WEBVTT 00:02.250 --> 00:03.860 - All right, good morning, everyone. 00:03.860 --> 00:05.850 Today, we're joined by Marine Brigadier General 00:05.850 --> 00:08.500 James F. Glynn, who is the deputy commanding general 00:08.900 --> 00:10.290 of Special Operations Joint Task 00:10.290 --> 00:12.090 Force-Operation Inherent Resolve. 00:12.830 --> 00:15.300 General Glynn is currently briefs us 00:15.300 --> 00:17.740 from Baghdad, Iraq, and is responsible 00:17.740 --> 00:21.630 for U.S. special operations activities in Iraq specifically. 00:22.100 --> 00:23.610 With that, we'll start with a radio check. 00:23.610 --> 00:25.410 General Glynn, sir, how do you hear us? 00:28.750 --> 00:30.120 - I have you very well, Adrian. 00:30.120 --> 00:31.170 Thanks, how 'bout me? 00:31.870 --> 00:32.703 - Very clearly. 00:33.140 --> 00:33.973 Why don't we get started, sir, 00:33.973 --> 00:36.140 with if you have an opening statement for us? 00:42.870 --> 00:43.730 - Say that again? 00:44.270 --> 00:45.410 - Sir, we'll get started. 00:45.410 --> 00:47.310 If you have an opening statement for us? 00:50.560 --> 00:53.050 - Okay, yeah, sure, I could open up with a few comments, 00:53.050 --> 00:55.980 and then we'll turn it over to you, there, for questions. 00:55.980 --> 00:57.380 So good morning, everyone. 00:58.270 --> 01:01.360 Iraqi Security Forces continue to pursue 01:01.360 --> 01:03.220 the few ISIS fighters that seek 01:03.220 --> 01:04.850 to threaten the people of Iraq, 01:05.420 --> 01:08.310 and clear previously ISIS-occupied areas, 01:08.520 --> 01:10.470 making them safe for residents. 01:11.040 --> 01:12.870 The campaign against ISIS has resulted 01:12.870 --> 01:15.230 in over 4.5 million people in Iraq 01:15.230 --> 01:17.680 liberated from the evil of ISIS, 01:17.680 --> 01:20.530 and we congratulate the government of Iraq on their success, 01:20.530 --> 01:22.280 and are proud to stand beside them. 01:22.610 --> 01:25.370 However, we must not lose sight of the fact 01:25.520 --> 01:28.080 that much work remains to ensure the enduring defeat 01:28.080 --> 01:30.270 of this evil terrorist ideology. 01:31.430 --> 01:33.190 ISIS has demonstrated its desire 01:33.190 --> 01:35.050 to return to its terrorist roots, 01:35.050 --> 01:37.720 with the bombings and attacks that have killed 01:37.720 --> 01:40.960 innocent civilians in Ramadi, Nasiriyah, Baghdad 01:40.960 --> 01:43.730 and elsewhere over the past several weeks. 01:44.120 --> 01:46.750 Our Iraqi partners continue to provide security, 01:46.760 --> 01:48.840 which will increasingly include policing 01:48.840 --> 01:51.220 and border control functions to prevent 01:51.220 --> 01:53.930 the migration and re-emergence of the ISIS threat. 01:55.370 --> 01:58.530 Through this success, the Coalition Joint Task Force remains 01:58.530 --> 02:01.020 committed to working with our Iraqi partners 02:01.020 --> 02:04.430 to root out and destroy the remaining ISIS fighters 02:04.690 --> 02:06.740 and the influence they attempt to peddle. 02:07.430 --> 02:09.660 We anticipate this will take some time, 02:09.660 --> 02:12.350 since ISIS fighters are hiding in the mountains 02:12.350 --> 02:14.180 and amongst the civilian population. 02:14.820 --> 02:16.770 But it is necessary in order to ensure 02:16.770 --> 02:20.420 the sustained security to Iraq and guarantee 02:20.420 --> 02:22.040 the safety of the Iraqi people. 02:23.210 --> 02:25.970 The ISF has proven itself a legitimate fighting force 02:25.970 --> 02:28.240 that has and will continue their momentum, 02:28.850 --> 02:30.960 provide security for the people of Iraq, 02:30.980 --> 02:33.700 and quell the rise of new insurgencies. 02:34.480 --> 02:36.670 This has been shown in the last few weeks, 02:36.670 --> 02:39.410 as the ISF has destroyed over a hundred IEDs 02:40.000 --> 02:42.950 and thousands of pounds of explosives across Iraq. 02:43.990 --> 02:46.640 As we look forward to the next stage in the campaign, 02:46.820 --> 02:48.830 the coalition will continue to assist 02:49.030 --> 02:51.840 in consolidating gains made over the past few years. 02:53.040 --> 02:55.710 This involves the stabilization of security 02:55.710 --> 02:58.720 and essential services, focused predominantly 02:58.720 --> 03:00.670 in areas where ISIS once dominated. 03:00.820 --> 03:03.070 And our Iraqi partners will make this happen. 03:04.520 --> 03:06.330 This does not consist of nation-building 03:06.330 --> 03:08.180 or large construction projects. 03:08.570 --> 03:11.060 It instead focuses on returning the nation 03:11.060 --> 03:13.160 and people of Iraq to a state of normalcy. 03:13.740 --> 03:16.250 Residents can concentrate on earning a living, 03:16.670 --> 03:18.190 taking care of their families. 03:18.590 --> 03:21.080 It means enabling local governance, 03:21.460 --> 03:24.180 moving towards self-sufficiency, in other words, 03:24.180 --> 03:28.347 getting back to a normal life, free from the threat of ISIS, 03:28.620 --> 03:30.170 and ensuring it doesn't return. 03:31.410 --> 03:34.710 The CJTF will continue to be value added to our partners 03:34.710 --> 03:38.290 by providing training, equipment, advice and assistance 03:38.730 --> 03:41.960 that enables security and ultimately expanding 03:41.960 --> 03:45.680 the government's and non-governmental organizations' access 03:46.070 --> 03:48.910 to offer assistance to the people of Iraq, which will 03:48.910 --> 03:52.020 ultimately lead to more regional and global stability. 03:52.930 --> 03:55.080 The government of Iraq is currently focused 03:55.190 --> 03:57.160 on providing essential services for people 03:57.160 --> 04:00.320 most affected by the campaign against ISIS. 04:01.010 --> 04:03.350 This is evident across Iraq as schools continue 04:03.350 --> 04:05.860 to open, people return to their homes 04:05.860 --> 04:08.250 and local security forces are established. 04:09.040 --> 04:11.650 Several weeks ago, the Iraqi police conducted 04:11.650 --> 04:15.130 a graduation ceremony for 300 new police officers. 04:16.220 --> 04:18.750 An international aid agency has provided 04:18.750 --> 04:22.620 over 280,000 people across Iraq with access to clean water. 04:23.670 --> 04:25.680 Iraqi soldiers have helped repair desks 04:25.680 --> 04:27.580 so that children can return to school. 04:28.470 --> 04:31.510 And the United Nations migration agency recently announced 04:31.510 --> 04:34.430 that, since 2013, the number of Iraqis 04:34.430 --> 04:37.030 that have returned to their homes exceeds 04:37.030 --> 04:40.540 the number of displaced Iraqis previously reported. 04:41.810 --> 04:44.260 For us in the Special Operations Joint Task Force 04:44.270 --> 04:47.420 here in Iraq, as an element of the CJTF, we continue to work 04:47.810 --> 04:50.620 with Iraqi security forces in many training missions. 04:51.710 --> 04:55.700 Since the beginning of January 2015, the coalition has 04:55.700 --> 04:59.000 helped train over 120,000 Iraqi security forces, 04:59.000 --> 05:01.820 to include the counterterrorism force, 05:02.070 --> 05:04.810 Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense forces. 05:05.750 --> 05:09.390 Within the past couple months, a thousand Iraqi men 05:09.390 --> 05:12.160 have graduated from the counterterrorism service's 05:12.160 --> 05:15.010 basic training, and 500 more are scheduled 05:15.010 --> 05:17.980 to graduate from CTS in a coming week. 05:18.720 --> 05:20.860 There are about 4,000 Iraqis who are currently 05:20.860 --> 05:23.420 undergoing coalition-enabled training, as well. 05:24.230 --> 05:27.250 And the SOJTF works closely with counterterrorism, 05:27.250 --> 05:31.240 commando and SWAT forces to ensure violent extremism doesn't 05:31.240 --> 05:34.850 threaten the livelihood of the people of Iraq ever again. 05:35.990 --> 05:38.280 They are professional and capable forces committed 05:38.280 --> 05:40.790 to the future of Iraq, and we quite honestly 05:40.790 --> 05:42.490 take pride in their successes. 05:43.280 --> 05:44.650 I'll share with you an example 05:44.650 --> 05:46.650 that demonstrates their professionalism. 05:47.830 --> 05:50.090 During the height of conflict in Mosul, 05:50.160 --> 05:53.270 there was a CTS soldier on guard who observed 05:53.270 --> 05:55.770 several ISIS fighters moving towards his position. 05:56.840 --> 05:58.650 With no time to warn his teammates, 05:58.650 --> 06:00.200 he engaged one of the fighters. 06:00.960 --> 06:02.850 The four remaining ISIS fighters unleashed 06:02.850 --> 06:05.400 a hail of gunfire on the CTS position, 06:05.600 --> 06:09.140 hitting this particular CTS soldier five times. 