WEBVTT

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(suspenseful music)

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- Hi I'm Major Jonathan Barber.

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Here at Over the Horizon, we focus on

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the emergency security environment.

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You can go to the website and read articles,

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listen to podcasts and watch interviews that

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talk about the emerging trends shaping the future.

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It talks about the breakneck speed of technology

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and how that's fundamentally changing how individuals

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interact, how governments interact

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and how countries interact.

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We kind of take all of this and look at it through

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a lens or a paradigm, a framework, to decide

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what kind of capabilities do we need to produce?

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How should we react to advisories?

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How should we co-opt friends?

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Some of these paradigms are outdated.

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Some of them we know they're outdated

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and we need to change them.

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Some of them we don't know they're outdated

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and that's dangerous.

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All of this put together exponentially increases

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the risk as we go forward to the decisions that

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we make and the directions that we take

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as a nation and as a group of nations.

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There's one thing, however, in all of this

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that doesn't change and that's human nature.

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We know that we all have a mind, a will and a motion

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and we've seen through history that humans have

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a great capacity for evil and they have

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a great capacity for good.

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To harness that good and to bring it out

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for humans to meet the improbable or

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the impossible and to over come it for good,

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takes leadership, takes teamwork, takes character

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and it takes the right value based system that you

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ground all that on.

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If you listen to General Kwast's video in his interview,

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he talks about how there's still heroes among us

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and there's still a great need for heroes.

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They're often not people who stand out

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as much as the great leaders and the great teammates

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that help do all this and make it happen.

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One of those heroes is with us here today.

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His name is Gene Kranz.

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He was a fighter pilot back in the F86 days.

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A test pilot, and then he worked for NASA

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as a mission commander.

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Throughout the Apollo program, he was a mission commander.

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First for Apollo 1 where three of our astronauts

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and three of his friends burned to death

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on the launchpad in an operational failure.

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He talks to us about the lessons learned from that

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and then ultimately he was the mission commander

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for Apollo 11 where mankind in probably its greatest feat,

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put a man on the moon and returned him safely to the earth.

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Furthermore, it was Apollo 13.

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He was the mission commander, you've seen in the movie.

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He was the guy with the vest.

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The leader of that whole team to take three astronauts

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in a stricken spacecraft, abandoned in outer space,

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with pretty much all odds against them

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and safely and successfully returned them to the earth.

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Gene talks to us about what it took to accomplish this

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and what it takes to take a team, put it together

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to face the impossible and to overcome it.

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I hope you enjoy it.

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- When we meet in an hour of change and challenge

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in a decade of hope and fear,

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in an age of both knowledge and ignorance.

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The greater our knowledge increases,

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the greater our ignorance unfolds.

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No man can fully grasp how far

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and how fast we have come.

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But condense if you will

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the 50,000 years of man's recorded history

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in a time span of about a half a century.

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Stated in these terms we know very little

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about the first 40 years

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except at the end of them

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advanced man had learned to use the skins of animals

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to cover them.

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Then about 10 years ago, under this standard,

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man emerged from his caves to construct other kinds

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of shelter.

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Only five years ago man learned to write

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and use a cart with wheels.

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Christianity began less than two years ago.

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The printing press came this year

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and then less than two months ago

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during this whole 50 year span of human history,

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the steam engine provided a new source of power.

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Newton explored the meaning of gravity,

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last month electric lights and telephones

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and automobiles and airplanes became available.

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Only last week did we develop Penicillin

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and television and nuclear power.

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This is a breathtaking pace

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and such a pace cannot help

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but create new ills as it dispels old.

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So it is not surprising that some would have

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us stay where we are a little longer

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to rest, to wait, if this capsule history

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of our progress teaches us anything

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it is that man and his quest for knowledge

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and progress is determined and cannot be deterred.

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That we shall send to the moon 240,000 miles away

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a giant rocket more than 300 feet tall

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on an untried mission

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to an unknown celestial body

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and then return it safely to earth

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but why, some say, the moon?

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Why choose this as our goal?

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And they may well ask why climb the highest mountain?

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Why 35 years ago fly the Atlantic?

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We choose to go to the moon.

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We choose to go to the moon

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(dramatic music)

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we choose to go to the moon in this decade

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and do the other things not because they are easy

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but because they are hard.

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- [Voiceover] The Eagle has landed.

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- [John Kennedy] Because that goal

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will serve to organize and measure the best

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of our energies and skills.

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Because that challenge is one that we are willing

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to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone

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and therefore as we set sail, we ask God's blessing

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on the most hazardous and dangerous

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and greatest adventure on which man has ever embarked.

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(suspenseful music)

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- So Mr. Kranz, where were you when you saw

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that speech and what went through your mind?

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- The impact was almost immediate because

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one month prior to the speech, we had blown up

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our second Atlas rocket.

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We launched Alan Shepard two weeks earlier

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and so we had a total of 20 minutes man spaceful

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experience, we had never been to orbit

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and we were challenged by President Kennedy

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to go to the moon.

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For the first few days it was just, this guy

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just doesn't understand, but then I think it came,

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not only to myself, but to the entire team at

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Space Task Group, that my God, this guy trusts us.

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Look at what he is asking us to do.

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We're going to go to the moon

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but we gotta learn and we gotta master

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all aspects of space flight.

