WEBVTT

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- To this session, contemporary military forum

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entitled A New Kind of Force for a New Fighting Domain:

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Cyber Talent Management.

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As your professional organization,

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the Army Association and the Institute of Land Warfare

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are proud to present forums like this

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throughout the course of the year.

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These professional development seminars

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are a way of amplifying the Army's narrative

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to audiences around the country.

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Of course, they can't do this alone.

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AUSA relies on its members to tell the story

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and to support our Soldiers and their families.

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A strong membership base is important for telling

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Congress, the Pentagon and the American people

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that the Army is an important place

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in which they should put their faith.

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For those of you Army professionals

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who are not yet members of your professional association,

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you will find an invitation to join

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on the seats beside you.

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Just bring it over to our booth,

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number 307 in the exhibit hall, or online

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at AUSA.org.membership.

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If you're already a member of the AUSA, we thank you.

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And now I'd like to turn the floor over

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to General Nakasone.

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- Thank you very much, General.

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(audience clapping)

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So ladies and gentleman, we have saved

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the best for last, Wednesday afternoon,

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for the cyber panel, we are excited to have you here.

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First of all, let me express my thanks for all

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of you that have come out to join us this afternoon.

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We do think that we have a fascinating topic

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upon which we're going to discuss.

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For those of you that were present

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at the creation, 2009, 2010,

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as Army started into cyber,

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I would say that one of the things that you might remark

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is the fact that we have truly come a long ways.

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And today, we want to talk about perhaps,

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one of the most important factors

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in terms of not only our present, but certainly our future,

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and that's talent management.

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And I think we have been able to garner

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an outstanding panel today.

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I'd like to introduce to my left,

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Major General John Morrison, who is the Commanding General,

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U.S. Army Cyber School of Excellence.

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To his left, Army veteran and former Soldier,

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Mr. Guy Filippelli, who's the Vice President

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for Solutions, Forcepoint at Ratheon.

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And very familiar to many of you

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that have been around Army Cyber

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and Army Intelligence for many years.

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To his left, Brigadier General Steve Hager,

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currently the Deputy Commanding General for Operations

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at the Cyber National Mission Force,

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formerly out forward in Southwest Asia,

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a tremendous background in the private sector.

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A tremendous technologist and a great leader.

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And then to his left, certainly,

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as we talk about talent management,

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one of the things we want to do is make sure

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that Chris Lynch was part of this panel.

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He is with Defense Digital Services,

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those of you that have watched Hack the Pentagon,

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Hack the Army, Hack the Air Force, fill in Hack the,

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really Chris has been at the forefront

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of what has been going on.

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He has cajoled us, he has encouraged us,

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he has criticized us, he has been our biggest supporter

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and at times, he has also been our greatest advocate.

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So we are really pleased to have Chris here today.

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Ladies and gentleman, I talk a little bit about

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Army Cyber based upon a little bit of background,

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as I reflect on where we have been.

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If you again, return to the creation of Army Cyber

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and you took a look at the Army cyber enterprise,

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and that's broader than just Army Cyber Command.

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That's obviously the Cyber Center for Excellence,

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that John commands, that's DAMO Cyber at the Pentagon

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that Major General Patricia Frost leads.

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And then of course, it's Colonel Andy Hall's

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effort at Army Cyberspace Institute

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at the United States Military Academy.

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This is really the forefront

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of what we're doing in Army Cyber.

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But again, if you return to the early days,

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one of the things that I would offer is,

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if there was going to be a hard way to do it,

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we figured that out.

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We built a branch and we built a schoolhouse.

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And now that we have the momentum

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and we have all good things coming from that,

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that was tremendously difficult in the early days.

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It was chaotic, it was at times, friction-laden.

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But at the end, I think we are at a place right now

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where we are starting to move forward.

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And are really reaping the benefits of it.

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I would tell you the other uniqueness,

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from the perspective of us here in Army Cyber

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is we have tremendous senior leader support.

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Whether or not it's been previous Secretaries

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of the Army, Chiefs of Staff of the Army,

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the current Acting Secretary of the Army

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or the Chief of Staff of the Army today,

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there is tremendous emphasis on what we do in cyberspace.

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And you say, "How is that so?"

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It's so because if you take a look at the ability

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for us to garner resources, both money and talent,

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we have been very, very fortunate in terms of the focus

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that our senior leadership has provided to us.

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But the other thing I would say

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is that we've also been a benefit of in-house capabilities.

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If you take a look at where we're at today,

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the development of infrastructure,

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the development of resourcing strategy,

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the development of our own schoolhouse,

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these are all in-house things that the Army has done

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that has been very beneficial to what we're doing.

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As we begin today, what I would like to do

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is to show a quick video in terms of where

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we're at today with the Army Cyber writ large.

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And then come back to a series of questions.

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So please, if you'd roll the video.

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(dramatic music)

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(lively music)

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- I had completed my Associate's Degree

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in Intelligence Studies, and I have also

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continued pursuing my Bachelor's in Cyber Security.

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I am Staff Sergeant Sanic, and I work

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in the United States Army Cyber Command.

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- Cyberspace operations is just

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a world of opportunity for anyone

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that wants to get involved.

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I am Chief Warrant Officer Mullens,

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and I work with U.S. Army Cyber Command.

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Our senior leaders and commanders

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are working with industry to ensure

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our warfighters are provided with the best

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cutting-edge technology and defense of our networks

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for the future warfighter.

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^- If you go back when we first started

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^doing this, about 10 years ago,

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^we found that the military folks

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^had less experience in the cyber realm.

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It has been a huge change in the last 10 years.

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And now, when we run these classes,

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we find that the military personnel

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are among the best trained, the most aware.

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It's really been a scene change and it's refreshing.

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- It's extremely exciting to think that I don't have

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to only fight fires, I get to be involved

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with a cyber event.

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^We want to understand before the event happens,

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how we're going to respond and how we integrate together.

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You definitely don't want to learn

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who your partner is or who to go to during an event.

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We want to know who our partners are,

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who we're going to work with.

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What resources you have and what resources I have,

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and how we can attack the problem together,

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instead of finding it out after the fact.

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^- Here at the Cyber School, we think it's very important

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^to harness the interests of the students.

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It fosters a climate of creativity

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and allows for out-of-the-box thinking,

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which is essential to be successful in the cyber field.

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^- I joined the Cyber branch in the military

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^because ever since I was a kid, I always loved computers.

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^And I, in fact, wanted to design video games as a kid

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and I thought that joining cyber would be

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^the best thing towards going about achieving that dream.

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^- I'm Pfc. Morales, and I joined the 17 Charlie branch

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^because I wanted to challenge myself mentally.

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^I've always been someone that's been driven

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by self-improvement and I figured that

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no matter how much you learn in this cyber field,

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there's always more.

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- For the young professional that wants to

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pursue a career in the Cyberspace Operations,

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the time is now.

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The opportunities are endless.

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And the rewards are priceless.

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- Okay, so as we start off, not a bad video (claps).

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(audience clapping)

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What I would like to do now is to ask the panelists

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to just do a short introduction of themselves

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and a little bit about background

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on what they've done and why they're here today, so John?

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- So my name is John Morrison,

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I'm the Commander of the Cyber Center

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of Excellence in Fort Gordon.

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Essentially what my background is,

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I started off as signal officer.

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My two most recent commands have been the 7th Signal Command

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Theater that does all the networks here

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in the Western Hemisphere and then it's parent organization,

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Network Enterprise Technology Command.

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As a part of my tenure in NETCOM,

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who's responsible for all DODIN operations across the globe,

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we also built the Cyber Protection Brigade,

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so got more than just a little bit of experience

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on the defensive cyber operations front.

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What we're responsible for at Fort Gordon

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is the customer is General Nakasone in Army Cyber.

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We are the producer.

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So we're responsible for developing not only

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the capabilities that we hand over to Army Cyber,

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but more importantly, and what we're here

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to talk about today, its people.

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So we handle all the accessions

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and then all the training for all cohorts.

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And by all cohorts, I mean officer, warrant officer

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and enlisted, Reserve component and active component,

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and DA civilian.

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And then we transition those folks over to U.S. Army Cyber,

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where we can get them on that as rapidly as possible.

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I look forward to your questions today

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and I look forward to a great session.

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- [Paul] Thanks, John.

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Mr. Filippelli.
- Thank you, sir.

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Guy Filippelli, as General Nakasone said,

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I started off my career as an Army officer for nine years,

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MI officer, before Cyber Command existed.

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But ran software teams for five of those years,

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culminating in a year in Afghanistan

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and then at NSA, where I became the tech lead for

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a really phenomenal program called RTRG

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and did that in Baghdad.

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And then I built a, first thing was a software services

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company, five years, called Berico Technologies.

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Grew it and eventually exited it.

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Spun out a couple companies, invested in some

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software companies, and then launched a new company

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in 2012 called RedOwl, based in Baltimore

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and New York and San Francisco and raised a bunch of money.

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And sold it about three weeks ago.

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Along the way, why I'm here, I've learned a lot about

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what it's like to try to be technical in the Army.

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I've learned a lot about how that compares

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and contrasts with how to be successful

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at that in the private sector.

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Probably made a bunch of mistakes along the way.

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But really, really happy to provide

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as much perspective as I can, thanks.

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- [Paul] Thanks, Guy.

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General Hager.
- Great, my name's

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Steve Hager, I'm actually a native of Silicon Valley.

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I was actually born and raised there.

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I went on active duty in 1989

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and worked at Fort Mead as my first assignment.

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Then I left active duty in 1994

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and became a traditional Reservist.

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And I did the traditional things a signal officer

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would do in the Army Reserves.

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But on my technical side,

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I had a number of startups.

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Some of them were successful, some of them were not.

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So what I bring to the table,

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as a person from Silicon Valley with my business background

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and in running technical companies and seeing

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how small startups would scale to bigger companies

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or even IPO, the leadership needs to change.

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As a traditional signal corps officer,

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I've made it through the ranks because I took

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the difficult command jobs in the signal corps.

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I was a battalion commander, brigade commander,

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one of General Baker's theater signal commanders,

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as General Nakasone said.

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So when he asked me for an opportunity

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of what I would like do, I said,

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well, I'd like to do an operational cyber assignment.

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So now I'm the Deputy Commander of Operations

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for the Cyber National Mission Force.

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And the reason why I think that's important is,

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I view this as a great startup opportunity.

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We're growing the cyber force and the cyber force

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that we have today, version 1.0,

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just like in a startup company,

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is not the cyber force that we need tomorrow.

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We want to make it professional corps.

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And we have to figure out how to do that

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within the confines of DoD and maybe

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some of the policies need to change.

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So that's why I'm here, I'm looking forward

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to your questions, thanks.

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- [Paul] Thanks a lot, Steve.

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Mr. Lynch.

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- Hi, my name is Chris Lynch.

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I head up a team called Defense Digital Service.

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My team has very unique and interesting challenge.

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I try to convince people to come from

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the tech sectors all over the United States

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to work on problem sets and challenges

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that are unlike anything else that they can experience

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in their day to day jobs from where they come.

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Work on things that matter, things that have impact.

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And I think that that's one of the most interesting

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things about where we are today,

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at least with the Department of Defense.

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I come from a family with no background

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in government, no background in military.

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But I do believe that everybody believes

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deeply in the problem sets that we face

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and the things that we work on here.

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I get them to come from Silicon Valley

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or any of the other tech hubs.

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They come for one to two years,

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in what I endearingly refer to as a SWAT team of nerds.

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Software engineers, right, to bring a skillset in

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to the Department of Defense that has traditionally

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left the building or been pushed off into

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the furthest regions without necessarily the ability

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to fall into leadership positions or do things

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that actually use their skills successfully.

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And that is one of the things that we focus on

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quite a bit, is bringing in great talent.

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We partnered with General Nakasone in Army Cyber,

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run a number of different endeavors.

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Our most famous program in one called Hack the Pentagon.

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If you can imagine what that was like

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when we pitched that name.

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Essentially we brought in people,

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anybody in the United States to come and hack us.

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Because we wanted to prove that there are different

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and new ways to think about doing cyber.

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That has been incredibly successful.

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So I look at the programs and the projects

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that we pick are all focused around the idea

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that technical people and technical decisions

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will ultimately lead to better, more effective forces

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and lets us be more successful in the mission of defense.

15:39.780 --> 15:40.983
- Thank you very much, Chris.

15:40.983 --> 15:42.569
So ladies and gentlemen, let me remind you

15:42.569 --> 15:45.507
that we are past the days of white cards and pencils.

15:45.507 --> 15:47.519
That we would ask for questions to come

15:47.519 --> 15:49.382
into the text numbers that are there

15:49.382 --> 15:52.282
or at the microphone today, for you extroverts.

15:52.282 --> 15:54.963
But please feel free to come out with a series of questions.

15:54.963 --> 15:57.507
And as they come in, let me begin by just

15:57.507 --> 16:00.882
a series of thoughts and then some followup questions.

16:00.882 --> 16:02.933
So this year has been an incredibly important year

16:02.933 --> 16:06.037
for the Army cyber enterprise, writ large.

16:06.037 --> 16:08.134
Operationally, we have finished our build

16:08.134 --> 16:11.051
of 41 teams a year ahead of the DoD

16:11.360 --> 16:15.460
and U.S. Cyber Command mandated 30, September, 2018.

16:15.460 --> 16:18.433
We continue to operate offensively against ISIS

16:18.433 --> 16:21.587
in Northern Iraq and Syria with great effect.

16:21.587 --> 16:24.654
We have continued CIMA support to corps and below.

16:24.654 --> 16:27.904
The idea of how do we provide IO, cyber

16:28.783 --> 16:31.987
and EW effects at a brigade combat team

16:31.987 --> 16:34.194
at a Combat Training Center location.

16:34.194 --> 16:36.062
And the final thing is that we have also

16:36.062 --> 16:37.861
moved on to a total force solution.

16:37.861 --> 16:40.592
So the Army has built 41 active teams,

16:40.592 --> 16:43.356
21 teams now in addition to that will be

16:43.356 --> 16:44.927
in the Reserve component.

16:44.927 --> 16:46.527
10 in the U.S. Army Reserve and 11

16:46.527 --> 16:48.777
in the Army National Guard.

16:49.650 --> 16:51.702
But it's not only been on the operational side

16:51.702 --> 16:54.001
that I think that this has been such an important year.

16:54.001 --> 16:55.797
It's also been on the institutional side.

16:55.797 --> 16:58.151
And as John will talk to in just a second here,

16:58.151 --> 17:01.702
our cyber military occupation skill force now numbers

17:01.702 --> 17:05.664
2,200 plus, that's cyber and electronic warfare Soldiers.

17:05.664 --> 17:08.414
Last year, 500 Soldiers graduated

17:09.472 --> 17:11.381
the Cyber Center of Excellence.

17:11.381 --> 17:13.030
This year and the years forth,

17:13.030 --> 17:15.697
we'll push that number to 1,000.

17:15.818 --> 17:18.272
We've also graduated our first enlisted class.

17:18.272 --> 17:20.900
So this year means that we have trained,

17:20.900 --> 17:22.986
as John mentioned, all three cohorts.

17:22.986 --> 17:25.687
Officer, warrant officer and enlisted.

17:25.687 --> 17:28.631
So truly, this has been a very monumental year

17:28.631 --> 17:30.982
in the development of the Army cyber enterprise.

17:30.982 --> 17:33.515
And as we begin with that, if I might return

17:33.515 --> 17:36.654
to General Hager's point about being 1.0,

17:36.654 --> 17:38.370
in terms of where we're at,

17:38.370 --> 17:40.776
Steve, I'd like to give you an opportunity

17:40.776 --> 17:43.579
just to reflect on what you've seen

17:43.579 --> 17:46.246
both in the Army Reserves and now at your time

17:46.246 --> 17:48.410
at the National Mission Force.

17:48.410 --> 17:50.880
And what has it been from the private sector

17:50.880 --> 17:53.328
that has been so helpful for you to advance us

17:53.328 --> 17:55.578
from 1.0 to 2.0 and beyond?

17:56.385 --> 17:57.968
- Yes, sir, thanks.

17:58.245 --> 17:59.965
Cyber is a team sport.

17:59.965 --> 18:02.143
In Silicon Valley, I'm with a bunch of technical guys

18:02.143 --> 18:04.965
and we're focused on a really technical problem.