06:10.270 --> 06:12.720 With bravery, he continued to defend his position 06:12.840 --> 06:14.330 as another ISIS fighter attempted 06:14.330 --> 06:16.280 to enter through the back of the house. 06:16.810 --> 06:18.730 CTS soldier was able to shoot the fighter 06:18.730 --> 06:21.640 before he entered the home, but not before the combatant 06:21.640 --> 06:23.620 was able to detonate his suicide belt. 06:24.490 --> 06:26.580 The blast from the detonation threw 06:26.580 --> 06:28.510 the already-wounded CTS soldier 06:28.880 --> 06:30.840 into a wall, further injuring him. 06:31.620 --> 06:34.160 Still fighting, however, now alongside 06:34.160 --> 06:36.000 his awakened teammates, they were able 06:36.000 --> 06:38.220 to drive away the remaining ISIS fighters. 06:39.190 --> 06:41.940 And his actions reflect the courage, tenacity 06:42.310 --> 06:43.900 and strength it takes to be a member 06:43.900 --> 06:45.640 of the elite counterterrorism service 06:45.640 --> 06:47.650 here in Iraq and explain a little bit 06:47.650 --> 06:49.550 about the culture of the organization. 06:51.060 --> 06:53.010 We applaud the successes of other elements 06:53.010 --> 06:55.560 of the Iraqi Security Forces, just about all of whom 06:55.560 --> 06:58.010 we've personally seen in action against ISIS. 06:58.640 --> 07:00.890 Their success has been evident time and again 07:00.960 --> 07:02.680 in the dismantling of threats 07:03.060 --> 07:05.190 and tyranny held on communities. 07:05.830 --> 07:07.440 We see this not only through the defeat 07:07.440 --> 07:08.870 of ISIS on the battlefield, 07:09.400 --> 07:12.460 but also through the marked drop in ISIS propaganda. 07:13.670 --> 07:15.720 Although ISIS has been militarily defeated, 07:15.720 --> 07:18.670 we recognize the post-conflict challenges they present. 07:19.360 --> 07:21.860 As we recognize these challenges, we wish to extend 07:21.860 --> 07:25.200 our sympathies to those who were killed and injured 07:26.240 --> 07:29.240 in the suicide attack in a Baghdad market just yesterday. 07:29.930 --> 07:33.050 This attack is another example of the cowardice, evil 07:33.370 --> 07:35.890 and the desperate acts that ISIS 07:35.890 --> 07:40.057 and other violent extremists who want to remain 07:40.060 --> 07:44.180 relevant throughout this area of operation will execute. 07:44.910 --> 07:46.930 We're dedicated to working with our partners 07:46.930 --> 07:48.640 on the permanent defeat of ISIS. 07:49.220 --> 07:51.450 The coalition will be here to help, 07:51.450 --> 07:54.300 as we have been thus far, and we look forward 07:54.300 --> 07:58.400 to the future that we all see as a safe, secure Iraq, 07:58.400 --> 08:00.450 where people can live their lives freely, 08:01.000 --> 08:03.350 with a government dedicated to protecting them. 08:04.370 --> 08:06.320 And with that, I look forward to your questions. 08:06.320 --> 08:07.153 Thank you. 08:07.860 --> 08:08.693 - Thank you, sir. 08:08.693 --> 08:10.220 We'll start with Joe Tabet from Al Hurra. 08:10.220 --> 08:11.053 - Thank you. 08:11.160 --> 08:13.640 General Glynn, I would like to ask you 08:13.640 --> 08:17.580 about the border force that the U.S. 08:17.580 --> 08:20.480 is backing in Eastern Syria. 08:21.590 --> 08:24.720 If you could explain, give us more details about this force. 08:25.160 --> 08:28.680 And what are the implications of this decision 08:29.130 --> 08:32.010 on Turkey, when we heard, this morning, 08:32.330 --> 08:35.820 the Turkish president saying that the Turkish military will 08:35.820 --> 08:39.880 attack Afrin, and mainly the YPG in Afrin? 08:39.880 --> 08:42.980 So, if you could address that, thank you. 08:48.570 --> 08:50.640 - Yeah, thanks for that question. 08:51.610 --> 08:53.310 Unfortunately, I don't have a lot 08:53.310 --> 08:55.280 of information on that particular subject. 08:55.280 --> 08:58.410 As it was stated in the opening, my emphasis, 08:58.630 --> 09:01.980 here in Baghdad, is on operations in Iraq. 09:01.980 --> 09:04.670 And so what I can tell you is, 09:04.670 --> 09:07.430 as I mentioned, as our emphasis here, 09:07.430 --> 09:11.597 the Iraqi security force emphasis, returns and focuses 09:11.750 --> 09:15.090 on local policing and securing their borders. 09:15.960 --> 09:20.127 As you're aware, ISIS has tried to take advantage of areas 09:20.130 --> 09:22.640 such as that, that would be seen as vulnerabilities. 09:22.640 --> 09:25.100 So I could tell you that that is 09:25.100 --> 09:27.270 important for the Iraqi security forces 09:27.270 --> 09:29.650 and something they're focused on, going forward. 09:31.662 --> 09:34.050 - Next to Laurie Mylroie with Kurdistan 24. 09:34.300 --> 09:35.133 - Hi, General. 09:35.133 --> 09:37.430 Thank you very much for this briefing. 09:37.570 --> 09:40.490 Since you're special operations, I wonder, 09:40.490 --> 09:44.657 and on Kurdistan 24, we hear of the Peshmerga 09:44.840 --> 09:47.126 and think of them as a kind of conventional army. 09:47.126 --> 09:49.130 But is there a special operations 09:49.130 --> 09:50.910 unit within the Kurdish forces? 10:01.428 --> 10:02.950 - I had a little bit of trouble hearing you. 10:02.950 --> 10:05.630 I think you asked about the Kurdish forces 10:06.680 --> 10:09.450 and what kind of capabilities they have. 10:10.890 --> 10:15.057 Across Iraq, the security forces are 10:15.910 --> 10:19.400 arrayed to handle the situations 10:19.400 --> 10:22.380 that are presented to them. 10:22.960 --> 10:27.127 And so, as an example, I think about Kirkuk, 10:27.360 --> 10:30.910 where they have both a SWAT and a commando unit 10:31.710 --> 10:33.840 that are capable of handling 10:34.210 --> 10:36.180 any and all threats that emerge. 10:36.620 --> 10:40.020 And I think you'll find, similarly, we find, similarly, 10:40.020 --> 10:43.820 in just about every large population center, 10:44.120 --> 10:46.160 that you'll have some force that's focused 10:46.160 --> 10:50.060 exclusively on counterterrorism and the special weapons 10:50.060 --> 10:52.870 and tactics that would come with a police SWAT unit. 10:53.660 --> 10:56.710 - Maybe I could make sure. 10:56.950 --> 11:00.710 Is there an equivalent of special forces 11:00.910 --> 11:04.700 within the Peshmerga, distinct from the regular Peshmerga, 11:04.700 --> 11:07.860 like there is, say, in the Iraqi army or in the U.S. Army? 11:17.370 --> 11:19.030 - No, there's no element that's 11:19.030 --> 11:21.490 distinguished separate, that I'm aware of, 11:21.490 --> 11:25.220 within the Peshmerga or any of the forces. 11:26.030 --> 11:29.830 - Okay, and let me ask you also about there are news reports 11:30.350 --> 11:34.060 that the Iraqis are preparing an offensive 11:34.060 --> 11:37.720 against ISIS around Tuz Khurmatu. 11:37.720 --> 11:40.640 Is there coordination still ongoing 11:40.870 --> 11:43.970 between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi forces 11:43.970 --> 11:46.670 in attacking these ISIS remnants, do you know? 11:56.440 --> 11:58.410 - That one was a little bit hard to hear. 11:58.410 --> 12:00.570 Could you say the question again? 12:00.570 --> 12:03.340 I caught Tuz Khurmatu and the Kurds 12:04.020 --> 12:06.110 or the Iraqi forces in Peshmerga. 12:06.310 --> 12:10.030 - Okay, there are news reports that 12:11.200 --> 12:14.610 the Iraqi forces are preparing an offensive 12:15.160 --> 12:19.327 against ISIS remnants around Tuz Khurmatu, which is very, 12:19.730 --> 12:21.710 you know, one of the disputed areas. 12:22.130 --> 12:26.280 Is there coordination between the Peshmerga 12:26.290 --> 12:30.440 and the Iraqi army that is still ongoing 12:30.440 --> 12:33.990 for such an offensive or would that be the Iraqi army alone? 12:34.080 --> 12:35.680 Would you be familiar with that? 12:41.030 --> 12:43.950 - Yeah, I'm familiar with the situation 12:43.950 --> 12:45.890 in the area of Tuz Khurmatu. 12:45.890 --> 12:49.310 And I know that, like any place 12:49.310 --> 12:52.190 that has that kind of challenge, 12:53.020 --> 12:56.910 the challenges to security that would put at risk 12:56.910 --> 12:59.770 the stability of the local area that it has 12:59.770 --> 13:02.440 the attention of any security force in the area. 13:02.890 --> 13:06.980 And so, at a military level, there is always 13:06.980 --> 13:11.147 discussions between any of the forces that could cooperate 13:11.650 --> 13:14.200 to achieve security in a local area 13:14.200 --> 13:16.050 and that is the case in Tuz Khurmatu. 