WEBVTT

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- From General Anderson,

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(laughs)

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But I wanna just start, if I may, by

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sort of setting the stage from

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the Army Reserve's perspective.

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I'm not suggesting that this conversation

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should be limited to either

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the Guard or the Reserve.

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I know each panel member will take this conversation

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to wherever they wanna go.

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Then I know we'll leave time

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to answer some questions at the end.

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I hope that we encourage conversation

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as we roll through this.

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Just real briefly, slide please.

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So it says strategic environment.

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That's probably not the right characterization,

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it's probably more just about the dynamics

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that I think at least frame the conversation

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from the Army Reserve's perspective

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as it pertains to the challenge that I articulated

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across the third component of the United States Army

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is being ready enough to be relevant,

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but no so ready that my soldiers can't keep

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good, meaningful civilian employment.

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I reiterate that point a lot because

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I think it sometimes gets lost in an environment where

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the Reserve Components, both the Guard

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and Reserve, have become operationally efficacious

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to the point where there may be an expectation

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that we can pretty much do everything

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on a force that is primarily part time in nature.

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The answer is yes, given sufficient time.

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Part of what we need to talk about is, I think,

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when we talk specifically about,

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and it's not gonna be about any particular war plan,

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it's gonna be more generic from my perspective.

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But it is ultimately about making sure that

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we are very clear, and that I'm doing

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the best I can to articulate.

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Ultimately, to General Anderson,

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who's the G-3 of the Army, what we can

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and can't do in space and time with a workforce,

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with a capability set that is vital and integrated

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into the United States Army's ability to fight war,

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but is also, as I said,

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primarily compromised of soldiers

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who are out there everywhere in America

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and 7/8 of the Earth's surface.

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We cover 20 time zones, 200,000 soldiers,

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350,000 dependents, and our relationships

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with the employers across America and around the world

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are critical to us being able to retain

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the capability that we need.

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We recruit and we retain where our soldiers

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live and work.

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We can't pick up the phone and call somebody

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and tell us to send us more soldiers.

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That's not how it works.

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That fundamental dynamic about how we

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sustain our force, from the manning perspective,

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is critical to understanding what we need to do

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to get after this fight.

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When I talk about the fight, I'm talking now about

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a near-peer competitor in a contingency

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modality of moving capability.

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In other words, non-predictive in nature,

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not a two or three or four-year build,

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not a rotational model,

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not a progressive readiness model,

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but what I call a fight fast model.

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We started talking fight tonight,

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and I said, "That's not realistic.

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"We're over promising, and we're gonna under deliver

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"if we talk about fighting tonight."

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That is not the core competency of the Army Reserve,

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nor should it be.

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The American people are paying us to be very ready,

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but at a significant cost savings to the taxpayer.

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If you want us to be ready to fight right this second,

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then you gotta fund us in a different way

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and you gotta get a different type of soldier

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'cause most of our soldiers are out there everyday

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working across America and around the world.

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I've given ya a chance to look at this.

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I'm not gonna hit any of these points

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in any particular detail.

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I'm gonna show you one more slide

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to give you a sense of the problem statement

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from our perspective.

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Then I'm gonna turn it over to General Brown

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and let him rip, rock and roll.

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Slide.

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This is sort of the, I won't say it's the money slide

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cause it's my slide and that would be arrogant,

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but it is the one takeaway that I want you

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to get out of this little presentation from me.

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Ready Force X-ray.

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This is a construct that we started about a year ago.

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It focuses primarily on what are the requirements

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of one of two war plans, or some amalgamation

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of both of them together, which, frankly,

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would be I think probably problematic for us,

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but we can talk about that

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in unclassified form if we wanna.

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What I want you to take from this slide,

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very briefly, and don't focus too much on the numbers

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because the numbers keep changing.

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That's why it's X.

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Inside Ready Force X, as I sit here today,

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there are focused readiness units.

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There are STGC formations that we need,

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that would be the Army Reserve needs,

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to support, to supply the SDC in very short term,

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very short notice.

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There's a bunch of capabilities in here

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that will support General Twitty

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in the event that we have to mobilize the force.

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Packed inside Ready Force X,

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in the third aspect, so RFX 3,

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is what we call the mission support force

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for the MFGI platforms.

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I think General Twitty will probably talk

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a little bit more about the MFGI platforms

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here in a minute.

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Then RFX 4 is really those forces

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which would probably be needed for a different

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contingency operation in a different theater,

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but they're not necessarily in the focus readiness pool.

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Now I'm not gonna get into the numbers

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of formations here, but as you can see,

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it's, depending on how you wanna talk about this,

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it's on orders of magnitude about 600 units of action.

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If you look at the middle of the screen,

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you'll see those forces that are stressed.

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Stressed formations are,

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we've defined these terms for ourselves.

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I say us, I'm talking about America's Army Reserve.

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Stressed formations are capabilities

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that at least 40% of which are formations

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or capabilities inside the Army Reserve

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that have to go very quickly.

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That means a significant portion of the entire capacity

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of the Army Reserve has to be able to fight fast

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in those particular category set.

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That's your blue box in the middle.

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Those are your stressed formations.

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If you look to the upper right quad, you see unique.

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Unique formations are a little different.

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Unique formations are formations inside

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the Army Reserve that are defined

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as formations of which and capabilities as of which

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70% or more, and in some cases all,

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of the Army's total capacity resides

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in America's Army Reserve.

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The left slide, the left side of the slide,

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stressed and unique, is sort of the

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super mac daddy problem set.

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Those are formations that reside primarily

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in the Army Reserve, and a significant portion

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of what's in the Army Reserve has to go quickly.

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The heavy lift for us, in terms of being able

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to provide theater opening capabilities,

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provide the MFGI capabilities

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that the First Army's looking for,

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the things that G-3 of the Army needs,

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STGC's gonna need, those capabilities,

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many of 'em, exist on the left side of that slide.

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That requirement that you're looking at right there

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is plus or minus the first 90 days

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of any sort of contingency operation.

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It represents, ostensibly, somewhere between 1/4,

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probably 18 to 25% of the entire strength

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of the Army Reserve.

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When I talk about having to fight fast,

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when I talk about capability,

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combat readiness and lethality for America's Army Reserve,

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I'm not kidding around.

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What I've told soldiers in the Army Reserve

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is if you think that you're out there

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playing Junior Varsity ball, and you've got

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months or years to get ready to go

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to do something in a very contested, lethal environment,

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you're in the wrong ball club because

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that left side of that screen,

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that is stuff that has to be provided

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very quickly to the Army, and a lot of it

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is our responsibility to provide.

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I just wanted, sir, I'm gonna turn this over to you.

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I just wanna sort of paint that picture.

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I will say between General Twitty, General Piggee

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and General Anderson, we've had a lotta conversations

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sort of in different lengths about this.

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Fundamentally, as I said,

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the challenge we have is being ready enough

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to be relevant to support these requirements,

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but also not so ready to support these requirements

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that our soldiers essentially can't keep

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civilian employment anymore because they're spending

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so much time having to train to meet this

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that they can't keep good civilian jobs.

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Sir, at this point, I'm gonna turn it over to you.

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- Okay, thanks, Chip.

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I really appreciate General Luckey

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putting together this great panel.

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I told my panel mates here

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I'm gonna be short as can be 'cause I wanna

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hear what they have to say.

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Joe Anderson was insisting I talk

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for about an hour and 1/2,

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so I'll see what I can do.

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Hey, just from the Indo-Asia-Pacific perspective,

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really would like to, there we go.

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Just seeing that slide there,

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give you a little look.

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First of all, I will tell ya that

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I've never seen a better total force effort right now

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across the board, Active, Guard and Reserves.

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We all fought together.

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Anybody who has been out there

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in exercises and key positions,

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you know we can't do it,

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none of us can do it alone.

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We're together a total Army,

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and I've never seen it better.

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We had some issues a few years ago,

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I think, in headquarters and stuff,

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but out in the force, it's always been terrific,

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and continuing to get better.

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No different in Indo-Asia-Pacific.

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We simply can't do our mission without

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our critical Reserve assets

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and all that they do for us.

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I'll give you some statistics later,

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but for example, 78% of our sustainment

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we'll get in the Pacific is from the Reserves.

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Obviously, everything we do, we're doing as a total force.

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Readiness is absolutely our number one priority.

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We got a few issues going on right now

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out in the Pacific.

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The five major challenges our nation faces,

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four of 'em, China out there.

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Russia, which people kind of forget,

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they're out there and filling lots of gaps

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and lots of voids in the Pacific.

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ISIS, if you're following what's been going on

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in the Philippines and Marawi,

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quite a fight there as they flowing

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out of other areas, looking for places to go,

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and made, putting up quite a stand in the Philippines.

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Fortunately, Philippine army is winning that fight

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with a lot of support from allies, et cetera.

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We have these four challenges.

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The fourth one, of course, being North Korea,

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which is the most dangerous challenge right now

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to our nation.

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The key to our success is working as a total force

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as we're preparing out there.

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I just wanna highlight a couple,

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the Ready Force X-ray that General Luckey talked about,

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really critical for us.

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I'll highlight a little bit on that.

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Then some additional initiatives we need.

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We have a pilot going on, mobilization in place.

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I'll talk a little bit more about that.

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But all these things are key,

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working together, absolutely ensuring

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that we're in sync.

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Then what initiatives do we need 'cause,

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as was mentioned earlier, Reserves,

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they have full-time jobs, and we know

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we can't take away from their civilian jobs.

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We gotta leverage that tremendous experience,

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which helps us immensely throughout the region.

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If you see right here, I'd just like to,

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106,000 soldiers and civilians in the Pacific.

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Power projection forces from Joint Base Lewis-McChord,

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Alaska and Hawaii.

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Then forward presence forces, of course,

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in Japan, Korea, Guam,

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American Samoa, Saipan.

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Then we have other areas where we're improving

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our posture and getting out there across the region,

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mostly Southeast Asia where we haven't had

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an opportunity in the past, the past few years,

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to be out there as much.

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We're really increasing that.

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Reserves involved in every single aspect of that.

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The two Reserve forces I own are highlighted

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in yellow there.

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9th MSC will have 28 of those Ready Force X-ray units,

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and that just changed.

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That's a huge, significant change for us

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because they're involved in everything,

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logistics from, as was mentioned earlier,

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theater opening, transportation,

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quartermaster, mortuary affairs.

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Critical across the board in logistics, in medical,

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those hospitals that are needed forward

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and those other key assets.

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Engineering assets, BEB, et cetera,

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many, many of those engineering assets that are needed,

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and communications.

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Again, we can't do it without

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those assets out there.

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How are they integrated?

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We've gotta, as we develop our plan

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to make sure we're a total force,

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we look longer range for the Reserves, obviously,

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and give them time.

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A mistake we made in the past is we'd see

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an opportunity and say, "Hey, can you guys do this?"

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"When is it?"

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"Two weeks from now."

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That doesn't work real well. (laughter)

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We've learned and we've planned years out,

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and look at who's in the cycle of readiness, where.

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Of course, with the Ready Force X, that gives us,

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sometimes you can't predict everything.

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Obviously, there's gonna be those black swans

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that come in outta nowhere.

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Having those forces that can be ready faster

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because of their posture is absolutely key for us.

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We also have the only Reserve combat arms formation

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remaining in the Army.

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We're very proud.

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The famous 100th battalion 442nd.

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Just incredible unit, incredible history.

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It's just an honor to have them.

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- [Robert] We're not giving them up,

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by the way, sir, either.

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- No, absolutely not.

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We're really proud of them.

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They're there in Hawaii

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with a good portion of their force,

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they're on Guam, they're in American Samoa

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and they're in Saipan.

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Absolutely key.

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Again, we're the only combat arms within the Army

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in the Reserve, so we're awful proud of that.

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They're amazing,

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I'll talk a little bit about all that they do for us.

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If you can go to the next slide.

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Really, when we looked at enhancing the total force,

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there are some things we need to do.

13:39.721 --> 13:42.364
I was really glad to see, about a year ago,

13:42.364 --> 13:43.947
this idea of really

13:44.819 --> 13:47.652
a prioritization in Ready Force X.

13:47.818 --> 13:50.447
For us, that means we do have to have

13:50.447 --> 13:54.027
a fight tonight mentality across the Pacific.

13:54.027 --> 13:56.933
We do realize that it's fight fast for our Ready Force X,

13:56.933 --> 13:58.251
and how do we incorporate them

13:58.251 --> 14:00.622
and what different adjustments do we make.

14:00.622 --> 14:02.644
As I mentioned, it's been a game changer

14:02.644 --> 14:04.899
to see 28 of our units permanently

14:04.899 --> 14:08.566
in the Pacific with that new, renewed focus.

14:08.882 --> 14:11.215
You see an immediate change.

