WEBVTT 00:02.824 --> 00:03.915 - Hello, I'm Mike Guillot, 00:03.915 --> 00:06.175 ^editor of Strategic Studies Quarterly, 00:06.175 --> 00:10.187 ^and welcome to another edition of Issues and Answers. 00:10.187 --> 00:13.437 Today, the issue, U.S.-China relations. 00:14.350 --> 00:16.683 My guest is Dr. Dawn Murphy, 00:17.591 --> 00:20.344 ^assistant professor of international security 00:20.344 --> 00:22.026 ^at the Air War College. 00:22.026 --> 00:24.994 She specializes in Chinese foreign policy, 00:24.994 --> 00:28.413 northeast Asia, and international relations. 00:28.413 --> 00:31.888 Her current research analyzes China's interests 00:31.888 --> 00:35.055 and behavior as a rising global power. 00:35.153 --> 00:37.426 Dr. Murphy holds a B.S. degree 00:37.426 --> 00:41.416 in industrial and labor relations from Cornell University, 00:41.416 --> 00:44.559 and a master's degree in international affairs 00:44.559 --> 00:46.642 from Columbia University. 00:46.758 --> 00:49.361 She earned a PhD in political science 00:49.361 --> 00:51.744 from the George Washington University. 00:51.744 --> 00:53.587 Dawn, welcome, and thanks for being here. 00:53.587 --> 00:55.391 - Thank you so much for having me here tonight. 00:55.391 --> 00:56.974 - It's my pleasure. 00:57.053 --> 00:59.650 To begin, I want to ask you if you could, 00:59.650 --> 01:02.040 big picture-wise, characterize 01:02.040 --> 01:05.123 current U.S.-China relations overall. 01:05.536 --> 01:07.369 - Mike, I think the best way to look 01:07.369 --> 01:10.203 ^at the current state of U.S.-China relations 01:10.203 --> 01:11.472 ^is to think about it as 01:11.472 --> 01:14.555 ^both interdependence and competition. 01:15.374 --> 01:17.752 ^From an interdependence standpoint, 01:17.752 --> 01:19.486 if you really think about it, 01:19.486 --> 01:22.766 China is the number one source of imports 01:22.766 --> 01:25.505 for the U.S. economy, and the number three source 01:25.505 --> 01:29.621 of exports for the U.S. economy after Mexico and Canada. 01:29.621 --> 01:32.288 We also have a lot of investment 01:32.787 --> 01:35.510 going back and forth between our economies, 01:35.510 --> 01:38.017 and we cooperate on a number of different issues 01:38.017 --> 01:40.701 related to peace and security throughout the world, 01:40.701 --> 01:43.739 so we cooperate, we're interdependent, 01:43.739 --> 01:46.465 but we also have competitive aspects 01:46.465 --> 01:50.476 to our relationship with China as a rising power, 01:50.476 --> 01:54.022 and with different interests between the two states. 01:54.022 --> 01:57.497 - Mm-hmm, well, I'm glad you mention economic issues 01:57.497 --> 02:00.414 because that's a followup question. 02:01.815 --> 02:03.750 Give us a perspective of the size 02:03.750 --> 02:07.917 and power of China's economy relative to the U.S. economy. 02:09.268 --> 02:11.909 - Right, so today, China has an overall 02:11.909 --> 02:15.214 gross domestic product of about 11 trillion dollars, 02:15.214 --> 02:18.177 compared to the U.S. at 18 trillion or so, 02:18.177 --> 02:20.156 so essentially, in absolute terms, 02:20.156 --> 02:22.366 you can think of China's economy being 02:22.366 --> 02:25.908 about 60% the size of the U.S. economy. 02:25.908 --> 02:30.075 That said, and over the next between five and 10 years, 02:31.176 --> 02:32.926 that gap will narrow. 02:33.237 --> 02:36.112 You also have another metric that you could examine, 02:36.112 --> 02:38.555 which is gross domestic product 02:38.555 --> 02:41.888 on a purchasing power parity standpoint, 02:42.161 --> 02:43.740 and when you look at those numbers, 02:43.740 --> 02:45.836 China's economy has actually surpassed 02:45.836 --> 02:48.503 the U.S. economy by that metric. 02:48.732 --> 02:50.965 Another way you could look at the size of the economies 02:50.965 --> 02:54.048 is gross domestic product per capita, 02:54.345 --> 02:56.935 which means per person, and when you look at those numbers, 02:56.935 --> 03:00.518 China's economy is about $8,000 per person, 03:00.677 --> 03:03.260 compared to the U.S. at 55,000, 03:03.822 --> 03:07.405 so China's a much poorer economy per person 03:07.622 --> 03:10.289 than the U.S. at about 15%. 