boards with Sulaymaniyah 02:01:47.320 --> 02:01:51.000 with his arm around every single Iraqi core commander 02:01:51.220 --> 02:01:52.350 and militia guy. 02:01:53.613 --> 02:01:55.340 They're all buddies. 02:01:55.340 --> 02:01:57.810 Sulaymaniyah is now hand-picking the guys 02:01:58.501 --> 02:01:59.520 that we're equipping and training, 02:01:59.600 --> 02:02:01.800 but that's the fight that we're in right now. 02:02:02.162 --> 02:02:04.740 So the question is, and you've already spoken to this, 02:02:04.740 --> 02:02:08.020 but specifically, do you think it's gonna be possible 02:02:08.020 --> 02:02:13.020 to extract Iran out of Syria and Iraq 02:02:14.816 --> 02:02:17.990 if there's an end to what's happening in Syria? 02:02:19.430 --> 02:02:21.290 'Cause they're dug in deeply now. 02:02:22.524 --> 02:02:27.240 - Yeah, I think there certainly is an opportunity 02:02:27.240 --> 02:02:30.510 in Iraq through our strong relationships 02:02:30.510 --> 02:02:32.410 that we're developing here and I think 02:02:32.968 --> 02:02:36.500 that one of the things that I've observed about Iraq 02:02:36.500 --> 02:02:38.260 over last year has been their outreach 02:02:38.260 --> 02:02:41.420 to other partners across the region, whether it's Jordan, 02:02:41.420 --> 02:02:43.090 whether Saudi Arabia, whether it's Kuwait, 02:02:43.090 --> 02:02:45.780 whether it's Turkey, the other key Sunni nations 02:02:45.780 --> 02:02:48.130 in the area and so they are very much emerging, 02:02:51.078 --> 02:02:54.020 you know, trying to be much more involved in the region, 02:02:54.020 --> 02:02:56.590 which I think is a very positive thing. 02:02:56.730 --> 02:03:01.730 And I think it connotes the fact that Iraq is for Iraqis 02:03:02.620 --> 02:03:04.670 and while they live in a difficult neighborhood 02:03:04.670 --> 02:03:07.620 with difficult neighbors and they have to deal with that, 02:03:07.880 --> 02:03:09.580 that they are principally concerned with Iraq. 02:03:09.580 --> 02:03:10.830 - But let's bring it back right now, 02:03:10.830 --> 02:03:12.490 because right now we're playing the enemy 02:03:12.490 --> 02:03:14.350 of our enemy is our friend. 02:03:14.400 --> 02:03:16.020 That's what we're playing now. 02:03:17.330 --> 02:03:20.320 If the Iranians are the major power players with weapons 02:03:20.430 --> 02:03:23.460 and our training and our gear right now 02:03:23.460 --> 02:03:25.650 with their hand-picked militia guys, 02:03:27.280 --> 02:03:28.910 the Iraqis can reach out all they want to, 02:03:28.910 --> 02:03:30.700 but the power is with the Iranians 02:03:30.700 --> 02:03:32.100 in Iraq and Syria right now. 02:03:32.450 --> 02:03:35.030 Is that not where the power lies in your opinion? 02:03:35.740 --> 02:03:36.573 The actual power. 02:03:36.573 --> 02:03:38.280 And I'm taking power by force. 02:03:38.530 --> 02:03:40.640 - Well I think there certainly is. 02:03:40.650 --> 02:03:41.770 There's influence here. 02:03:41.770 --> 02:03:43.170 There's no doubt about that. 02:03:43.480 --> 02:03:47.871 But again, I do see within the Iraqi leadership 02:03:47.871 --> 02:03:52.430 a very strong sense of independence 02:03:52.720 --> 02:03:55.610 and a desire to protect Iraq. 02:03:56.260 --> 02:03:57.570 And so I think these are things 02:03:57.570 --> 02:03:59.430 that we have to continue to build on. 02:03:59.580 --> 02:04:01.610 - So let me just lay it out there one last time. 02:04:01.610 --> 02:04:04.516 You're confident that in the next 10 years 02:04:04.516 --> 02:04:07.690 we're not gonna see an Iranian controlled ratline 02:04:07.690 --> 02:04:10.090 where the Iranians can go from Tehran 02:04:10.440 --> 02:04:14.040 through Syria down to Israel on a high-speed road 02:04:14.040 --> 02:04:16.500 with M1 Abrams tanks that we've trained them on? 02:04:17.240 --> 02:04:18.922 You do not see that happening? 02:04:18.922 --> 02:04:21.830 - Congressman, I wouldn't speculate 02:04:21.830 --> 02:04:23.050 in that particular regard. 02:04:23.050 --> 02:04:25.440 What I would tell you is that I think our best opportunity 02:04:25.440 --> 02:04:28.660 to prevent something like that is to stay engaged and to -- 02:04:28.660 --> 02:04:31.057 - I wouldn't disagree with you on that. 02:04:31.057 --> 02:04:34.480 - And to continue to be the valuable partner 02:04:34.480 --> 02:04:35.830 that we have been for them. 02:04:36.330 --> 02:04:40.810 And to continue to professionalize their forces 02:04:40.810 --> 02:04:44.880 and their capabilities so that they are beholden 02:04:44.880 --> 02:04:47.100 to themselves, not beholden to others 02:04:47.390 --> 02:04:50.020 to do things for them and they don't allow their terrain 02:04:50.020 --> 02:04:52.810 to be exploited in the manner that you highlighted. 02:04:53.470 --> 02:04:54.730 - As you've seen General, as we train 02:04:54.730 --> 02:04:56.330 and equip and try to pick sides, 02:04:56.420 --> 02:04:59.230 we're not always right on who we end up helping 02:04:59.650 --> 02:05:02.310 and that's turned around to bite a few times. 