13:17.610 --> 13:19.860 - Next to Jeff Schogol with Task and Purpose. 13:20.243 --> 13:21.790 - Thank you, General. 13:22.050 --> 13:24.930 Has ISIS become an insurgency? 13:24.930 --> 13:28.870 If so, has the mission changed to counter-insurgency? 13:35.700 --> 13:37.600 - Hey, thanks for that question, Jeff. 13:39.160 --> 13:40.990 I would say that 13:43.520 --> 13:47.687 it would be too early to make that kind of an assessment. 13:48.510 --> 13:50.730 I would tell you that I certainly look 13:50.730 --> 13:52.540 for those types of indicators. 13:53.080 --> 13:56.410 However, it's just too soon. 13:56.420 --> 13:59.950 There are still remnants of ISIS 13:59.950 --> 14:03.830 who reside in a cellular structure 14:04.540 --> 14:08.440 who seek to bring instability to local areas, 14:08.440 --> 14:10.420 in particular population centers. 14:10.990 --> 14:14.710 And that remains as it has for some time 14:14.980 --> 14:17.200 the focus of the Iraqi security forces 14:17.530 --> 14:19.920 and their counterterrorism forces specifically. 14:20.640 --> 14:23.170 This did not allow those elements 14:23.170 --> 14:27.060 to form into a network or something 14:27.060 --> 14:28.870 that could look like an insurgency. 14:29.290 --> 14:32.610 - If I could follow up, if you have cells of ISIS 14:32.610 --> 14:36.530 committing terrorist acts, how is that not an insurgency? 14:45.790 --> 14:49.957 - Jeff, there's no indicator of any coordination. 14:51.440 --> 14:55.607 It's merely a matter of disparate 14:56.480 --> 15:00.647 cellular structures trying to have 15:00.790 --> 15:03.510 some legitimacy, some recognition 15:04.810 --> 15:08.977 and, frankly, to be, at this point, to be disruptive. 15:09.700 --> 15:13.780 I think that's what you saw in the 15:14.260 --> 15:16.780 double suicide vest attack in Baghdad, 15:17.530 --> 15:21.480 which is a disruptive act on the behalf 15:21.480 --> 15:24.690 of an organization focused on violence. 15:27.840 --> 15:30.180 - All right, next to Lita from AP. 15:31.080 --> 15:32.780 - Hi General, Lita Baldor with AP. 15:34.090 --> 15:37.150 Just one quick followup on Jeff's question. 15:37.310 --> 15:39.940 You said there's no indicator of any coordination. 15:39.940 --> 15:44.107 Are you talking about ISIS as a whole across Iraq, 15:44.160 --> 15:46.910 that there is no indication that there is 15:46.910 --> 15:50.290 any coordination within the terror group at all? 15:56.570 --> 16:00.640 - Lita, what I'm saying is that there are 16:03.110 --> 16:06.350 remnants of ISIS who have been isolated 16:07.140 --> 16:11.180 and face some pretty dire choices. 16:12.200 --> 16:15.690 And they are to try to come together 16:17.410 --> 16:19.440 with potentially with other elements, 16:20.310 --> 16:24.010 or to try to relocate somewhere else 16:24.450 --> 16:27.550 and what the government of Iraq 16:27.720 --> 16:31.280 and their very capable security forces are focused on 16:31.680 --> 16:33.980 is ensuring that that doesn't happen, 16:34.640 --> 16:38.520 to lock them down where they are and to give them 16:38.520 --> 16:42.540 no alternatives but to be captured or killed. 16:45.014 --> 16:49.181 - Can you give me an assessment of how much of your force 16:49.790 --> 16:53.870 is actively advising and assisting and working 16:53.870 --> 16:58.037 with the Iraqi units versus how much of it 16:58.660 --> 17:02.150 is, you know, just doing sort of broader based training? 17:08.480 --> 17:12.647 - On the special operations specifically, Lita, 17:12.900 --> 17:17.067 I would say about, I mean, I'm pulling it 17:17.210 --> 17:20.600 out of thin air to be honest, but the vast majority, I mean, 17:20.600 --> 17:24.767 75, 80% of what we're doing is advising and assisting 17:26.150 --> 17:30.317 our Iraqi counterparts in an active role. 17:31.150 --> 17:34.810 Increasingly, the good news story is increasingly, 17:34.870 --> 17:38.500 they execute an operation on their own. 17:39.390 --> 17:41.620 And the advice and assistance we're 17:41.620 --> 17:44.330 providing them is in the planning and 17:45.700 --> 17:49.180 in the post-operational aspect 17:49.480 --> 17:52.290 of exploiting what they've gotten 17:52.400 --> 17:55.390 when they have captured the individual 17:55.390 --> 17:59.530 who they're looking for and any of the associated materials 17:59.530 --> 18:02.590 they might have available to exploit. 18:04.400 --> 18:05.350 - [Lita] Thank you. 18:05.370 --> 18:07.370 - Next to Tara Copp with Military Times. 18:07.550 --> 18:09.300 - Hi, thank you for doing this. 18:10.240 --> 18:12.640 I wanted to talk about contractors for a minute. 18:12.710 --> 18:15.060 Over the last year, the number of contractors 18:15.060 --> 18:17.930 in Iraq has increased significantly, 18:17.930 --> 18:21.450 even though major operations have dwindled. 18:22.560 --> 18:24.240 Is the U.S. transitioning a lot 18:24.240 --> 18:27.600 of these roles to contractors, and, if not, 18:27.810 --> 18:29.820 why would that footprint be getting bigger 18:29.820 --> 18:33.740 if the kinetic mission there has reduced? 18:39.720 --> 18:41.380 - Thanks for the question, Tara. 18:41.540 --> 18:45.707 I honestly am not familiar at all 18:46.060 --> 18:47.600 with the contracting numbers. 18:48.080 --> 18:51.100 So I would deflect to somebody there 18:51.100 --> 18:53.990 in the Pentagon to help you talk specifically 18:54.460 --> 18:56.900 about what direction they're trending. 18:57.280 --> 18:59.530 I can tell you, the few contractors that I work with 18:59.530 --> 19:03.697 every day play a very significant role in our operations. 19:04.080 --> 19:06.180 But their numbers have not changed at all. 19:06.920 --> 19:09.400 - As the number of military operations 19:09.420 --> 19:11.510 against ISIS in Iraq has gone down, 19:11.510 --> 19:14.180 have the numbers of troops in Iraq gone down? 19:14.240 --> 19:16.710 And, if so, can you give us a ballpark number? 19:23.380 --> 19:27.547 - So, first of all, I wouldn't categorize 19:28.070 --> 19:31.680 the number of military operations in Iraq as going down. 19:32.720 --> 19:35.870 What has gone down are operations to liberate 19:35.870 --> 19:38.880 terrain that ISIS formerly held. 19:39.200 --> 19:43.367 But you got to give credit to the Iraqi Security Forces 19:43.490 --> 19:46.410 who, quite frankly, night after night, day after day, 19:47.090 --> 19:48.600 are getting out there and getting 19:48.600 --> 19:52.090 after whatever they become aware of 19:52.090 --> 19:55.640 or, in some instances, just proactively moving out 19:55.640 --> 19:58.640 to patrol and secure local areas. 19:59.440 --> 20:03.607 So that doesn't lend itself to anything, 20:03.930 --> 20:06.740 numbers-wise, moving one direction or the other. 20:07.000 --> 20:08.950 - Are U.S. and coalition, oh. 20:09.430 --> 20:11.330 - With regards to numbers, I would say 20:12.830 --> 20:16.280 it's less about numbers as it is about capability. 20:16.880 --> 20:21.047 And what, I think can certainly be acknowledged 20:21.350 --> 20:23.340 is that what you'll see on our part is 20:24.121 --> 20:27.021 probably a shift in capability is what I would anticipate, 20:27.100 --> 20:30.080 based on what the needs are going forward. 20:31.480 --> 20:35.580 - And we lost you for just a part of your response. 20:35.900 --> 20:39.040 But, to get back to the shift in capability, 20:39.040 --> 20:41.970 so are you seeing the U.S. forces that are there, 20:41.970 --> 20:44.830 on the ground, and the coalition forces there on the ground, 20:45.410 --> 20:47.520 what they are doing has changed? 20:55.060 --> 20:57.000 - You know, I would categorize it 20:57.000 --> 21:00.250 as we were very actively 21:02.260 --> 21:06.080 in a position to support the Iraqi Security Forces 21:06.090 --> 21:07.840 as they moved around the country, 21:08.410 --> 21:10.760 in some instances simultaneously, 21:11.500 --> 21:14.100 to liberate particular areas. 21:14.550 --> 21:16.130 For example, during my tenure here, 21:16.130 --> 21:20.297 they left Mosul and went to Tal Afar and to Hawija 21:21.100 --> 21:24.160 and then out west to Al Anbar and Al-Qa'im. 21:24.710 --> 21:27.020 And so our positioning and our support 21:27.020 --> 21:30.630 was specific to those particular missions. 21:30.720 --> 21:33.380 What we've done now, in particular, 21:33.380 --> 21:36.900 on the special operations side, is gone 21:36.900 --> 21:39.800 where our partners have gone and continued 21:39.800 --> 21:43.870 to support them with whatever they deem necessary. 