18:04.965 --> 18:07.065
But when I go and recruit my team,

18:07.065 --> 18:08.691
I ask them a couple of questions,

18:08.691 --> 18:10.388
do they know some technology?

18:10.388 --> 18:11.905
But more importantly, I ask them

18:11.905 --> 18:13.360
what are they passionate about?

18:13.360 --> 18:15.051
And it doesn't matter what they're passionate about,

18:15.051 --> 18:18.326
but I ask them how they define their passion

18:18.326 --> 18:21.112
for whatever that event is or whatever that topic is.

18:21.112 --> 18:24.214
So when I gather a group of really smart people,

18:24.214 --> 18:26.061
that are passionate about something,

18:26.061 --> 18:29.031
and then I give them a problem set and I say,

18:29.031 --> 18:31.730
if you can be passionate about solving that problem,

18:31.730 --> 18:34.995
building a product, or whatever, and they work together,

18:34.995 --> 18:37.171
they're going to achieve great things.

18:37.171 --> 18:38.219
And you give them a little bit

18:38.219 --> 18:39.825
of guidance and they execute.

18:39.825 --> 18:41.378
And in the Cyber National Mission Force,

18:41.378 --> 18:44.710
that's what I see, I see a lot of very smart people.

18:44.710 --> 18:46.059
They're not all just technical folks,

18:46.059 --> 18:47.411
there's a number of mathematicians

18:47.411 --> 18:48.870
and computer scientists like myself.

18:48.870 --> 18:51.888
But we do that more to have a common lexicon.

18:51.888 --> 18:54.079
So when I see from industry, technical folks

18:54.079 --> 18:57.219
like to use jargon and then in the military,

18:57.219 --> 18:58.834
we have our own set of jargon.

18:58.834 --> 19:00.421
And I hate to say this, even the MI corps,

19:00.421 --> 19:01.827
they have their own set of jargon.

19:01.827 --> 19:03.931
So part of our job is translating it.

19:03.931 --> 19:06.252
But when it gets down to building a team

19:06.252 --> 19:08.751
and retaining that team, it's really about

19:08.751 --> 19:10.951
how well you interact with your teammates.

19:10.951 --> 19:13.160
And that you're adding worth to it.

19:13.160 --> 19:14.567
So if I have a startup company

19:14.567 --> 19:16.357
and I'm going to get them to create a product

19:16.357 --> 19:18.120
in a very quick amount of time,

19:18.120 --> 19:19.918
how do I energize them to do that?

19:19.918 --> 19:21.528
And it comes down to having that

19:21.528 --> 19:23.467
same mission focus and that passion.

19:23.467 --> 19:26.638
And being able to work together is very, very important.

19:26.638 --> 19:29.777
So I see the Cyber National Mission Force

19:29.777 --> 19:32.122
and I also like to draw this other analogy.

19:32.122 --> 19:33.956
When I had a startup company, it's a different

19:33.956 --> 19:35.570
type of leadership that we would have.

19:35.570 --> 19:37.730
If we were going to scale that company to be a little

19:37.730 --> 19:40.148
bit larger, I may change some of that leadership,

19:40.148 --> 19:43.612
which is often difficult for some of the folks that we have.

19:43.612 --> 19:46.258
Then if I were to IPO or make it a public company,

19:46.258 --> 19:49.033
that's a completely different set of leadership in general.

19:49.033 --> 19:50.811
Because you have to scale the company and you have to worry

19:50.811 --> 19:53.534
about lots more of legal and policy things.

19:53.534 --> 19:55.963
And I think the Cyber Mission Force

19:55.963 --> 19:58.307
is going to go through that natural evolution.

19:58.307 --> 20:01.774
So I do not believe that cyber, as a domain itself,

20:01.774 --> 20:04.162
is any more special than the other domains.

20:04.162 --> 20:05.941
I think as we start out with it,

20:05.941 --> 20:07.972
we have to incubate it and make sure

20:07.972 --> 20:11.055
that it's built to a way where I have

20:11.700 --> 20:14.973
what I call a cyber core, C-O-R-E,

20:14.973 --> 20:17.182
a group of people who understand what it's going to do.

20:17.182 --> 20:20.400
And they're going to spread through the rest of the forces.

20:20.400 --> 20:21.834
And they'll understand the goodness

20:21.834 --> 20:24.967
and what cyber can bring to the multi-domain fight.

20:24.967 --> 20:27.133
And then we have to develop the cyber corps,

20:27.133 --> 20:29.391
C-O-R-P-S, where we professionalize it.

20:29.391 --> 20:31.810
We have KD jobs and those types of positions.

20:31.810 --> 20:33.266
And I don't see that any different than when

20:33.266 --> 20:34.690
I do that with a small startup company

20:34.690 --> 20:37.092
and I want to scale it to be a publicly run company.

20:37.092 --> 20:38.610
It's an evolution of change.

20:38.610 --> 20:39.570
Is that good, sir?
- Thank you very much.

20:39.570 --> 20:41.721
I appreciate, so Chris, you have made a name

20:41.721 --> 20:44.306
for yourself in the department by

20:44.306 --> 20:48.406
breaking down walls and moving around bureaucracy.

20:48.406 --> 20:51.311
And avoiding bureaucratic shutdowns.

20:51.311 --> 20:53.490
What I would like to pose to you

20:53.490 --> 20:55.033
are what are the walls that we've created

20:55.033 --> 20:56.633
for our own talent management?

20:56.633 --> 20:59.003
And what have you seen in terms of change

20:59.003 --> 21:01.718
that's necessary for us to break down those walls

21:01.718 --> 21:04.581
and to get around that bureaucracy?

21:04.581 --> 21:06.664
- That's a good question.

21:06.894 --> 21:10.894
It's interesting, the talent that we think about

21:11.506 --> 21:15.589
when you look at a really good software engineer,

21:17.714 --> 21:20.547
there are challenges to how we see

21:21.061 --> 21:23.644
traditional military structures

21:23.969 --> 21:26.343
and how they can be applied to that talent.

21:26.343 --> 21:29.093
As an example, earlier this year,

21:29.189 --> 21:31.594
myself and one of the person,

21:31.594 --> 21:34.573
one other person on General Nakasone's teams,

21:34.573 --> 21:38.740
went and we met with about 200 different cyber soldiers.

21:39.170 --> 21:42.054
Looking at things to understand their backgrounds.

21:42.054 --> 21:44.563
Just for more to also get a baseline to be able

21:44.563 --> 21:46.820
to compare to them to they types of engineers

21:46.820 --> 21:49.622
that I bring in from companies that you would think of

21:49.622 --> 21:52.773
that run the biggest machines on the internet.

21:52.773 --> 21:54.408
And it's really interesting.

21:54.408 --> 21:57.746
Some of the best engineers, they started long before school.

21:57.746 --> 22:00.227
They started writing code when they were in,

22:00.227 --> 22:03.060
maybe, junior high or high school.

22:03.274 --> 22:05.537
Maybe they were just tinkering at that time,

22:05.537 --> 22:07.895
but that's a really interesting thing.

22:07.895 --> 22:10.049
Because at some point after that,

22:10.049 --> 22:11.882
the spark gets lit up.

22:12.114 --> 22:14.864
And it becomes something far more

22:15.605 --> 22:17.272
of a drive for them.

22:17.422 --> 22:19.779
And that is what I think is interesting about

22:19.779 --> 22:23.105
software engineers, it's different than anything else.

22:23.105 --> 22:25.819
My belief is that you really can't make someone

22:25.819 --> 22:27.986
a great software engineer.

22:28.115 --> 22:31.498
You can find them and you can give them all the education

22:31.498 --> 22:34.711
in the world to actually further craft that,

22:34.711 --> 22:36.907
but that's a very different model.

22:36.907 --> 22:38.539
Meaning that you can't just take somebody

22:38.539 --> 22:41.272
off the street and make them great,

22:41.272 --> 22:45.414
you have to find the great people and attract them.

22:45.414 --> 22:48.291
And I like to contrast that to where

22:48.291 --> 22:50.168
we've been in the Department of Defense.

22:50.168 --> 22:52.340
At one point, in the Department of Defense,

22:52.340 --> 22:54.311
if you wanted to work on encryption,

22:54.311 --> 22:57.144
in the world, you went to the NSA.

22:57.577 --> 22:59.947
That was it, that was the place you went.

22:59.947 --> 23:01.626
And I remember, when I was a kid,

23:01.626 --> 23:04.837
I remember the term military-grade technology.

23:04.837 --> 23:09.004
And people wouldn't chuckle, like that guy just did.

23:09.417 --> 23:11.811
And I think of those things because

23:11.811 --> 23:14.260
we're now competing with a world

23:14.260 --> 23:16.201
that is unlike anything else.

23:16.201 --> 23:18.774
All those companies that run the things

23:18.774 --> 23:20.980
that power the apps on your phones,

23:20.980 --> 23:23.309
all those companies that build the things

23:23.309 --> 23:25.694
that are doing your transactions to pay your friend

23:25.694 --> 23:29.861
for dinner last night, we compete for those people.

23:30.354 --> 23:33.383
The people who build those things have,

23:33.383 --> 23:36.815
long before they ever showed up at those jobs,

23:36.815 --> 23:39.898
started to craft and hone that skill.

23:39.928 --> 23:40.828
Which I think is interesting.

23:40.828 --> 23:42.804
So when I think of the challenges that we face

23:42.804 --> 23:45.914
and the traditional barriers, we have to be willing

23:45.914 --> 23:49.198
to let go of the idea of a couple things.

23:49.198 --> 23:52.781
One, nerds sometimes just like to be nerds.

23:52.794 --> 23:55.294
They don't want to be leaders.

23:55.453 --> 23:58.248
And we have a concept that in order to be a great leader

23:58.248 --> 24:01.051
within our military, that you have to, what?

24:01.051 --> 24:04.588
You have to let go of the individual contributor role.

24:04.588 --> 24:06.496
Well, that doesn't work.

24:06.496 --> 24:08.348
I have people, I literally had someone

24:08.348 --> 24:09.792
on one of my teams years ago who told me

24:09.792 --> 24:12.356
that he was fine working out of a closet.

24:12.356 --> 24:14.403
He said, "Please don't put me near people."

24:14.403 --> 24:16.456
And he was one of my best engineers.

24:16.456 --> 24:17.758
Now think about that.

24:17.758 --> 24:19.244
We would let that person go.

24:19.244 --> 24:21.744
That's crazy, we need to build

24:21.828 --> 24:25.328
a place where this type of work has a home

24:25.479 --> 24:27.473
and we don't push these people out.

24:27.473 --> 24:29.712
So having technical tracks and breaking down

24:29.712 --> 24:32.435
the idea that you have to just be a leader

24:32.435 --> 24:36.093
to be part of the Army and have these authorities.

24:36.093 --> 24:37.067
- Thanks, Chris.

24:37.067 --> 24:40.282
So, Guy, followup with a question the audience

24:40.282 --> 24:43.283
has asked, which I think is quite appropriate here.

24:43.283 --> 24:44.875
What role, based upon your experiences,

24:44.875 --> 24:48.130
do you see industry playing in developing a work force?

24:48.130 --> 24:50.075
And what have you experienced based upon

24:50.075 --> 24:51.985
the development of such a work force?

24:51.985 --> 24:54.579
And what can we learn from industry's development

24:54.579 --> 24:57.835
of talent management and future acquisition?

24:57.835 --> 24:59.835
- Sure, so first of all,

25:01.019 --> 25:03.436
my experience in the industry

25:03.780 --> 25:07.456
is I've probably hired I don't know, 200 software engineers

25:07.456 --> 25:11.039
in the last 10 years in some shape or form.

25:11.848 --> 25:16.015
And really personally interacted with a lot of them.

25:17.054 --> 25:20.333
I have formed some opinions about what works,

25:20.333 --> 25:22.083
what doesn't and why.

25:22.138 --> 25:23.515
And one thing I'll tell you,

25:23.515 --> 25:26.332
from sort of just a, the other thing to recognize

25:26.332 --> 25:27.968
in the private sector is the private sector

25:27.968 --> 25:29.619
is a really ugly place right now,

25:29.619 --> 25:32.136
in general for technical talent.

25:32.136 --> 25:35.719
There is a massive, massive demand problem.

25:38.412 --> 25:40.469
What certain companies, you think about

25:40.469 --> 25:41.672
who do you really want to copy?

25:41.672 --> 25:43.275
What certain companies like Google do

25:43.275 --> 25:45.442
is they pay a ton of money

25:48.008 --> 25:50.035
to beat the demand curve.

25:50.035 --> 25:52.080
So the question I think you have to ask yourself,

25:52.080 --> 25:55.156
as the military, as a cyber force in the military is,

25:55.156 --> 25:56.872
who do you really want to mimic?

25:56.872 --> 25:59.136
I don't think we want to mimic Google.

25:59.136 --> 26:02.219
Because Google does it through money.

26:03.151 --> 26:06.734
Is my general thesis and Steve may disagree

26:06.828 --> 26:08.745
and Chris may disagree.

26:08.934 --> 26:13.101
You want to really mimic the kind of scrappy startups

26:14.083 --> 26:16.272
that don't have a lot of money and have to

26:16.272 --> 26:18.328
wheel and deal to get that first team

26:18.328 --> 26:20.411
of 20 or 30 or 50 in the door.

26:20.411 --> 26:23.744
And the thing that I find that they have

26:24.597 --> 26:27.916
as the things that have always gotten us

26:27.916 --> 26:29.833
to get our best people.

26:31.298 --> 26:34.381
One, it's all about the initial core.

26:36.487 --> 26:38.779
And then it's all about their ability,

26:38.779 --> 26:42.100
in almost like a very decentralized way to hire around them.

26:42.100 --> 26:44.691
I've always found that my most successful teams

26:44.691 --> 26:46.441
built their own team.

26:46.589 --> 26:48.352
Now that's really hard to do.

26:48.352 --> 26:51.185
But like, how can you somehow push

26:52.103 --> 26:55.187
the recruiting and the vetting down to the unit level?

26:55.187 --> 26:56.702
I don't know how the heck you do that.

26:56.702 --> 26:58.771
But it's where I've always found

26:58.771 --> 27:01.261
that the most high-performing teams come out of.

27:01.261 --> 27:03.452
They didn't just, people didn't just show up and it was

27:03.452 --> 27:06.215
like all of the the sudden, "Hey, do work for me."

27:06.215 --> 27:08.122
The other thing that's interesting is

27:08.122 --> 27:09.800
you have to recognize that the private sector

27:09.800 --> 27:11.966
has some advantages that you're probably not going to get,

27:11.966 --> 27:14.112
like the hire and fire advantage.

27:14.112 --> 27:16.698
We don't go out in the private sector and say,

27:16.698 --> 27:19.646
we got to hire 20 people and just know that we're

27:19.646 --> 27:21.503
going to have to work with those 20 people

27:21.503 --> 27:23.434
for the next five years.

27:23.434 --> 27:27.267
We go in with the mindset of, we might hire 30

27:27.746 --> 27:31.913
and eventually end up with 20 that we really liked.

27:32.212 --> 27:35.346
I don't know how, it's almost like one of the interesting

27:35.346 --> 27:37.997
learning lessons for the military might be

27:37.997 --> 27:40.950
how quickly can you get rid of people?

27:40.950 --> 27:44.033
As a measure of success in some sort.

27:44.732 --> 27:48.585
Because that's probably something that doesn't exist.

27:48.585 --> 27:50.337
And then the other thing is just like,

27:50.337 --> 27:52.337
where do we find people?

27:53.043 --> 27:55.548
I think the companies that are being very successful

27:55.548 --> 27:59.291
right now are definitely getting people early.

27:59.291 --> 28:02.435
They're getting their best people on internships

28:02.435 --> 28:05.163
when they're in grad school and when they're in

28:05.163 --> 28:06.766
undergrad and how do you make sure

28:06.766 --> 28:09.266
you're really targeting there?

28:11.875 --> 28:14.525
Just in general, I would say that

28:14.525 --> 28:16.642
the single, I'll close it with this thought,

28:16.642 --> 28:19.892
the single biggest reason for retention

28:21.225 --> 28:23.329
that I have found amongst my engineers

28:23.329 --> 28:26.347
over the last 10 years, is when they have

28:26.347 --> 28:29.519
great respect for their direct supervisor,

28:29.519 --> 28:32.852
number one, and their peers, number two.