02:05:02.640 --> 02:05:04.970 And I really hope that right now with the Iranians 02:05:04.970 --> 02:05:07.040 we're not doing that in a much bigger way 02:05:07.040 --> 02:05:08.540 than we messed up in the past. 02:05:09.330 --> 02:05:10.330 Thank you very much. 02:05:10.610 --> 02:05:11.740 Thank you Mr. Chairman. 02:05:12.840 --> 02:05:15.510 - General, I wanna follow on two questions 02:05:15.510 --> 02:05:17.700 that I don't think you've been asked directly. 02:05:18.150 --> 02:05:23.000 You started the hearing talking about considerable success 02:05:23.090 --> 02:05:25.260 in the fight to eliminate ISIS 02:05:25.260 --> 02:05:27.170 from controlling any territory. 02:05:27.570 --> 02:05:32.180 Is there, or will there be a reduction in US people 02:05:32.180 --> 02:05:34.390 and US capabilities from Iraq, 02:05:34.840 --> 02:05:38.560 especially due to that success? 02:05:39.720 --> 02:05:43.130 - Well as part of our alignment process 02:05:43.130 --> 02:05:44.280 there already has been. 02:05:45.020 --> 02:05:47.840 And the success we've had has given us the ability 02:05:47.840 --> 02:05:50.790 to move some of these critical resources, whether it's ISR, 02:05:51.514 --> 02:05:54.350 or fighter aircraft, or some of our engineering capability, 02:05:54.350 --> 02:05:57.750 or medical capability that we required on the ground, 02:05:58.643 --> 02:06:00.830 and we've been able to reposition that within the theater, 02:06:00.830 --> 02:06:02.030 Afghanistan in particular, 02:06:02.030 --> 02:06:03.320 to make sure that General Nicholson 02:06:03.320 --> 02:06:05.120 has what he needs to be successful. 02:06:05.450 --> 02:06:07.100 So we already have seen that. 02:06:07.100 --> 02:06:09.540 And of course as the situation continues 02:06:09.540 --> 02:06:10.930 to mature we will continue 02:06:11.695 --> 02:06:13.020 to make smart decisions on this. 02:06:13.020 --> 02:06:14.760 We don't wanna keep one more soldier, 02:06:14.760 --> 02:06:16.740 one more piece of equipment there 02:06:17.070 --> 02:06:18.970 than is needed to support the mission. 02:06:19.660 --> 02:06:22.850 And that's what we're pursuing, 02:06:23.300 --> 02:06:25.470 but we're trying to do it as smartly as we can. 02:06:25.470 --> 02:06:27.600 - Yeah, 'cause we also don't wanna repeat the mistakes 02:06:27.600 --> 02:06:30.120 of the past and leave completely. 02:06:30.380 --> 02:06:34.870 The other thing, at one point the assessment we got 02:06:34.870 --> 02:06:39.870 was the most capable terrorist enemy we faced was AQAP, 02:06:40.620 --> 02:06:43.300 especially in their bomb-making and so forth. 02:06:43.510 --> 02:06:47.590 You've talked a little bit about Al Qaeda and ISIS in Yemen. 02:06:48.040 --> 02:06:52.720 Is there still a terrorist threat that emanates from Yemen? 02:06:54.130 --> 02:06:59.130 - There is Chairman and first of all I think our efforts 02:06:59.630 --> 02:07:01.470 over the last year have been very effective 02:07:01.470 --> 02:07:03.850 at addressing many of the concerns 02:07:03.850 --> 02:07:07.860 that we had with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 02:07:08.300 --> 02:07:11.720 and I think we addressed their leadership, 02:07:11.720 --> 02:07:12.930 their media capabilities, 02:07:12.930 --> 02:07:14.470 their external operations capably, 02:07:14.470 --> 02:07:17.520 certainly some of their explosive capability 02:07:17.520 --> 02:07:19.720 that has been inherent in this organization. 02:07:19.910 --> 02:07:22.460 But I think with Al Qaeda it's important 02:07:22.460 --> 02:07:25.310 to always understand what their long-term objectives are. 02:07:25.440 --> 02:07:28.010 They are a very patient and savvy organization 02:07:28.010 --> 02:07:30.910 and I think we always have to be concerned about Al Qaeda. 02:07:31.530 --> 02:07:36.060 So it is absolutely vital to not take the pressure off now, 02:07:36.330 --> 02:07:37.930 but to keep the pressure on them 02:07:38.686 --> 02:07:43.686 and make sure that we complete this effort against them. 02:07:46.010 --> 02:07:48.540 - I just, while it's a complex situation, 02:07:48.540 --> 02:07:51.170 you talked about humanitarian, the Houthis 02:07:51.170 --> 02:07:52.480 and all that's going on, 02:07:53.010 --> 02:07:54.580 I just think it's important not to lose sight 02:07:54.580 --> 02:07:55.770 of the fact that there continues 02:07:55.770 --> 02:07:58.860 to be a terrorist threat that emanates from there. 02:08:01.720 --> 02:08:03.430 I think that we're good for now. 02:08:03.850 --> 02:08:05.160 Thank you for being here. 02:08:05.450 --> 02:08:07.710 We will adjourn this open session 02:08:07.710 --> 02:08:11.110 and within about five minutes reconvene upstairs. 02:08:11.110 --> 02:08:11.943 Thank you. 02:08:12.192 --> 02:08:13.812 (gavel thump)