WEBVTT 00:03.400 --> 00:04.233 - Good afternoon. 00:04.233 --> 00:06.070 Ladies and gentlemen, I call this joint hearing 00:06.070 --> 00:07.490 of the Readiness and Seapower 00:07.490 --> 00:09.209 and Projection Forces sub-committees 00:09.209 --> 00:11.910 of the House Armed Services Committee to order. 00:12.460 --> 00:14.800 First, I would like to honor the 17 Sailors 00:15.030 --> 00:17.670 who were lost in the USS Fitzgerald. 00:17.670 --> 00:21.990 Sailors Shingo Douglass, Noe Hernandez, 00:22.220 --> 00:23.790 Ngoc Truong Huynh, 00:24.440 --> 00:28.400 Xavier Martin, Gary Rehm, Dakota Rigsby, 00:28.710 --> 00:31.170 Carlos Victor Sibayan 00:32.080 --> 00:35.740 and the 10 USS John S. McCain sailors 00:36.400 --> 00:40.610 Kevin Bushell, Dustin Doyon, Jacob Drake, 00:41.000 --> 00:45.480 Timothy Eckels Jr., Charles Findley, John Hoagland, 00:45.860 --> 00:50.140 Corey Ingram, Abraham Lopez, Kenneth Smith, 00:50.290 --> 00:51.210 Logan Palmer, 00:52.970 --> 00:55.090 and each one of them is so special to, 00:55.880 --> 00:57.620 I know every person here. 00:58.370 --> 01:00.350 Over the course of the past six months, 01:00.370 --> 01:03.040 our sub-committees have met with Navy leadership 01:03.040 --> 01:05.550 to under the causal factors that have lead 01:05.550 --> 01:07.940 to four gruesome and tragic incidents 01:08.170 --> 01:10.260 involving surface ships resulting 01:10.260 --> 01:11.980 in the deaths of 17 sailors. 01:12.860 --> 01:16.188 I remain confident that our Navy remains the most 01:16.188 --> 01:17.630 powerful in the world. 01:18.020 --> 01:21.020 However, the Navy is not alone in responsibility. 01:21.580 --> 01:24.510 As Secretary James Mattis stated in August, 01:24.813 --> 01:27.170 "It just creates unpredictability. 01:27.460 --> 01:28.450 "It makes us rigid. 01:28.790 --> 01:32.330 "We cannot deal with new and revealing threats. 01:32.610 --> 01:35.030 "We know our enemies are not standing still." 01:36.180 --> 01:37.750 Passing another temporary measure 01:37.750 --> 01:41.090 compounds the negative impacts for our military. 01:41.330 --> 01:43.490 Some of those impacts are highlighted 01:43.490 --> 01:45.840 by the manning, training and certification gaps 01:45.980 --> 01:48.910 necessitated by increased operational demand. 01:49.390 --> 01:51.840 Speaker Paul Ryan and Chairman Mac Thornberry 01:51.840 --> 01:54.020 have been clear and outspoken 01:54.030 --> 01:55.530 in promoting the critical need 01:55.800 --> 01:58.930 for a robust, year-long defense appropriations bill. 01:59.710 --> 02:01.800 I fully believe the primary responsibility 02:01.800 --> 02:03.780 of the national government is to provide 02:03.780 --> 02:05.880 for the national security of its citizens, 02:06.000 --> 02:08.980 and that is especially true of our Sailors, Soldiers, 02:08.980 --> 02:10.100 Airmen, and Marines. 02:10.460 --> 02:13.080 Therefore, it is our responsibility as members 02:13.080 --> 02:15.330 of these sub-committees to better understand 02:15.330 --> 02:16.610 the readiness situation 02:16.920 --> 02:19.180 and how the Navy Strategic Readiness Review 02:19.540 --> 02:23.440 and Comprehensive Review are informing and assisting 02:23.800 --> 02:24.910 the Department of the Navy 02:24.910 --> 02:27.380 in correcting any deficiencies and shortfalls. 02:27.760 --> 02:30.155 This week, the Navy announced additional actions 02:30.155 --> 02:34.020 for shipboard personnel involved in these collisions. 02:34.340 --> 02:36.230 Separate from these military actions, 02:36.230 --> 02:37.860 this committee remains concerned 02:38.200 --> 02:40.940 that senior officers who created the conditions 02:41.230 --> 02:45.080 for ships to not receive depot-level repairs, 02:45.270 --> 02:48.430 the individuals who chose to repeatedly approve waivers 02:48.670 --> 02:50.220 of expired certifications, 02:50.450 --> 02:53.110 and the individuals who had the ability to balance 02:53.110 --> 02:55.940 and globally resource operational requirements 02:56.120 --> 02:57.740 are not being held accountable. 02:58.330 --> 03:00.360 Today, the Secretary of the Navy, 03:00.600 --> 03:02.100 the Honorable Richard Spencer, 03:02.350 --> 03:05.410 and the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson 03:05.700 --> 03:08.920 are here to testify to the Navy's Strategic Readiness Review 03:09.290 --> 03:11.590 and the Comprehensive Review for our hearing 03:11.780 --> 03:14.640 on Surface Warfare at a Crossroads. 03:15.070 --> 03:16.870 I remain concerned about the Navy's 03:16.870 --> 03:18.970 training and certification processes, 03:19.300 --> 03:22.500 the approach to correcting any deficiencies and shortfalls, 03:22.780 --> 03:25.320 and the Navy's approach to improve accountability. 03:25.800 --> 03:29.720 I hope that today's hearing will address these concerns. 03:30.010 --> 03:32.360 I would like now to turn to our ranking member, 03:32.470 --> 03:34.670 Congresswoman Madeleine Bordallo of Guam 03:34.770 --> 03:37.420 for any remarks she may desire to make. 03:38.880 --> 03:41.690 - Thank you very much Chairman Wilson and Chairman Wittman 03:41.690 --> 03:44.710 for convening this important joint hearing 03:44.710 --> 03:45.930 on Navy's readiness. 03:46.390 --> 03:48.610 And thank you also to Secretary Spencer 03:48.610 --> 03:50.810 and Admiral Richardson for being here today. 03:51.950 --> 03:54.760 Following several mishaps in 2017 03:54.760 --> 03:58.670 involving U.S. Navy ships, you each directed separate, 03:58.760 --> 04:02.900 parallel reviews of surface fleet operations and readiness. 04:03.450 --> 04:05.130 The Strategic Readiness Review 04:05.160 --> 04:07.260 and the Fleet Comprehensive Review 04:07.900 --> 04:11.070 are important steps aimed at identifying 04:11.070 --> 04:14.450 and addressing the challenges that our Navy is facing today. 04:15.310 --> 04:18.690 However, actions speak louder than words, 04:18.720 --> 04:21.390 and we must ensure that the recommendations 04:21.390 --> 04:24.840 included in these reviews are promptly considered 04:24.840 --> 04:28.110 and acted upon to improve the readiness of the fleet 04:28.330 --> 04:32.440 and prevent a repeat of the tragedies of 2017. 04:33.710 --> 04:36.110 Today's hearing is the first opportunity 04:36.110 --> 04:37.560 for members of this committee 04:37.840 --> 04:40.960 to discuss the recommendations of these two reviews. 04:41.840 --> 04:44.930 However, this committee's oversight of these issues 04:44.930 --> 04:46.940 will not end with today's hearings. 04:47.380 --> 04:49.060 I hope that members of this committee 04:49.060 --> 04:52.360 can continue a frank and an open dialog 04:52.810 --> 04:54.160 with the Navy's leadership 04:54.460 --> 04:56.680 as progress is made toward implementing 04:56.940 --> 04:59.230 these review's recommendations. 05:00.020 --> 05:02.660 Without question, I think my colleagues would agree 05:02.980 --> 05:06.590 that the U.S. Navy is the most powerful fleet in the world. 05:07.070 --> 05:10.110 However, in the light of recent global events 05:10.110 --> 05:13.650 and the escalation of near peer threats around the world, 05:13.980 --> 05:17.460 we must ensure that the Navy is properly manned, 05:17.870 --> 05:20.680 trained and equipped to conduct 05:22.000 --> 05:25.120 the missions that may be asked of them. 05:26.280 --> 05:29.920 As highlighted by the four incidents of 2017, 05:30.330 --> 05:32.040 the high operational tempo 05:32.040 --> 05:35.480 and the lack of emphasis on ship maintenance and training 05:35.650 --> 05:39.280 have chipped away at the overall readiness of the fleet. 05:40.440 --> 05:42.350 One element of Navy readiness 05:42.350 --> 05:44.360 that I am particularly concerned about 05:44.700 --> 05:47.440 is ship maintenance and specifically 05:47.610 --> 05:49.480 for ships operating in the Pacific. 05:50.320 --> 05:51.610 Over the past several years, 05:51.610 --> 05:54.900 we have engaged senior Navy leaders regarding 05:54.900 --> 05:58.680 the Navy's readiness requirements in the Western Pacific. 05:58.980 --> 06:01.740 Specifically, in depot-level ship repair 06:01.960 --> 06:04.860 and dry dock capabilities and capacity. 06:05.620 --> 06:07.620 In the Fleet Comprehensive Review 06:08.080 --> 06:11.120 the Navy identified capacity issues 06:11.120 --> 06:14.660 at the ship repair facility in Yokosuka, Japan. 06:15.740 --> 06:18.670 To our witnesses, I look forward today 06:18.960 --> 06:21.530 to hearing how the Navy plans to address 06:21.730 --> 06:24.560 the ship repair capacity issue in the Pacific 06:24.930 --> 06:29.030 and improve the materiel condition of the fleet. 06:29.680 --> 06:32.790 Furthermore, I also look forward to hearing 06:32.790 --> 06:36.900 how that plan will align with the President's 2018 06:36.900 --> 06:40.410 National Strategic Security Strategy 06:40.650 --> 06:43.130 to maintain a forward military presence 06:43.330 --> 06:46.960 capable of deterring, and if necessary defeating 06:46.970 --> 06:49.630 any adversary, which will be balanced 06:49.760 --> 06:52.330 with an economic strategy that rejuvenates 06:52.460 --> 06:53.790 the domestic economy. 06:54.650 --> 06:57.690 In addition to supporting proper ship maintenance, 06:57.860 --> 07:01.020 we must also ensure our surface warfare officers 07:01.230 --> 07:04.340 and Sailors are receiving adequate training 07:04.600 --> 07:06.950 to perform the missions that are asked of them. 07:08.200 --> 07:10.900 We must empower ship commanding officers 07:10.900 --> 07:13.860 to express concerns up their chain of command 07:14.200 --> 07:17.060 without facing career-ending repercussions 07:17.260 --> 07:19.310 when they are tasked with a mission 07:19.530 --> 07:21.610 that they feel their ship or crew 07:22.010 --> 07:23.950 are not properly trained for. 07:24.990 --> 07:27.180 This is a management and a cultural issue 07:27.180 --> 07:29.540 for the Navy's leadership to address. 07:29.950 --> 07:32.660 And to that end, I look forward to hearing your 07:32.660 --> 07:35.460 plans to ensure sufficient time 07:35.610 --> 07:37.810 is allocated for training and maintenance, 07:38.100 --> 07:41.810 two pillars for restoring the Navy's surface readiness. 07:42.620 --> 07:44.380 I fear that will be a long journey 07:44.380 --> 07:46.510 to return to proper readiness levels, 07:47.150 --> 07:49.480 but I do assure you that this committee 07:49.480 --> 07:51.270 will try to help you where we can. 07:51.970 --> 07:55.090 Similarly, we will not hesitate to raise concerns 07:55.090 --> 07:58.820 and issues with you as we perform our oversight role. 07:59.740 --> 08:01.860 I believe the Navy is in good hands, 08:02.100 --> 08:05.030 and I look forward to staying updated 08:05.030 --> 08:06.460 on the progress of your work 08:06.680 --> 08:08.820 to restore readiness across the fleet. 08:09.530 --> 08:13.680 And I look forward today, this afternoon, to your testimony. 08:14.070 --> 08:16.270 Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I yield back. 08:16.730 --> 08:18.890 - Thank you ranking member Bordallo. 08:19.280 --> 08:21.040 I now turn to the gentleman from Virginia 08:21.040 --> 08:23.180 and Chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces 08:23.180 --> 08:25.330 sub-committee, Congressman Rob Wittman 08:25.330 --> 08:26.730 for any remarks he may have. 08:27.580 --> 08:29.380 - Thank you Mr. Chairman and thank you for yielding 08:29.380 --> 08:32.240 and I want to thank Secretary Spencer, Admiral Richardson 08:32.240 --> 08:34.040 for joining us today and for being part of 08:34.040 --> 08:35.800 what I think is a very 08:36.162 --> 08:40.300 needed, and I think productive process to go through 08:40.300 --> 08:42.550 to make sure that we are making the necessary 08:43.020 --> 08:45.060 course changes to address this issue. 08:45.900 --> 08:48.490 Let me begin by quoting Dr. James Holmes. 08:48.490 --> 08:50.420 He's a noted Navy War College professor 08:50.420 --> 08:52.241 and he recently wrote an article entitled 08:52.241 --> 08:55.920 Who Watches the Watchers in the United States Navy? 08:56.590 --> 08:58.630 In this article he expressed concern about 08:58.630 --> 09:01.270 the apparent lack of accountability for the structural 09:01.270 --> 09:03.370 problems in the surface warfare community. 09:03.780 --> 09:05.990 He indicated that the Navy is quick in citing 09:05.990 --> 09:07.930 senior leadership's loss of confidence 09:07.930 --> 09:09.120 in commanding officers, 09:09.510 --> 09:12.560 but is at best circumspect when assessing faults 09:12.560 --> 09:15.190 of the system that drove these commanding officers 09:15.630 --> 09:19.980 to seek what he calls the normalization of deviation. 09:20.640 --> 09:23.082 This culture of holding the commanding officer accountable 09:23.082 --> 09:26.280 is very apparent with the decision announced on Tuesday 09:26.540 --> 09:29.030 to bring the commanding officers and other officials 09:29.030 --> 09:31.100 from the USS Fitzgerald and McCain 09:31.430 --> 09:34.180 before an Article 32 hearing for negligent homicide. 09:34.740 --> 09:37.650 While I agree with the Navy that officers 09:37.650 --> 09:39.000 should be held accountable, 09:39.200 --> 09:41.890 I'm equally convinced that we need to reform the system 09:41.890 --> 09:45.130 that drove these officers to avoid additional incidents 09:45.480 --> 09:49.820 and to reduce future normalization of deviation instances. 09:50.420 --> 09:52.970 I think the Navy has taken a tremendously important 09:53.100 --> 09:56.390 and good first step at addressing these systematic areas, 09:56.750 --> 09:58.640 but there are a multitude of other issues 09:58.640 --> 10:00.710 that need to be reviewed, to include: 10:01.260 --> 10:04.340 organization reform, manning deficiencies, 10:04.740 --> 10:06.000 materiel readiness, 10:06.480 --> 10:07.890 and serious training reform. 10:08.540 --> 10:09.880 While the Comprehensive Review 10:09.880 --> 10:11.850 and Strategic Readiness Review have identified 10:11.850 --> 10:14.070 the organizational problems facing the Navy, 10:14.580 --> 10:16.400 I think it is time to take bold steps 10:16.400 --> 10:17.820 in correcting the deficiencies 10:17.820 --> 10:20.510 that were identified almost 15 years ago. 10:21.210 --> 10:23.030 It's time to flatten the organization 10:23.030 --> 10:25.570 and centralize the Title 10 Manning, Training 10:25.570 --> 10:28.140 and Equipping Authorities at Fleet Forces Command. 10:28.730 --> 10:30.780 It is time to reactivate the Second Fleet 10:30.780 --> 10:32.890 and eliminate Fourth Fleet to ensure the Navy 10:32.890 --> 10:36.550 retains an emphasis on deployment credibility. 10:37.140 --> 10:39.850 It is time that we consolidate Navy policy and leg 10:39.850 --> 10:43.190 by co-locating the three star type commanders 10:43.190 --> 10:44.390 at Fleet Forces Command. 10:44.880 --> 10:47.460 And it is time for Congress to end restrictions 10:47.690 --> 10:50.340 that contributed to the Seventh Fleet disorganization 10:50.650 --> 10:53.630 and allow the Navy to effectively reorganize. 10:54.150 --> 10:56.420 I'm particularly disappointed with the manning levels 10:56.420 --> 10:58.270 of our forward deployed naval forces, 10:58.530 --> 11:00.240 particularly concerning the disparity 11:00.240 --> 11:01.980 between different ship classes. 11:02.510 --> 11:05.140 I do not understand why forward deployed naval forces 11:05.140 --> 11:07.540 are the worst manned forces in the surface Navy. 11:08.000 --> 11:09.260 They need to be the best. 11:10.070 --> 11:12.190 With regard to training, I am concerned 11:12.470 --> 11:14.950 that as our ships before more technically challenging 11:14.950 --> 11:17.537 to operate, our surface warfare community 11:17.537 --> 11:20.090 has retained a generalist preference 11:20.430 --> 11:23.690 that contributes to the surface warfare malaise. 11:24.150 --> 11:25.580 I think it is time that we adopt 11:25.580 --> 11:28.150 specialists similar to the aviation community 11:28.630 --> 11:29.760 and foreign navies. 11:30.310 --> 11:32.520 We should require surface warfare officers 11:32.520 --> 11:35.020 to specialize in deck or engineering 11:35.650 --> 11:37.250 and allow needed junior officers 11:37.250 --> 11:39.140 time to develop basic skills. 11:39.770 --> 11:41.690 Further, the Navy should consider adopting 11:41.690 --> 11:45.120 certification milestones similar to the commercial sector. 11:45.970 --> 11:48.170 The U.S. Navy needs to significantly improve 11:48.170 --> 11:49.790 the surface warfare pipeline 11:50.240 --> 11:53.000 to ensure Navy officers are provided basic 11:53.000 --> 11:55.060 navigation and engineering skills. 11:55.680 --> 11:57.800 Finally, as to correcting materiel issues, 11:58.080 --> 11:59.600 I think it is time that we start to take 11:59.600 --> 12:02.000 our INSURV process seriously, 12:02.000 --> 12:03.600 and correct the materiel problems 12:03.600 --> 12:05.970 facing the four deployed naval forces. 12:06.610 --> 12:10.700 INSURV is a statutorily-driven process 12:10.840 --> 12:12.610 that provides Congress and our nation 12:12.610 --> 12:15.110 a snapshot of the materiel condition of the fleet. 12:15.660 --> 12:17.470 I am concerned that the classification 12:17.470 --> 12:20.070 the INSURV reports fails to provide our nation 12:20.470 --> 12:23.450 a reasonable perspective of the negative consequences 12:23.450 --> 12:26.310 associated with underfunding the readiness accounts. 12:26.850 --> 12:29.500 Navy should be prepared to publicly articulate the risk 12:29.500 --> 12:31.100 of our surface ship maintenance, 12:31.620 --> 12:33.490 and we need to ensure that forward deployed 12:33.490 --> 12:35.680 Navy forces are properly maintained 12:36.090 --> 12:38.680 with a competent workforce that has the capacity 12:38.680 --> 12:40.570 and skills to maintain the fleet. 12:41.220 --> 12:43.390 It is time that we routinely rotate ships 12:43.390 --> 12:44.400 back to the United States 12:44.400 --> 12:46.900 that have been forward deployed for over 20 years. 12:47.330 --> 12:50.241 We have significant challenges that face our surface forces, 12:50.241 --> 12:53.180 but with time and resolve I am confident 12:53.520 --> 12:55.480 that we can right the surface forces 12:55.940 --> 12:58.160 that are perilously askew. 12:58.840 --> 13:02.710 As to Dr. Holmes question as to who watches the watchers? 13:03.220 --> 13:06.640 I want to unambiguously answer that this committee 13:06.640 --> 13:09.030 will continue to drive toward accountability 13:09.330 --> 13:11.800 and providing solutions to the systemic problems 13:11.800 --> 13:13.800 that face the surface warfare community. 13:14.300 --> 13:16.600 We will watch the watchers. 13:17.080 --> 13:19.030 I yield back the balance of my time Mr. Chairman. 13:19.030 --> 13:20.480 - Thank you Chairman Wittman. 13:20.580 --> 13:22.320 And now to the gentleman from Connecticut 13:22.320 --> 13:24.790 and ranking member of the Seapower and Projection Forces 13:24.790 --> 13:27.690 sub-committee, Congressman Joe Courtney for his remarks. 13:28.320 --> 13:29.419 - Thank you Mr. Chairman and thank you 13:29.419 --> 13:31.710 to Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson 13:31.710 --> 13:34.670 for you presence here today to update our sub-committees 13:34.670 --> 13:37.350 and the American people on the result of your reviews 13:37.470 --> 13:39.360 of last year's Navy ship collisions. 13:39.700 --> 13:41.520 This is the fourth engagement that we have held 13:41.520 --> 13:43.990 on this topic since last fall 13:44.330 --> 13:45.590 which is of the highest urgency 13:45.590 --> 13:47.990 given the unacceptable level of fatalities 13:48.620 --> 13:52.140 in non-combat settings which occurred in 2017. 