21:43.870 --> 21:48.037 Oftentimes, it comes in the form of intelligence, planning, 21:49.030 --> 21:51.290 some of the things like I mentioned earlier, 21:51.290 --> 21:54.270 exploitation of materials after an operation, 21:54.850 --> 21:57.340 and that the operations are increasingly done 21:57.650 --> 21:59.920 without us physically present with them. 22:01.230 --> 22:02.480 - [Tara] Okay, thank you. 22:03.280 --> 22:04.750 - Sir, if you could identify yourself 22:04.750 --> 22:06.022 and your affiliation, please. 22:06.022 --> 22:10.189 - (mumbles) So, General, Iraqis are preparing 22:10.460 --> 22:13.450 for parliamentary elections in mid-May. 22:13.730 --> 22:17.897 Are you concerned that ISIS and other militant groups 22:18.590 --> 22:21.640 might increase their activities 22:22.870 --> 22:26.490 just to disrupt the campaigns for the elections? 22:34.580 --> 22:36.080 - So thanks for that question. 22:37.214 --> 22:40.570 The Iraqi election upcoming in May 22:40.570 --> 22:43.040 is actually a very exciting opportunity. 22:43.580 --> 22:47.747 And the types of activities that I just described 22:47.780 --> 22:50.880 a moment ago, in terms of what the Iraqi Security Forces, 22:51.160 --> 22:53.890 local police forces are doing, are exactly 22:53.890 --> 22:57.700 the types of things that they assess, 22:57.800 --> 23:01.600 and I would certainly agree, need to be done now 23:02.000 --> 23:03.700 to ensure that the conditions are set 23:03.700 --> 23:05.730 so we don't have to be concerned 23:05.730 --> 23:08.790 about exactly the types of things you just described. 23:09.280 --> 23:13.180 And so, we're engaged in conversations 23:13.180 --> 23:16.480 and planning with our Iraqi counterparts right now, 23:17.000 --> 23:19.370 to talk about the things that need to be done now 23:19.370 --> 23:21.880 and in the ensuing months to prepare for that election. 23:21.880 --> 23:26.047 - Are you actually doing anything to assist 23:26.360 --> 23:30.410 the local forces to secure the country 23:30.410 --> 23:32.100 in preparation for the elections? 23:40.220 --> 23:43.060 - At this juncture, with regard to the elections, 23:43.060 --> 23:46.140 I would say that we are focused, 23:46.140 --> 23:47.980 it's really in a planning stage, 23:48.580 --> 23:52.747 and with a recognition that operations, 23:53.090 --> 23:56.800 on any given day, particularly in a 23:59.200 --> 24:02.100 population-dense area like Baghdad, 24:02.300 --> 24:06.050 like Mosul, Ramadi, those types of operations 24:06.050 --> 24:08.290 that are being done, day in and day out 24:08.290 --> 24:11.690 by the Iraqi army, by local police forces 24:11.910 --> 24:14.310 in the counterterrorism service, are being done 24:14.310 --> 24:17.400 to set the conditions for security going forward, 24:17.400 --> 24:21.280 but certainly with a mind towards ensuring 24:21.610 --> 24:24.970 that it is firmly in place prior to the elections in May. 24:26.444 --> 24:28.044 - Now to Courtney Kube from NBC. 24:28.540 --> 24:29.690 - Hi, General Glynn. 24:29.830 --> 24:31.930 It's good to see you back in the Pentagon. 24:32.930 --> 24:37.050 Could I go back to this idea of some remnants of ISIS? 24:37.050 --> 24:38.280 'Cause there's been some confusion, 24:38.280 --> 24:41.900 in the last month or so, about how many ISIS fighters 24:41.900 --> 24:44.250 are actually still in Iraq and Syria. 24:44.250 --> 24:46.450 And there was a number that was put around that was 24:46.450 --> 24:49.710 just included where there was coalition fighters. 24:49.750 --> 24:53.000 What is the total number, if you have it, 24:53.070 --> 24:55.550 of ISIS fighters you believe are in Iraq, 24:55.640 --> 24:59.580 you believe are in Syria, and does that include 24:59.750 --> 25:02.650 these ones who are sort of out and more disparate 25:02.650 --> 25:06.710 in the area, in these cellular structures? 25:12.150 --> 25:14.150 - Hey Courtney, thanks for the question. 25:14.680 --> 25:16.310 And thanks for the welcome. 25:17.190 --> 25:19.610 I don't have an exact number. 25:19.610 --> 25:21.720 In fact, we don't focus on the exact numbers, 25:21.720 --> 25:22.820 to be honest with you. 25:23.400 --> 25:27.020 In much the same way that we focus 25:27.020 --> 25:29.270 on our partners, it's about the capabilities. 25:32.220 --> 25:36.387 So what we see, what we're watching closely is, 25:37.210 --> 25:39.760 as I mentioned, where are they going? 25:40.330 --> 25:41.820 Why are they going there? 25:42.180 --> 25:45.010 And, at this point, unique to Iraq, 25:45.010 --> 25:46.560 why would you want to stay? 25:47.240 --> 25:51.100 The so-called caliphate has been dismantled 25:51.370 --> 25:53.830 at this point, and so ISIS has no 25:55.010 --> 25:59.060 recognizable structure of the bureaucracy 25:59.060 --> 26:03.227 that they had previously sought to achieve. 26:04.270 --> 26:08.437 And so, with a very few and dwindling options here in Iraq, 26:09.470 --> 26:13.310 what capabilities are they trying to sustain here 26:13.680 --> 26:16.200 and where are they trying to locate them 26:16.330 --> 26:18.880 is really what we focus on more than anything else. 26:19.080 --> 26:21.240 - Have you seen, if the consequence 26:21.240 --> 26:22.900 or the choices there are so bad, 26:22.900 --> 26:26.070 have you seen any large numbers of them leaving Iraq? 26:33.180 --> 26:37.347 - We watch their movement, and the Iraqis 26:38.090 --> 26:40.300 are a great source of that watching, 26:41.230 --> 26:43.900 based on the local populace. 26:45.140 --> 26:47.990 And we do have evidence of their moving. 26:48.430 --> 26:50.930 It's just not all that coherent. 26:51.450 --> 26:53.200 And I, frankly, don't think that's 26:53.300 --> 26:55.170 a lack of understanding on our part. 26:55.170 --> 26:58.240 I think that is indicative of the desperation 26:58.240 --> 27:02.280 of ISIS at this point, trying to bring some coherency 27:02.870 --> 27:05.750 to what has happened to them in the last, 27:05.750 --> 27:07.640 certainly, at least in the last year. 27:08.520 --> 27:09.670 - [Courtney] Thank you. 27:09.800 --> 27:12.100 - Next to Wyatt Goolsby from EWTN. 27:12.410 --> 27:13.243 - Thanks. 27:13.243 --> 27:14.830 Thanks, General, for doing this, by the way. 27:14.880 --> 27:18.500 You'd talked about Iraqis returning to a sense of normalcy. 27:18.550 --> 27:19.840 I'm wondering if there's any insight 27:19.840 --> 27:21.180 you can give us about what's happening 27:21.180 --> 27:23.530 in the Nineveh region, the Nineveh Plains region. 27:23.530 --> 27:25.550 'Cause, as you know, there's so many towns 27:25.550 --> 27:27.360 and villages where religious minorities, 27:27.360 --> 27:30.430 like Christians and Yazidis, were previously under attack. 27:30.430 --> 27:32.300 Are there religious minorities 27:32.300 --> 27:33.990 who are returning to their homes? 27:34.190 --> 27:37.270 Is there more of a sense of normalcy there in that area? 27:44.360 --> 27:48.527 - Yeah, I'll say it's an encouraging situation, 27:50.060 --> 27:54.227 in most instances that, as I alluded to earlier, 27:54.520 --> 27:56.420 that you see more people returning 27:56.420 --> 28:00.140 to formerly ISIS-controlled areas than we were 28:00.140 --> 28:04.307 previously reporting by aid organizations in 2013. 28:05.200 --> 28:09.367 And so, unique to the Nineveh Plains, you're exactly right, 28:10.080 --> 28:13.550 a very diverse and rich area, and an area 28:13.550 --> 28:17.710 where there is now a sense of opportunity 28:17.710 --> 28:21.130 to return and see what the future may hold. 28:21.770 --> 28:25.210 And so, that's true in a number of areas, 28:25.210 --> 28:27.000 and some places are gonna recover 28:27.330 --> 28:29.700 from ISIS's presence quicker than others. 28:30.350 --> 28:31.250 - [Wyatt] Thank you. 28:31.809 --> 28:34.040 - All right, next to Ryan Browne, CNN. 28:34.250 --> 28:36.260 - Hello General, thank you for doing this. 28:36.260 --> 28:39.680 Quick question on the Baghdad suicide attacks. 28:39.820 --> 28:42.570 Do attacks like these kind of highlight 28:42.570 --> 28:45.690 the need for additional training of Iraqi police? 28:45.690 --> 28:46.930 I know the focus had been, kind of, 28:46.930 --> 28:49.830 before on offensive kinetic training. 28:49.989 --> 28:51.510 Does there need to be a shift, 28:51.510 --> 28:54.010 more coalition advisers with police units? 