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We gotta do it within the next 8 1/2 years.

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So the challenge was very dramatic

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but it was the stimulus we needed

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because we had been very unsuccessful

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in 1960 or roughly 30 to 40% of our missions failed

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and they failed very spectacularly.

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So we were just in the process of getting on track

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with Alan Shepard and we were celebrating Alan

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and then we get this mission to go to the moon.

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We choose to go to the moon, we choose to go to the moon

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in this decade and do the other things

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not because they're easy, but because they are hard

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and those last words, I think, pretty much stated

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the challenge we were faced with.

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- Now here at Over the Horizons we really try

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to focus on the next decade and the problems

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of the emerging security environment

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and how do we provide security for the American people?

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A lot of the challenges there can sometimes

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seem insurmountable.

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There's a lot of complexity, it's downright scary

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sometimes when you look at these.

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Not so unlike the 1960s.

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So you were faced with a seemingly impossible task

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at the same time we had social unrest.

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We had Vietnam starting and that going on.

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So you have some individuals flying in Vietnam.

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Some individuals over there in the mud,

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some as POWs for up to eight years

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and then you had some of those same people

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branching off into NASA to create a team

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to face that insurmountable task.

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Could you tell us what did you guys do

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to forge a team to try to do this?

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To take the kind of risks necessary

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and to come together and overcome these challenges.

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- The most important aspect we had,

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we're in a significantly different environment

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than we are today.

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The majority of members of the US Congress basically

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were warriors that finished with World War II

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and Korea.

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The media, we didn't have FOX or CNN or

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any of those instant news networks

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so we had time to really pull our thoughts together

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and tell the story and the media, in particular,

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was very forceful but very honest

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and the entire space program, which was one

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of the greatest challenge, was basically totally

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open to the public.

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And this is one thing that we had to get used to.

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In mission control I could look over my shoulder

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and I could see the news commentators

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from radio, TV and newspapers.

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We'd have a press conferences after each one

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of the missions.

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So we were now communicating what we were doing

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to the public, what we were doing and why.

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And that was one of the unifying factors

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is that we recognized that we were part

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of a much larger mission.

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The cold war was very real to me,

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the cold war was real to many of my compatriots.

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Others that came in from college,

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they're looking at this as the greatest challenge

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since canned beer basically.

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The president wanted to go to the moon

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and we were going to do it.

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So we had a culture of challenge.

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We had the culture that led us to establish

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the motto that we used in mission control

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which is achievement through excellence

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and we established the four standards:

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discipline, morale, toughness and competence.

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Or the qualities that as individuals would allow

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us to come together as a team.

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Now one of the greatest aspects of the team building

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was in our mission preparation work.

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We spent roughly about a third of our time

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in preparation for each one of the space missions

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developing our overall risk strategy.

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We call it the mission rules

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where we would take and decompose every one of the

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space craft's systems, what could happen in that thing

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for every phase of the mission.

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This would basically emerge from

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the lower level.

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We'd give them the overall strategy

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relative to how far we wanted to press,

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how we wanted to use the redundancy

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but then they would start giving us the piece parts

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and this debate between the flight directors

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and the team members really allowed us to

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come to a very complete understanding

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of the issues that we face, the risks and also

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the benefits as we step forward into the unknown.

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The mission roles, we then continued the communications

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with the astronauts, the crews that we're flying.

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So by the time I got ready to fly,

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basically I knew how my controllers thought,

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they knew how I thought, we could communicate this

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effectively to the crew so we didn't have much time

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to react.

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We knew that this particular direction that we

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were going had been very closely vetted

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and basically that was the best decision we

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could make given the few seconds to the minutes

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we had to work on her.

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If we had a longer period of time,

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we knew again the bottom line for each one

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of the controllers and the crew.

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So the mission rules, I think, were one of the

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unifying processes.

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I assumed I was the branch chief and division chief

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in flight control and I had the responsibility

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for all the controllers that would be faced

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with the program so establishing the

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standardization for our training process,

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I couldn't get it from a contractor

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so I decided to do it myself.

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I worked in aircraft flight test for two years

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and when I want to board an aircraft

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and we're flying an aircraft, basically I knew

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everything that was in that bomb bay.

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We were basically developing the capabilities

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to allow the B52 to penetrate Soviet airspace.

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What took the same approach in working with

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the members of my team, I wanted absolute correct,

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concise, crisp knowledge of every one of the

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space craft systems and everything that we

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intended to do and I wanted that communicated

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throughout the team.

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And as a result of the working level

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and preparation for a mission, we started coming

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together as a team.

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The training team we had, basically, was again

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a calvary of mission controllers whose job

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was to defeat the flight control team.

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And so it was this basic antagonism that we needed

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to drive us, achieve the highest level

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of performance that was humanly possible

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and we had an instructional team that was driving us

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to that point.

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It was amazing the scenarios they would develop

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because we would come together individually,

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flight controller or flight director,

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but also had to bring the astronauts in.

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So it was a question by the time we got ready to fly,

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we were capable of making 100% correct short-term,

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crisp decisions that basically acknowledged the risk

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we had, we also acknowledge the gain from each one

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of those steps we would take so it was a continual

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process of translating risks versus gain.

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For instance during Apollo 13, the real challenge was

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I had the opportunity to do a direct abort,

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come back into earth's atmosphere and be back home

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within a day and a half.