13:52.310 --> 13:54.400 For many members, even those who hail from districts 13:54.400 --> 13:57.350 far from the Western Pacific, these collisions strike home. 13:57.410 --> 13:59.230 In Connecticut, two outstanding Sailors, 13:59.230 --> 14:02.160 Electronics Technician Second Class Dustin Doyon 14:02.530 --> 14:05.110 of Suffield and Sonar Technician Second Class 14:05.310 --> 14:07.420 Ngoc Truong Huynh of Watertown, Connecticut 14:07.420 --> 14:08.530 lost their lives. 14:09.010 --> 14:11.420 Given this drastic harm, it is the duty of all of us 14:11.420 --> 14:13.900 to ensure that bold systemic change happens 14:13.900 --> 14:15.310 to protect our Sailors and ships 14:15.310 --> 14:17.160 from similar tragedies in the future. 14:17.533 --> 14:21.250 Last week at the Surface Navy Association Annual Symposium 14:21.250 --> 14:23.350 held just across the Potomac in Virginia, 14:23.350 --> 14:26.640 a panel of young officers assigned to forward deployed ships 14:26.640 --> 14:28.630 in Japan discussed the challenges they face 14:28.630 --> 14:30.780 maintaining readiness in the Seventh Fleet. 14:30.930 --> 14:32.720 They described high operational tempo, 14:32.720 --> 14:35.430 a challenge of simultaneous training and operations 14:35.430 --> 14:36.430 and long hours. 14:36.890 --> 14:38.490 Their most powerful comments, however, 14:38.490 --> 14:40.730 described a system in which they could not even be certain 14:40.730 --> 14:43.100 they understood the risks that they were taking. 14:43.100 --> 14:44.900 One junior officer stated that following 14:44.900 --> 14:47.020 the collisions of the Fitzgerald and the McCain 14:47.020 --> 14:49.830 he asked himself, "I'm certified for my position, 14:50.040 --> 14:52.040 "but do I actually know what I'm doing?" 14:52.400 --> 14:54.870 Another officer, when considering the relatively incident 14:54.870 --> 14:57.520 free deployment he had just returned home from asked, 14:57.600 --> 14:59.800 "Are we good at this, or are we just lucky?" 15:00.250 --> 15:02.270 These anguished statements describe issues 15:02.270 --> 15:04.870 which go far beyond the particulars of any one ship. 15:04.890 --> 15:07.556 They speak to systemic problems in operations training 15:07.556 --> 15:09.820 and management of our surface forces. 15:10.520 --> 15:12.502 The Comprehensive Review and Strategic Review 15:12.502 --> 15:15.540 make dozens of recommendations for changes and reforms 15:15.540 --> 15:17.470 that are needed inside the Navy. 15:17.800 --> 15:19.730 After meeting with each of you, 15:19.730 --> 15:22.290 it is clear that many of these recommendations have been, 15:22.290 --> 15:23.430 or are in the process of, 15:23.430 --> 15:26.590 being implemented internally in real time. 15:26.930 --> 15:29.340 I urge you to continue to make the implementation 15:29.340 --> 15:31.260 of these recommendations a top priority, 15:31.260 --> 15:34.050 and to keep Congress and the families of our lost Sailors 15:34.050 --> 15:35.440 updated on your progress. 15:36.200 --> 15:38.360 Other recommendations however, will need Congress' 15:38.360 --> 15:39.900 direct attention and action. 15:40.050 --> 15:42.160 For example, one of the areas where both 15:42.160 --> 15:45.013 of the reviews agree, is that Congress has contributed 15:45.013 --> 15:48.130 to these systemic readiness issues in the surface forces. 15:48.340 --> 15:50.840 Specifically, recent defense appropriations bills 15:50.840 --> 15:53.140 have carried language which restricts the Navy 15:53.330 --> 15:55.630 from realigning its man, train and equip functions 15:55.630 --> 15:56.780 under a single command. 15:57.130 --> 15:58.790 These congressionally mandated command 15:58.790 --> 16:01.540 and control restrictions have allowed an unusual situation 16:01.540 --> 16:03.210 to continue in the Pacific Fleet, 16:03.520 --> 16:05.940 which is responsible for both deploying forces 16:06.150 --> 16:08.460 and determining when those forces are ready to deploy, 16:08.460 --> 16:10.910 and to do so separate from the rest of the fleet. 16:11.213 --> 16:14.070 As a result of your respective reviews, 16:14.170 --> 16:15.220 and as they've made clear, 16:15.220 --> 16:17.273 this arrangement allowed ships to be deployed 16:17.273 --> 16:20.510 without basic certifications and without meaningful plans 16:20.510 --> 16:22.310 to mitigate the risk to our Sailors. 16:22.930 --> 16:24.900 While there is disagreement in the Comprehensive Review 16:24.900 --> 16:27.280 and Strategic Review about the best actual 16:27.280 --> 16:30.150 command and control structure for Navy surface forces, 16:30.150 --> 16:33.580 it is clear that continued congressional limitation 16:33.580 --> 16:36.170 in this area is a hindrance to the management 16:36.170 --> 16:37.520 and readiness of the fleet. 16:38.160 --> 16:39.750 Even before these recent collisions, 16:39.750 --> 16:41.517 Congress had seriously considered changes 16:41.517 --> 16:44.350 to this restrictive language. 16:44.350 --> 16:47.130 In 2016, the House voted unanimously 16:47.130 --> 16:48.880 to remove the provision completely, 16:49.100 --> 16:52.930 but it was later restored by the Senate in the 2016 NDAA, 16:53.710 --> 16:55.000 and appropriations bill. 16:55.000 --> 16:56.850 It is my hope that we can one again work 16:56.850 --> 16:59.380 on a bi-partisan basis to remove these restrictions 16:59.380 --> 17:00.530 from our funding bills, 17:00.680 --> 17:02.360 and to see these efforts through to the end. 17:02.360 --> 17:05.400 Your input here today will be invaluable in that effort. 17:05.910 --> 17:07.970 The other obvious mission Congress can execute 17:07.970 --> 17:10.170 is to restore budget stability for the Navy. 17:10.280 --> 17:13.190 We need repair work to move forward in a timely manner. 17:13.510 --> 17:16.050 We need to increase the supply of combat-ready ships 17:16.050 --> 17:17.790 available to Fleet Forces Command, 17:18.080 --> 17:20.140 rather than letting shipbuilding plans languish 17:20.140 --> 17:21.310 because of CRs. 17:21.650 --> 17:23.770 The federal government has operated under CRs 17:23.770 --> 17:25.530 in eight of the last 12 months, 17:25.740 --> 17:28.210 and it appears this week that that number is likely 17:28.210 --> 17:29.980 to grow to nine out of 13. 17:30.250 --> 17:33.520 This is hardly the roadmap to a 355 ship Navy. 17:34.260 --> 17:35.910 I think I speak for my colleagues in saying 17:35.910 --> 17:37.880 that we stand ready to assist our witnesses today 17:37.880 --> 17:40.300 to create bold new institutional change. 17:40.590 --> 17:42.570 We owe it to the memory of the Sailors we've lost. 17:42.570 --> 17:43.970 We owe it to their families, 17:44.000 --> 17:46.310 and we owe it to those forward deployed Sailors 17:46.310 --> 17:48.950 who are asking themselves today, "Am I just lucky?" 17:49.170 --> 17:50.820 I look forward to your testimony. 17:51.770 --> 17:53.570 - Thank you ranking member Courtney. 17:53.750 --> 17:56.510 We're grateful that Congresswoman Liz Chaney of Wyoming 17:56.510 --> 17:57.850 is present with us today. 17:58.370 --> 18:01.040 I ask unanimous consent that non sub-committee 18:01.040 --> 18:03.770 members be allowed to participate in today's briefing 18:04.050 --> 18:06.780 after all sub-committee members have had an opportunity 18:06.780 --> 18:07.640 to ask questions. 18:07.920 --> 18:08.890 Is there any objection? 18:08.890 --> 18:09.760 - [Female] No objection. 18:10.180 --> 18:11.880 - Hearing none, without objection, 18:11.880 --> 18:14.430 the non sub-committee members will be recognized 18:14.430 --> 18:16.790 at the appropriate time for five minutes. 18:17.035 --> 18:19.790 Secretary Richard Spencer, we now turn to you 18:19.800 --> 18:22.150 for your remarks and briefing on the incidents. 18:22.710 --> 18:24.600 - Chairman Wittman and Wilson, 18:25.210 --> 18:27.060 ranking member Courtney and Bordallo, 18:27.140 --> 18:28.440 distinguished members of the committee, 18:28.440 --> 18:31.480 thank you for having us here today to talk about our reviews 18:31.960 --> 18:33.410 and how we're moving forward. 18:33.870 --> 18:36.470 I would be remiss though if I didn't start by saying 18:36.770 --> 18:38.690 that we should keep the Sailors lost 18:38.690 --> 18:40.690 on McCain and Fitzgerald in our thoughts 18:40.970 --> 18:42.440 and prayers as we go forward. 18:44.510 --> 18:47.410 Over the past year, our surface fleet has continued 18:47.410 --> 18:49.600 to operate and train around the globe, 18:50.060 --> 18:51.810 filling a strong demand signal 18:52.190 --> 18:54.430 to help preserve our national security. 18:55.030 --> 18:56.405 At the same time however, 18:56.405 --> 19:00.210 those operations have lead to some tragic losses. 19:00.640 --> 19:03.240 Those losses demand that we take time to study, 19:03.630 --> 19:06.060 understand, make course corrections 19:06.060 --> 19:09.570 to ensure the safety of our most valuable resource, 19:09.950 --> 19:10.783 which is people. 19:11.810 --> 19:13.927 As you are well aware, we lost 20 Sailors 19:13.927 --> 19:16.950 in major incidents in the Pacific last year. 19:17.580 --> 19:19.620 The loss of any Sailor is a tragedy. 19:20.610 --> 19:22.360 All of us in the Department of the Navy 19:22.360 --> 19:24.610 stand in solidarity and support 19:24.720 --> 19:27.140 of our fellow Sailors and families. 19:27.840 --> 19:30.300 I am here today as the responsible one, 19:30.720 --> 19:33.510 and accountable for our most valuable resources. 19:33.930 --> 19:35.840 To fulfill these responsibilities, 19:36.000 --> 19:37.870 I'm directing change across the fleet 19:37.950 --> 19:40.720 and Marine Corps to correct the issues identified 19:40.720 --> 19:44.150 in our analysis of those intolerable events. 19:45.040 --> 19:47.840 Both the Comprehensive and Strategic Readiness Reviews 19:47.990 --> 19:49.800 sought to identify factors 19:49.960 --> 19:51.960 that lead to last year's accidents. 19:52.410 --> 19:55.950 The Comprehensive Review focused on the causal factors 19:56.050 --> 19:58.270 and underlying conditions at the tactical 19:58.550 --> 20:00.020 and operational levels, 20:00.320 --> 20:02.270 while the Strategic Readiness Review 20:02.560 --> 20:05.840 examined broader systemic and root causes. 20:07.110 --> 20:08.910 The Strategic Readiness Review 20:09.330 --> 20:11.050 found that the discovered deficiencies 20:11.050 --> 20:13.900 were not traceable to any single policy or decision, 20:14.180 --> 20:17.290 but were cumulative results of decisions 20:17.370 --> 20:19.570 aimed at achieving short-term goals. 20:19.990 --> 20:23.480 Overall, the review team found that accepting deviations 20:23.480 --> 20:26.840 from our standards, which translates into higher risks, 20:27.110 --> 20:28.940 had gradually become normalized, 20:29.240 --> 20:32.890 and therefore compounding accumulated risks. 20:33.270 --> 20:35.500 This must, and will be corrected. 20:36.040 --> 20:39.210 As we move forward, success will not be attained overnight. 20:39.510 --> 20:41.647 My leadership team and I are working closely 20:41.647 --> 20:44.580 with the Navy Marine Corps team to examine, 20:44.970 --> 20:48.860 adopt and implement recommendations from these reviews. 20:49.270 --> 20:52.190 The CNO will address remedial actions we have taken 20:52.650 --> 20:54.220 to restore us to an environment 20:54.220 --> 20:56.120 of safety and sustainability. 20:56.700 --> 20:58.640 Simultaneously, we are working through 20:58.640 --> 21:01.020 implementation plans for all of the review's, 21:01.020 --> 21:03.610 the Strategic Readiness Review's recommendations. 21:03.990 --> 21:06.570 As we do so, we are addressing issues 21:06.570 --> 21:08.390 that fit into five categories: 21:08.630 --> 21:09.810 command and control, 21:10.280 --> 21:11.230 operations, 21:11.460 --> 21:12.620 manning and training, 21:12.990 --> 21:15.130 governance and culture and learning. 21:15.820 --> 21:18.310 Many of the review's recommended corrective actions 21:18.310 --> 21:20.650 are with my authority, within my authority 21:20.650 --> 21:22.820 to implement as Secretary of the Navy. 21:23.070 --> 21:25.160 Some however, will require coordination 21:25.160 --> 21:27.820 with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 21:28.040 --> 21:30.340 as well as with you, the Congress. 21:31.310 --> 21:33.800 The most important step that you could take now 21:34.570 --> 21:37.020 that would help us restore the health of the Navy 21:37.140 --> 21:39.700 is to give us stable and adequate funding. 21:40.310 --> 21:43.610 We must be able to count on reliable resourcing 21:43.900 --> 21:47.280 to operate safely and efficiently. 21:48.530 --> 21:51.680 Despite these challenges, I want to assure you, 21:51.810 --> 21:55.710 I want to assure you, that the Navy Marine Corps team 21:55.710 --> 21:59.150 is still the most ready, capable and lethal force 21:59.160 --> 21:59.993 in our arsenal. 22:00.560 --> 22:02.590 We know however, that staying that way means 22:02.590 --> 22:05.330 we must seize every opportunity to improve. 22:05.860 --> 22:07.660 And we are committed to do so. 22:08.410 --> 22:10.206 We stand with the families of the fallen 22:10.206 --> 22:13.750 and their loved ones, and their repeated requests 22:14.200 --> 22:16.540 that good must come out of these cathartic events 22:16.540 --> 22:20.230 rings true throughout our enterprise on a daily basis. 22:20.900 --> 22:23.100 We must act with a sense of urgency 22:23.100 --> 22:26.790 to grow our competitive advantage in a sustainable manner. 22:27.380 --> 22:29.820 And I look forward to working with you to do so. 22:29.946 --> 22:30.840 Thank you. 22:32.550 --> 22:34.150 - Thank you very much Secretary, 22:34.360 --> 22:36.410 and we now turn to Admiral John Richardson 22:36.410 --> 22:37.730 for your opening remarks. 22:38.390 --> 22:40.350 - Thank you Chairman Wilson, Chairman Wittman, 22:40.350 --> 22:42.510 ranking members Bordallo and Courtney 22:42.510 --> 22:43.580 and distinguished members 22:43.580 --> 22:45.830 of the Readiness and Seapower sub-committees. 22:46.180 --> 22:47.480 I want to thank you for the opportunity 22:47.480 --> 22:50.590 to brief you today on our unified action plan 22:51.010 --> 22:53.150 to address the systemic issues identified 22:53.150 --> 22:54.750 in both the Comprehensive Review 22:55.150 --> 22:57.700 and Secretary Spencer's Strategic Readiness Review. 22:58.650 --> 23:02.210 Looking back, 2017 was a year of both triumph 23:02.210 --> 23:03.640 and tragedy for our Navy. 23:04.440 --> 23:06.090 We consistently forward deployed 23:06.090 --> 23:09.430 more than 60,000 Sailors, and 95 ships and submarines 23:09.430 --> 23:12.480 around the globe to protect America from attack, 23:12.840 --> 23:14.350 advance our nation's interest, 23:14.370 --> 23:17.940 and enhance our economic prosperity and strategic influence. 23:18.800 --> 23:20.690 But even as we achieved these successes, 23:20.690 --> 23:22.790 we were reminded of the unforgiving nature 23:22.790 --> 23:23.840 of operating at sea. 23:24.660 --> 23:27.700 Our Navy experienced five serious incidents in the Pacific, 23:27.700 --> 23:30.920 resulting in the loss of 20 dedicated Sailors, 23:30.930 --> 23:34.598 American patriots all, and our thoughts and prayers remain 23:34.598 --> 23:38.100 with our fallen shipmates and their families. 23:38.700 --> 23:40.730 And as we have said, our investigations revealed 23:40.730 --> 23:43.820 that these tragedies were due in large part 23:43.830 --> 23:46.390 to human error and failures in leadership 23:46.610 --> 23:49.310 as we took our eye off mastering the basics 23:49.310 --> 23:50.670 in seamanship and navigation, 23:50.670 --> 23:53.510 and we owe it to our fallen Sailors, 23:53.920 --> 23:57.100 our active duty Sailors, and our loved ones who support us 23:57.380 --> 23:59.980 to quickly and forcefully apply these lessons learned 23:59.980 --> 24:01.030 through corrective action. 24:01.030 --> 24:02.920 And that's exactly what we're doing. 24:04.010 --> 24:06.070 I testified before this committee in November 24:06.070 --> 24:07.890 on the findings of the Comprehensive Review 24:07.890 --> 24:09.490 lead by Admiral Phil Davidson, 24:09.800 --> 24:11.590 Commander of the U.S. Fleet Forces Command. 24:11.590 --> 24:14.320 And as I outlined in my written statement, 24:14.620 --> 24:16.100 we've already acted on many 24:16.100 --> 24:18.470 of the report's 58 recommendations. 24:19.200 --> 24:21.610 Additionally, I established an oversight board, 24:21.610 --> 24:23.880 chaired by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 24:23.880 --> 24:26.730 Admiral Bill Moran to track the completion 24:26.760 --> 24:28.880 of those actions that remain in progress. 24:29.260 --> 24:30.860 Things like command and control, 24:31.410 --> 24:33.560 surface warfare officer career paths, 24:33.810 --> 24:36.540 training, equipment and certifications. 24:37.463 --> 24:40.270 Finally, as the Chief of Naval Operations, 24:40.520 --> 24:44.110 I am responsible for crushing any obstacles 24:44.130 --> 24:47.630 that prevent our Sailors from achieving war-fighting 24:47.630 --> 24:49.160 and safe operations at sea. 24:50.570 --> 24:53.080 So to get a deck plate perspective on our progress, 24:53.080 --> 24:55.710 in December I visited our naval forces in Korea, 24:55.810 --> 24:59.710 Japan, Bahrain and the USS Theodore Roosevelt 24:59.710 --> 25:03.000 Carrier Strike Group on station in the Persian Gulf. 25:03.850 --> 25:06.490 And through my interactions with thousands of our Sailors, 25:06.490 --> 25:09.730 it's clear to me that these incidents do not, 25:10.090 --> 25:12.460 repeat, do not, define your Navy. 25:13.310 --> 25:15.890 It would be a grave, even lethal mistake 25:16.190 --> 25:19.290 to underestimate our capability and dedication. 25:20.078 --> 25:22.190 And it was also clear that our corrective action 25:22.190 --> 25:25.280 are also, are already having a positive impact. 25:26.050 --> 25:28.600 But there's more work to do, and we'll get it done. 25:28.967 --> 25:30.450 And we'll get it done briskly, 25:30.450 --> 25:31.890 learning from our mistakes, 25:32.190 --> 25:33.750 capturing our successes, 25:34.010 --> 25:36.200 sharing those insights across the force 25:36.490 --> 25:38.400 and improving upon our best every day. 25:39.231 --> 25:41.120 And we'll do so as the Secretary said, 25:41.120 --> 25:42.320 with a sense of urgency. 25:42.920 --> 25:44.630 By dedicating our hearts and minds, 25:44.630 --> 25:48.500 we will finish 2018 as the safest Navy in the world 25:48.500 --> 25:49.640 for our Sailors, 25:50.150 --> 25:53.150 the favored partner in the world for our friends and allies, 25:53.440 --> 25:56.640 and the most lethal Navy in the world for our enemies. 25:57.740 --> 26:00.410 But before I close, I can't in good conscience 26:00.410 --> 26:02.780 testify before Congress about Naval power 26:03.240 --> 26:05.910 without mentioning the toxic and corrosive effect 26:06.260 --> 26:08.320 of nine years of continuing resolutions 26:08.320 --> 26:10.330 and years under the Budget Control Act. 26:10.930 --> 26:13.330 We are getting after the work we have to do, 26:13.950 --> 26:16.730 but the absence of stable and adequate funding for defense, 26:16.730 --> 26:19.220 makes everything, everything that our Sailors 26:19.220 --> 26:21.010 and their commanders do, harder. 26:21.760 --> 26:23.050 On a scale of one to 10, 26:23.260 --> 26:26.730 the importance of stable and adequate funding scores an 11. 26:27.900 --> 26:29.950 On behalf of our Sailors, their families, 26:29.950 --> 26:32.550 and our Navy civilians, I thank the Congress 26:32.550 --> 26:34.300 and especially these sub-committees 26:34.610 --> 26:36.770 for your continued support in providing us 26:36.780 --> 26:38.420 the Navy our nation needs 26:38.770 --> 26:40.670 and I look forward to working with you 26:41.030 --> 26:43.750 and in answering your questions. 