03:11.009 --> 03:13.020 Finally, when you look at China as a source 03:13.020 --> 03:15.699 of foreign direct investment globally, 03:15.699 --> 03:19.866 increasingly, it's becoming a major player in that realm. 03:20.435 --> 03:24.518 Over the last 30 years or so, from 1978 to today, 03:25.718 --> 03:29.585 China's gone from being a minimal autarchic economy 03:29.585 --> 03:33.752 to being the second largest economy in the global system, 03:33.816 --> 03:37.421 so if you look at any area of economic interaction, 03:37.421 --> 03:41.338 manufacturing, services, finance, construction, 03:41.934 --> 03:44.584 they're becoming a major player across the board, 03:44.584 --> 03:47.167 so it has been a stunning rise. 03:47.199 --> 03:49.666 If you look at the beginning of their opening, 03:49.666 --> 03:52.952 they were growing at 10% a year or so. 03:52.952 --> 03:56.136 Now, they've slowed down to closer to six percent a year, 03:56.136 --> 03:57.894 but that's still a very high growth rate 03:57.894 --> 03:59.762 compared to many developed economies. 03:59.762 --> 04:02.184 - Well, it sounds like, under the status quo 04:02.184 --> 04:04.742 in Asia and most parts of the world, 04:04.742 --> 04:08.478 the Chinese economy and the Chinese society writ large 04:08.478 --> 04:11.408 is really progressing, so do you think 04:11.408 --> 04:15.046 the Chinese are interested in maintaining the status quo, 04:15.046 --> 04:17.806 particularly in Asia, or are they really more interested 04:17.806 --> 04:19.344 in changing that status quo 04:19.344 --> 04:23.085 that seems to have led to very great success? 04:23.085 --> 04:24.688 - I think, when you ask that question, 04:24.688 --> 04:25.895 when you think about that question, 04:25.895 --> 04:28.630 you have to look at specific functional areas 04:28.630 --> 04:30.705 and specific issue areas. 04:30.705 --> 04:33.125 What is the status quo, for example? 04:33.125 --> 04:35.145 From an economics standpoint, 04:35.145 --> 04:37.064 you could argue that the current status quo 04:37.064 --> 04:40.705 is interacting through the World Trade Organization, 04:40.705 --> 04:44.538 free trade agreements, having strong bilateral 04:45.043 --> 04:47.723 economic relations with partners throughout Asia, 04:47.723 --> 04:49.980 and essentially, I think, for the most part, 04:49.980 --> 04:52.358 China wants to maintain the status quo 04:52.358 --> 04:54.572 from an economic interaction standpoint 04:54.572 --> 04:57.559 with the rest of Asia as it continues to grow in power. 04:57.559 --> 05:00.607 But when you start to look at other issue areas, 05:00.607 --> 05:02.660 there may be more or less comfort 05:02.660 --> 05:04.044 with what the status quo is, 05:04.044 --> 05:06.950 or disagreements on what the status quo is. 05:06.950 --> 05:10.150 For example, Taiwan, what is the status quo 05:10.150 --> 05:11.970 associated with Taiwan? 05:11.970 --> 05:14.827 From a Chinese perspective, even though it may be 05:14.827 --> 05:16.925 the status quo, they've never agreed 05:16.925 --> 05:19.349 with having a separate Taiwan. 05:19.349 --> 05:21.607 If you look at claims in the East China Sea, 05:21.607 --> 05:24.909 South China Sea, China's assertion is that 05:24.909 --> 05:28.279 it is making claims that it has historically 05:28.279 --> 05:30.679 for a very long time, and that it's wanting 05:30.679 --> 05:34.006 to preserve the status quo rather than change it. 05:34.006 --> 05:35.593 Those are just a few examples. 05:35.593 --> 05:37.047 - Okay, I'm glad you mentioned those, 05:37.047 --> 05:41.189 because I want to shift focus now to some of those issues, 05:41.189 --> 05:44.689 particularly more security-related issues, 05:44.861 --> 05:48.278 and ask the question, what does China see 05:48.358 --> 05:51.274 as its greatest national security threats? 05:51.274 --> 05:53.094 - I think it's important, when you look at China, 05:53.094 --> 05:55.793 to think about what China's interests are overall, 05:55.793 --> 05:57.730 from a national security standpoint, 05:57.730 --> 06:00.124 and number one is maintaining power 06:00.124 --> 06:02.229 of the Chinese Communist Party. 