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But to do that, I'd go from a very risky plateau

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where I was embedded in a serious problem

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and I would have to move into perform a maneuver

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that if I didn't do this perfectly,

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there was a good chance that I'd impact the moon.

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So it was a question of making the decision

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to buy time and the trust I had in my lunar module team

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that I said I know these guys, I know the space craft,

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I'd flown it four times previously,

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we will find a way to bring this crew home

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and that was basically the thought process,

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not only permeated my team, it was every team

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that worked in mission control.

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One of the great aspects of it

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our bosses came to us and said how can we help you?

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They let us carry the ball, they knew we were the best

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qualified to do that thing and they were on the job.

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I mean figuring out some way to allow us to have

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the freedom.

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They'd cover the media for us, they'd cover

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the headquarters, people up in Washington.

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They were our blocking backs that allowed us

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to carry the mission off.

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- Sounds like you have an organization with a lot of trust

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which enables great communication amongst all

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the diverse perspectives which give you a solution

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and also a capacity to handle the unknown

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or emergencies or rapid decision making.

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What are some of the things, as a leader,

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as a mission controller, that you helped enable

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that kind of an organization?

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- Well I believe teamwork starts at the very top.

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You need a known leader.

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You have to carry a reputation for it.

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Your reputation basically is your entry

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into team building and once you carry that

16:09.512 --> 16:13.308
reputation into the team and can establish the trust,

16:13.308 --> 16:16.571
then you can work together to develop a set of values

16:16.571 --> 16:20.738
that then you can apply across the entire membership

16:21.273 --> 16:22.773
base in your team.

16:23.030 --> 16:27.197
So it's got leadership, trust, values and teamwork.

16:27.353 --> 16:29.705
And once you get to that final stage,

16:29.705 --> 16:31.927
you can literally do anything.

16:31.927 --> 16:32.866
And this is true.

16:32.866 --> 16:35.366
You mentioned Vietnam earlier.

16:35.503 --> 16:38.718
I had military personnel in the early years

16:38.718 --> 16:41.593
detailed from the MOL program, the orbiting laboratory

16:41.593 --> 16:44.808
program, all the way through the Gemini program

16:44.808 --> 16:48.134
and as we moved into Apollo, basically I had

16:48.134 --> 16:51.093
another cadre that we are preparing actually for

16:51.093 --> 16:53.939
developing a team for the Air Force

16:53.939 --> 16:57.772
to actually carry mission operations in space.

16:58.073 --> 17:01.118
And many of them were aviators, a good portion of them,

17:01.118 --> 17:03.630
as the war heated up over there.

17:03.630 --> 17:05.975
They basically were recalled and basically moved

17:05.975 --> 17:07.725
to active duty again.

17:07.795 --> 17:10.612
We has a very close relationship to the people

17:10.612 --> 17:12.435
who had been working with us that were now

17:12.435 --> 17:15.768
fighting the battles overseas which is a

17:17.705 --> 17:19.422
really, I think it was a difficult time for many of us

17:19.422 --> 17:22.496
because we knew what they were facing over there.

17:22.496 --> 17:25.312
We had our job and we were both fighting a war.

17:25.312 --> 17:26.880
We were fighting for the war in space

17:26.880 --> 17:29.874
and they were fighting over in Vietnam.

17:29.874 --> 17:32.880
- Now when you were talking about leadership

17:32.880 --> 17:34.987
and it starts there, and then you get down to values,

17:34.987 --> 17:38.411
America's been incredibly blessed in that we're

17:38.411 --> 17:41.399
very materially wealthy, we've been wealthy in experience,

17:41.399 --> 17:45.076
wealthy in knowledge, our society, but we don't talk

17:45.076 --> 17:47.260
as much it seems today about being wealthy

17:47.260 --> 17:48.845
in character, wealthy in values.

17:48.845 --> 17:51.040
Something we all know is important though.

17:51.040 --> 17:52.656
What are some of those values that you,

17:52.656 --> 17:54.552
as a leader or that you as a team,

17:54.552 --> 17:56.387
that you're trying to embed to make sure

17:56.387 --> 17:58.420
those are there to enable everything else.

17:58.420 --> 18:02.170
- I believe the singular event that I believe

18:04.432 --> 18:08.515
moved the teams in mission control from damn good

18:08.601 --> 18:12.768
to excellence came about as a result of the Apollo 1 fire.

18:14.171 --> 18:16.595
I had worked in flight test, several of the flight

18:16.595 --> 18:18.981
directors that I had had been military aviators.

18:18.981 --> 18:21.136
I had been a military aviator.

18:21.136 --> 18:23.223
But many of the young people that we had

18:23.223 --> 18:25.157
had never gone through that kind of a trauma,

18:25.157 --> 18:28.445
to lose a crew and listen to our crew die

18:28.445 --> 18:30.862
and hear their final seconds.

18:31.037 --> 18:35.204
And I called my team, I had roughly about 300 people

18:36.877 --> 18:39.438
at that time, a division together,

18:39.438 --> 18:42.462
and basically had talked about the nature

18:42.462 --> 18:44.234
of flight test, the nature of risk

18:44.234 --> 18:46.984
and what it would take to succeed

18:47.410 --> 18:50.410
and identified the day of this fire,

18:52.924 --> 18:53.928
none of us...