14:11.492 --> 14:14.282
It's made a huge difference across the formation.

14:14.282 --> 14:16.522
Really applaud those efforts, and I think

14:16.522 --> 14:18.565
that's the type of innovative approach

14:18.565 --> 14:20.720
we have to take to make sure the total Army

14:20.720 --> 14:24.470
can be there when needed in those situations.

14:24.760 --> 14:27.834
The other key effort that we have ongoing

14:27.834 --> 14:32.001
is we're on our third pilot of mobilization in place.

14:32.686 --> 14:34.686
We actually have Reserve

14:35.282 --> 14:37.870
soldiers and leaders that will be forward

14:37.870 --> 14:41.037
in Korea, Japan, Guam, American Samoa.

14:42.570 --> 14:45.033
The plan originally, a few years ago,

14:45.033 --> 14:47.092
was they come all the way back

14:47.092 --> 14:49.256
to either Hawaii or the States to mobilize.

14:49.256 --> 14:52.169
Well, that doesn't make a whole lotta sense.

14:52.169 --> 14:54.435
They're not allowed airframes out there. (laughter)

14:54.435 --> 14:56.599
Why would we bring folks back, have that requirement,

14:56.599 --> 14:58.058
and then bring 'em back again?

14:58.058 --> 14:59.445
When are they gonna get there?

14:59.445 --> 15:01.327
It doesn't make much sense.

15:01.327 --> 15:03.701
Great leaders looked at that, working with General Luckey.

15:03.701 --> 15:04.858
I said, "Hey, what can we do?"

15:04.858 --> 15:06.941
We've really worked hard,

15:07.223 --> 15:08.536
and we're on our third pilot.

15:08.536 --> 15:11.653
The first one, about a year and 1/2 ago,

15:11.653 --> 15:13.509
and we had some issues we fixed.

15:13.509 --> 15:14.636
The second one went really well,

15:14.636 --> 15:16.355
and the third one's going even better.

15:16.355 --> 15:17.529
We're gonna go forward.

15:17.529 --> 15:19.883
We gotta get some waivers to mob forward,

15:19.883 --> 15:22.137
but the biggest lesson learned from that

15:22.137 --> 15:24.541
mobilization forward, it really is a joint team effort

15:24.541 --> 15:25.874
to get after it.

15:26.346 --> 15:28.190
It's not in any way, shape or form

15:28.190 --> 15:30.909
a reduction in the standards, but it does require

15:30.909 --> 15:33.251
a lot more coordination to get forward

15:33.251 --> 15:35.515
and do the mobilization forward.

15:35.515 --> 15:37.693
I can see that as being a key for us

15:37.693 --> 15:38.943
in the Pacific.

15:38.979 --> 15:39.980
I think of the difference.

15:39.980 --> 15:41.686
Now someone can stay in Japan,

15:41.686 --> 15:43.679
stay on the peninsula in Korea,

15:43.679 --> 15:46.740
stay in Guam, Saipan, American Samoa.

15:46.740 --> 15:48.808
The Saipan, American Samoa may have to go to Guam,

15:48.808 --> 15:52.124
but they'll be right there in the region.

15:52.124 --> 15:53.329
A heck of a lot better.

15:53.329 --> 15:54.950
That's one of the initiatives, as we look,

15:54.950 --> 15:56.450
is absolutely key.

15:58.182 --> 16:00.620
The other thing that our Reserve Component soldiers

16:00.620 --> 16:03.110
bring us uniquely, and I notice other regions,

16:03.110 --> 16:04.805
under other Army service component commands,

16:04.805 --> 16:06.935
but for us, it's an incredible advantage.

16:06.935 --> 16:10.349
We have 650 of our Reserve Component soldiers

16:10.349 --> 16:13.736
that speak 42 different languages in the Pacific.

16:13.736 --> 16:17.569
Think about that, 42 different languages, 650.

16:17.588 --> 16:19.814
The expertise they bring, as we all know,

16:19.814 --> 16:22.008
from their civilian jobs often is critical,

16:22.008 --> 16:24.552
but then also that expertise of knowing the region,

16:24.552 --> 16:27.052
having been there a long time.

16:27.111 --> 16:28.437
Active will rotate in and out.

16:28.437 --> 16:29.717
You'll have Reserve folks that have

16:29.717 --> 16:31.494
a 20 year relationship.

16:31.494 --> 16:32.721
That makes a difference.

16:32.721 --> 16:34.221
The Secretary said

16:34.573 --> 16:36.930
at the breakfast this morning,

16:36.930 --> 16:38.591
"Relationships matter, and you can't start

16:38.591 --> 16:39.910
"that relationship in the crisis."

16:39.910 --> 16:42.231
Somebody that's been around 20, 25-plus years,

16:42.231 --> 16:43.583
I just see it all over the region,

16:43.583 --> 16:46.857
it's a game changer with those key skills.

16:46.857 --> 16:51.024
61% of our assigned Reserve forces in the Pacific

16:51.498 --> 16:53.569
are of Asian-Pacific background.

16:53.569 --> 16:55.168
Again, they know the culture.

16:55.168 --> 16:57.532
It helps when you're out there in the region.

16:57.532 --> 16:58.665
It makes a huge difference.

16:58.665 --> 16:59.913
As I mentioned earlier,

16:59.913 --> 17:02.495
probably the most significant statistic,

17:02.495 --> 17:06.299
78% of our Pacific sustainment capability

17:06.299 --> 17:07.238
is in the Reserves.

17:07.238 --> 17:09.655
Now, back as an infantry guy,

17:09.664 --> 17:12.038
I never paid much attention to logistics.

17:12.038 --> 17:13.796
I only got mad when the supplies weren't there.

17:13.796 --> 17:15.159
- [Aundre] Didn't show up.

17:15.159 --> 17:16.711
- But all the sudden, the higher up you go,

17:16.711 --> 17:18.199
all the sudden, holy smokes, this logistics

17:18.199 --> 17:20.536
is important, and it's hard stuff.

17:20.536 --> 17:23.786
It's really tough, the tactics is easy.

17:24.222 --> 17:26.521
I've learned that over and over again.

17:26.521 --> 17:29.165
We cannot do, and obviously we're not gonna

17:29.165 --> 17:32.296
be very good, if we can't do the sustainment.

17:32.296 --> 17:34.523
Our Reserve forces are the key to that,

17:34.523 --> 17:37.557
and do an amazing job across the board.

17:37.557 --> 17:40.297
It's also a tremendous enabling capacity

17:40.297 --> 17:42.224
for other issues we have.

17:42.224 --> 17:43.911
Seven out of 10 people in the world

17:43.911 --> 17:47.181
who are killed in a disaster, it's in the Pacific.

17:47.181 --> 17:49.701
We got the Rim of Fire, and are key to that posture.

17:49.701 --> 17:52.125
Those we have postured forward, in particular,

17:52.125 --> 17:55.386
make a huge difference of that immediate response.

17:55.386 --> 17:58.718
Then DSCA, Defense Security Cooperation,

17:58.718 --> 18:00.551
and those key aspects.

18:00.917 --> 18:05.084
Homeland Security and other humanitarian assistance.

18:05.487 --> 18:07.155
That understanding of the region

18:07.155 --> 18:08.979
and that posturing of those Reserve forces

18:08.979 --> 18:11.166
makes a key difference beyond combat

18:11.166 --> 18:13.872
with the near-peer competitor and preparations we do,

18:13.872 --> 18:16.859
readiness for the highest end of the fight,

18:16.859 --> 18:18.641
be it, again, whether North Korea

18:18.641 --> 18:21.044
or whatever contingency could occur.

18:21.044 --> 18:22.627
Next slide, please.

18:22.758 --> 18:23.841
Mobilization.

18:24.177 --> 18:27.594
I think, as we look, this is an area that

18:28.364 --> 18:30.019
everybody's been working very hard.

18:30.019 --> 18:32.934
I did a series of great tabletop exercise.

18:32.934 --> 18:34.379
Unfortunately, we can't do.

18:34.379 --> 18:36.516
I don't know how we, when I was much younger,

18:36.516 --> 18:40.516
25, 30 years ago, I had hair and it wasn't gray,

18:41.355 --> 18:44.602
we would do team spirit and take a division plus to Korea.

18:44.602 --> 18:46.539
We'd do Reforger, I was on several of those.

18:46.539 --> 18:50.456
We'd take returning forces to Germany, 45 days.

18:50.607 --> 18:52.814
Well, that's gotten very expensive.

18:52.814 --> 18:54.550
You can't do that anymore, unfortunately,

18:54.550 --> 18:55.520
I wish we could.

18:55.520 --> 18:58.218
But we do a whole bunch of different variations

18:58.218 --> 19:00.524
of that, one of those, Pacific Pathways.

19:00.524 --> 19:03.107
We tailor and scale that force.

19:03.637 --> 19:05.749
Stryker Brigade Minus, for example.

19:05.749 --> 19:08.875
They'll go in three to four different countries.

19:08.875 --> 19:12.326
So expeditionary, not just talking about it,

19:12.326 --> 19:14.234
talking the talk about being tailorable,

19:14.234 --> 19:17.257
scalable, expeditionary, but actually doing it.

19:17.257 --> 19:20.271
Who's key, who is an absolute key to those operations?

19:20.271 --> 19:21.421
Our Reserve forces.

19:21.421 --> 19:22.759
National Guard, as well, I will say.

19:22.759 --> 19:25.633
We'll actually, in 2018, we'll have our first

19:25.633 --> 19:27.702
National Guard-led, Indiana National Guard'll lead

19:27.702 --> 19:29.141
a Pacific Pathways.

19:29.141 --> 19:31.224
Those are absolutely key.

19:31.489 --> 19:33.674
It builds readiness because we're doing

19:33.674 --> 19:36.841
high-end, live fire, complex training.

19:37.020 --> 19:38.685
Then you talk about the differences.

19:38.685 --> 19:40.823
You're going into Malaysia, Australia,

19:40.823 --> 19:43.656
Thailand, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,

19:44.029 --> 19:45.809
on and on, Philippines.

19:45.809 --> 19:47.211
It's different for each one.

19:47.211 --> 19:49.266
You can talk about it, but if you get people

19:49.266 --> 19:50.428
out there doing it, they learn a heck

19:50.428 --> 19:52.587
of a lotta lessons they share.

19:52.587 --> 19:54.004
The other thing it does for us,

19:54.004 --> 19:56.693
it puts an Army force forward of,

19:56.693 --> 19:58.812
west of the International Date Line,

19:58.812 --> 20:00.197
between eight to 10 months out of the year,

20:00.197 --> 20:01.618
depending on the length of the Pathways.

20:01.618 --> 20:03.421
You do three a year, eight to 10 months.

20:03.421 --> 20:04.711
They're forward there, so it gives

20:04.711 --> 20:07.051
the PACOM commander options, like he exercised

20:07.051 --> 20:09.384
some of those options having

20:09.471 --> 20:11.452
some Stryker Brigade Minus forces go back

20:11.452 --> 20:14.355
to the peninsula for a little flexible response option,

20:14.355 --> 20:16.236
a little show of force there

20:16.236 --> 20:17.569
for North Korea.

20:18.676 --> 20:20.312
We're looking at, in this next year,

20:20.312 --> 20:22.978
a little bit more in Korea, obviously,

20:22.978 --> 20:25.126
on our Pathways because of the

20:25.126 --> 20:27.126
obvious situation there.

20:27.378 --> 20:28.295
It's a key.

20:28.369 --> 20:30.634
Folks notice when those forces come.

20:30.634 --> 20:31.791
This is another way.

20:31.791 --> 20:34.239
Mobilization, it's hard to do it in the scale

20:34.239 --> 20:37.744
we used to do, but combining Pacific Pathways,

20:37.744 --> 20:39.825
innovative efforts like that,

20:39.825 --> 20:42.590
and then tying in tabletops and getting folks

20:42.590 --> 20:43.533
walking though.

20:43.533 --> 20:44.633
It's kind of amazing.

20:44.633 --> 20:46.163
You're walking through mobilization,

20:46.163 --> 20:47.674
it seems pretty easy till you walk through it.

20:47.674 --> 20:49.032
You're, "Holy smokes."

20:49.032 --> 20:50.542
The things ya just haven't thought of.

20:50.542 --> 20:52.284
Unless you're doing it all the time,

20:52.284 --> 20:53.600
you'll forget about it.

20:53.600 --> 20:57.183
Final slide, just take a look at, no doubt,

20:57.951 --> 21:00.361
absolutely key as we look to the future,

21:00.361 --> 21:02.484
as well, the total force advantage is one

21:02.484 --> 21:03.984
of the key things.

21:05.366 --> 21:07.544
We couldn't do it, none of the components

21:07.544 --> 21:09.400
could do it alone, have to be a total force.

