WEBVTT 00:00.380 --> 00:02.120 - Thanks very much for attending today. 00:02.120 --> 00:03.710 We're gonna get started, 00:03.710 --> 00:06.390 although a few people may continue to straggle in. 00:07.860 --> 00:11.200 There was a panel this morning, that was outstanding. 00:11.200 --> 00:13.300 I think probably many of you attended 00:13.300 --> 00:14.700 with regard to shipbuilding. 00:15.550 --> 00:17.060 The theme, as I see it, 00:17.060 --> 00:19.330 that's run through the last couple of days here 00:19.330 --> 00:20.920 at the SNA Symposium 00:21.540 --> 00:25.140 concerns, of course, the topical events from last summer 00:25.310 --> 00:28.220 and the difficulties, that the fleet in general, 00:28.390 --> 00:31.960 the problems, that those incidents may exemplify, 00:31.960 --> 00:36.127 that the fleet in general was experiencing difficulty 00:36.610 --> 00:39.920 associated with too much demand, too little supply, 00:40.730 --> 00:44.897 too many needs to overlook 00:45.400 --> 00:47.470 certifications and qualifications, 00:48.190 --> 00:52.357 the shortage, perhaps, of adequate maintenance 00:53.146 --> 00:56.200 in keeping those ships on station 00:56.200 --> 00:58.440 to the degree that they're demanded. 00:59.930 --> 01:03.470 This morning, the numbers issue was largely addressed, 01:03.470 --> 01:06.740 I think, by this very capable ship building panel 01:06.740 --> 01:08.270 that admiral Johnson ran. 01:08.630 --> 01:11.120 And now he's going to do one on maintenance, 01:11.120 --> 01:14.720 which I think bookends this issue very nicely, 01:14.720 --> 01:16.690 and I'm excited to hear it, 01:16.690 --> 01:18.280 and I know you are as well. 01:18.750 --> 01:21.210 Thanks, admiral Johnson, for picking it up. 01:24.400 --> 01:26.200 - Thanks, Lee, thanks for the intro. 01:28.070 --> 01:29.410 I'm Tom Moore, okay? 01:29.440 --> 01:31.440 Better looking, but I'm Tom Moore today. 01:32.270 --> 01:35.760 He is with my classmate Mike Shoemaker, Shoe, 01:36.070 --> 01:38.330 probably drinking beer now after Bullet Miller 01:38.330 --> 01:41.410 relieved Shoe as the new air boss out in San Diego. 01:41.950 --> 01:44.610 But frankly, I'd rather be here, believe it or not. 01:45.490 --> 01:47.840 It was great doing the morning panel 01:47.840 --> 01:50.320 and really, I think it dovetails right on 01:50.320 --> 01:52.640 what secretary Geurts, 01:53.530 --> 01:55.020 who had a chance to actually sit through 01:55.020 --> 01:57.420 secretary Geurts lunch, and probably just a few. 01:58.370 --> 02:02.537 Well, as you get a chance to meet our new RDA boss, 02:03.590 --> 02:07.620 one of his key elements is the maintenance 02:07.620 --> 02:10.420 end of the business, actually having ships out 02:10.420 --> 02:12.910 on station doing their job. 02:12.910 --> 02:15.320 Just as important as delivering new stuff, 02:15.320 --> 02:16.830 modernizing stuff, 02:17.550 --> 02:20.050 coming out of the new construction shipyard 02:20.410 --> 02:21.580 industrial base. 02:21.880 --> 02:23.900 He is very much focused on, 02:23.900 --> 02:25.700 hey, we need to do a much better job 02:26.090 --> 02:27.860 on the backend, as he calls it. 02:27.860 --> 02:30.550 Now, you remember, in SOCOM, he actually soup to nuts. 02:30.550 --> 02:31.860 He had the new stuff by, 02:31.860 --> 02:33.270 and he also had the ONS stuff, 02:33.270 --> 02:36.260 keeping the war fighter in the field supported. 02:36.430 --> 02:37.500 Very much in line. 02:38.750 --> 02:42.917 Today I get to bridge the gap from the start to the end. 02:46.040 --> 02:47.870 Thanks, Lee, for introducing me. 02:48.540 --> 02:52.490 Again, you have another panel led by a submarine qualified 02:52.490 --> 02:54.780 guy, I am the principal military deputy 02:54.780 --> 02:57.070 for secretary Geurts and for the CNO. 02:58.490 --> 03:00.640 I have a little experience with maintenance end, 03:00.640 --> 03:02.740 I actually grow up at a try and refit facility, 03:02.740 --> 03:05.270 at the time it was Bangor and December of 82 03:05.270 --> 03:07.830 I showed up, Ohio got back from patrol one 03:08.083 --> 03:12.250 and I really appreciated learning maintenance done right. 03:14.590 --> 03:18.757 Skeptics will say, it's overfunded, it's a strategic mission 03:18.760 --> 03:20.510 they got everything they wanted. 03:20.780 --> 03:24.947 I came back 13 years later, it was the planning officer 03:26.120 --> 03:28.200 at that same facility at TRF Bangor 03:28.660 --> 03:31.560 and I learned the value and I think every acquisition 03:31.560 --> 03:34.840 system should have contact with the repair 03:34.840 --> 03:37.890 end of the business or my big seven million dollar 03:37.890 --> 03:39.860 a year budget for TRIPER, 03:40.040 --> 03:42.040 tried and planned equipment replacement, 03:42.080 --> 03:45.530 if I got a couple hundred k more, I was ecstatic, 03:45.530 --> 03:48.310 because I could now overhaul another valve 03:48.430 --> 03:50.590 and get it from F condition to A condition 03:50.590 --> 03:52.140 and keep the TRIPER pool alive. 03:52.450 --> 03:53.870 Thinking it that kind of terms, 03:53.870 --> 03:55.810 where you're actually are working in very short 03:55.810 --> 03:59.280 22 days refit cycles, every 35 days that baby's out 03:59.720 --> 04:03.887 in contact with the fleet, that's just good for everybody, 04:03.910 --> 04:06.150 it's good for acquires to have that understanding 04:06.150 --> 04:08.317 and it's actually good for the maintainers, 04:08.317 --> 04:10.870 cuz I help bring some of the acquiring, 04:10.870 --> 04:12.290 program management, thinking into 04:12.290 --> 04:14.420 how tier F ran the business. 04:14.420 --> 04:16.770 They're now part of Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, 04:16.960 --> 04:20.080 Whitney had the pleasure of actually being responsible 04:20.080 --> 04:21.490 for that work, when he was a CEO 04:21.490 --> 04:22.970 Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. 04:23.710 --> 04:26.400 I'm actually very pleased to be here today. 04:26.400 --> 04:28.900 I did get to moderate the panel and ship building. 04:30.650 --> 04:33.410 I noted with secretary Geurts' inextricably linked 04:33.410 --> 04:37.577 with delivering naval capability to our force commanders. 04:38.892 --> 04:41.620 We're fortunate today to have a superb panel 04:41.620 --> 04:44.900 of navy and coast guard ship maintenance experts. 04:44.900 --> 04:46.790 These guys know what they're doing. 04:46.910 --> 04:48.700 Leaders in the field and I'll introduce them 04:48.700 --> 04:49.560 in just a minute. 04:51.450 --> 04:54.140 Yesterday, Bill Murs, he did lead a panel 04:54.140 --> 04:57.430 on preserving our naval advantage, investing in the future, 04:57.430 --> 04:59.220 part of our investing in the future 04:59.220 --> 05:01.900 includes investing in the sustainment future. 05:02.330 --> 05:05.010 Achieving the readiness, which in our view, 05:05.010 --> 05:08.410 capable ships and crews ready for tasking, 05:08.610 --> 05:11.080 tasking, that are combatant commanders need. 05:11.750 --> 05:13.280 The panel this morning, it will discuss 05:13.280 --> 05:15.670 our navy and coast guard investment and ship maintenance 05:15.670 --> 05:18.060 and this discussion won't be exclusive to the surface 05:18.060 --> 05:20.280 navy with Moises del Toro in the end, 05:20.280 --> 05:22.430 anchoring the submarine enterprise piece. 05:25.690 --> 05:27.640 I'll try to Mel's name right, I'll goon it up, 05:27.640 --> 05:29.420 Boboolis, alright. 05:30.480 --> 05:34.350 80%, with Mel anchoring the coast guard piece 05:34.350 --> 05:37.160 and what the great work they're doing in sustainment. 05:37.470 --> 05:40.280 If you looked at the recently releases national security 05:40.280 --> 05:42.010 strategy, it makes it clear our nation, 05:42.010 --> 05:43.420 it needs a strong navy. 05:44.100 --> 05:46.000 There are three interrelated elements 05:46.000 --> 05:50.167 to the ship systems and the sustainment elements there. 05:51.290 --> 05:53.610 One, is we have to have capacity building 05:53.610 --> 05:55.160 and sustaining ships, but we also have to have 05:55.160 --> 05:58.070 the capability, the new and modernized systems 05:58.070 --> 06:00.960 and weapons and three, we have to have the maintenance, 06:01.440 --> 06:04.870 capable ships sitting alongside the pier do little good. 06:04.970 --> 06:07.270 They have to be at sea serving their missions. 06:07.620 --> 06:09.630 This panel of ship maintenance leaders 06:09.630 --> 06:12.450 at Navsea coast guard headquarters and the fleet, 06:12.650 --> 06:15.060 they're leading our naval and coast guard enterprise 06:15.060 --> 06:17.000 in all three parts. 06:17.640 --> 06:19.890 They'll have the chance to further elaborate. 06:20.010 --> 06:21.440 As I note this morning, 06:21.550 --> 06:23.860 the pace of deliveries, the stuff coming out, 06:23.860 --> 06:25.760 that we're gonna end up having to sustain 06:25.760 --> 06:28.570 for commissionings and christenings, it's increasing 06:28.600 --> 06:30.730 and just this year alone, fiscal year 18 06:30.730 --> 06:33.790 will deliver 14 ships and will commission 10. 06:34.210 --> 06:37.880 Four LCSs 2DDGs, an SSN and an LPD 06:38.370 --> 06:40.740 and as i was just discussing with Jim Downy, 06:40.740 --> 06:44.380 will execute 57 CENO maintenance availabilities. 06:45.410 --> 06:46.960 This year, 57. 06:47.680 --> 06:50.410 While 10 commissionings is like wow, 06:50.430 --> 06:54.070 he's doing six x that and he does it every year, 06:54.070 --> 06:56.320 in and out, all the meantime, 06:56.320 --> 06:57.950 while we're trying to deal with these things, 06:57.950 --> 07:01.190 called continuing resolutions, which wreak havoc 07:01.520 --> 07:04.100 and our ability to plan and execute. 07:04.100 --> 07:07.120 Not just the maintenance, but he modernization, 07:07.200 --> 07:09.160 that the combatant commanders expect, 07:09.410 --> 07:11.530 when those ships come out of their availabilities. 07:11.530 --> 07:13.940 These folks, again, are the guys, 07:13.940 --> 07:15.440 who work that and live it. 07:16.710 --> 07:17.890 This ever growing fleet, 07:17.890 --> 07:20.110 it requires sustainment infrastructure, 07:20.110 --> 07:22.180 the facilities workforce and processes 07:22.180 --> 07:23.950 to keep this delivering fleet ready 07:23.950 --> 07:26.710 and to modernize and sustain the fleet we have today. 07:27.010 --> 07:30.540 The responsibility here falls on both the navy 07:30.900 --> 07:32.080 and on industry. 07:32.080 --> 07:34.230 Congress and the navy recognize the need 07:34.230 --> 07:36.540 to modernize our naval shipyard enterprise, 07:36.540 --> 07:39.890 arguably the most capable sustainment enterprise 07:40.250 --> 07:42.930 in the world, keeping our nuclear carriers 07:42.930 --> 07:44.950 and submarines ready for sea and relevant 07:44.950 --> 07:45.990 to the next fight. 07:46.430 --> 07:49.180 Industries part is critical in both the public 07:49.180 --> 07:50.820 and private sectors. 07:51.050 --> 07:53.480 Our surface ship private sectors health and capability 07:53.480 --> 07:55.840 is even more important to this audience, 07:55.870 --> 07:58.830 it is a first order influence on keeping 07:58.870 --> 08:00.570 our surface navy at sea. 08:01.110 --> 08:02.760 Much like the acquisition business, 08:02.760 --> 08:05.320 the key to delivering this pace of capacity 08:05.530 --> 08:08.300 is to plan for it and sustain stable 08:08.300 --> 08:11.160 well understood maintenance availability profiles, 08:11.350 --> 08:13.750 building the base and industry for future growth 08:14.100 --> 08:15.680 as the nation demands. 08:15.890 --> 08:17.910 And also like the acquisition side, 08:17.910 --> 08:20.800 affordability is critical to achieving the navy 08:20.800 --> 08:23.220 the nation needs, the maintenance along 08:23.220 --> 08:25.890 with the fore structure and the modernization. 