18:53.928 --> 18:56.414
We could have called off that test,

18:56.414 --> 18:58.947
the people at the Cape could have called it off,

18:58.947 --> 19:00.587
the crew could have called it off.

19:00.587 --> 19:03.605
No one assumed the responsibility to take the action

19:03.605 --> 19:07.207
to say this is not the day we should press on

19:07.207 --> 19:08.395
with this test.

19:08.395 --> 19:09.728
We're not ready.

19:10.169 --> 19:13.109
And wrote two words, put two words in the vocabulary,

19:13.109 --> 19:14.022
tough and competent.

19:14.022 --> 19:16.847
Tough meaning we always assume responsibility

19:16.847 --> 19:18.868
for whatever actions we take.

19:18.868 --> 19:21.266
Whether we take them or whether we avoid taking them

19:21.266 --> 19:24.092
and in the case of the Apollo 1 fire,

19:24.092 --> 19:25.876
we could have shut down that countdown,

19:25.876 --> 19:26.849
and we didn't.

19:26.849 --> 19:27.682
Competent.

19:27.857 --> 19:31.046
We assumed that operations are 100% oxygen environment

19:31.046 --> 19:31.879
is safe.

19:31.879 --> 19:32.780
That is not true.

19:32.780 --> 19:33.613
Okay?

19:34.062 --> 19:37.199
We had stopped learning, we had stopped understanding

19:37.199 --> 19:38.941
the nature of this environment.

19:38.941 --> 19:42.706
From now on, the teams in mission control be perfect

19:42.706 --> 19:45.147
and I told my people to write those two words,

19:45.147 --> 19:47.285
tough and competent, on their blackboard

19:47.285 --> 19:50.427
and they would not be erased until we had completed

19:50.427 --> 19:52.010
the Apollo program.

19:52.428 --> 19:54.941
I think there are certain events that provide

19:54.941 --> 19:57.265
the opportunity in my office.

19:57.265 --> 19:59.481
You talked about risk earlier.

19:59.481 --> 20:02.486
I had basically the pictures of the missions

20:02.486 --> 20:04.903
where we weren't good enough.

20:05.533 --> 20:07.914
I had the Apollo 9 where basically we

20:07.914 --> 20:11.173
darn near lost Gene Cernan during an EVA.

20:11.173 --> 20:13.404
I had the pictures, the early Atlas explosions

20:13.404 --> 20:14.404
that we had.

20:14.947 --> 20:18.142
I had problems associating with the Apollo 13 spacecraft

20:18.142 --> 20:20.169
so basically I looked at these and there was

20:20.169 --> 20:22.690
a constant reminder that our business

20:22.690 --> 20:26.107
is managing risk and doing it to the best

20:26.504 --> 20:28.504
possible fashion we can.

20:30.374 --> 20:32.375
We wrote a set of standards that we call

20:32.375 --> 20:34.341
the Foundations of Mission Control.

20:34.341 --> 20:36.010
It talks about discipline, morale, toughness,

20:36.010 --> 20:38.333
competence, commitment, teamwork.

20:38.333 --> 20:40.412
But it had one statement in there that was very

20:40.412 --> 20:42.429
applicable to the young people we had.

20:42.429 --> 20:45.660
New people coming into the organization

20:45.660 --> 20:47.895
and it said to always be aware that suddenly

20:47.895 --> 20:50.681
and unexpectedly you may find yourselves in a role

20:50.681 --> 20:54.229
where your performance has ultimate consequences.

20:54.229 --> 20:56.414
And this was, I think, very important for the new

20:56.414 --> 20:59.018
people coming in because I thought well

20:59.018 --> 21:02.082
somebody above me is going to make that decision

21:02.082 --> 21:03.421
but that isn't the way it is.

21:03.421 --> 21:07.004
It's I wanted you, the new employee we got,

21:07.253 --> 21:10.227
to really accept this responsibility from the day

21:10.227 --> 21:14.394
you start training until the day you're fully operational.

21:15.227 --> 21:17.981
So the Foundations of Mission Control is a series

21:17.981 --> 21:21.821
of statements that we carried all the way through

21:21.821 --> 21:25.028
the program and it lasted for almost 50 years.

21:25.028 --> 21:26.965
And finally after the Columbia accident,

21:26.965 --> 21:29.616
we added one more element to that foundation,

21:29.616 --> 21:31.616
that's called vigilance.

21:31.733 --> 21:33.753
Because basically we should have been on top of

21:33.753 --> 21:36.836
the problems that we had on Columbia,

21:36.980 --> 21:40.354
the accident where we had that debris hit.

21:40.354 --> 21:42.055
Much earlier, and got on top of it and maybe

21:42.055 --> 21:44.368
taken some different direction.

21:44.368 --> 21:46.567
- One thing we talk about in the military

21:46.567 --> 21:48.520
quite a bit, our senior leaders talk about,

21:48.520 --> 21:50.485
is the ability to take risk.

21:50.485 --> 21:54.555
So it's easy to become a risk-averse organization.

21:54.555 --> 21:56.831
It's easy for NASA to become a very risk-averse

21:56.831 --> 21:57.914
organization.

21:58.180 --> 22:00.583
You guys were allowed to take a lot of risk.

22:00.583 --> 22:01.469
You were allowed to fail.