06:02.229 --> 06:05.812 That is a bit different than other systems, 06:06.338 --> 06:08.639 considering the fact that, for example, 06:08.639 --> 06:10.689 in the U.S., that's not the first thing 06:10.689 --> 06:13.652 the current administration thinks about when they wake up, 06:13.652 --> 06:17.204 is preserving their party's dominance over the system 06:17.204 --> 06:18.701 in the way that you have in 06:18.701 --> 06:21.655 a Leninist authoritarian political system, 06:21.655 --> 06:23.288 so number one is that. 06:23.288 --> 06:26.244 What threatens their security the most 06:26.244 --> 06:28.341 is any sort of internal stability, 06:28.341 --> 06:31.805 any issues with legitimacy associated with the party, 06:31.805 --> 06:33.339 those type of issues. 06:33.339 --> 06:34.784 Their second most important interest 06:34.784 --> 06:37.753 is territorial integrity and sovereignty. 06:37.753 --> 06:39.661 What falls into that bucket would be, 06:39.661 --> 06:41.828 as I already said, Taiwan, 06:41.917 --> 06:45.688 Tibet, Xinjiang, some minority areas within China 06:45.688 --> 06:47.642 that they worry about breaking away 06:47.642 --> 06:49.850 and having secessionist activities, 06:49.850 --> 06:52.825 Hong Kong and Macau, and then increasingly, 06:52.825 --> 06:54.396 when you look at territorial claims 06:54.396 --> 06:56.656 in the East China Sea and South China Sea, 06:56.656 --> 06:58.525 those are included as some of 06:58.525 --> 07:02.015 China's more core interests within that realm. 07:02.015 --> 07:05.266 That would be the number two interest and threat. 07:05.266 --> 07:07.897 The third would be China being able 07:07.897 --> 07:10.193 to continue to grow its economy 07:10.193 --> 07:14.153 and provide a better life for its citizens overall, 07:14.153 --> 07:16.986 anything that would threaten that. 07:17.624 --> 07:20.541 If you look at conflict in regions, 07:20.756 --> 07:23.004 whether it's the Middle East, or in Asia Pacific, 07:23.004 --> 07:26.055 that potentially could damage China's ability 07:26.055 --> 07:28.149 to continue to grow its economy, 07:28.149 --> 07:31.399 that's also a national security threat. 07:31.468 --> 07:32.925 They have other interests as far as 07:32.925 --> 07:35.219 a voice in the international system, 07:35.219 --> 07:37.960 advocating for a developing country causes, 07:37.960 --> 07:39.768 but from a national security standpoint, 07:39.768 --> 07:41.692 I would say it's maintaining the power 07:41.692 --> 07:43.471 of the Chinese Communist Party, 07:43.471 --> 07:45.133 territorial integrity and sovereignty, 07:45.133 --> 07:46.799 so the ability to defend themselves 07:46.799 --> 07:50.052 and to keep their country from breaking apart. 07:50.052 --> 07:53.027 - Is that the extent of what the Chinese would consider 07:53.027 --> 07:55.360 the ideal situation in Asia? 07:56.788 --> 07:58.539 - Again, I think this is one where you really need 07:58.539 --> 08:01.289 to think about how that's framed. 08:01.791 --> 08:05.876 I say, big picture, the ideal situation within Asia 08:05.876 --> 08:08.905 would be an environment where China could 08:08.905 --> 08:10.186 keep its party in power, and maintain 08:10.186 --> 08:12.704 its territorial integrity, and grow its economy, 08:12.704 --> 08:16.043 so a peaceful environment within Asia Pacific, 08:16.043 --> 08:17.518 but I think there's a lot of disagreement 08:17.518 --> 08:18.835 within the scholarly community 08:18.835 --> 08:20.677 regarding what that looks like, 08:20.677 --> 08:21.637 because if you think about it 08:21.637 --> 08:23.364 from an international relations perspective, 08:23.364 --> 08:25.971 they are a growing economy, right? 08:25.971 --> 08:28.011 They're a growing power, and together 08:28.011 --> 08:32.178 with growing economic power comes other aspects of power, 08:32.461 --> 08:35.387 military, political, and as you know, 08:35.387 --> 08:37.992 a classic security dilemma is that 08:37.992 --> 08:39.886 you never know a state's intentions, 08:39.886 --> 08:41.882 and that states build up their capability 08:41.882 --> 08:46.049 in order to protect themselves at a minimum, right? 