21:09.400 --> 21:10.733
As we look to the future, things like

21:10.733 --> 21:13.539
multi-domain battle, key out in the Pacific.

21:13.539 --> 21:15.297
We have to have multi-domain battle to be able

21:15.297 --> 21:18.680
to do our mission, be it against North Korea

21:18.680 --> 21:20.876
or against rising powers out there that

21:20.876 --> 21:22.300
are looking to take away our advantage

21:22.300 --> 21:24.550
with extensive A2AD threat.

21:25.164 --> 21:27.290
Working with all the services.

21:27.290 --> 21:30.069
Clearly, the ability to strike, protect

21:30.069 --> 21:33.069
and sustain within that multi-domain

21:33.147 --> 21:35.616
requires our Reserve efforts above and beyond

21:35.616 --> 21:38.212
anything ever seen before, and that teamwork,

21:38.212 --> 21:39.308
the total force.

21:39.308 --> 21:41.023
We're working that very hard.

21:41.023 --> 21:43.616
35 events this year where we're getting after that.

21:43.616 --> 21:45.475
Again, it's a total force effort.

21:45.475 --> 21:48.894
Then that will culminate in 2018 with RIMPAC,

21:48.894 --> 21:51.485
the largest maritime exercise in the world.

21:51.485 --> 21:53.751
It will be a multi-domain exercise,

21:53.751 --> 21:56.182
PACOM supporting that, all the components.

21:56.182 --> 21:57.740
It's capabilities we've never used before.

21:57.740 --> 21:59.131
Again, the Reserves are right in there,

21:59.131 --> 22:01.240
a key part of that, all the components.

22:01.240 --> 22:03.836
Then in 2019, we'll see the first ever

22:03.836 --> 22:07.669
multi-domain taskforce on the Pacific Pathways

22:07.812 --> 22:10.081
in the Pacific in areas where they

22:10.081 --> 22:14.248
would be used, if needed, such as Ryukyus in Japan

22:14.329 --> 22:16.178
and one of that first island chain

22:16.178 --> 22:18.230
down in the Philippines where, as I

22:18.230 --> 22:20.999
was describing it to the Sec Def a few months ago,

22:20.999 --> 22:22.138
he picked right up on it.

22:22.138 --> 22:23.163
Said, "Oh, I see.

22:23.163 --> 22:26.279
"It's basically an unsinkable aircraft carrier."

22:26.279 --> 22:28.364
That's a pretty good description of it

22:28.364 --> 22:29.928
as we're looking at these capabilities.

22:29.928 --> 22:31.472
But Reserve forces right there.

22:31.472 --> 22:34.055
Again, can't do it without 'em.

22:34.609 --> 22:35.708
Thanks for the opportunity to talk about

22:35.708 --> 22:38.920
all the Reserves are doing in Indo-Asia-Pacific.

22:38.920 --> 22:41.275
Really appreciate the tremendous teamwork,

22:41.275 --> 22:42.725
and I'm really thankful for things like

22:42.725 --> 22:43.892
Ready Force X.

22:44.231 --> 22:46.567
No doubt about it, absolutely key.

22:46.567 --> 22:47.586
Joe, over to you.

22:47.586 --> 22:48.753
- Thanks, sir.

22:49.554 --> 22:50.818
- Good afternoon, everybody.

22:50.818 --> 22:52.508
Chip, thanks for the invitation to join

22:52.508 --> 22:54.386
these distinguished colleagues.

22:54.386 --> 22:56.343
Ya may have great hair, but you don't wear glasses.

22:56.343 --> 22:58.118
(laughter)

22:58.118 --> 22:59.280
You're doing okay, you're doing okay.

22:59.280 --> 23:00.391
(laughter)

23:00.391 --> 23:01.586
All right, I'll take it up a notch

23:01.586 --> 23:03.301
from USARPAC and talk more totality

23:03.301 --> 23:05.384
off the Army perspective.

23:05.652 --> 23:07.657
Again, the bottom line is without the Reserves,

23:07.657 --> 23:08.818
we can't make it happen.

23:08.818 --> 23:10.308
I think you all were tracking that

23:10.308 --> 23:12.261
the Reserves are 20% of our force.

23:12.261 --> 23:13.866
I think, again, you heard the Chief,

23:13.866 --> 23:15.621
you've heard the Secretary, this is all about demand

23:15.621 --> 23:17.593
and how we fulfill demand.

23:17.593 --> 23:19.400
If the Army's gonna keep filling 50%

23:19.400 --> 23:21.905
of known demand and 70% of emergent demand,

23:21.905 --> 23:23.288
that's the stuff that we don't know about,

23:23.288 --> 23:25.136
upticks in Afghanistan, Iraq,

23:25.136 --> 23:27.217
what we're doing in Syria, what we're doing in Europe,

23:27.217 --> 23:28.289
there's no way we're gonna do it without

23:28.289 --> 23:29.622
the total force.

23:29.893 --> 23:33.810
If you look up here at the first chart, please,

23:33.925 --> 23:36.397
8155 Compo 3 soldiers deployed

23:36.397 --> 23:37.820
in support of eight named operations.

23:37.820 --> 23:38.903
That's a lot.

23:38.967 --> 23:40.788
You'll see over there on the lower right-hand corner

23:40.788 --> 23:42.990
how many Reservists are mobilized today.

23:42.990 --> 23:44.950
But you can see by AO, you just heard

23:44.950 --> 23:49.033
about the Pacific, what our reservists are doing.

23:49.261 --> 23:50.530
The other key piece of that, of course,

23:50.530 --> 23:52.280
remains the homeland.

23:52.420 --> 23:54.003
Next slide, please.

23:56.530 --> 23:58.254
I know you're all watching hurricanes,

23:58.254 --> 24:00.648
and you can see the numbers up there.

24:00.648 --> 24:02.499
Working with Chip and his team these last

24:02.499 --> 24:04.527
four or five weeks, we've been dealing with hurricanes,

24:04.527 --> 24:07.021
between Harvey, Irma and Maria, but you're talking

24:07.021 --> 24:11.021
316 for Harvey, 98 for Irma and 1,747 for Maria.

24:11.460 --> 24:13.163
The real kicker there is that lower

24:13.163 --> 24:15.352
left-hand green box down there,

24:15.352 --> 24:17.203
which is the whole chemical, biological,

24:17.203 --> 24:19.619
radiological and nuclear explosive enterprise.

24:19.619 --> 24:20.552
That's a lot.

24:20.552 --> 24:22.572
That's all the DCRF stuff, the deployed

24:22.572 --> 24:25.492
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Response Force.

24:25.492 --> 24:27.107
The two command and control elements,

24:27.107 --> 24:29.249
the Alpha and Bravo, and, of course, the QRF,

24:29.249 --> 24:31.355
which is Active Component.

24:31.355 --> 24:33.852
That, again, that's a lotta folks on standby

24:33.852 --> 24:36.295
over a two-year period to react on something here

24:36.295 --> 24:39.293
in the homeland, which is not insignificant.

24:39.293 --> 24:41.998
Then lastly, if you go to the next one,

24:41.998 --> 24:43.723
if we had to do something to face a major

24:43.723 --> 24:45.567
contingency today, we're talking about one

24:45.567 --> 24:47.321
out of every five soldiers would be from

24:47.321 --> 24:49.552
the Army Reserve to go ahead and make that happen.

24:49.552 --> 24:52.162
Don't pay attention to the psychedelic colors there.

24:52.162 --> 24:54.004
That's kind of a readiness chart showing

24:54.004 --> 24:55.604
C1 through C4 what you would be.

24:55.604 --> 24:57.666
From a left-hand column is the regular Army,

24:57.666 --> 24:59.512
the second column is the Guard,

24:59.512 --> 25:01.041
but the part I wanna highlight is the

25:01.041 --> 25:02.129
right-hand side.

25:02.129 --> 25:04.016
What you see are all the enablers,

25:04.016 --> 25:06.311
and what the Reserves would provide from a

25:06.311 --> 25:07.418
Reserve Component perspective.

25:07.418 --> 25:08.906
General Brown talked about the Pacific,

25:08.906 --> 25:10.957
but again, you're talking about 59%

25:10.957 --> 25:14.039
of our quartermaster forces, 56 transportation forces,

25:14.039 --> 25:17.456
51 medical, 40 chemical, 100% decon,

25:17.955 --> 25:20.372
36 engineers and 30% MI.

25:20.678 --> 25:22.178
That's a mouthful.

25:22.575 --> 25:24.767
Then if you compound that with the unique

25:24.767 --> 25:26.030
capabilities they provide, which means

25:26.030 --> 25:28.157
nobody else does it, which we,

25:28.157 --> 25:29.866
as General Brown's talking about, the tabletop

25:29.866 --> 25:31.160
we just had on the Korean Peninsula here

25:31.160 --> 25:33.013
about three or four weeks ago.

25:33.013 --> 25:34.904
Port opening, petroleum distribution,

25:34.904 --> 25:37.383
theater sustainment brigades, medical logistic support

25:37.383 --> 25:39.187
and theater aviation battalions.

25:39.187 --> 25:42.760
That is unique, niche capabilities in the Reserves.

25:42.760 --> 25:44.545
If they don't come, if they're not ready,

25:44.545 --> 25:46.674
if they're not in Force X,

25:46.674 --> 25:48.424
we're all in trouble.

25:48.771 --> 25:51.258
The issue now becomes, I'm talking,

25:51.258 --> 25:52.694
what I showed you on that very first chart,

25:52.694 --> 25:54.854
again, was based on known demand requirements.

25:54.854 --> 25:57.053
When you do expand this into contingency,

25:57.053 --> 25:58.960
the question becomes, again, how do we

25:58.960 --> 26:00.725
get the Reserves there on time, how do we

26:00.725 --> 26:02.296
make this a joint fight and how do we work

26:02.296 --> 26:03.760
with our international partners?

26:03.760 --> 26:05.907
The one thing we heard repeatedly

26:05.907 --> 26:08.615
in Yongsan a couple weeks ago was late to need.

26:08.615 --> 26:09.905
If we heard it once, we probably heard it

26:09.905 --> 26:11.773
20 times that morning, sitting over there

26:11.773 --> 26:12.920
in the theater.

26:12.920 --> 26:15.015
The question becomes how do we get

26:15.015 --> 26:16.362
reservists out the door?

26:16.362 --> 26:17.588
As we'll work with First Army

26:17.588 --> 26:20.448
this coming fiscal year, it's trying to enhance

26:20.448 --> 26:22.879
pre-mobilization training to make sure you get

26:22.879 --> 26:25.240
more done before you actually mobilize

26:25.240 --> 26:27.657
so you're not talking 45, 55,

26:28.102 --> 26:30.269
60 days from mobilization.

26:30.365 --> 26:33.625
The more we can invest in that and accomplish that,

26:33.625 --> 26:36.803
again, based on Force X prioritize units,

26:36.803 --> 26:38.262
it's not the total Reserves, it's the

26:38.262 --> 26:40.096
prioritize units, how do we get there

26:40.096 --> 26:44.263
above the 39 statutory days is the million dollar question.

26:44.292 --> 26:46.020
One thing we did garner this past year

26:46.020 --> 26:48.011
was gaining two 1/2 days back based on

26:48.011 --> 26:49.444
mandatory training.

26:49.444 --> 26:51.916
Again, our goal is to put the Reserves

26:51.916 --> 26:53.898
on less of a cycle to meet those requirements,

26:53.898 --> 26:55.423
but really, to all you commanders out there,

26:55.423 --> 26:57.278
it's allowing you the flexibility and coordination

26:57.278 --> 26:59.387
with Chip down there is what you write off

26:59.387 --> 27:01.360
with risk, with respect to risk to mission,

27:01.360 --> 27:02.368
risk to force.

27:02.368 --> 27:03.404
But giving you the authority to say,

27:03.404 --> 27:05.952
"This is not relevant based on the war plan."

27:05.952 --> 27:07.039
Am I a Europe person?

27:07.039 --> 27:08.336
Am I a 4020 person?

27:08.336 --> 27:09.839
Am I a 5015 person?

27:09.839 --> 27:10.949
Am I a homeland person?

27:10.949 --> 27:12.350
What are my roles, responsibilities

27:12.350 --> 27:14.683
and where do we accept risk?

27:14.905 --> 27:16.764
From the training perspective, as you know,

27:16.764 --> 27:20.347
the goal remains, again, 51%, 49%

27:20.614 --> 27:23.302
Reserve Component to Active Component for rotations.

27:23.302 --> 27:26.122
Very phenomenal FY '17, where the Reserves

27:26.122 --> 27:28.456
were in 15 of the 18 rotations.

27:28.456 --> 27:30.677
In this coming '18, FY '18,

27:30.677 --> 27:33.070
they're in 15 of 19 CTC rotations.