22:01.469 --> 22:03.272
We talk about being allowed to fail.

22:03.272 --> 22:07.439
How do you turn that failure into success later on

22:08.033 --> 22:11.192
and then what does it mean to be allowed to fail?

22:11.192 --> 22:12.560
How do you think the senior leaders

22:12.560 --> 22:15.727
connect with the operators to do that?

22:16.596 --> 22:19.430
- First of all, you have to accept the fact

22:19.430 --> 22:22.242
that risk is the price of progress.

22:22.242 --> 22:24.074
I don't care whether you're trying to make money

22:24.074 --> 22:25.564
in the stock money or you're trying to put

22:25.564 --> 22:26.588
a man in space.

22:26.588 --> 22:29.841
It has an element of risk and if you want to move forward

22:29.841 --> 22:33.425
you have to accept that and the key thing is

22:33.425 --> 22:37.008
is to accept the responsibility personally.

22:39.973 --> 22:42.558
That I am going to sign up for this and

22:42.558 --> 22:46.141
I am going to communicate what I am willing

22:46.231 --> 22:48.686
to do to my people and get them to come in

22:48.686 --> 22:49.936
and share this.

22:50.168 --> 22:53.298
The management of risk, I look at in today's world,

22:53.298 --> 22:56.807
is a team process because as fast as we're moving

22:56.807 --> 22:59.214
with the technology we've got, with all the

22:59.214 --> 23:02.310
very rapid decisions, very few people are capable

23:02.310 --> 23:06.477
of making the 100% correct decision all the time,

23:06.517 --> 23:08.902
so it's really a question of embedding

23:08.902 --> 23:12.153
that responsibility within the members of your team

23:12.153 --> 23:14.737
and mission control basically, I had a team in there

23:14.737 --> 23:17.721
and my principle job, my greatest lesson that

23:17.721 --> 23:20.150
I had learned through the training process

23:20.150 --> 23:22.567
is to become a good listener.

23:22.948 --> 23:25.732
I would get ahead of my team, I would make decisions

23:25.732 --> 23:29.899
that I should have had them make and that is demeaning,

23:30.372 --> 23:33.311
it defeats the purpose of building a team.

23:33.311 --> 23:35.668
So in training, the instructors we had

23:35.668 --> 23:38.835
singled me out and taught me some very

23:40.365 --> 23:41.615
rugged lessons.

23:43.835 --> 23:46.668
I'm a Catholic in mission control,

23:48.373 --> 23:50.953
our debriefings, I always start off at the very top level

23:50.953 --> 23:52.572
where you have to explain what you did,

23:52.572 --> 23:54.683
why you did it and identify where you were

23:54.683 --> 23:56.683
deficient in doing that.

23:57.568 --> 23:59.376
That is a good element of the team building

23:59.376 --> 24:01.677
because if the team sees you owning up

24:01.677 --> 24:05.161
to your own deficiencies, they will open up

24:05.161 --> 24:07.661
and start discussing them also

24:07.883 --> 24:10.862
and as a result other people say, hey, I had the

24:10.862 --> 24:11.810
same problem.

24:11.810 --> 24:14.617
I can come in, let's start working together.

24:14.617 --> 24:18.599
When I can see he's overloaded, I'm going to jump in

24:18.599 --> 24:20.270
and give him a bit of a hand.

24:20.270 --> 24:23.568
So I think that the process of training and

24:23.568 --> 24:26.887
debriefing missions, assuming the personal responsibilities

24:26.887 --> 24:31.054
go with the risk taking, I think are very important

24:31.091 --> 24:35.258
in being able to succeed in a high risk environment.

24:36.828 --> 24:39.648
We were fortunate because had a very clear

24:39.648 --> 24:41.287
mandate in mission control.

24:41.287 --> 24:44.596
The flight director's job, no ambiguity to take

24:44.596 --> 24:47.028
any actions necessary for who's safety in

24:47.028 --> 24:48.361
mission success.

24:48.617 --> 24:50.978
We knew as flight directors, that there was

24:50.978 --> 24:52.311
no one above us.

24:52.338 --> 24:53.171
Okay?

24:53.210 --> 24:55.618
That was our job and we had been given the job

24:55.618 --> 24:58.618
and it would be supported by our top

24:58.643 --> 25:01.425
level management and I believe this was true

25:01.425 --> 25:02.606
as it went down in the ranks.

25:02.606 --> 25:04.980
Each one of my systems controllers on the console

25:04.980 --> 25:08.309
had the responsibility for giving me 100%

25:08.309 --> 25:11.582
correct, definitive answer to whatever problems

25:11.582 --> 25:15.091
we were faced in there, addressing the known risks

25:15.091 --> 25:18.174
of that path that he would recommend.

25:19.347 --> 25:21.663
The training process was very rugged,

25:21.663 --> 25:25.099
very realistic and by the time we got ready to fly,

25:25.099 --> 25:26.877
we knew each other personally.

25:26.877 --> 25:28.408
We were a relatively small team.

25:28.408 --> 25:30.236
We were like one of the ones where you look

25:30.236 --> 25:32.382
for the special operators.

25:32.382 --> 25:35.243
Basically we had that kind of relationship in there.

25:35.243 --> 25:37.657
I had a mission where one of my controllers

25:37.657 --> 25:39.721
was involved in an automobile accident.