08:46.426 --> 08:49.581 And that, as a result, you need to plan 08:49.581 --> 08:53.498 for various contingencies associated with that. 08:54.535 --> 08:57.717 Does China want to be a hegemon within Asia? 08:57.717 --> 08:59.063 We don't know that. 08:59.063 --> 09:01.119 I don't think there's a way to actually know that 09:01.119 --> 09:04.123 given the lack of transparency in their system 09:04.123 --> 09:07.242 and the fact that they don't claim that 09:07.242 --> 09:09.152 as a desire at this point, 09:09.152 --> 09:10.970 but you could look at certain behavior 09:10.970 --> 09:12.631 that indicates, in the longer term, 09:12.631 --> 09:15.604 they could potentially become a hegemon. 09:15.604 --> 09:18.292 Do they want a hierarchical system within Asia? 09:18.292 --> 09:20.439 There's nothing tangible that indicates that, 09:20.439 --> 09:23.418 but you look historically in the region, 09:23.418 --> 09:25.850 and China has played a different role 09:25.850 --> 09:28.168 at different points in time than it does today, 09:28.168 --> 09:30.776 and there's been different relations between states 09:30.776 --> 09:32.859 than what you have today. 09:33.046 --> 09:35.362 I think it's very hard to say what China wants 09:35.362 --> 09:37.149 other than China wants to protect 09:37.149 --> 09:39.322 what it sees as its sovereignty, 09:39.322 --> 09:41.180 and to continue to grow its economy. 09:41.180 --> 09:43.379 - Okay, so the things you mentioned 09:43.379 --> 09:45.296 in an earlier question. 09:45.964 --> 09:48.559 You mentioned a keyword in my next question, 09:48.559 --> 09:51.431 and that has to do with the fact that 09:51.431 --> 09:54.119 no relationship survives friction, 09:54.119 --> 09:56.890 no international relationship among nations survives 09:56.890 --> 09:59.557 or exists without some friction, 09:59.845 --> 10:02.917 so I would ask you to give us some examples 10:02.917 --> 10:05.688 of some of the greatest disagreements 10:05.688 --> 10:08.515 between China and the United States. 10:08.515 --> 10:10.225 - I would say some of the major disagreements, 10:10.225 --> 10:13.142 one would be associated with trade. 10:13.279 --> 10:15.672 I think the audience is very familiar 10:15.672 --> 10:17.705 ^with a lot of the critique right now 10:17.705 --> 10:20.173 ^of the trade deficit in relations with China, 10:20.173 --> 10:22.529 ^and as China's economy grows, 10:22.529 --> 10:25.925 ^and as it is more incorporated into the international order 10:25.925 --> 10:27.208 and trades more with the U.S. 10:27.208 --> 10:30.768 as their domestic dissatisfaction within the U.S. 10:30.768 --> 10:32.841 regarding growth rates, regarding unemployment, 10:32.841 --> 10:34.341 and other aspects. 10:34.802 --> 10:36.491 I do think there's growing domestic pressure 10:36.491 --> 10:40.658 within the U.S. to have a more level playing field 10:41.815 --> 10:43.425 in economic relations with China, 10:43.425 --> 10:45.916 so that's one potential point of friction. 10:45.916 --> 10:47.521 Another point of friction, as I've already said, 10:47.521 --> 10:49.478 is East China Sea, South China Sea, 10:49.478 --> 10:52.163 but an important dynamic to remember in that is, 10:52.163 --> 10:53.543 for the East China Sea issues, 10:53.543 --> 10:55.569 on the Senkaku Diaoyu Islands, 10:55.569 --> 10:58.936 the other claimant in that is a country, Japan, 10:58.936 --> 11:01.533 that the U.S. has a mutual defense treaty with, 11:01.533 --> 11:05.366 so we have security obligations associated with that. 11:05.366 --> 11:06.759 In the South China Sea, when you look at 11:06.759 --> 11:08.904 the various claimants there, whether it's the Philippines, 11:08.904 --> 11:11.732 or Malaysia, Indonesia, we have strong 11:11.732 --> 11:13.760 security relationships and partnerships 11:13.760 --> 11:15.064 with those countries as well, 11:15.064 --> 11:16.643 so it's more complicated 11:16.643 --> 11:18.989 than just those territorial disputes. 