26:43.750 --> 26:46.470 And with that, I'd like to pass it back to the Secretary. 26:47.500 --> 26:48.333 - Thank you CNO. 26:49.320 --> 26:51.000 Mr. Chairman, I took, 26:51.420 --> 26:54.190 you've taken a brief on the Comprehensive Review 26:54.190 --> 26:57.044 behind closed doors, and I know I met with a couple 26:57.044 --> 27:00.250 of you on the committee to explain the SRR, 27:00.250 --> 27:02.092 would it be worthwhile for me to just do a 27:02.092 --> 27:04.490 two or three minute overview on the Strategic Review? 27:04.490 --> 27:05.960 - [Chairman Wilson] I think it would be very helpful, yes. 27:05.960 --> 27:06.793 Please proceed. 27:07.050 --> 27:07.883 - Thank you. 27:09.320 --> 27:10.750 After the accident occurred, 27:11.400 --> 27:15.290 the CNO and I both decided to take the path that we took, 27:15.290 --> 27:16.870 which was to immediately set up 27:17.260 --> 27:21.080 a review of the tactical and operational 27:23.770 --> 27:26.680 areas where we had to investigate due to these accidents. 27:27.410 --> 27:29.870 I took it upon myself to say, 27:29.870 --> 27:32.160 "Okay, let's go a little higher at 30,000 feet 27:32.160 --> 27:35.060 "and see if we can go after the systemic and root causes." 27:35.990 --> 27:39.020 We engaged Michael Bayer, who is actually here today, 27:39.020 --> 27:40.880 former Chairman of the Defense Business Board 27:40.880 --> 27:45.470 and Admiral Gary Roughead to chair the strategic review. 27:46.030 --> 27:48.280 They went back and looked at 30 years of data 27:48.570 --> 27:51.740 to assess our present state of play 27:51.740 --> 27:54.960 and really look at systemic issues that are affecting us. 27:55.640 --> 27:58.830 We looked outside, we had them look outside to industry, 27:58.830 --> 28:00.440 and this was kind of an interesting point 28:00.440 --> 28:01.810 that I'd like to present to those 28:01.810 --> 28:03.160 that didn't hear the brief. 28:03.620 --> 28:06.050 We incorporated people such as Crowley Marine. 28:08.100 --> 28:09.540 You might call that fairly obvious. 28:09.540 --> 28:10.970 They sail on the seas also. 28:10.970 --> 28:15.970 They had a series of events that were unproductive for them 28:16.590 --> 28:20.250 and they turned inside and re-examined how they did work 28:20.250 --> 28:22.860 and they came out the other side as a poster child 28:22.860 --> 28:25.480 according to the Merchant Marine Academy 28:25.500 --> 28:27.600 of an organization that upholds safety. 28:28.970 --> 28:32.070 We talked to Maersk, which also had some events happen to it 28:32.160 --> 28:34.650 that were cathartic and they actually went through 28:34.650 --> 28:37.170 the same path and came out the other side. 28:37.660 --> 28:39.820 Boeing, in their industrial floors, 28:40.240 --> 28:42.740 in increasing their capacity to produce 28:42.920 --> 28:45.060 found that they were also running into areas 28:45.060 --> 28:47.330 where they were hurting their human resources. 28:47.330 --> 28:50.180 And they put a plan in place and came out the other side. 28:50.550 --> 28:51.710 BP North America. 28:52.180 --> 28:54.980 Needless to say we all knew the Deepwater Horizon event. 28:55.180 --> 28:56.780 They also went through the same. 28:56.810 --> 28:59.190 What is the common link here? 28:59.470 --> 29:02.330 It is organizations that had cathartic events 29:02.330 --> 29:03.380 that threatened them. 29:03.940 --> 29:06.640 We called them up, their CEOs, and asked if they would 29:06.640 --> 29:10.380 help us in our analysis on the Strategic Readiness Review. 29:10.650 --> 29:12.710 And they were more than forthcoming 29:12.710 --> 29:14.990 to send us all the assets we needed, 29:14.990 --> 29:17.790 including all the plans that came out on the other side. 29:17.930 --> 29:19.050 Didn't need the plans. 29:19.350 --> 29:22.100 Wanted to speak to the people who went from the journey 29:22.430 --> 29:25.630 from cathartic event to the development of the plans. 29:25.810 --> 29:28.670 We wanted to see how they got to where they got. 29:29.130 --> 29:31.070 One of the other people that we incorporated, 29:31.070 --> 29:32.240 which was quite interesting, 29:32.240 --> 29:33.340 was the Mayo Clinic. 29:33.690 --> 29:36.120 And you might say, "How can you connect the Mayo Clinic 29:36.120 --> 29:38.150 "to sailing on the bluer waters?" 29:39.010 --> 29:39.843 It's interesting. 29:39.843 --> 29:42.320 They had been doing some studies over the past three years 29:42.320 --> 29:45.360 and we contacted John Noseworthy, the CEO of Mayo Clinic. 29:45.800 --> 29:47.980 They looked at large, I beg your pardon, 29:47.980 --> 29:51.790 long-term complex operations in the operating room 29:51.790 --> 29:53.960 and they wanted to improve the outcomes. 29:53.960 --> 29:58.660 Think organ transplant, think very complex operations. 29:58.660 --> 29:59.840 Seven, eight hours. 29:59.980 --> 30:03.780 The traditional mindset in an operating environment 30:03.780 --> 30:07.020 was Chief Surgeon would raise his or her scalpel 30:07.020 --> 30:09.410 and go, "Is everyone ready, here we go." 30:09.540 --> 30:12.040 Put the head down and start working along the way. 30:12.170 --> 30:13.920 The professional teams in the room, 30:14.130 --> 30:18.130 the cardiac, the pulmonologist, the cardiac analysis, 30:18.310 --> 30:21.730 the anesthesiologist were all working along, 30:21.950 --> 30:24.870 one step behind, or if in fact equal at best. 30:25.250 --> 30:27.280 They found that there was not a door open 30:27.280 --> 30:29.480 to turn around and say, "Need a minute here. 30:30.080 --> 30:32.730 "We're falling behind, need to double set something." 30:32.930 --> 30:35.500 They decompressed and decomposed the whole culture 30:35.500 --> 30:37.750 of the operating room and basically reset it. 30:38.110 --> 30:41.490 Where the lead surgeon would lift up his or her knife 30:41.490 --> 30:44.000 and go, "Is everybody with me, we're ready?" 30:44.000 --> 30:46.320 And then every one or two minutes sit there and go, 30:46.320 --> 30:47.810 "Are we still all together?" 30:47.970 --> 30:50.050 The environment for communication 30:50.290 --> 30:52.530 as the mission went forward was wide open. 30:52.920 --> 30:56.120 We saw a direct applicability to the bridge of a ship, 30:56.530 --> 30:58.380 the engineering department of a ship, 30:58.380 --> 31:02.030 and we incorporated that into the study. 31:02.340 --> 31:05.550 23 recommendations ranging from command and control 31:05.760 --> 31:08.370 to culture, to modeling came forth. 31:08.740 --> 31:11.260 We're in the process now of actually 31:11.260 --> 31:13.250 triaging those recommendations. 31:13.840 --> 31:15.960 We've had our first meeting to date, 31:15.960 --> 31:17.670 which we addressed command and control. 31:17.670 --> 31:19.620 We can go into that a little bit later. 31:19.780 --> 31:22.090 But we're moving out on that as the CNO 31:22.090 --> 31:24.140 has moved out with his CR. 31:25.600 --> 31:27.340 I just wanted to give you all an overview 31:27.340 --> 31:28.570 as to what we actually did 31:28.570 --> 31:30.240 in the Strategic Review and the outcomes 31:30.240 --> 31:31.790 and I appreciate it, thank you. 31:31.930 --> 31:33.470 - Thank you Mr. Secretary. 31:33.530 --> 31:35.910 As we proceed we'll be under a five minute rule 31:36.220 --> 31:39.480 so that we have as much opportunity as we can 31:39.770 --> 31:42.770 for each of the sub-committee members who are here. 31:43.650 --> 31:45.860 And this will be maintained by our professional 31:45.860 --> 31:47.260 staff member, Margaret Dean, 31:47.520 --> 31:52.520 who herself is a very valued member of the Navy Reserve. 31:54.280 --> 31:55.120 The first question, 31:55.120 --> 31:57.800 and of course the timing begins on me. 31:58.270 --> 32:01.600 And that is, forward for each of you, 32:02.060 --> 32:04.400 the forward deployed Naval forces 32:04.560 --> 32:06.450 have critical operational demands that took 32:06.450 --> 32:09.520 the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain 32:09.860 --> 32:11.930 away from dedicated maintenance, training 32:11.930 --> 32:13.350 and certificated periods. 32:13.790 --> 32:16.090 What steps has the Navy taken to ensure 32:16.090 --> 32:18.170 that this is not continuing to occur 32:18.550 --> 32:22.140 with the remaining forward deployed Naval forces? 32:22.500 --> 32:26.210 Is the Navy reviewing current sourcing requirements? 32:26.490 --> 32:28.420 Additionally, has the Navy coordinated 32:28.420 --> 32:31.030 with the combatant commanders to validate 32:31.030 --> 32:34.330 or review current mandatory sourcing requirements? 32:34.570 --> 32:37.580 How is the Navy leadership communicating an inability 32:37.580 --> 32:41.510 to resource, or risk associated with resourcing 32:41.830 --> 32:43.310 the Co-COM requirements? 32:43.310 --> 32:44.310 And for each of you. 32:46.750 --> 32:48.260 - Sir, I'll begin on this. 32:49.100 --> 32:52.090 The simple answer is that particularly the forward deployed 32:52.090 --> 32:54.170 Naval forces in Japan have taken a look 32:54.170 --> 32:56.120 at the force generation process, 32:56.120 --> 33:00.480 the process by which they maintain and train and certify 33:00.480 --> 33:03.170 forces for the missions to which they are assigned. 33:03.800 --> 33:07.320 And so, we started by re-baselining every cruiser 33:07.320 --> 33:10.900 and destroyer that is in the forward deployed Naval force 33:10.900 --> 33:13.940 in Japan and so that first and foremost, 33:13.940 --> 33:15.650 every ship that is underway right now 33:15.650 --> 33:18.660 has been assessed to be ready for those missions. 33:18.660 --> 33:22.760 And then it's a matter of just sticking to that plan 33:22.850 --> 33:26.471 so that we do provide sufficient time to maintain the ships 33:26.471 --> 33:29.400 when they get out there, so there's sufficient time 33:29.400 --> 33:32.300 and attention given to training and certifying those ships 33:32.390 --> 33:34.010 before they get assigned to their missions. 33:34.010 --> 33:38.740 And so, just that schedule discipline has been established 33:38.740 --> 33:40.400 and enforced my Admiral Sawyer, 33:40.400 --> 33:42.350 the new Commander of the Seventh Fleet. 33:42.520 --> 33:45.900 With respect meeting combatant commander demands, 33:45.900 --> 33:47.450 Sir, as you're very well aware, 33:47.700 --> 33:50.450 we've not been close as a joint force 33:50.710 --> 33:53.060 meeting combatant commander demands for a decade. 33:53.060 --> 33:58.060 We traditionally meet about 50% of the requested forces 33:58.720 --> 34:01.720 and that's not just the Navy, that's across the joint force. 34:01.760 --> 34:03.940 So there's a constant adjudication that goes on 34:03.940 --> 34:05.500 to find the priority missions 34:05.800 --> 34:09.540 and we're doing that, mindful that the forces have 34:09.540 --> 34:11.690 to be trained and certified before they go. 34:13.070 --> 34:15.990 - My only addition to that, Mr. Chairman would be 34:16.350 --> 34:18.170 think of the Mayo Clinic example 34:18.170 --> 34:19.230 I just brought up right now. 34:19.230 --> 34:21.260 The CNO and I are in lockstep when it comes 34:21.260 --> 34:25.110 to man, train, equip, that we have an atmosphere 34:25.110 --> 34:26.700 that people can speak up, 34:27.100 --> 34:31.230 and I don't use the word no, I use the phrase not today. 34:31.860 --> 34:34.000 It might be ready tomorrow, it might be ready in a week, 34:34.000 --> 34:37.240 but it is upon us to have that, instill that environment 34:37.240 --> 34:39.100 within our organization to make it that much 34:39.100 --> 34:41.690 of a more reactive and effective organization. 34:42.700 --> 34:44.790 - Sir, if I could just pile off of this, 34:44.790 --> 34:46.400 as long as we're talking about this. 34:46.400 --> 34:48.580 Those conversations have happened, 34:48.630 --> 34:50.330 happened today and have happened. 34:50.330 --> 34:51.778 So all right, this is not a Navy 34:51.778 --> 34:56.750 where there is a cultural inhibition to having that happen. 34:56.750 --> 34:59.240 And those officers have gone on to have fruitful 34:59.240 --> 35:01.259 careers and promotions and everything else. 35:01.259 --> 35:05.470 So, these types of conversations happen in our Navy 35:05.470 --> 35:08.360 right now, have been happening for some time. 35:08.510 --> 35:10.170 So it is possible to have this 35:10.520 --> 35:12.460 without career implications. 35:13.510 --> 35:16.220 - Additionally, investigation documents indicate 35:16.220 --> 35:18.750 that the shipboard squadron and fleet leadership 35:19.080 --> 35:20.830 were properly reporting on training 35:20.830 --> 35:24.160 and materiel deficiencies and requesting relief. 35:24.650 --> 35:26.390 Yet these individuals were fired. 35:26.990 --> 35:29.670 How is the surface warfare Navy addressing 35:29.670 --> 35:31.120 the culture of accountability 35:31.360 --> 35:34.120 and empowering commanders to highlight deficiencies 35:34.410 --> 35:36.490 and properly inform the chain of command 35:36.490 --> 35:39.040 or risk associated with these decisions 35:39.040 --> 35:40.800 without facing punitive action? 35:42.230 --> 35:44.100 - Sir, I'll tell you this goes right to 35:44.100 --> 35:45.820 what it means to be in command. 35:46.000 --> 35:49.340 And so when personnel were held accountable, 35:50.210 --> 35:52.610 and that went up to the Seventh Fleet Commander, 35:52.720 --> 35:56.550 so this was not restricted to the unit level, right, 35:56.580 --> 35:59.250 and this level of accountability frankly hasn't 35:59.250 --> 36:01.890 been at that senior level, has not really 36:01.890 --> 36:03.480 occurred since World War II. 36:03.980 --> 36:06.540 And so, in terms of watching the watchers, 36:07.060 --> 36:10.150 we're with you on that. 36:10.150 --> 36:13.330 The accountability actions addressed those things 36:13.330 --> 36:14.930 for which those commanders were, 36:15.400 --> 36:16.840 they had complete ownership. 36:16.950 --> 36:19.490 They had the responsibility, accountability, 36:19.800 --> 36:21.990 and authority to act 36:21.990 --> 36:24.310 to avoid 36:25.090 --> 36:26.530 the series of decisions 36:26.530 --> 36:28.050 that resulted in either a collision 36:28.050 --> 36:29.520 or an assignment of a ship 36:29.890 --> 36:31.240 that wasn't ready to do its mission. 36:31.240 --> 36:34.220 And so, each one of those was appreciated 36:34.220 --> 36:35.730 on its individual merit, 36:36.190 --> 36:39.500 and I strongly believe that the accountability measures 36:39.500 --> 36:40.350 were appropriate. 36:41.750 --> 36:43.690 - And these are being monitored still? 36:43.800 --> 36:46.110 The deficiencies and the requests made? 36:47.790 --> 36:50.340 - Yes, Sir, it's a part of a constant dialog there. 36:50.340 --> 36:55.020 Particularly with the new Seventh Fleet leadership in place. 36:55.610 --> 36:58.190 - Thank you, we now proceed to ranking member 36:58.190 --> 36:59.440 Bordallo of Guam. 37:01.870 --> 37:04.390 - Mr. Secretary, I strongly support 37:04.390 --> 37:06.780 the National Security Strategy's intent, 37:06.970 --> 37:09.440 to keep our forces forward deployed. 37:10.410 --> 37:12.230 In the Navy's two reviews, 37:12.920 --> 37:15.130 as well as previous discussions I've had 37:15.130 --> 37:18.390 with Navy leadership, concerns have been raised 37:18.390 --> 37:21.580 about the gaps in the capability and the capacity 37:21.580 --> 37:26.480 to support ship repair requirements in the Western Pacific. 37:27.450 --> 37:29.200 As I mentioned in my opening statement, 37:29.200 --> 37:33.860 the Comprehensive Review specifically identifies this 37:34.000 --> 37:38.450 as a real challenge for SRF Yokosuka, Japan. 37:39.770 --> 37:41.530 So with that concern in mind, 37:41.750 --> 37:45.330 can you please discuss what additional options 37:46.051 --> 37:49.410 are being considered to meet ship maintenance requirements 37:49.410 --> 37:52.350 for Navy ships operating in the Western Pacific? 37:53.200 --> 37:55.220 Whether we are discussing peace time 37:55.220 --> 37:57.060 or a potential contingency, 37:57.440 --> 38:00.710 it seems to me that a ship repair facility 38:01.090 --> 38:05.670 on sovereign U.S. soil in the Western Pacific, 38:06.010 --> 38:07.720 and we all know where that is, 38:09.500 --> 38:12.500 would be capable of supporting depot-level maintenance 38:12.770 --> 38:14.870 and this would be an ideal solution 38:14.870 --> 38:17.200 to meet ship maintenance requirements 38:17.410 --> 38:19.460 while keeping them forward in the region. 38:19.640 --> 38:24.270 So what options, Mr. Secretary, are you discussing 38:24.840 --> 38:25.880 to meet these needs? 38:27.290 --> 38:29.070 - Congresswoman Bordallo, thank you. 38:29.440 --> 38:31.430 We are looking at all options at all times. 38:31.430 --> 38:33.730 You and I met earlier, I think last week. 38:35.260 --> 38:36.560 The fact of the matter is, 38:36.700 --> 38:41.030 if in fact we pass the continuing resolution 38:41.030 --> 38:42.530 and hopefully get to a budget, 38:42.890 --> 38:44.980 the numbers that we have going into '18 38:44.980 --> 38:48.200 are gonna support some healthy additions 38:48.200 --> 38:50.060 to ship maintenance. 38:50.472 --> 38:53.280 At all times we're going to look at the business 38:53.310 --> 38:55.260 opportunities available, the best deal 38:55.260 --> 38:56.900 for the American taxpayer. 38:58.240 --> 39:00.370 If you look at the Western Pacific 39:00.370 --> 39:02.440 and you look into how we go about repairing, 39:02.440 --> 39:03.520 we do have Japan, 39:03.780 --> 39:06.810 we do have dockside, robust dockside abilities in Guam, 39:07.090 --> 39:09.350 we have Hawaii, and then we move to the West Coast 39:09.350 --> 39:14.020 for big deep-dive maintenance availabilities. 39:14.310 --> 39:17.750 We will, on an ongoing basis, look for any and all 39:17.750 --> 39:19.530 capabilities as we go forward 39:19.530 --> 39:21.430 because we are going to be using them, 39:21.540 --> 39:23.690 if in fact we receive the funding to do so. 39:24.880 --> 39:26.220 - Well thank you Mr. Secretary 39:26.220 --> 39:29.180 and I appreciate your comments during this hearing 39:29.180 --> 39:30.130 and your leadership 39:30.740 --> 39:33.220 in ensuring adequate ship repair capabilities, 39:33.220 --> 39:34.950 especially in the Pacific, 39:35.470 --> 39:37.310 and necessary to maintain the fleet 39:37.310 --> 39:38.760 and keep it forward deployed. 39:39.110 --> 39:42.030 I also appreciate our meeting last week, as you mentioned, 39:42.280 --> 39:45.660 and your commitment to working with me as you review options 39:45.800 --> 39:47.960 for ship repair in the Western Pacific 39:48.320 --> 39:51.950 that makes strategic and operational sense. 39:52.430 --> 39:55.820 I hope that we can continue our positive dialog 39:56.310 --> 40:00.000 and work on a solution that supports American jobs 40:00.470 --> 40:02.070 and our readiness in the region. 40:03.930 --> 40:07.510 And I have a second question for you also Mr. Secretary. 40:08.490 --> 40:10.590 Or no, this one is for Admiral Richardson. 40:11.020 --> 40:13.820 It is my understanding that forward deployed Naval forces 40:13.820 --> 40:16.790 had critical operational demands that took the 40:16.790 --> 40:20.740 USS Fitzgerald and the USS John S. McCain 40:20.810 --> 40:23.730 away from dedicated maintenance, training, 40:23.950 --> 40:25.490 and certification periods. 40:25.750 --> 40:28.606 Now can you please describe steps that the Navy has taken 40:28.606 --> 40:31.950 to ensure that this is not continuing to occur 40:32.160 --> 40:34.470 with the remaining FDNF ships? 40:34.780 --> 40:38.850 In other words, how are we ensuring FDNF ships 40:39.000 --> 40:41.750 receive the necessary maintenance and training 40:41.940 --> 40:44.130 to set their crews up for success? 