28:33.284 --> 28:35.701
And I mean technical respect.

28:36.144 --> 28:39.048
When they have technical respect for their direct

28:39.048 --> 28:43.215
supervisor, it's the fundamentally the biggest thing.

28:43.246 --> 28:47.058
And my guess, and this is just in my own talking with lots

28:47.058 --> 28:49.594
of junior military officers over the last few years,

28:49.594 --> 28:51.024
that's the one thing we struggle with.

28:51.024 --> 28:54.857
Because not many, frankly, of the next tier up

28:55.126 --> 28:59.103
tend to have some of those technical experiences.

28:59.103 --> 29:01.177
Just a few random thoughts to start.

29:01.177 --> 29:02.010
- [Paul] Thanks, Guy.

29:02.010 --> 29:04.259
So when we have difficult challenges in Army Cyber,

29:04.259 --> 29:06.719
in the Army cyber enterprise, we turn to John Morrison.

29:06.719 --> 29:08.831
So I'm going to turn to John Morrison as follow up

29:08.831 --> 29:10.998
from those comments, John.

29:11.470 --> 29:13.300
- Guy, I really appreciate those comments.

29:13.300 --> 29:16.193
I think most of them are absolutely spot on.

29:16.193 --> 29:18.869
But I want to highlight an opportunity where

29:18.869 --> 29:21.054
truly what's happened across the cyber enterprise

29:21.054 --> 29:24.590
is really challenging traditional Army thinking.

29:24.590 --> 29:26.652
And the one that really struck me the most

29:26.652 --> 29:29.283
is when you talked about how do you push down,

29:29.283 --> 29:32.950
accessions, almost, to where the operational

29:32.972 --> 29:34.763
formation get to vote?

29:34.763 --> 29:37.518
One of the things that, I truly don't think that

29:37.518 --> 29:39.557
the Army realized what a brilliant decision

29:39.557 --> 29:41.946
they made deciding that they were going to put

29:41.946 --> 29:43.986
Army Cyber down at Fort Gordon,

29:43.986 --> 29:48.069
with the institutional arm, when General Odierno,

29:48.080 --> 29:50.015
who is a brilliant man, made that decision

29:50.015 --> 29:51.676
four or five years ago.

29:51.676 --> 29:53.398
Because the second and third order effects

29:53.398 --> 29:54.957
that are starting to come out of that

29:54.957 --> 29:56.543
are pretty significant.

29:56.543 --> 29:59.885
To where the institution, unlike any place else

29:59.885 --> 30:03.190
in our Army gets immediate operational feedback

30:03.190 --> 30:04.594
on what is happening.

30:04.594 --> 30:08.455
And the qualities to which we need to be training folks.

30:08.455 --> 30:11.463
So now we can set up a paradigm where, literally,

30:11.463 --> 30:13.033
and I'll point to Paul Stanton,

30:13.033 --> 30:14.996
who's the Cyber Protection Brigade Commander,

30:14.996 --> 30:16.779
can come over to the schoolhouse

30:16.779 --> 30:19.953
and meet folks that are now going through training

30:19.953 --> 30:22.266
and we can do the same thing on the offensive side.

30:22.266 --> 30:25.626
And we can get a sense for where is the best place

30:25.626 --> 30:28.533
to, excuse the pun, to place somebody?

30:28.533 --> 30:32.700
And where will they fit best inside Army cyber forces?

30:33.897 --> 30:36.730
So that's a unique paradigm shift,

30:36.808 --> 30:38.281
I'm not going to tell you it's completely mature,

30:38.281 --> 30:39.864
but it is maturing.

30:40.257 --> 30:42.531
What we need to work through now is how do we bring

30:42.531 --> 30:45.195
that to the front end of the accessions process

30:45.195 --> 30:47.484
so that it's almost a joint look?

30:47.484 --> 30:49.395
From both the operational side and from

30:49.395 --> 30:53.017
the institutional side that takes a look at a candidate

30:53.017 --> 30:55.548
that's coming in and there's an agreement on the front end

30:55.548 --> 30:57.716
that, yep, this is somebody that we want to bring in

30:57.716 --> 31:00.237
and take on some of this training.

31:00.237 --> 31:02.142
The other thing that I will tell you is

31:02.142 --> 31:05.751
inside the cyber enterprise, to get after your other point,

31:05.751 --> 31:07.992
we're not seeing the traditional,

31:07.992 --> 31:10.536
we've got to get everybody through the course.

31:10.536 --> 31:13.286
Not inside the Army cyber forces.

31:14.895 --> 31:17.783
They've got to meet joint certifications.

31:17.783 --> 31:19.980
And if they are unable to meet that,

31:19.980 --> 31:22.406
then they're not going to stay a 17.

31:22.406 --> 31:25.779
You're really not a 17, a cyber operator,

31:25.779 --> 31:27.735
until the conclusion of the course.

31:27.735 --> 31:29.417
That is also a different paradigm,

31:29.417 --> 31:31.326
because that's usually not how we do this.

31:31.326 --> 31:32.738
There's usually recycles and other things

31:32.738 --> 31:36.017
so that we can take the investment that we made

31:36.017 --> 31:37.935
and try and get somebody through.

31:37.935 --> 31:40.785
But in this space, where you really need to be able

31:40.785 --> 31:43.469
to be a self-starter and operate on your own,

31:43.469 --> 31:46.136
that's just not the right model.

31:46.511 --> 31:47.660
- Thanks, John.

31:47.660 --> 31:49.109
So I'd like to return to Steve.

31:49.109 --> 31:52.942
And Steve Hager, question comes in from audience member.

31:52.942 --> 31:54.430
So really, what are the core tenets,

31:54.430 --> 31:56.943
as you take a look at recruiting and retaining

31:56.943 --> 31:59.776
Soldiers within Army cyber forces?

32:00.583 --> 32:03.418
- Core tenets, well, sorry, I guess they're more attributes.

32:03.418 --> 32:05.310
I wouldn't necessarily say they're core tenets.

32:05.310 --> 32:07.227
It's a mission purpose,

32:07.800 --> 32:09.521
so you gotta have a real good purpose.

32:09.521 --> 32:11.535
And like you said, you want to make sure that

32:11.535 --> 32:13.708
you don't only respect your leadership

32:13.708 --> 32:14.916
and the mission you're doing,

32:14.916 --> 32:17.753
but you also want to be acknowledged by your peers.

32:17.753 --> 32:20.538
And you get that in the tech sector, too.

32:20.538 --> 32:22.449
To comment on what you said about

32:22.449 --> 32:24.866
not just having command jobs,

32:24.954 --> 32:27.827
we do allow folks to be technical directors,

32:27.827 --> 32:30.259
at least at the National Mission Force.

32:30.259 --> 32:31.876
So we do understand the ability

32:31.876 --> 32:34.322
to allow people to do these technical things.

32:34.322 --> 32:35.996
And in the tech sector, you kind of see that.

32:35.996 --> 32:39.579
The rule, lots of the good technical folks,

32:39.956 --> 32:42.609
that stay technical are more introverted.

32:42.609 --> 32:44.982
And those that have the ability to speak publicly

32:44.982 --> 32:46.145
and so forth, they, I hate to say this,

32:46.145 --> 32:47.895
they go to marketing.

32:48.059 --> 32:49.719
So one of the things that--
- I resent that.

32:49.719 --> 32:52.563
- (laughs) Yeah, so then inherently,

32:52.563 --> 32:55.198
they're not going to be as technical.

32:55.198 --> 32:56.845
But the one thing I'd like to say is

32:56.845 --> 32:59.608
when you want to develop that really technical force,

32:59.608 --> 33:02.471
and this is something that I think is interesting,

33:02.471 --> 33:05.590
is in Silicon Valley, a lot of the companies,

33:05.590 --> 33:07.712
they generally get rid of 10 to 15%

33:07.712 --> 33:11.028
of their work force every year to bring in new blood.

33:11.028 --> 33:12.892
And I think in the military and the government,

33:12.892 --> 33:14.681
that's a hard thing to think about,

33:14.681 --> 33:16.653
because we're kind of a pyramid structure.

33:16.653 --> 33:18.253
So you go, if I'm going to do that,

33:18.253 --> 33:21.258
it's always at the lower end of the spectrum.

33:21.258 --> 33:22.731
And I think maybe we should do that

33:22.731 --> 33:25.273
at some of the senior positions, too.

33:25.273 --> 33:27.678
(audience laughing)
- Appreciate that, Steve.

33:27.678 --> 33:29.734
- I'm always a little,
- General Hager's looking

33:29.734 --> 33:32.085
for a promotion.
- Yeah, self interest.

33:32.085 --> 33:33.438
- No, no, not at all, sir.

33:33.438 --> 33:36.393
So first thing is I think competition's good.

33:36.393 --> 33:38.098
So we often worry about, hey, I'm losing

33:38.098 --> 33:39.432
my active duty Soldiers,

33:39.432 --> 33:41.160
I've invested all this money into them.

33:41.160 --> 33:42.648
And they leave, and I go, "Hey, if you get

33:42.648 --> 33:45.776
"a better opportunity, you should take it up."

33:45.776 --> 33:47.564
So I think one of the things we should be willing to do

33:47.564 --> 33:49.953
is allow our workforce to permeate,

33:49.953 --> 33:52.158
so that they go to the private sector for a number of years.

33:52.158 --> 33:53.234
Why don't we take them back?

33:53.234 --> 33:55.227
Because they're coming back with this great skillset.

33:55.227 --> 33:58.307
So as a COMPO-2, COMPO-3 guy, a Reserve or Guard guy,

33:58.307 --> 34:00.050
I go, "Now that's my responsibility."

34:00.050 --> 34:01.938
When an active duty Solider leaves

34:01.938 --> 34:03.662
that we invested all this money in.

34:03.662 --> 34:04.786
So one of the things I'll say,

34:04.786 --> 34:06.802
and some people have heard me say this,

34:06.802 --> 34:10.230
the United States military is the greatest military on Earth

34:10.230 --> 34:12.103
and I'm a proud member of it.

34:12.103 --> 34:14.461
But it's not the most important thing to our nation.

34:14.461 --> 34:16.261
The most important thing to our nation

34:16.261 --> 34:17.724
is our economic might.

34:17.724 --> 34:21.546
So if the U.S. Army spends time training a young

34:21.546 --> 34:25.263
soldier or officer to learn about cyber security

34:25.263 --> 34:28.140
and they leave active duty and they go work for

34:28.140 --> 34:31.223
WalMart or, say, Equifax or something

34:33.065 --> 34:35.982
that will help secure our economic,

34:36.215 --> 34:37.323
I don't want to say dominance,

34:37.323 --> 34:39.808
but our economic ability to grow our GDP,

34:39.808 --> 34:41.721
well, I think that's a great thing.

34:41.721 --> 34:43.132
Now if they work for another company,

34:43.132 --> 34:45.206
or a different country, I'd be a little upset.

34:45.206 --> 34:47.659
But then it's my job to go recruit them

34:47.659 --> 34:49.976
and say, "Hey, how can you still support

34:49.976 --> 34:54.143
"the force when you do things as a Reserve or Guardsman?"

34:54.295 --> 34:57.190
Another thing I'd like to say, sir, is,

34:57.190 --> 34:59.685
we talk about that permeability,

34:59.685 --> 35:03.041
you want to bring in folks that have great technical skills.

35:03.041 --> 35:04.880
So you always have to have a core of people

35:04.880 --> 35:07.213
who understand the military.

35:07.406 --> 35:09.844
General McGee told me this, he said,

35:09.844 --> 35:12.472
so I grew up in California and I'm a deer hunter.

35:12.472 --> 35:14.269
So as a young kid, I knew,

35:14.269 --> 35:16.069
we hunt deer a little differently on the East Coast,

35:16.069 --> 35:17.848
or on the West Coast than you do on the East Coast.

35:17.848 --> 35:19.621
We climb up on a hill, we take our binoculars,

35:19.621 --> 35:21.402
we look for the deer and then we go stalk them.

35:21.402 --> 35:23.267
It's called glassing and stalking.

35:23.267 --> 35:26.866
So I have the technical skills to walk around,

35:26.866 --> 35:28.665
go through the woods without being detected,

35:28.665 --> 35:31.387
engage my target a couple hundred meters and take it out.

35:31.387 --> 35:33.728
That does not qualify me to be a sniper

35:33.728 --> 35:35.286
in the United States Army.

35:35.286 --> 35:36.370
And why is that?

35:36.370 --> 35:37.846
Because we work as a team.

35:37.846 --> 35:41.093
So I have that skillset, so I'm a great Unix hacker,

35:41.093 --> 35:42.851
but that doesn't necessarily mean

35:42.851 --> 35:45.136
I'm qualified to be a 17 series.

35:45.136 --> 35:47.546
I may have those technical skills,

35:47.546 --> 35:49.257
but those things to work as a team,

35:49.257 --> 35:52.159
because remember, cyber is not done for cyber itself.

35:52.159 --> 35:54.069
While hacking may be done for hacking itself,

35:54.069 --> 35:56.090
we have to understand how the skillset

35:56.090 --> 35:59.810
translates to how the Army or the Joint Force operates.

35:59.810 --> 36:01.758
So it's good it identify those folks

36:01.758 --> 36:04.371
that have those skillsets, but we have to remember

36:04.371 --> 36:06.229
you need a professional military force

36:06.229 --> 36:08.398
to put them in the right domain.

36:08.398 --> 36:11.158
And when I think how we talk about the permeability

36:11.158 --> 36:13.621
if we look at how COMPO-2, COMPO-3 does things,

36:13.621 --> 36:16.808
we can look at that force to bring in those new ideas.

36:16.808 --> 36:18.339
The reason I say that, in Silicon Valley,

36:18.339 --> 36:20.465
I grew up and raised there, I've seen the number

36:20.465 --> 36:22.375
of new career fields come out.

36:22.375 --> 36:23.811
So it's a brand new thing,

36:23.811 --> 36:26.672
first it was semi-conductors, then it was software,

36:26.672 --> 36:29.173
then it was web-based stuff, then social media.

36:29.173 --> 36:30.632
These are all new things.

36:30.632 --> 36:32.745
Well, where do you go to get the expertise?

36:32.745 --> 36:34.387
There is no expertise out there.

36:34.387 --> 36:36.887
There's a few academic people,

36:37.302 --> 36:39.586
but then you go to people who have a track record

36:39.586 --> 36:42.694
of picking up a new technology and monetizing it

36:42.694 --> 36:44.839
and commercializing it and moving it through.

36:44.839 --> 36:46.838
So that's the ecosystem that they've built

36:46.838 --> 36:49.417
out in the Valley, so there's no issue with

36:49.417 --> 36:51.554
people working for a company for a few years

36:51.554 --> 36:52.658
and then moving on.

36:52.658 --> 36:54.929
And the problem I've seen is I've had senior people

36:54.929 --> 36:57.497
tell me, "Well, they're not dedicated to that company."

36:57.497 --> 37:00.091
Just like if I don't do 20 or 30 years in the military.

37:00.091 --> 37:02.737
And I go, "You're right, they're not dedicated to a company,

37:02.737 --> 37:05.378
"they're dedicated to the advancement of technology."

37:05.378 --> 37:07.236
Just like we have many people who are dedicated

37:07.236 --> 37:09.526
to the defense of this nation.

37:09.526 --> 37:11.321
You don't always have to do it in uniform.

37:11.321 --> 37:13.020
You could do it in other ways.

37:13.020 --> 37:14.801
And maybe you don't do it all the time.

37:14.801 --> 37:16.864
So I think the permeability to allow people

37:16.864 --> 37:18.595
to go off and do stuff in industry

37:18.595 --> 37:20.602
that may have nothing to do with defense,

37:20.602 --> 37:22.070
but they're learning a lot of new stuff

37:22.070 --> 37:24.154
about quantum computing or something that's new.

37:24.154 --> 37:26.227
And then we have the ability to bring them back in

37:26.227 --> 37:28.145
to then help us be force multipliers.

37:28.145 --> 37:28.978
- Thanks, Steve.

37:28.978 --> 37:30.612
Hey Chris, interesting question here.

37:30.612 --> 37:32.344
A question comes in from the audience,

37:32.344 --> 37:34.140
what are your plans and venues for inspiring

37:34.140 --> 37:37.307
collaborative innovation, what's next?