25:39.721 --> 25:42.588
I had a flight surgeon who basically

25:42.588 --> 25:44.634
was Canadian and basically he had taken care

25:44.634 --> 25:47.300
of Canadian hockey players after the game

25:47.300 --> 25:50.138
so I sent him out and he jumped in there.

25:50.138 --> 25:53.471
But the team relationship was really the

25:54.604 --> 25:57.099
ultimate key to our success combined with

25:57.099 --> 25:59.682
the ability that we were given.

26:00.789 --> 26:02.692
The challenge, the responsibilities we were

26:02.692 --> 26:03.910
given by our management.

26:03.910 --> 26:08.077
Seldom did we ever get overruled by our leadership.

26:08.957 --> 26:10.730
One of the other things that was interesting

26:10.730 --> 26:12.770
in mission control was the flight directors

26:12.770 --> 26:16.103
always came from the ranks of the teams.

26:16.317 --> 26:18.692
For over 50 years, every flight controller

26:18.692 --> 26:22.109
was selected from membership in the team.

26:23.025 --> 26:24.533
You do this because you want an individual

26:24.533 --> 26:26.752
with a good decision track record.

26:26.752 --> 26:28.713
You want an individual capable of coping

26:28.713 --> 26:29.760
with the stress.

26:29.760 --> 26:30.978
You want an individual who can build a team.

26:30.978 --> 26:32.319
You want an individual who's a good listener.

26:32.319 --> 26:35.908
You want an articulator because when times get tough,

26:35.908 --> 26:38.911
you know, when we went down to the moon,

26:38.911 --> 26:41.028
I had the responsibility for that landing

26:41.028 --> 26:42.825
and my final words to the team as we

26:42.825 --> 26:46.992
had acquisition spacecraft, then we came into this room

26:47.800 --> 26:50.636
as a team and we will leave as a team.

26:50.636 --> 26:54.003
I will stand behind every decision you will make.

26:54.003 --> 26:56.546
And that was a very difficult period because

26:56.546 --> 26:58.707
one of my controllers was faced with a series

26:58.707 --> 27:00.504
of computer program alarms that were totally

27:00.504 --> 27:04.108
unexpected and he had to make the calls to say

27:04.108 --> 27:06.025
where I go to continue.

27:06.039 --> 27:09.382
And he made them right on track and it was

27:09.382 --> 27:13.549
recognizing the significance, the importance of the work

27:15.804 --> 27:17.406
that he was doing, but in particular his role

27:17.406 --> 27:21.001
in this decision process and accepting the risk

27:21.001 --> 27:22.834
to make that decision.

27:23.250 --> 27:26.947
It was, I think, an incredible time in the life

27:26.947 --> 27:30.603
of many of the controllers to experience this.

27:30.603 --> 27:32.972
The space program, none of the missions were

27:32.972 --> 27:35.724
ever easy and probably one of the most

27:35.724 --> 27:38.932
important missions we ever faced was Apollo 13,

27:38.932 --> 27:40.590
we were getting ready to go down to the moon

27:40.590 --> 27:42.349
and we're in our final pass around the front

27:42.349 --> 27:44.637
side of the moon and one of my controllers sees

27:44.637 --> 27:47.446
he has a board indication on his console.

27:47.446 --> 27:49.371
That shouldn't be there if the engine had been armed

27:49.371 --> 27:51.564
that would have been a bad day.

27:51.564 --> 27:55.224
Checked with the back room, it's a valid calorimetry bit,

27:55.224 --> 27:57.738
goes to the flight director and say flight,

27:57.738 --> 27:59.720
will you have the astronaut hit the abort switch

27:59.720 --> 28:01.387
with the flashlight?

28:01.815 --> 28:04.732
And the board indication went away.

28:04.975 --> 28:07.720
And we now had two hours, one more opportunity

28:07.720 --> 28:10.715
to go down to the moon and he led the development

28:10.715 --> 28:14.272
of a software patch to bypass the abort switch

28:14.272 --> 28:17.689
during engine start and then re-enable it

28:18.478 --> 28:20.296
once the engine was started and the thing was

28:20.296 --> 28:22.637
our management, our leadership, let us take

28:22.637 --> 28:24.304
that kind of a risk.

28:25.247 --> 28:28.414
The business of risk has to be shared.

28:29.914 --> 28:31.296
There's no one individual that has to be

28:31.296 --> 28:34.129
accepted as a community, as a team

28:34.961 --> 28:38.205
and leadership, top level leaders eventually

28:38.205 --> 28:40.636
I left the flight directors console,

28:40.636 --> 28:43.039
I became the flight operation director.

28:43.039 --> 28:44.797
Basically I accepted the risk that they were

28:44.797 --> 28:47.285
going to accept the risk so I would support them

28:47.285 --> 28:49.452
because they were my team.

28:50.541 --> 28:53.708
- So you've given these great ideas of

28:53.990 --> 28:55.241
bringing a team together.

28:55.241 --> 28:57.757
What are some of the biggest enemies of that?

28:57.757 --> 28:59.740
What are the things that tears the team apart?

28:59.740 --> 29:02.972
- I think the greatest enemy is what they call ego.

29:02.972 --> 29:05.218
Many of us came in from aircraft flight test

29:05.218 --> 29:08.208
and basically we had to learn to check our ego

29:08.208 --> 29:11.066
at the door every day when we came to work.