40:44.540 --> 40:45.373 - Yes, Ma'am. 40:46.820 --> 40:50.700 The establishment of that force generation model in Japan, 40:51.020 --> 40:53.850 the fact that we are doing rigorous scheduling, 40:53.850 --> 40:56.060 not only for maintenance, but also to schedule 40:56.060 --> 40:57.860 training and certification events, 40:58.640 --> 41:01.520 enforced by the Fleet Commander before they are assigned 41:01.860 --> 41:04.780 to missions, that is essentially, 41:06.230 --> 41:10.960 our side, the supply side of the supply-demand tension. 41:12.500 --> 41:15.600 And so adhering to that in a rigorous way 41:15.860 --> 41:18.490 is really the way that we guarantee that. 41:18.950 --> 41:20.680 And then as we look through 41:20.680 --> 41:22.410 the command and control structure, 41:23.760 --> 41:26.290 in a comprehensive way with both the CR 41:26.290 --> 41:28.220 and the Strategic Review, 41:29.740 --> 41:31.650 establishing sort of an advocate 41:31.660 --> 41:33.520 for training and certification out there 41:33.520 --> 41:34.570 will be part of that. 41:34.600 --> 41:37.920 - And Admiral, you can assure that this is occurring 41:37.920 --> 41:38.900 right as we speak? 41:38.940 --> 41:40.050 - It is, yes, Ma'am. 41:40.050 --> 41:42.200 - Thank you, and I yield back Mr. Chairman. 41:42.390 --> 41:43.960 - And thank you Congresswoman Bordallo. 41:43.960 --> 41:47.450 And myself having toured the Guam Naval Shipyard, 41:47.850 --> 41:52.020 I share your appreciation of the assets there. 41:52.460 --> 41:55.270 We now proceed to Chairman Rob Wittman of Virginia. 41:56.490 --> 41:57.323 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 41:57.323 --> 41:58.930 Gentlemen, thanks again for joining us today. 41:58.930 --> 42:00.980 I think you will agree with me in that 42:00.980 --> 42:05.880 we need to make sure that our junior surface Navy officers 42:05.890 --> 42:08.680 need time to excel in their trades. 42:09.580 --> 42:12.690 Today though, in the Navy, if you look at our 42:12.690 --> 42:14.060 surface warfare officers, 42:14.060 --> 42:16.920 we see a path for them to be generalists 42:17.360 --> 42:19.760 not one that allows them to be specialists, 42:20.140 --> 42:22.690 allows them to really get down into 42:22.690 --> 42:27.120 that specific area of skill that they need 42:27.120 --> 42:30.480 across all of these different areas of ship operations 42:30.480 --> 42:32.890 that have become increasingly more complex. 42:32.890 --> 42:35.210 We see the aviation community 42:35.850 --> 42:38.140 that looks into creating those specialists. 42:38.140 --> 42:40.240 We see foreign Navies doing the same thing. 42:40.240 --> 42:42.670 We're in this increasingly complex and technologically 42:42.670 --> 42:45.560 challenging environment, specialties are things 42:45.560 --> 42:47.410 that are encouraged. 42:48.467 --> 42:52.930 Is it time for the Navy to adopt best practices 42:53.440 --> 42:55.630 for deck and engineering specialist's 42:55.630 --> 42:59.250 development within our junior officer corps within the Navy? 43:02.340 --> 43:04.750 - Sir, as you can appreciate, 43:05.800 --> 43:08.690 that model, which is largely used by the Royal Navy, 43:08.710 --> 43:12.680 is always on the table and being assessed and considered. 43:13.170 --> 43:15.930 I look forward to having a more robust conversation with you 43:15.930 --> 43:19.530 about some of these, the gives and takes are complicated. 43:20.320 --> 43:23.510 But in terms of the approach that the U.S. Navy 43:23.510 --> 43:25.160 has taken throughout its history, 43:25.640 --> 43:28.590 we've saying that, to your point, 43:28.590 --> 43:31.240 providing adequate time to learn the trade 43:31.240 --> 43:35.850 of being the officer of the deck and driving a U.S. warship, 43:36.360 --> 43:38.990 it requires time and rigor in that training cycle. 43:40.010 --> 43:43.650 And there is also value to understanding the engineering 43:43.650 --> 43:45.690 department and the rest of the ship as well. 43:45.690 --> 43:46.523 - [Chairman Wittman] Sure. 43:46.523 --> 43:47.880 - And so there is always a balance there. 43:47.880 --> 43:49.970 I look forward to discussing that with you more. 43:50.090 --> 43:52.940 - Great, and that's a great lead in to the next question, 43:52.940 --> 43:56.190 and that is as our junior officers come to the fleet, 43:56.280 --> 43:58.250 as that new ensign comes to the fleet 43:58.870 --> 44:00.860 and they're faced with standing that watch, 44:00.860 --> 44:02.780 with being the junior officer on the deck 44:02.780 --> 44:03.990 in increasingly 44:06.180 --> 44:08.740 more complex responsibilities there, 44:09.160 --> 44:11.770 the question always becomes when they come to the fleet 44:11.820 --> 44:13.070 what experience do they come with? 44:13.070 --> 44:14.870 Do they have time at sea experience? 44:14.870 --> 44:16.760 I know my son who is a merchant mariner 44:16.760 --> 44:18.810 has spent years and years and years, 44:18.810 --> 44:20.770 thousands of hours of sea time 44:21.160 --> 44:24.560 and many, many courses to actually get a certification 44:24.560 --> 44:27.050 so that he can captain a ship at sea. 44:27.480 --> 44:28.790 The question then becomes 44:29.790 --> 44:33.250 should we have the same component for those young ensigns 44:33.250 --> 44:34.900 that are put on board a gray hull 44:35.060 --> 44:36.300 and the experience that they have? 44:36.300 --> 44:38.490 Should they not maybe spend a year at sea? 44:38.490 --> 44:40.690 I understand you can't go there immediately. 44:40.800 --> 44:42.900 But should they not maybe spend a year at sea 44:42.900 --> 44:45.170 and get their third mate's license 44:45.170 --> 44:46.870 so that when they get to the fleet 44:47.090 --> 44:48.900 they are extraordinarily well versed 44:48.900 --> 44:50.200 and experienced with that? 44:50.750 --> 44:54.040 - Yes, Sir, again, I think we again have to really spend 44:54.040 --> 44:56.230 a long time on problem definition 44:56.370 --> 44:58.060 with respect to this career path. 44:58.610 --> 45:01.660 As you can appreciate, driving a destroyer, 45:01.660 --> 45:06.400 a complex U.S. Navy warship is much more complicated 45:06.400 --> 45:09.150 than driving a merchant ship. 45:09.573 --> 45:12.650 But again, I think that we're in violent agreement 45:12.650 --> 45:16.610 that that training and career path needs some adjustments, 45:16.830 --> 45:19.140 some rugged enhancements. 45:20.373 --> 45:21.206 - [Chairman Wittman] Sure. 45:21.206 --> 45:22.210 - Those have all been part of the recommendations 45:22.210 --> 45:23.610 in the Comprehensive Review, 45:23.930 --> 45:26.520 and the Strategic Review is in agreement with that. 45:27.357 --> 45:28.190 - [Chairman Wittman] Yeah. 45:28.190 --> 45:29.023 - And so I think that 45:29.717 --> 45:33.060 moving through those recommendations as proposed right now 45:33.080 --> 45:36.980 will get at your concerns, which I share. 45:37.300 --> 45:38.133 - Very good. 45:38.270 --> 45:39.520 One other additional element too, 45:39.520 --> 45:41.720 as we look at forward deployed Naval forces, 45:42.770 --> 45:45.390 and we look at the Navy's directive 45:45.390 --> 45:47.520 to say those ships should return back stateside 45:47.520 --> 45:50.040 every seven to 10 years for the deep dive maintenance 45:50.040 --> 45:51.870 to make sure that their materiel readiness 45:51.870 --> 45:52.703 is where it needs to be, 45:52.703 --> 45:54.230 'cause these are the ships, the tip of the spear, 45:54.230 --> 45:56.530 they get pushed the hardest, they're out there 45:56.890 --> 45:58.760 you know really on point constantly, 45:59.630 --> 46:03.350 do you believe that a situation like we had with McCain 46:03.350 --> 46:04.690 where it's been there for 20 years 46:04.690 --> 46:05.970 without coming back stateside, 46:05.970 --> 46:08.420 and listen, I understand the things that go on at Yokosuka, 46:08.420 --> 46:09.800 but there's a limited capability 46:09.800 --> 46:12.800 in really the deep dive maintenance that's being done there. 46:13.010 --> 46:17.220 Do you think that the maintenance cycles of FDNF ships 46:17.220 --> 46:19.250 coming back stateside should be looked at 46:19.250 --> 46:21.500 and getting back to a seven to 10 year cycle? 46:21.520 --> 46:22.820 - Sir, we already did that. 46:22.820 --> 46:25.120 Even before these incidents we'd already made the decision 46:25.120 --> 46:26.230 to return to that cycle. 46:26.230 --> 46:27.063 - [Chairman Wittman] Okay. 46:27.063 --> 46:28.680 - And so, I could give you the specific schedule 46:28.680 --> 46:31.250 of those FDNF ships that will be returning stateside 46:31.250 --> 46:32.230 and that rotation. 46:32.920 --> 46:34.150 It's a bit classified, 46:34.310 --> 46:35.860 but I'll give it to you in the appropriate setting. 46:35.860 --> 46:37.830 So we've already decided that 46:38.461 --> 46:43.450 trying to do all the maintenance for deployed Naval forces 46:43.450 --> 46:46.600 in Yokosuka or Sasebo, it's not a long-term solution. 46:46.600 --> 46:48.270 So, we'll be bringing those ships back. 46:48.270 --> 46:50.060 Our goal is to get to an eight year cycle. 46:50.060 --> 46:50.893 - Very good, thank you. 46:50.893 --> 46:51.830 Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 46:51.830 --> 46:53.080 - And thank you Chairman Wittman. 46:53.080 --> 46:54.490 We now proceed to ranking member 46:54.490 --> 46:56.110 Joe Courtney of Connecticut. 46:57.040 --> 46:58.280 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 46:58.600 --> 47:01.409 Secretary Spencer, for the benefit of the record-- 47:01.409 --> 47:03.369 - [Male] You need to turn his microphone on. 47:03.369 --> 47:04.329 - Could you explain what the problem is 47:04.329 --> 47:06.407 with the current command and control structure 47:06.407 --> 47:10.877 that both of the reports identified as not optimal-- 47:10.877 --> 47:12.089 Did you hear that? 47:12.089 --> 47:12.922 - [Secretary Spencer] I believe I did. 47:12.922 --> 47:13.755 I believe I did. 47:13.755 --> 47:15.490 - Okay. 47:15.490 --> 47:16.630 To not hear is optimal. 47:16.630 --> 47:18.400 And contributed to the readiness issues 47:18.400 --> 47:19.240 in the Seventh Fleet? 47:19.240 --> 47:20.993 Why are you seeking to change that structure 47:20.993 --> 47:23.050 and why do you need Congress' help? 47:24.810 --> 47:27.040 - Congressman, we just had our first, 47:27.480 --> 47:30.410 I call it a solarium, where we brought together 47:31.560 --> 47:35.370 both our four stars, some three stars, some gray beards, 47:35.740 --> 47:39.140 and sit down and looked at the wiring diagram 47:39.500 --> 47:42.620 for command and control in the Navy. 47:42.940 --> 47:47.500 Specifically, the Pacific Fleet and the European Theater. 47:49.110 --> 47:51.410 We had two goals in mind and this first meeting 47:51.410 --> 47:54.110 was to basically assess what we had, 47:55.330 --> 47:58.370 guide ourselves by our goal should be 47:58.370 --> 48:00.870 that the commander of a ship should have a clear line 48:00.870 --> 48:03.950 to know what he or she is reporting to, 48:03.950 --> 48:06.080 and whom she or he is reporting to. 48:06.390 --> 48:08.760 We should also have a clear line of sight 48:09.040 --> 48:12.480 from command on down, as to where responsibilities lie. 48:12.980 --> 48:14.380 When we looked at the chart, 48:14.980 --> 48:17.330 we have not come to final conclusions yet, 48:17.350 --> 48:19.550 but we are in an iterative process 48:19.550 --> 48:23.780 which will have our first step forthcoming soon. 48:24.780 --> 48:25.840 We wanted to clean up 48:26.600 --> 48:28.370 exactly what you were talking about, 48:28.370 --> 48:30.540 which is the ability for us to act 48:30.540 --> 48:32.390 in the most efficient manner possible 48:32.470 --> 48:34.670 with the most direct lines of communication. 48:36.440 --> 48:39.230 - And why do you need Congress to help you with that? 48:39.230 --> 48:42.300 - Well, we have in the case of the Pacific Fleet, 48:42.300 --> 48:45.850 we have an issue that I believe is gonna 48:45.850 --> 48:48.140 be immateriated if in fact we do away 48:48.140 --> 48:50.570 with what used to be known as the Inouye amendment. 48:50.820 --> 48:53.910 And again, we have a clear, direct command and control 48:53.910 --> 48:56.590 as to what the line of sight is for responsibility 48:56.590 --> 48:57.423 and efficiency. 48:58.460 --> 49:00.680 - Thank you, and again, just to be clear, 49:01.270 --> 49:03.570 that amendment is not really, 49:03.570 --> 49:05.830 well that amendment actually intrudes 49:05.900 --> 49:08.310 by Congress, in terms of how the command and control 49:08.310 --> 49:09.610 structure is designed. 49:09.950 --> 49:11.832 If that amendment was removed, 49:11.832 --> 49:13.880 we actually step back, 49:13.880 --> 49:16.130 Congress steps back from this issue. 49:16.130 --> 49:19.300 It really allows the Navy to then move forward 49:19.300 --> 49:22.000 with more optimal arrangement. 49:22.000 --> 49:23.860 Which I think again, both reports 49:24.150 --> 49:26.060 really identified that 49:26.060 --> 49:28.200 as a way to move forward 49:28.200 --> 49:30.710 and to help untangle the conflicts. 49:30.710 --> 49:31.543 Is that correct? 49:31.543 --> 49:33.070 - We are in agreement, yes. 49:33.510 --> 49:35.070 - And Admiral, would you agree with that? 49:35.070 --> 49:35.980 - Sir, I would. 49:36.040 --> 49:37.430 To me, it's all about standards, 49:37.430 --> 49:39.020 and the way that this amendment is structured 49:39.020 --> 49:41.280 it allows really two standards to emerge, 49:41.490 --> 49:43.930 and we need to have one single standard of excellence 49:43.930 --> 49:45.690 for our Navy for these matters. 49:45.930 --> 49:46.880 - Great, thank you. 49:47.220 --> 49:49.610 Admiral, the Government Accountability Office 49:49.610 --> 49:52.610 reviewed the certifications for the ships involved 49:52.610 --> 49:56.330 in the 2017 mishaps and found that many had expired 49:56.430 --> 49:58.550 and remained expired for months or years. 49:58.550 --> 50:01.148 The McCain had seven of 22 certifications expired, 50:01.148 --> 50:02.950 some for more than two years. 50:02.950 --> 50:06.430 The Fitzgerald had 15 of 22 certifications expired, 50:06.640 --> 50:08.750 including a basic seamanship certification 50:08.750 --> 50:11.590 which had been expired for nearly a year. 50:12.720 --> 50:14.600 Admiral, what's your plan to bring these ships 50:14.600 --> 50:15.640 back into compliance 50:15.640 --> 50:17.540 with their basic certification requirements? 50:17.540 --> 50:19.780 And I know that you canceled all existing 50:19.780 --> 50:22.760 risk mitigation plans and required ships to resubmit 50:22.760 --> 50:25.610 more comprehensive plans at a higher command than before. 50:25.670 --> 50:27.473 What is the status of developing and improving 50:27.473 --> 50:30.320 these new plans and how are the forward deployed ships 50:30.320 --> 50:32.570 treating these risks differently than before? 50:32.670 --> 50:34.940 - Well, Sir, the immediate actions are complete, 50:34.940 --> 50:37.650 which was to re-baseline all ships, 50:38.140 --> 50:41.130 except for those in deep maintenance in Yokosuka. 50:41.300 --> 50:43.650 And so ready for sea assessments have been done 50:43.890 --> 50:46.560 on all cruisers and destroyers in the forward deployed 50:46.560 --> 50:47.780 Naval forces in Japan. 50:48.370 --> 50:51.240 That includes the certification 50:51.530 --> 50:53.890 for every ship that's underway, assigned to a mission, 50:53.890 --> 50:56.330 to be certified to do those missions. 50:56.330 --> 50:59.080 And that's being done at the Seventh Fleet command level. 50:59.080 --> 51:01.630 And then, there is sort of the longer term 51:02.784 --> 51:07.470 plan to go through sort of the longer, more detailed 51:08.850 --> 51:11.240 holistic certification for each of these ships, 51:11.390 --> 51:13.830 and that's being done on a priority basis as well. 51:14.140 --> 51:17.210 - So what we had before was a device, 51:17.210 --> 51:19.300 a risk mitigation plan which really 51:19.300 --> 51:20.520 sort of lost its meaning, 51:20.520 --> 51:24.730 because of again, just the repeated ... go ahead. 51:24.730 --> 51:26.970 - Yes, Sir, this is the exact definition 51:26.970 --> 51:28.700 of normalization of deviance. 51:28.700 --> 51:31.510 Is that what started from a risk mitigation, 51:31.510 --> 51:32.970 hey we know you can't get this done, 51:32.970 --> 51:35.300 but here's the mitigating measures we'll take. 51:36.010 --> 51:38.070 We'll maybe put this expertise on board 51:38.130 --> 51:39.450 and we'll reschedule that. 51:39.890 --> 51:43.480 That devolved down to really almost a rubber stamp, 51:44.150 --> 51:46.740 clearly articulated in Admiral Davidson's 51:46.740 --> 51:47.840 Comprehensive Review. 51:48.320 --> 51:50.030 And so part of this 51:52.210 --> 51:53.790 matter that we have talked about 51:53.790 --> 51:55.160 with respect to the Inouye Amendment 51:55.160 --> 51:58.220 is having that advocate for force generation 51:58.220 --> 52:00.420 and the training and certification standards 52:00.810 --> 52:04.180 that can, really, whose sole function 52:04.860 --> 52:07.950 is to maintain those standards. 52:07.950 --> 52:10.120 That installs a firebreak if you will, 52:10.310 --> 52:12.650 from allowing this degradation to happen again. 52:13.580 --> 52:15.250 - [Chairman Wilson] And thank you Congressman Courtney. 52:15.250 --> 52:18.210 We now proceed to Congressman Duncan Hunter of California. 52:19.140 --> 52:19.973 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 52:19.973 --> 52:21.780 I'm gonna tie in with what Chairman Wittman's 52:21.780 --> 52:24.010 kind of line of questioning was. 52:24.330 --> 52:26.120 And it's specific 'cause in San Diego 52:26.120 --> 52:28.180 we had the LCS there in the beginning 52:28.480 --> 52:31.110 and I went, I dunno, it was like six years ago or so, 52:31.110 --> 52:33.650 I went to the LCS simulator, if you will, 52:33.880 --> 52:35.580 right there by 32nd Street, 52:35.820 --> 52:37.610 and it's the bridge of an LCS. 52:37.700 --> 52:39.690 And it's a virtual environment. 52:39.880 --> 52:40.800 You can walk around on it. 52:40.800 --> 52:41.910 You can see all the way around. 52:41.910 --> 52:44.450 I think it moves even, the water looks like it moves. 52:44.580 --> 52:45.840 It's a fairly realistic 52:47.000 --> 52:48.600 setup, and it's cheap 52:48.670 --> 52:50.820 because it's not a real boat that's underway. 52:51.210 --> 52:52.930 I've also seen the LCS courseware 52:52.930 --> 52:54.570 where it's game-based learning. 52:54.570 --> 52:58.400 I think it's Immersive Virtual Ship Environment 52:58.400 --> 52:59.300 learning as well. 52:59.540 --> 53:01.890 And you use for like the engine plans in one of the LCSs, 53:01.890 --> 53:03.240 I don't remember which one. 53:03.370 --> 53:04.450 But it works. 53:05.010 --> 53:06.650 It works, it's game-based learning. 53:06.650 --> 53:08.110 It's new, all the kids do it. 53:08.330 --> 53:10.750 They know how to play an Xbox, they know how to do this. 53:10.750 --> 53:12.230 So, specifically then, 53:12.860 --> 53:15.670 in light of the value of the LCS training program, 53:15.670 --> 53:18.750 how do you plan on leveraging that type of thing? 53:18.780 --> 53:21.720 Where you don't have to go out for a year at sea, 53:21.970 --> 53:24.350 you can spend three weeks on the bridge 53:25.340 --> 53:27.570 of a ship like the one you're gonna take over, 53:27.570 --> 53:28.853 or you're gonna be on the deck of. 53:28.853 --> 53:31.630 And there were a couple of things, that's my first question. 