37:38.371 --> 37:40.788
- Wow, there's so much there.

37:41.928 --> 37:43.322
One of the interesting things about

37:43.322 --> 37:47.018
the Department of Defense is it is really, really big.

37:47.018 --> 37:49.025
As a matter of fact, I probably,

37:49.025 --> 37:51.674
I talk about that every time I do a recruiting call.

37:51.674 --> 37:55.257
And I meet potential candidates to come in.

37:56.077 --> 37:59.244
I mention just the size and the scope.

37:59.454 --> 38:01.458
And I always talk about how many people work

38:01.458 --> 38:03.655
for the Department of Defense.

38:03.655 --> 38:07.072
How we build cities, we build everything.

38:07.577 --> 38:10.145
Literally everything, all the way down to tanks.

38:10.145 --> 38:12.531
You just think about it and it's mind blowing.

38:12.531 --> 38:14.781
So how do you improve that?

38:14.946 --> 38:18.733
Well, one thing that I do think is very important,

38:18.733 --> 38:22.396
when you look at, this is more maybe a statement

38:22.396 --> 38:25.313
about the United States government,

38:26.576 --> 38:30.743
writ large, but I'll just focus on the DoD for a second.

38:31.406 --> 38:33.489
My team, we're like this,

38:35.195 --> 38:39.326
little bastion of if you were to leave the Department

38:39.326 --> 38:40.871
of Defense, you were to go to a startup,

38:40.871 --> 38:42.889
we pretty much work the same way.

38:42.889 --> 38:44.722
We use the same tools.

38:44.735 --> 38:47.491
When we edit a document, we edit a document.

38:47.491 --> 38:49.363
We would send it to somebody else in the office

38:49.363 --> 38:52.127
and they edit it together with us in real time.

38:52.127 --> 38:54.794
We have a chat thing that we use

38:56.059 --> 38:58.055
that every single one of our projects,

38:58.055 --> 38:59.159
everybody's in there.

38:59.159 --> 39:01.723
We invite people from other parts of the DoD

39:01.723 --> 39:04.925
to come in and they collaborate with us on all that.

39:04.925 --> 39:07.508
To us, that's just how we work.

39:07.621 --> 39:09.520
But it's really funny, because it's not how

39:09.520 --> 39:11.291
the Department of Defense works.

39:11.291 --> 39:13.538
As a matter of fact, when I try to bring a lot of people

39:13.538 --> 39:17.705
in from the DoD, A, the tools that we're using are blocked.

39:18.608 --> 39:22.108
So then we figure out how to unblock them.

39:22.156 --> 39:23.823
So then we got that.

39:24.025 --> 39:27.692
And then we have multifactor authentication.

39:28.634 --> 39:31.184
Well, they're probably in a SCIF, where they can't have

39:31.184 --> 39:34.039
their phone, so they can get the code.

39:34.039 --> 39:36.346
So then they have to leave the room, get the code,

39:36.346 --> 39:37.307
run back into the room and then type it

39:37.307 --> 39:38.896
really quickly into the computer.

39:38.896 --> 39:43.063
And when you actually look at it, it's kind of funny.

39:43.131 --> 39:47.298
Because it just shows how we haven't really kept up.

39:48.804 --> 39:52.364
And I find that fascinating, because we have to.

39:52.364 --> 39:54.417
We have to do these things,

39:54.417 --> 39:57.177
because this is all really, really important.

39:57.177 --> 40:00.177
Every single decision that we do is,

40:00.364 --> 40:03.897
comes down in some form, in a way that we are

40:03.897 --> 40:06.263
trusting the information on a screen.

40:06.263 --> 40:08.443
That it's telling us that something is true.

40:08.443 --> 40:11.443
And we're verifying the authenticity

40:12.296 --> 40:16.463
of where it came from to convey some kind of an action.

40:16.819 --> 40:18.652
And I think that that's fascinating,

40:18.652 --> 40:19.708
because if you think about that,

40:19.708 --> 40:21.507
that means it all must work and work

40:21.507 --> 40:24.507
with 100% trust and be perfect.

40:24.840 --> 40:28.358
So therefore, we should be exceptional at collaborating.

40:28.358 --> 40:30.379
We should be doing the things that you see

40:30.379 --> 40:32.281
at any one of the companies that I have started

40:32.281 --> 40:34.210
before I showed up at the Department of Defense

40:34.210 --> 40:35.790
in the United States government.

40:35.790 --> 40:37.435
Those things should be,

40:37.435 --> 40:39.365
what I would call birthright technologies.

40:39.365 --> 40:40.888
They should just be the way that they are.

40:40.888 --> 40:43.760
But instead, people email documents around.

40:43.760 --> 40:46.420
They rename the document, they put their initials on it,

40:46.420 --> 40:49.546
dash V3, send it back, somebody does their edits,

40:49.546 --> 40:52.159
dash V4, pens their initials to it.

40:52.159 --> 40:53.501
Have you guys seen this?

40:53.501 --> 40:54.370
(audience laughing)

40:54.370 --> 40:56.247
And I look at that, and I'm like, that happened

40:56.247 --> 40:59.549
a long time ago, that is no longer a thing.

40:59.549 --> 41:01.009
That's a solved problem.

41:01.009 --> 41:02.636
Imagine that we all walked out of here,

41:02.636 --> 41:04.061
and you saw horses and buggies.

41:04.061 --> 41:05.636
And you're like, actually, if you just went

41:05.636 --> 41:09.256
a couple blocks down the street, there are cars.

41:09.256 --> 41:10.419
And I think that that's funny

41:10.419 --> 41:13.656
because when I think of how we do things,

41:13.656 --> 41:16.655
we struggle with questions that sometimes

41:16.655 --> 41:20.155
are actually kind of irrational arguments.

41:21.749 --> 41:24.423
Like we'll say, "Well, maybe this isn't secure."

41:24.423 --> 41:26.861
But you're like, "But the current one's not super secure."

41:26.861 --> 41:29.468
And they'll say, "Yes, I know, but maybe

41:29.468 --> 41:32.885
"that one's just as good or just as bad."

41:33.664 --> 41:36.010
And you're like, "That doesn't even make sense."

41:36.010 --> 41:39.064
It just is better, because I could get all these things.

41:39.064 --> 41:41.406
And you look at that, and I really think that

41:41.406 --> 41:43.286
when you think about the future of collaboration

41:43.286 --> 41:45.174
and how the Department of Defense needs to work

41:45.174 --> 41:47.248
and all these things and why this type of talent

41:47.248 --> 41:49.126
is important, and I'll just go back

41:49.126 --> 41:51.078
to something that I said before.

41:51.078 --> 41:54.179
It is extremely important that we pursue

41:54.179 --> 41:57.846
a world in which a nerd can sit in the place

41:57.959 --> 42:00.575
where a policy or a decision is made about

42:00.575 --> 42:04.742
a technical thing and say, "Actually, that's not a thing."

42:05.446 --> 42:06.863
It's okay, right?

42:08.768 --> 42:10.685
We don't do that today.

42:11.582 --> 42:15.415
So we end up with a world that, I kid you not,

42:15.547 --> 42:17.462
I remember my first day.

42:17.462 --> 42:18.974
I walked into the Department of Defense.

42:18.974 --> 42:21.741
I walked into the Pentagon, that was weird,

42:21.741 --> 42:25.658
and I walked in and I had no cell phone access.

42:25.662 --> 42:28.329
Nothing, and I was like, "What?"

42:28.418 --> 42:30.566
I was like, "How do I get ahold of the people

42:30.566 --> 42:32.083
"who are meeting me?"

42:32.083 --> 42:34.464
That's crazy, I remember I had somebody show up to my office

42:34.464 --> 42:37.187
and they said, "Why do you need WiFi in your office?"

42:37.187 --> 42:39.604
And I'm like, "What are you talking about?"

42:39.604 --> 42:41.762
That didn't even make sense to me.

42:41.762 --> 42:43.469
And that's the world that we're in.

42:43.469 --> 42:45.146
The future of collaboration actually

42:45.146 --> 42:47.396
just looks like your house.

42:47.667 --> 42:51.250
I'm serious, let that sink in for a second.

42:51.564 --> 42:53.603
The future of collaboration in the Department of Defense

42:53.603 --> 42:54.825
probably looks like the things

42:54.825 --> 42:57.070
that you use in your daily lives.

42:57.070 --> 42:59.726
And until we get there, we're at a very,

42:59.726 --> 43:01.749
very disadvantaged place.

43:01.749 --> 43:04.716
Because we don't have policies and bureaucracies

43:04.716 --> 43:07.032
in our adversaries that are stopping them

43:07.032 --> 43:10.449
from doing things that we stop ourselves.

43:10.769 --> 43:11.603
- [Paul] Thanks, Chris.

43:11.603 --> 43:14.477
General Morrison, one of the questions that came in is,

43:14.477 --> 43:15.902
and I think germane here, how are you

43:15.902 --> 43:17.443
teaching leadership in Cyber?

43:17.443 --> 43:20.624
Traditionally, the more senior you are, the more you know.

43:20.624 --> 43:22.054
How are you teaching leaders to handle

43:22.054 --> 43:23.886
an inverted pyramid of knowledge and skills

43:23.886 --> 43:27.219
when juniors may have greater knowledge?

43:27.244 --> 43:28.606
- So that's a great question.

43:28.606 --> 43:30.238
I'm still trying to catch up to Chris.

43:30.238 --> 43:33.053
(audience laughing)

43:33.053 --> 43:35.502
For the first time, I feel like an old Southern boy

43:35.502 --> 43:39.669
and I'm going to talk real slow compared to my predecessor.

43:39.977 --> 43:41.938
That is a great question.

43:41.938 --> 43:43.414
And I'm just going to give you an analogy,

43:43.414 --> 43:45.257
because it goes back to something

43:45.257 --> 43:47.955
that General Hager said a couple seconds ago.

43:47.955 --> 43:50.410
And I want to tie in off of the nerd comment

43:50.410 --> 43:52.169
that Chris sat there and said.

43:52.169 --> 43:54.515
It is a very technical branch.

43:54.515 --> 43:58.432
Don't get us wrong, fully 85% of the folks

43:58.561 --> 44:01.064
that are coming into this, at least at the officer

44:01.064 --> 44:04.511
and warrant officer have some level of a STEM degree.

44:04.511 --> 44:07.846
That said, they're still a part of the United States Army.

44:07.846 --> 44:10.478
And they've got to be able to think like operators.

44:10.478 --> 44:12.229
And what I would submit to you,

44:12.229 --> 44:14.802
the vast majority of the folks that we have inside

44:14.802 --> 44:18.014
the force today want to be doing operations,

44:18.014 --> 44:20.881
want to be challenged, want to be working

44:20.881 --> 44:23.381
on the most pressing problems.

44:23.556 --> 44:27.260
Now that said, they are part of the United States Army.

44:27.260 --> 44:29.681
So we do all the standard common core leadership

44:29.681 --> 44:32.737
training that you do to get people to understand

44:32.737 --> 44:36.097
how the Army operates, what leadership is about.

44:36.097 --> 44:38.242
And quite frankly, how the Army

44:38.242 --> 44:40.399
conducts maneuver operations.

44:40.399 --> 44:44.566
And I'll tell you why all three of those are important.

44:44.642 --> 44:47.279
When we've been doing these CIMA support,

44:47.279 --> 44:49.012
corps and below pilots.

44:49.012 --> 44:51.350
An analogy I got from General Flynn,

44:51.350 --> 44:52.940
who is never at a loss for words was,

44:52.940 --> 44:55.742
the first time a cyber operator walked in there,

44:55.742 --> 44:57.825
I could not understand a word they were saying,

44:57.825 --> 44:59.341
and this was back in the day.

44:59.341 --> 45:00.993
Couldn't understand a word they were saying,

45:00.993 --> 45:05.076
John, I sent them off to the land of misfit toys.

45:05.666 --> 45:07.761
Having that basic leadership piece,

45:07.761 --> 45:09.745
understanding how the Army operates

45:09.745 --> 45:11.908
and understanding how the technical effects

45:11.908 --> 45:15.362
that Chris was articulating, and Steve were articulating,

45:15.362 --> 45:19.233
can actually impact and support a maneuver commander's

45:19.233 --> 45:22.233
key maneuver is absolutely critical.

45:22.852 --> 45:26.519
We must teach that, it's taught at each one,

45:27.236 --> 45:31.153
at the NCO, warrant officer and officer levels.

45:32.908 --> 45:36.403
Now that said, we have purposely opened up

45:36.403 --> 45:40.236
our management policies to allow for the folks

45:40.259 --> 45:42.625
that, as Chris so eloquently said,

45:42.625 --> 45:45.352
sometimes nerds just want to be nerds.

45:45.352 --> 45:47.174
So it is not the traditional,

45:47.174 --> 45:48.755
you must be a company commander,

45:48.755 --> 45:50.440
you must be a battalion S3,

45:50.440 --> 45:53.056
you must be a battalion commander.

45:53.056 --> 45:55.201
We have allowed enough flexibility in the system

45:55.201 --> 45:58.701
to take advantage of those unique talents,

45:58.779 --> 46:01.989
where somebody just does want to be a tool developer.

46:01.989 --> 46:04.086
And then what we do is we've established

46:04.086 --> 46:06.776
at the DA level, I'm not sure if you want to talk

46:06.776 --> 46:08.694
about information dominance or not, sir.

46:08.694 --> 46:10.895
- Go ahead.
- An information dominance

46:10.895 --> 46:13.873
category that allows us to manage folks

46:13.873 --> 46:16.873
inside the cyber branch differently.

46:16.985 --> 46:20.022
So they're not doing Army competitive category,

46:20.022 --> 46:21.880
where they're completing across the broad force

46:21.880 --> 46:23.550
with folks who may not quite understand

46:23.550 --> 46:25.552
the skillsets that they're looking at.

46:25.552 --> 46:27.579
You have folks that actually are doing that operational

46:27.579 --> 46:30.371
mission who can take advantage and look at the talent

46:30.371 --> 46:32.689
that we have and continue to do that.

46:32.689 --> 46:35.166
And as you take a look at the promotion rates,

46:35.166 --> 46:37.966
significantly, not well, significantly

46:37.966 --> 46:39.860
above the Army averages.

46:39.860 --> 46:42.529
So it's a process that I think is changing.

46:42.529 --> 46:44.876
Now to go back to that point about where

46:44.876 --> 46:47.987
your subordinates may know more than you.

46:47.987 --> 46:51.377
I think that no matter what branch you've in,

46:51.377 --> 46:53.320
you get to a point where that's going to happen

46:53.320 --> 46:55.124
at some point, especially if you've gotten

46:55.124 --> 46:57.041
into a leadership role.

46:57.085 --> 46:59.668
The key is, inside this branch,

47:00.107 --> 47:03.323
we've got to have a train-employ-train methodology,

47:03.323 --> 47:05.906
that allows our senior leaders,

47:06.260 --> 47:09.510
not General Nakasone and myself, Steve,

47:10.112 --> 47:11.861
(audience laughing)

47:11.861 --> 47:13.808
but allows our senior leaders to understand

47:13.808 --> 47:15.698
what is still out there, so that they can

47:15.698 --> 47:18.005
effectively employ the folks that have

47:18.005 --> 47:19.678
the skillsets down below them.

47:19.678 --> 47:21.148
That's where we've gotten disconnected

47:21.148 --> 47:23.618
over the course of time in many regards.

47:23.618 --> 47:24.560
- [Paul] Thanks, John.

47:24.560 --> 47:25.393
Guy, you had a follow up.

47:25.393 --> 47:26.575
- I just want to make a comment,

47:26.575 --> 47:29.703
because there's a, I think these are all awesome comments.

47:29.703 --> 47:32.823
I think there's one, maybe I'm going to almost call it

47:32.823 --> 47:36.392
a dangerous perception thread that could form here.

47:36.392 --> 47:39.728
Which is that, I know nobody's implying it,

47:39.728 --> 47:41.979
I just am more focused on the perception of it.

47:41.979 --> 47:46.059
Which is that the notion that nerds want to be nerds

47:46.059 --> 47:49.533
or the notion that, yes, nerds are different,

47:49.533 --> 47:52.592
but that not, I want to be very clear,

47:52.592 --> 47:55.915
not every, quote, nerd and not every great

47:55.915 --> 47:58.832
software engineer is a good leader.