08:26.410 --> 08:30.170 The navy's expectation of industry in our naval ship yards 08:30.170 --> 08:32.470 is that for stable maintenance profiles, 08:32.620 --> 08:36.100 performance will improve and costs will come down. 08:36.780 --> 08:40.290 Investment in modern facilities, capable work force 08:40.290 --> 08:42.140 to achieve this level of performance 08:42.140 --> 08:45.560 is both the responsibility and an opportunity 08:45.560 --> 08:47.280 for this navy industry team. 08:48.090 --> 08:50.460 As I said this morning, the bottom line here is, 08:50.460 --> 08:52.570 that this is not just theory. 08:52.610 --> 08:55.500 It is not a theoretical argument on how we sustain 08:55.500 --> 08:59.470 and modernize a capable navy on ever decreasing timelines. 08:59.570 --> 09:02.080 Just look around, we are in an era 09:02.130 --> 09:04.160 of great power competition and our navy 09:04.160 --> 09:07.270 is increasingly going to be tested by out competitors. 09:07.720 --> 09:09.460 That's without arguing. 09:10.060 --> 09:12.840 The team up here working with their industry partners 09:12.840 --> 09:16.630 has a responsibility of delivering this stronger navy 09:16.810 --> 09:17.880 our nation needs. 09:18.700 --> 09:19.950 Let me introduce them. 09:20.500 --> 09:22.280 First up, we have Mark Whitney, 09:22.280 --> 09:24.230 he is a director of fleet maintenance 09:24.240 --> 09:26.240 at Fleet Forces Command. 09:26.700 --> 09:30.310 Previously, he was CO4, deputy commander, 09:30.400 --> 09:32.840 logistics maintenance and industrial operations 09:33.290 --> 09:34.560 working at Navsea. 09:34.950 --> 09:37.900 He also served as the 47th commander of Puget Sound 09:37.900 --> 09:40.930 Naval Shipyard in intermediate maintenance facility. 09:40.940 --> 09:42.810 Like me, Mark's an insuring duty officer 09:42.810 --> 09:44.960 and been doing it for a long time, 09:45.380 --> 09:49.340 a URL, squo before crossing over into the ED community. 09:50.040 --> 09:52.380 He knows the maintenance business. 09:53.010 --> 09:54.670 Next to Mark, Jim Downey. 09:55.080 --> 09:58.150 He is deputy commander surface warfare at Navsea 09:58.630 --> 10:00.980 and commander navy regional maintenance center. 10:01.370 --> 10:05.420 He is C 21 and commander navy regional maintenance center. 10:05.630 --> 10:07.781 Jim previously served as partner manager 10:07.781 --> 10:10.610 for the DGG 1000 program, that was pretty easy, 10:10.880 --> 10:13.400 including delivery of the first ship of the class, 10:13.400 --> 10:16.240 not easy, and he also served as program manager 10:16.240 --> 10:18.410 for this thing called CGX. 10:18.640 --> 10:20.100 I think his head's a little flatter 10:20.100 --> 10:22.250 after having lived through that experience. 10:22.390 --> 10:25.560 He's battle hardened, he's an engineering duty officer also 10:25.560 --> 10:28.440 and a squo, before becoming an ED. 10:29.240 --> 10:32.450 Moises, on the end, he is deputy commander 10:32.450 --> 10:34.570 for undersea warfare naval sea systems commander 10:34.570 --> 10:36.080 and he's CO7. 10:36.660 --> 10:39.710 And he also is the commander, as I was for a year, 10:39.710 --> 10:41.380 of naval undersea warfare center. 10:41.780 --> 10:43.700 He previously served as a program manager 10:43.700 --> 10:45.940 for the undersea defensive war systems 10:46.330 --> 10:50.497 and commanding officer of USS Rhode Island SSBN 740 blue. 10:53.350 --> 10:57.517 Moises is our URL sub panel member today. 10:57.910 --> 11:00.760 He's also prior enlisted for seven years. 11:01.970 --> 11:05.240 Three, it just looks like seven, okay. 11:06.360 --> 11:09.790 Then finally we have our coast guard rep here, Mel. 11:10.410 --> 11:12.710 He is assistant commandant for engineering logistics, 11:12.710 --> 11:15.410 US coast guard, he is their chief engineer. 11:15.670 --> 11:17.870 Mel previously served as a coast guard district 11:17.870 --> 11:20.450 eighth chief of staff and as chief office 11:20.450 --> 11:22.280 of aeronautical engineering. 11:22.280 --> 11:24.160 You notice Mel, he's wearing wings, 11:24.250 --> 11:26.190 but he knows a lot about maintenance and he's bringing 11:26.190 --> 11:29.230 some of that to the surface ship enterprise 11:29.230 --> 11:30.210 in the coast guard. 11:31.110 --> 11:33.230 Without further ado, I'd like to turn it over 11:33.230 --> 11:35.360 and let Mark lead off, they'll get five to 10 11:35.360 --> 11:37.620 minutes to talk and then well open it up 11:37.620 --> 11:38.700 for the questions. 11:38.700 --> 11:40.620 If you don't ask questions, I'll ask questions, 11:40.620 --> 11:42.570 and your questions will be much better. 11:43.030 --> 11:43.930 Over to you, Mark. 11:44.350 --> 11:47.130 - Alright, thanks, good afternoon. 11:49.560 --> 11:52.330 Thank you very much for the opportunity to come 11:52.330 --> 11:54.530 to talk to you today and my intent 11:54.530 --> 11:56.670 is to be exceptionally brief, 11:57.320 --> 11:59.890 because I know who is in the audience 12:00.180 --> 12:04.347 and we need to leave lots of time for questions. 12:05.700 --> 12:08.210 I'm just gonna be brief and what I wanna do 12:08.210 --> 12:11.290 is provide the fleet maintenance officer perspective 12:11.290 --> 12:12.610 on two specific areas. 12:12.610 --> 12:15.410 One is rit large depot maintenance 12:15.480 --> 12:17.750 and that is both in the naval ship yards 12:17.750 --> 12:19.440 and in private industry. 12:19.820 --> 12:22.030 And then the second one is on what I'll just broadly 12:22.030 --> 12:24.740 term as sailor maintenance and I'll talk a little bit 12:24.740 --> 12:26.390 more about that here in a second. 12:27.520 --> 12:30.300 Depot maintenance, from the fleet maintenance officer 12:30.300 --> 12:34.467 perspective, across all of it, we are improving. 12:36.210 --> 12:38.370 I'll leave it up to my esteemed colleagues here 12:38.370 --> 12:40.780 to dive down into the details for you, 12:41.760 --> 12:45.927 but what CO4 or CO7 and the naval ship yards 12:45.940 --> 12:49.390 are doing inside for aircraft carriers and submarines. 12:49.930 --> 12:52.660 We are seeing the lost operational days 12:52.660 --> 12:54.410 from the fleet are decreasing, 12:54.410 --> 12:57.430 we're delivering on time, better than what we have 12:57.430 --> 13:00.500 in the past and it's continuing to improve 13:01.055 --> 13:03.090 across all four shipyards. 13:03.790 --> 13:07.790 For C21 CNRMC and private industry partners, 13:08.580 --> 13:10.710 Jim will talk about some specific numbers, 13:10.710 --> 13:12.300 but again, from the fleet perspective, 13:12.300 --> 13:14.390 the lost operational days, we're seeing 13:14.390 --> 13:18.557 are significantly coming down and that's in no small part 13:18.770 --> 13:22.650 due to the process discipline, that has been 13:22.650 --> 13:24.482 going on for years and years now. 13:24.482 --> 13:26.460 Elements of the Belial report 13:26.730 --> 13:29.400 the integration of maintenance and modernization together, 13:29.400 --> 13:32.190 understanding the true material condition of our ships. 13:32.420 --> 13:34.780 Building a rock solid work package, 13:34.780 --> 13:36.820 that we then hand off to private industry 13:36.820 --> 13:38.390 to successfully execute. 13:39.580 --> 13:43.747 The results to the fleet is in the lost operational 13:43.930 --> 13:46.480 days is significantly decreasing. 13:46.800 --> 13:49.760 What that matters most to and you head it from my boss 13:49.760 --> 13:53.438 this morning is now not having to compete the pressure 13:53.438 --> 13:57.140 in the training cycle of allowing the sailors 13:57.480 --> 14:00.310 the requisite amount of time to train 14:00.310 --> 14:03.040 and to be certified ready for deployment 14:03.040 --> 14:05.600 to meet the threats, that they're gonna see. 14:06.930 --> 14:10.180 The second part is sailor maintenance. 14:10.630 --> 14:12.860 What I'm really talking about and for those of you, 14:12.860 --> 14:15.110 that have gone to any of the ASNI functions 14:15.110 --> 14:17.060 over the course of the last year or so, 14:17.464 --> 14:21.010 my mantra is self sufficient sailors at sea. 14:22.330 --> 14:23.580 I'm gonna add a little piece to that, 14:23.580 --> 14:25.590 which is self sufficient sailors at sea 14:25.590 --> 14:26.980 in a contested environment. 14:27.770 --> 14:30.650 We gotta change the way, that we are thinking about this 14:31.100 --> 14:33.550 and I believe we are, and we've got some specific 14:33.550 --> 14:34.840 actions in place. 14:35.540 --> 14:38.420 But what I'm talking about is, think about it, 14:38.440 --> 14:42.310 is for many many years, 14:42.920 --> 14:47.087 we have taken margins on PMS, on tech manuals, 14:48.500 --> 14:51.317 on having available piece parts on board, 14:51.317 --> 14:55.484 on training, to where we've got satisfied, 14:56.580 --> 15:00.220 that if something broke and you get to step 15 15:00.491 --> 15:04.658 in the repair process, it says called navy 311. 15:05.870 --> 15:09.540 There's a phone home capability built into the system 15:09.860 --> 15:12.120 and that's not gonna work when you're operating 15:12.120 --> 15:14.840 in a contested environment and you cannot call home. 15:15.430 --> 15:17.640 We have got to get back to where the sailors 15:17.640 --> 15:20.600 are self sufficient at sea, where they have the training, 15:20.600 --> 15:22.910 they have the tech manual they have the ability 15:22.910 --> 15:26.326 to practice and some of the things, 15:26.326 --> 15:30.493 that allow them to do that is the rotation 15:31.140 --> 15:34.040 through the eye level and through the NAMTS 15:34.040 --> 15:36.620 program to get a secondary NEC, 15:36.710 --> 15:39.610 to get some reps and sets, to be able to practice 15:39.610 --> 15:41.910 those things and bring them back to the fleet, 15:42.160 --> 15:43.350 when they get underway. 15:47.120 --> 15:48.970 The assessment, that I'll give us on that 15:48.970 --> 15:52.890 is improving, but a lot of room for improvement 15:52.890 --> 15:54.840 and a lot of work still left to do. 15:55.640 --> 15:57.290 One of the simple ways to do this 15:57.974 --> 16:00.324 is who here remembers the old Battle Force IMA? 16:02.490 --> 16:04.410 Now called Strike Force IMA. 16:05.260 --> 16:07.710 That is not something, that we measure right now. 16:07.770 --> 16:11.810 We do not measure activity at the Strike Force IMA level. 16:12.910 --> 16:14.664 What we're gonna do is we're gonna start 16:14.664 --> 16:18.600 measuring results from Strike Force IMAs 16:18.950 --> 16:21.900 at the secondary NEC level to see, 16:21.900 --> 16:24.360 where we are getting a return on investment 16:24.360 --> 16:26.730 from the sailors, that are going thought the NAMTS 16:26.730 --> 16:28.460 program, going through the RMCs 16:28.730 --> 16:30.630 and then having the ability to refix 16:30.630 --> 16:33.810 and repair themselves underway by themselves. 16:35.770 --> 16:38.490 The first step towards that and if anybody 16:38.490 --> 16:40.360 had the opportunity while it was out there, 16:40.360 --> 16:43.450 the NAMTS booth, that was here, a piece of that 16:43.450 --> 16:45.020 is what's called SORCAT. 16:45.180 --> 16:48.240 Ship's organic capability assessment team. 16:48.780 --> 16:51.070 What that's doing is it's going out to the ships 16:51.070 --> 16:53.660 and assessing whether or not they have the consumables, 16:53.660 --> 16:57.010 whether or not they're drill press actually works. 16:57.160 --> 16:58.870 Whether they've got the weld rod. 16:59.080 --> 17:01.510 Whether or not they have the tech manuals. 17:01.510 --> 17:05.330 The things they need to be able to do fix themselves. 17:06.570 --> 17:10.737 That's the precursor, that's CNRMC led effort here, 17:12.130 --> 17:14.500 but it's all intended to get us to where 17:14.500 --> 17:16.790 we can measure something, we can evaluate, 17:16.790 --> 17:20.957 we can improve our disciple to some fundamental processes, 17:22.190 --> 17:24.530 that allows us to get back to sailors at sea. 17:25.420 --> 17:27.140 Self sufficient sailors at sea. 17:28.070 --> 17:31.010 Improving both areas from the fleet perspective, 17:31.821 --> 17:32.971 still a long way to go. 17:34.880 --> 17:39.047 Quite frankly, from both Bill Green and I 17:39.480 --> 17:42.330 and we are aligned on this and we talk fairly frequently. 