29:00.830 --> 29:04.000 - So, the bombing in Baghdad, 29:04.000 --> 29:08.160 as I mentioned early on, is, you know, 29:09.840 --> 29:11.990 there's already, I mentioned in my opening comments, 29:11.990 --> 29:13.490 I'm trying to harken back. 29:13.710 --> 29:17.610 There has already been a shift in focus on the part 29:17.610 --> 29:20.260 of the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Security Forces 29:20.930 --> 29:24.260 to an emphasis towards local policing and border security. 29:24.810 --> 29:27.570 And so, I wouldn't categorize it 29:27.570 --> 29:29.160 as a shift that's necessary. 29:29.160 --> 29:30.650 It was anticipated. 29:31.750 --> 29:34.720 And that training, that advising 29:34.720 --> 29:37.670 has already begun and is ongoing, 29:37.810 --> 29:41.070 a recognition on the behalf of the Iraqis themselves. 29:41.790 --> 29:43.330 - And one additional question. 29:44.480 --> 29:47.680 Have the Iraqis, in kind of these mopping-up operations, 29:47.800 --> 29:50.240 have they apprehended any foreign fighters 29:50.290 --> 29:52.290 in the recent months, in the last month? 30:00.240 --> 30:04.407 - Not that I'm aware of, but the foreign 30:04.690 --> 30:08.710 fighter issue in ISIS, writ large, 30:08.710 --> 30:11.930 is one that needs continued attention. 30:12.030 --> 30:16.197 I mean, the future of ISIS, or organizations like ISIS, 30:19.110 --> 30:23.020 they had their hopes and aspirations in being, 30:23.060 --> 30:24.860 holding territory that have all 30:24.860 --> 30:26.600 but been shattered and dismantled. 30:27.170 --> 30:29.880 At this point, it's a matter of the ideology 30:30.180 --> 30:33.370 and what would attract someone from another country 30:33.910 --> 30:38.077 to come here to Iraq or to anywhere else in the region 30:39.070 --> 30:42.560 and fight on their behalf, and so that's the focus. 30:43.600 --> 30:46.500 Was it a month ago, maybe, I had 30:46.500 --> 30:48.640 the privilege, here in Baghdad, of attending 30:48.640 --> 30:51.130 what was the third annual conference 30:51.130 --> 30:53.960 on defeating Daesh propaganda and ideology. 30:54.530 --> 30:56.980 And I think that's indicative of the recognition, 30:57.080 --> 31:00.870 regional recognition, because it had folks beyond Iraq, 31:01.050 --> 31:03.300 predominantly Iraqis, but beyond Iraq, 31:03.560 --> 31:06.480 with a recognition that this is about the ideology 31:06.970 --> 31:11.137 and getting people to recognize, particularly young people, 31:11.900 --> 31:14.610 to recognize that there's no hope in that. 31:16.770 --> 31:18.670 - Next to Jack Detsch from Al-Monitor. 31:18.950 --> 31:19.783 - Thanks, General. 31:19.783 --> 31:21.620 You've mentioned that sort of a specific focus 31:21.620 --> 31:23.270 of this effort, now, is to reduce 31:23.500 --> 31:25.480 ISIS's capabilities and scale those back. 31:25.480 --> 31:27.500 Does the coalition have a specific metric 31:27.500 --> 31:29.240 or sort of threshold that you're using 31:29.240 --> 31:32.390 to reduce ISIS's capabilities that might allow the mission 31:32.390 --> 31:35.040 to be scaled back or U.S. troops to leave the region? 31:41.000 --> 31:45.167 - A particular metric, certainly, 31:45.440 --> 31:49.560 the things that we aspire to support 31:49.560 --> 31:53.727 on behalf is that which the Iraqis want, as well. 31:54.000 --> 31:57.470 And so those metrics are security and stability. 31:58.280 --> 31:59.530 And I would tell you, in the places 31:59.530 --> 32:02.480 where I travel to in Iraq, it's measured 32:02.480 --> 32:05.410 by the ability of local governance 32:05.410 --> 32:09.577 to provide essential services by access 32:09.820 --> 32:13.180 on the part of the government of Iraq at a federal level, 32:13.290 --> 32:15.420 as well as for non-governmental organizations 32:15.420 --> 32:18.910 to come in and provide augmentation 32:18.910 --> 32:21.100 to those essential services that allow 32:21.100 --> 32:23.320 Iraqis to return to a normal life. 32:23.770 --> 32:26.810 I was traveling the other day and had a conversation 32:26.810 --> 32:29.540 with a local gentleman and, you know, in the end, 32:29.540 --> 32:31.760 it really comes down to the same thing you and I want. 32:31.760 --> 32:33.660 They want their kids to be able to go out in the street 32:33.660 --> 32:35.970 in front of their house and have a soccer game 32:35.970 --> 32:37.800 while they're preparing their dinner. 32:38.160 --> 32:41.840 And so, you know, in terms of a personal metric, 32:42.000 --> 32:44.000 when I travel and I talk to local folks, 32:44.120 --> 32:46.220 that's the kind of metric I'm looking for. 32:47.030 --> 32:48.350 - Got it, and you mentioned at the beginning 32:48.350 --> 32:52.140 of your remarks that several thousand CTS 32:52.140 --> 32:54.340 are scheduled to graduate from academy. 32:54.990 --> 32:56.450 Does the coalition have an update 32:56.450 --> 32:58.060 of how many CTS have been trained? 32:58.060 --> 33:00.840 And are you still on track to reach the 20,000 33:01.250 --> 33:02.300 that are expected to be trained 33:02.300 --> 33:03.690 by the end of the next three years 33:03.690 --> 33:05.590 that the Pentagon mentioned last year? 33:11.170 --> 33:13.250 - Yeah, so thanks for that question. 33:13.580 --> 33:17.580 CTS is our longtime partner, 33:18.880 --> 33:22.020 both for the U.S. and for special operations, 33:22.550 --> 33:26.717 have a very deliberate plan to get themselves refit 33:27.660 --> 33:31.470 and refurbished and ready for any emerging threats. 33:31.520 --> 33:35.687 And so, this week alone, they have had the opportunity 33:36.360 --> 33:39.490 to rotate some folks back from what they have been doing 33:39.490 --> 33:41.490 literally, now, for two and a half years 33:41.980 --> 33:45.210 and get some well-deserved leave and begin to focus 33:45.640 --> 33:48.180 on their training plan and some 33:48.180 --> 33:50.780 of their equipment updates that need to be provided. 33:51.610 --> 33:54.160 I mentioned the numbers that are in the course now. 33:54.280 --> 33:58.080 The CTS has a plan, an annual plan 33:58.496 --> 34:01.700 to keep themselves on track for what they think they need. 34:02.210 --> 34:04.400 And, just like any of the challenges 34:05.130 --> 34:07.200 any of the coalition nations face, 34:07.360 --> 34:08.700 in terms of what their target is, 34:08.700 --> 34:12.490 their target's driven by both what capabilities they need, 34:12.900 --> 34:16.380 how significant the threat is they face, and then, 34:16.820 --> 34:18.900 you know, like the rest of us, what can they afford. 34:18.940 --> 34:21.190 But I'll tell you they're on a very good path 34:21.600 --> 34:25.767 to maintain their capabilities, and they are, 34:26.350 --> 34:30.517 without a doubt, a force that remains 34:30.640 --> 34:33.540 focused and dedicated towards the counterterrorism mission 34:33.850 --> 34:35.960 and ensuring that things like ISIS 34:35.960 --> 34:39.020 do not return to the lands, here, of Iraq. 34:39.700 --> 34:41.010 - Sorry, just real quick, are you 34:41.010 --> 34:42.670 still on track for that 20,000? 34:42.670 --> 34:43.620 Is that still the goal? 34:43.620 --> 34:46.563 Or has that goal changed specifically for the CTS? 34:46.563 --> 34:48.520 Are you not using that as a snapshot? 34:55.140 --> 34:59.090 - The goal itself is in Iraq, that's a CTS, 34:59.540 --> 35:02.480 that's a CTS-driven objective. 35:02.780 --> 35:06.947 And what I would tell you is that is 35:09.080 --> 35:10.730 what they started to plan against 35:10.730 --> 35:14.130 in the last two and a half years of fighting 35:14.130 --> 35:17.100 in urban environments every single day. 35:18.909 --> 35:22.220 They're getting right back to focusing 35:22.220 --> 35:24.630 on building their capabilities 35:24.640 --> 35:27.730 and less concerned with what number they need right now. 35:29.720 --> 35:31.720 - Next to Lucas Tomlinson with Fox News. 35:32.260 --> 35:34.320 - General, when Turkey's president says, 35:34.320 --> 35:36.290 "We will strangle U.S.-backed force 35:36.290 --> 35:39.850 "in Syria before it's even born," is that helpful? 35:49.580 --> 35:53.520 - Lucas, the political comments 35:54.330 --> 35:56.420 and exchanges are clearly are not 35:56.420 --> 36:00.250 in my lane nor in my area of expertise. 36:01.860 --> 36:03.610 - He's a NATO ally, and this affects 36:03.610 --> 36:06.920 your forces in Syria and, potentially, Iraq. 36:06.920 --> 36:09.240 Does that give you some concern, General? 36:17.000 --> 36:19.330 - We pay attention to the dynamics 36:19.330 --> 36:21.020 between partners in the area. 36:21.970 --> 36:23.570 Certainly, in the case of Turkey 36:24.330 --> 36:28.497 and as it relates to how they interact 36:28.540 --> 36:32.010 on a state-to-state level, nationally, 36:32.010 --> 36:33.860 that's something we pay attention to. 36:34.180 --> 36:38.347 But where we have the most interaction is militarily. 