11:18.989 --> 11:20.508 Especially on the South China Sea, 11:20.508 --> 11:21.869 that really brings up a lot of issues 11:21.869 --> 11:24.534 associated with freedom of navigation, 11:24.534 --> 11:26.134 what is the global commons, 11:26.134 --> 11:30.230 what norms are we going to conform to in our behavior, 11:30.230 --> 11:33.688 and there are disagreements regarding that as well. 11:33.688 --> 11:35.290 The major points of friction, I would say, 11:35.290 --> 11:36.699 between the U.S. and China right now 11:36.699 --> 11:40.380 are some trade issues and economic competition. 11:40.380 --> 11:42.786 I do think that, as China's economy grows, 11:42.786 --> 11:46.545 and as it surpasses the U.S. in absolute size, 11:46.545 --> 11:49.628 those conflicts will likely increase. 11:49.649 --> 11:51.971 You've got East China Sea, Senkaku Diaoyu, 11:51.971 --> 11:54.526 you have South China Sea, you have Taiwan 11:54.526 --> 11:58.193 that's been an enduring point of contention, 11:58.194 --> 12:01.527 and in many ways, China sees the U.S. as 12:01.630 --> 12:04.730 having played a major role in that issue, 12:04.730 --> 12:07.272 obviously, from the beginning, during the Cold War, 12:07.272 --> 12:09.419 but even today, and that's calmed down a bit 12:09.419 --> 12:13.586 in recent years, but that is a potential point of conflict. 12:14.507 --> 12:17.207 Finally, I would say, North Korea, 12:17.207 --> 12:21.374 in especially, I would say, over the last year or so 12:22.568 --> 12:25.735 as North Korea's capability increases, 12:26.151 --> 12:30.010 and as it becomes apparent that China and the U.S. 12:30.010 --> 12:31.854 have different interests associated. 12:31.854 --> 12:33.870 We've known this for a very long time, 12:33.870 --> 12:36.158 but obviously, it's become a higher priority, 12:36.158 --> 12:39.936 from a U.S. perspective, and China and the U.S. have 12:39.936 --> 12:42.248 differing views regarding how to resolve that issue, 12:42.248 --> 12:45.601 so I think that could be a potential point of stress. 12:45.601 --> 12:49.624 - The president just came back from the far East yesterday, 12:49.624 --> 12:53.791 and I'm wondering if you saw some signs in that trip 12:54.140 --> 12:56.807 that would lead us to think that 12:56.931 --> 12:59.770 China and the U.S. could actually reconcile 12:59.770 --> 13:01.534 some of our differences in Asia. 13:01.534 --> 13:02.738 Do you think that's possible? 13:02.738 --> 13:04.988 Or is it already happening? 13:06.376 --> 13:09.083 - From this trip itself, I think it'll take a while 13:09.083 --> 13:13.000 to see what the actual results of the trip are. 13:13.608 --> 13:17.004 On the surface of it, all that I've seen tangible 13:17.004 --> 13:19.517 come out of the meetings in Beijing 13:19.517 --> 13:20.783 are announcements regarding 13:20.783 --> 13:23.533 a few hundred billion dollars ... 13:30.144 --> 13:32.811 of business deals that have been 13:34.114 --> 13:36.125 in the works for quite a while, 13:36.125 --> 13:40.292 and if you think about, compared to the overall deficit, 13:41.042 --> 13:42.603 and compared to the overall relationship, 13:42.603 --> 13:44.853 I think that's a minor win, 13:44.901 --> 13:49.068 but that could be seen as a positive result of the trip. 13:50.758 --> 13:53.671 I don't know what happened behind closed doors, obviously, 13:53.671 --> 13:57.838 but if you look at the speech that President Trump gave 13:58.303 --> 14:02.470 in China, it was still echoing the same sentiments 14:02.488 --> 14:04.566 regarding concerns over the deficit, 14:04.566 --> 14:07.046 and concerns over those trade frictions. 14:07.046 --> 14:10.469 Then you look at the speech that he gave a few days later 14:10.469 --> 14:14.636 at APEC, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, 14:14.819 --> 14:17.306 in that speech, there continued to be 14:17.306 --> 14:20.095 the rhetoric associated with concerns 14:20.095 --> 14:22.496 about the international economic order 14:22.496 --> 14:24.761 and concerns from the U.S. perspective 14:24.761 --> 14:28.106 regarding trade partners that are not providing 14:28.106 --> 14:30.661 a level playing field for U.S. companies. 14:30.661 --> 14:34.093 I have not seen any tangible results of the trip yet, 14:34.093 --> 14:35.364 but it's still early days. 14:35.364 --> 14:38.431 He just returned, and most of those discussions 14:38.431 --> 14:40.598 occur behind closed doors. 