17:42.490 --> 17:45.330 There is not difference between coasts on this, 17:45.570 --> 17:47.650 this is something, that both fleets see 17:47.860 --> 17:51.860 and both fleets are aligned with our operators 17:52.199 --> 17:53.730 on a way forward. 17:54.160 --> 17:56.420 I greatly look forward to your questions, 17:56.500 --> 17:57.870 cuz I can see some head nods 17:57.870 --> 18:00.890 and I'm expecting some intriguing ones, thanks. 18:07.030 --> 18:08.380 - Is this on, yeah it's on. 18:09.900 --> 18:12.540 Good afternoon everyone, great to see everybody. 18:13.770 --> 18:16.110 I've got, as the admiral mentioned, 18:16.630 --> 18:18.470 maintenance and modernization programs 18:18.470 --> 18:22.637 undersea 21 and the regional maintenance under stats, 18:23.320 --> 18:26.760 essentially non nuclear ships in the navy. 18:28.030 --> 18:30.140 Certainly don't do that by myself, 18:30.140 --> 18:33.180 I'm a casual visitor into DC once in a while. 18:33.540 --> 18:34.440 On the road a lot. 18:35.450 --> 18:37.450 Miss Karen Davis is here with me, 18:37.450 --> 18:41.510 she's the executive director with the Eschalon two program 18:41.660 --> 18:44.670 activities and miss Stephanie Douglas is here. 18:44.720 --> 18:48.060 She's the executive director for Eschalon three activities 18:48.060 --> 18:49.310 across the RMCs. 18:49.400 --> 18:52.400 There's several other folks on that navy side here as well, 18:52.400 --> 18:55.940 but if you're involved in ship maintenance out there, 18:55.940 --> 18:57.910 whether it's a ship yard, a region, 18:58.000 --> 19:00.340 complex, non complex, can you raise your hand? 19:01.480 --> 19:03.270 There's a few of you out there. 19:03.950 --> 19:08.117 The navy side across the RMCs runs about 7000 folks 19:09.860 --> 19:13.740 and we have 20 to 30 thousand depending upon 19:13.740 --> 19:15.890 the work load out in the private shipyards. 19:16.870 --> 19:19.020 About two dozen shipyards world wide. 19:20.713 --> 19:24.690 That is across eight locations, Norfolk, May port, 19:25.170 --> 19:29.337 San Diego, Packnorwest, Hawaii, Rhoda, Naples in Bahrain. 19:31.170 --> 19:34.160 I didn't mention Ucuscan Sasibo, 19:34.220 --> 19:36.920 those two locations were directly for pack fleet 19:37.400 --> 19:40.070 and we support them as needed. 19:40.320 --> 19:43.840 A significant amount of work on an annual basis, 19:43.840 --> 19:47.260 that ranges about five to six billion a year 19:47.580 --> 19:49.230 in maintenance and modernization. 19:49.590 --> 19:51.770 We're coming out of the last three years 19:51.770 --> 19:55.937 of about three dozen major availabilities a year, 19:56.620 --> 19:58.990 depot level maintenance efforts 19:59.390 --> 20:03.557 and 18 to 21, is essentially a 135% 20:05.050 --> 20:06.670 of that historical work load. 20:06.940 --> 20:09.150 Then next two years, we will induct 20:09.150 --> 20:13.317 the 113 ships, 57 this year, as admiral Johnson mentioned 20:14.450 --> 20:16.870 and 57 next year. 20:17.680 --> 20:21.780 With that goes to planning, I see Captain Dave Bouers here 20:22.020 --> 20:22.910 from Surfmap. 20:22.910 --> 20:27.077 A few years ago, we really stood up the surface planning 20:27.200 --> 20:29.520 effort, about five years or so ago 20:29.810 --> 20:33.977 and changed out approach on how we would address planning, 20:34.130 --> 20:36.940 where navy would take on that responsibility 20:37.090 --> 20:38.420 and then provide those products. 20:38.420 --> 20:41.520 We had the solicitation for industry to execute. 20:42.757 --> 20:45.420 We're working two to five years ahead of the avail. 20:46.290 --> 20:49.070 Dave and team in addition to the numbers I just mentioned, 20:49.070 --> 20:52.540 has about a 100 ships in planning at any given time. 20:52.720 --> 20:54.520 Significant amount of work there. 20:54.640 --> 20:56.620 Some of that is relatively routine, 20:56.620 --> 20:59.550 as we've done the avail before, 20:59.550 --> 21:03.717 we were executing repeat maintenance on the follow ships. 21:04.960 --> 21:08.390 Some of it isn't, some of it is CG LSD mod. 21:09.080 --> 21:13.190 We have six CGs inducted right now in a multi billion 21:13.190 --> 21:15.760 dollar program and one of the LSD. 21:16.670 --> 21:17.770 There's a program manager, 21:17.770 --> 21:20.940 who's actually the ESEC for those seven ships right now. 21:21.210 --> 21:24.030 63 and 64 on the cruiser side 21:24.360 --> 21:26.840 are in a combined solicitation right now 21:27.640 --> 21:30.990 to give industry a chance to team 21:31.080 --> 21:33.700 and propose a national strategy back to navy 21:33.960 --> 21:37.380 and those proposals will come in early February, 21:37.610 --> 21:41.777 and then we'll move off into 18 to 24 month docking 21:42.050 --> 21:46.200 efforts to finally modernize those cruisers. 21:46.750 --> 21:50.917 That's a program across half of the navy, the 11. 21:52.892 --> 21:57.059 Across the prior years, back to admiral Whitney's comment 21:58.060 --> 22:02.227 on lost operational days, the numbers basically 22:03.160 --> 22:06.540 go like this, there's been a 75% reduction 22:06.540 --> 22:08.150 in lost operational days. 22:08.430 --> 22:12.597 Coming through 14, it was nearly 5000 lost operational days, 22:15.010 --> 22:17.440 4900 and change. 22:18.760 --> 22:21.540 There's some avail still going on from 17, 22:21.730 --> 22:25.897 but as of November 17 closed about at about 1165 22:27.210 --> 22:28.610 lost operational days. 22:29.230 --> 22:31.390 We're still not where we need to be. 22:31.990 --> 22:35.090 75% reduction over the last three to four years, 22:35.320 --> 22:37.210 principally by efforts put in place 22:37.210 --> 22:41.080 by my predecessors, process on standing up 22:42.050 --> 22:45.100 various planning activities and on strategy. 22:45.800 --> 22:48.500 Going forward into this 135%, 22:48.500 --> 22:50.530 still a lot of room for improvement. 22:51.120 --> 22:53.900 We have significant concurrent activity 22:53.900 --> 22:57.120 in multiple ports, navy really needs to move 22:57.120 --> 23:01.030 into some more combined solicitations instead of ship 23:01.030 --> 23:04.500 by ship solicitations to afford industry 23:04.500 --> 23:08.480 the opportunity, one to propose back strategies, 23:08.480 --> 23:11.510 that best use our infrastructures, such as dual docking 23:11.860 --> 23:13.430 of ships where possible 23:15.840 --> 23:19.130 as well us given some relief 23:19.130 --> 23:20.870 on some very specific milestones, 23:20.870 --> 23:22.240 that we have in the avail, 23:22.810 --> 23:25.980 and us looking at our QA and QC over site, 23:26.210 --> 23:28.970 and what are we doing to impede industry 23:29.160 --> 23:32.130 form hitting those on time requirements. 23:33.407 --> 23:36.510 Those are some of the strategies, dual docking, 23:36.540 --> 23:38.980 multiple ships combined in solicitation. 23:41.817 --> 23:43.730 Then it gets into more definite 23:45.127 --> 23:49.294 and more solid RFPs, as we go forward 23:50.200 --> 23:53.080 to really truly hit those dates, 23:53.890 --> 23:55.840 that are required for those deliveries. 23:56.410 --> 23:58.810 Then you get into how do we contribute 23:58.810 --> 24:01.150 to the goal towards 355. 24:03.690 --> 24:07.857 I generally don't agree, that there is a lot of maintenance 24:07.960 --> 24:10.240 deferred, in fact, the actions over the last 24:10.240 --> 24:13.380 three to five years have taken us and our classes 24:13.380 --> 24:17.547 or flights of ships from zero to 10% max deferred 24:18.180 --> 24:21.130 in maintenance, haul by haul as we go through. 24:21.719 --> 24:24.400 We know that, via the larger team, 24:24.540 --> 24:27.990 the very specifics of it and the burn down of that 24:27.990 --> 24:32.157 is programmed in the numbers, that I was discussing. 24:33.810 --> 24:36.780 Going forward, we certainly are participating, as I said, 24:36.780 --> 24:40.947 in the 355 and off analyzing what additional life 24:42.300 --> 24:45.130 can we get out of those ships, 24:45.130 --> 24:48.460 what service life extension programs 24:48.460 --> 24:51.680 would we potentially put in place, 24:51.680 --> 24:54.700 pending the need for the navy to support the nation. 24:55.090 --> 24:58.190 Those are some of the big efforts I mentioned 24:58.660 --> 25:00.930 I'll bring up on my portion of it. 25:01.180 --> 25:05.347 The rest of it is, that we do much of the planning, 25:05.460 --> 25:07.330 that's in the work spec area, 25:07.450 --> 25:10.520 we're heavily teamed with industry on the modernization side 25:10.810 --> 25:13.680 across what is principally our new construction yards 25:14.100 --> 25:17.380 or Bath and Paspigola, as well as the naval ship yards 25:17.770 --> 25:20.580 planning the modernization efforts as well. 25:21.290 --> 25:23.950 Those teams are heavily involved in planning 25:23.950 --> 25:27.280 and preparing the execute Fitzgerald right now 25:27.280 --> 25:31.447 down in Paspigola, she arrives there in the coming days, 25:32.810 --> 25:35.010 she should be there by about 17, 25:35.080 --> 25:36.840 the morning of 17th January. 25:38.140 --> 25:40.110 Big pitcher, those are the areas 25:40.130 --> 25:43.370 and my portion of surface warfare, thank you. 25:46.164 --> 25:47.747 - Great, thank you. 25:48.710 --> 25:52.877 I figured I'd do a couple of things, 25:54.080 --> 25:57.240 talk a little bit about what my area responsibility is, 25:58.570 --> 26:01.300 review some of the modernization efforts 26:01.300 --> 26:03.150 we've made on our support system at large 26:03.150 --> 26:05.640 and then talk a little bit about our naval engineering, 26:05.640 --> 26:06.890 but I guess first of all, 26:08.076 --> 26:10.126 I need to follow up with Admiral Johnson. 26:10.900 --> 26:12.940 What does an aviator know about ship maintenance 26:12.940 --> 26:14.080 or what is he interested in. 26:14.080 --> 26:15.860 I was very interested in ship maintenance, 26:15.860 --> 26:19.130 I always wanted to make sure, that the fuel systems 26:19.130 --> 26:20.790 on the cutters worked well, 26:20.790 --> 26:23.270 the habitability systems and I was especially interested 26:23.270 --> 26:26.170 in the MWR movies and late racks. 26:30.250 --> 26:33.680 My roles CG for the chief engineer for the coast guard, 26:33.680 --> 26:36.370 I've got the engineering and logistics directorate. 26:37.120 --> 26:39.210 It's a pretty broad area of responsibility. 26:39.210 --> 26:41.780 Includes aviation or aeronautical engineering, 26:41.780 --> 26:45.947 civil engineering, naval engineering, logistics 26:47.220 --> 26:51.387 and then environmental compliance and energy 26:51.510 --> 26:53.070 or fuel accounts as well. 26:53.970 --> 26:57.260 In that area, we've got three major logistics centers, 26:57.260 --> 27:01.320 one for air, one for surface and one for shore. 27:03.299 --> 27:06.470 Two of those have large industrial capabilities. 27:06.470 --> 27:09.770 We also have some smaller industrial capabilities 27:09.770 --> 27:12.810 spread throughout the nation along the coast line. 27:13.910 --> 27:18.077 In 2006, the coast guard began to modernize 27:20.220 --> 27:22.470 or refocus the way we were doing mission support 27:22.470 --> 27:24.070 across all those areas. 27:25.010 --> 27:26.620 We really looked at a couple of things, 27:26.620 --> 27:29.180 we benchmarked off of industry, 27:29.650 --> 27:31.850 particularly some of the automotive industry 27:31.890 --> 27:33.680 type of support mechanisms. 27:34.540 --> 27:36.840 We looked at other agencies and then 27:36.840 --> 27:38.670 internally at our aviation community, 27:38.670 --> 27:41.770 and we came up with this, took best practices 27:41.770 --> 27:45.860 from all those and came up with coast guard 27:45.860 --> 27:47.790 mission support business model. 27:48.190 --> 27:52.250 That business model had four primary elements. 27:52.730 --> 27:55.300 Configuration management was a big focus, 27:55.300 --> 27:58.810 product line management or capability management, 27:59.860 --> 28:01.910 included total asset visibility 28:02.110 --> 28:04.570 and then a buy level support structure. 28:04.570 --> 28:08.020 Some kind of the O and D level maintenance for all those. 