27:33.070 --> 27:34.653
That's a huge deal.

27:34.841 --> 27:36.299
As you know, you've heard the Chief talk about

27:36.299 --> 27:38.330
the Associated Units Pilot.

27:38.330 --> 27:40.109
That's a very small scale in the Reserves,

27:40.109 --> 27:41.787
but what's on a larger scale in the Reserves

27:41.787 --> 27:43.981
is the remaining command post operational detachments.

27:43.981 --> 27:47.107
Without the main command post operational detachments,

27:47.107 --> 27:49.590
our corps and division headquarters

27:49.590 --> 27:51.068
cannot deploy and survive.

27:51.068 --> 27:53.068
They've taken a 25%

27:53.406 --> 27:55.150
slash across the board.

27:55.150 --> 27:56.745
Some very niche capabilities.

27:56.745 --> 27:59.979
Lot of intel, logistics, some other areas.

27:59.979 --> 28:01.245
The goal remains making sure we've got

28:01.245 --> 28:04.039
the right unit aligned with the right headquarters,

28:04.039 --> 28:07.372
but my corps had it, 18th, 101st had it,

28:07.516 --> 28:08.749
18th just had it again.

28:08.749 --> 28:10.205
It's gonna keep being a back and forth

28:10.205 --> 28:12.758
with the Reserves heavily in the corps piece.

28:12.758 --> 28:14.737
The Guard's playing a role in the

28:14.737 --> 28:16.587
division headquarters, as well.

28:16.587 --> 28:17.934
Again, it's how do we get, just like

28:17.934 --> 28:19.433
we're talking about keeping people in the Pacific

28:19.433 --> 28:20.986
from coming home and mobilizing, how do we get

28:20.986 --> 28:22.482
more of that done at home?

28:22.482 --> 28:24.354
Home station to you meaning, obviously,

28:24.354 --> 28:26.482
reserve centers, but how we get that done

28:26.482 --> 28:28.920
at home station versus having to bring you somewhere,

28:28.920 --> 28:31.103
which adds one more dance step to the equation,

28:31.103 --> 28:32.996
instead of bringing you right to an airfield,

28:32.996 --> 28:35.235
a seaport or whatever to get ya out the door.

28:35.235 --> 28:36.593
I think the key remains, again,

28:36.593 --> 28:38.549
decentralizing training and mobilization

28:38.549 --> 28:40.213
to make sure the right people are empowered

28:40.213 --> 28:41.587
to do what they have to do and get it done

28:41.587 --> 28:44.004
without being micromanaged by

28:44.780 --> 28:47.947
OCAR, HQDA or anybody else in between.

28:48.044 --> 28:50.161
All that fits into the logic of sustainable readiness.

28:50.161 --> 28:51.588
I hope by now that's been unveiled here

28:51.588 --> 28:54.411
a couple years ago, of how that overall process

28:54.411 --> 28:55.479
allows us to do this.

28:55.479 --> 28:56.526
I think that is huge.

28:56.526 --> 28:58.613
That's how we align your medal tasks.

28:58.613 --> 29:00.931
Right now, everybody, as I go to PCC every month,

29:00.931 --> 29:02.611
everybody is very worried about

29:02.611 --> 29:04.401
Reserve-specific medals and training

29:04.401 --> 29:05.496
and evaluation outlines.

29:05.496 --> 29:07.480
Right now, we've done very well,

29:07.480 --> 29:10.980
in terms of 300 USAR-specific mob standard

29:11.005 --> 29:12.903
training strategies, which I think is awesome,

29:12.903 --> 29:15.486
and over 1,060 standard medals.

29:17.220 --> 29:18.596
It's a lotta work, but I would tell you,

29:18.596 --> 29:20.843
through your proponents and through your commands,

29:20.843 --> 29:22.327
if some particular function were having

29:22.327 --> 29:24.463
a hard time with figuring out what those

29:24.463 --> 29:26.241
bins are, I ask you all to work that with

29:26.241 --> 29:29.345
the chain and DAMO-TR to help us see that better.

29:29.345 --> 29:31.534
I think without having those standards,

29:31.534 --> 29:32.898
without having those objectives that are all

29:32.898 --> 29:35.077
measurable, quantifiable, we're not gonna

29:35.077 --> 29:37.754
get you to Ready Force X-ray sooner than later.

29:37.754 --> 29:39.409
It'll take us longer.

29:39.409 --> 29:40.631
We ask for your help.

29:40.631 --> 29:42.206
As General Brown talked about, we're all about

29:42.206 --> 29:44.823
this enhanced forward presence mission stuff.

29:44.823 --> 29:46.065
The more we can employ the Reserves

29:46.065 --> 29:48.289
as part of that, and what you're gonna find here,

29:48.289 --> 29:49.840
what you're gonna see for Atlantic Resolve

29:49.840 --> 29:52.060
and Pacific Pathways in Korea specifically,

29:52.060 --> 29:54.686
when we have a rotational brigade,

29:54.686 --> 29:56.733
in this case, ABCT's going, we're going

29:56.733 --> 29:58.995
to appendage more capabilities.

29:58.995 --> 30:00.912
The question becomes under what authorities.

30:00.912 --> 30:03.778
That's where the 12304 stuff, specifically Bravo,

30:03.778 --> 30:06.166
becomes more demanding because that's not

30:06.166 --> 30:08.179
a year of execution, that's a POM task.

30:08.179 --> 30:10.164
We keep trying to fight that battle

30:10.164 --> 30:12.080
to give us much more flexibility to say that

30:12.080 --> 30:13.726
we want one of those capabilities that I

30:13.726 --> 30:14.976
explained to you a little while ago

30:14.976 --> 30:17.783
to be appendaged to 1st Brigade, 3rd ID,

30:17.783 --> 30:20.764
2nd Brigade, 1st ID, whatever the case may be,

30:20.764 --> 30:23.041
to go with them to give more capability

30:23.041 --> 30:26.791
to USARA, USARPAC, US Forces Korea, 8th Army.

30:26.977 --> 30:27.969
That's our free chicken.

30:27.969 --> 30:29.718
That's our way of doing it, assuming we have

30:29.718 --> 30:31.666
the authority and resources to pull that off.

30:31.666 --> 30:33.332
That's our goal, and that's what we're gonna

30:33.332 --> 30:34.665
keep working on.

30:34.786 --> 30:36.483
The goal is to keep the Reserves as relevant

30:36.483 --> 30:37.544
and ready as possible.

30:37.544 --> 30:39.839
Again, fight tonight is a silly term,

30:39.839 --> 30:42.579
but the bottom line is how much ready

30:42.579 --> 30:45.010
and how much more capacity and capability,

30:45.010 --> 30:46.468
as you hear the Chief talk about,

30:46.468 --> 30:48.004
can we generate from the Reserves to meet

30:48.004 --> 30:49.587
COCOM requirements.

30:49.621 --> 30:51.855
Thanks, look forward to your questions.

30:51.855 --> 30:54.187
To my battle buddy, the G-4.

30:54.187 --> 30:55.020
- Awesome.

30:55.760 --> 30:57.310
Chip, thank you for this invitation.

30:57.310 --> 30:58.963
I really appreciate you including me

30:58.963 --> 31:01.296
on this distinguished panel.

31:01.386 --> 31:02.742
I'm pretty excited.

31:02.742 --> 31:03.926
My head's getting pretty big.

31:03.926 --> 31:06.910
I got three of the most world famous war fighters,

31:06.910 --> 31:10.077
division commanders, corps commanders,

31:10.436 --> 31:12.539
omni-component command commanders taking about

31:12.539 --> 31:14.383
how great logistics is. (laughter)

31:14.383 --> 31:16.620
I think I could just pass (laughter)

31:16.620 --> 31:17.952
and not say anything at all.

31:17.952 --> 31:18.845
- [Joseph] Come on, man, this is your minute.

31:18.845 --> 31:19.678
Let's go.

31:19.678 --> 31:20.990
- This is wonderful.

31:20.990 --> 31:24.973
- [Joseph] Don't peak too early, man. (laughter)

31:24.973 --> 31:26.783
- A couple of weeks ago, I was out at

31:26.783 --> 31:29.200
the US Transportation Command

31:29.667 --> 31:31.944
with General McDew, who's the commander out there.

31:31.944 --> 31:34.694
He made what I thought was a very

31:34.956 --> 31:37.421
profound statement, and I wanna share it with ya.

31:37.421 --> 31:39.908
He said that there's two great powers

31:39.908 --> 31:43.135
in the world, and he was talking about Russia

31:43.135 --> 31:43.968
and China.

31:44.195 --> 31:46.593
He said, "There's one superpower."

31:46.593 --> 31:50.426
He asked, "What makes us that one superpower?"

31:52.862 --> 31:56.029
It's because of our ability to project

31:57.210 --> 32:00.210
combat power and capability anywhere

32:01.364 --> 32:04.197
in the world in a moment's notice.

32:05.632 --> 32:07.049
That's logistics.

32:07.281 --> 32:09.504
That's the power of logistics.

32:09.504 --> 32:13.406
That's the power that you bring to this nation.

32:13.406 --> 32:14.757
When you think about that and look at it

32:14.757 --> 32:18.071
from that perspective, that's pretty powerful.

32:18.071 --> 32:20.738
Logistics is what I think is our

32:20.756 --> 32:23.339
strategic comparative advantage

32:23.491 --> 32:26.889
for our nation that makes us a superpower.

32:26.889 --> 32:28.955
That was pretty profound.

32:28.955 --> 32:30.585
That stuck with me, and that ought to stick

32:30.585 --> 32:31.918
with all of you.

32:32.029 --> 32:33.321
- [Joseph] Makes you wanna cry, doesn't it?

32:33.321 --> 32:35.234
- It does. (laughter)

32:35.234 --> 32:37.022
So you've heard the Chief, you've heard

32:37.022 --> 32:38.209
General Brown just talked about it,

32:38.209 --> 32:40.257
you heard the three, readiness is our number one priority.

32:40.257 --> 32:43.174
We must be ready now, not tomorrow.

32:43.616 --> 32:46.353
We gotta be ready today for that potential

32:46.353 --> 32:47.520
fight tonight.

32:48.623 --> 32:51.361
That's what the rare Reserve Component provides us,

32:51.361 --> 32:54.180
is that unique capability and skillsets

32:54.180 --> 32:55.949
through this stressed and unique forces

32:55.949 --> 32:59.869
that Chip talked about, and our Ready Force X formations

32:59.869 --> 33:02.369
that gives us that capability.

33:02.931 --> 33:05.456
Unit readiness is central to us,

33:05.456 --> 33:08.625
from a logistician and sustainment perspective,

33:08.625 --> 33:10.125
78%, 78%

33:12.380 --> 33:16.467
of logistics forces reside in the Reserve Component.

33:16.467 --> 33:19.228
Now, you talked about that early entry capability,

33:19.228 --> 33:22.965
that petroleum capability, that transportation capability.

33:22.965 --> 33:27.048
We gotta ask ourselves, can it get there in time?

33:27.246 --> 33:28.329
I don't know.

33:28.774 --> 33:32.184
We oughta have a discussion about that conversation.

33:32.184 --> 33:35.086
Do we have the right balance to execute

33:35.086 --> 33:38.503
when our nation calls us on short notice?

33:38.750 --> 33:42.250
78% resides in the Reserve Component.

33:43.266 --> 33:44.815
A lot of those requirements are in three,

33:44.815 --> 33:47.359
sometimes seven days to get there.

33:47.359 --> 33:49.195
Can we meet that requirement?

33:49.195 --> 33:51.512
We're looking for you to be able to execute

33:51.512 --> 33:54.595
those tasks with this Ready Force formations.

33:54.595 --> 33:56.109
I think we gotta be ready.

33:56.109 --> 33:57.464
For all the reasons that the Chief

33:57.464 --> 34:00.254
and the Sec Def told us two days ago,

34:00.254 --> 34:03.771
or yesterday, we have to be ready for those missions

34:03.771 --> 34:06.235
if our nation ask us to do that.

34:06.235 --> 34:08.568
This chart kinda talks about

34:08.993 --> 34:10.474
where we are and where I think we're going.

34:10.474 --> 34:12.118
I'm not gonna talk a lot about

34:12.118 --> 34:12.951
what's on that chart.

34:12.951 --> 34:15.109
I'm happy to take questions about it,

34:15.109 --> 34:16.739
but there's just a couple things that I think that

34:16.739 --> 34:19.802
we ought to be aware of and will continue

34:19.802 --> 34:22.719
to need your help on as we continue

34:22.835 --> 34:24.305
to prepare ourselves to be ready

34:24.305 --> 34:27.170
for any future fight, anywhere around the world.