36:40.280 --> 36:44.130 And so I keep track more 36:44.500 --> 36:48.380 on what their military intentions are. 36:49.351 --> 36:50.820 - To Lita's question, when you said 36:50.820 --> 36:54.150 that U.S. Special Operations forces in Iraq spend 75 to 80% 36:54.150 --> 36:57.640 of their time advising the Iraqi counterterrorism service, 36:57.850 --> 37:00.190 what are you all doing the rest of the time? 37:01.040 --> 37:03.873 (reporter laughs) 37:07.880 --> 37:10.700 - So it's not just the counterterrorism service. 37:11.180 --> 37:14.630 It's special weapons and tactics units 37:14.770 --> 37:16.340 from the Ministry of Interior. 37:16.970 --> 37:20.450 It's other elements, commando units 37:22.530 --> 37:26.410 in the Iraqi army and, as far as the other percentage, 37:26.530 --> 37:30.040 you know, like I mentioned, there's an element of ours 37:30.040 --> 37:34.207 that's dedicated to supporting the training apparatus, 37:34.740 --> 37:37.110 like the question a moment ago about the CTS. 37:37.410 --> 37:41.530 And the CTS runs their own academy, or school. 37:42.060 --> 37:45.720 What the coalition provides is some oversight 37:45.720 --> 37:49.180 and some assistance with development of future programs, 37:50.330 --> 37:52.570 based on lessons that they have learned 37:52.830 --> 37:55.060 from two and a half years of hard fighting 37:55.840 --> 37:59.240 and what kind of skills they want to expand on and improve. 38:00.150 --> 38:03.260 - Each week, how often do U.S. Special Operations forces 38:03.260 --> 38:05.870 accompany Iraqi forces on raids? 38:12.850 --> 38:17.017 - We don't accompany the Iraqi Security Forces 38:17.710 --> 38:19.610 hardly ever, at this point. 38:21.090 --> 38:21.930 - [Lucas] Thank you. 38:22.260 --> 38:24.460 - Next to Carlo Munoz with Washington Times. 38:25.030 --> 38:26.500 - [Carlo] Hey sir, thanks for doing this. 38:26.500 --> 38:28.480 A quick follow up on Jeff and Lita's 38:28.480 --> 38:31.020 question about the existence 38:31.020 --> 38:33.090 or nonexistence of an insurgency in Iraq. 38:33.550 --> 38:35.010 In their claim of responsibility 38:35.010 --> 38:36.910 for yesterday's bombing in Baghdad, 38:37.470 --> 38:39.520 ISIS propaganda said that this was the beginning 38:39.520 --> 38:42.660 of a, quote, "vengeance campaign" which could lead 38:42.660 --> 38:44.790 to a string of bombings, similar to what we saw 38:44.790 --> 38:47.130 in the run-up to the fight for Mosul. 38:47.980 --> 38:51.800 What I wanted to ask: How does that sort of statement, 38:51.800 --> 38:53.210 claim of responsibility square 38:53.210 --> 38:55.780 with what you're picking up from Iraqi Security Forces, 38:55.780 --> 38:58.580 as far as the existence of an insurgency in Iraq? 38:58.790 --> 39:02.957 And, two, you mentioned that one of your main requirements 39:02.970 --> 39:05.620 is to see what capabilities is 39:05.980 --> 39:08.160 Islamic State looking to keep in the country. 39:08.160 --> 39:09.310 What are those capabilities? 39:09.310 --> 39:12.880 Are they focused on sort of these 39:12.880 --> 39:16.974 bomb-making areas or bomb-making facilities that they use 39:16.974 --> 39:19.380 to great effect in Mosul and elsewhere? 39:19.630 --> 39:21.900 Or other capabilities that maybe relate 39:21.900 --> 39:24.870 to more of their conventional military skills? 39:32.410 --> 39:33.470 - So thanks, Carlo. 39:34.620 --> 39:38.787 I'm not familiar, first, with that statement 39:39.370 --> 39:42.370 that ISIS has put out, claiming responsibility. 39:42.370 --> 39:44.390 So I appreciate that insight. 39:44.390 --> 39:46.640 I'll have to go back and take a look at that. 39:48.940 --> 39:53.040 With regards to the capabilities, the types of things 39:56.401 --> 39:58.570 that we see ourselves, I'm trying 39:58.570 --> 40:00.090 to remember the first half of your question. 40:00.090 --> 40:02.000 It related something about insurgency. 40:02.090 --> 40:03.473 Could you say it again? 40:03.473 --> 40:05.120 - [Carlo] Sir, I just wanted to, you said 40:05.120 --> 40:07.990 earlier that the Task Force... 40:09.902 --> 40:12.780 the Task Force is focusing on looking at what capabilities 40:12.780 --> 40:15.500 Islamic State is looking to maintain inside Iraq. 40:15.560 --> 40:17.710 I kind of wanted to get some specifics on that. 40:17.710 --> 40:19.740 What capabilities are they trying to maintain 40:19.740 --> 40:20.780 from what you've seen, what you've 40:20.780 --> 40:24.200 picked up from Iraqi Security Forces? 40:29.280 --> 40:31.730 - Okay, thanks, much clearer now. 40:35.350 --> 40:38.140 It is a little bit early for us to tell exactly. 40:38.320 --> 40:40.870 I think they'd like to retain as much as they can. 40:41.920 --> 40:44.670 But that's an assessment on my part. 40:45.820 --> 40:49.987 Certainly, the ability to finance... 40:50.900 --> 40:55.067 The strengths of ISIS at their peak were their brand 40:56.160 --> 41:00.110 and their finances. 41:00.790 --> 41:04.957 Their brand has been proven completely ineffective 41:06.030 --> 41:08.600 and their finances, from everything that I can tell, 41:08.600 --> 41:11.940 are severely diminished and very much struggling. 41:12.980 --> 41:17.147 And so, the types of things that the Iraqis are focused on, 41:17.990 --> 41:20.670 and that we cooperate with them most, 41:20.940 --> 41:25.107 is on intelligence and how intelligence 41:25.650 --> 41:29.350 is integrated and utilized to drive operations, 41:29.350 --> 41:32.230 operations that are done to keep pressure 41:32.750 --> 41:35.600 on that cellular structure I mentioned earlier. 41:36.140 --> 41:38.390 And then, to your point about Baghdad, 41:38.390 --> 41:41.990 it's also about counter-improvised explosive devices. 41:42.330 --> 41:44.120 The types of materials that are necessary 41:44.120 --> 41:47.070 to form those things, how they have to be moved, 41:47.250 --> 41:49.980 the types of conditions that are required 41:50.050 --> 41:51.550 in order to put them together. 41:52.150 --> 41:54.540 And the Iraqis are very much focused 41:55.890 --> 41:59.230 on precluding those types of things from occurring. 41:59.550 --> 42:02.250 And then, lastly, of course, is the security side of it, 42:02.250 --> 42:06.417 and a lot of that shifts from what was 42:07.210 --> 42:10.080 clearing swaths of land that ISIS was holding, 42:10.330 --> 42:13.950 and focused more so on the local security 42:13.950 --> 42:15.760 and the border security, the types of things 42:15.760 --> 42:17.830 that will allow all the capabilities 42:17.830 --> 42:19.890 that I just rattled off to move around 42:20.250 --> 42:24.250 and try to reform into an effective network. 42:25.570 --> 42:26.710 - [Carlo] Thank you, sir. 42:26.920 --> 42:29.580 - All right, next to Kasim Ileri with Anadolu. 42:30.870 --> 42:32.930 - General Glynn, thanks for doing this. 42:33.360 --> 42:37.527 I know you're, you know, you are focusing on Iraq. 42:38.680 --> 42:40.400 But I will follow up on questions 42:40.510 --> 42:43.480 regarding the Border Security Forces in Syria. 42:46.090 --> 42:48.530 Under which legal premises does the coalition 42:48.530 --> 42:51.730 form the Border Security Force in Syria, General? 42:52.447 --> 42:54.260 Because, first, there should be a defined 42:54.260 --> 42:57.040 and synchronized border before you form 42:57.040 --> 43:00.280 a border security to protect that border. 43:01.040 --> 43:04.950 Which legal premises leads the coalition to that decision? 43:11.650 --> 43:14.830 - Okay, so, like I said earlier, and you acknowledged, 43:14.830 --> 43:18.997 my focus here in Iraq doesn't put me 43:19.050 --> 43:22.010 in a position to comment on that directly. 43:23.277 --> 43:26.770 What I will say is that border security, 43:27.550 --> 43:30.140 in this region, remains a concern 43:31.120 --> 43:33.250 for everyone in the region. 43:33.880 --> 43:37.970 And it's a common objective to ensure 43:38.430 --> 43:40.730 that ISIS is unavailable 43:43.000 --> 43:46.810 and not able to move 43:47.580 --> 43:51.220 aspects of whatever remaining capabilities 43:51.220 --> 43:55.330 they might have around, to build a structure that could 43:55.330 --> 43:57.880 threaten any government in the area. 43:59.621 --> 44:03.700 - He is considering YPG, which is part of the SDF, 44:03.700 --> 44:06.890 as a connected group to the PKK, 44:06.890 --> 44:08.380 that's a terrorist organization. 