28:09.571 --> 28:11.330 It focused on a couple of things 28:11.560 --> 28:14.550 or brought some benefits, a clear consolidated 28:14.550 --> 28:17.480 accountability for a particular capability, 28:17.510 --> 28:20.560 a more proactive focus on support, 28:20.560 --> 28:21.890 rather than reactive. 28:23.940 --> 28:26.480 It also helped a lot with making sure, 28:26.480 --> 28:30.560 that we were using data getting good sound metrics 28:30.560 --> 28:32.730 to have data driven decisions. 28:33.150 --> 28:37.280 Then we also reduced the field level burden 28:37.280 --> 28:39.280 for a lot of the maintenance activities. 28:39.560 --> 28:41.790 We found, that it yielded several benefits, 28:41.880 --> 28:44.400 created a culture of continuous learning 28:44.860 --> 28:49.027 and it leveraged information on different ways, 28:49.410 --> 28:52.090 that we could control cost, really prioritize our readiness 28:52.090 --> 28:55.240 decisions and then maintain standards, 28:55.240 --> 28:57.150 I know that's particularly something, 28:57.784 --> 29:00.710 that the navy's been looking at more recently. 29:01.860 --> 29:05.220 Ultimately, all that was designed and proven our readiness, 29:05.460 --> 29:08.390 and our affordability for our assets. 29:09.470 --> 29:12.130 Then I'll talk a little bit about our coast guard yard, 29:12.130 --> 29:13.320 which is in Baltimore. 29:13.580 --> 29:16.310 Obviously the size of the coast guard infrastructure 29:16.476 --> 29:19.310 fails in comparison to the navy, 29:19.310 --> 29:23.070 but we have common philosophies on a few things. 29:24.390 --> 29:28.320 Our coast guard yard was established with a working 29:28.320 --> 29:32.487 capital fund and I would say previously, 29:35.110 --> 29:38.810 last 10, 15 years or so, or historically 29:38.810 --> 29:42.320 in the coast guard yard, we followed the opening inspect 29:42.418 --> 29:46.150 and find what the condition of the asset was 29:46.150 --> 29:48.100 to do maintenance and what not. 29:49.490 --> 29:51.280 We changed that philosophy a little bit, 29:51.280 --> 29:55.080 we found, that we could really greatly improve 29:55.080 --> 29:56.920 our efficiency and effectiveness, 29:57.120 --> 29:59.590 if we had repeatable, as much like acquisitions, 29:59.590 --> 30:01.550 if we have a steady funding stream, 30:01.600 --> 30:05.340 repeatable work, where we can continuously improve, 30:05.450 --> 30:07.240 that we'd reach some benefits. 30:07.999 --> 30:10.540 We support out surface assets 30:10.540 --> 30:14.460 with a fleet wide sustainability approach. 30:14.460 --> 30:18.510 We do two major depot activities for our assets 30:18.510 --> 30:21.530 during their cycle, the midlife maintenance availability 30:21.530 --> 30:24.950 period, where we look at addressing obsolescence 30:24.950 --> 30:27.780 over an asset line and ensuring, 30:27.780 --> 30:30.180 that it's capable throughout its programmed life 30:30.320 --> 30:31.880 or its expected service life. 30:31.880 --> 30:33.780 Then we do the service life extension, 30:33.990 --> 30:35.680 where we may extend those. 30:35.680 --> 30:39.200 Of course most of our assets designed 20, 30 years 30:39.200 --> 30:42.110 and we're keeping them to 40, 50 and often 60 years 30:42.110 --> 30:46.240 we do service life extensions on a regular basis. 30:48.892 --> 30:52.070 Couple of the topics, that were in the abstract for this, 30:52.070 --> 30:55.250 where ship yard resilience, true maintenance cost 30:55.250 --> 30:58.690 and then capacity and personnel trait skills. 30:59.340 --> 31:02.230 Our resilience really goes to ensuring, 31:02.230 --> 31:04.440 that our yard's viable and productive force 31:04.440 --> 31:06.940 and we are doing some investments 31:07.241 --> 31:10.020 in the infrastructure there to handle 31:10.020 --> 31:11.730 some of our larger assets. 31:12.490 --> 31:14.040 Get a little closer, thank you. 31:15.130 --> 31:19.297 Our new acquisitions OPCs off shore patrol cutters, 31:19.730 --> 31:21.930 we're gonna expand the capability of our yard there 31:21.930 --> 31:24.390 and ensure, that we can do that type of work 31:24.390 --> 31:25.780 on a regular basis. 31:28.250 --> 31:30.570 As I mentioned, we've seen some great benefits 31:30.570 --> 31:33.280 with both our ice breaker 31:34.770 --> 31:38.460 or ice breaking tug boats and our patrol boats. 31:38.460 --> 31:41.420 We have 87 foot patrol boats, we bring them in 31:41.420 --> 31:45.310 for a recurring depot maintenance, 31:46.410 --> 31:48.720 basically hot turn the assets. 31:48.720 --> 31:50.620 We bring them in for haul maintenance, 31:51.100 --> 31:52.800 the crew will drop off that cutter 31:52.980 --> 31:55.870 and then another cutter will already be in the works 31:55.870 --> 31:57.800 ready to go and they'll pick that cutter up 31:57.800 --> 32:00.520 and head back out for patrol. 32:00.520 --> 32:03.610 Seen some great benefits with that, learning curves 32:03.610 --> 32:07.777 and savings in the tune of 20 to 30% cost reduction 32:08.440 --> 32:10.040 from the initial planned work. 32:10.850 --> 32:12.632 The savings, that we get with that, 32:12.632 --> 32:16.799 we're able to free up time, that we can do other work, 32:18.420 --> 32:21.600 that the asset might need and particularly the operational 32:21.600 --> 32:22.960 commander's interested in. 32:23.650 --> 32:27.310 By turning those cutters around, those hauls around 32:27.310 --> 32:29.290 as quickly as we do, we were able to return 32:29.290 --> 32:32.200 back to the operational commander a full year's 32:32.530 --> 32:35.930 worth of operations for that particular asset line. 32:40.210 --> 32:42.220 On the maintenance requirements, 32:43.150 --> 32:46.140 we continuously evaluate the maintenance requirements, 32:46.140 --> 32:48.870 whether they're calendar based maintenance cycles, 32:49.220 --> 32:52.170 looking at rolling those into reliability or hourly 32:52.176 --> 32:54.870 maintenance cycles or even going down to condition 32:54.870 --> 32:56.430 typed maintenance. 32:56.790 --> 33:00.640 Then finally, for the personnel and trait space, 33:00.640 --> 33:01.940 we've had a couple things, 33:02.270 --> 33:03.103 that I've been particularly proud of. 33:03.103 --> 33:07.100 We work with a local high school on sea going 33:07.275 --> 33:10.230 marine orientation type program 33:10.230 --> 33:11.930 and we'll bring students in, 33:11.930 --> 33:14.330 who are interested in the marine repair area 33:14.390 --> 33:15.990 and the local area in the Baltimore area 33:15.990 --> 33:18.290 and we've been seeing some benefits with that. 33:18.390 --> 33:20.640 We got a summer internship program with them. 33:21.430 --> 33:23.300 We also work with the local college, 33:23.330 --> 33:25.950 doing some trades training programs, 33:26.540 --> 33:29.180 where some of the students there will be able to do 33:29.180 --> 33:33.204 their lab work at our coastguard yard 33:33.204 --> 33:37.020 and get college credits as they pursue their associates 33:37.020 --> 33:38.500 to degrees for that. 33:40.060 --> 33:42.170 Then we've gotten some recruiting out of that. 33:42.170 --> 33:43.950 We also have a unique thing, 33:43.950 --> 33:46.640 where we do a nine trade specific hire 33:46.850 --> 33:48.890 for our work force at GS3 level 33:49.070 --> 33:51.500 and then we'll put them through various shops 33:51.500 --> 33:53.390 and different trades within the yard, 33:53.570 --> 33:56.110 that we can find where we might be able 33:56.110 --> 33:59.540 to match up their skills, knowledge, interests 33:59.540 --> 34:01.410 with what are needs are in the organization 34:01.410 --> 34:05.050 and then they can pursue other areas 34:05.201 --> 34:08.060 in the yard work force there. 34:08.750 --> 34:10.890 Thank you very much and I'll yield. 34:16.330 --> 34:18.430 - Alright, I guess the lace done his work. 34:18.490 --> 34:22.657 Thanks for the opportunity to at least share with you 34:23.630 --> 34:27.230 the submarines forces perspective on maintenance. 34:27.640 --> 34:30.700 It allows, in a group like this, 34:31.430 --> 34:33.830 the ability to have true high velocity learning, 34:33.890 --> 34:36.830 cuz not too often, there's someone like 34:36.830 --> 34:40.100 a submarine will sit here in a surface symposium 34:40.540 --> 34:42.620 and understand exactly what's going. 34:42.620 --> 34:45.180 The sharing analogy, I think, is very important. 34:46.620 --> 34:48.470 One of the primary goals in Navsea O7 34:50.370 --> 34:53.390 of course is on time delivery of ships and submarines. 34:53.390 --> 34:56.870 Submarines specifically from availability. 34:56.890 --> 34:58.310 That's the number one goal. 34:58.310 --> 35:01.310 If I said more of the commander an naval sea system command. 35:02.080 --> 35:05.200 How do we do that in Navsea O7? 35:05.500 --> 35:09.667 Long term, sub team one, sub team one has been around 35:11.640 --> 35:15.170 for a number of year and its charter 35:15.670 --> 35:19.837 is to develop champion and improve 35:21.210 --> 35:23.720 planning and execution processes, 35:23.970 --> 35:26.580 that ensure, that we give our ships submarine 35:26.580 --> 35:28.740 specifically out of availabilities on time. 35:28.800 --> 35:30.910 That's been a long term process, 35:30.910 --> 35:35.077 that I am a chairman of, but more importantly, 35:35.970 --> 35:38.460 in the first couple of months 35:38.460 --> 35:39.940 of vice Admiral More's 10 years 35:39.940 --> 35:42.040 as the commander of naval systems command, 35:42.430 --> 35:44.690 he set up a planning summit. 35:44.960 --> 35:47.910 Again, cross organizational, as we did a planning summit, 35:48.230 --> 35:51.280 that brought in everybody, the carrier planning folks, 35:51.280 --> 35:53.020 the surface planning folks, 35:53.190 --> 35:55.500 the submarine planning folks, the shipyards 35:55.740 --> 35:59.290 and we sat down for a day and looked at, 35:59.350 --> 36:02.840 from a planning perspective, what was holding us back. 36:03.670 --> 36:05.550 We briefed last week it was, 36:05.550 --> 36:09.717 we've completed 21 of our 28 action items 36:10.900 --> 36:12.780 and making some progress there. 36:13.780 --> 36:17.910 How are we doing from getting the submarines 36:17.910 --> 36:19.530 out of availabilities on time? 36:19.770 --> 36:22.550 Similar to what admiral Whitney said, 36:23.290 --> 36:24.630 we're not out of the woods yet, 36:24.630 --> 36:26.180 but we're making progress. 36:26.720 --> 36:28.780 We've completed from a submarine perspective 36:28.780 --> 36:30.870 two availabilities early. 36:31.570 --> 36:35.737 Providence pre inactivation restricted availability 36:36.370 --> 36:40.537 in the Oklahoma city dry docking selecting availability. 36:41.640 --> 36:44.450 Then, more importantly, we cleared too long, 36:44.450 --> 36:48.617 greater than four year resource constraint availability. 36:48.690 --> 36:52.857 Connecticut DMP and Asheville engineering overhaul 36:53.280 --> 36:55.780 and we're almost out of one more, which is Albany. 36:57.487 --> 37:00.370 We returned 92 months of submarine ASO weld 37:00.570 --> 37:01.690 back to the fleet. 37:02.580 --> 37:06.710 By evaluating our OP interval and service life extension 37:06.840 --> 37:08.500 of select submarines. 37:09.260 --> 37:11.890 This is helping us mitigate the operational concerns, 37:11.890 --> 37:14.880 while the shipyards works down the availability 37:14.880 --> 37:18.770 back log and allows us to optimize our down stream 37:18.770 --> 37:21.780 schedules by better balancing work load 37:21.780 --> 37:25.100 and the projected work force work load, 37:25.360 --> 37:26.760 ship yard work force. 37:27.780 --> 37:31.947 And we are evaluating on a case by case basis 37:32.370 --> 37:36.190 the ability to shift work to the private sector, 37:36.190 --> 37:37.640 where it makes sense. 37:38.460 --> 37:41.210 To date, over the last couple of years, 37:41.210 --> 37:43.710 we've shifted over a million man days of work 37:44.030 --> 37:45.810 to the private nuclear ship yards 37:45.810 --> 37:47.510 by contracting out four 37:47.510 --> 37:49.470 submarine maintenance availabilities. 