29:11.066 --> 29:13.399
That was one of the aspects.

29:13.711 --> 29:15.943
The other thing was recognition that basically

29:15.943 --> 29:19.443
you are only a small part of this venture,

29:21.275 --> 29:23.376
like going to the moon or whatever job that

29:23.376 --> 29:25.126
you're given in life.

29:25.973 --> 29:28.537
I think it's really accepting the fact that this,

29:28.537 --> 29:31.870
in today's world, is a team related job.

29:32.974 --> 29:34.923
It's a team decision because things are moving fast.

29:34.923 --> 29:39.090
I think the other one is not doing enough homework.

29:39.338 --> 29:42.921
I used to spend a good portion of every day

29:44.913 --> 29:48.996
coming home from work and really preparing myself

29:49.250 --> 29:50.893
for the next day's job.

29:50.893 --> 29:54.210
It was basically a self-recognition of my own

29:54.210 --> 29:55.293
deficiencies.

29:55.396 --> 29:58.673
Like I say, mine was one of being ahead of my team,

29:58.673 --> 30:01.923
not training them to make the decisions

30:02.441 --> 30:06.274
and then getting to the point where I was able

30:07.454 --> 30:10.954
to visualize actually what the crew's role

30:12.500 --> 30:15.668
in this thing was, how they fit into this thing

30:15.668 --> 30:19.585
and basically make a decision that looked at it

30:20.776 --> 30:21.765
as a total team.

30:21.765 --> 30:24.474
If I move in this direction, is the crew capable

30:24.474 --> 30:26.627
of implementing this thing?

30:26.627 --> 30:27.858
Are they going to have any questions?

30:27.858 --> 30:31.118
How do I make sure that in the few seconds

30:31.118 --> 30:33.359
that we got to talk, that they are going

30:33.359 --> 30:36.026
to execute what our best call is

30:36.911 --> 30:39.138
and this was true during powered flight.

30:39.138 --> 30:41.170
We had roughly around 20 seconds

30:41.170 --> 30:42.829
and basically as a trained team

30:42.829 --> 30:46.383
we could make 100% correct decision in 20 seconds.

30:46.383 --> 30:49.147
That's a lifetime in mission control.

30:49.147 --> 30:52.897
It's a lifetime in many professional aspects.

30:53.948 --> 30:56.998
Those people operate as special operators

30:56.998 --> 30:59.165
or air combat controllers.

30:59.550 --> 31:02.550
20 seconds for a well prepared team,

31:02.589 --> 31:05.089
you can get an awful lot done.

31:05.271 --> 31:08.128
- What could you tell us about, as we do go forward,

31:08.128 --> 31:10.229
and there's a lot of changes that are going to

31:10.229 --> 31:11.968
happen to the world over the next 10 years.

31:11.968 --> 31:13.229
There's a lot of changes that are going

31:13.229 --> 31:15.445
to happen in space over the next 10 to 20 years.

31:15.445 --> 31:17.389
From a commercial point of view and from

31:17.389 --> 31:19.441
a military point of view, where do you see

31:19.441 --> 31:21.485
the way forward is for us?

31:21.485 --> 31:23.965
- First of all, I'm very bullish in space.

31:23.965 --> 31:27.465
I believe that to a great extent the books

31:27.710 --> 31:30.908
have been written on how to accomplish various things

31:30.908 --> 31:33.186
in space, the technology is there,

31:33.186 --> 31:35.047
we got generations of young people capable

31:35.047 --> 31:38.196
of stepping up and accepting and being successful

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and living in a high risk environment.

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The major challenge that we need is

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to get the kind of leadership component that

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is going to allow us to do this.

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I believe with with the changed administration

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and I know some of the people up in Washington

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that they're now looking back at what I consider

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the next step from a standpoint of exploration,

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let's go back to the moon.

31:58.315 --> 31:59.997
And I believe a lot of people have been

31:59.997 --> 32:02.703
talking Mars, Mars, Mars but basically that's far out

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and it's very easy to say yes we support Mars

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and it becomes nothing but a PowerPoint presentation.

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You don't have to commit money to it,

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you can just study, study, study, study, study.

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Where the moon, you can set an objective

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to be there in five years, six years.

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And I think you could do it.

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I think the great difficulty that both the commercial

32:22.723 --> 32:26.056
and the NASA military space operators is

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to build the team.

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It's easier to build the hardware

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than it is to build the team that is capable

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of properly exercising that hardware.

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But I think team building is the greatest challenge

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that we face looking towards the future.

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Once you get that team ready, what you need

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is a person who is capable of articulating

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the program and selling it to the public.

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I believe, as we go further in exploration,

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like the International Space Station right now,

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is going to be an international project.

32:55.460 --> 32:57.289
I believe that it's, to a great extent, going to

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be still focused by the United States because we're

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the ones that have the technology, the economic,

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and the leadership base to allow that to happen.

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The commercial entities, I'm really amazed

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at how successful that they have been.

33:11.185 --> 33:13.596
When I started off in the space program,

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the EVA was incredibly difficult.

33:15.770 --> 33:18.764
The second EVA with Gene Cernan, we almost lost him.

33:18.764 --> 33:21.430
But now you can see the crewmen outside the spacecraft

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with the robotics working cooperative.