14:40.990 --> 14:43.288 - I want to ask you to look in a crystal ball 14:43.288 --> 14:45.431 and give us a couple of examples 14:45.431 --> 14:49.598 where the U.S. and China can and should cooperate more, 14:51.774 --> 14:53.547 specifically in Asia, or maybe even 14:53.547 --> 14:54.876 in other parts of the world. 14:54.876 --> 14:58.293 What should we be working to do together? 14:58.676 --> 15:01.987 - I think the most probable areas of cooperation 15:01.987 --> 15:05.945 would be issues on which we have a shared interest, 15:05.945 --> 15:08.056 that it's clear cut as a shared interest. 15:08.056 --> 15:11.689 Basically, for example, global climate change. 15:11.689 --> 15:13.732 That's something that we could cooperate on. 15:13.732 --> 15:17.315 We both have an interest in preventing that 15:17.470 --> 15:19.045 from occurring in the longer term, 15:19.045 --> 15:20.100 and that's something, in the past, 15:20.100 --> 15:21.511 we have cooperated on in certain ways, 15:21.511 --> 15:22.676 so that would be one. 15:22.676 --> 15:25.009 Developing green technology. 15:25.476 --> 15:28.076 Another potential area of cooperation would be 15:28.076 --> 15:30.261 in foreign aid provision or providing 15:30.261 --> 15:32.581 assistance to developing economies. 15:32.581 --> 15:36.664 In many cases, we play within that realm together 15:36.787 --> 15:39.284 from the standpoint of, we're both providing foreign aid 15:39.284 --> 15:41.034 to individual countries, we're both providing 15:41.034 --> 15:42.956 various levels of technical assistance 15:42.956 --> 15:45.128 for economic development, and I think 15:45.128 --> 15:47.258 many countries would be able to learn quite a bit 15:47.258 --> 15:49.675 from both of our experiences, 15:49.811 --> 15:51.163 so that's something that I think we could do 15:51.163 --> 15:53.101 in a noncompetitive way. 15:53.101 --> 15:54.815 Another example would be anti-piracy. 15:54.815 --> 15:56.815 We've seen this in the past with the Gulf of Aden, 15:56.815 --> 15:58.898 we have cooperated on those issues. 15:58.898 --> 16:02.339 Another would be United Nations peacekeeping operations, 16:02.339 --> 16:06.506 which China has been heavily involved with over the years. 16:06.506 --> 16:08.025 Those are a few examples, 16:08.025 --> 16:10.277 and I think we have opportunities for cooperation, 16:10.277 --> 16:12.227 but we really need to focus on those areas 16:12.227 --> 16:14.068 where we have a shared interest 16:14.068 --> 16:18.235 and there's not these debates over territorial integrity, 16:19.047 --> 16:21.839 or over values that may not be the same 16:21.839 --> 16:24.089 between the U.S. and China. 16:25.249 --> 16:28.675 - Over the past few years, we've seen some instances 16:28.675 --> 16:32.092 where things had a potential to escalate. 16:34.446 --> 16:36.946 I'm wondering if there are ... 16:37.329 --> 16:41.272 you have some specific recommendations that would ... 16:41.272 --> 16:44.500 Give us some examples of the kinds of things 16:44.500 --> 16:47.903 the U.S. and China should be either doing 16:47.903 --> 16:51.570 to eliminate these potential conflict areas, 16:53.532 --> 16:55.362 should we be doing, and things that 16:55.362 --> 16:58.279 we should be refraining from doing. 16:59.047 --> 17:02.436 - I think the best advice to give on that 17:02.436 --> 17:04.724 would be that we need to increase communication 17:04.724 --> 17:06.276 as much as possible. 17:06.276 --> 17:10.180 We need to have as much military to military cooperation 17:10.180 --> 17:11.981 that we can have that still, obviously, 17:11.981 --> 17:14.692 protects U.S. interests and isn't threatening 17:14.692 --> 17:17.135 our national security, but ultimately, 17:17.135 --> 17:20.083 more communication is better because, 17:20.083 --> 17:23.833 where I see the most likely areas of conflict 17:24.129 --> 17:27.879 would be, for example, on the East China Sea, 17:28.461 --> 17:29.532 not necessarily a misunderstanding, 17:29.532 --> 17:32.377 but a miscommunication, or a very minor incident 17:32.377 --> 17:34.577 that then escalates into a crisis, 17:34.577 --> 17:37.544 and we don't have the proper communication 17:37.544 --> 17:41.711 between our militaries in order to deescalate that in time. 17:42.020 --> 17:43.284 That would be one example. 