37:50.330 --> 37:53.460 Montpelier, Columbus, Helena and Boise 37:54.050 --> 37:56.300 and addition to that, we contracted out 37:56.300 --> 38:00.467 about 3000 additional man days 38:01.780 --> 38:04.040 for the more training ships, 38:04.040 --> 38:06.230 that are going though a conversion. 38:07.820 --> 38:11.987 Then we look at the continued private sector initiatives 38:12.140 --> 38:14.790 to reduce the ship yard work load 38:15.400 --> 38:17.010 or repair turn arounds. 38:17.010 --> 38:19.520 We're actually qualifying additional depot 38:19.810 --> 38:23.170 overhaul points to allow additional industry folks 38:23.170 --> 38:26.970 to work on, as admiral Johnson mentioned, 38:26.970 --> 38:28.640 TRIPER is one of those programs. 38:28.640 --> 38:31.240 Instead of just the ship yards or the TRFs 38:31.240 --> 38:33.880 doing that work, we can qualify additional folks 38:34.160 --> 38:35.590 to overhaul those components, 38:35.590 --> 38:38.040 that we get those components back in the service. 38:39.800 --> 38:42.500 That's where we stand now, we're looking at additional 38:42.810 --> 38:45.430 efforts, that are starting here in fiscal year 18. 38:45.430 --> 38:49.597 We're looking at evaluating the option to refuel 38:50.980 --> 38:55.147 or extend to 45 years, four or five, six class submarines. 38:57.090 --> 38:58.710 That's where it's just started. 39:00.597 --> 39:04.040 We're evaluating alternative inactivation concepts. 39:04.040 --> 39:06.570 That we can free up some of the folks, 39:06.570 --> 39:10.290 that are tied not only the ship yard workers, 39:10.290 --> 39:13.050 but the ship's crew, that are tied to that submarine, 39:13.050 --> 39:16.030 while it's waiting for that inactivation to cur. 39:16.885 --> 39:19.135 Then we're looking at some innovative systems 39:19.220 --> 39:22.750 to reduce the recycling and disposal of our submarines. 39:22.750 --> 39:26.070 Again, free up cost, free up schedule, 39:26.070 --> 39:28.000 again, provide that work force, 39:28.000 --> 39:29.260 that we can actually do the work, 39:29.260 --> 39:31.350 that needs to be done to get our ships 39:31.350 --> 39:33.360 and submarines out of the availabilities on time. 39:33.360 --> 39:37.527 That's like a quick sense of where we are at CO7 39:38.211 --> 39:41.410 and be happy to answer any questions, that you may have. 39:45.957 --> 39:48.910 - This time is for you, after the lead in by the panel. 39:49.120 --> 39:52.020 Please feel free to queue up and we already got the first. 39:52.690 --> 39:54.380 Alright, commander, fire away. 39:54.740 --> 39:56.530 - Good afternoon gentlemen, my name is Brian Hart, 39:56.530 --> 39:58.020 I work in N96. 39:58.820 --> 40:01.010 As you're well aware, one of the surface navy's 40:01.010 --> 40:04.170 challenges is meeting the greater high demand 40:04.170 --> 40:08.337 for operations and one of the ways to do that 40:08.740 --> 40:12.365 is argued, is to increase that operational availability 40:12.365 --> 40:15.100 is to have rotational crews 40:15.310 --> 40:17.180 and keep ships forward for longer. 40:17.490 --> 40:19.990 We're seeing that on our small surface combatants. 40:20.180 --> 40:23.590 Both on LCS and then in projected future capabilities, 40:23.680 --> 40:25.380 as we move forward in that effort. 40:26.020 --> 40:28.840 My question is, if we were to do that, it seems, 40:28.840 --> 40:30.840 that there's an argument, that you would need 40:30.840 --> 40:32.670 to be able to conduct maintenance forward 40:32.670 --> 40:34.420 for reconnais based ship, but as you know, 40:34.420 --> 40:37.180 Tidal 10 prevents that as it currently stands. 40:37.970 --> 40:41.600 Are there are ongoing efforts or do you foresee 40:41.850 --> 40:44.680 any future efforts to amend Tidal 10 40:44.680 --> 40:47.110 to allow for that, therefore enabling 40:47.110 --> 40:50.120 a greater operational availability of ships going forward 40:50.120 --> 40:52.450 and allowing us to meet those demands? 40:53.570 --> 40:55.160 - Thank you, go ahead, Mark. 40:56.260 --> 40:59.550 - Don't know if any specific activity in that regard, 41:00.270 --> 41:02.410 but I believe it makes sense to do so. 41:03.080 --> 41:04.660 I think that would also be consistent 41:04.660 --> 41:07.330 with some of the actions of the comprehensive review. 41:08.670 --> 41:11.560 Not that I know of, I don't know if you do, Jim, 41:11.940 --> 41:14.510 actually, I don't know if you know any admiral Johnson, 41:14.510 --> 41:16.560 but no, but it would make sense to me. 41:19.427 --> 41:20.777 - To second what Mark said, 41:20.830 --> 41:23.200 don't know of any specific activities there, 41:23.200 --> 41:24.670 but I do wanna, as you know, 41:24.670 --> 41:27.500 we do do a lot of forward maintenance. 41:28.636 --> 41:30.570 A lot out in the Ucuscan Sasibo, 41:30.770 --> 41:34.200 a lot in Bahrain, much of the fifth fleet maintenance 41:34.200 --> 41:35.550 conference a couple months ago 41:35.550 --> 41:37.510 was all about, of course, LCS 41:38.070 --> 41:40.940 and how do we deal with that situation, 41:42.380 --> 41:44.430 rotating alpha eight team once at a time. 41:45.230 --> 41:49.397 I would like to comment, as you look at rotating crews, 41:51.470 --> 41:53.450 whatever the rotational basis is, 41:53.450 --> 41:54.930 the crew's get on the ship 41:55.620 --> 41:58.140 and we have experience with positive 41:58.140 --> 41:59.640 and negative approaches there. 42:00.140 --> 42:01.840 We have to teach the sailors how to do 42:01.840 --> 42:04.390 the maintenance on the ship and they need to do it, 42:04.978 --> 42:07.680 whatever the rotational basis is. 42:07.890 --> 42:09.970 I think that goes hand in hand 42:09.970 --> 42:13.170 with being enable, if we have the Tidal 10 authority 42:13.320 --> 42:16.280 to go ahead and execute what we expect to receive 42:16.280 --> 42:18.590 in that maintenance period forward deployed. 42:19.650 --> 42:20.710 - Alright, thank you. 42:21.140 --> 42:22.290 - Thank you, gentlemen. 42:23.080 --> 42:24.110 - Looks like it's you, Sydney. 42:24.110 --> 42:26.420 - Hi, didn't want to disappoint you, sir. 42:27.270 --> 42:29.400 Sydney Freeburg, breaking defense. 42:29.850 --> 42:30.880 The point, 42:33.220 --> 42:36.100 that really struck me is the idea, 42:36.100 --> 42:39.648 that it was the phrase navy 311, 42:39.648 --> 42:42.220 used to having some kind of reach back 42:43.240 --> 42:46.920 to Kaunas for a lot of the support and in a contested 42:46.920 --> 42:48.680 environment, even before the shooting starts, 42:48.680 --> 42:50.920 when you're still in the gray zone, 42:50.920 --> 42:52.840 electromagnetic warfare phase, 42:53.740 --> 42:55.440 you may not be able to do that. 42:55.870 --> 42:58.760 You may not be able to get back to a friendly port. 42:59.310 --> 43:03.330 You may not be able to phone home to call a friend. 43:04.040 --> 43:05.970 I'm curious, how are we rethinking that, 43:05.970 --> 43:08.150 how are we trying to address maintenance 43:08.400 --> 43:11.400 to make it, so that we are self sufficient 43:11.420 --> 43:14.410 enough to keep operating in the contested zone? 43:16.120 --> 43:16.953 - Go ahead, Mark. 43:16.953 --> 43:18.380 - There's a couple of things. 43:19.030 --> 43:21.510 First, specifically, the activity, 43:21.510 --> 43:24.260 that we have going on with the ready relevant learning, 43:24.310 --> 43:27.890 which is the fundamental seed corn change in the way 43:27.890 --> 43:30.190 we're gonna train sailors, how we're gonna train them, 43:30.190 --> 43:31.270 where we're gonna train them, 43:31.270 --> 43:32.670 what we're gonna train them. 43:33.330 --> 43:35.860 Ready relevant learning has a great opportunity for us 43:35.860 --> 43:39.430 to help shape and mold training across the continuum 43:39.430 --> 43:43.597 of a career such, that they have that skillset, 43:44.560 --> 43:46.170 the reps and sets piece. 43:46.430 --> 43:48.530 The second part is to continue with NAMTS, 43:49.851 --> 43:52.580 the third piece is continue the investment 43:52.580 --> 43:55.280 to make sure, that we've got the piece parts on board. 43:55.640 --> 43:59.070 There's another piece, which is the investment in PMS, 43:59.370 --> 44:00.720 that we're doing the preventive maintenance, 44:00.720 --> 44:03.370 that maybe the things won't break in the first place. 44:03.900 --> 44:06.340 Then the other part would be making sure, 44:06.340 --> 44:08.480 that they have the support on board, 44:08.480 --> 44:12.610 the tech manuals, the repair processes, et cetera 44:14.142 --> 44:17.080 and quite frankly, there's activity in all of those areas. 44:17.320 --> 44:19.080 We're moving down that road, 44:21.751 --> 44:24.900 but like I said, there's still a lot of work left to do. 44:26.280 --> 44:29.320 - They had answered that, I'm responsible back to the fleet 44:29.320 --> 44:30.560 for the NAMTS suffered. 44:31.270 --> 44:35.110 That effort includes a sea shore rotation for those sailors. 44:35.500 --> 44:37.210 We train them on the shore side, 44:37.380 --> 44:41.510 that's been underway now for five years or so. 44:41.510 --> 44:45.180 We've gone from about 500 sailors a year 44:45.490 --> 44:47.760 to a throughput of about 1500 hundred 44:47.760 --> 44:50.850 and then they go on a rotation to the ships 44:50.890 --> 44:53.820 with those maintenance NECs to take care of their ships. 44:55.190 --> 44:58.180 There's certainly that effort, 44:58.432 --> 45:01.420 that enables the situation, 45:01.420 --> 45:02.640 where they don't have to call back, 45:02.640 --> 45:03.980 they can fix themselves. 45:04.440 --> 45:06.380 The other demand signal there, 45:06.540 --> 45:09.730 that we are focused on filling is increased demand 45:09.730 --> 45:13.897 for combat systems and C4I like NCSs within that area. 45:18.610 --> 45:21.330 - Navy afloat maintenance training strategy, 45:22.721 --> 45:24.200 n, a, m, t, s. 45:24.200 --> 45:26.228 - The most difficult acronym to pronounce, 45:26.228 --> 45:28.228 it's what it stands for. 45:30.430 --> 45:33.230 - Alright, thank you, yes sir? 45:33.470 --> 45:36.400 - Dick Doby with CSRA retired Squo. 45:37.270 --> 45:40.080 Very excited about the comments about piggybacking us 45:40.080 --> 45:42.010 in the last question with self sufficient sea 45:42.010 --> 45:44.760 and sailor maintenance, however it seems 45:44.760 --> 45:47.960 it has contrary to the acquisition philosophy, 45:47.960 --> 45:49.760 that we are currently going through, 45:49.770 --> 45:52.110 particularly with the new class of ships of LCS 45:52.110 --> 45:53.810 and that the ships are not manned, 45:54.030 --> 45:55.980 the ships to do any maintenance at all. 45:55.980 --> 45:57.320 I think they can do monthly and blow, 45:57.320 --> 45:59.660 and everything else has to be outsourced. 46:00.160 --> 46:02.150 How do we get ourselves wrapped around 46:02.150 --> 46:05.670 where we can be able to put more bodies on the ship 46:06.090 --> 46:08.550 to do more maintenance, when we don't have birthing racks 46:08.550 --> 46:11.750 for who we already have and as the acquisit 46:11.750 --> 46:14.270 philosophy going forward for the FFGX 46:14.350 --> 46:15.800 and future surface combatant. 46:15.910 --> 46:17.560 Going to allow for the man power 46:17.610 --> 46:19.930 to do this self maintenance, thank you. 46:23.260 --> 46:24.760 - I'll jump in there. 46:26.753 --> 46:30.920 First I would say in LCS, we're at twice the crew, 46:31.330 --> 46:32.530 that we planned to have. 46:33.690 --> 46:37.430 I wanna point that out, that 40 some and 70 some. 46:39.070 --> 46:43.237 We are preparing to receive the odd, numerically odd 46:43.590 --> 46:46.600 variant, the LCS wonder in May port. 46:47.210 --> 46:50.780 In that effort, with south east RMC, 46:51.370 --> 46:55.160 we're preparing for the navy to take on a portion 46:55.160 --> 46:58.410 of that PMS via south east RMC 46:58.410 --> 47:02.070 and to train the ships how to do that maintenance as well. 47:04.130 --> 47:06.260 Yet there's some of that in that strategy, 47:06.260 --> 47:09.520 where that would be outsourced, that's changing a bit 47:10.470 --> 47:12.180 and with the growth of those crew sizes, 47:12.180 --> 47:13.750 we see opportunity for it. 47:14.860 --> 47:16.570 Regardless of the crew size, though, 47:16.570 --> 47:17.870 within the RMC structure, 47:17.870 --> 47:22.037 we're taking on the over site of the maintenance execution, 47:22.820 --> 47:25.510 that industry does, to some degree today 47:25.568 --> 47:28.560 in a load sharing back to navy. 47:29.320 --> 47:32.350 Then I would just offer, that's a portion of the navy. 47:32.880 --> 47:35.600 You have that number of ships and those numbers of sailors 47:35.600 --> 47:38.500 and then you have the entire rest of the navy, 47:38.740 --> 47:42.907 which is generally manned to a more traditional model, 47:44.060 --> 47:46.390 which makes up the vast majority of the ships. 