33:23.498 --> 33:26.608
Assembling a space system that had never been

33:26.608 --> 33:30.005
physically mated on earth gives you opportunities

33:30.005 --> 33:31.146
when you look towards the future.

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How do I want to go to the moon?

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Well maybe I can assemble the systems to go to the moon

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or to Mars in space.

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We've got automated docking.

33:40.186 --> 33:42.603
The technology is incredible.

33:42.669 --> 33:45.594
I was in mission control just watching the

33:45.594 --> 33:48.677
International Space Station operation

33:49.537 --> 33:51.511
and I'm dazzled at their ability

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to do things that we could only dream of

33:54.899 --> 33:56.232
decades earlier.

33:57.646 --> 34:01.229
This is the future and it is important that

34:02.562 --> 34:05.877
we recognize that we have to keep moving

34:05.877 --> 34:09.516
forward, we have to take the risks to be bold,

34:09.516 --> 34:12.152
take big steps and I believe exploration is one

34:12.152 --> 34:16.319
of those steps that is necessary because as a nation,

34:16.363 --> 34:18.936
risk is the price of progress but also difficult

34:18.936 --> 34:21.946
missions force the emergence of new, cutting edge

34:21.946 --> 34:24.843
technology and I believe that as a nation,

34:24.843 --> 34:26.693
we're going to be able to provide for the

34:26.693 --> 34:29.443
economic foundation of our nation

34:31.115 --> 34:35.032
through high technology that is not easily replicated.

34:35.032 --> 34:37.220
Basically I believe that space has many reasons,

34:37.220 --> 34:39.178
we got to inspire the young people to sign up

34:39.178 --> 34:42.303
for science, technology, engineering and math.

34:42.303 --> 34:44.489
So there's all kinds of reasons to go into space

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but I believe that exploration is part of human nature.

34:49.495 --> 34:51.408
We want to challenge boundaries.

34:51.408 --> 34:52.624
We want to challenge ourselves.

34:52.624 --> 34:55.295
We want to challenge our organization

34:55.295 --> 34:57.117
and I believe we are capable of doing that

34:57.117 --> 35:00.538
and I'm looking forward to the coming years.

35:00.538 --> 35:03.966
When I finished, I was flight director for the final launch

35:03.966 --> 35:06.506
off the surface of the moon and I believed

35:06.506 --> 35:09.429
in my lifetime I would see Americans back on

35:09.429 --> 35:10.484
the moon again.

35:10.484 --> 35:13.132
I won't see it, I'm too old right now

35:13.132 --> 35:16.465
but I can only pray now that my children

35:16.945 --> 35:18.612
and their children's children will again

35:18.612 --> 35:22.779
see America plant our flag on the surface of the moon.

35:23.457 --> 35:24.781
- And to drive the point home, how many computers

35:24.781 --> 35:28.304
did you have when you were doing Apollo 11?

35:28.304 --> 35:31.137
- You know that's interestingly...

35:31.780 --> 35:34.613
When we started off in the Gemini,

35:35.502 --> 35:38.548
we had the first solid state computer that

35:38.548 --> 35:40.570
was ever developed by IBM and they didn't trust us

35:40.570 --> 35:42.725
to operate and have them in mission control.

35:42.725 --> 35:45.192
They put them 700 miles north of the Cape

35:45.192 --> 35:48.156
at Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland.

35:48.156 --> 35:51.229
Our back-up communications was morse code.

35:51.229 --> 35:54.234
So basically we had to be as adept at morse code

35:54.234 --> 35:57.182
as we were in the space craft systems.

35:57.182 --> 35:59.449
The computer that we went down to the surface of the moon

35:59.449 --> 36:02.439
with was a 64k machine, 16k erasable.

36:02.439 --> 36:05.655
One cubic foot in volume and weighed 70 pounds.

36:05.655 --> 36:08.234
Try to carry that around in your wrist there.

36:08.234 --> 36:12.317
So the technology is there, the people are there,

36:13.533 --> 36:15.950
everything you need is ready.

36:16.359 --> 36:19.730
What we need is somebody to say let's go.

36:19.730 --> 36:21.233
- And the one thing that hasn't changed

36:21.233 --> 36:23.756
is human nature and the capability of humans

36:23.756 --> 36:27.076
to come together to display values, leadership,

36:27.076 --> 36:29.583
come together as a team and accomplish the impossible.

36:29.583 --> 36:32.306
So I think there's so many lessons we can take

36:32.306 --> 36:34.222
from the amazing accomplishments that you

36:34.222 --> 36:37.127
and that group of people at NASA accomplished

36:37.127 --> 36:39.053
and that your generation kind of showed us

36:39.053 --> 36:40.407
so we really appreciate that.

36:40.407 --> 36:42.129
Thanks so much for coming, for talking to us.

36:42.129 --> 36:44.694
We really enjoyed it and it's an honor to have you, sir.

36:44.694 --> 36:45.899
- Great, thank you very much sir.

36:45.899 --> 36:47.494
- Yes, sir
Have a good one.

36:47.494 --> 36:50.827
- Come join us at overthehorizonmdos.com

36:50.944 --> 36:53.253
for more conversations on the emerging security

36:53.253 --> 36:55.176
environment and how we can handle it.

36:55.176 --> 36:57.009
Thanks for joining us.

36:57.584 --> 37:00.001
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