44:08.380 --> 44:10.520 And Turkey is angered by that decision, 44:10.650 --> 44:14.520 saying that the U.S. has said that they will stop arming, 44:14.520 --> 44:18.290 giving, providing arms to the YPG after the defeat of ISIS. 44:18.290 --> 44:22.250 Now, the U.S. is forming a 30,000-troop workforce 44:22.310 --> 44:26.477 and give it under the leadership of the SDF, which is led 44:26.610 --> 44:30.010 by YPG, which Turkey considers to be a part of PKK. 44:30.130 --> 44:34.050 So, how do you situate this into the specific 44:34.050 --> 44:36.960 U.S. mission in Syria, with respect 44:36.960 --> 44:40.460 to defeating or fighting ISIS, 44:41.510 --> 44:43.510 and the alliance with Turkey, of course? 44:50.120 --> 44:52.320 - So, again, my focus here in Iraq, 44:52.710 --> 44:56.420 that doesn't really get me a whole lot of, 44:56.420 --> 44:59.170 you clearly have more information on that than I do. 45:01.980 --> 45:04.470 - Next to Anna Varfolomeeva from Globe Post. 45:04.916 --> 45:06.616 - (mumbles) but thank you so much. 45:06.800 --> 45:08.430 General, thank you for doing this. 45:08.430 --> 45:10.000 I just want to follow up on Ryan's 45:10.000 --> 45:12.830 question and clarify something. 45:12.830 --> 45:16.510 Are there any plans to transfer Iraqi military personnel 45:16.780 --> 45:20.270 to civilian policing or counterterror roles at the moment? 45:25.950 --> 45:27.600 - I missed the beginning of that. 45:28.120 --> 45:29.580 Could you repeat that, please? 45:29.580 --> 45:33.080 - Are there any plans to transfer Iraqi military personnel 45:33.080 --> 45:36.000 to civilian policing or counterterrorism roles? 45:41.489 --> 45:42.790 - Oh, okay, I understand the question. 45:42.790 --> 45:43.623 Thanks. 45:44.770 --> 45:48.937 There are a number of discussions going on now 45:53.680 --> 45:56.760 about the capabilities that the Iraqi Security Forces have, 45:57.180 --> 46:00.200 where they reside and where they're needed most. 46:01.010 --> 46:04.480 And so, to your point, there are 46:04.800 --> 46:08.710 or could be opportunities for folks 46:08.710 --> 46:11.440 who have performed one function previously 46:12.180 --> 46:15.000 to shift to another one going forward. 46:15.100 --> 46:17.360 And, as I've mentioned several times now, 46:17.360 --> 46:20.800 clearly, I would say the two most opportunistic areas 46:20.800 --> 46:23.700 would be local policing and border security. 46:24.810 --> 46:26.870 - Is there anyone already in training 46:26.910 --> 46:28.710 at the moment, shifting these roles? 46:35.430 --> 46:37.790 - Is there training in those particular areas? 46:37.790 --> 46:40.030 Is that what you're saying? 46:40.050 --> 46:41.540 - You are trying to shift these roles, 46:41.540 --> 46:44.920 trying to shift to policing from military? 46:51.640 --> 46:55.180 - I don't exactly know, in individual cases. 46:55.430 --> 46:58.420 I do know that there is a considerable effort going 46:59.442 --> 47:02.142 into police training as well as border guard training. 47:02.630 --> 47:05.330 And both of those began, well, they've 47:05.330 --> 47:08.270 been ongoing throughout, but there has been 47:08.270 --> 47:10.580 a definite increase in emphasis 47:10.580 --> 47:14.690 on those two particular areas since operations 47:14.690 --> 47:18.857 out in Al-Anbar in terms of clearing ISIS-controlled areas 47:18.870 --> 47:21.270 concluded back in the middle of December. 47:21.650 --> 47:22.600 - [Anna] Thank you. 47:22.961 --> 47:26.040 - Next we'll go to Tom Squitieri from Talk News Media. 47:27.782 --> 47:29.650 - Happy Tuesday, General. 47:30.360 --> 47:32.160 I'm pulling together some of your responses 47:32.160 --> 47:35.080 to earlier questions and noted that you said 47:35.080 --> 47:38.560 most of the missions now is not to clear territory 47:38.560 --> 47:41.950 but to secure territory and restore normalcy. 47:43.880 --> 47:45.810 Pulling another figure out of the air, 47:45.840 --> 47:49.120 as you did earlier, how much territory still 47:49.120 --> 47:52.160 needs to be cleared of ISIS, please? 47:57.700 --> 47:59.820 - Here in Iraq, Tom, 48:02.420 --> 48:05.180 it has all been cleared once. 48:06.570 --> 48:09.240 So an easy answer would be none. 48:10.120 --> 48:11.970 The reality, though, back to what I mentioned 48:11.970 --> 48:15.190 about ISIS remnants, is 48:16.460 --> 48:20.627 the Iraqis continue to see enough opportunities 48:21.530 --> 48:24.440 that they're going back to areas of concern. 48:25.470 --> 48:28.120 It was mentioned earlier about the 48:29.202 --> 48:31.480 Tuz Khurmatu region in Hawija. 48:32.040 --> 48:35.490 And they go back to revisit those areas 48:35.640 --> 48:39.807 and to determine whether or not there's people that need 48:41.480 --> 48:44.700 to be addressed and potentially captured, 48:44.700 --> 48:47.660 or at least spoken to, as well as, 48:47.660 --> 48:49.090 as you heard in my opening remarks, 48:49.090 --> 48:53.170 the number of IEDs and caches 48:53.180 --> 48:57.347 of explosive materials continues to be pretty substantial. 48:57.470 --> 49:01.410 And it's those kinds of work when we talk about going back 49:01.410 --> 49:04.610 and clearing particular areas, that's the kind 49:04.610 --> 49:06.410 of work that's ongoing at this time. 49:07.300 --> 49:09.650 - Clearing that up. (chuckles) 49:09.650 --> 49:12.200 - Next to Fatima al-Samadi from Al Jazeera English. 49:12.610 --> 49:14.510 - Good morning, thank you for doing this, General. 49:14.550 --> 49:18.660 Excuse me, I'm wondering, what is 49:18.660 --> 49:22.350 the, sort of, as you talk about shifting to advising, 49:22.400 --> 49:24.440 it seems like there are a couple of gaps 49:24.440 --> 49:28.560 with the Iraqi local forces in certain areas, an example, 49:28.560 --> 49:30.390 obviously, being the double suicide vest bombings. 49:30.390 --> 49:32.370 Do you think that with the shift 49:32.960 --> 49:36.150 that those kind of concerns will continue? 49:36.150 --> 49:39.600 Basically, is the shortfall with the local training? 49:39.600 --> 49:41.050 Is it a training issue? 49:48.820 --> 49:52.987 - No, so I wouldn't so much categorize it as a shift. 49:54.120 --> 49:58.287 The advising and assisting has been ongoing 49:59.990 --> 50:01.830 for the entire time that the coalition 50:01.830 --> 50:04.900 has been side by side with Iraqi Security Forces. 50:06.570 --> 50:10.737 As was asked earlier, what we've done much less of 50:11.100 --> 50:14.240 is the accompanying, so the direct support. 50:14.490 --> 50:18.110 And what that has allowed is an emphasis 50:18.110 --> 50:20.280 on the training and the preparation. 50:21.030 --> 50:24.360 And so that's where much of our attention is now 50:24.360 --> 50:27.600 and that's at the request of our partners. 50:28.530 --> 50:30.950 And so, it's working very well. 50:34.180 --> 50:35.230 - Luis Martinez, ABC. 50:36.730 --> 50:39.070 - Hey General, two questions, one 50:39.070 --> 50:42.629 on the training aspect that you've talked about. 50:42.629 --> 50:44.890 You talked about intelligence being something 50:44.890 --> 50:46.440 that you're providing right now 50:48.508 --> 50:51.050 as CT continues in its operations. 50:51.320 --> 50:55.340 Is that a capability that you're training them specifically, 50:55.340 --> 50:58.990 organically, to the special operations community in Iraq? 50:59.340 --> 51:02.420 And how long do you think that process is going to take? 51:09.550 --> 51:11.320 - Hey Luis, thanks for the question. 51:11.320 --> 51:12.520 Good to hear your voice. 51:14.992 --> 51:19.159 So, let's start with the Iraqi intelligence, very good. 51:22.850 --> 51:25.110 You categorized it as we're providing it to 'em. 51:25.110 --> 51:29.277 I would more so say, we, on a daily basis, 51:29.400 --> 51:32.520 have an increasing awareness of just how good 51:32.520 --> 51:34.330 and effective their intelligence is. 51:34.530 --> 51:38.400 And so, it's much more a case of us providing 51:38.410 --> 51:41.610 some advice on how that can best be integrated 51:42.090 --> 51:45.870 into what they're planning and the kind of assessments 51:45.870 --> 51:50.037 they're making of what any organization, in this case, 51:50.260 --> 51:52.710 we'll stay focused on ISIS, may be trying to do. 51:53.280 --> 51:57.447 And so, while we could continue to work 51:57.640 --> 52:00.520 side by side in the intelligence area alone 52:02.150 --> 52:05.910 for quite some time, and we'd be happy to, at the request 52:05.910 --> 52:09.450 of our friends and partners in Iraqi Security Forces, 52:09.450 --> 52:12.840 quite honestly, they'd be capable 52:12.840 --> 52:14.920 of doing it without our help, today. 