47:58.880 --> 48:01.713
And great engineering teams still,

48:01.784 --> 48:03.231
I don't care if you're in the Valley

48:03.231 --> 48:06.010
or you're in Baltimore or you're in Israel,

48:06.010 --> 48:09.093
are run by great engineering leaders.

48:10.258 --> 48:12.804
This is a very important distinction.

48:12.804 --> 48:14.381
And what does this really mean?

48:14.381 --> 48:16.706
What am I trying to get at here?

48:16.706 --> 48:19.789
I'll just out of personal experience,

48:20.241 --> 48:23.074
yes, there are categories of geeks

48:24.286 --> 48:26.540
that don't want to be leaders.

48:26.540 --> 48:29.030
And we don't want to try to make them leaders.

48:29.030 --> 48:31.530
But even worse is a leaderless

48:33.758 --> 48:35.841
engineering organization.

48:35.971 --> 48:39.471
So the VP of Engineering role in a startup

48:39.730 --> 48:42.147
is a critical, critical role.

48:46.081 --> 48:49.498
I started my last company five years ago.

48:49.958 --> 48:52.256
I would say that the first few years

48:52.256 --> 48:56.253
we were led by a really, really, extremely talented

48:56.253 --> 48:58.778
off-the-charts brilliant software engineer

48:58.778 --> 49:00.299
who was a good leader.

49:00.299 --> 49:03.886
By the way, did great things, got us from zero to 10.

49:03.886 --> 49:06.469
Then, we hired, at his request,

49:07.558 --> 49:09.660
you talk about a self-aware guy, he said,

49:09.660 --> 49:11.999
"Hey, look, I'm not the best guy to go from here to here.

49:11.999 --> 49:14.004
"We're going to have now 50 engineers.

49:14.004 --> 49:18.171
"And my former boss is the best engineering manager

49:18.374 --> 49:21.814
"that I ever had, you need to get him to run this team."

49:21.814 --> 49:23.401
And I brought in him.

49:23.401 --> 49:25.518
Now, his name's Steve McCall.

49:25.518 --> 49:29.094
Steve is not, Steve's a phenomenal software engineer.

49:29.094 --> 49:30.059
I think, I've never actually

49:30.059 --> 49:32.305
really seen him write much code.

49:32.305 --> 49:34.398
But he's a phenomenal software leader.

49:34.398 --> 49:36.918
He knows how to do code reviews.

49:36.918 --> 49:40.085
He knows how to do weekly one-on-ones.

49:40.491 --> 49:44.658
He knows how to hold the engineers extremely accountable.

49:45.560 --> 49:49.310
Extremely accountable, and when that happens,

49:49.671 --> 49:52.338
peers are very, very self-aware.

49:53.193 --> 49:57.052
So it's an interesting, like you don't want to lose,

49:57.052 --> 49:58.875
it's not about losing leadership.

49:58.875 --> 50:02.418
Leadership's still super, super critical in a digital force.

50:02.418 --> 50:05.032
But that's a very precise skillset.

50:05.032 --> 50:07.032
And how do you get that?

50:07.307 --> 50:10.224
My sense is that that's a huge area

50:11.372 --> 50:14.147
for the Digital Service to probably think about

50:14.147 --> 50:16.326
how you bring that kind of leadership in.

50:16.326 --> 50:18.533
Because not to insult any of us at the table,

50:18.533 --> 50:21.450
but that's a very particular thing.

50:21.710 --> 50:23.620
Would you agree with that, Chris?

50:23.620 --> 50:25.870
- Yeah, I want to be clear,

50:26.988 --> 50:28.524
because I know that I've been talking

50:28.524 --> 50:30.691
about the technical track.

50:31.464 --> 50:33.381
That is one part of it.

50:33.633 --> 50:35.647
We did a really interesting thing where we took

50:35.647 --> 50:39.305
General McGee, Colonel Stanton came with us,

50:39.305 --> 50:41.055
out to Silicon Valley

50:43.174 --> 50:46.507
and we just went to a bunch of companies

50:46.596 --> 50:48.429
that run the internet.

50:48.537 --> 50:50.364
The companies that you would know.

50:50.364 --> 50:51.938
And there was a really great comment

50:51.938 --> 50:54.809
that somebody made at one of the companies.

50:54.809 --> 50:57.226
Somebody who was a very early

50:59.186 --> 51:02.769
leader over at a social networking company.

51:03.449 --> 51:07.616
And he just made the comment that the best companies

51:08.552 --> 51:11.184
are engineering focused in tech.

51:11.184 --> 51:12.196
The best companies.

51:12.196 --> 51:13.902
He said, "You can just look across the board."

51:13.902 --> 51:16.846
The ones that are not, they just don't do well

51:16.846 --> 51:19.063
at retaining talent, they have different focuses,

51:19.063 --> 51:20.825
they just don't run as well.

51:20.825 --> 51:23.615
And I think that that's really interesting,

51:23.615 --> 51:25.448
because to your point,

51:26.815 --> 51:29.330
having great engineering talent

51:29.330 --> 51:33.194
is of course the lifeblood of doing these things.

51:33.194 --> 51:35.968
but then you have to put them into a space

51:35.968 --> 51:40.030
with great leadership that people are inspired by.

51:40.030 --> 51:42.360
And that includes the leadership.

51:42.360 --> 51:45.693
People have to have, I call it a beacon.

51:45.948 --> 51:47.926
General Nakasone and I have been working

51:47.926 --> 51:51.310
together on something where we talked about

51:51.310 --> 51:53.436
the ability to bring in what I would call

51:53.436 --> 51:56.318
beacon engineering talent, beacon leadership.

51:56.318 --> 51:58.369
And that does drive people, because it makes people

51:58.369 --> 52:00.468
want to say, "I want to work for that person."

52:00.468 --> 52:03.281
I want to work for that woman or that guy.

52:03.281 --> 52:06.125
I think that that's an incredibly important thing.

52:06.125 --> 52:08.237
Just as much as the space that you put them in.

52:08.237 --> 52:10.018
And it's not about pay, you said that.

52:10.018 --> 52:12.629
It's definitely not about the pay.

52:12.629 --> 52:14.026
But yeah, for sure.
- And I'm just saying

52:14.026 --> 52:16.365
it's two kind of beacons, there really are.

52:16.365 --> 52:18.158
There's two kind of beacons.

52:18.158 --> 52:20.542
There's, I want to work around that guy

52:20.542 --> 52:22.466
or that gal because I know that he or she

52:22.466 --> 52:24.510
is a phenomenal software engineer

52:24.510 --> 52:25.898
and I'm going to learn from them.

52:25.898 --> 52:27.953
I want that person to be my peer.

52:27.953 --> 52:31.082
For sure, because that's a beacon, that's an effect.

52:31.082 --> 52:34.544
And then there's, I want to work for that leader.

52:34.544 --> 52:36.381
And they're two different kind of beacons,

52:36.381 --> 52:38.798
whether you're in any kind of tech company.

52:38.798 --> 52:40.935
So it's just something to remember,

52:40.935 --> 52:43.255
two very different kind of tracks.

52:43.255 --> 52:44.443
- Some really good points there.

52:44.443 --> 52:46.428
I would like to just transition a bit

52:46.428 --> 52:48.209
to the Reserve component.

52:48.209 --> 52:51.110
As we mentioned early on, the Army has decided

52:51.110 --> 52:53.268
and has already begun the build of 21 cyber protection

52:53.268 --> 52:56.731
teams, 11 in the National Guard, 10 in the Army Reserve.

52:56.731 --> 53:00.743
Steve, from your vantage point, both as active duty Soldier

53:00.743 --> 53:04.152
and then a Reserve component Soldier, as member of the

53:04.152 --> 53:08.104
high-tech industry, in reflecting on what the Army

53:08.104 --> 53:10.898
is able to leverage from the Reserve component.

53:10.898 --> 53:13.130
What would you share with us most?

53:13.130 --> 53:16.068
- Sir, I think version 1.0 of the Army Reserve

53:16.068 --> 53:20.146
cyber protection brigade or ARCOG, as they call it,

53:20.146 --> 53:22.099
I think it was a very good start.

53:22.099 --> 53:24.654
So the number of people they had to get,

53:24.654 --> 53:28.821
needed TSSCI, so it's very I'll say, East Coast centric.

53:28.972 --> 53:31.406
We have a brigade headquarters here in the national

53:31.406 --> 53:33.978
capital region, we have a battalion here.

53:33.978 --> 53:37.108
We have another one by MIT, great area.

53:37.108 --> 53:40.025
Another one out in Carnegie Mellon.

53:41.255 --> 53:43.780
One down in San Antonio, which is the,

53:43.780 --> 53:45.743
if you go to San Antonio, the largest employer

53:45.743 --> 53:47.438
there is the Department of Defense.

53:47.438 --> 53:49.007
And then they one out there on the West Coast,

53:49.007 --> 53:51.148
they say Camp Parks is close to Silicon Valley,

53:51.148 --> 53:52.713
but anybody that grew up there knows

53:52.713 --> 53:54.936
it's actually not Silicon Valley.

53:54.936 --> 53:57.127
So to recruit people, I think

53:57.127 --> 53:59.536
it's important to start that way.

53:59.536 --> 54:02.363
So we get to that core, the C-O-R-E,

54:02.363 --> 54:04.298
but now what I think as a general officer,

54:04.298 --> 54:06.333
is we have to think five to 10 years out.

54:06.333 --> 54:08.339
So what I would do is I would erase the map

54:08.339 --> 54:10.269
of where the active duty bases are.

54:10.269 --> 54:12.037
Because what I'm constantly told,

54:12.037 --> 54:13.955
from the AGRs and the active duty folks,

54:13.955 --> 54:15.390
"Hey, where should I put my cyber folks?"

54:15.390 --> 54:18.380
They say Fort Mead, Fort Belvoir and Fort Gordon.

54:18.380 --> 54:20.297
Which is a great place.

54:21.051 --> 54:24.468
But I think to add depth to our skillset,

54:26.524 --> 54:28.994
and not replicate what active duty has,

54:28.994 --> 54:31.463
we need to diversify our workforce.

54:31.463 --> 54:34.295
So I would recommend is you wipe the map off

54:34.295 --> 54:37.487
and you go, where is the tech sector growing

54:37.487 --> 54:39.737
for IT and cyber skillsets?

54:40.138 --> 54:41.744
And that's where I want to put

54:41.744 --> 54:43.890
my battalions and Guard units.

54:43.890 --> 54:45.652
Because when that active duty Soldier leaves,

54:45.652 --> 54:47.543
and as I told you before, I don't think it's bad

54:47.543 --> 54:49.621
that they leave, and they go make their six, seven

54:49.621 --> 54:52.832
figure salaries in industry to make that money,

54:52.832 --> 54:56.106
I want to be able to offer them a job there where they work.

54:56.106 --> 54:57.968
And the reason why I want to go to that target-rich

54:57.968 --> 54:59.586
environment, they're going to jump around

54:59.586 --> 55:01.175
from company to company, but they're probably

55:01.175 --> 55:03.680
going to stay in that close geographical area.

55:03.680 --> 55:05.524
And then when it comes to cyber, they go,

55:05.524 --> 55:08.301
"Well, why do I have to go to Fort Gordon

55:08.301 --> 55:10.819
"or Fort Mead to do this when it's cyber?

55:10.819 --> 55:13.254
"I should be able to operate from wherever I'm at."

55:13.254 --> 55:14.766
And I think that's one of the things

55:14.766 --> 55:17.051
that the Reserves could do a lot better.

55:17.051 --> 55:18.780
The other thing I think is that,

55:18.780 --> 55:20.396
we're trying to hit numbers.

55:20.396 --> 55:21.791
And we should be a lot more critical

55:21.791 --> 55:24.398
about the talent that we recruit.

55:24.398 --> 55:28.075
And we should also be willing to let some talent leave,

55:28.075 --> 55:30.468
if they're not meeting the muster.

55:30.468 --> 55:33.024
So from the Reserve forces, I would look at

55:33.024 --> 55:34.787
how we can position ourselves better

55:34.787 --> 55:37.115
in the next five to 10 years to be additive

55:37.115 --> 55:39.438
to what active duty has and not to be replicate

55:39.438 --> 55:40.681
of what they have, sir.

55:40.681 --> 55:42.373
- [Paul] Thanks, Steve, so a question comes in

55:42.373 --> 55:44.488
and it's directed towards General Morrison.

55:44.488 --> 55:46.072
I'm an electronic warfare soldier,

55:46.072 --> 55:47.681
I hear a lot about cyber today.

55:47.681 --> 55:50.200
But I understand that as a 29 Series Soldier,

55:50.200 --> 55:52.240
I am quickly coming to the realization

55:52.240 --> 55:53.962
that I'm going to be part of the cyber force.

55:53.962 --> 55:55.979
Can you tell me what the future holds for me

55:55.979 --> 55:58.396
as a future EW cyber Soldier?

55:59.229 --> 56:01.193
- So that's a great question.

56:01.193 --> 56:04.026
Effective 1, October of next year,

56:05.541 --> 56:08.433
our 29 Series, our Electronic Warfare professionals

56:08.433 --> 56:11.875
will, in fact, become a part of the cyber branch.

56:11.875 --> 56:15.189
Starting in January, we will roll out a transition course.

56:15.189 --> 56:17.939
And this goes across all cohorts.

56:18.314 --> 56:21.090
Enlisted, warrant officer and officer.

56:21.090 --> 56:23.701
So that we can start training our Electronic Warfare

56:23.701 --> 56:27.868
professionals in the basics of cyberspace operations.

56:28.282 --> 56:30.743
Primarily from a planning perspective.

56:30.743 --> 56:33.225
Because our Electronic Warfare professionals

56:33.225 --> 56:37.392
are going to be the face of cyber for the foreseeable future

56:37.520 --> 56:39.862
that will be in our brigade combat teams

56:39.862 --> 56:42.217
and our division and our corps formations.

56:42.217 --> 56:44.476
So it's important that they understand the fundamentals

56:44.476 --> 56:47.692
of cyberspace operations so that if we ever

56:47.692 --> 56:51.859
deploy some elements out of Army Cyber, into their

56:51.912 --> 56:54.991
area of operation, they understand how that works.

56:54.991 --> 56:57.013
And just as importantly, they can interface

56:57.013 --> 56:59.663
with their cyber defenders that come from the

56:59.663 --> 57:01.042
signal regiment that are already going to be

57:01.042 --> 57:02.770
a part of those formations.

57:02.770 --> 57:04.867
They've got that comprehensive standing.

57:04.867 --> 57:08.929
As a part of that, we are formalizing CIMA cells,

57:08.929 --> 57:11.064
or excuse me, CIMA sections that will be a part

57:11.064 --> 57:14.645
of all these formations, which our Electronic Warfare

57:14.645 --> 57:16.651
professionals will be the head of.

57:16.651 --> 57:18.907
And that really is to bring together the integration

57:18.907 --> 57:23.074
of cyber, EW, signal, information operations, all with

57:23.583 --> 57:27.750
the right intelligence underpinnings as we move forward.

57:27.899 --> 57:31.566
In the future, as we complete the transition

57:31.968 --> 57:36.135
of bringing our current electronic warfare force over,

57:36.496 --> 57:38.824
all folks that come into the cyber branch

57:38.824 --> 57:41.824
will go through the standard courses

57:42.146 --> 57:45.169
that we have today for our cyber operators.

57:45.169 --> 57:47.241
And then, on top of that,

57:47.241 --> 57:50.219
they'll get some electronic warfare training.

57:50.219 --> 57:53.025
That's so that we now have cyber operators,

57:53.025 --> 57:55.078
who have a complete understanding of how to operate

57:55.078 --> 57:57.729
in the electromagnetic spectrum,

57:57.729 --> 58:00.009
down inside these tactical formations.

58:00.009 --> 58:02.733
It will also build a bench for future growth

58:02.733 --> 58:05.891
inside the Cyber Mission Force, if that individual

58:05.891 --> 58:08.150
decides they want to go down that track as well.

58:08.150 --> 58:09.988
But it will baseline everybody so we have

58:09.988 --> 58:13.799
a common understanding across the 17 Series in cyber branch.