34:27.170 --> 34:30.170
Divestiture, getting rid of obsolete

34:30.599 --> 34:33.743
and excess equipment continues to be a challenge for us.

34:33.743 --> 34:36.501
We're not resourced to sustain that equipment.

34:36.501 --> 34:37.976
We don't have the manpower.

34:37.976 --> 34:39.975
I know I'm preaching to the choir.

34:39.975 --> 34:41.939
You don't have the man hours available

34:41.939 --> 34:44.022
to properly sustain that equipment.

34:44.022 --> 34:46.228
We have to divest of that equipment.

34:46.228 --> 34:48.542
If it's obsolete, we need to move it out

34:48.542 --> 34:49.977
of the Army inventory.

34:49.977 --> 34:52.045
If it's excess, we need to move it

34:52.045 --> 34:55.003
where it's needed, and we can increase readiness.

34:55.003 --> 34:56.892
Readiness is what we're trying to achieve

34:56.892 --> 34:58.609
at the end of the day.

34:58.609 --> 35:01.883
We're about 45% complete building these

35:01.883 --> 35:04.848
common ASLs for our brigade combat teams.

35:04.848 --> 35:06.814
We'll have that completed by the end

35:06.814 --> 35:08.319
of this fiscal year.

35:08.319 --> 35:11.777
We're looking at a most aggressive OPTEMPO.

35:11.777 --> 35:15.444
We're not using the normal supply and demand

35:15.872 --> 35:17.405
requirements to build our ASLs.

35:17.405 --> 35:19.141
We're building these ASLs on what we think

35:19.141 --> 35:23.308
the most dangerous course of action in OPTEMPO might be.

35:23.701 --> 35:27.073
We're making 'em 100% mobile so we can move 'em

35:27.073 --> 35:29.338
anywhere around the battlefield.

35:29.338 --> 35:30.849
We think this will be a good news story.

35:30.849 --> 35:33.164
We think increasing the breadth and depth

35:33.164 --> 35:36.747
of our ASLs will build readiness over time.

35:36.765 --> 35:40.098
We're look at innovative ways to reduce demand

35:40.098 --> 35:43.539
for water, for fuel and other commodities.

35:43.539 --> 35:45.215
That's something that we need to continue

35:45.215 --> 35:46.632
to team together.

35:47.049 --> 35:50.097
I ask for your innovative ideas from your

35:50.097 --> 35:51.673
smart teammates out there to help us

35:51.673 --> 35:52.923
get after that.

35:53.416 --> 35:56.249
I was out in LA a couple weeks ago

35:56.878 --> 36:00.795
visiting the Army West, Army Research Lab West,

36:01.066 --> 36:03.733
and how we execute 3-D printing.

36:05.683 --> 36:08.162
When we don't have the appropriate repair ports,

36:08.162 --> 36:11.411
we can print it at the forward location,

36:11.411 --> 36:14.012
either the part that we need or the special

36:14.012 --> 36:15.595
tools that we need.

36:15.632 --> 36:17.965
We don't have to worry about

36:18.012 --> 36:19.966
the supply system to resupply that system

36:19.966 --> 36:21.776
when we can repair it or build it

36:21.776 --> 36:23.047
at the point of need.

36:23.047 --> 36:24.130
That's power.

36:24.170 --> 36:25.790
That's the innovative ideas that I think

36:25.790 --> 36:27.963
that we need to approach as we go forward

36:27.963 --> 36:30.213
to be a combat ready force.

36:31.916 --> 36:34.598
There's the units that are executing

36:34.598 --> 36:36.914
condition-based maintenance programs.

36:36.914 --> 36:39.312
There's a transportation company

36:39.312 --> 36:41.145
that has saved $69,000

36:42.815 --> 36:44.472
on parts and services alone.

36:44.472 --> 36:46.701
Now, that may not be a lotta money,

36:46.701 --> 36:49.857
you might say, but $69,000 for a transportation company

36:49.857 --> 36:52.206
is still quite a bit of money.

36:52.206 --> 36:54.854
But more importantly, it's not about the dollars,

36:54.854 --> 36:58.574
it's about 6,000 man hours that those soldiers

36:58.574 --> 37:00.990
can execute other required missions

37:00.990 --> 37:04.740
or execute training instead of doing services

37:04.908 --> 37:07.575
or repair ports that we did get.

37:09.000 --> 37:10.000
I own a BMW.

37:12.965 --> 37:14.238
Previously, I had a Nissan.

37:14.238 --> 37:16.795
That Nissan, I had to change the oil

37:16.795 --> 37:19.462
every six months or 3,000 miles.

37:20.175 --> 37:22.486
I did that religiously for 20-something years,

37:22.486 --> 37:23.630
and then I bought a BMW.

37:23.630 --> 37:25.210
I got a sensor on there, and I only change

37:25.210 --> 37:26.889
the oil when the sensor says take it

37:26.889 --> 37:30.639
to the store, the dealer, and change the oil.

37:31.827 --> 37:34.231
Why am I changing all the oil just because?

37:34.231 --> 37:36.285
It's a routine, we've always done it that way.

37:36.285 --> 37:38.680
We gotta get away from doing it the same old way

37:38.680 --> 37:41.217
just because we've done it that way.

37:41.217 --> 37:43.509
We need to take advantage of today's technology

37:43.509 --> 37:45.870
that can allow us the opportunity to save money

37:45.870 --> 37:48.599
and time with those limited resources that we have,

37:48.599 --> 37:52.420
and execute better and more improved training.

37:52.420 --> 37:54.442
I need your help looking for those

37:54.442 --> 37:56.692
innovative ways to do that.

37:58.100 --> 38:02.012
I was struck by the Sec Def's comment yesterday.

38:02.012 --> 38:03.882
He talked about getting back to basics,

38:03.882 --> 38:05.632
blocking and tackling.

38:05.632 --> 38:08.242
(mumbles) Bell and I talk about that

38:08.242 --> 38:09.325
all the time.

38:09.602 --> 38:13.185
We've done a lot, been extremely successful

38:13.308 --> 38:16.585
sustaining operations over the past 16 years of war,

38:16.585 --> 38:18.380
but it's different from what we had trained

38:18.380 --> 38:20.297
before 9/11.

38:20.335 --> 38:23.208
We need to get back to that level of training.

38:23.208 --> 38:24.851
You heard John Brown and you heard the three

38:24.851 --> 38:26.243
talk about some of those things that we

38:26.243 --> 38:28.245
need to do to get back to that level

38:28.245 --> 38:30.307
of proficiency of being able to execute

38:30.307 --> 38:32.886
combat operations and sustainment operations

38:32.886 --> 38:34.901
in an expeditionary environment.

38:34.901 --> 38:36.473
We've lost some of those skills.

38:36.473 --> 38:38.065
We've lost that muscle memory.

38:38.065 --> 38:40.963
We have to get back to those fundamentals

38:40.963 --> 38:43.899
that made us successful before 9/11.

38:43.899 --> 38:47.439
We're not gonna have contractors on the battlefield.

38:47.439 --> 38:49.815
Those FOBs are not gonna exist.

38:49.815 --> 38:51.098
We're gonna go out there, and we're gonna

38:51.098 --> 38:52.584
sustain ourselves.

38:52.584 --> 38:54.738
We have to prepare for that now in training.

38:54.738 --> 38:57.176
We talked about these increase in CTC rotations

38:57.176 --> 38:58.676
and NTC rotations.

38:58.818 --> 39:02.515
We're having Reserve Component CSSBs out there

39:02.515 --> 39:04.578
executing sustainment operations.

39:04.578 --> 39:07.172
That's a way that we can get after

39:07.172 --> 39:11.118
ensuring that the total force is trained to execute

39:11.118 --> 39:13.406
combat operations, and for us to be successful

39:13.406 --> 39:14.858
at the tip of the spear.

39:14.858 --> 39:16.212
A couple of examples of what we're doing.

39:16.212 --> 39:19.295
Operating Atlantic Resolve in Europe.

39:19.555 --> 39:21.722
34 ID deployed in January.

39:22.665 --> 39:23.805
We hadn't done that in a while.

39:23.805 --> 39:25.334
General Brown talked about we used to execute

39:25.334 --> 39:26.565
the Reforger exercise.

39:26.565 --> 39:28.096
This is the first brigade to deploy

39:28.096 --> 39:29.294
in the heel to toe operation.

39:29.294 --> 39:31.720
We're doing this in Korea, as well.

39:31.720 --> 39:34.757
But this first brigade went into Poland,

39:34.757 --> 39:37.246
and it took them 14 days from ramp down

39:37.246 --> 39:38.746
to ready to fight.

39:38.992 --> 39:41.320
I think that was pretty good, pretty good.

39:41.320 --> 39:43.062
That met General Hodges', I think, timeline,

39:43.062 --> 39:45.056
but he would have liked to seen us

39:45.056 --> 39:46.715
execute that quicker.

39:46.715 --> 39:50.465
The second brigade, 21 ID, that just recently

39:51.214 --> 39:53.496
deployed in there, actually beat that timeframe

39:53.496 --> 39:56.575
because we are a learning organization.

39:56.575 --> 39:59.158
We have to learn those lessons,

39:59.223 --> 40:00.911
share that with our brothers and sisters

40:00.911 --> 40:03.293
so that they are better than we are when we

40:03.293 --> 40:05.460
execute these deployments.

40:05.609 --> 40:07.538
Another good example of working with STGC,

40:07.538 --> 40:08.601
the 10th Cav.

40:08.601 --> 40:09.434
I was in

40:10.409 --> 40:14.576
Poland with, excuse me, Greece with General Hodges

40:14.751 --> 40:17.084
when we downloaded the ship.

40:17.235 --> 40:20.318
The 10th Cav downloaded six aircraft,

40:21.839 --> 40:24.024
but because we ordered the right size ship

40:24.024 --> 40:25.328
that was high enough where we did not

40:25.328 --> 40:28.369
have to take the blades off and the rotors off,

40:28.369 --> 40:30.857
within two hours of coming off the ship,

40:30.857 --> 40:33.335
they were flying to their tactical assembly area.

40:33.335 --> 40:36.085
That's powerful, that's powerful.

40:36.089 --> 40:37.785
Because we had a plan in place early,

40:37.785 --> 40:40.432
we coordinate with all of our sustainment partners,

40:40.432 --> 40:42.715
our strategic partners, and we executed

40:42.715 --> 40:44.518
the mission to standard.

40:44.518 --> 40:46.124
That's another example of how it's important

40:46.124 --> 40:48.767
for us to work together with all of our components.

40:48.767 --> 40:50.759
Now, I talked about those brigades that

40:50.759 --> 40:51.823
are in Poland.

40:51.823 --> 40:54.151
They're being supported by Reserves Component CSSB

40:54.151 --> 40:56.627
that are doing rotations throughout Europe.

40:56.627 --> 40:59.833
We don't have sufficient active duty forces

40:59.833 --> 41:01.533
there to do that mission.

41:01.533 --> 41:04.033
Another capability that exists

41:04.719 --> 41:06.691
in our Reserve Component that's absolutely critical,

41:06.691 --> 41:09.165
that we're gonna continue to depend on

41:09.165 --> 41:10.582
as we go forward.

41:11.199 --> 41:12.859
About 10 days ago, I was out in California.

41:12.859 --> 41:14.175
I don't know if mob powers are here,

41:14.175 --> 41:16.546
but I assisted in standing up the

41:16.546 --> 41:19.049
79th Theater Sustainment Command as they

41:19.049 --> 41:21.101
transitioned from an administrative organization,

41:21.101 --> 41:25.268
and now became a operational deployable headquarters,

41:25.892 --> 41:29.725
aligned with AFRICOM and US Africa in Vicenza.

41:30.590 --> 41:33.268
They are in the process of deploying

41:33.268 --> 41:35.632
probably about 25% of that organization,

41:35.632 --> 41:37.965
that 30-man team, to Vicenza

41:39.473 --> 41:41.541
to be permanently located

41:41.541 --> 41:43.874
with USAF, US Forces Africa.

41:44.680 --> 41:47.756
The Reserve Theater Sustainment Command Headquarters

41:47.756 --> 41:49.969
executed operations that I was responsible

41:49.969 --> 41:51.315
for running when I commanded the

41:51.315 --> 41:54.322
21st Theater Sustainment Command years ago

41:54.322 --> 41:56.887
with Paul Benenati back in the back of the room.

41:56.887 --> 42:00.297
How powerful is that to have a Reserve Component

42:00.297 --> 42:01.880
aligned with a Army

42:04.657 --> 42:07.577
Component Command forward executing operations

42:07.577 --> 42:10.994
throughout that vast continent of Africa?

42:11.685 --> 42:12.751
That's power.

42:12.751 --> 42:16.918
That's what the Reserve Component brings to the fight.

42:16.981 --> 42:18.064
We need that.