52:16.860 --> 52:20.440 - So, do they have an enhanced capability? 52:21.370 --> 52:23.370 Do you bring enhanced capabilities 52:23.370 --> 52:25.590 to them as well, with regards to intelligence, 52:25.590 --> 52:28.140 that maybe you may want to transfer to them 52:28.770 --> 52:30.770 in the future as an enduring capability? 52:36.880 --> 52:41.047 - Yes, there are definitely some capabilities, 52:42.550 --> 52:46.717 often technical, that, for security reasons, 52:47.610 --> 52:49.790 you know, obviously aren't transferrable. 52:50.220 --> 52:54.387 And so we will, at their request, continue to support them 52:55.680 --> 52:59.450 with the kind of technical assistance. 52:59.890 --> 53:02.830 But, again, an increasingly capable 53:03.960 --> 53:08.127 intelligence infrastructure and it's 53:08.640 --> 53:12.760 the kind of areas that intelligence 53:12.760 --> 53:16.150 to prepare for operations, Iraqi Security Forces have 53:16.150 --> 53:17.300 been doing for quite some time, 53:17.300 --> 53:19.450 and obviously, have more experience with it 53:19.780 --> 53:21.120 than most of the rest of the world, 53:21.120 --> 53:23.420 based on the last two and a half, three years. 53:24.380 --> 53:26.330 As an example, I would offer to you is, 53:26.350 --> 53:28.590 where some of our advice and assistance 53:28.590 --> 53:31.870 is focused now is on after an operation, 53:32.410 --> 53:36.400 when there is information available on documents 53:36.400 --> 53:40.567 or on technical, on a laptop, for example, 53:40.750 --> 53:43.630 the exploitation of that type of stuff 53:44.040 --> 53:46.060 is what we increasingly find ourselves 53:46.060 --> 53:49.100 partnered with and teaching, going forward. 53:50.180 --> 53:52.290 - Thanks for that, and just one last question. 53:52.820 --> 53:54.970 During the battles for Mosul and elsewhere, 53:54.970 --> 53:56.500 what we saw were special operations 53:56.500 --> 53:58.550 being used in large-scale formations. 53:58.920 --> 54:00.360 It's a little different than, I think, 54:00.360 --> 54:03.040 the original concept for special ops forces. 54:04.382 --> 54:08.340 How did your teams adjust to that type of mission planning, 54:08.530 --> 54:10.170 versus what I guess is now a return 54:10.170 --> 54:14.180 to a more agile force capability 54:14.180 --> 54:17.080 that I think is what is happening now against these cells? 54:22.640 --> 54:24.570 - Yeah, Luis, another good question. 54:27.820 --> 54:30.870 Our teams, in particular, well, 54:31.450 --> 54:33.550 we're at the point, at this juncture, 54:33.550 --> 54:35.660 we were at the point where we knew what we were getting into 54:35.660 --> 54:38.330 and so we're well-prepared to provide 54:38.330 --> 54:40.130 that kind of advice and assistance. 54:40.670 --> 54:44.390 And the other half of it was that what we're asking, 54:44.620 --> 54:47.450 in this case, the counterterrorism service 54:47.450 --> 54:51.000 and commando units to do in Iraq were the types of things 54:51.000 --> 54:54.660 that many of us would see as light infantry skillsets. 54:57.960 --> 55:00.330 For example, the counterterrorism service has 55:00.620 --> 55:03.870 a very good capability in that regard, at this point. 55:04.620 --> 55:06.520 What we're doing, literally this week, 55:07.160 --> 55:11.327 is having a conversation with their counterterrorism service 55:12.090 --> 55:15.170 about the training plan they've put together for themselves, 55:15.280 --> 55:17.690 to get back focused on those elite 55:17.690 --> 55:19.690 counterterrorism school skills 55:20.597 --> 55:22.500 that they perceive they're gonna need most, 55:22.500 --> 55:24.750 and the ones that they're gonna need soonest, 55:25.270 --> 55:29.437 in anticipation of ensuring a stable situation here in Iraq, 55:30.420 --> 55:33.430 and as was asked earlier, particularly in a run-up 55:33.430 --> 55:35.330 to an election here later this spring. 55:37.000 --> 55:39.680 - We are nearly at one hour, so the last question 55:39.680 --> 55:42.030 will go to Laurie Mylroie from Kurdistan 24. 55:42.660 --> 55:43.493 - Thank you. 55:43.493 --> 55:46.840 I just wanted to follow up on stability operations. 55:47.270 --> 55:51.437 Can you give us a rough estimate of the number of IDPs 55:52.100 --> 55:54.460 who have returned to their homes versus the number 55:54.460 --> 55:58.627 who are still in camps and they're still displaced? 56:05.485 --> 56:07.080 - I can get somebody there in the 56:07.080 --> 56:08.840 Pentagon to get you the numbers. 56:08.840 --> 56:11.460 I don't have them immediately at my fingers. 56:11.460 --> 56:14.710 But I do, as I mentioned in the opening comments, 56:14.960 --> 56:17.930 I do increasingly see, as I travel 56:17.930 --> 56:22.097 and interact with the U.N. and with others 56:22.430 --> 56:26.597 that IDPs are returning to areas from where they came, 56:27.350 --> 56:30.620 in particular to familial areas, 56:30.770 --> 56:34.937 where they had family or have family, to tribal areas. 56:35.790 --> 56:39.190 And there's a growing attitude 56:40.613 --> 56:42.870 of returning and rebuilding. 56:44.220 --> 56:47.500 But, as far as the exact numbers go, I'm not 100% sure. 56:48.190 --> 56:50.674 I can have somebody there in the Pentagon get them for you. 56:50.674 --> 56:54.841 - And, as you transition to stability operations, 56:55.510 --> 56:57.390 how does that change the composition 56:57.390 --> 56:59.590 of the U.S. presence in Iraq? 56:59.590 --> 57:01.900 Does that mean more contractors, State Department? 57:01.900 --> 57:03.370 Are you more engaged in stability 57:03.370 --> 57:05.410 operations than the conventional Army? 57:11.460 --> 57:15.120 - So I'd like to clarify the question a little bit. 57:15.600 --> 57:18.780 As you say, "As we transition to stability operations," 57:20.860 --> 57:23.870 that wouldn't be the way I would poise it, to be honest. 57:23.870 --> 57:27.450 I would say that we remain focused, 57:27.450 --> 57:30.040 the Iraqi Security Forces remain 57:30.040 --> 57:32.410 focused on the security aspect of it. 57:33.130 --> 57:36.090 And that's where we remain side 57:36.090 --> 57:38.700 by side, in advising and assisting. 57:39.150 --> 57:43.180 So, that doesn't shift things too much. 57:43.180 --> 57:46.270 Now, what's the end state of that security? 57:46.590 --> 57:49.850 It's to provide a stable local situation that allows 57:49.850 --> 57:53.520 for essential services, allows for clearing and rebuilding. 57:54.300 --> 57:58.460 In terms of what that means for us going forward, 57:58.920 --> 58:01.660 most of you have heard General Funk say in the past, 58:01.660 --> 58:04.140 and he says it to us on a regular, recurrent basis, 58:04.140 --> 58:07.810 we're not gonna have one more soldier, 58:07.810 --> 58:10.490 sailor, airman, Marine, contractor here 58:11.090 --> 58:13.080 than we assess we need to do what we're being 58:13.080 --> 58:14.980 asked to do by the government of Iraq. 58:15.240 --> 58:18.480 What I think I can say with certainty 58:19.040 --> 58:21.580 and absolute confidence is I think what we'll see 58:21.640 --> 58:24.680 is a shift in what the capability of the force is here. 58:25.380 --> 58:28.390 And what those capabilities will be will go 58:28.390 --> 58:31.220 back along the lines of those types of things 58:31.220 --> 58:34.500 that we're seeing most frequently in terms of intelligence, 58:34.500 --> 58:36.980 in counter-IED, in security advising 58:36.980 --> 58:38.980 and some of the counterterrorism skills 58:38.980 --> 58:40.930 that we just talked about a moment ago. 58:42.270 --> 58:43.410 - General Glynn, sir, thank you very much 58:43.410 --> 58:45.190 for taking the time to brief the press corps here. 58:45.190 --> 58:47.390 Do you have any closing words for the group? 58:52.220 --> 58:54.150 - There's some familiar voices. 58:54.150 --> 58:55.230 I can't see you all, but there's 58:55.230 --> 58:56.550 some familiar voices in there. 58:56.550 --> 58:57.730 So happy New Year to you all, 58:57.730 --> 59:00.590 and I appreciate you spending an hour with me. 59:00.716 --> 59:03.090 And, if you need anything in the interim, 59:03.090 --> 59:04.160 you know where to find us. 59:04.160 --> 59:05.230 We're here just about all day, 59:05.230 --> 59:07.980 every day, so drop a line anytime. 59:08.090 --> 59:08.923 Thanks. 59:09.410 --> 59:10.243 - Thank you, sir. 59:10.243 --> 59:11.076 Have a great day.