58:13.799 --> 58:16.850
- Thanks, John, next question is directed towards

58:16.850 --> 58:19.112
Mr. Guy Filippelli and it says,

58:19.112 --> 58:21.900
Mr. Filippelli, based upon your experiences in the Army

58:21.900 --> 58:24.487
as a Soldier and as an officer, what did you learn

58:24.487 --> 58:26.584
that you applied to the private sector,

58:26.584 --> 58:30.501
particularly with regards to talent management?

58:30.961 --> 58:33.711
- The first thing I would say is,

58:34.207 --> 58:37.749
I guess I learned that you can't fake caring.

58:37.749 --> 58:41.916
And I think that has always really held true for me.

58:44.218 --> 58:48.090
I've always tried to both exemplify that myself,

58:48.090 --> 58:50.090
but hire people that do.

58:50.812 --> 58:53.970
And I think that goes a long way, especially,

58:53.970 --> 58:55.436
there always comes a time in any kind of

58:55.436 --> 58:58.005
working relationship where stress enters the equation.

58:58.005 --> 58:59.965
And when you're really trying to extract

58:59.965 --> 59:03.633
the last 10%, or the next 10% out of a person,

59:03.633 --> 59:06.818
when they trust you, when they know you care,

59:06.818 --> 59:09.318
you can push them pretty hard.

59:10.217 --> 59:12.237
The second thing I would say that,

59:12.237 --> 59:15.820
lessons that have really stretched through,

59:16.481 --> 59:18.539
there's a lot of good things about,

59:18.539 --> 59:20.113
I say this all the time, I'm more in admiration

59:20.113 --> 59:23.064
of the United States military since every day

59:23.064 --> 59:25.064
I've been outside of it.

59:25.114 --> 59:28.636
You're talking about a million-person organization

59:28.636 --> 59:32.386
that self-manages with new people every year.

59:35.026 --> 59:37.391
Imagine, no company in Silicon Valley

59:37.391 --> 59:39.671
could come close to pulling that off, frankly.

59:39.671 --> 59:42.754
There's something amazing about that.

59:45.427 --> 59:47.988
It works because of some of the discipline

59:47.988 --> 59:51.321
and the order around performance reviews

59:51.967 --> 59:55.819
and these are all good concepts done the right way.

59:55.819 --> 59:59.236
I've found that people love transparency,

01:00:01.060 --> 01:00:02.824
they want to know how they're doing.

01:00:02.824 --> 01:00:04.504
They want to know where they're going.

01:00:04.504 --> 01:00:05.677
They want to know that their family's

01:00:05.677 --> 01:00:06.712
cared about and taken care of.

01:00:06.712 --> 01:00:10.879
So those are definitely lessons that have pulled through.

01:00:13.688 --> 01:00:15.611
And I've always just also just tried

01:00:15.611 --> 01:00:17.812
to drive people really hard.

01:00:17.812 --> 01:00:19.204
Almost to a point of exhaustion

01:00:19.204 --> 01:00:22.121
and when they're ready to go, then,

01:00:22.599 --> 01:00:24.453
the one thing I would say that I've changed,

01:00:24.453 --> 01:00:26.058
and I'll just change the question a little bit,

01:00:26.058 --> 01:00:28.141
is like what's different?

01:00:28.965 --> 01:00:30.777
The biggest difference I'll tell you

01:00:30.777 --> 01:00:32.777
as a private sector guy,

01:00:33.595 --> 01:00:37.678
when I've got investors or when I've got a Board,

01:00:39.225 --> 01:00:40.992
if I would have said, "What's my job as a leader

01:00:40.992 --> 01:00:43.325
"in the United States Army?"

01:00:43.416 --> 01:00:46.047
I would have probably said my job,

01:00:46.047 --> 01:00:49.152
the core of my job is to develop my people

01:00:49.152 --> 01:00:52.379
and manage and develop my people the best I can every day.

01:00:52.379 --> 01:00:54.046
Make my team better.

01:00:55.547 --> 01:00:57.547
That's the great leader.

01:00:58.248 --> 01:01:00.441
And I always tell people, that's not my job

01:01:00.441 --> 01:01:02.452
when I'm the CEO of a company.

01:01:02.452 --> 01:01:05.785
My job is to put the best field on the team every day.

01:01:05.785 --> 01:01:09.952
Going back to the early comments about who's right when.

01:01:10.413 --> 01:01:12.664
I kind of go in with the mindset, for better

01:01:12.664 --> 01:01:15.987
or for worse, for what it's worth, every day,

01:01:15.987 --> 01:01:18.580
if you're not the right, if there's a better person

01:01:18.580 --> 01:01:20.330
for the job than you,

01:01:22.090 --> 01:01:24.196
my number one choice is probably

01:01:24.196 --> 01:01:26.169
to fire you and replace you.

01:01:26.169 --> 01:01:29.445
I hate to say that, but it's a mindset shift.

01:01:29.445 --> 01:01:31.288
And obviously there's costs to that.

01:01:31.288 --> 01:01:33.707
So you don't want to do that all the time, you'd have chaos,

01:01:33.707 --> 01:01:35.848
because that's what keeps you from doing that.

01:01:35.848 --> 01:01:38.753
But your job's not to develop people

01:01:38.753 --> 01:01:40.177
when you're trying to move fast.

01:01:40.177 --> 01:01:42.645
Your job is to get the team right.

01:01:42.645 --> 01:01:45.004
Just some additional color, I guess.

01:01:45.004 --> 01:01:47.327
- [Paul] Mr. Chris Lynch, a question comes in,

01:01:47.327 --> 01:01:49.813
in terms of what has pleasantly surprised you,

01:01:49.813 --> 01:01:51.975
in terms of talent management, what have you learned

01:01:51.975 --> 01:01:54.431
from your experiences here at the Department of Defense?

01:01:54.431 --> 01:01:55.732
- This is one of the,

01:01:55.732 --> 01:01:58.065
I'll tell you a funny story.

01:01:59.939 --> 01:02:03.106
Again, I knew very little about, well,

01:02:03.184 --> 01:02:05.351
the DoD or the government.

01:02:05.896 --> 01:02:10.063
And I showed up for 45 days, about 2 1/2 years ago,

01:02:10.374 --> 01:02:13.078
so I showed up initially for 45 days.

01:02:13.078 --> 01:02:16.328
That's both the joke and the punchline.

01:02:17.141 --> 01:02:20.391
The interesting part about that is that

01:02:20.557 --> 01:02:23.890
I talked a little bit ago about mission.

01:02:24.193 --> 01:02:26.286
And one of the things that I actually find

01:02:26.286 --> 01:02:28.369
fascinating about this is

01:02:30.408 --> 01:02:34.408
I showed up because like so many people like me,

01:02:34.830 --> 01:02:38.344
I can remember when, I'll tell you this quick story.

01:02:38.344 --> 01:02:40.640
I remember watching when, you remember healthcare.gov

01:02:40.640 --> 01:02:42.361
when it launched on the internet

01:02:42.361 --> 01:02:44.853
and it didn't launch very well?

01:02:44.853 --> 01:02:46.866
And I'm a nerd and I'm watching the news

01:02:46.866 --> 01:02:49.398
and I remember it being talked about, healthcare.gov

01:02:49.398 --> 01:02:50.442
and how it was doing so bad.

01:02:50.442 --> 01:02:53.724
And I said this exact statement to my wife,

01:02:53.724 --> 01:02:56.116
I was like, "I could just do better myself."

01:02:56.116 --> 01:02:58.794
(laughs) I could literally write the whole thing myself

01:02:58.794 --> 01:03:02.017
and it would be better than what the government made.

01:03:02.017 --> 01:03:04.488
So that's the attitude I came in with.

01:03:04.488 --> 01:03:07.155
Was, nobody's coming to save us.

01:03:08.692 --> 01:03:10.626
We have to, the nerds have to show up,

01:03:10.626 --> 01:03:12.258
we have to do this thing.

01:03:12.258 --> 01:03:13.396
But here's the really interesting part

01:03:13.396 --> 01:03:17.117
that I kind of mentioned when I did my introduction.

01:03:17.117 --> 01:03:21.284
General Nakasone has been witness to this as well.

01:03:22.120 --> 01:03:24.229
I mentioned that we went around and interviewed

01:03:24.229 --> 01:03:26.812
about 200 or so cyber soldiers.

01:03:28.921 --> 01:03:33.088
We kicked off a, everything in my office is about Star Wars.

01:03:33.541 --> 01:03:36.687
Actually, the sign on my office door says Rebel Alliance

01:03:36.687 --> 01:03:40.104
on it, so there's a program that we have,

01:03:40.943 --> 01:03:43.854
much like Hack the Pentagon that's called

01:03:43.854 --> 01:03:45.609
Jyn Erso, which is one of the characters

01:03:45.609 --> 01:03:47.457
from Star Wars Rogue One.

01:03:47.457 --> 01:03:51.124
If you haven't seen it, I highly suggest it.

01:03:51.599 --> 01:03:55.099
The first cohort we generously got a group

01:03:55.786 --> 01:03:59.036
of incredible soldiers from Army Cyber,

01:04:00.835 --> 01:04:03.519
the schoolhouse and a few other places

01:04:03.519 --> 01:04:07.269
who came in to work side by side with my team

01:04:08.937 --> 01:04:12.687
on building something that hadn't been built.

01:04:13.057 --> 01:04:15.488
And you know what, they're just as good

01:04:15.488 --> 01:04:17.488
as the team that I hire.

01:04:18.159 --> 01:04:21.459
I hire top 1% talent in the United States.

01:04:21.459 --> 01:04:24.126
Top 1%, you can do searches

01:04:24.769 --> 01:04:27.717
around some of the people who've been on my team there.

01:04:27.717 --> 01:04:31.860
Some of the most well-known people that exist in tech.

01:04:31.860 --> 01:04:33.889
And they're just as good.

01:04:33.889 --> 01:04:38.056
I have five exceptional Soldiers building something

01:04:38.493 --> 01:04:42.660
in my offices in the Pentagon that are just as good.

01:04:43.485 --> 01:04:47.652
I didn't know that that existed, honestly, I didn't.

01:04:48.173 --> 01:04:51.262
I've learned a lot since I've shown up here.

01:04:51.262 --> 01:04:52.289
And a lot of it has probably changed me

01:04:52.289 --> 01:04:54.060
for the rest of my life.

01:04:54.060 --> 01:04:57.251
On many days, I say it's the worst job that I've ever had.

01:04:57.251 --> 01:04:58.459
But then I have occasional moments

01:04:58.459 --> 01:05:02.134
where it's the best thing that I'll ever experience.

01:05:02.134 --> 01:05:06.301
One of those things is truly some exceptional talent.

01:05:07.246 --> 01:05:09.291
And I'm going to tie this back to something

01:05:09.291 --> 01:05:11.206
that's really important, going back to the point

01:05:11.206 --> 01:05:13.452
that I was making around what's different,

01:05:13.452 --> 01:05:17.369
the question about what's different about this?

01:05:17.730 --> 01:05:21.012
Those five Soldiers that we have working side by side

01:05:21.012 --> 01:05:22.713
with my engineers on something that is

01:05:22.713 --> 01:05:26.645
an incredible thing that they're developing in our offices,

01:05:26.645 --> 01:05:30.812
those five Soldiers are worth multiples over anything else.

01:05:31.929 --> 01:05:34.299
At least in the technical front.

01:05:34.299 --> 01:05:38.466
Can't train it, they just are, they're great engineers.

01:05:38.955 --> 01:05:40.955
And they're in the Army.

01:05:41.011 --> 01:05:43.085
And I think that that's amazing.

01:05:43.085 --> 01:05:46.418
That should make us all proud and happy.

01:05:47.266 --> 01:05:49.699
But here's the thing, we have to get them

01:05:49.699 --> 01:05:53.031
into the place where they can work in a group like mine.

01:05:53.031 --> 01:05:56.377
Work in a partnership with General Nakasone

01:05:56.377 --> 01:05:58.152
on something that matters.

01:05:58.152 --> 01:06:01.819
Remove the bureaucracy, remove the bullshit.

01:06:01.852 --> 01:06:05.741
Take all that away, let them do a thing that matters.

01:06:05.741 --> 01:06:08.365
And I think that that's really important.

01:06:08.365 --> 01:06:12.448
So when I think of the thing that I have learned,

01:06:12.808 --> 01:06:15.641
it's that, we have amazing talent.

01:06:15.903 --> 01:06:19.143
Sometimes we just have them in the wrong place.

01:06:19.143 --> 01:06:22.532
So let's put them in the places where they can shine.

01:06:22.532 --> 01:06:23.895
- Thanks, Chris, really appreciate it.

01:06:23.895 --> 01:06:25.537
Ladies and gentlemen, just to synchronize our watches,

01:06:25.537 --> 01:06:28.304
it's 15:07 right now, we're going to take questions

01:06:28.304 --> 01:06:32.471
until about 15:15 and then have one closing question

01:06:33.526 --> 01:06:35.096
to all members of the panel.

01:06:35.096 --> 01:06:37.314
So have about 13, 15 minutes left.

01:06:37.314 --> 01:06:40.064
So please send your questions in.

01:06:40.423 --> 01:06:42.840
Let me return to Steve Hager.

01:06:43.792 --> 01:06:46.723
Steve, as you take a look at what you've been able

01:06:46.723 --> 01:06:50.795
to work on, both deployed in Southwest Asia and here

01:06:50.795 --> 01:06:54.009
in terms of your work with the National Mission Force,

01:06:54.009 --> 01:06:56.004
what has it been about your experiences

01:06:56.004 --> 01:06:58.230
with the Soldiers and civilians that you're working with

01:06:58.230 --> 01:07:00.159
today that has surprised you the most?

01:07:00.159 --> 01:07:01.153
- Surprised me the most.

01:07:01.153 --> 01:07:03.961
So I'll actually echo what Chris had said.

01:07:03.961 --> 01:07:07.278
As a youngster, I should say, back in the late '80s,

01:07:07.278 --> 01:07:10.042
early '90s when I worked at, my first assignment

01:07:10.042 --> 01:07:11.742
was at National Security Agency.

01:07:11.742 --> 01:07:15.909
On a technical side, tremendous capability skillset.

01:07:16.989 --> 01:07:19.383
So I have to echo that and now at the Cyber National

01:07:19.383 --> 01:07:22.606
Mission Force, I have some young captains

01:07:22.606 --> 01:07:26.158
that do just some amazing work that I would say

01:07:26.158 --> 01:07:28.366
some of them actually were industry before.

01:07:28.366 --> 01:07:30.565
And they left active duty, they did some stuff

01:07:30.565 --> 01:07:32.538
in industry and they said they wanted to get back

01:07:32.538 --> 01:07:34.354
to do the mission, so they came back.

01:07:34.354 --> 01:07:36.546
And I think one of my jobs is try to make sure

01:07:36.546 --> 01:07:40.256
we can retain them by giving them good mission sets.

01:07:40.256 --> 01:07:42.306
And the thing I've learned as a leader

01:07:42.306 --> 01:07:43.798
at the Cyber National Mission Force

01:07:43.798 --> 01:07:47.648
is I constantly ask them, "Am I challenging you enough?"

01:07:47.648 --> 01:07:49.522
Because I think if the answer is they're not

01:07:49.522 --> 01:07:52.032
being challenged, that's when they're going to walk.

01:07:52.032 --> 01:07:54.291
And I think that's important.

01:07:54.291 --> 01:07:55.837
So, sure, what I'd say the difference is,

01:07:55.837 --> 01:07:58.270
as the ONM guy, working for General Baker,

01:07:58.270 --> 01:08:01.119
running the network, running a network,

01:08:01.119 --> 01:08:02.905
at least the DODIN part of the network,

01:08:02.905 --> 01:08:05.072
it's much more regimented.

01:08:06.293 --> 01:08:08.775
Because we have to make sure that we have things

01:08:08.775 --> 01:08:12.164
patched and STIGed and change management is very important.

01:08:12.164 --> 01:08:14.765
We can use some automation to maybe simulate the network

01:08:14.765 --> 01:08:17.576
to help us with incident, trouble ticketing,

01:08:17.576 --> 01:08:21.002
and change management, so it's a much more regimented thing.

01:08:21.002 --> 01:08:23.627
And when I go to the Cyber National Mission Force,

01:08:23.627 --> 01:08:26.290
we've taken teams the services give us,

01:08:26.290 --> 01:08:29.893
we have national teams, support teams, and CPTs,

01:08:29.893 --> 01:08:33.599
that we've done there is we've actually combined the teams.