42:18.906 --> 42:19.859
Great to be here.

42:19.859 --> 42:21.005
I look forward to your questions.

42:21.005 --> 42:22.944
The power of the Reserve Component cannot

42:22.944 --> 42:24.760
be understated, but we need to look

42:24.760 --> 42:27.557
at the structure to ensure we have it right.

42:27.557 --> 42:29.772
If we don't, now is the time, I think,

42:29.772 --> 42:31.204
that we have to get that right because

42:31.204 --> 42:34.704
our nation expects us to be ready to fight

42:34.938 --> 42:36.865
and prepared to sustain whenever it calls.

42:36.865 --> 42:38.258
Thank you very much.

42:38.258 --> 42:39.553
- [Charles] Hooah.

42:39.553 --> 42:40.697
Thanks, Andre.

42:40.697 --> 42:41.614
First Army.

42:43.051 --> 42:44.656
- When I was a division commander,

42:44.656 --> 42:47.632
brigade commander or battalion commander,

42:47.632 --> 42:50.215
I would only give my S-4 or G-4

42:51.948 --> 42:54.269
five minutes to talk about logistics.

42:54.269 --> 42:57.186
(laughter) Aundre,

42:57.298 --> 42:58.914
you took 15 minutes too long.

42:58.914 --> 43:01.164
(laughter)

43:02.892 --> 43:04.024
- Thank you, brother.

43:04.024 --> 43:05.468
I'm still learning.

43:05.468 --> 43:07.148
This is a learning organization.

43:07.148 --> 43:08.469
- It's great to be here.

43:08.469 --> 43:11.717
I just wanna echo something that General Brown said.

43:11.717 --> 43:14.033
That is every day I get to watch

43:14.033 --> 43:17.533
our Compo-2, Compo 3 brothers and sisters,

43:17.947 --> 43:21.730
and I'm part of the Compo 1 community, as well,

43:21.730 --> 43:23.536
interact with each other, train with each other

43:23.536 --> 43:24.602
and so forth.

43:24.602 --> 43:27.602
We're in a better place than we were

43:28.304 --> 43:30.554
16 years ago, 17 years ago.

43:31.266 --> 43:34.807
I am truly proud of our Reserve Component forces.

43:34.807 --> 43:37.263
I get to see 'em every day, both National Guard

43:37.263 --> 43:38.347
and Army Reserve.

43:38.347 --> 43:41.011
I wanna thank all you all for what you do

43:41.011 --> 43:43.709
if you wear the Army Reserve patch

43:43.709 --> 43:46.298
or you wear the National Guard patch.

43:46.298 --> 43:48.709
The First Army stands by all you all.

43:48.709 --> 43:50.858
As you all know, and you can read the,

43:50.858 --> 43:52.661
if you can go to the next slide, please.

43:52.661 --> 43:54.979
You can read the mission statement of First Army,

43:54.979 --> 43:57.760
but the bottom line is, just to shorten

43:57.760 --> 44:00.088
that mission statement up a little bit,

44:00.088 --> 44:01.505
we exist for you.

44:02.311 --> 44:05.228
We don't come and impose or enforce

44:06.616 --> 44:09.319
our will on you (mumbles).

44:09.319 --> 44:11.723
You tell us what you need assistance in,

44:11.723 --> 44:12.758
and that's what we do.

44:12.758 --> 44:13.947
We come and assist you.

44:13.947 --> 44:15.614
We partner with you.

44:16.083 --> 44:18.000
We come and assist you.

44:18.372 --> 44:21.551
We provide training assistance throughout

44:21.551 --> 44:23.757
whatever you want us to focus on

44:23.757 --> 44:25.436
because at the end of the day,

44:25.436 --> 44:28.769
it is my job as the First Army commander

44:28.884 --> 44:31.384
to validate you for deployment

44:31.708 --> 44:35.875
because we must meet combatant commanders' requirement.

44:36.140 --> 44:37.928
That's what our nation expects,

44:37.928 --> 44:40.284
that's what our Army Chief of Staff expects

44:40.284 --> 44:43.194
and that's what the FORSCOM commander expects.

44:43.194 --> 44:44.611
Couple of things.

44:44.671 --> 44:47.407
We operate on three lines of communications.

44:47.407 --> 44:49.990
Number one is pre-mobilization.

44:50.719 --> 44:53.334
During pre-mobilization, we're there with you

44:53.334 --> 44:55.981
and your battle assemblies or drills

44:55.981 --> 44:57.887
or whenever you need us.

44:57.887 --> 44:59.507
We're composed of nine brigades

44:59.507 --> 45:01.696
and two division headquarters.

45:01.696 --> 45:04.347
Most of you all probably know where our

45:04.347 --> 45:08.077
nine brigades are located, but every single unit

45:08.077 --> 45:09.569
in the United States Army Reserve

45:09.569 --> 45:11.495
and in United States National Guard,

45:11.495 --> 45:14.495
they're partnered with our brigades.

45:15.013 --> 45:17.543
If you have not spoken with your partnered

45:17.543 --> 45:20.612
First Army brigade, then I would encourage you

45:20.612 --> 45:24.445
to do so because they are there to assist you.

45:26.468 --> 45:30.027
The way we get after readiness in First Army

45:30.027 --> 45:32.944
is we focus first on those brigades

45:33.325 --> 45:34.408
that are NOS,

45:35.568 --> 45:37.993
notice of sourcing, for deployment.

45:37.993 --> 45:39.155
That's how we get after it.

45:39.155 --> 45:40.706
That's our priority.

45:40.706 --> 45:42.895
We also focus in terms of the

45:42.895 --> 45:46.053
United States Army Reserve, those Ready X forces

45:46.053 --> 45:48.803
that General Luckey talked about.

45:48.884 --> 45:51.668
Those are our priorities for focus.

45:51.668 --> 45:53.760
That's where we tend to focus.

45:53.760 --> 45:55.760
If you are not in those bins that I

45:55.760 --> 45:58.797
just talked about, you're on a lower priority

45:58.797 --> 46:00.821
for First Army simply because we only

46:00.821 --> 46:02.404
have nine brigades.

46:02.606 --> 46:04.487
Not only do we service the United States

46:04.487 --> 46:07.919
Army Reserve, we also service the Army National Guard.

46:07.919 --> 46:10.252
They have the same bins that

46:10.541 --> 46:11.971
I'm speaking of, as well.

46:11.971 --> 46:14.388
They just don't call it Ready X,

46:14.388 --> 46:17.505
just like the United States Army Reserve.

46:17.505 --> 46:20.731
The other place that we focus is post-mobilization.

46:20.731 --> 46:23.064
That's our bread and butter.

46:23.284 --> 46:26.410
Post-mobilization, we expect for you all

46:26.410 --> 46:30.410
in the Army Reserve to come to post-mobilization

46:30.540 --> 46:34.397
already completed your individual requirements.

46:34.397 --> 46:36.391
We're out of the business in First Army

46:36.391 --> 46:38.890
of training in individual requirements,

46:38.890 --> 46:41.190
unless there's an anomaly out there.

46:41.190 --> 46:43.018
I will just give you an example.

46:43.018 --> 46:45.286
Many cases, you will deploy, and you do not

46:45.286 --> 46:47.532
have MRAPs at home station.

46:47.532 --> 46:50.034
We have MRAPs down at Fort Hood or Fort Bliss,

46:50.034 --> 46:53.506
we'll do that training for ya, but other than that,

46:53.506 --> 46:54.801
we're out of the business.

46:54.801 --> 46:58.004
No individual range training, none of that stuff anymore

46:58.004 --> 47:01.099
because, as ya heard the G-3, General Anderson,

47:01.099 --> 47:05.113
hey, we gotta reduce those post-mobilization timelines.

47:05.113 --> 47:08.611
The way that I've directed my folks in First Army

47:08.611 --> 47:10.380
to do it is first ya gotta cut out

47:10.380 --> 47:12.323
the individual training that's going on

47:12.323 --> 47:14.348
at Fort Hood and Fort Bliss.

47:14.348 --> 47:16.515
We do not do that anymore.

47:17.901 --> 47:20.040
I talked about Fort Hood and Fort Bliss.

47:20.040 --> 47:22.591
Those are our two primary locations

47:22.591 --> 47:25.508
to conduct mobilization operations.

47:26.104 --> 47:30.039
24 hour operations down there to ensure that we,

47:30.039 --> 47:33.399
in fact, meet combatant commander's requirement

47:33.399 --> 47:35.643
and get soldiers through their

47:35.643 --> 47:37.742
mission readiness exercise and units through

47:37.742 --> 47:39.675
their missions readiness exercise.

47:39.675 --> 47:41.182
Then we put 'em on planes, trains

47:41.182 --> 47:43.049
and automobiles, and deploy 'em wherever

47:43.049 --> 47:45.466
they need to deploy to serve.

47:47.194 --> 47:50.156
We also have seven contingency platform locations.

47:50.156 --> 47:52.010
We can talk about that further during

47:52.010 --> 47:54.505
the question and answer sessions,

47:54.505 --> 47:57.672
but we now, in fact, have seven others

47:58.460 --> 48:01.025
that are prepared for contingency operations.

48:01.025 --> 48:03.912
Ya heard Chip Luckey talk about the

48:03.912 --> 48:06.238
mobilization support force that will

48:06.238 --> 48:09.988
also deploy to support us at those locations.

48:10.860 --> 48:12.677
Then just in case you're wondering,

48:12.677 --> 48:14.559
they're at the same locations that my

48:14.559 --> 48:16.726
nine brigades are located.

48:17.828 --> 48:20.369
When you get down to the mobilization site,

48:20.369 --> 48:24.036
we conduct, our job is to conduct validation

48:24.144 --> 48:27.984
of whether you met the combatant commanders' requirements.

48:27.984 --> 48:30.069
If you don't meet combatant commanders' requirement,

48:30.069 --> 48:31.902
then you don't deploy.

48:32.197 --> 48:34.604
I've had several units in my 15 months

48:34.604 --> 48:37.104
of command, they do not deploy

48:37.264 --> 48:38.933
'cause at the end of the day, I go back

48:38.933 --> 48:40.918
to the Chief of Staff of the Armies.

48:40.918 --> 48:43.668
Number one priority is readiness.

48:44.158 --> 48:47.658
If you're not ready, you're not deploying.

48:48.107 --> 48:49.887
The last line of effort that we operate on

48:49.887 --> 48:52.387
is the demobilization process.

48:53.296 --> 48:55.634
It is not the demobilization process of old.

48:55.634 --> 48:57.335
It's changed significantly.

48:57.335 --> 48:59.129
It is actually on your timeline, so when you

48:59.129 --> 49:02.296
come back outta theater, we treat that

49:02.373 --> 49:05.540
as a deployment, not as an admin move.

49:06.216 --> 49:08.133
We put you, the leader,

49:10.424 --> 49:12.674
involved in that operation.

49:12.711 --> 49:14.734
You can be there four days or you can

49:14.734 --> 49:16.151
be there 14 days.

49:17.377 --> 49:20.511
It is self-driven mainly by the commander

49:20.511 --> 49:23.076
or the first sergeant or CSM, what level

49:23.076 --> 49:25.743
of command coming through there.

49:26.177 --> 49:28.182
Then we'll take ya off Title 10,

49:28.182 --> 49:29.956
put you back on 32 or whatever status

49:29.956 --> 49:34.123
we need to put you back on, and get ya on your way.

49:34.659 --> 49:37.326
The final thing I'll say is that

49:37.823 --> 49:40.896
you've heard everyone talk about being ready

49:40.896 --> 49:42.479
for the next fight.

49:42.634 --> 49:44.717
MFGI is the focus for me.

49:45.625 --> 49:47.228
It's gonna be a tabletop exercise.

49:47.228 --> 49:49.267
We're gonna have several exercises throughout,

49:49.267 --> 49:52.100
but we have to move ourselves from

49:52.479 --> 49:53.812
an ARFORGEN-like

49:56.075 --> 49:58.408
operation like you will find

49:58.600 --> 50:00.634
down at Fort Bliss and Fort Hood

50:00.634 --> 50:02.821
as we take you through pre-mobilization,

50:02.821 --> 50:05.988
to contingency mobilization platforms.

50:06.131 --> 50:08.673
That's what we're making that transition on now

50:08.673 --> 50:12.090
so that we can meet unknown requirements.

50:12.494 --> 50:14.333
Right now, our operations at Fort Bliss

50:14.333 --> 50:16.196
and Fort Hood, they're pretty easy.

50:16.196 --> 50:18.152
I look and see who's deploying,

50:18.152 --> 50:19.819
I contact that unit.

50:20.125 --> 50:23.175
We take 'em through a gated strategy.

50:23.175 --> 50:26.201
We bring 'em through a gated training strategy

50:26.201 --> 50:29.275
and SRP process down at Fort Hood and Fort Bliss.