47:47.340 --> 47:50.480 There's plenty of room for training and improvement there, 47:50.630 --> 47:52.100 self sufficiency. 47:52.330 --> 47:55.830 A bit more complex is how much work can they do, 47:55.880 --> 47:58.080 based upon the complexity of the systems, 47:58.200 --> 48:01.560 that gets to the lowest replaceable unit 48:01.560 --> 48:03.800 as pretty sophisticated item, 48:04.260 --> 48:05.990 it's a pull out and replace type item, 48:05.990 --> 48:07.490 rather than to do maintenance. 48:07.790 --> 48:09.720 We're trying to balance both of those, 48:10.660 --> 48:13.790 because the ship's gotta operate unafraid and alone. 48:14.920 --> 48:16.010 - Let me just add on there, 48:16.010 --> 48:19.318 from my perspective, the genesis of the question was 48:19.318 --> 48:21.240 where we started with LCS, 48:22.300 --> 48:24.280 but we learned from it, we moved forward 48:24.280 --> 48:25.930 in a different direction and I think, 48:25.930 --> 48:27.820 that that, what we've learned with LCS 48:27.820 --> 48:29.950 is gonna inform FFG. 48:30.743 --> 48:34.910 We go down a path, we learn, we adapt, we move forward. 48:34.950 --> 48:36.410 I think that's exactly what the CNO's 48:36.410 --> 48:39.680 looking for us to do with becoming a high velocity 48:39.980 --> 48:44.147 organization, where we learn and move forward, and we are. 48:45.235 --> 48:47.130 - If you look at what admiral Rode did, 48:47.130 --> 48:49.160 we did the study on the LCS. 48:50.340 --> 48:52.560 It was about how do we get the simplicity 48:52.560 --> 48:54.380 and ownership back into that fleet. 48:54.380 --> 48:56.020 He came with the blue gull concept, 48:56.020 --> 48:59.960 but essentially, no more crews have crew 206 on their hat, 48:59.960 --> 49:02.440 they had I'm USS independence. 49:02.670 --> 49:05.530 In getting that ownership of the crew for that haul 49:06.110 --> 49:07.790 and then having that stay with it, 49:07.790 --> 49:09.410 and we add, as admiral Downey said, 49:09.410 --> 49:11.350 we have increased the size of those crews 49:11.350 --> 49:13.690 to get at the ship taking ownership 49:13.690 --> 49:15.570 and being able to do the maintenance 49:15.570 --> 49:17.460 to keep those ships operational. 49:17.460 --> 49:20.240 I think your question's in the right direction 49:20.240 --> 49:23.650 and we are very much in that philosophy, 49:23.650 --> 49:27.010 looking forward into not only the future frigate, 49:27.010 --> 49:30.240 but the future surface combatant as well. 49:31.240 --> 49:32.620 That's a great question. 49:32.620 --> 49:34.680 I will ask Mel, if there's anything you'd like to add 49:34.680 --> 49:35.960 from a coast guard's perspective 49:35.960 --> 49:38.290 in the competence of sailors in the manning 49:38.530 --> 49:40.500 to support your ships? 49:41.490 --> 49:45.657 - I appreciate that, we're following the same challenge, 49:47.480 --> 49:50.010 our acquisition strategy has been to minimally man 49:50.440 --> 49:53.760 the assets, that the operating costs 49:53.760 --> 49:55.880 are as low as possible, trying to cluster 49:55.880 --> 49:57.390 some of our smaller assets 49:57.390 --> 49:59.870 and have maintenance augmentation teams, 49:59.870 --> 50:03.080 which are near the forward deployed areas. 50:03.790 --> 50:06.850 While that works well in concept 50:06.850 --> 50:08.680 and perhaps with coast guard operations 50:08.680 --> 50:12.847 in contested environments or for assets, 50:13.060 --> 50:15.350 that have longer deployment periods, 50:15.350 --> 50:16.970 it's obviously more challenging, 50:16.970 --> 50:18.770 but we're facing the similar things. 50:19.260 --> 50:22.410 And I appreciated the comment about the parts, 50:22.410 --> 50:25.580 because another element, that we've pursued 50:25.580 --> 50:29.340 is consolidating our parts and our inventory control points. 50:29.340 --> 50:31.670 We've gone through the last 10, 15 years 50:31.670 --> 50:34.490 at pulling bunch of parts off of ships 50:34.710 --> 50:38.180 and out of local units to centralize and reduce costs. 50:39.840 --> 50:42.400 That's just not gonna work in a contested environment, 50:42.400 --> 50:44.100 when you need those parts forward. 50:44.640 --> 50:47.360 - Thanks, Mel, I will say from my early days, 50:47.360 --> 50:49.650 this is a system, you gotta look at the sea shore rotation 50:49.650 --> 50:51.120 and what are the sailor doing on shore, 50:51.120 --> 50:54.110 do you value maintenance, is there even a billet 50:54.110 --> 50:56.250 in a maintenance billet for the right NEC. 50:57.160 --> 51:00.450 Back in 82, when I first started at TRF Bangor, 51:00.450 --> 51:02.470 a third of that work force were sailors. 51:04.200 --> 51:08.367 As the navy shrank, its military size, 51:08.650 --> 51:10.280 we lost a lot of those billets. 51:10.560 --> 51:12.803 We recognize and started to grow back. 51:12.803 --> 51:15.320 I think recognized, that the intermediate level 51:15.320 --> 51:16.970 maintenance competence of a sailor 51:16.970 --> 51:19.210 is extremely important in their ability to function 51:19.210 --> 51:22.260 as an operational level maintainer when at sea. 51:22.900 --> 51:24.420 Jim, did you wanna add anything more to that 51:24.420 --> 51:25.430 on your efforts? 51:25.430 --> 51:27.830 You talked about 1500 sailors in throughput. 51:30.360 --> 51:34.527 - If you talk to ship COs, they'll say, 51:35.910 --> 51:38.590 on the selection of the sailors, 51:38.740 --> 51:41.170 I want a guy or gal with the maintenance NEC. 51:41.540 --> 51:43.290 Hands down they will tell you that. 51:43.643 --> 51:46.830 We're buying back the last decade or two 51:46.830 --> 51:48.590 of how we had changed training 51:49.090 --> 51:51.290 and sailor maintenance capability 51:52.000 --> 51:55.430 and finding, that it's definitely needed 51:55.430 --> 51:57.210 and desired by the ships, 52:01.071 --> 52:03.370 and positively impacts ACVO. 52:03.370 --> 52:05.030 - Thanks, Jim, Moises, do you have anything else to add 52:05.030 --> 52:06.380 from the submarine element? 52:07.480 --> 52:11.150 - I would just go back to one of the earlier questions, 52:11.460 --> 52:12.860 that we were talking about, making sure, 52:12.860 --> 52:17.027 that our sailors had the capability to fix the equipment 52:17.050 --> 52:18.950 if we were in a contested environment. 52:19.170 --> 52:23.337 Having served as a CO of a ballistic missile submarine, 52:23.580 --> 52:26.260 when at portions of your deployment 52:26.260 --> 52:29.750 you are in a no communication standpoint 52:29.750 --> 52:33.260 and on SSNs doing some missions, 52:33.260 --> 52:37.130 I have all the trust and confidence in our sailors, 52:37.490 --> 52:41.100 that they, if tasked, will fix the majority 52:41.100 --> 52:44.040 of the equipment on board are submarines. 52:44.290 --> 52:46.390 The goal, that we have to ensure is, 52:46.390 --> 52:48.820 that they have the requisite spare parts, 52:49.240 --> 52:51.360 that they have the tech manuals. 52:51.580 --> 52:55.050 We in the submarine force do a tech manual health 52:55.050 --> 52:57.810 assessment on occasion, funded by the fleet, 52:58.220 --> 53:00.130 where we send some folks down to make sure 53:00.130 --> 53:01.680 the submarines, before they deploy, 53:01.680 --> 53:04.340 have all the tech manuals, that they should have. 53:05.280 --> 53:07.090 And then again, from a logistics standpoint, 53:07.090 --> 53:09.410 as long as they have the spare parts they need, 53:09.410 --> 53:11.320 they should be set up pretty well 53:11.320 --> 53:13.500 to accomplish pretty much everything. 53:14.400 --> 53:16.700 - Thanks, Moises, great question, over to you. 53:17.020 --> 53:19.310 - Hi, Scott Masioni with federal news radio. 53:19.740 --> 53:20.580 Not sure if you've noticed, 53:20.580 --> 53:22.430 but we're in a continuing resolution, 53:22.450 --> 53:26.617 just wondering, pretty hacked in question, 53:27.285 --> 53:29.460 how much is this slowing you down, 53:29.460 --> 53:31.320 at what point are things gonna break 53:32.160 --> 53:34.800 or goals not bet met, will that happen 53:34.800 --> 53:37.130 at any point in 2018 if this continues? 53:38.040 --> 53:39.830 Where are you at when it comes to that? 53:39.880 --> 53:41.650 - I'll let Jim start that. 53:44.430 --> 53:48.597 - We have 57 ships to solicit, award contracts for this year 53:52.980 --> 53:55.410 all within the 12 month period, 53:55.410 --> 53:57.020 that's a lot of competitions 53:57.020 --> 53:58.610 and a lot of contract activity. 53:59.220 --> 54:01.540 We don't have the money on the books 54:01.540 --> 54:03.140 to award those contracts. 54:04.510 --> 54:08.677 With a lot positive discussions with the fleet last year, 54:08.980 --> 54:11.650 we've changed how we contract for the ships, 54:12.320 --> 54:13.830 because of the CR. 54:14.400 --> 54:18.567 Maintenance is not what the base of the contract is. 54:21.700 --> 54:23.860 Modernization money is three year money, 54:24.720 --> 54:27.650 I have that money, in most cases, to go forward. 54:28.860 --> 54:31.170 The base of the contract in some cases 54:31.570 --> 54:33.870 is now the modernization work for the maintenance 54:33.870 --> 54:36.250 availability and the maintenance work 54:36.250 --> 54:39.540 is the option on the contract for us to execute 54:39.540 --> 54:41.430 if we get it just in time. 54:42.110 --> 54:44.330 Which today, we have. 54:46.610 --> 54:48.420 The CR efforts have caused us 54:48.420 --> 54:51.320 to restructure our acquisition approach. 54:51.720 --> 54:54.370 They've had an effect on long time and material 54:54.980 --> 54:57.330 and then certainly have and effect on planning, 54:57.500 --> 55:00.560 while we're handling the largest number, 55:00.740 --> 55:01.573 this year, anyway, 55:01.573 --> 55:02.960 that we've handled in recent years. 55:02.960 --> 55:05.310 It's a very significant challenge 55:05.560 --> 55:07.990 to do with a CR on an annual appropriation. 55:09.440 --> 55:12.650 - Mark, anything to add? 55:12.650 --> 55:16.817 - To date, we have not awarded any contracts. 55:18.180 --> 55:20.270 The longer the CR continues, 55:20.270 --> 55:23.800 the more challenge and pressure we are going to feel 55:25.040 --> 55:29.207 and the potential is there, but thus far we have not. 55:31.700 --> 55:33.340 - I just wanna add in, 55:35.150 --> 55:37.030 that tends to make people think, 55:37.030 --> 55:39.960 so you've awarded them all, it doesn't have an effect. 55:40.360 --> 55:41.690 It does have an effect. 55:42.373 --> 55:44.950 We're meeting a fleet demand signal 55:45.220 --> 55:49.387 and with many different iterations and just in time. 55:49.670 --> 55:51.780 Not as efficient as we could, 55:52.090 --> 55:56.257 if it was funded off of an approved budget, obviously. 56:00.140 --> 56:01.670 - Folks are telling you, we're getting pretty good 56:01.670 --> 56:03.730 at managing with CRs, that should not be 56:03.730 --> 56:06.080 the default norm of how we go forward to CRs. 56:06.080 --> 56:09.240 If we're gonna drive cost down in this industrial base, 56:09.440 --> 56:10.840 we have to be able to plan, 56:11.020 --> 56:13.050 we have to be able to supply support, 56:13.300 --> 56:16.680 modernize and execute on a stable plan. 56:16.680 --> 56:19.920 CRs inject variability into a stable plan. 56:19.920 --> 56:21.830 They cause increased in cost, 56:21.830 --> 56:23.610 they case uncertainty in industry 56:23.980 --> 56:26.860 and if we want world's best performance out of this, 56:26.860 --> 56:29.340 maintenance infrastructure, that the navy needs 56:29.670 --> 56:31.450 to have forward deploy capability, 56:31.450 --> 56:34.860 we have to not live under CRs year after year. 56:35.460 --> 56:36.380 Simple as that. 56:37.760 --> 56:39.270 Okay, yes, sir. 56:39.930 --> 56:41.660 - [Rick] Thank you, gentlemen, Rick Caparelli, 56:41.660 --> 56:42.960 navigator of USS champion. 