01:08:33.599 --> 01:08:37.204
So we don't think of offensive-defensive teams.

01:08:37.204 --> 01:08:40.371
We actually think that latency between

01:08:40.702 --> 01:08:43.386
intelligence and operations and operations and intelligence,

01:08:43.386 --> 01:08:45.757
we're trying to make that near zero.

01:08:45.757 --> 01:08:48.543
Offensive cyber operations, defensive cyber operations.

01:08:48.543 --> 01:08:50.962
I'm trying to make that latency near zero.

01:08:50.962 --> 01:08:53.467
And to do that, you have to have skillsets.

01:08:53.467 --> 01:08:55.540
And you have to have trust,

01:08:55.540 --> 01:08:57.044
which is very important and you have

01:08:57.044 --> 01:08:58.470
to have a network of people.

01:08:58.470 --> 01:09:01.999
So the thing that's amazed me in my time is

01:09:01.999 --> 01:09:05.002
the depth of knowledge of my workforce

01:09:05.002 --> 01:09:08.862
and the ability where, what I also see in Silicon Valley,

01:09:08.862 --> 01:09:11.734
is who they can go to ask questions of.

01:09:11.734 --> 01:09:15.723
And that gets back to being recognized by their peers.

01:09:15.723 --> 01:09:17.883
In the tech sector, everybody wants to work for these

01:09:17.883 --> 01:09:20.523
really cool guys that are leaders in their tech sector,

01:09:20.523 --> 01:09:23.221
well, we know the person who's called the top malware

01:09:23.221 --> 01:09:26.773
analyst in the Navy, we have him in San Antonio

01:09:26.773 --> 01:09:28.503
and my guys want to go talk to him.

01:09:28.503 --> 01:09:30.696
Or I have somebody who's really good at this type of access

01:09:30.696 --> 01:09:32.192
that they want to talk to you.

01:09:32.192 --> 01:09:36.343
So in that small community, they get that reputation

01:09:36.343 --> 01:09:38.322
and they're able to develop that.

01:09:38.322 --> 01:09:40.645
From my perspective, I think that's great.

01:09:40.645 --> 01:09:42.234
That's how we're building that skillset.

01:09:42.234 --> 01:09:44.187
And we want to, as you guys maybe call it a beacon,

01:09:44.187 --> 01:09:46.208
I think that's how we're exemplifying it.

01:09:46.208 --> 01:09:48.483
And we actually have those individuals in our workforce,

01:09:48.483 --> 01:09:50.841
and I'm very proud to work with them.

01:09:50.841 --> 01:09:53.689
- [Paul] Guy Filippelli, before you joined the Army

01:09:53.689 --> 01:09:56.781
and before you were a leader in industry,

01:09:56.781 --> 01:09:59.727
you were an academician you were a scholar,

01:09:59.727 --> 01:10:02.249
to include a martial scholar as I recall.

01:10:02.249 --> 01:10:04.302
The question that's come in here is,

01:10:04.302 --> 01:10:06.020
what do you see as the role for academia

01:10:06.020 --> 01:10:08.776
and the academic partnerships with universities?

01:10:08.776 --> 01:10:10.938
What role should the Army have, based upon

01:10:10.938 --> 01:10:13.486
your experiences in encouraging such things

01:10:13.486 --> 01:10:15.882
as science, technology, engineering and mathematics

01:10:15.882 --> 01:10:18.960
in the highs schools or in cyber areas?

01:10:18.960 --> 01:10:22.124
- Yeah, I'll be probably maybe a little more

01:10:22.124 --> 01:10:24.707
critical of this than expected,

01:10:25.032 --> 01:10:28.983
but I kind of thing academia is a little dangerous

01:10:28.983 --> 01:10:31.733
at the higher levels, in general.

01:10:31.877 --> 01:10:35.877
So yes, I had some exposure to elite grad school

01:10:36.888 --> 01:10:41.055
kind of stuff, but academics, I think if you asked any

01:10:41.972 --> 01:10:44.324
private sector company how much do they focus

01:10:44.324 --> 01:10:48.491
on their academic relationships with big-time academics?

01:10:50.243 --> 01:10:52.795
They'd say, "Yeah, we focus on universities for recruiting.

01:10:52.795 --> 01:10:55.592
"We try to get them early before get too mentally shape

01:10:55.592 --> 01:10:59.759
"shifted in being into being like a permanent student."

01:11:01.513 --> 01:11:03.513
Just to be fair on that,

01:11:08.474 --> 01:11:10.508
yeah, I think I'll leave it at that.

01:11:10.508 --> 01:11:11.848
(audience laughing)

01:11:11.848 --> 01:11:13.038
- [Paul] Well done, Guy.

01:11:13.038 --> 01:11:14.291
Ladies and gentlemen, let me go ahead

01:11:14.291 --> 01:11:15.641
and we'll move on to our last question.

01:11:15.641 --> 01:11:17.187
And the last question here is designed

01:11:17.187 --> 01:11:19.716
for each of our panelists to answer.

01:11:19.716 --> 01:11:22.280
And I'm going to start with Steve Hager,

01:11:22.280 --> 01:11:24.060
since I think he introduced this.

01:11:24.060 --> 01:11:25.832
And the question goes like this,

01:11:25.832 --> 01:11:27.997
we've heard a lot about Army Cyber 1.0

01:11:27.997 --> 01:11:31.164
and a little bit about Army Cyber 2.0,

01:11:31.478 --> 01:11:34.311
what does Army Cyber 3.0 look like

01:11:34.570 --> 01:11:36.898
and what's the greatest missing element

01:11:36.898 --> 01:11:39.565
that we need to build as of now?

01:11:39.793 --> 01:11:41.949
- Sir, it's hard to predict the future.

01:11:41.949 --> 01:11:43.672
But I think what you have to do

01:11:43.672 --> 01:11:45.784
is you have to invest in trends.

01:11:45.784 --> 01:11:49.283
So we need a workforce that can identify trends,

01:11:49.283 --> 01:11:53.325
whether they be technological, social or geopolitical.

01:11:53.325 --> 01:11:55.821
And based on that, trying to figure out how,

01:11:55.821 --> 01:11:59.008
within the multi-domain battle that we can figure out

01:11:59.008 --> 01:12:02.341
where those investments are and not just

01:12:02.533 --> 01:12:05.033
shiny objects, but with people

01:12:05.560 --> 01:12:07.146
and how we're going to do that.

01:12:07.146 --> 01:12:09.436
And I think that's why my earlier comments

01:12:09.436 --> 01:12:12.090
of how COMPO-2, COMPO-3 can add to that,

01:12:12.090 --> 01:12:16.257
I really believe that as cyber is being recognized

01:12:17.009 --> 01:12:21.176
with the elevation of Cyber Command to be its own domain.

01:12:21.777 --> 01:12:23.884
Most of us know that, but now that's acknowledged

01:12:23.884 --> 01:12:24.791
that it will happen.

01:12:24.791 --> 01:12:26.740
I think we also should try to think of cyber

01:12:26.740 --> 01:12:29.030
as an instrument of national power.

01:12:29.030 --> 01:12:32.001
And if I look at the analogy of, say, the air domain,

01:12:32.001 --> 01:12:34.790
we have the greatest military Air Force in the world,

01:12:34.790 --> 01:12:37.835
but we also have a huge economic base

01:12:37.835 --> 01:12:41.304
that helps develop airplanes and so forth.

01:12:41.304 --> 01:12:43.050
We have a huge commercial sector

01:12:43.050 --> 01:12:45.877
that has people traveling around the world.

01:12:45.877 --> 01:12:48.723
And our government can use that as a tool,

01:12:48.723 --> 01:12:52.175
a lever, to influence other nations to do things.

01:12:52.175 --> 01:12:54.065
We can say, hey, Boeing's not going to be allowed

01:12:54.065 --> 01:12:56.336
to sell you aircraft, we're not going to allow flights

01:12:56.336 --> 01:12:58.972
into your country and back and forth.

01:12:58.972 --> 01:13:00.992
And I think we should have that discussion

01:13:00.992 --> 01:13:03.407
if cyber should go along that domain.

01:13:03.407 --> 01:13:06.306
And I think when you talk about Cyber 3.0

01:13:06.306 --> 01:13:09.815
or farther on, we should, at the academic level,

01:13:09.815 --> 01:13:12.339
have those discussions, so the policy makers

01:13:12.339 --> 01:13:14.564
can help us put the resources to that,

01:13:14.564 --> 01:13:17.031
if they so choose to go in that direction.

01:13:17.031 --> 01:13:19.364
- [Paul] Thanks, Steve, Guy.

01:13:23.221 --> 01:13:26.096
- For me, first of all, having watched

01:13:26.096 --> 01:13:29.513
what has been accomplished, it is awesome

01:13:29.731 --> 01:13:32.456
that the military, if you take a step back,

01:13:32.456 --> 01:13:35.504
that, in a very, very short amount of time,

01:13:35.504 --> 01:13:38.271
have built an organization that does have

01:13:38.271 --> 01:13:40.399
this much flexibility in it.

01:13:40.399 --> 01:13:41.893
Within the federal government, I think we ought

01:13:41.893 --> 01:13:44.322
to recognize that that's been a hell of an achievement.

01:13:44.322 --> 01:13:47.655
Not perfect yet, but it's getting there.

01:13:47.846 --> 01:13:50.846
That guys like Chris Lynch and Steve

01:13:50.872 --> 01:13:53.539
are even in the room in the jobs

01:13:54.180 --> 01:13:57.013
that they're in is pretty amazing.

01:13:57.276 --> 01:14:00.526
I think the two areas that could really

01:14:01.528 --> 01:14:03.611
take it to another level,

01:14:04.578 --> 01:14:07.086
I think one I talked about a lot, leadership,

01:14:07.086 --> 01:14:10.091
and figuring out how the right technical leaders

01:14:10.091 --> 01:14:13.241
can be attached at all levels of the force.

01:14:13.241 --> 01:14:15.821
Because that's not always going to be the commander role,

01:14:15.821 --> 01:14:18.278
but just to be clear on one more point on this,

01:14:18.278 --> 01:14:21.102
there are great companies in Silicon Valley

01:14:21.102 --> 01:14:23.181
that are not run by engineers.

01:14:23.181 --> 01:14:26.035
They're run by sales and marketing people.

01:14:26.035 --> 01:14:28.467
But I guarantee you they have strong

01:14:28.467 --> 01:14:30.909
engineering leadership within them.

01:14:30.909 --> 01:14:33.811
And great CEOs who come from sales marketing

01:14:33.811 --> 01:14:35.976
backgrounds know that well, that's what the first

01:14:35.976 --> 01:14:39.150
thing they do is they say, "I got sales and marketing.

01:14:39.150 --> 01:14:41.902
"But I'm going to make sure that my right hand

01:14:41.902 --> 01:14:44.485
"is a technical badass leader."

01:14:44.527 --> 01:14:47.694
Beacon, whatever we want to call them.

01:14:47.887 --> 01:14:50.214
The second thing, though, that I do want to

01:14:50.214 --> 01:14:53.214
touch on is this permeation concept.

01:14:53.555 --> 01:14:56.827
Because I think that Steve said it like three different

01:14:56.827 --> 01:14:59.253
times today and it's such a powerful,

01:14:59.253 --> 01:15:01.686
the idea that we gotta change the way people can

01:15:01.686 --> 01:15:04.388
come in and come out and what we do with them

01:15:04.388 --> 01:15:06.536
when they leave, we talked about this,

01:15:06.536 --> 01:15:08.727
we had a prior conversation,

01:15:08.727 --> 01:15:11.502
but when you think about who you want to emulate,

01:15:11.502 --> 01:15:14.259
really, I'm saying like what system you want to run.

01:15:14.259 --> 01:15:16.695
What kind of offense or what's the system?

01:15:16.695 --> 01:15:18.663
There are certain companies out there

01:15:18.663 --> 01:15:20.766
that make assumptions that they're not

01:15:20.766 --> 01:15:22.623
going to keep all their people.

01:15:22.623 --> 01:15:26.550
But they build and manage their alumni network accordingly.

01:15:26.550 --> 01:15:29.300
Goldman Sachs is a great example.

01:15:31.283 --> 01:15:33.843
They operate with the assumption that we're going to

01:15:33.843 --> 01:15:35.711
get somebody for two or three years,

01:15:35.711 --> 01:15:37.618
so they overhire at the bottom.

01:15:37.618 --> 01:15:41.368
Overhire, way, they accept 60% attrition

01:15:41.536 --> 01:15:43.818
in the first few years, and then they take advantage

01:15:43.818 --> 01:15:46.803
of every single one of those people when they've left.

01:15:46.803 --> 01:15:48.171
Take advantage of every single one of them

01:15:48.171 --> 01:15:50.043
in a different way, they figure out a way.

01:15:50.043 --> 01:15:54.210
I think the Israelis do this as a military extremely well.

01:15:54.541 --> 01:15:57.458
Where they embrace, you never know,

01:15:57.484 --> 01:15:59.979
I hate to say this, I love the Israelis.

01:15:59.979 --> 01:16:01.991
But we all kind of feel like we're not sure

01:16:01.991 --> 01:16:03.632
if somebody, an Israeli, who's out of the military

01:16:03.632 --> 01:16:05.465
is still in it or not.

01:16:06.090 --> 01:16:07.242
When we're dealing with them,

01:16:07.242 --> 01:16:08.975
because they just do such a good job

01:16:08.975 --> 01:16:11.558
of keeping everybody connected.

01:16:12.947 --> 01:16:14.893
It's easy to say, tactical way,

01:16:14.893 --> 01:16:17.921
how the heck, I was just thinking like how do you do that?

01:16:17.921 --> 01:16:20.053
So for example, one of the challenges with our

01:16:20.053 --> 01:16:23.643
Reserve system right now is that it's still binary.

01:16:23.643 --> 01:16:24.697
It's still like you want to be in the Reserves,

01:16:24.697 --> 01:16:28.014
okay, it's a weekend a month, two weeks a year thing.

01:16:28.014 --> 01:16:31.062
And in reality, I'm not going to impact

01:16:31.062 --> 01:16:34.295
the organization if I come in on the weekend

01:16:34.295 --> 01:16:36.878
and all the other people leave.

01:16:37.065 --> 01:16:38.850
So the Reserve comes in that weekend

01:16:38.850 --> 01:16:41.600
and all the main people are gone.

01:16:42.130 --> 01:16:43.691
So you've got to think of like,

01:16:43.691 --> 01:16:45.908
take advantage of technology and think of like a Reserve

01:16:45.908 --> 01:16:48.971
system where I could be in the Reserves

01:16:48.971 --> 01:16:51.388
as like a Reserve consultant.

01:16:51.530 --> 01:16:53.278
And they could, I don't care what they pay,

01:16:53.278 --> 01:16:55.460
$50 an hour, but the whole point of it is,

01:16:55.460 --> 01:16:57.231
can I somehow get at access to be there

01:16:57.231 --> 01:16:58.974
for a 2:00 p.m. meeting on a Thursday

01:16:58.974 --> 01:17:01.224
to talk about architecture?

01:17:01.649 --> 01:17:04.152
And that's where the geographics do come into play,

01:17:04.152 --> 01:17:06.174
too, but think about that.

01:17:06.174 --> 01:17:07.955
If we could create the conditions where

01:17:07.955 --> 01:17:10.989
I could leave and I could stay connected

01:17:10.989 --> 01:17:14.489
to the force and I could still participate

01:17:14.545 --> 01:17:16.465
and stay inspired and that's what's also going

01:17:16.465 --> 01:17:18.798
to cause me to come back in.

01:17:19.066 --> 01:17:21.566
And who says we can't do that?

01:17:22.106 --> 01:17:25.356
So it's just to me, it's thinking about

01:17:26.244 --> 01:17:30.411
how does the structure change to keep people more connected?

01:17:30.667 --> 01:17:34.000
By the way, who owns the alumni network?

01:17:35.198 --> 01:17:37.115
To know it and keep it?

01:17:38.498 --> 01:17:41.069
Look at any great venture capital firm

01:17:41.069 --> 01:17:43.757
that really is the engine of all innovation in the Valley,

01:17:43.757 --> 01:17:47.327
they know where every person they want to hire is.