50:29.275 --> 50:31.001
We spit it out the other end.

50:31.001 --> 50:33.128
It's just like being on a hamster wheel

50:33.128 --> 50:35.772
that you hear us talk about sometimes,

50:35.772 --> 50:38.022
against known requirements.

50:38.157 --> 50:41.359
Now, if you told me contingency requirements,

50:41.359 --> 50:42.837
you're talking about a different story.

50:42.837 --> 50:45.076
That's what we're planning for now,

50:45.076 --> 50:47.497
to be able to meet contingency requirements,

50:47.497 --> 50:49.766
ensure that we can get forces out in order

50:49.766 --> 50:53.183
to meet combatant commander requirements.

50:53.659 --> 50:55.159
That's all I have.

50:55.544 --> 50:56.841
- All right, so thanks, team.

50:56.841 --> 50:59.235
I appreciate all the panel members pitching in

50:59.235 --> 51:01.152
and getting this going.

51:01.322 --> 51:03.480
At this point, I'd like to open the floor to questions.

51:03.480 --> 51:07.397
They got a couple mics set in the middle aisle.

51:07.701 --> 51:09.531
You can either stand up and sound off,

51:09.531 --> 51:13.198
or you can grab a mic, but the floor's open.

51:14.047 --> 51:14.880
Go ahead.

51:15.484 --> 51:16.412
- [Witsig] This is Lieutenant Colonel Witsig.

51:16.412 --> 51:17.579
I'm with OCAR.

51:17.660 --> 51:20.077
Over here, sir, to your left.

51:20.636 --> 51:21.553
- Go ahead.

51:21.647 --> 51:22.480
- [Witsig] This question's for General Brown

51:22.480 --> 51:23.670
and General Twitty.

51:23.670 --> 51:24.907
General Brown, you mentioned that you

51:24.907 --> 51:26.976
have units essentially, on reserve units

51:26.976 --> 51:28.235
forward deployed in theater, and you

51:28.235 --> 51:30.512
were planing on mobilizing them in place.

51:30.512 --> 51:32.427
Could you discuss a little bit more about

51:32.427 --> 51:33.836
how that would work?

51:33.836 --> 51:35.957
Then the followup for that is based on

51:35.957 --> 51:37.232
the units that you have out there

51:37.232 --> 51:38.658
and what you believe you need,

51:38.658 --> 51:40.548
without getting into classified information,

51:40.548 --> 51:42.777
would you prefer a different force mix

51:42.777 --> 51:46.110
in theater than what you have right now?

51:46.273 --> 51:47.321
- Good question.

51:47.321 --> 51:48.287
I'll start off.

51:48.287 --> 51:51.807
The mob forward, the key is General Twitty's folks,

51:51.807 --> 51:52.724
First Army.

51:52.833 --> 51:55.083
We have 196 Brigade with us

51:56.067 --> 51:58.150
that is First Army asset.

51:58.330 --> 52:00.365
Without them, we could not mob forward.

52:00.365 --> 52:03.947
Obviously, they have to send a team forward.

52:03.947 --> 52:06.030
That is the absolute key.

52:06.438 --> 52:08.960
The other aspect is obviously where we go

52:08.960 --> 52:11.210
has to have the capability,

52:12.073 --> 52:13.821
the mobilization assets and the capability.

52:13.821 --> 52:15.896
Some places just don't have it.

52:15.896 --> 52:18.185
American Samoa, for example, would not have

52:18.185 --> 52:20.807
the capability, nor would Saipan.

52:20.807 --> 52:24.390
Guam does and, obviously, forward in Korea,

52:25.014 --> 52:26.597
and Japan, as well.

52:26.685 --> 52:29.152
But the biggest lesson learned for us,

52:29.152 --> 52:31.735
and it is a total force effort,

52:32.212 --> 52:33.951
mobilization forward.

52:33.951 --> 52:35.284
It does require,

52:36.870 --> 52:39.315
they're not just out there on an island, if you will.

52:39.315 --> 52:40.751
They're still following the same exact

52:40.751 --> 52:43.896
standards that those folks who are mobilized

52:43.896 --> 52:46.769
at a FORSCOM installation or we have backup

52:46.769 --> 52:50.352
in Hawaii and Alaska mob stations, as well,

52:50.596 --> 52:52.066
the same requirements.

52:52.066 --> 52:54.483
You can't skip, no shortcuts.

52:56.509 --> 52:59.593
But, again, in the pilots, we found that

52:59.593 --> 53:02.230
very effective can be done forward.

53:02.230 --> 53:04.373
Fortunately, it's smaller numbers, obviously.

53:04.373 --> 53:07.203
It's not a large number, but it's significant enough

53:07.203 --> 53:09.256
to make a difference, again, in not having

53:09.256 --> 53:12.019
to fly that individual all the way back

53:12.019 --> 53:15.602
from Japan or Korea or Guam in the Pacific,

53:16.231 --> 53:18.806
and be able to get them doing their job

53:18.806 --> 53:20.571
a heck of a lot faster, and not competing

53:20.571 --> 53:22.114
with those limited assets.

53:22.114 --> 53:24.447
Never gonna have enough air.

53:24.477 --> 53:26.091
That's absolutely key.

53:26.091 --> 53:27.508
Staff, any other?

53:28.279 --> 53:31.279
I know his folks have been involved,

53:31.449 --> 53:33.423
empowered at the brigade level.

53:33.423 --> 53:34.659
We haven't have too many issues we've had

53:34.659 --> 53:36.438
to bubble up to First Army level.

53:36.438 --> 53:38.236
It's gone fairly well.

53:38.236 --> 53:39.403
The only thing we're waiting on now

53:39.403 --> 53:42.236
is we have to get a waiver on that

53:42.473 --> 53:43.806
up through M&RA.

53:45.251 --> 53:48.091
I was talking to new M&RA earlier today.

53:48.091 --> 53:50.064
We're working through that now,

53:50.064 --> 53:51.894
but it's not two standards.

53:51.894 --> 53:54.144
It's gotta be one standard.

53:54.348 --> 53:57.145
The second, the force mixture question.

53:57.145 --> 53:59.312
- Force mix forward, yeah.

54:00.364 --> 54:02.447
- I think it's very good,

54:02.860 --> 54:04.931
but, obviously, if you could start

54:04.931 --> 54:06.514
with a clean slate,

54:07.454 --> 54:09.651
there are some forces you would want.

54:09.651 --> 54:12.075
Port opening I'd want farther forward

54:12.075 --> 54:13.913
and some experts in that, for example.

54:13.913 --> 54:15.760
Obviously, that's early on.

54:15.760 --> 54:17.009
Certainly, if ya had a clean slate.

54:17.009 --> 54:19.405
But the reality is ya gotta go with what ya got.

54:19.405 --> 54:22.063
We're not gonna be able to adjust significantly.

54:22.063 --> 54:24.549
Little adjustments here and there, no question.

54:24.549 --> 54:26.632
When you look at a TPFDD.

54:29.332 --> 54:30.705
The good news is I think commanders

54:30.705 --> 54:32.057
are getting involved.

54:32.057 --> 54:34.685
As we're walking through who needs to be where

54:34.685 --> 54:36.577
and working that over the last eight

54:36.577 --> 54:37.660
to 10 months.

54:39.756 --> 54:42.134
You're continuing to revise it all the time,

54:42.134 --> 54:44.309
but where we're postured now is pretty darn good.

54:44.309 --> 54:46.142
We can do the mission.

54:46.760 --> 54:48.409
But would I change it if I could?

54:48.409 --> 54:49.864
Sure, there'd be little things you would adjust

54:49.864 --> 54:52.485
here and there, but we can do the mission.

54:52.485 --> 54:54.280
We've gone through, as General Anderson mentioned,

54:54.280 --> 54:56.865
that tabletop exercise we went through in Korea

54:56.865 --> 54:58.198
a few weeks ago.

54:58.292 --> 55:01.540
It's just eye opening, little things here and there.

55:01.540 --> 55:03.231
I think the most significant aspect,

55:03.231 --> 55:06.481
we had commanders who were in the TPFDD

55:06.649 --> 55:09.570
on the ground involved in it, from 82nd,

55:09.570 --> 55:12.828
101st, corps commanders, the folks involved,

55:12.828 --> 55:14.283
the right folks involved.

55:14.283 --> 55:15.607
Commanders know what they need.

55:15.607 --> 55:18.274
Then we've gotta make it happen.

55:19.018 --> 55:20.437
- Let me just, if I would, just one other thing.

55:20.437 --> 55:23.120
Go back to the RFX slide, please.

55:23.120 --> 55:24.710
While they're doing that, just one other

55:24.710 --> 55:26.955
thought on this whole, sort of get

55:26.955 --> 55:28.821
to a different part of this question.

55:28.821 --> 55:30.130
General Twitty and I have talked about this

55:30.130 --> 55:31.297
a fair amount.

55:31.492 --> 55:34.722
Depending on when C-Day is and when M-Day is,

55:34.722 --> 55:37.145
the reality is some stuff is gonna go.

55:37.145 --> 55:38.879
First of all, as you all know,

55:38.879 --> 55:41.494
we're Title 10 all the time, but some stuff's gonna go

55:41.494 --> 55:43.188
without ever going through a mob platform

55:43.188 --> 55:44.975
because it is gonna be the mob platform,

55:44.975 --> 55:47.481
or it's gonna open up an ammo bunker someplace.

55:47.481 --> 55:50.398
Part of what we owe the Army is the

55:50.971 --> 55:54.785
all-time federal force that is always Title 10

55:54.785 --> 55:57.894
is to be able to go fast enough to be relevant to this.

55:57.894 --> 55:59.739
In some cases, that means we aren't going

55:59.739 --> 56:00.894
to a mob platform.

56:00.894 --> 56:02.479
We either are the mob platform

56:02.479 --> 56:04.142
or we're already opening up stuff

56:04.142 --> 56:05.809
to get stuff moving.

56:05.857 --> 56:07.479
Part of what we gotta work our way through--

56:07.479 --> 56:09.243
- [Stephen] That's the key.

56:09.243 --> 56:12.453
- [Charles] Is that delta between C and M.

56:12.453 --> 56:13.515
I didn't mean to cut you off.

56:13.515 --> 56:15.049
Steph, ya got anything else on that?

56:15.049 --> 56:17.219
- The other piece of that is,

56:17.219 --> 56:19.306
and General Luckey is exactly right.

56:19.306 --> 56:21.806
I have the ability to not just

56:21.839 --> 56:24.756
stay static at these mob platforms,

56:25.119 --> 56:27.596
but move to the sound of the guns.

56:27.596 --> 56:30.001
I still have that validation authority

56:30.001 --> 56:32.501
that the Sec Def and the Chief

56:33.492 --> 56:36.343
and the FORSCOM commander expects me to do.

56:36.343 --> 56:39.665
Even if it's home station, my guys will be there.

56:39.665 --> 56:40.582
That's all.

56:42.333 --> 56:43.560
- Thanks, Steph. Go ahead.

56:43.560 --> 56:44.477
- Hey, sir.

56:44.500 --> 56:45.857
Chris Stockel, commander of the

56:45.857 --> 56:47.447
351 Civil Affairs Command out in

56:47.447 --> 56:49.884
Mountain View, California, one of those highlighted units

56:49.884 --> 56:50.884
for USARPAC.

56:52.234 --> 56:53.477
I'll start off with General Brown,

56:53.477 --> 56:54.733
but anybody else.

56:54.733 --> 56:57.877
Given the fact that the 84th Civil Affairs Battalion,

56:57.877 --> 57:01.048
which is the active duty Civil Affairs support

57:01.048 --> 57:04.298
to Indo-Asia, has now been inactivated,

57:06.326 --> 57:08.669
we're seeing an increased demand signal

57:08.669 --> 57:12.704
from you, from PACOM, from General Brooks in Korea

57:12.704 --> 57:14.537
for access to the 351.

57:15.281 --> 57:18.209
Is there any additional authorities or resources

57:18.209 --> 57:20.189
that are gonna come to help meet those

57:20.189 --> 57:21.544
mission requirements?

57:21.544 --> 57:23.887
Thanks, thanks for your time.

57:23.887 --> 57:26.377
- I specifically told Chris no tough questions.

57:26.377 --> 57:27.832
(laughter)

57:27.832 --> 57:29.089
If there are tough questions, I'm giving 'em

57:29.089 --> 57:30.006
to the G-3.

57:30.625 --> 57:31.938
Let's not be crazy here.

57:31.938 --> 57:33.998
That's actually an easy question, though.

57:33.998 --> 57:36.755
Yeah, Civil Affairs is a critical asset.

57:36.755 --> 57:38.171
I think it's pretty interesting.