56:43.510 --> 56:44.570 There's been a lot of focus today 56:44.570 --> 56:48.570 talking about being able to have sustained maintenance 56:48.690 --> 56:49.523 in a contested environment, 56:49.523 --> 56:51.400 specifically focusing on LCS. 56:52.080 --> 56:54.420 But I'm certain, that the modernization 56:54.420 --> 56:56.640 of all the amphibious assault ships for JSF 56:56.640 --> 56:58.380 is also a focus of yours. 56:58.770 --> 57:01.550 With that in mind and bringing these ideas together, 57:01.550 --> 57:04.100 what are our measures and preparations 57:04.100 --> 57:07.910 ongoing for ensuring, that we can have sustained 57:07.910 --> 57:10.710 maintenance on this very technologically advanced system 57:11.140 --> 57:13.010 in a contested environment on our amphibious 57:13.010 --> 57:14.410 assault ships in the future? 57:15.890 --> 57:16.723 - Alright, Jim? 57:18.880 --> 57:20.210 - I won't talk about MCMs, 57:21.812 --> 57:24.080 done a great ship there, but in a different category 57:24.080 --> 57:26.430 right now and what I mean by that 57:26.430 --> 57:30.597 is PCs and MCMs, they're past their service life in navy. 57:33.670 --> 57:34.990 They have a significant amount 57:34.990 --> 57:36.890 of deferred maintenance and challenges 57:37.840 --> 57:40.180 and obviously are challenged 57:40.180 --> 57:41.780 with the modernization programs. 57:42.090 --> 57:43.490 Onto the rest of the navy. 57:46.340 --> 57:48.730 Wherever the ship is deployed to, 57:48.730 --> 57:52.670 wherever the ship is, if it's forward deployed location 57:52.670 --> 57:55.680 or home port, it's the same approach 57:55.756 --> 57:59.560 on the modernization and maintenance. 57:59.560 --> 58:01.530 It's planned years in advance. 58:01.820 --> 58:03.610 The difference, that occurs to us 58:03.610 --> 58:05.520 for the forward deployed folks 58:05.530 --> 58:08.840 is on the maintenance cycle, on the timing. 58:09.210 --> 58:13.370 We go off of a certain OFRP cycle, Kaunas, as you know, 58:13.370 --> 58:15.720 more three year based, versus what we do 58:15.720 --> 58:18.210 forward deployed more two year based. 58:19.780 --> 58:21.500 The demand signal from the fleet is 58:21.500 --> 58:23.830 we've got a modernize those ships, 58:24.861 --> 58:27.200 we've gotta repair those ships, 58:27.200 --> 58:28.700 we gotta maintain those ships, 58:28.750 --> 58:30.800 no matter where they are. 58:31.380 --> 58:34.190 That's specifically, that's a portion 58:34.190 --> 58:36.970 of the rationale behind why is McCain 58:36.970 --> 58:38.440 being repaired in Ucusca, 58:39.060 --> 58:41.830 because we have to demonstrate that capability 58:41.990 --> 58:44.040 and they have the capability to do it. 58:45.460 --> 58:49.627 The contested environments, it's the same worldwide 58:50.250 --> 58:51.500 on the demand signal to us. 58:51.500 --> 58:53.710 We have to support that world wide. 58:56.010 --> 58:58.080 - Anything else from the panel on that? 58:58.784 --> 59:02.110 Alright, thank you, good, yes, sir? 59:02.840 --> 59:05.010 - Yes, sir, thank you very much and thank you 59:05.010 --> 59:06.680 all for your service to our country, 59:06.680 --> 59:08.830 greatly appreciate everything, that you do. 59:10.350 --> 59:12.610 My question centers around infrastructure 59:13.060 --> 59:16.260 and with the recent change in contract structure, 59:16.440 --> 59:20.090 that has taken place moving towards firm fix 59:20.090 --> 59:22.380 price bidding, the number of ships, 59:22.380 --> 59:26.547 that we see and the availabilities, that are occurring, 59:26.600 --> 59:29.490 that the likelihood, that there's going to be 59:29.670 --> 59:33.090 some constraints on docking capabilities 59:33.200 --> 59:36.100 and various locations, San Diego, Puget Sound, 59:37.150 --> 59:40.790 in addition to that, not having any public dock available, 59:41.350 --> 59:43.850 the question I've got, as the navy, 59:44.450 --> 59:48.510 are you considering or continuing to assess 59:48.540 --> 59:51.960 the possibility of either utilizing a public dock 59:51.960 --> 59:53.640 in the north west and Puget Sound 59:53.640 --> 59:57.807 for private sector work and, or repair 59:58.050 --> 01:00:01.190 of the 32nd street dock in San Diego. 01:00:01.190 --> 01:00:03.800 Or an acquisition of a public dock? 01:00:05.210 --> 01:00:06.350 - Alright, great question, 01:00:06.350 --> 01:00:08.982 I'll let Mark start with that one. 01:00:08.982 --> 01:00:13.140 - I was going for Jim, the answer is yes. 01:00:13.580 --> 01:00:16.510 - Good, thank you very much, appreciate it. 01:00:17.546 --> 01:00:20.310 - I'll let Jim give you details, but the answer is yes. 01:00:21.760 --> 01:00:22.750 - I'll start, 01:00:25.219 --> 01:00:27.840 you know how we do this work for the larger group, 01:00:27.930 --> 01:00:30.180 if it's a naval ship yard or private yard, 01:00:30.400 --> 01:00:32.350 regardless nuclear or non nuclear, 01:00:32.520 --> 01:00:36.687 we have an owner operator structure here, 01:00:36.980 --> 01:00:41.147 where the fleet owns the facilities on the navy side 01:00:41.370 --> 01:00:42.880 and Navsea operates them. 01:00:43.810 --> 01:00:46.260 I say, that that's why Mark deferred to me, 01:00:46.260 --> 01:00:49.060 it's my responsibility to give him input on this though. 01:00:49.470 --> 01:00:51.080 First of all, for the group, 01:00:51.370 --> 01:00:54.070 as we are transitioning, I just wanna be clear 01:00:54.070 --> 01:00:56.410 to everybody, we've transitioned, 01:00:56.550 --> 01:00:58.580 we've been transitioning for years. 01:00:58.770 --> 01:01:00.920 There's only one region, that hasn't transitioned 01:01:00.920 --> 01:01:03.260 to firm fix price and that's Hawaii. 01:01:03.960 --> 01:01:06.640 At industry day is in a couple of weeks, 01:01:06.640 --> 01:01:08.520 we will transition this year. 01:01:09.680 --> 01:01:13.847 The rest of it has been in transition for three plus years. 01:01:15.380 --> 01:01:19.280 We're way into the firm fix price effort, 01:01:19.280 --> 01:01:22.660 regardless of contract type, the main message there 01:01:22.660 --> 01:01:25.300 is going forward, those efforts 01:01:25.300 --> 01:01:27.130 will be awarded competitively. 01:01:28.290 --> 01:01:30.880 That's where the theme is, do we have adjustments 01:01:30.880 --> 01:01:32.270 needed to that strategy? 01:01:32.270 --> 01:01:34.770 Certainly, one of the biggest suggestments 01:01:34.910 --> 01:01:36.464 an I'm gonna get to your question, 01:01:36.464 --> 01:01:38.400 one of the biggest suggestments really 01:01:38.400 --> 01:01:41.580 is I work load stability and how do I get to a mode, 01:01:41.580 --> 01:01:43.680 where I can award multiple ships or base ship 01:01:43.680 --> 01:01:47.200 and option ships, and reduce some of that variability. 01:01:47.700 --> 01:01:48.970 On docks, 01:01:51.790 --> 01:01:54.480 certainly, as you go to 355 and you consider 01:01:54.790 --> 01:01:56.490 efforts and things of that nature, 01:01:57.341 --> 01:02:00.080 we have a relatively significant demand signal on docks. 01:02:00.080 --> 01:02:03.360 You can talk in the one to three dock category 01:02:03.360 --> 01:02:05.660 per major home port area. 01:02:05.930 --> 01:02:09.310 Norfolk in San Diego and the relationship 01:02:09.310 --> 01:02:12.280 up to Pacnorwest and on to May port. 01:02:12.520 --> 01:02:14.750 We're off studying that now. 01:02:15.925 --> 01:02:20.092 We're close to being done with a public ship yard 01:02:20.200 --> 01:02:24.367 optimization plan and my boss, Admiral Moore 01:02:27.420 --> 01:02:31.330 requires over the next few months a public ship yard 01:02:31.330 --> 01:02:34.020 optimization plan, I'm sorry, 01:02:34.020 --> 01:02:36.190 private ship yard optimization plan, 01:02:36.570 --> 01:02:38.080 taking into account what we're doing 01:02:38.080 --> 01:02:40.250 on the public yard site. 01:02:42.700 --> 01:02:45.550 You can quickly go to we need more docks. 01:02:46.100 --> 01:02:49.070 Part of that also becomes what has happened 01:02:49.070 --> 01:02:52.440 to the docking duration, what's happened to navy 01:02:52.440 --> 01:02:54.790 oversight activity and industry's activity 01:02:54.790 --> 01:02:58.957 during the dock duration and how do we solicit 01:02:59.020 --> 01:03:01.920 docking related avails in a more efficient way 01:03:02.190 --> 01:03:03.870 to allow industry to propose 01:03:03.870 --> 01:03:05.690 if they could double dock ships. 01:03:05.980 --> 01:03:09.860 That certainly is a very, there's a need there, 01:03:10.230 --> 01:03:12.570 certainly in the even variant of LCS 01:03:12.800 --> 01:03:16.850 with every avail being a docking avail. 01:03:17.712 --> 01:03:20.680 Yes, we're gonna be talking with you 01:03:20.680 --> 01:03:23.880 over the next six months and soliciting 01:03:23.880 --> 01:03:25.480 industry's input on that. 01:03:25.540 --> 01:03:27.720 It's a different part, a private part 01:03:27.730 --> 01:03:30.870 is different than public, it doesn't mean, 01:03:31.530 --> 01:03:34.420 that navy's necessarily gonna request funds 01:03:34.420 --> 01:03:36.980 to go buy docks out in private, 01:03:37.320 --> 01:03:39.220 out in the private sector. 01:03:39.610 --> 01:03:41.330 We might be improving some docks, 01:03:41.330 --> 01:03:45.330 like at 32nd street to modify that graving dock 01:03:45.330 --> 01:03:48.740 to handle the DDG due to the sonar dome issues, 01:03:48.870 --> 01:03:53.037 but we wanna get into the incent of insuring approach 01:03:54.520 --> 01:03:58.600 on what industry is interested in across the nation. 01:03:58.740 --> 01:04:00.770 To do that, we realize, though, 01:04:00.770 --> 01:04:04.270 the most important thing is probably predictable 01:04:04.270 --> 01:04:07.190 forecastable work, that you understand 01:04:07.236 --> 01:04:09.450 what basis the work is. 01:04:10.690 --> 01:04:14.150 Back to what my fleet maintenance officer boss here 01:04:14.150 --> 01:04:18.317 said, yes, we're heavily involved in that right now 01:04:18.790 --> 01:04:21.340 and we're gonna be talking to you 01:04:21.410 --> 01:04:23.700 between now and the summer as we work 01:04:23.700 --> 01:04:25.960 on this private yard optimization plan. 01:04:26.270 --> 01:04:27.690 - Great, thank you very much. 01:04:27.690 --> 01:04:29.100 - Sorry for the long response. 01:04:29.310 --> 01:04:31.240 - Megan, I'm just gonna interject one question here, 01:04:31.240 --> 01:04:34.130 cuz I think it dubtails onto what the question, 01:04:34.130 --> 01:04:36.710 that was just asked and it's really to Mark, 01:04:36.920 --> 01:04:40.520 cuz Mark, he's CFFC, but he's also Steve Whitney today, 01:04:40.520 --> 01:04:41.730 cuz he couldn't be here. 01:04:41.820 --> 01:04:45.080 He's got two hats from his past and his present. 01:04:46.059 --> 01:04:47.100 I think, Mark, one of the things, 01:04:47.100 --> 01:04:48.380 I think, you can enlighten us on 01:04:48.380 --> 01:04:50.800 is what you think the fleet's role is 01:04:51.050 --> 01:04:54.000 in leading and managing the private sector industrial base? 01:04:55.490 --> 01:04:56.790 - That's a great question. 01:04:57.550 --> 01:05:01.520 The fleet's role is to be a demanding customer, 01:05:01.890 --> 01:05:02.790 demanding owner. 01:05:05.131 --> 01:05:08.470 I absolutely believe in the owner operator construct, 01:05:09.130 --> 01:05:12.300 that the fleet as the BSO has the responsibility 01:05:12.300 --> 01:05:14.910 to provide the funding and the prioritization 01:05:15.420 --> 01:05:19.230 and then over to the Navsea O4, I'll put my Steve hat on 01:05:19.230 --> 01:05:20.190 for just a second. 