17:43.284 --> 17:45.529 I do think we need to increase in that way. 17:45.529 --> 17:49.362 That said, many of our tensions are the result 17:49.823 --> 17:53.490 of an actual difference of interests, right? 17:55.453 --> 17:58.340 How that's addressed in the longer term, I think, 17:58.340 --> 18:00.865 is difficult in that, are U.S. interests 18:00.865 --> 18:02.401 in the region gonna change? 18:02.401 --> 18:04.750 Are China's interests in the region gonna change? 18:04.750 --> 18:06.555 Perhaps, those are strategic decisions 18:06.555 --> 18:09.129 we make as a country over time, 18:09.129 --> 18:11.659 but assuming that those don't change, 18:11.659 --> 18:14.101 we have a situation where China is 18:14.101 --> 18:17.934 an authoritarian, politically communist regime 18:18.542 --> 18:22.138 that there are sincere differences of opinion 18:22.138 --> 18:24.884 regarding how they govern their society, 18:24.884 --> 18:27.384 and how the U.S. governs ours. 18:29.033 --> 18:30.475 I think that's a fundamental difference, 18:30.475 --> 18:31.855 and the reason I bring that up is, 18:31.855 --> 18:33.945 I think one of the discomforts with China 18:33.945 --> 18:37.862 as a rising power is not just that it's rising. 18:37.954 --> 18:39.496 It's that it's a rising power 18:39.496 --> 18:42.926 that doesn't necessarily share the same norms 18:42.926 --> 18:46.172 as the U.S. and the West on a number of key issues 18:46.172 --> 18:48.695 regarding governance of their population. 18:48.695 --> 18:49.965 That will continue. 18:49.965 --> 18:51.966 I don't anticipate that that is going to change 18:51.966 --> 18:54.475 in a dramatic way in the future, 18:54.475 --> 18:56.983 and as China's economic power grows, 18:56.983 --> 18:59.316 those tensions may escalate. 18:59.316 --> 19:02.409 On territorial integrity, I don't think 19:02.409 --> 19:04.033 that the U.S. should be backing down 19:04.033 --> 19:06.667 from our commitments to allies in the region. 19:06.667 --> 19:10.500 I don't think that we should be allowing China 19:11.129 --> 19:12.844 to operate in a way that we don't think 19:12.844 --> 19:15.773 is a proper interpretation of international law, 19:15.773 --> 19:18.590 so I don't think we should back down on that, 19:18.590 --> 19:20.725 but I also think we need to increase communication 19:20.725 --> 19:23.308 so we can avoid a minor dispute 19:24.163 --> 19:27.580 turning into something much more serious. 19:27.616 --> 19:30.283 - That's a very well description 19:31.744 --> 19:33.911 of the situation, I think, 19:34.018 --> 19:36.920 a very helpful description of the situation, 19:36.920 --> 19:39.863 the things we should and should not be doing. 19:39.863 --> 19:42.122 Last question, again, I want to ask you 19:42.122 --> 19:44.289 to speculate a little bit. 19:44.308 --> 19:47.641 What would you assess is the probability 19:48.020 --> 19:52.187 that conflict would erupt between the U.S. and China 19:52.819 --> 19:54.902 within the next 20 years? 19:55.550 --> 19:58.057 - I think it's a relatively low probability, 19:58.057 --> 20:00.336 and you have to look at different functional areas. 20:00.336 --> 20:02.186 On the military side, for me, 20:02.186 --> 20:03.883 the most likely areas of conflict, again, 20:03.883 --> 20:06.093 would be East China Sea, South China Sea. 20:06.093 --> 20:09.114 There are scenarios under which North Korea 20:09.114 --> 20:10.947 could potentially become a conflict scenario 20:10.947 --> 20:12.573 between our two countries because 20:12.573 --> 20:16.245 China still has a mutual defense treaty with North Korea, 20:16.245 --> 20:19.705 and has recently re-articulated their commitment to that 20:19.705 --> 20:23.455 to specify that, if North Korea is aggressive 20:24.362 --> 20:27.075 towards another country and initiates conflict, 20:27.075 --> 20:29.222 China will essentially restrain itself 20:29.222 --> 20:31.559 and not become involved in that conflict, 20:31.559 --> 20:34.642 but that, if North Korea is attacked, 20:35.069 --> 20:36.827 that China would contribute to 20:36.827 --> 20:38.702 the mutual defense of North Korea. 