53:31.630 --> 53:33.190 How do you plan to leverage that? 53:35.401 --> 53:37.890 Admiral Richardson stated, "Multiple bridge watch standards 53:37.890 --> 53:39.390 "like the basic level of knowledge 53:39.390 --> 53:40.590 "on the steering control system, 53:40.590 --> 53:43.180 "in particular the transfer of steering and thrust control 53:43.180 --> 53:46.780 "et cetera" and with the USS McCain several Sailors, 53:46.790 --> 53:49.770 I quote again, "several Sailors on watch 53:49.770 --> 53:51.410 "during the collision with the control oversteering 53:51.410 --> 53:53.710 "were temporarily assigned from USS Antietam." 53:55.140 --> 53:57.310 They could have done a game based learning scenario 53:57.310 --> 53:59.820 on the ship before they transferred to the new ship 53:59.820 --> 54:01.700 and been at least familiar 54:01.700 --> 54:03.730 with what they were going to do on the ship. 54:03.730 --> 54:04.930 And easily, 'cause it's, 54:05.560 --> 54:07.000 it's in the cloud or it's on a DVD. 54:07.000 --> 54:08.570 So that's, that's my question. 54:08.810 --> 54:10.230 I'll stop there and let you answer, thank you. 54:10.230 --> 54:12.240 - Sir, if I could, I just read it back to you, 54:12.240 --> 54:14.060 is the value of simulators 54:14.100 --> 54:16.520 in terms of training and certifying our Sailors. 54:16.520 --> 54:17.600 I couldn't agree with you more 54:17.600 --> 54:20.070 that particularly now, with the technology, 54:20.070 --> 54:24.230 the degree of realism, the fidelity of those simulators 54:24.230 --> 54:25.240 is very, very high. 54:25.630 --> 54:27.060 It can't take you all the way, 54:27.060 --> 54:28.870 as you know from your service, 54:29.060 --> 54:31.420 but it can take you a lot further than it used to. 54:31.510 --> 54:33.630 And so with respect to the LCS, 54:33.630 --> 54:36.460 which is designed to have sort of a blue gold crew 54:36.780 --> 54:38.250 type of an arrangement, 54:38.550 --> 54:40.830 you know, there's gonna be one crew on the ship all the time 54:40.830 --> 54:43.110 and one crew in the trainers and simulators. 54:43.110 --> 54:45.970 And so we need to make those as realistic as possible, 54:45.970 --> 54:48.870 as prototypic to the complexity of the assignment. 54:49.110 --> 54:50.310 So we're all in on that. 54:50.650 --> 54:52.400 As the Comprehensive Review states, 54:52.500 --> 54:55.300 we need to sort of spread that philosophy around 54:55.300 --> 54:57.720 so that we can move those simulators 54:57.720 --> 55:00.390 and stand them up in places like Yokosuka, Japan, 55:00.640 --> 55:02.930 like Sasebo, so that we've got that level 55:02.930 --> 55:06.300 of training capacity and capability there. 55:06.730 --> 55:08.840 And it's much more than just the realistic environment. 55:08.840 --> 55:10.970 It also allows you to measure your performance 55:10.970 --> 55:12.320 throughout the game, right? 55:12.670 --> 55:14.970 And so it's more than just kids playing games. 55:15.844 --> 55:17.290 The science behind these things 55:17.290 --> 55:18.940 in terms of accelerating learning 55:19.260 --> 55:21.510 is really been stunning in the last 10 years. 55:21.690 --> 55:22.900 We're leveraging all of that, 55:22.900 --> 55:25.650 not only in the corrective actions for these incidents, 55:25.820 --> 55:27.890 but in the training philosophy for the Navy, 55:27.890 --> 55:31.180 which falls under the title of Ready Relevant Learning. 55:32.950 --> 55:34.500 - Congressman, I just might add 55:34.920 --> 55:36.110 when it comes to 55:38.080 --> 55:39.730 how we're gonna address training, 55:40.970 --> 55:43.800 AI is now just beginning to tip our scales. 55:44.220 --> 55:46.800 If we look at specifically what you're talking about 55:46.800 --> 55:48.110 with simulators et cetera, 55:48.790 --> 55:50.900 they have the ability and we're exploring 55:51.150 --> 55:53.270 the application of artificial intelligence, 55:53.270 --> 55:55.690 which actually would work with the individual people 55:55.690 --> 55:58.510 to find weaknesses and actually strengthen 55:58.510 --> 55:59.750 the areas of weakness. 56:00.650 --> 56:02.120 You might turn around and ask you know, 56:02.120 --> 56:03.890 "What are we looking for going forward?" 56:03.890 --> 56:06.070 I gonna pre-answer a question 56:06.070 --> 56:08.270 'cause it fits right here in the wheelhouse. 56:08.760 --> 56:10.690 Between the SRR and the CR, 56:11.230 --> 56:14.440 we're probably looking for $800 million over the fit up, 56:14.700 --> 56:17.090 and it's primarily in the area of schools, 56:17.400 --> 56:19.870 the simulators, bridge uniformity, 56:20.170 --> 56:21.380 along those lines. 56:21.380 --> 56:23.240 But it's not a tremendous amount of money 56:23.240 --> 56:26.090 in the grand scheme of things, but it has great leverage. 56:27.280 --> 56:28.113 - [Congressman Hunter] Thank you both. 56:28.113 --> 56:30.990 I yield back the balance of my time. 56:31.050 --> 56:32.260 - Thank you very much Congressman Hunter. 56:32.260 --> 56:35.540 We now proceed to Congressman Salud Carbajal of California. 56:36.370 --> 56:37.470 - Thank you Mr. Chair, 56:38.190 --> 56:41.320 and thank you Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson 56:41.320 --> 56:42.370 for being here today. 56:42.950 --> 56:44.640 I am concerned about the frequency 56:44.640 --> 56:48.620 and number of expired warfare certifications in the fleet, 56:49.280 --> 56:52.430 in instances where a ship is required for a mission, 56:53.010 --> 56:55.540 the lack of certification for the primary mission. 56:56.110 --> 56:59.220 What mitigation actions will the Navy take 56:59.220 --> 57:01.670 to include globally sourcing ships? 57:02.610 --> 57:05.747 Do other warfare areas for example aviation or submarines 57:05.747 --> 57:08.650 allow their platforms to deploy following 57:08.650 --> 57:12.620 a depot level repair without certifying qualifications 57:13.200 --> 57:16.280 and ensuring the minimum level of safety-trained criteria? 57:17.120 --> 57:19.030 What steps will the Navy take to ensure 57:19.030 --> 57:22.740 basic and advanced training are satisfied 57:23.130 --> 57:26.090 before they are sourced to other defense missions? 57:26.730 --> 57:29.530 - Sir, I'll take first stab at that question 57:29.530 --> 57:31.220 which is really, it goes back to this 57:31.220 --> 57:34.410 fourth generation model and the rigor that needs to be 57:35.430 --> 57:38.740 applied to the training and certification elements 57:38.740 --> 57:40.940 of the fourth generation schedule. 57:41.460 --> 57:44.490 And so typically, when a ship or an aircraft 57:44.490 --> 57:47.970 or any Navy asset, any Navy platform 57:47.970 --> 57:49.910 comes out of a deep maintenance period, 57:49.910 --> 57:52.380 there is a work-up period where you work-up the crew 57:52.380 --> 57:54.910 and then you take them from basic through intermediate 57:54.910 --> 57:55.750 and advanced. 57:56.300 --> 57:58.690 That's certainly a very formal process for a ship 57:58.690 --> 58:00.700 stationed in the continental United States 58:00.700 --> 58:03.790 and they get formally certified before they deploy. 58:04.750 --> 58:07.067 And then with respect to other forward deployed 58:07.067 --> 58:10.610 Naval forces, both in Bahrain in the Middle East 58:10.610 --> 58:15.610 and also in Rota, Spain, those models have been 58:16.020 --> 58:18.960 adhered to and we don't see these lapsed certifications 58:18.960 --> 58:21.560 in those forward deployed places as we did in Japan. 58:21.850 --> 58:23.550 So it really is a matter of rigor. 58:23.600 --> 58:25.610 The new Seventh Fleet commander is on that. 58:25.610 --> 58:27.300 We're looking at command and control structures 58:27.300 --> 58:31.570 to buttress that approach, and that's all wrapped into 58:31.570 --> 58:33.510 the Comprehensive Plan going forward. 58:33.730 --> 58:37.300 In the immediate time, we've taken action to ensure 58:37.760 --> 58:39.730 that every ship that's underway right now 58:39.730 --> 58:42.310 is certified for the missions it's conducting. 58:44.600 --> 58:45.830 - Thank you, Secretary? 58:46.760 --> 58:47.593 Nothing to add? 58:48.240 --> 58:49.820 Well, let me ask a second question. 58:49.820 --> 58:52.170 Under the current command and control construct 58:52.440 --> 58:54.700 for the Navy surface forces in the Pacific, 58:55.230 --> 58:57.230 there appears to be an inherent conflict 58:57.630 --> 58:59.050 with having a single command 58:59.450 --> 59:02.420 responsible for both sourcing operational requirements 59:02.840 --> 59:05.430 and ensuring the proper manning, training, 59:05.890 --> 59:07.080 equipment of the fleet. 59:08.010 --> 59:10.660 What steps is the Navy taking to address the conflict 59:11.150 --> 59:12.450 and how can Congress help? 59:15.260 --> 59:18.070 - Sir, as we address the command and control, 59:20.550 --> 59:22.730 the Comprehensive Review and the Strategic Review 59:22.730 --> 59:25.990 are in firm agreement that there needs 59:25.990 --> 59:29.790 to be a separation to a degree, as good a degree as possible 59:30.070 --> 59:33.270 between those responsible for training and certifying forces 59:33.270 --> 59:36.000 to be ready and then those who are responsible 59:36.000 --> 59:37.950 for employing those ready forces 59:38.090 --> 59:41.710 to meet combatant commander requests, demands. 59:42.170 --> 59:47.170 And so, that separation, to a single standard of excellence, 59:48.350 --> 59:52.120 is a major goal for both of the reviews 59:52.330 --> 59:53.810 and will certainly be one 59:53.810 --> 59:56.230 of the major achievements going forward. 59:56.700 --> 59:59.450 With respect to any assistance from the Congress, 01:00:00.240 --> 01:00:03.910 this Inouye Amendment as it was called is just one, 01:00:04.270 --> 01:00:05.740 I would say artificial seam 01:00:06.160 --> 01:00:09.600 that inhibits us from establishing that single standard. 01:00:11.740 --> 01:00:12.600 - Great, thank you very much. 01:00:12.600 --> 01:00:13.650 I yield back my time. 01:00:14.100 --> 01:00:15.490 - Thank you Congressman Carbajal. 01:00:15.490 --> 01:00:18.240 We now proceed to Congressman Bradley Byrne of Alabama. 01:00:18.900 --> 01:00:19.733 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 01:00:19.733 --> 01:00:21.340 Gentlemen, good to see ya. 01:00:21.340 --> 01:00:23.110 I heard what you said loud and clear 01:00:23.110 --> 01:00:24.850 about continuing resolutions. 01:00:25.250 --> 01:00:27.840 And you need to know that there are many of us 01:00:27.840 --> 01:00:30.280 on this committee and many of us off the committee 01:00:30.280 --> 01:00:32.780 who have been communicating very directly 01:00:32.780 --> 01:00:35.240 and very clearly to the leadership of the Congress 01:00:35.240 --> 01:00:36.870 that the use of continuing resolutions 01:00:36.870 --> 01:00:38.020 to fund the government, 01:00:38.090 --> 01:00:40.070 and particularly the use of continuing resolutions 01:00:40.070 --> 01:00:42.750 to fund the Department of Defense has got to stop. 01:00:43.630 --> 01:00:44.463 We hear ya. 01:00:44.910 --> 01:00:46.960 And you have many advocates in this room. 01:00:48.160 --> 01:00:51.080 Last week at the Surface Navy Association Symposium 01:00:51.390 --> 01:00:54.330 Vice Admiral Rowden said, "The way to avoid collisions 01:00:54.330 --> 01:00:57.350 "like the Fitzgerald and McCain is to give our crews 01:00:57.350 --> 01:00:59.380 "more time to train and maintain." 01:01:00.040 --> 01:01:02.190 He offered two options in how to get there. 01:01:02.700 --> 01:01:05.380 More ships, or fewer obligations. 01:01:06.130 --> 01:01:08.260 I think we can all agree that the current threat 01:01:08.260 --> 01:01:11.680 environment is not going to lead to fewer obligations. 01:01:12.060 --> 01:01:14.110 So that means more ships. 01:01:14.880 --> 01:01:16.050 The Navy's requirement, 01:01:16.180 --> 01:01:18.830 and now the statutory requirement adopted by Congress 01:01:18.830 --> 01:01:20.230 and signed by the President, 01:01:20.460 --> 01:01:22.620 is a 355 ship fleet. 01:01:23.600 --> 01:01:24.990 Now, in order for us to help you, 01:01:24.990 --> 01:01:27.040 we need to know what the plan is. 01:01:27.690 --> 01:01:30.100 We haven't received a new 30 year shipbuilding plan 01:01:30.100 --> 01:01:31.270 under this administration. 01:01:31.270 --> 01:01:33.830 Can we expect this plan to be delivered 01:01:34.080 --> 01:01:36.030 with the President's budget next month? 01:01:37.080 --> 01:01:39.384 - [Secretary Spencer] Yes, you can, Congressman. 01:01:39.384 --> 01:01:40.217 - Good. 01:01:40.217 --> 01:01:43.380 The FY18 NDAA authorized 13 ships, 01:01:43.380 --> 01:01:46.280 which was five more than the President's budget requested, 01:01:46.490 --> 01:01:49.430 in large part to ensure we are taking advantage 01:01:49.650 --> 01:01:52.220 of hot production lines across industrial base 01:01:52.420 --> 01:01:55.170 to keep acquisition efficient and affordable. 01:01:56.010 --> 01:01:58.810 Does the Navy recognize that without careful planning 01:01:58.810 --> 01:02:00.320 losses in our industrial base 01:02:00.320 --> 01:02:04.320 make achieving a 355 ship Navy nearly impossible? 01:02:05.520 --> 01:02:08.180 - Congressman, we are very much aware of this, 01:02:08.180 --> 01:02:10.296 and I'm more than happy to share with you 01:02:10.296 --> 01:02:12.820 and your fellow members 01:02:13.320 --> 01:02:15.390 the analysis that we've just come through 01:02:15.390 --> 01:02:18.130 and we're putting a dot on it as we speak. 01:02:18.500 --> 01:02:22.230 There is, as we call it, three projections. 01:02:22.230 --> 01:02:26.140 We can go along on a keep everything warm line, 01:02:26.140 --> 01:02:28.010 which does not get us to 355 01:02:28.010 --> 01:02:30.080 within an acceptable period of time, 01:02:30.080 --> 01:02:32.030 we can do a normalized curve, 01:02:32.270 --> 01:02:33.620 which brings it in a little closer, 01:02:33.620 --> 01:02:34.970 or a very aggressive curve. 01:02:35.240 --> 01:02:38.420 The balancing act that we have to do 01:02:38.730 --> 01:02:41.250 is to feed our demand need 01:02:41.250 --> 01:02:43.980 and also, to be very frank with you, 01:02:43.980 --> 01:02:45.460 care for the industrial base. 01:02:45.460 --> 01:02:48.080 Because one of the things we're suffering right now 01:02:48.290 --> 01:02:49.690 is the last boom and bust, 01:02:49.690 --> 01:02:51.683 because we have a number of hulls 01:02:51.683 --> 01:02:54.760 that are coming up in a short period of time 01:02:54.900 --> 01:02:55.900 for decommissioning. 01:02:56.040 --> 01:02:57.500 And if we can smooth that curve, 01:02:57.500 --> 01:02:59.160 that would be an excellent solution 01:02:59.160 --> 01:03:01.160 for both the industrial base and for us. 01:03:01.390 --> 01:03:03.720 That is all with one caveat. 01:03:03.850 --> 01:03:06.310 If in fact we need ships for whatever reason 01:03:06.310 --> 01:03:08.790 in an expedited rate, we're gonna have to go there. 01:03:10.667 --> 01:03:11.500 - [Admiral Richardson] Sir, if I could add on 01:03:11.500 --> 01:03:12.350 to that though. 01:03:12.784 --> 01:03:13.617 - [Congressman Byrne] Yes, Sir. 01:03:13.617 --> 01:03:14.450 - When we bring you this plan, 01:03:14.450 --> 01:03:16.640 it will come with some historical perspective. 01:03:16.860 --> 01:03:19.950 Really, sort of going back to 1955 01:03:20.290 --> 01:03:22.320 and tracking our way forward. 01:03:22.330 --> 01:03:25.680 And it will show you the absolutely devastating effect 01:03:25.780 --> 01:03:28.160 of the peace dividend if you will, 01:03:28.560 --> 01:03:29.750 on our industrial base, 01:03:29.750 --> 01:03:32.830 where more than a dozen shipyards really shuttered down 01:03:33.260 --> 01:03:35.810 and leaves us with an industrial base 01:03:35.810 --> 01:03:37.930 that has far less capacity now. 01:03:37.990 --> 01:03:40.090 So we need to really protect that treasure 01:03:40.490 --> 01:03:41.640 with everything we can. 01:03:42.040 --> 01:03:43.260 - I think both of you know this, 01:03:43.260 --> 01:03:45.800 but when we stood up the shipyard in Mobile, 01:03:45.800 --> 01:03:47.680 I was the chancellor of post secondary education 01:03:47.680 --> 01:03:51.720 for the state, and we had the entity under my direction, 01:03:51.960 --> 01:03:53.820 so they actually had to create the workforce 01:03:53.820 --> 01:03:55.170 for the shipyard in Mobile. 01:03:55.570 --> 01:03:59.750 And we had the luxury of time, a whole lot of time, 01:04:00.160 --> 01:04:01.530 and we had a recession where we had 01:04:01.530 --> 01:04:02.820 a lot of people laid off. 01:04:03.270 --> 01:04:05.830 We have exactly the opposite situation right now. 01:04:05.840 --> 01:04:07.540 We do not have the luxury of time, 01:04:07.860 --> 01:04:09.660 we have a very active economy 01:04:09.670 --> 01:04:11.790 where people with those sorts of skills, 01:04:12.000 --> 01:04:13.040 if we lay them off, 01:04:13.300 --> 01:04:15.040 they can go anywhere and get a job. 01:04:15.040 --> 01:04:17.830 And it's very hard both to get, train the people 01:04:17.860 --> 01:04:19.040 that you need to replace them, 01:04:19.040 --> 01:04:21.630 and the people that you train will not have the experience 01:04:21.630 --> 01:04:23.530 that the people they're replacing had, 01:04:23.580 --> 01:04:25.460 which means you're gonna have a less efficient 01:04:25.460 --> 01:04:28.330 production schedule, and the ship's gonna cost more. 01:04:28.560 --> 01:04:30.660 Which we all don't want the ships to cost more. 01:04:30.660 --> 01:04:33.510 So, I just plead with you, and I know you hear me 01:04:33.510 --> 01:04:35.700 'cause I've said this to you so many times, 01:04:36.060 --> 01:04:37.100 please work with us on this. 01:04:37.100 --> 01:04:39.750 I just want you to know that as you work to implement 01:04:39.820 --> 01:04:41.970 the priorities of the Trump administration, 01:04:42.160 --> 01:04:44.230 we expect a large investment in ship building 01:04:44.230 --> 01:04:46.380 to relieve the stress in our current fleet, 01:04:46.440 --> 01:04:49.110 which we know has contributed to some of these issues. 01:04:49.110 --> 01:04:51.240 We in Congress are your willing partners, 01:04:51.780 --> 01:04:53.830 and we want to help in growing the fleet. 01:04:54.250 --> 01:04:57.360 However, we can't do that unless we have a signal from you 01:04:57.360 --> 01:05:00.250 on what you need, and understand your roadmap to get there. 01:05:00.250 --> 01:05:02.400 So I understand the roadmap is forthcoming, 01:05:02.829 --> 01:05:04.460 and I look forward to having some time with you 01:05:04.460 --> 01:05:06.200 so I can understand what I can do 01:05:06.200 --> 01:05:08.020 and what we can do together to grow the fleet. 01:05:08.020 --> 01:05:08.870 And I yield back. 01:05:09.310 --> 01:05:10.240 - Thank you Congressman Byrne. 01:05:10.240 --> 01:05:13.860 We now proceed to Congresswoman Stephanie Murphy of Florida. 01:05:15.240 --> 01:05:17.360 - Secretary Spencer, Admiral Richardson, 01:05:17.360 --> 01:05:19.360 thank you for your testimony here today. 01:05:19.450 --> 01:05:22.060 First, I want to associate myself with the comments 01:05:22.060 --> 01:05:23.310 of some of my colleagues, 01:05:23.630 --> 01:05:25.510 that we must do all that we can to ensure 01:05:25.510 --> 01:05:27.000 that the tragic accidents, 01:05:28.420 --> 01:05:31.220 that the tragic and avoidable surface fleet incidents 01:05:31.220 --> 01:05:33.370 that we experienced this year never happen again. 01:05:33.370 --> 01:05:35.510 And specifically, I'd like to associate myself 01:05:35.510 --> 01:05:37.900 with the remarks by Rep. Bradley 01:05:38.130 --> 01:05:40.330 regarding the continuing resolutions. 