01:17:47.327 --> 01:17:49.401
They track them, they spend a tremendous amount

01:17:49.401 --> 01:17:51.979
of money on tracking people once they've left.

01:17:51.979 --> 01:17:53.505
Especially the good ones.

01:17:53.505 --> 01:17:55.816
So you're going to lose some of those five.

01:17:55.816 --> 01:17:57.733
For sure, at one point.

01:17:58.110 --> 01:17:59.865
And really, in reality, there's hundreds,

01:17:59.865 --> 01:18:01.901
if not thousands of them.

01:18:01.901 --> 01:18:04.524
Who in the Army has the responsibility

01:18:04.524 --> 01:18:06.357
to track those people?

01:18:06.496 --> 01:18:09.579
That's what's going to make us great.

01:18:10.281 --> 01:18:12.614
- [Paul] Thanks, Guy, Chris.

01:18:14.098 --> 01:18:16.564
- I was sitting here listening to everybody answers

01:18:16.564 --> 01:18:17.647
and I was trying to think,

01:18:17.647 --> 01:18:20.480
what am I going to say about this?

01:18:20.564 --> 01:18:22.460
I'll just make a couple observations,

01:18:22.460 --> 01:18:25.553
because I believe that humans are inherently

01:18:25.553 --> 01:18:29.364
not very good at predicting the future very well.

01:18:29.364 --> 01:18:32.114
10 years ago, I had a BlackBerry.

01:18:33.672 --> 01:18:36.589
And I had just bought a BlackBerry,

01:18:36.821 --> 01:18:39.523
but it was called the Pearl, it had just come out.

01:18:39.523 --> 01:18:42.264
And I remember showing people this phone,

01:18:42.264 --> 01:18:43.901
and I was like, this is really cool.

01:18:43.901 --> 01:18:46.650
Okay, this one, this what the DoD uses.

01:18:46.650 --> 01:18:48.124
It's fine, it's fine.
- It's my personal.

01:18:48.124 --> 01:18:49.514
- It's actually not the story,

01:18:49.514 --> 01:18:51.714
but that's the (laughs).
- That's the Army phone,

01:18:51.714 --> 01:18:54.135
that's my own personal.
- Yeah, no, I know.

01:18:54.135 --> 01:18:56.715
This is real, this is happening.

01:18:56.715 --> 01:18:57.954
(audience laughing)

01:18:57.954 --> 01:19:00.243
And I remember I just bought this and then I watched

01:19:00.243 --> 01:19:04.326
the keynote where Steve Jobs unveiled the iPhone.

01:19:06.116 --> 01:19:08.533
And I remember thinking, wow.

01:19:08.965 --> 01:19:12.798
It looked like, I remember this exact thought,

01:19:12.926 --> 01:19:17.009
it's almost like somebody had gone to the future,

01:19:17.241 --> 01:19:21.408
taken something from it and then brought it back in time.

01:19:21.691 --> 01:19:24.940
Because I was comparing it to the BlackBerry Pearl.

01:19:24.940 --> 01:19:27.335
Well, you could compare it to this, too.

01:19:27.335 --> 01:19:28.752
This one's newer.

01:19:30.830 --> 01:19:34.247
My reason for bringing that up is because

01:19:34.404 --> 01:19:36.578
that was just 10 years ago, think of how much

01:19:36.578 --> 01:19:39.411
your life has changed in 10 years.

01:19:39.425 --> 01:19:42.592
The entire lighting system in my house

01:19:43.433 --> 01:19:46.100
is controlled by an Amazon Echo.

01:19:47.071 --> 01:19:48.583
I say, "Turn on the living room lights."

01:19:48.583 --> 01:19:51.415
They automatically turn on, really, for the most part.

01:19:51.415 --> 01:19:54.833
I can change them any color just by saying the color I want.

01:19:54.833 --> 01:19:57.051
In some ways, I think of these things

01:19:57.051 --> 01:19:59.551
and I think back 10 years ago,

01:20:01.499 --> 01:20:02.999
that didn't exist.

01:20:03.379 --> 01:20:05.546
Those things didn't exist.

01:20:06.461 --> 01:20:09.002
And it's really funny when you think about that.

01:20:09.002 --> 01:20:11.252
Because it's the difficulty

01:20:13.175 --> 01:20:15.518
that we have is that it comes down to one

01:20:15.518 --> 01:20:18.185
incredible thing and I feel like

01:20:18.465 --> 01:20:20.798
Guy and Steve and I probably

01:20:22.497 --> 01:20:26.164
can all relate to this very important thing.

01:20:26.932 --> 01:20:29.265
The only constant is change.

01:20:30.283 --> 01:20:33.762
And it is also the most uncomfortable thing that exists.

01:20:33.762 --> 01:20:35.345
Humans hate change.

01:20:35.486 --> 01:20:38.538
You know how Facebook, they change like an icon

01:20:38.538 --> 01:20:41.418
and people are like, "Oh my God, they changed an icon!"

01:20:41.418 --> 01:20:43.358
And they go insane and they're like,

01:20:43.358 --> 01:20:45.503
"Don't like this on Facebook," and there's all

01:20:45.503 --> 01:20:47.464
these little things that are going around.

01:20:47.464 --> 01:20:49.595
And it's like, "Jeez, it's just an icon change."

01:20:49.595 --> 01:20:51.698
And if you think about it, that's actually part

01:20:51.698 --> 01:20:54.226
of the difficulty in an organization the size

01:20:54.226 --> 01:20:55.808
of the Department of Defense.

01:20:55.808 --> 01:20:57.491
Because when you have millions of people

01:20:57.491 --> 01:21:01.329
who are connected to this thing, it is the constant.

01:21:01.329 --> 01:21:04.912
But cyber is even faster, it's even faster.

01:21:05.842 --> 01:21:09.759
New frameworks are released nearly once a month

01:21:09.894 --> 01:21:12.500
at the very least, if not weekly.

01:21:12.500 --> 01:21:14.541
New frameworks, that's new vulnerabilities,

01:21:14.541 --> 01:21:17.166
that's new weaknesses, that's new,

01:21:17.166 --> 01:21:20.749
there's an opportunity in there every week.

01:21:21.421 --> 01:21:23.838
How does that work in a world

01:21:24.628 --> 01:21:28.795
where the acquisition of things can take sometimes years?

01:21:29.517 --> 01:21:31.321
How does that work in a way that we think about

01:21:31.321 --> 01:21:34.152
our traditional instructional models?

01:21:34.152 --> 01:21:37.448
How does that work in a world where we have

01:21:37.448 --> 01:21:40.281
a concept that's called zero days?

01:21:41.408 --> 01:21:44.339
It doesn't, that's actually the answer.

01:21:44.339 --> 01:21:45.834
The answer is it doesn't.

01:21:45.834 --> 01:21:49.169
So when I think about what all of this is,

01:21:49.169 --> 01:21:51.167
what does it mean, where are we going?

01:21:51.167 --> 01:21:53.313
And without making any broad predictions,

01:21:53.313 --> 01:21:55.526
I can tell you the characteristics

01:21:55.526 --> 01:21:59.026
that ultimately are important to startups,

01:21:59.145 --> 01:22:03.228
in particular, but to whatever we want to become.

01:22:03.292 --> 01:22:06.542
And one is, we are incredibly adaptable

01:22:06.681 --> 01:22:10.722
to the change that we did not ever assume would exist.

01:22:10.722 --> 01:22:12.918
Because one day you bought the BlackBerry Pearl

01:22:12.918 --> 01:22:16.182
and then I bought a new phone for $700 three months later.

01:22:16.182 --> 01:22:17.679
And it was called the iPhone.

01:22:17.679 --> 01:22:21.086
That was a true story, I was like "Holy crap."

01:22:21.086 --> 01:22:24.497
I just bought another phone just a couple months before.

01:22:24.497 --> 01:22:25.904
But that was okay, because I knew

01:22:25.904 --> 01:22:28.237
that it was the right thing.

01:22:28.462 --> 01:22:29.962
We have to change.

01:22:30.385 --> 01:22:33.135
So change is the constant thing.

01:22:33.281 --> 01:22:35.692
We have so many words that we use in the Department

01:22:35.692 --> 01:22:37.812
of Defense that I've never heard any place else.

01:22:37.812 --> 01:22:40.103
We come up with spiral and all these other things,

01:22:40.103 --> 01:22:41.615
I don't know what any of that means.

01:22:41.615 --> 01:22:43.665
But I'll say this, we're really good at iterating.

01:22:43.665 --> 01:22:45.196
We're really good at adapting.

01:22:45.196 --> 01:22:47.524
We're really, really good at removing the barriers

01:22:47.524 --> 01:22:49.938
and the bureaucracy that allow rational

01:22:49.938 --> 01:22:54.105
and reasonable decisions to be made and be implemented

01:22:54.268 --> 01:22:57.018
without stepping on our own feet.

01:22:59.217 --> 01:23:02.384
Without tripping over own shoestrings.

01:23:04.730 --> 01:23:07.331
That, to me, is at the end of the day,

01:23:07.331 --> 01:23:11.498
the only thing that I could imagine that we want to be.

01:23:12.271 --> 01:23:14.783
Because that will actually give us the things

01:23:14.783 --> 01:23:17.283
that we want in order to be A,

01:23:17.990 --> 01:23:21.573
superior in an incredibly important domain,

01:23:23.960 --> 01:23:25.418
which I would just broadly say,

01:23:25.418 --> 01:23:27.808
you could say cyber or technology.

01:23:27.808 --> 01:23:30.475
No different and they're no less

01:23:30.527 --> 01:23:33.277
important than air, land and sea.

01:23:34.166 --> 01:23:36.628
And it allows us to actually deliver

01:23:36.628 --> 01:23:40.290
the results that we expect and defend ourselves,

01:23:40.290 --> 01:23:43.515
our nation, the people that we care about

01:23:43.515 --> 01:23:45.268
and do the mission of defense.

01:23:45.268 --> 01:23:48.297
So I don't know what all the things are

01:23:48.297 --> 01:23:52.214
and I'm not going to predict the future because

01:23:52.525 --> 01:23:54.941
maybe this will become popular again, I don't know.

01:23:54.941 --> 01:23:56.037
(audience laughing)

01:23:56.037 --> 01:23:57.454
But probably not.

01:23:58.211 --> 01:24:00.961
That was a joke, that was a joke.

01:24:00.974 --> 01:24:04.141
But I do think that that is the thing.

01:24:04.502 --> 01:24:06.419
Change is the constant.

01:24:06.470 --> 01:24:09.553
And it will happen faster and faster.

01:24:09.826 --> 01:24:12.159
Nobody is coming to save us.

01:24:13.027 --> 01:24:15.245
We have to do this ourselves.

01:24:15.245 --> 01:24:18.281
And I do know that and I believe in that deeply.

01:24:18.281 --> 01:24:20.698
- [Paul] Thanks, Chris, John.

01:24:20.998 --> 01:24:23.060
- I appreciate everybody's comments.

01:24:23.060 --> 01:24:25.998
Me, I'm going to take just a little bit different tact.

01:24:25.998 --> 01:24:29.165
Version 2.0, version 3.0, version 4.0,

01:24:29.699 --> 01:24:32.866
spirals, iterating, I'll tell you what

01:24:34.380 --> 01:24:37.171
I consider the missing linchpin to get to any

01:24:37.171 --> 01:24:40.539
version that you want to throw out there.

01:24:40.539 --> 01:24:44.122
And quite frankly, it's changing ourselves.

01:24:44.769 --> 01:24:48.936
And I'm talking about from a cultural perspective.

01:24:49.037 --> 01:24:52.454
The underpinnings that both Guy and Chris

01:24:53.434 --> 01:24:57.039
laid out for you are in the art of the possible.

01:24:57.039 --> 01:24:59.881
I firmly believe that, I don't think there's anything

01:24:59.881 --> 01:25:02.195
that our Army cannot accomplish.

01:25:02.195 --> 01:25:05.525
However, I will tell you that we've got permafrost

01:25:05.525 --> 01:25:08.605
out there that are underlying inside our bureaucracy

01:25:08.605 --> 01:25:11.938
that inhibit really that creative change

01:25:12.356 --> 01:25:15.410
and that creative thought and that innovation

01:25:15.410 --> 01:25:17.617
that we need in this space.

01:25:17.617 --> 01:25:21.200
So we can actually see what version 3.0 is.

01:25:21.804 --> 01:25:24.625
So the missing component from my perspective

01:25:24.625 --> 01:25:27.958
is that underlying challenge on the bureaucracy

01:25:27.958 --> 01:25:30.270
that makes it adaptable and flexible

01:25:30.270 --> 01:25:33.020
that turns loose the human spirit

01:25:33.790 --> 01:25:35.790
that is inside our Army.

01:25:36.227 --> 01:25:38.444
And if we don't get that right,

01:25:38.444 --> 01:25:41.361
and we let the permafrost run amok,

01:25:42.315 --> 01:25:44.430
it will inhibit our progress.

01:25:44.430 --> 01:25:46.518
I will tell you and I don't want to speak

01:25:46.518 --> 01:25:49.902
for General Nakasone, but we spend an inordinate

01:25:49.902 --> 01:25:54.069
amount of time making the bureaucracy work for us.

01:25:54.075 --> 01:25:56.779
When the reality of it is, it should enabling

01:25:56.779 --> 01:25:59.411
this innovative thought that you heard both

01:25:59.411 --> 01:26:02.019
Guy and Chris and Steve talk about.

01:26:02.019 --> 01:26:05.769
So to get to version 3.0, that missing piece,

01:26:05.953 --> 01:26:07.694
it's ourselves and changing the culture

01:26:07.694 --> 01:26:09.196
of which we operate.

01:26:09.196 --> 01:26:12.159
We talked about talent management a lot today.

01:26:12.159 --> 01:26:14.177
But it is a change in paradigm

01:26:14.177 --> 01:26:15.705
and how we need to manage folks.

01:26:15.705 --> 01:26:18.042
And it doesn't need to be company commander,

01:26:18.042 --> 01:26:21.292
battalion commander, brigade commander.

01:26:21.307 --> 01:26:23.853
We need to come up with a way that changes

01:26:23.853 --> 01:26:25.653
the way that we manage our talent,

01:26:25.653 --> 01:26:27.707
so we're smart and efficient about it.

01:26:27.707 --> 01:26:30.040
And we harvest all the innovation

01:26:30.040 --> 01:26:31.712
that people can bring to us.

01:26:31.712 --> 01:26:35.303
And quite frankly, when somebody's not a part

01:26:35.303 --> 01:26:39.136
of that team that Guy so eloquently described,

01:26:39.809 --> 01:26:41.718
then maybe we need to find somewhere else

01:26:41.718 --> 01:26:43.845
in the Army to use their talents.

01:26:43.845 --> 01:26:46.122
But the underlying component that we all need to be

01:26:46.122 --> 01:26:50.129
mindful of, because we do have a ton of momentum right now,

01:26:50.129 --> 01:26:52.358
is allowing it to fall back into the old way

01:26:52.358 --> 01:26:55.852
of managing our people, managing our capabilities,

01:26:55.852 --> 01:26:58.153
managing everything when it comes to cyber.

01:26:58.153 --> 01:27:01.908
Because I don't want to sound like Debbie Downer here,

01:27:01.908 --> 01:27:03.978
if we don't force that change,

01:27:03.978 --> 01:27:06.095
then we will find ourselves in a predicament

01:27:06.095 --> 01:27:08.706
where the enemy will make us change.

01:27:08.706 --> 01:27:09.758
- Thanks, John.

01:27:09.758 --> 01:27:11.292
So ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of all of us

01:27:11.292 --> 01:27:13.329
in the Army cyber enterprise, thank you for

01:27:13.329 --> 01:27:16.320
your attendance today here on the third day of AUSA.

01:27:16.320 --> 01:27:18.201
Thank you for support of our Army

01:27:18.201 --> 01:27:20.865
and thank you for support of the Army cyber enterprise.

01:27:20.865 --> 01:27:21.782
Have a great day, appreciate it.

01:27:21.782 --> 01:27:24.782
(audience clapping)

01:27:25.687 --> 01:27:27.725
- [Steve] So when I was in Southwest Asia,

01:27:27.725 --> 01:27:30.040
I had a smartphone, right (mumbles).

01:27:30.040 --> 01:27:34.207
- [Man] Thanks a lot.
(people chatting distantly)