20:38.702 --> 20:41.954 There are scenarios where, if the U.S. engaged 20:41.954 --> 20:46.121 in a preventive or preemptive action against North Korea, 20:46.376 --> 20:49.209 that you could have militarized dispute 20:49.209 --> 20:50.748 between China and the U.S. 20:50.748 --> 20:52.211 So there is potential. 20:52.211 --> 20:53.992 That's a relatively small probability. 20:53.992 --> 20:55.510 I think it's a higher probability today 20:55.510 --> 20:58.074 than it was a year ago or two years ago, 20:58.074 --> 21:00.184 just because of escalating tensions, 21:00.184 --> 21:03.684 and more because of the U.S. approach to the situation 21:03.684 --> 21:06.137 rather than the Chinese approach. 21:06.137 --> 21:08.237 I think that's a growing area. 21:08.237 --> 21:10.290 Taiwan, as I said before, is always, 21:10.290 --> 21:12.873 there's the potential for that. 21:13.097 --> 21:16.342 The military realm, I think it's unlikely, 21:16.342 --> 21:18.259 but could happen due to 21:18.421 --> 21:21.053 a relatively minor incident escalating. 21:21.053 --> 21:24.221 What I think the more likely tension areas would be, 21:24.221 --> 21:26.372 would be more of a Cold War type of environment 21:26.372 --> 21:29.690 that potentially could emerge either through China's actions 21:29.690 --> 21:31.613 or through U.S. actions. 21:31.613 --> 21:34.338 If the U.S. continues to withdraw itself 21:34.338 --> 21:36.086 from the international order, 21:36.086 --> 21:38.315 and China takes a leadership role, 21:38.315 --> 21:41.685 and we continue to have these frictions regarding trade, 21:41.685 --> 21:44.994 and especially if either side takes trade action 21:44.994 --> 21:46.986 that then results in a trade war, 21:46.986 --> 21:51.153 you could have a ruptured U.S.-China economic relationship 21:51.214 --> 21:54.863 with China having a sphere of influence economically 21:54.863 --> 21:57.186 with certain countries, and the U.S., 21:57.186 --> 21:59.402 so basically breaking up into blocks. 21:59.402 --> 22:00.489 I think that's much more likely 22:00.489 --> 22:03.202 than any sort of militarized dispute. 22:03.202 --> 22:04.471 Again, that really depends on both 22:04.471 --> 22:07.144 the actions of the U.S. and China. 22:07.144 --> 22:08.644 That could happen. 22:08.950 --> 22:11.995 We also, I think, could have some breakdown 22:11.995 --> 22:14.090 of the overall international order 22:14.090 --> 22:18.257 due to many factors globally associated with nationalism 22:18.880 --> 22:21.587 and the downsides of globalization. 22:21.587 --> 22:23.077 We may be seeing a fraying of 22:23.077 --> 22:24.707 the overall international order, 22:24.707 --> 22:27.258 so you may have an economic order 22:27.258 --> 22:29.400 that China leads in a longer term, 22:29.400 --> 22:32.016 and one that the U.S. and the West leads, 22:32.016 --> 22:35.671 and have, more similar to the actual Cold War, 22:35.671 --> 22:38.053 rather than just having regional blocks, 22:38.053 --> 22:40.489 having full-fledged systems that have 22:40.489 --> 22:43.239 different norms that govern them. 22:43.820 --> 22:46.212 We may be at this turning point, 22:46.212 --> 22:47.359 so I think that's more likely 22:47.359 --> 22:49.251 than any sort of militarized dispute. 22:49.251 --> 22:52.154 - Okay, so low on the military side, 22:52.154 --> 22:54.385 and maybe higher in the economic realm. 22:54.385 --> 22:55.218 - Mm-hmm. 22:55.325 --> 22:58.874 - Okay, Dr. Murphy, you've given us a lot to think about 22:58.874 --> 23:01.413 over this very short period of time, 23:01.413 --> 23:03.746 so on behalf of the team SSQ 23:04.707 --> 23:07.925 and the entire SSQ audience, I want to thank you 23:07.925 --> 23:09.811 for sharing your experience with us, 23:09.811 --> 23:13.311 and also leading us to think strategically 23:13.382 --> 23:15.652 about this very important relationship 23:15.652 --> 23:17.119 between the U.S. and China. 23:17.119 --> 23:17.969 Thank you very much. 23:17.969 --> 23:20.877 - Thank you again for having me, appreciate it. 23:20.877 --> 23:23.794 (orchestral music)