01:05:40.750 --> 01:05:43.542 I have heard you and your colleagues loud and clear 01:05:43.542 --> 01:05:47.530 about the deleterious effect of CRs 01:05:47.530 --> 01:05:50.370 on the Navy's ability to ensure readiness, 01:05:50.390 --> 01:05:53.950 and I hope you know that we'll continue to advocate 01:05:54.280 --> 01:05:57.250 to ensure that you have a predictable funding stream 01:05:57.250 --> 01:05:58.083 for our military. 01:05:58.083 --> 01:06:00.630 So that you can make the investments that are needed 01:06:00.630 --> 01:06:03.370 to ensure readiness and the safety of our Sailors. 01:06:07.130 --> 01:06:08.420 Just by way of introduction, 01:06:08.420 --> 01:06:10.190 my district is in central Florida 01:06:10.190 --> 01:06:11.740 and it's home to Team Orlando 01:06:11.740 --> 01:06:13.750 which is a vibrant modeling, simulation, 01:06:13.750 --> 01:06:16.810 and training community centered around the Navy's NAWCTSD. 01:06:17.710 --> 01:06:20.360 I've had the opportunity to see demonstrations 01:06:20.360 --> 01:06:22.700 of the same virtual game-based training systems 01:06:22.700 --> 01:06:24.582 for specific workstation requirements 01:06:24.582 --> 01:06:26.480 that Mr. Hunter had described. 01:06:27.000 --> 01:06:29.070 There are several companies located in my district, 01:06:29.070 --> 01:06:31.550 in Orlando that offer innovative training solutions 01:06:31.550 --> 01:06:34.400 like this, and I'm just very impressed by the technology. 01:06:34.720 --> 01:06:37.640 As Mr. Hunter had said, these immersive virtual training 01:06:37.640 --> 01:06:39.970 systems can either be deployed in schoolhouses 01:06:39.970 --> 01:06:42.860 or be operated on a sailor's laptop or another device. 01:06:43.360 --> 01:06:45.170 So I wanted to ask you, do you see value 01:06:45.170 --> 01:06:46.710 in virtual training technologies 01:06:46.710 --> 01:06:48.130 that can help ensure that Sailors 01:06:48.130 --> 01:06:50.250 in operational environments are maintaining 01:06:50.250 --> 01:06:54.280 their qualifications and routinely assessed while deployed? 01:06:55.200 --> 01:06:59.610 And also to follow up, and another question on that is 01:06:59.910 --> 01:07:02.860 what is the Navy doing urgently, in 2018, 01:07:03.420 --> 01:07:05.990 to improve training deficiencies in navigation, 01:07:05.990 --> 01:07:08.140 emergency procedures and collision avoidance 01:07:08.140 --> 01:07:09.890 in highly trafficked areas? 01:07:10.480 --> 01:07:13.050 - I'll take the first part of your question Congresswoman. 01:07:13.050 --> 01:07:16.620 As far as it comes to virtual reality training 01:07:16.620 --> 01:07:19.580 and the technological advances that are available to us, 01:07:19.930 --> 01:07:22.850 we are looking at every single possible avenue. 01:07:23.250 --> 01:07:26.450 Having just signed out travel authority last quarter 01:07:26.450 --> 01:07:30.810 for close to 500 members of the Navy to go down to Orlando 01:07:31.000 --> 01:07:33.290 and participate in that event down there, 01:07:33.490 --> 01:07:36.240 I think that shows our level of commitment to the area. 01:07:37.190 --> 01:07:40.710 In my initial testimony, in confirmation, 01:07:40.827 --> 01:07:42.870 I will reiterate again 01:07:44.137 --> 01:07:47.030 that technology is going to be our force multiplier, 01:07:47.380 --> 01:07:50.230 in every single aspect of how we do business, 01:07:50.230 --> 01:07:52.530 and training is one that we will benefit from. 01:07:53.378 --> 01:07:54.220 - [Congresswoman Murphy] Great, thank you. 01:07:54.250 --> 01:07:56.340 - Ma'am, I'll pile in on part two of your question. 01:07:56.340 --> 01:07:58.090 With respect to just immediate actions 01:07:58.090 --> 01:08:01.030 to address the concerns you had regarding 01:08:01.499 --> 01:08:03.970 operation in heavily trafficked areas, 01:08:04.160 --> 01:08:06.290 we've revised the formality of the procedures 01:08:06.290 --> 01:08:09.150 for ships approaching within two nautical miles, 01:08:09.360 --> 01:08:12.550 to preserve decision making time for the commanding officers 01:08:12.550 --> 01:08:14.500 to assess that heavily trafficked area. 01:08:14.890 --> 01:08:16.630 We have changed the reporting criteria 01:08:16.630 --> 01:08:19.870 regarding propulsion, navigation and steering 01:08:19.870 --> 01:08:23.580 types of systems so that we have a more firm control over, 01:08:24.500 --> 01:08:27.550 and a reassurance that those systems operate properly. 01:08:28.030 --> 01:08:30.210 That also includes damage control systems. 01:08:30.430 --> 01:08:32.410 And there is a whole list that I could go down 01:08:32.410 --> 01:08:34.040 of measures that we've taken. 01:08:34.300 --> 01:08:36.160 Automatic identification system, 01:08:36.630 --> 01:08:39.330 the rules governing when to transmit on that, 01:08:39.330 --> 01:08:41.580 so you are visible to other ships in the area 01:08:41.720 --> 01:08:44.590 have changed for our surface ships operating in those areas, 01:08:44.590 --> 01:08:46.650 and we're gonna integrate that AIS system 01:08:46.650 --> 01:08:48.730 more seamlessly into the rest of the gear 01:08:49.040 --> 01:08:52.050 that we use to establish situational awareness 01:08:52.050 --> 01:08:53.670 in those types of situations. 01:08:53.670 --> 01:08:56.320 So, a whole host of measures have already been taken. 01:08:56.360 --> 01:09:00.360 - And specifically, have you expedited any training, 01:09:01.740 --> 01:09:05.010 additional training or other ways in which 01:09:05.010 --> 01:09:06.800 to make the Sailors more prepared? 01:09:07.230 --> 01:09:09.740 - To date, because it has been such a short time, 01:09:09.740 --> 01:09:12.690 a lot of that has been sort of on board the ships. 01:09:12.690 --> 01:09:14.290 So, we've just sort of mandated, 01:09:14.590 --> 01:09:17.170 and the COs really didn't need to be told, right? 01:09:17.300 --> 01:09:18.700 They knew what to get after. 01:09:18.950 --> 01:09:22.100 In the longer term, as we look to expand 01:09:22.100 --> 01:09:24.160 some of these types of technologies, 01:09:24.430 --> 01:09:27.210 and enhance them more into the fleet concentration areas 01:09:27.210 --> 01:09:28.060 around the world, 01:09:28.340 --> 01:09:31.069 we're certainly gonna be going to these types of simulation 01:09:31.069 --> 01:09:34.320 and performance measuring types of systems 01:09:34.320 --> 01:09:36.420 to get us up to speed as fast as possible. 01:09:37.070 --> 01:09:38.370 - Thank you, I yield back. 01:09:39.080 --> 01:09:40.400 - And thank you Congresswoman Murphy. 01:09:40.400 --> 01:09:43.560 We now proceed to Congressman Dr. Ralph Abraham 01:09:43.620 --> 01:09:44.453 of Louisiana. 01:09:45.070 --> 01:09:47.630 - Thank you Mr. Chairman thanks for being here. 01:09:47.640 --> 01:09:51.710 And I appreciate the words of the authority responsibility 01:09:51.710 --> 01:09:53.120 because we all know that 01:09:53.910 --> 01:09:55.790 certainly in the military or business 01:09:55.790 --> 01:09:58.720 you can designate authority but never responsibility. 01:09:58.720 --> 01:10:01.650 So I appreciate you gentlemen being here 01:10:01.650 --> 01:10:05.070 and Mr. Secretary, the analogy to the Mayo Clinic 01:10:05.070 --> 01:10:06.170 with the lead surgeon, 01:10:06.510 --> 01:10:11.510 I think is a good comparison as to how things go. 01:10:12.940 --> 01:10:15.660 We understand certainly in hazard mitigation 01:10:15.660 --> 01:10:18.870 and risk management that there is an error chain 01:10:18.870 --> 01:10:21.320 usually if you have an incident, a mishap or an accident. 01:10:21.320 --> 01:10:23.980 And if any link of that chain is broken, 01:10:24.300 --> 01:10:27.270 then that error, or that accident does not happen. 01:10:27.710 --> 01:10:30.240 We all are familiar with the Swiss cheese model, 01:10:30.240 --> 01:10:32.200 with the holes lining up so to speak, 01:10:32.780 --> 01:10:34.960 and unfortunately, in these incidences 01:10:34.960 --> 01:10:36.460 that we're here to talk about, 01:10:36.950 --> 01:10:38.940 the holes did align and we understand. 01:10:38.940 --> 01:10:42.170 So I assume, and I hope that the culture 01:10:42.220 --> 01:10:43.450 of the Navy Admiral, 01:10:44.000 --> 01:10:46.220 is that if any member of that crew 01:10:46.760 --> 01:10:50.560 sees something and he or she says, "Knock it off" 01:10:51.030 --> 01:10:54.970 or some phraseology, that everybody takes a step back 01:10:55.190 --> 01:10:57.520 and reevaluates where they are. 01:10:58.580 --> 01:11:02.120 - Sir, absolutely, and you're very familiar 01:11:02.120 --> 01:11:04.600 with the investigations and the literature 01:11:04.600 --> 01:11:06.190 on these types of major events. 01:11:06.430 --> 01:11:08.640 They are the accumulation of a lot of small errors 01:11:08.640 --> 01:11:10.890 that just sort of line up in a very unpredictable way. 01:11:10.890 --> 01:11:13.530 Whether that be Deepwater Horizon, Challenger, 01:11:13.800 --> 01:11:16.990 an operating room, and so that's exactly the philosophy 01:11:16.990 --> 01:11:17.890 that we're taking. 01:11:18.020 --> 01:11:20.890 - And I'll associate my comments with my good friend 01:11:20.890 --> 01:11:22.840 Bradley over here as far as the funding. 01:11:22.840 --> 01:11:26.023 We certainly own HASC, but I can say 01:11:26.023 --> 01:11:29.290 most, if not all members of Congress understand 01:11:29.860 --> 01:11:32.890 the severe shortage that you're faced with. 01:11:32.890 --> 01:11:34.904 And when we're told and we understand that 01:11:34.904 --> 01:11:38.000 in last year, 2016, 01:11:38.010 --> 01:11:39.560 I mean 2017, 01:11:40.210 --> 01:11:41.940 that we had almost four times the number 01:11:41.940 --> 01:11:44.840 of training accidents as we did have deaths in combat, 01:11:45.433 --> 01:11:47.040 there's something wrong there. 01:11:47.140 --> 01:11:50.280 And we understand that does go back to certification 01:11:50.280 --> 01:11:54.190 and training and that type of issue. 01:11:54.190 --> 01:11:56.240 So, I just want to make a statement that, 01:11:56.860 --> 01:12:00.140 again, I appreciate your forthrightness of coming forward. 01:12:00.140 --> 01:12:03.480 Giving us direct answers to direct questions, 01:12:04.010 --> 01:12:06.960 and we certainly understand 01:12:07.600 --> 01:12:10.980 what the continuing CRs does to 01:12:11.780 --> 01:12:14.080 the training or therefore the lack of training 01:12:14.210 --> 01:12:15.460 in your wheelhouse. 01:12:15.480 --> 01:12:16.360 So thank you very much. 01:12:16.360 --> 01:12:17.670 Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 01:12:17.670 --> 01:12:19.600 - And thank you very much Dr. Abraham. 01:12:19.600 --> 01:12:22.250 We now proceed to Congressman Ro Khanna of California. 01:12:24.825 --> 01:12:27.330 - [Congressman Khanna] Thank you Mr. Chair, Mr. Secretary, 01:12:27.330 --> 01:12:29.680 Admiral Richardson, thank you for your service. 01:12:29.990 --> 01:12:33.030 My question concerns the Aegis system. 01:12:33.230 --> 01:12:37.180 And I wanted your assessment of how effective 01:12:37.610 --> 01:12:42.610 that currently is in the boost phase of an intercontinental 01:12:42.665 --> 01:12:46.100 ballistic missile in intercepting that 01:12:46.260 --> 01:12:48.990 and how much assurance the American public 01:12:48.990 --> 01:12:51.430 could have in that technology currently. 01:12:52.160 --> 01:12:53.550 - Well first, let me say foremost 01:12:53.550 --> 01:12:57.920 that the Aegis Combat System is highly effective 01:12:57.950 --> 01:12:59.850 in the ballistic missile defense role. 01:13:00.580 --> 01:13:03.750 And so we have tuned it for that role. 01:13:03.750 --> 01:13:05.750 We continue to improve it for that role, 01:13:05.970 --> 01:13:08.770 not only in the combat system but also the interceptors. 01:13:08.980 --> 01:13:11.770 And so that's a program, a capability 01:13:11.770 --> 01:13:13.920 that's on a path of continuous improvement. 01:13:14.310 --> 01:13:16.580 You asked specifically about the boost phase. 01:13:16.970 --> 01:13:19.760 Well, I'll tell ya, just from a geometry standpoint 01:13:20.430 --> 01:13:22.870 I gotta say that that is a very difficult 01:13:24.240 --> 01:13:28.260 part of the kill chain, if you will, to get after. 01:13:28.260 --> 01:13:30.510 The missile that you're trying to hit 01:13:30.510 --> 01:13:32.910 does not spend a lot of time in the boost phase. 01:13:32.910 --> 01:13:34.660 Depending upon where it's launched, 01:13:34.760 --> 01:13:36.700 just achieving the geometry to get 01:13:36.820 --> 01:13:39.900 any type of an interceptor to intercept that missile 01:13:39.900 --> 01:13:42.320 during its boost phase is difficult. 01:13:42.640 --> 01:13:44.790 And so it takes a very sophisticated 01:13:45.600 --> 01:13:49.510 combination of sensors to get it, you know, instantaneously. 01:13:49.860 --> 01:13:52.600 And then a highly capable vehicle to intercept it. 01:13:53.400 --> 01:13:55.520 So, we're working towards that capability, 01:13:56.050 --> 01:13:59.030 and the Aegis system will naturally be a big part of that. 01:14:00.080 --> 01:14:02.560 - So right now, is there any capability of getting 01:14:02.560 --> 01:14:05.020 a missile that's launched at any phase 01:14:05.094 --> 01:14:06.910 other than the ground interceptors 01:14:06.910 --> 01:14:09.620 or right now there is with the Aegis system? 01:14:09.620 --> 01:14:13.050 - Absolutely, throughout, and particularly sort of 01:14:13.050 --> 01:14:14.860 in the terminal phase is where, 01:14:15.640 --> 01:14:17.840 so atmospheric phase is where those do best. 01:14:18.030 --> 01:14:19.880 If we've got the opportunity, 01:14:19.890 --> 01:14:22.060 there's nothing that really precludes us 01:14:22.420 --> 01:14:25.490 from a system standpoint of getting the boost phase, 01:14:25.490 --> 01:14:26.900 it's just physics. 01:14:26.900 --> 01:14:28.420 It's just time and distance. 01:14:29.870 --> 01:14:33.410 You gotta be very, very close and very, very fast 01:14:33.410 --> 01:14:34.710 to catch it in that phase. 01:14:35.340 --> 01:14:38.360 - Would you then, in Congress, if we were prioritizing 01:14:38.590 --> 01:14:40.800 funding more of the ground interceptors 01:14:41.040 --> 01:14:44.640 with the hope of preventing an intercontinental 01:14:44.640 --> 01:14:47.850 ballistic missile that was about to hit, 01:14:47.940 --> 01:14:49.910 or if we were saying let's fund more 01:14:50.210 --> 01:14:52.770 the development of the Aegis system 01:14:53.110 --> 01:14:55.700 to prevent an intercontinental ballistic missile 01:14:55.700 --> 01:14:57.460 that could hit the United States, 01:14:57.660 --> 01:14:59.080 what would you recommend, 01:14:59.770 --> 01:15:04.140 and how difficult would it be to have a system 01:15:04.380 --> 01:15:07.020 that would have a very high probability of success? 01:15:07.410 --> 01:15:09.480 - Well again, the probability of success 01:15:09.480 --> 01:15:12.650 for intercept is pretty high. 01:15:15.010 --> 01:15:18.590 And in terms of the approach to missile defense, 01:15:18.800 --> 01:15:21.470 it really is a comprehensive approach that you want to take 01:15:21.470 --> 01:15:24.430 without singling in on any specific capability. 01:15:24.430 --> 01:15:27.570 So, I'm reluctant to choose between one system or another. 01:15:27.570 --> 01:15:31.580 They're all appropriate in different applications. 01:15:32.700 --> 01:15:35.450 - We make tough choices, you make tough choices all the time 01:15:35.450 --> 01:15:37.600 and I mean in terms of if you had resources, 01:15:37.600 --> 01:15:39.910 how would you allocate them, or prioritize them? 01:15:39.910 --> 01:15:44.260 - The program that's put forward is the best balance 01:15:44.740 --> 01:15:47.220 and assessment of the comprehensive approach. 01:15:48.530 --> 01:15:49.780 - Thank you, any further? 01:15:50.890 --> 01:15:52.130 Thank you, yield back. 01:15:52.130 --> 01:15:54.270 - Thank you, thank you Congressman Khanna. 01:15:54.270 --> 01:15:57.170 We now proceed to Congressman Mike Gallagher of Wisconsin. 01:15:57.480 --> 01:15:58.680 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 01:15:58.680 --> 01:16:00.350 Gentlemen, thank you both for your service 01:16:00.350 --> 01:16:01.750 and for being with us today. 01:16:02.580 --> 01:16:04.740 CNO, you said something very interesting 01:16:04.860 --> 01:16:06.550 that I think was not in your written testimony 01:16:06.550 --> 01:16:07.650 but was in your oral testimony 01:16:07.650 --> 01:16:10.430 about how the lack of adequate funding 01:16:10.430 --> 01:16:12.520 has affected the Navy and something about 01:16:12.520 --> 01:16:13.353 a scale of one to 10. 01:16:13.353 --> 01:16:14.690 If you wouldn't mind sort of repeating that, 01:16:14.690 --> 01:16:16.070 'cause I actually think it's a particularly important 01:16:16.070 --> 01:16:17.120 point for us to hear. 01:16:18.500 --> 01:16:19.890 - Sir, I'd be happy to repeat that. 01:16:19.890 --> 01:16:24.140 I think I really talked about, let me see, 01:16:24.870 --> 01:16:27.980 the toxic and corrosive effect of nine years 01:16:27.980 --> 01:16:31.160 of continuing resolutions and the Budget Control Act. 01:16:32.000 --> 01:16:34.180 And I wanted to highlight that there's plenty 01:16:34.180 --> 01:16:35.860 of work that we are responsible for, 01:16:35.860 --> 01:16:37.410 and we're gonna get after that. 01:16:37.600 --> 01:16:39.400 But the absence of stable and adequate funding 01:16:39.400 --> 01:16:41.750 for defense makes everything that we're doing 01:16:41.910 --> 01:16:44.400 to correct this system harder, much harder. 01:16:45.170 --> 01:16:46.740 And on a scale of one to 10, 01:16:46.740 --> 01:16:48.391 the importance of stable and adequate funding 01:16:48.391 --> 01:16:50.120 scores an 11. 01:16:50.410 --> 01:16:52.210 - That's a really critical point. 01:16:52.210 --> 01:16:53.650 I salute you for bringing that to light 01:16:53.650 --> 01:16:55.050 and I hope we can echo that, 01:16:55.150 --> 01:16:57.070 particularly in the context of the negotiations 01:16:57.070 --> 01:16:58.200 we're having right now. 01:16:58.200 --> 01:17:00.220 And I would say Mr. Secretary, 01:17:00.220 --> 01:17:02.450 you reference sort of a solarium process underway, 01:17:02.450 --> 01:17:03.870 which is of course a model 01:17:03.870 --> 01:17:05.610 for a competitive review of strategy, 01:17:05.610 --> 01:17:09.300 but we sort of already legislated that review 01:17:09.300 --> 01:17:11.539 through three outside assessments of what the future 01:17:11.539 --> 01:17:13.250 fleet needs to look like. 01:17:13.850 --> 01:17:15.010 I'm heartened to hear that we're gonna get 01:17:15.010 --> 01:17:17.570 the 30 year shipbuilding plan soon, 01:17:18.100 --> 01:17:20.630 so I do think we need sort of a rethink 01:17:20.630 --> 01:17:24.370 of our communications strategy, and start from the beginning 01:17:24.370 --> 01:17:26.590 making that strategy first case to the American people 01:17:26.590 --> 01:17:28.770 for why seapower is so critical 01:17:28.770 --> 01:17:30.280 to our national security in the first place. 01:17:30.280 --> 01:17:32.150 'Cause it strikes me as someone who's only been here 01:17:32.150 --> 01:17:34.450 for a year, that we keep making the same case, 01:17:34.560 --> 01:17:36.390 and for whatever reason, it's not working. 01:17:36.390 --> 01:17:37.223 So I just sort of ask you, 01:17:37.223 --> 01:17:39.230 and maybe this is a dumb question Mr. Secretary, 01:17:39.230 --> 01:17:41.160 what's kind of your elevator pitch to the American people? 01:17:41.160 --> 01:17:43.930 Describe to me if you will, what the purpose of the Navy 01:17:43.930 --> 01:17:45.530 is today and in the near future. 01:17:45.940 --> 01:17:48.080 - Well the purpose of the Navy, Congressman, 01:17:48.080 --> 01:17:50.490 is it is your forward deployed force, 01:17:50.490 --> 01:17:52.810 your primary forward deployed force. 