01:05:21.610 --> 01:05:24.740 As the technical warrant, the contracting warrant, 01:05:24.740 --> 01:05:28.450 the industrial processes, CO4, CO7, 01:05:28.450 --> 01:05:32.617 all of the elements of Navsea to then define 01:05:32.970 --> 01:05:36.020 based on our demand, which is deliver on time 01:05:36.020 --> 01:05:39.890 on cost, on schedule, with requisite quality 01:05:40.440 --> 01:05:44.480 over to you to tell us how you want to accomplish that. 01:05:44.480 --> 01:05:47.980 Develop the strategy, align with this on that strategy, 01:05:48.090 --> 01:05:50.880 but the clear leadership role in managing 01:05:50.880 --> 01:05:52.940 the private sector industrial base 01:05:52.940 --> 01:05:54.980 resides with the operator, 01:05:55.560 --> 01:05:57.600 with a very demanding customer, over. 01:05:58.460 --> 01:06:00.060 - Alright, Jim, did you have anything else 01:06:00.060 --> 01:06:01.880 you wanted to add to that? 01:06:02.010 --> 01:06:06.177 - No, there's demanding customer, as they should be. 01:06:06.890 --> 01:06:09.420 - As they should be, alright, thanks, Mark, Megan. 01:06:09.680 --> 01:06:13.270 - Hi, Megan, institute news, as admiral Downey 01:06:13.270 --> 01:06:15.580 just mentioned, there's a product optimization 01:06:15.780 --> 01:06:17.480 plan going congress next month 01:06:17.670 --> 01:06:20.120 and I wondered ahead of that, if you cold tea up 01:06:20.120 --> 01:06:21.320 what the problem is a little bit, 01:06:21.320 --> 01:06:22.670 some of the challenges, that you're seeing 01:06:22.670 --> 01:06:24.830 with the aging infrastructure at the public yards 01:06:24.830 --> 01:06:27.430 and why those challenges are only gonna get worse 01:06:27.430 --> 01:06:29.520 as you're going forward with the Ford class carriers 01:06:29.520 --> 01:06:32.130 and some new blocks on the Virginia submarine program? 01:06:35.990 --> 01:06:37.073 - You got it. 01:06:38.030 --> 01:06:39.630 - I'll put my Steve hat back on. 01:06:42.680 --> 01:06:46.847 The challenge, though, a dry dock, a building 01:06:48.000 --> 01:06:50.350 is fundamentally not any different than a ship. 01:06:51.190 --> 01:06:53.290 It has an expected service life. 01:06:54.160 --> 01:06:57.810 If you don't do the maintenance over a period of time, 01:06:57.810 --> 01:07:00.050 if you don't have that midlife upgrade, 01:07:01.460 --> 01:07:05.030 you're gonna run out of service life on a building, 01:07:05.030 --> 01:07:08.060 a dry dock, a lave, it doesn't really matter. 01:07:10.792 --> 01:07:12.780 Over the course of decades and decades, 01:07:12.960 --> 01:07:15.630 we've accumulated risk in our infrastructure 01:07:15.630 --> 01:07:17.450 and that's a broad term. 01:07:19.298 --> 01:07:21.480 We're now at the point, where we've gotten 01:07:21.480 --> 01:07:23.440 a bit more sophisticated, 01:07:23.440 --> 01:07:27.607 we've called the data and I think the Navsea O4 01:07:28.540 --> 01:07:32.707 has put together a very credible argument 01:07:33.490 --> 01:07:37.370 on the need to make decisions now 01:07:37.530 --> 01:07:39.440 and over the foreseeable future, 01:07:39.540 --> 01:07:42.070 that if we do not make decisions, 01:07:42.210 --> 01:07:46.377 we start to lose the capability to do a type of ship 01:07:47.070 --> 01:07:51.237 in a dry dock in this year and it just starts to accumulate. 01:07:51.982 --> 01:07:54.440 Now is the time to articulate that 01:07:55.180 --> 01:07:57.670 and present that in terms of risk 01:07:57.670 --> 01:07:59.360 to senior decision makers. 01:07:59.920 --> 01:08:01.300 Followed closely behind that 01:08:01.300 --> 01:08:04.410 and that's the dry dock piece, 01:08:05.910 --> 01:08:07.240 there's a private sector of this, 01:08:07.240 --> 01:08:11.270 there has to be a companion, and integrated together, 01:08:12.447 --> 01:08:16.614 but then the large ship yard business plan, 01:08:16.770 --> 01:08:20.937 that also ends up going to congress 01:08:21.870 --> 01:08:24.310 is the optimization plan, I'll say, 01:08:24.310 --> 01:08:25.990 much broader optimization plan, 01:08:25.990 --> 01:08:27.910 that Jim is also working on. 01:08:27.950 --> 01:08:29.900 There's gonna be two companion products 01:08:30.070 --> 01:08:33.600 and it's a holistic approach from the operator 01:08:33.830 --> 01:08:35.740 to communicate with senior leadership, 01:08:35.740 --> 01:08:37.590 where the risks are across the board. 01:08:38.260 --> 01:08:40.420 - I'd just like to comment on that for a second 01:08:40.420 --> 01:08:44.587 as well as, I wouldn't characterize it as a problem. 01:08:46.100 --> 01:08:50.267 The expected service life may not have been 200 years 01:08:51.240 --> 01:08:54.360 and when this was built in certain locations. 01:08:55.070 --> 01:08:56.540 You have that, you have how long 01:08:56.540 --> 01:08:58.240 some of the yards have been around 01:08:58.520 --> 01:09:01.380 and a lot of work has been done on them over the years. 01:09:01.770 --> 01:09:03.180 But it's been a long time. 01:09:03.670 --> 01:09:05.000 They've been around for a long time. 01:09:05.000 --> 01:09:09.167 The other piece is, who's here form new construction, 01:09:09.650 --> 01:09:12.250 who's a private yard new construction, 01:09:12.250 --> 01:09:13.900 I see general dynamics here. 01:09:14.060 --> 01:09:16.180 There isn't a private yard, a new construction 01:09:16.180 --> 01:09:20.347 or in repair, that doesn't have an optimization plan. 01:09:20.890 --> 01:09:24.490 How you use the yard, how you move people 01:09:24.490 --> 01:09:28.010 closer to the work, your tools, your material, 01:09:28.120 --> 01:09:31.580 it's a natural processes evolve. 01:09:34.520 --> 01:09:36.570 The work load for those yards increasing. 01:09:37.570 --> 01:09:40.200 It's a bit of a natural progression on the people, 01:09:40.280 --> 01:09:44.030 the hiring of the folks and the updating of a yard, 01:09:44.030 --> 01:09:45.894 that may have been planned for new construction 01:09:45.894 --> 01:09:49.070 200 years ago, versus what they do today. 01:09:50.330 --> 01:09:51.860 Private piece of it, 01:09:56.556 --> 01:09:59.520 it's back and fourth, it's what does industry 01:09:59.520 --> 01:10:01.580 need to do, how do we co share, 01:10:01.580 --> 01:10:04.240 that we're appropriate versus, 01:10:05.340 --> 01:10:07.570 make sure they have the work out there 01:10:08.040 --> 01:10:10.010 to be able to invest themselves. 01:10:12.330 --> 01:10:15.640 Rather complex and how you put that together. 01:10:15.700 --> 01:10:18.310 Most important piece is what project, 01:10:18.310 --> 01:10:19.790 what demand signal are you trying 01:10:19.790 --> 01:10:22.810 to put it together for and is that gonna be enduring. 01:10:24.640 --> 01:10:26.530 - Thank you, alright, question. 01:10:27.360 --> 01:10:29.410 - Robbie Harris, a formal naval person. 01:10:30.370 --> 01:10:33.890 Tuesday afternoon, in one of admiral Bocksol's slides, 01:10:33.890 --> 01:10:36.730 there was a bullet, that showed surface ship maintenance, 01:10:36.730 --> 01:10:40.897 funded at 100%, which sounds almost too good to be true. 01:10:42.300 --> 01:10:44.650 Is there a footnote, that goes along with that? 01:10:46.908 --> 01:10:49.550 - No. 01:10:50.340 --> 01:10:54.507 - First of all, we're getting all the money we're asking for 01:10:55.830 --> 01:10:56.980 within the navy. 01:10:57.690 --> 01:10:59.610 Do things go to plan? 01:11:01.660 --> 01:11:05.827 100% funded, not all jobs come in at 100% or less, 01:11:08.740 --> 01:11:11.060 because of the nature of the ships. 01:11:11.060 --> 01:11:15.227 In many cases, the average age of classes is increasing, 01:11:17.530 --> 01:11:21.180 which affects the base of what you're working on. 01:11:22.860 --> 01:11:26.690 Readiness is the highest priority we're funding in the navy. 01:11:27.229 --> 01:11:30.610 We're getting what we're asking for in the budgets. 01:11:33.010 --> 01:11:33.843 - Chris. 01:11:33.843 --> 01:11:37.600 - Yes, sir, love the renewed focus on self sufficiency 01:11:37.660 --> 01:11:41.190 and you know why, love the renewed focus on high MA 01:11:41.190 --> 01:11:42.440 and maintenance training. 01:11:42.820 --> 01:11:46.330 My question comes from my misguided youth, 01:11:46.330 --> 01:11:50.090 where I long coveted the idea of becoming a repair officer. 01:11:53.060 --> 01:11:55.980 Any of you do, that was our float point, 01:11:56.080 --> 01:11:59.510 that was our captain maker jobs and there were many of them, 01:11:59.510 --> 01:12:02.130 including repair officers afloat. 01:12:02.770 --> 01:12:05.490 How many repair officers do we have, 01:12:05.490 --> 01:12:08.450 that goes along with the regional maintenance? 01:12:08.600 --> 01:12:11.770 I mean true repair officers, these captain maker jobs 01:12:11.846 --> 01:12:16.013 and then does anybody ever include in their studies 01:12:16.240 --> 01:12:19.510 on the future of return to afloat IMA 01:12:19.990 --> 01:12:23.610 beyond the Argama Bigama of back to tenders 01:12:24.600 --> 01:12:26.850 and the repair divisions, that were in there? 01:12:28.810 --> 01:12:31.110 - A quick head count in my mind, 01:12:31.420 --> 01:12:35.210 I think we've got six repair officers. 01:12:37.050 --> 01:12:41.217 I am F tier F, two tenders, point loma. 01:12:47.350 --> 01:12:51.517 Submarine side for Pural and Norfolk. 01:12:53.460 --> 01:12:56.310 I don't know, did I just count seven, I think I may have. 01:12:58.660 --> 01:13:02.827 Those are what we would call the remaining repair officers 01:13:05.100 --> 01:13:07.700 and do we evaluate, re-evaluate, 01:13:07.700 --> 01:13:10.960 I don't think we have, but we probably should. 01:13:12.170 --> 01:13:13.220 Good question, Chris. 01:13:16.534 --> 01:13:17.840 This is a short question, 01:13:18.420 --> 01:13:20.500 cuz I'm up against my time, go ahead. 01:13:21.280 --> 01:13:23.540 - I'm gonna date myself like Robbie, 01:13:24.520 --> 01:13:27.200 I've been listening for you to say word like RSG 01:13:27.200 --> 01:13:30.960 and Sima and destroyer tender and wondered 01:13:30.960 --> 01:13:34.310 if those things from my recollection work pretty good 01:13:34.650 --> 01:13:38.030 and it gave the ship sailors a place to go ashore 01:13:38.030 --> 01:13:39.800 and build their skill, are you trying 01:13:39.800 --> 01:13:41.460 to recreate that capability? 01:13:42.090 --> 01:13:44.430 You use different nouns, so I'm not sure 01:13:44.547 --> 01:13:46.330 I'm understanding you. 01:13:49.820 --> 01:13:53.430 - No on the, I'll say, tenders, other than the two, 01:13:53.430 --> 01:13:56.520 that we currently have and then the Sima 01:13:56.520 --> 01:13:58.690 is the regional maintenance center 01:14:00.350 --> 01:14:03.100 high level capability, that we have and not RSGs, 01:14:03.830 --> 01:14:05.590 but again, that's a sub set, 01:14:05.590 --> 01:14:08.100 that's been subsumed into the regional maintenance centers. 01:14:08.100 --> 01:14:09.840 - You are trying to create the capability 01:14:09.840 --> 01:14:11.550 or place for your sailors to go. 01:14:12.010 --> 01:14:13.050 Like Mottus of other things. 01:14:13.050 --> 01:14:15.990 - We're about five years or so into recreating, 01:14:16.420 --> 01:14:17.970 probably more like seven years. 01:14:18.000 --> 01:14:18.833 - Good idea. 01:14:19.456 --> 01:14:21.180 - I've got about 3000 sailors 01:14:21.700 --> 01:14:24.560 and I think the largest chiefs mass in the world. 01:14:27.210 --> 01:14:28.043 - Thank you. 01:14:28.060 --> 01:14:29.930 - Thank you, to wrap this up, 01:14:29.930 --> 01:14:32.100 you can see we have a superb panel, 01:14:32.310 --> 01:14:34.110 this audience should feel comfortable, 01:14:34.110 --> 01:14:36.900 that this flag leadership team 01:14:37.010 --> 01:14:38.760 along with their folks, that support them 01:14:38.760 --> 01:14:40.320 are leading this enterprise. 01:14:40.800 --> 01:14:43.720 Maintenance is a war fighting capability, 01:14:43.720 --> 01:14:46.240 that's certainly how the navy views this 01:14:46.610 --> 01:14:50.090 and it directly links to operational days at sea 01:14:50.130 --> 01:14:52.050 of naval power. 01:14:53.730 --> 01:14:55.840 I'd like to thank you for participating, 01:14:55.840 --> 01:14:58.640 great questions and please give a hand to our panel, 01:14:58.640 --> 01:14:59.480 thank you. 01:15:00.704 --> 01:15:02.954 (applause)