01:17:52.810 --> 01:17:53.643 The most 01:17:54.720 --> 01:17:57.600 limber and flexible force that you have 01:17:57.900 --> 01:18:00.930 for a multitude of things, but primarily which comes 01:18:00.930 --> 01:18:05.280 to the top issues would be keeping the arteries 01:18:05.280 --> 01:18:07.570 of commerce open on the open seas, 01:18:09.030 --> 01:18:13.060 the presence factor of American power around the globe, 01:18:13.450 --> 01:18:15.270 keeping peace through presence, 01:18:15.490 --> 01:18:17.660 and then when needed the ability to provide 01:18:17.660 --> 01:18:20.440 the kinetic actions that we need to suppress 01:18:20.440 --> 01:18:21.890 and or conquer our foes. 01:18:23.479 --> 01:18:24.312 - [Congressman Gallagher] I appreciate that. 01:18:24.312 --> 01:18:25.860 - And through that, you need platforms, 01:18:26.400 --> 01:18:28.840 whether on the sea, under the sea or in the air 01:18:28.860 --> 01:18:30.700 and that's where Navy has all three. 01:18:31.465 --> 01:18:32.420 - And can you both give me a sense 01:18:32.420 --> 01:18:34.945 of how do you, how do you think about conveying 01:18:34.945 --> 01:18:38.800 that purpose to the American public, 01:18:39.180 --> 01:18:41.670 to the fleet, to our allies and our potential adversaries, 01:18:41.670 --> 01:18:44.320 and is that messaging coordinated, is it aligned, 01:18:44.370 --> 01:18:45.330 who's responsible? 01:18:45.810 --> 01:18:48.760 What's the process for strategic communications if you will? 01:18:48.760 --> 01:18:51.500 - Well I think the CNO and I are aligned in this. 01:18:52.600 --> 01:18:56.160 I flash back to when I was going through confirmation, 01:18:56.160 --> 01:19:00.100 and CNO, your strategy for Naval forces going forward 01:19:00.670 --> 01:19:01.650 did highlight it. 01:19:02.000 --> 01:19:04.210 It is out there in the public. 01:19:04.830 --> 01:19:06.680 Obviously what we're hearing, Congressman, 01:19:06.680 --> 01:19:08.630 is we have to do it in a better manner. 01:19:10.910 --> 01:19:12.370 But, it's a lockstep message 01:19:12.370 --> 01:19:15.170 which I just presented to you with the top three points. 01:19:16.480 --> 01:19:17.830 - Sir, if I could just add, 01:19:19.548 --> 01:19:21.410 the President has just released his National Security 01:19:21.410 --> 01:19:24.840 Strategy, the National Defense Strategy is imminent, 01:19:27.066 --> 01:19:28.650 and right on the heels of that will be 01:19:28.650 --> 01:19:31.420 the Military Strategy and a Marathon Strategy. 01:19:31.420 --> 01:19:33.770 And so with this 01:19:34.960 --> 01:19:36.790 issuance of strategic documents, 01:19:38.181 --> 01:19:41.480 and the sort of tiering of those, 01:19:42.480 --> 01:19:46.597 I would anticipate a vigorous strategic communications 01:19:46.597 --> 01:19:50.460 program going forward as we put together 01:19:51.030 --> 01:19:53.510 and release the new Maritime Strategy. 01:19:53.580 --> 01:19:54.710 - That's great to hear, and I know there's been 01:19:54.710 --> 01:19:56.910 some controversy about sort of the defense guidance 01:19:56.910 --> 01:20:00.460 that went out saying, "Err on the side of silence." 01:20:01.330 --> 01:20:03.010 I just would personally like to say I actually 01:20:03.010 --> 01:20:04.320 think that's a mistake in this case. 01:20:04.320 --> 01:20:06.920 I understand that loose lips can sink ships, 01:20:06.920 --> 01:20:09.290 but nonexistent strategic communications can sink 01:20:09.290 --> 01:20:10.123 entire Navies. 01:20:10.123 --> 01:20:11.400 And we need to do a better job 01:20:11.400 --> 01:20:12.830 of making that case to the American people. 01:20:12.830 --> 01:20:15.010 And it's a partnership, between us and between you, 01:20:15.010 --> 01:20:18.260 but you have the benefit of having the trust 01:20:18.260 --> 01:20:19.960 of the American people and a high approval rating 01:20:19.960 --> 01:20:21.170 that at times Congress does not. 01:20:21.170 --> 01:20:23.430 So we could really use your help in that regard. 01:20:23.782 --> 01:20:24.615 - [Secretary Spencer] Duly noted. 01:20:24.615 --> 01:20:25.810 - Thank you Mr. Secretary. 01:20:26.370 --> 01:20:28.420 - So I appreciate your help there 01:20:28.420 --> 01:20:30.900 and your pushing us in this regard 01:20:30.920 --> 01:20:33.480 and we'll go as far as we can, 01:20:34.052 --> 01:20:37.670 up to the point where the information we're providing 01:20:38.170 --> 01:20:40.440 provides information that the enemy can use against us. 01:20:40.440 --> 01:20:41.430 I mean that's the only point 01:20:41.430 --> 01:20:42.810 that we'll just have to stop. 01:20:42.810 --> 01:20:43.780 - I totally understand that. 01:20:43.780 --> 01:20:44.730 I have 16 seconds. 01:20:44.730 --> 01:20:46.620 If I could quickly ask Secretary Spencer 01:20:46.620 --> 01:20:49.270 how do you exercise oversight of the Navy 01:20:49.270 --> 01:20:51.610 and Marine Corps in their planning, programming 01:20:51.610 --> 01:20:53.690 and budgeting execution activities? 01:20:54.000 --> 01:20:55.430 In other words, how do you ensure 01:20:55.430 --> 01:20:56.790 that the budgets of the Navy and Marine Corps 01:20:56.790 --> 01:20:59.190 are a reflection of sort of an integrated vision 01:20:59.190 --> 01:21:00.240 of American seapower? 01:21:00.800 --> 01:21:03.340 - That is one of my sole jobs, with Title 10 01:21:03.670 --> 01:21:05.670 when it comes to the budgeting plan. 01:21:05.960 --> 01:21:09.180 What we look for, going forward in this last cycle 01:21:09.180 --> 01:21:10.310 which was my first cycle, 01:21:10.310 --> 01:21:13.870 was overlaying needs, overlaying plan, 01:21:14.620 --> 01:21:15.860 and then overlaying strategy 01:21:15.860 --> 01:21:17.410 and funding to that strategy, 01:21:17.760 --> 01:21:20.410 which is what we have done this last time around. 01:21:20.690 --> 01:21:21.600 - Well thank you both gentlemen. 01:21:21.600 --> 01:21:23.630 And Secretary, thank your wife as well 01:21:23.630 --> 01:21:25.380 for signing up for this assignment. 01:21:27.460 --> 01:21:28.860 - And thank you Congressman Gallagher, 01:21:28.860 --> 01:21:32.400 particularly with your combat background and experience. 01:21:32.400 --> 01:21:33.750 We appreciate your insight. 01:21:34.080 --> 01:21:36.110 Congressman Don McEachin of Virginia. 01:21:37.610 --> 01:21:38.860 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 01:21:40.140 --> 01:21:43.410 Mr. Secretary and Admiral, thank you both for being here. 01:21:43.820 --> 01:21:45.750 We've already spoken a little bit today about 01:21:45.750 --> 01:21:48.240 the fact that it's now our national policy 01:21:48.240 --> 01:21:52.160 to have not fewer than 355 battle force ships. 01:21:52.590 --> 01:21:55.508 Am I correct in assuming that if we make that progress 01:21:55.508 --> 01:21:57.860 that would at least partially relieve the pressures 01:21:57.860 --> 01:21:59.510 that we discussed here today. 01:21:59.860 --> 01:22:01.560 I'm under the assumption that being able 01:22:01.560 --> 01:22:03.260 to distribute the same commitments 01:22:03.380 --> 01:22:04.990 across a larger fleet would help. 01:22:04.990 --> 01:22:06.590 Am I under the right assumption? 01:22:07.860 --> 01:22:09.410 - That's absolutely correct, Sir. 01:22:09.410 --> 01:22:10.243 - All right. 01:22:10.472 --> 01:22:14.120 Pending the addition of the actual new ships to the Navy, 01:22:14.560 --> 01:22:16.450 are there steps that Congress can take, 01:22:16.450 --> 01:22:18.190 recognizing the resource constraints 01:22:18.190 --> 01:22:19.290 under which we operate 01:22:19.580 --> 01:22:23.120 and the need to continue investing in many, many 01:22:23.200 --> 01:22:25.090 priorities aside from defense 01:22:25.510 --> 01:22:27.550 that would demonstrate the seriousness of our commitment 01:22:27.550 --> 01:22:29.760 to the 355 ships in such a way 01:22:30.170 --> 01:22:32.250 that pressures are relieved on the front end? 01:22:32.250 --> 01:22:34.360 In other words, can we make things easier 01:22:34.360 --> 01:22:37.210 by giving you greater certainty that help is on the way? 01:22:38.920 --> 01:22:40.470 - Most definitely, Congressman. 01:22:40.890 --> 01:22:42.940 If we look at shipbuilding in particular, 01:22:43.220 --> 01:22:46.110 the conversations that we have with the industrial base, 01:22:46.540 --> 01:22:49.390 we are looking to make sure they're the most competitive, 01:22:49.720 --> 01:22:51.760 lowest cost provider with highest quality 01:22:51.760 --> 01:22:53.360 in the quickest manner possible. 01:22:54.020 --> 01:22:56.230 We turned around and asked them where are the capital 01:22:56.230 --> 01:22:58.330 investments that you're making in your yards 01:22:58.330 --> 01:22:59.390 to make you competitive 01:22:59.390 --> 01:23:01.180 and to provide a product in the parameters 01:23:01.180 --> 01:23:02.630 that I just presented to you. 01:23:02.680 --> 01:23:05.310 And they turn around and say, "Well, you give me the signal 01:23:05.310 --> 01:23:07.170 "that there's a consistency to fund, 01:23:07.690 --> 01:23:10.490 "three, four, five, seven ships, I will make 01:23:10.490 --> 01:23:12.040 "that commensurate investment." 01:23:12.200 --> 01:23:14.150 And that's where when I talk about the fact 01:23:14.150 --> 01:23:16.790 that we have to be partnership with industry, 01:23:16.990 --> 01:23:19.050 that is exactly what they're looking for 01:23:19.050 --> 01:23:21.150 and that is exactly how you could help us. 01:23:21.250 --> 01:23:23.700 Is to provide us the ability to send that signal, 01:23:23.860 --> 01:23:25.100 or you send it directly, 01:23:25.240 --> 01:23:27.420 that yes, this is where we wanna go, 01:23:27.420 --> 01:23:29.120 and this is what our goal will be. 01:23:29.612 --> 01:23:30.880 - [Admiral Richardson] Sir, if I could add to that. 01:23:30.880 --> 01:23:33.420 - Please. - In terms of that assurance, 01:23:33.480 --> 01:23:37.150 right now as we speak, we have about 400,000 Sailors 01:23:37.150 --> 01:23:40.170 and 180,000 Navy civilians looking at their watch 01:23:40.170 --> 01:23:41.570 wondering if the government is gonna shut down 01:23:41.570 --> 01:23:42.970 and are they gonna get paid? 01:23:44.600 --> 01:23:46.090 - And we do understand that. 01:23:46.420 --> 01:23:48.820 I thank you both, and Mr. Chairman I yield back. 01:23:49.200 --> 01:23:50.380 - Thank you Congressman McEachin. 01:23:50.380 --> 01:23:54.410 We now proceed to Congresswoman Colleen Hanabusa of Hawaii. 01:23:55.350 --> 01:23:56.600 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 01:23:58.110 --> 01:24:00.910 Thank you for being here to both the Secretary 01:24:00.910 --> 01:24:02.050 as well as the CNO. 01:24:02.470 --> 01:24:03.580 I do want to say something 01:24:03.580 --> 01:24:05.620 and make it very clear for the record. 01:24:07.100 --> 01:24:11.700 Senator Inouye was not one of us, normal kind of person. 01:24:12.370 --> 01:24:15.910 He is of course the recipient of the 01:24:16.570 --> 01:24:17.403 Medal of Honor, 01:24:17.570 --> 01:24:21.220 the highest award that can be presented in gratitude 01:24:21.220 --> 01:24:23.800 to anyone who wears the uniforms that you do. 01:24:24.370 --> 01:24:25.870 In addition, he's the recipient 01:24:25.870 --> 01:24:27.600 of the Congressional Gold Medal, 01:24:28.030 --> 01:24:30.200 and the Presidential Medal of Freedom. 01:24:31.380 --> 01:24:34.600 He, like me, we represent the state of Hawaii, 01:24:34.940 --> 01:24:37.780 and of course we are home to the Pacific Command. 01:24:38.250 --> 01:24:42.080 And as you know, their AOR is 54, almost 55% 01:24:42.140 --> 01:24:43.290 of the Earth's surface. 01:24:43.450 --> 01:24:46.708 I'm a strong advocate, and I say this to the 01:24:46.708 --> 01:24:49.230 people in the Army, to their chagrin, 01:24:49.230 --> 01:24:52.080 that the Pacific isn't air and sea power, 01:24:52.090 --> 01:24:54.150 but more accurately a sea power 01:24:54.580 --> 01:24:56.580 and therefore I am very concerned 01:24:56.820 --> 01:25:00.550 when we sit here and we start to say, 01:25:00.550 --> 01:25:01.850 well you know, maybe we need, 01:25:01.850 --> 01:25:05.300 and I don't disagree with a standard of excellence. 01:25:05.300 --> 01:25:07.060 A single standard of excellence. 01:25:07.370 --> 01:25:10.500 However, I would like to, to impress upon you 01:25:10.500 --> 01:25:12.030 that the Pacific is different. 01:25:12.380 --> 01:25:15.630 Where these accidents occurred, especially in the McCain, 01:25:15.630 --> 01:25:18.170 is in a very busy area. 01:25:18.170 --> 01:25:21.850 Because when we were briefed earlier, what we are faced with 01:25:22.130 --> 01:25:25.130 is a lot of commercial traffic as well. 01:25:25.130 --> 01:25:27.260 It's not like during World War II 01:25:27.260 --> 01:25:29.770 when it was just basically the military ships 01:25:29.770 --> 01:25:30.820 going back and forth. 01:25:30.930 --> 01:25:35.930 It is the busiest commercial trade zone in the world. 01:25:36.860 --> 01:25:37.850 Having said that, 01:25:41.150 --> 01:25:43.360 Admiral Richardson, in your testimony 01:25:43.810 --> 01:25:46.580 you said, "Looking back to 2017 was a year 01:25:46.580 --> 01:25:48.580 "of triumph and tragedy for our Navy. 01:25:49.000 --> 01:25:53.350 "We consistently forward deployed more than 60,000 Sailors 01:25:53.610 --> 01:25:56.430 "and 95 ships and submarines around the globe." 01:25:56.860 --> 01:26:01.580 So, does that mean we only had 95 of our 280 some odd 01:26:01.580 --> 01:26:06.580 ships, a far cry from the 355 or President Obama's 318. 01:26:07.380 --> 01:26:09.030 Is that what you're saying in that statement? 01:26:09.030 --> 01:26:10.970 We only had 95 deployed? 01:26:12.170 --> 01:26:16.040 - Consistently, at any one day we had 95 deployed. 01:26:16.040 --> 01:26:19.170 So that's about more than a third of your battle force. 01:26:19.520 --> 01:26:22.060 And so it goes back to this training and certification 01:26:22.060 --> 01:26:23.110 cycle that we're on. 01:26:23.110 --> 01:26:24.860 Those are ships that are on mission 01:26:25.570 --> 01:26:27.910 and the others are in maintenance and training, 01:26:27.910 --> 01:26:29.160 getting ready to go on mission. 01:26:29.160 --> 01:26:31.100 And so that's sort of the ratios 01:26:31.100 --> 01:26:33.470 that you deal with when you talking about 01:26:33.470 --> 01:26:35.320 maintaining a force forward deployed. 01:26:35.510 --> 01:26:38.000 - So the Secretary had a statement 01:26:38.000 --> 01:26:39.600 that was very interesting, that, 01:26:39.680 --> 01:26:42.580 "The Strategic Readiness Review team's assessment 01:26:42.580 --> 01:26:45.360 "determined that today's readiness deficiencies" 01:26:45.360 --> 01:26:47.710 and I assume this also talks about Fitzgerald, 01:26:47.710 --> 01:26:50.350 McCain and the other two that resulted 01:26:50.350 --> 01:26:52.910 with no physical injury to our benefit, 01:26:53.210 --> 01:26:55.570 "are not traceable to any single policy 01:26:55.570 --> 01:26:58.720 "or leadership decision, but rather the cumulative effect 01:26:58.720 --> 01:27:01.300 "of well-meaning decisions that were designed 01:27:01.300 --> 01:27:03.700 "to achieve short-term operational goals." 01:27:03.930 --> 01:27:05.770 I read in one of these reports 01:27:06.020 --> 01:27:07.380 that the problem was 01:27:07.740 --> 01:27:10.530 that actually those of you in the Pentagon 01:27:10.530 --> 01:27:13.470 would make decisions that we have to take action 01:27:13.470 --> 01:27:15.560 and you would basically send it down 01:27:15.560 --> 01:27:17.010 through the chain of command, 01:27:17.080 --> 01:27:20.210 and whether they were adequate or not, 01:27:20.760 --> 01:27:23.470 or the problem with maybe even the Pacific Fleet, 01:27:23.470 --> 01:27:27.260 or PACOM and all of our Sailors, is that they serve. 01:27:27.890 --> 01:27:31.870 And they probably were under adverse circumstances 01:27:31.870 --> 01:27:32.703 to do that? 01:27:32.703 --> 01:27:34.610 Was that a correct statement, Mr. Secretary. 01:27:35.440 --> 01:27:38.130 - The Navy Marine Corps team, much like our 01:27:38.130 --> 01:27:40.920 other sister services, are organizations 01:27:40.920 --> 01:27:42.300 that are biased for action. 01:27:42.730 --> 01:27:45.080 And that's what you want from uniformed people. 01:27:45.202 --> 01:27:47.990 What we have to find is that fine balance 01:27:47.990 --> 01:27:51.360 between when the alarm goes off in the barn, 01:27:51.620 --> 01:27:53.350 running out the door and making sure 01:27:53.350 --> 01:27:56.000 that you are prepared to do the mission you're doing. 01:27:56.949 --> 01:27:58.390 - And I'm going to be running out of time 01:27:58.390 --> 01:28:01.150 but I do wish that you would consider one thing. 01:28:01.620 --> 01:28:04.110 I believe the Pacific is different 01:28:04.710 --> 01:28:07.130 than the European Theater. 01:28:07.410 --> 01:28:08.270 It is different. 01:28:08.720 --> 01:28:12.830 And the reason why I feel that Senator probably put in, 01:28:13.100 --> 01:28:15.120 what you are calling the Inouye Amendment 01:28:15.120 --> 01:28:18.490 is to ensure that the difference of that 01:28:18.490 --> 01:28:21.980 which is the Pacific would become foremost 01:28:21.980 --> 01:28:23.050 in everyone's mind. 01:28:23.050 --> 01:28:27.670 I also would like you to also take more responsibility 01:28:27.750 --> 01:28:30.440 that the McCain and Fitzgerald were basically 01:28:30.440 --> 01:28:35.290 20 years old, and the training that goes on those ships 01:28:35.630 --> 01:28:37.650 and the fact that they're in Yokosuka 01:28:37.720 --> 01:28:40.020 and not being maintained like everything else, 01:28:40.080 --> 01:28:44.080 is really a function of, I think, higher up decisions 01:28:44.180 --> 01:28:45.830 than what you are concerned with. 01:28:46.250 --> 01:28:49.350 So I think this amendment that you are taking issue with 01:28:49.680 --> 01:28:52.690 probably is a good way to protect the people 01:28:52.690 --> 01:28:56.210 that serve in the PACOM AOR. 01:28:56.630 --> 01:28:58.480 So with that Mr. Chair, I yield back. 01:28:58.930 --> 01:29:00.500 - [Chairman Wilson] And thank you Congresswoman Hanabusa. 01:29:00.500 --> 01:29:03.620 We now proceed to Congressman Donald Norcross of New Jersey. 01:29:04.510 --> 01:29:06.220 - Thank you Chairman, and Chairmans 01:29:06.220 --> 01:29:10.640 for holding this hearing and certainly the ranking members, 01:29:11.600 --> 01:29:15.550 this is the last of many hearings we've held on 01:29:15.870 --> 01:29:18.170 the tragedies that you've talked about, 01:29:18.170 --> 01:29:19.570 and we've heard about today. 01:29:20.980 --> 01:29:23.240 Secretary and Admiral, good to see you again. 01:29:26.520 --> 01:29:29.700 When we look at what had occurred after 01:29:30.240 --> 01:29:31.650 the first loss of life, 01:29:33.060 --> 01:29:36.660 and then the second accident with a loss of life, 01:29:38.860 --> 01:29:42.410 I have to say how impressed we were 01:29:42.852 --> 01:29:46.170 after the second one, the reaction we finally were getting 01:29:46.170 --> 01:29:48.110 to try to address some core issues. 01:29:48.910 --> 01:29:51.560 And it's a challenge, there's no question about that. 01:29:52.030 --> 01:29:56.820 And back on November, the Fleet Comprehensive Review 01:29:56.890 --> 01:29:58.870 made 58 recommendations, 01:29:59.480 --> 01:30:04.480 and then after that, December 13th was the Readiness Review 01:30:05.450 --> 01:30:10.450 that had with it six chapters and 23 recommendations. 01:30:12.560 --> 01:30:15.930 And, I just want to read to you 01:30:16.430 --> 01:30:21.430 out of the December 13th Readiness Review that talked about 01:30:22.650 --> 01:30:24.600 the very first recommendation on there, 01:30:24.910 --> 01:30:28.250 "Condition Congressional and Executive Branch leaders 01:30:28.652 --> 01:30:33.652 "to accept that a higher cost and time to achieve 01:30:33.820 --> 01:30:35.480 "established readiness standards 01:30:35.730 --> 01:30:38.690 "will mean less presence worldwide." 01:30:42.390 --> 01:30:47.390 It appears reading that, that somehow you're making a choice 01:30:47.510 --> 01:30:49.930 between safety and lives 01:30:51.010 --> 01:30:51.843 and readiness. 01:30:52.290 --> 01:30:57.250 And I know you would never suggest that. 01:30:57.290 --> 01:31:01.190 That you understand that everybody under your command is 01:31:01.190 --> 01:31:05.570 a valuable source for not only our country, but the world. 01:31:06.270 --> 01:31:09.450 But to read that, it seems like you have to make a choice. 01:31:09.450 --> 01:31:11.010 Either we're going to be ready, 01:31:11.450 --> 01:31:14.340 or we're putting people at risk to lose their lives. 01:31:15.070 --> 01:31:17.830 The recommendations, the vast majority of them, 01:31:17.940 --> 01:31:18.840 I agree with. 01:31:19.830 --> 01:31:21.620 But I just want to give you a chance to address 01:31:21.620 --> 01:31:23.080 the very first recommendation 01:31:23.080 --> 01:31:25.060 that somehow we can choose safety 01:31:26.030 --> 01:31:26.863 or readiness. 01:31:26.863 --> 01:31:28.030 And I know you don't mean that. 01:31:28.030 --> 01:31:29.180 Would you explain that? 01:31:29.830 --> 01:31:30.730 - Certainly Congressman. 01:31:30.730 --> 01:31:33.030 What it does, is brings up in the conversation 01:31:33.150 --> 01:31:35.333 that it is a mathematical game. 01:31:35.333 --> 01:31:38.770 You cannot expand what you don't have. 01:31:39.290 --> 01:31:41.940 And we have to make sure everyone is attuned to that. 01:31:42.390 --> 01:31:45.240 And that is our responsibility, the CNO and I, 01:31:45.520 --> 01:31:48.270 to make sure that you all on the funding side 01:31:48.437 --> 01:31:51.980 understand what we are looking at at this model. 01:31:52.239 --> 01:31:54.390 That's what that recommendation was to do. 01:31:54.390 --> 01:31:56.280 To get the conversation started. 01:31:56.280 --> 01:31:59.390 - Are you suggesting we don't understand that? 01:31:59.430 --> 01:32:01.370 - No, I'm not suggesting you don't understand it. 01:32:01.370 --> 01:32:05.070 I'm suggesting that the discussion has to be made 01:32:05.430 --> 01:32:06.740 and has to be understood. 01:32:07.190 --> 01:32:08.910 - You make those decisions every day, right? 01:32:08.910 --> 01:32:10.290 - [Secretary Spencer] Correct. 01:32:10.440 --> 01:32:11.720 - Sir, as I attempt to interpret that, 01:32:11.720 --> 01:32:15.250 if I could just pile on to what the Secretary is saying, 01:32:15.400 --> 01:32:17.150 I think as I read that, 01:32:17.930 --> 01:32:22.010 it really strengthens the argument 01:32:22.010 --> 01:32:25.090 that our responsibility is to be both safe and ready 01:32:25.610 --> 01:32:28.350 before we go out and get assigned to a mission. 01:32:28.660 --> 01:32:31.950 And so, it's not a tension between safety and readiness 01:32:31.950 --> 01:32:32.783 as I see it. 01:32:32.783 --> 01:32:37.350 We need to cover down on those two fundamental obligations 01:32:37.650 --> 01:32:39.520 before we send that ship forward 01:32:40.190 --> 01:32:41.540 and put it into harm's way. 01:32:41.680 --> 01:32:43.400 - You need both, there's no question about that. 01:32:43.892 --> 01:32:44.725 - [Admiral Richardson] Exactly right. 01:32:44.725 --> 01:32:46.050 - And so it's our obligation, along with yours 01:32:46.050 --> 01:32:48.250 to make sure that you have the tools you need 01:32:48.250 --> 01:32:49.230 at the appropriate time. 01:32:49.230 --> 01:32:50.063 - Exactly. - It's that very thing, 01:32:50.063 --> 01:32:50.896 yes, Sir. 01:32:51.486 --> 01:32:52.850 - [Congressman Norcross] Thank you, I yield back. 01:32:53.120 --> 01:32:54.910 - And thank you very much Congressman Norcross. 01:32:54.910 --> 01:32:57.860 We now proceed to Congressman Jim Langevin of Rhode Island. 01:32:58.330 --> 01:33:00.100 - Thank you Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, 01:33:00.100 --> 01:33:02.150 and Admiral Richardson, thank you for being here 01:33:02.150 --> 01:33:03.100 for your testimony. 01:33:03.990 --> 01:33:06.610 I'd like to just continue on the issue 01:33:06.610 --> 01:33:08.520 of training and readiness. 01:33:09.420 --> 01:33:12.880 So, I'd like to know if and how the Navy 01:33:12.880 --> 01:33:14.390 is looking towards the expertise 01:33:14.390 --> 01:33:19.020 and training regimen of the professional mariner 01:33:19.020 --> 01:33:21.330 community in order to adopt best practices 01:33:21.330 --> 01:33:24.900 and improve upon navigation and seamanship 01:33:24.900 --> 01:33:26.600 and ship handling skills. 01:33:26.600 --> 01:33:31.320 For example, the United States Maritime Resource Center 01:33:31.320 --> 01:33:33.640 in my state of Rhode Island 01:33:33.970 --> 01:33:36.740 delivers professional training and continuous assessment 01:33:36.740 --> 01:33:38.570 of these proficiencies. 01:33:39.110 --> 01:33:41.450 Having provided all of the initial core 01:33:41.970 --> 01:33:44.790 nautical science, and professional maritime training 01:33:44.790 --> 01:33:47.710 for the NOAA Corps, for example. 01:33:48.070 --> 01:33:50.610 So have you considered utilizing in-depth training 01:33:50.610 --> 01:33:54.080 and assessment from the professional mariner community 01:33:54.080 --> 01:33:56.380 to fill any competency gaps 01:33:56.380 --> 01:33:58.060 that you might be facing right now? 01:33:58.230 --> 01:34:01.230 - Sir, we have a pretty good dialog with that community 01:34:01.280 --> 01:34:04.850 and dependent upon capacity and really technology, 01:34:04.850 --> 01:34:06.070 there were times when we were using 01:34:06.070 --> 01:34:07.520 those simulators quite a bit. 01:34:07.770 --> 01:34:10.520 Now, if you go just up the road to Newport, 01:34:10.900 --> 01:34:12.980 we will find some pretty state of the art trainers 01:34:12.980 --> 01:34:14.630 that better simulate some of the ships 01:34:14.630 --> 01:34:18.450 that we're training our officers and Sailors to drive. 01:34:18.850 --> 01:34:21.260 But in terms of standards and approaches, 01:34:21.610 --> 01:34:24.100 I would say it's a vigorous dialog, 01:34:24.890 --> 01:34:27.070 but what I'd like to do is just make sure 01:34:27.070 --> 01:34:28.850 that I'm right you know, and I'm current, 01:34:28.850 --> 01:34:30.300 and I'll get back to you Sir. 01:34:31.420 --> 01:34:33.280 - Okay, good enough, thank you. 01:34:33.670 --> 01:34:36.330 So I also understand the Navy plans to continue 01:34:36.330 --> 01:34:40.650 to conduct in service material inspections every six years 01:34:41.230 --> 01:34:42.620 as opposed to every three, 01:34:42.620 --> 01:34:45.230 potentially delaying necessary maintenance. 01:34:45.590 --> 01:34:48.580 So this is one of those areas where we sung this song before 01:34:48.580 --> 01:34:51.330 and the Navy's current collision record unfortunately 01:34:51.330 --> 01:34:54.110 is partly the result of choices to lessen 01:34:54.310 --> 01:34:57.530 shore side training that were made over a decade ago. 01:34:57.530 --> 01:35:00.770 And while I support reducing burdensome requirements, 01:35:00.770 --> 01:35:03.810 I do worry that loosening these inspection standards 01:35:03.810 --> 01:35:07.010 may set us up for increased maintenance problems 01:35:07.010 --> 01:35:07.843 in the future. 01:35:10.512 --> 01:35:13.050 So, is this a concern for the Navy 01:35:13.050 --> 01:35:16.670 and how do you intend to mitigate this potential risk? 01:35:17.140 --> 01:35:19.540 - Sir, you brought up the matter of inspections. 01:35:19.660 --> 01:35:21.900 And it's an absolute fundamental 01:35:21.970 --> 01:35:23.470 part of the way going forward. 01:35:24.030 --> 01:35:25.830 We want to make sure that we are inspecting 01:35:25.830 --> 01:35:27.000 at the proper frequency, 01:35:27.000 --> 01:35:28.880 and that those inspections are useful to the crew, 01:35:28.880 --> 01:35:30.630 particularly the commanding officer 01:35:30.740 --> 01:35:33.240 so that he or she can make the adjustments 01:35:33.240 --> 01:35:34.990 and continue to improve their crew. 01:35:35.160 --> 01:35:36.810 The Comprehensive Review found that there 01:35:36.810 --> 01:35:39.230 were something on the order of almost 300 01:35:39.590 --> 01:35:42.410 inspections in a typical training cycle, 01:35:42.970 --> 01:35:45.200 many of which never spoke to the commanding officer, 01:35:45.200 --> 01:35:47.950 and it's hard to be honest to even keep track of those. 01:35:48.340 --> 01:35:50.370 You mentioned INSURV, that's one of the critical ones 01:35:50.370 --> 01:35:52.100 for materiel readiness. 01:35:52.370 --> 01:35:55.450 I take those INSURV briefs myself as does the Secretary. 01:35:55.450 --> 01:35:57.700 We've provided an INSURV report to Congress. 01:35:58.070 --> 01:36:00.430 We're moving back to three year periodicity 01:36:00.770 --> 01:36:04.560 where we have a full-on detailed INSURV 01:36:04.560 --> 01:36:06.350 and then three years later we'll have 01:36:06.350 --> 01:36:08.900 sort of a lighter version of that INSURV 01:36:08.900 --> 01:36:10.070 that will come back and validate 01:36:10.070 --> 01:36:11.870 and then have a heavy one again. 01:36:11.950 --> 01:36:15.240 And so, also looking at what do those INSURV's 01:36:15.240 --> 01:36:18.750 actually inspect in terms of articulating 01:36:18.780 --> 01:36:22.100 the materiel readiness to conduct combat operations? 01:36:22.390 --> 01:36:24.190 You know, not all deficiencies are created equal 01:36:24.190 --> 01:36:25.290 when it comes to that, 01:36:25.370 --> 01:36:27.120 and so we are very interested 01:36:27.120 --> 01:36:29.670 and moving forward to make those INSURV inspections 01:36:29.810 --> 01:36:31.400 both at the proper periodicity 01:36:31.640 --> 01:36:33.290 and looking at the proper things. 01:36:35.670 --> 01:36:37.320 - And another topic, 01:36:37.320 --> 01:36:39.790 in order to match supply and demand 01:36:39.790 --> 01:36:42.160 as noted in your Strategic Readiness Review, 01:36:42.160 --> 01:36:44.560 how do you intend to balance re-establishing 01:36:44.560 --> 01:36:48.440 a culture of safety to support sustainable operations 01:36:48.830 --> 01:36:51.730 and the long term goal of persistent readiness 01:36:51.750 --> 01:36:53.330 and the constant need to fill 01:36:54.000 --> 01:36:55.650 increased operational requirements? 01:36:55.650 --> 01:36:58.080 Will you change your processes 01:36:58.399 --> 01:37:02.160 as to how you assess the readiness of ships and Sailors? 01:37:04.425 --> 01:37:06.430 - What we have in place Congressman, 01:37:07.150 --> 01:37:08.450 as you've heard us say before, 01:37:08.450 --> 01:37:09.620 the systems are in place. 01:37:09.620 --> 01:37:12.490 We've had a deviation from the norm. 01:37:13.250 --> 01:37:16.390 And the biggest lever that we have now 01:37:16.390 --> 01:37:20.800 is to have the conversations to bring us back towards norm. 01:37:21.130 --> 01:37:23.910 I believe, and I'll defer to the CNO, 01:37:24.140 --> 01:37:26.930 that we have a pretty good system in place right now 01:37:28.010 --> 01:37:30.990 that has adjudication, the ability to bring supply 01:37:30.990 --> 01:37:33.960 and demand to conversation and an adjudication process. 01:37:34.880 --> 01:37:36.670 But again, what we want to make sure 01:37:36.670 --> 01:37:39.210 is everyone is realizing what the true math is 01:37:39.210 --> 01:37:40.060 with the numbers. 01:37:42.354 --> 01:37:44.380 - Okay, well, thank you both for what you're doing. 01:37:44.380 --> 01:37:46.340 We'll continue to be on top of this. 01:37:46.340 --> 01:37:47.660 Something I'm gonna follow closely, 01:37:47.660 --> 01:37:50.040 and I know my colleagues and I will all do that, 01:37:50.040 --> 01:37:52.820 but thank you for your service and for being here today. 01:37:52.820 --> 01:37:54.830 Look forward to having you back, thank you. 01:37:55.590 --> 01:37:57.070 - Thank you very much Congressman Langevin. 01:37:57.070 --> 01:37:58.260 And we now conclude 01:37:58.260 --> 01:38:00.570 with Congresswoman Liz Cheney of Wyoming. 01:38:01.480 --> 01:38:02.710 - Thank you very much Mr. Chairman 01:38:02.710 --> 01:38:04.390 and thanks for your indulgence 01:38:04.390 --> 01:38:05.470 and the committee's indulgence 01:38:05.470 --> 01:38:07.070 in allowing me to be here today. 01:38:07.180 --> 01:38:09.820 Thank you very much Secretary Spencer 01:38:09.820 --> 01:38:13.970 and Admiral Richardson for your service and for being here. 01:38:14.340 --> 01:38:16.420 And I don't have a question. 01:38:16.420 --> 01:38:19.060 I have appreciated very much the chance to sit in, 01:38:19.060 --> 01:38:21.680 to understand where things stand, where you're going. 01:38:21.680 --> 01:38:24.540 But I also want to echo what you've heard 01:38:24.550 --> 01:38:26.000 a number of times here today. 01:38:26.040 --> 01:38:29.170 And that is, that we take very seriously, 01:38:29.630 --> 01:38:31.860 it's not just a situation, as you know, 01:38:32.208 --> 01:38:35.590 where we are in a holding pattern because of the CRs. 01:38:36.200 --> 01:38:38.300 But we, there are many of us, 01:38:39.330 --> 01:38:42.350 particularly on armed services but broadly 01:38:42.650 --> 01:38:44.260 who are consistently making the point 01:38:44.260 --> 01:38:46.150 that we are causing damage. 01:38:46.420 --> 01:38:49.440 That every time we vote for another continuing resolution 01:38:49.440 --> 01:38:50.490 we are doing damage. 01:38:50.490 --> 01:38:52.130 One more day is more damage. 01:38:52.130 --> 01:38:54.280 And you've made that point very eloquently. 01:38:55.540 --> 01:38:57.790 We're at a situation where we have to make sure 01:38:57.790 --> 01:39:01.150 that the members of Congress recognize and understand 01:39:02.140 --> 01:39:05.700 that our constitutional obligation is not being fulfilled 01:39:05.700 --> 01:39:08.070 so long as we don't provide that kind of stable 01:39:08.350 --> 01:39:10.600 and sufficient funding that you've discussed. 01:39:10.700 --> 01:39:12.640 We've passed, as you well know, 01:39:12.680 --> 01:39:14.600 the National Defense Authorization Act 01:39:14.680 --> 01:39:16.930 and the Appropriations Act through the House. 01:39:17.260 --> 01:39:18.870 The Senate's passed the Authorization, 01:39:18.870 --> 01:39:20.360 but we've got to get the Appropriations 01:39:20.360 --> 01:39:21.660 passed through the Senate. 01:39:21.810 --> 01:39:24.190 And I would just say in closing 01:39:24.190 --> 01:39:26.970 that one of the things that has become very clear 01:39:27.060 --> 01:39:28.600 in my short time here 01:39:29.125 --> 01:39:31.710 is how important it is we remind our colleagues 01:39:31.710 --> 01:39:34.530 that we cannot treat defense spending the way that we treat 01:39:34.530 --> 01:39:35.760 every other part of the budget, 01:39:35.760 --> 01:39:38.310 and every other part of the appropriations process. 01:39:38.440 --> 01:39:42.020 But we've got to recognize that if we fail to get this right 01:39:42.020 --> 01:39:44.050 and if we fail to get the resources, 01:39:44.324 --> 01:39:47.620 that our military needs to defend and protect us, 01:39:47.890 --> 01:39:50.930 it doesn't matter how important we think tax cuts are, 01:39:50.930 --> 01:39:53.230 it doesn't matter how important we think health reform is, 01:39:53.230 --> 01:39:54.760 it doesn't matter how important 01:39:54.760 --> 01:39:57.250 any of the other matters we deal with are. 01:39:57.490 --> 01:40:00.230 If we fail to get this fundamental issue right, 01:40:01.230 --> 01:40:03.430 then none of those other things will matter. 01:40:03.893 --> 01:40:06.530 And so we are very grateful, I am very grateful 01:40:06.530 --> 01:40:09.330 for your being very frank and direct. 01:40:09.510 --> 01:40:11.260 We urge you to continue to do that. 01:40:11.350 --> 01:40:13.560 And we're continuing to fight here. 01:40:13.580 --> 01:40:15.960 We're gonna need some very significant reforms 01:40:15.960 --> 01:40:17.690 to the entire budget process 01:40:17.930 --> 01:40:19.630 in order to be able to get out of 01:40:20.310 --> 01:40:21.520 the rut that we've been in 01:40:21.520 --> 01:40:23.010 and the real damage that's been done 01:40:23.010 --> 01:40:25.560 with the continuing resolutions for multiple years. 01:40:26.120 --> 01:40:28.290 But I thank very much the committee for it's time 01:40:28.290 --> 01:40:29.880 and I thank you very much for your service 01:40:29.880 --> 01:40:30.830 and for being here. 01:40:32.000 --> 01:40:33.440 - If I could respond to the Congresswoman. 01:40:33.440 --> 01:40:35.870 It would be remiss if I didn't put a dot on this 01:40:35.870 --> 01:40:37.570 because I know many of you in this room 01:40:37.570 --> 01:40:38.510 have heard this before. 01:40:38.510 --> 01:40:39.750 But to go on the record, 01:40:40.040 --> 01:40:42.450 we were asked to compute in the United States Navy 01:40:42.450 --> 01:40:45.400 what nine continuing resolutions have cost us. 01:40:46.133 --> 01:40:47.900 It has cost us $4 billion. 01:40:48.830 --> 01:40:50.300 That's not lost opportunity. 01:40:50.300 --> 01:40:53.120 That's $4 billion in cash in a trash can 01:40:53.120 --> 01:40:54.470 with lighter fluid burn it. 01:40:54.990 --> 01:40:57.360 And that's the impact the continuing resolutions 01:40:57.360 --> 01:41:00.290 have looking back at in a totally quantitative basis. 01:41:00.310 --> 01:41:02.510 - Yup, well and I appreciate that very much. 01:41:03.141 --> 01:41:05.730 And of course, in addition to that, 01:41:05.730 --> 01:41:08.080 we're to the point where we're seeing an impact 01:41:08.290 --> 01:41:11.460 in lives as well, as you know far better than I do. 01:41:12.480 --> 01:41:13.780 The other piece I would just point out 01:41:13.780 --> 01:41:14.710 is we're seeing an impact 01:41:14.710 --> 01:41:16.460 in terms of aid to our adversaries. 01:41:16.660 --> 01:41:20.600 And again, the fact that one body appears 01:41:20.600 --> 01:41:21.840 unable to do its job, 01:41:21.840 --> 01:41:23.190 the fact that the Senate is unable 01:41:23.190 --> 01:41:24.940 to do its constitutional obligation 01:41:25.150 --> 01:41:27.660 to pass an appropriations bill for defense 01:41:27.890 --> 01:41:29.580 doesn't absolve the House of Representatives 01:41:29.580 --> 01:41:31.490 from doing its job and its duty. 01:41:31.490 --> 01:41:33.470 And we are very committed to making sure 01:41:33.470 --> 01:41:35.170 that we do that and we get it done 01:41:35.330 --> 01:41:38.350 and get the United States Senate to pass it as well 01:41:38.350 --> 01:41:40.490 so we can get it to the President's desk for signature. 01:41:40.490 --> 01:41:42.390 Thank you very much, and I yield back. 01:41:42.680 --> 01:41:44.700 - And thank you very much Congresswoman Cheney 01:41:44.700 --> 01:41:48.220 and we particularly appreciate your appreciation 01:41:48.260 --> 01:41:51.070 of your constituents, Secretary and Mrs. Spencer 01:41:51.070 --> 01:41:52.020 who are here today. 01:41:52.990 --> 01:41:55.490 And then Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, 01:41:55.970 --> 01:41:58.260 as a grateful Navy dad myself, 01:41:58.570 --> 01:42:00.240 thank you for your candid remarks 01:42:00.870 --> 01:42:03.000 and thank you for following through 01:42:03.290 --> 01:42:06.252 on trying to address the issue of this catastrophic 01:42:06.252 --> 01:42:10.160 series of events and the Navy's plans to get back on course. 01:42:10.550 --> 01:42:13.640 Many of us have visited the Fitzgerald at Yokosuka, Japan 01:42:13.960 --> 01:42:15.810 and our sympathy has been underscored 01:42:16.050 --> 01:42:18.830 for the families who have been so gruesomely affected. 01:42:19.380 --> 01:42:22.730 We invite the Navy to return and update the sub-committees 01:42:22.900 --> 01:42:24.650 when your progress in a few months. 01:42:24.800 --> 01:42:26.850 Thank you Margaret Dean for your service. 01:42:27.080 --> 01:42:28.430 This hearing is adjourned.