57:38.171 --> 57:41.029
Again, all of us over the last 16 years,

57:41.029 --> 57:43.112
we've seen that firsthand

57:43.795 --> 57:47.394
in tough, complex situations how critical Civil Affairs.

57:47.394 --> 57:49.805
351st does a tremendous job for us,

57:49.805 --> 57:52.301
habitually aligned to the Pacific.

57:52.301 --> 57:53.786
There's nothing better than getting the unit

57:53.786 --> 57:55.397
you're habitually aligned with

57:55.397 --> 57:57.643
that's coming to support ya.

57:57.643 --> 57:59.626
I was very lucky as a Stryker Brigade commander,

57:59.626 --> 58:02.661
I had the Civil Affairs unit I trained with

58:02.661 --> 58:05.078
from the Reserves for two years.

58:05.078 --> 58:06.780
It worked out perfectly, timing wise.

58:06.780 --> 58:09.066
They supported us, did an amazing job

58:09.066 --> 58:10.399
when we deployed

58:10.872 --> 58:12.372
way back, '04,'05.

58:13.115 --> 58:15.547
It was amazing 'cause you trained together.

58:15.547 --> 58:17.547
We've got to have 351st.

58:17.725 --> 58:20.183
Now, there are some peculiar things in the system.

58:20.183 --> 58:22.597
Let me just say TPFDDs are dynamic

58:22.597 --> 58:25.956
is like the understatement of the century.

58:25.956 --> 58:29.123
I was in US Army Pacific 25 years ago,

58:29.610 --> 58:30.777
Captain Brown.

58:30.962 --> 58:32.559
I was sent to a TPFDD class.

58:32.559 --> 58:33.859
I was saying to myself, "There's gotta

58:33.859 --> 58:35.359
"be a better way."

58:35.462 --> 58:37.215
Here I am 25 years later, I'm saying,

58:37.215 --> 58:38.511
"Boy, we haven't figured out a better way yet."

58:38.511 --> 58:39.843
(laughter) TPFDD.

58:39.843 --> 58:42.006
Anyway, I guess it works out pretty well.

58:42.006 --> 58:45.397
The key to the TPFDD is the commanders' involvement.

58:45.397 --> 58:47.588
For example, at 351st, we have an issue

58:47.588 --> 58:49.881
with, okay, we lost the Active,

58:49.881 --> 58:52.881
so we've been higher demand on 351st

58:52.890 --> 58:53.906
in everything we're doing.

58:53.906 --> 58:58.073
They're doing a great job, involved all over the Pacific.

58:58.193 --> 58:59.510
Just doing great work.

58:59.510 --> 59:00.483
But we have the greater demand.

59:00.483 --> 59:02.953
We gotta give 'em a lot more lead time

59:02.953 --> 59:04.286
and preparation.

59:04.474 --> 59:05.826
Then there's the funding issue.

59:05.826 --> 59:07.459
Luckily, we've been able, I think the best

59:07.459 --> 59:10.095
funding solution we get is in joint exercises

59:10.095 --> 59:11.614
and exercise funds.

59:11.614 --> 59:13.364
That's what saves us.

59:14.131 --> 59:15.773
But are we gonna get an increase in it?

59:15.773 --> 59:17.413
No, I don't think so.

59:17.413 --> 59:19.096
Then we're gonna have to be clever

59:19.096 --> 59:22.285
as we look at things like a Korea deterrence initiative

59:22.285 --> 59:23.430
that we're trying to push.

59:23.430 --> 59:24.895
Well, that's one thing I'd say.

59:24.895 --> 59:26.695
We need money in the Korea deterrence initiative

59:26.695 --> 59:29.663
to help out the Reserve Civil Affairs

59:29.663 --> 59:31.103
being involved in more events.

59:31.103 --> 59:33.270
That's a key aspect of it.

59:33.731 --> 59:36.285
That will be in the '19 to '23 POM,

59:36.285 --> 59:38.682
but we're trying to pull some it forward into '18.

59:38.682 --> 59:40.908
That'd be one of the things we'd pull forward into '18.

59:40.908 --> 59:42.143
These are the type things.

59:42.143 --> 59:43.810
TPFDD is very fluid.

59:44.847 --> 59:47.509
It caused, initially, again, keeping it

59:47.509 --> 59:49.357
unclassified, some people said, well,

59:49.357 --> 59:51.345
don't identify the units, like don't identify

59:51.345 --> 59:53.595
351st or actually there may

59:54.739 --> 59:56.587
be a unit higher in readiness that's not

59:56.587 --> 59:58.663
habitually related that, on the TPFDD,

59:58.663 --> 01:00:00.132
could be going before 351st

01:00:00.132 --> 01:00:02.045
or Civil Affairs unit, for example.

01:00:02.045 --> 01:00:03.593
But ya have to do that as a commander.

01:00:03.593 --> 01:00:04.651
You've got to identify.

01:00:04.651 --> 01:00:07.287
We've gotta work this, but it is fluid because

01:00:07.287 --> 01:00:08.853
one unit may come off the TPFDD,

01:00:08.853 --> 01:00:11.922
committed elsewhere, another one comes on.

01:00:11.922 --> 01:00:13.835
You've gotta work that very hard.

01:00:13.835 --> 01:00:16.913
Specifically, Chris, I think exercise money,

01:00:16.913 --> 01:00:19.057
particularly joint exercise, is our best chance.

01:00:19.057 --> 01:00:21.284
Things like the Korea deterrence initiative,

01:00:21.284 --> 01:00:25.431
which we're pushing hard, would help significantly.

01:00:25.431 --> 01:00:28.582
Your folks would benefit from that, no doubt.

01:00:28.582 --> 01:00:29.949
If anybody else has any other ideas,

01:00:29.949 --> 01:00:31.107
I got a tin cup out there.

01:00:31.107 --> 01:00:33.283
I'll take any donations afterwards (laughter)

01:00:33.283 --> 01:00:34.722
to help out 351st Civil Affairs.

01:00:34.722 --> 01:00:36.030
They do amazing work.

01:00:36.030 --> 01:00:36.863
Thanks.

01:00:37.131 --> 01:00:39.277
- But the key will be Objective T for you.

01:00:39.277 --> 01:00:41.110
If you're in that pot,

01:00:41.598 --> 01:00:43.237
if you happen to be in that pot and you're going,

01:00:43.237 --> 01:00:44.809
the question becomes how you articulate

01:00:44.809 --> 01:00:47.757
based on what your training shortfalls are

01:00:47.757 --> 01:00:48.801
and/or equipment.

01:00:48.801 --> 01:00:50.670
People is a different issue, as you know.

01:00:50.670 --> 01:00:52.131
Then how, based on your assessment

01:00:52.131 --> 01:00:54.045
of how many days you need post-mo to train.

01:00:54.045 --> 01:00:55.180
Our goal's gotta be, number one,

01:00:55.180 --> 01:00:58.134
to get you C3 to C2, collectively as a unit,

01:00:58.134 --> 01:00:59.693
and our goal's gotta be to reduce those amount

01:00:59.693 --> 01:01:01.860
of days you need post-mob.

01:01:02.161 --> 01:01:03.948
That's what Objective T will ask you to spell out.

01:01:03.948 --> 01:01:06.472
How many days do you need post-mob?

01:01:06.472 --> 01:01:07.484
Then we'll keep working.

01:01:07.484 --> 01:01:10.179
Again, the potential of additional funding

01:01:10.179 --> 01:01:13.929
from a TT PEG to help you get there is there.

01:01:14.154 --> 01:01:16.068
The key is how well you articulate what that is,

01:01:16.068 --> 01:01:19.901
and we understand how that equates to dollars.

01:01:19.901 --> 01:01:21.617
- Yeah, if I can hit on that for a second.

01:01:21.617 --> 01:01:23.367
- Go ahead, go ahead.

01:01:25.060 --> 01:01:27.277
- Chip, I think you brought this up early.

01:01:27.277 --> 01:01:30.767
Readiness, how much readiness is enough and so forth.

01:01:30.767 --> 01:01:34.293
Let me just provide you a couple of thoughts here.

01:01:34.293 --> 01:01:36.780
One of the things that I'm seeing is

01:01:36.780 --> 01:01:39.205
we are, in some cases, trying to do

01:01:39.205 --> 01:01:40.685
too much readiness.

01:01:40.685 --> 01:01:42.993
Let me just explain that 'cause you can never

01:01:42.993 --> 01:01:44.076
be too ready.

01:01:44.629 --> 01:01:47.574
But what you can do is fail to follow

01:01:47.574 --> 01:01:50.157
our Army doctrine to get ready.

01:01:51.531 --> 01:01:54.198
In many cases, we will jump over

01:01:54.321 --> 01:01:57.904
individually training, individual training,

01:01:58.424 --> 01:02:00.874
and start out at collective training.

01:02:00.874 --> 01:02:03.559
We put the cart before the horse.

01:02:03.559 --> 01:02:05.154
Our soldiers are not ready to move

01:02:05.154 --> 01:02:07.104
to the collective level.

01:02:07.104 --> 01:02:10.500
I see that all the time in the places that I've gone.

01:02:10.500 --> 01:02:13.366
My talk to ya, and General Abrams have said this

01:02:13.366 --> 01:02:16.056
a thousand times, and I know you all have heard this,

01:02:16.056 --> 01:02:18.767
if you can't focus on anything else,

01:02:18.767 --> 01:02:22.100
focus on the individual training because

01:02:22.282 --> 01:02:24.198
you can't get the collective training

01:02:24.198 --> 01:02:28.031
unless your soldiers are individually trained.

01:02:28.863 --> 01:02:31.674
I always add a couple of other things

01:02:31.674 --> 01:02:33.007
from my foxhole.

01:02:33.372 --> 01:02:36.039
If you are trained individually,

01:02:36.568 --> 01:02:39.339
if your equipment is 10/20,

01:02:39.339 --> 01:02:41.417
and you have your bags packed, you come

01:02:41.417 --> 01:02:45.584
to post-mobilization, I'll get ya to collective training.

01:02:45.707 --> 01:02:47.172
I'll get ya there.

01:02:47.172 --> 01:02:48.339
That's my job.

01:02:48.500 --> 01:02:50.732
If I have to die to do it, I'm get you

01:02:50.732 --> 01:02:51.914
collective training.

01:02:51.914 --> 01:02:53.581
You're gonna deploy.

01:02:54.581 --> 01:02:57.171
I ask all you all is to focus on that

01:02:57.171 --> 01:02:58.588
individual piece.

01:02:59.039 --> 01:03:01.541
Understand that there's a collective piece

01:03:01.541 --> 01:03:03.848
that you have to train, as well,

01:03:03.848 --> 01:03:06.251
but don't put the cart before the horse.

01:03:06.251 --> 01:03:08.502
That's what we're doing in cases that I see

01:03:08.502 --> 01:03:10.166
out there in the field.

01:03:10.166 --> 01:03:12.768
Simply because someone's told you to get

01:03:12.768 --> 01:03:14.606
to T2 and you're trying your best to do it,

01:03:14.606 --> 01:03:16.149
you don't have enough mandates to do it,

01:03:16.149 --> 01:03:17.649
but you're trying.

01:03:18.043 --> 01:03:20.360
Individual training is what I would ask you

01:03:20.360 --> 01:03:21.360
to focus on.

01:03:22.231 --> 01:03:24.846
Let me do the rest if you can't do any more.

01:03:24.846 --> 01:03:25.679
Hooah.

01:03:26.024 --> 01:03:26.887
Chip does that sound?

01:03:26.887 --> 01:03:28.148
- Hooah, thanks.

01:03:28.148 --> 01:03:29.384
Yeah, go ahead.

01:03:29.384 --> 01:03:30.294
- Sir, thank you.

01:03:30.294 --> 01:03:34.165
Chief Griffin, 377 Theater Sustainment Command.

01:03:34.165 --> 01:03:37.332
I think about ability to mob and jump.

01:03:37.896 --> 01:03:39.423
I remember two years ago, sir, down at

01:03:39.423 --> 01:03:40.990
Fort Leavenworth, you came and talked to us

01:03:40.990 --> 01:03:42.240
at Brigade PCC.

01:03:43.798 --> 01:03:45.783
The comment there was, hey, if I tell you to go,

01:03:45.783 --> 01:03:46.740
you're going.

01:03:46.740 --> 01:03:49.065
All that broke stuff in your motor pool,

01:03:49.065 --> 01:03:51.653
drag it if you got to, but you're taking it.

01:03:51.653 --> 01:03:53.268
Over the past couple of years,

01:03:53.268 --> 01:03:56.268
how well are we doing at DREs, EDREs

01:03:56.541 --> 01:03:59.708
and demonstrating our ability to jump?

01:04:00.699 --> 01:04:04.366
The comments about mobing from home station,

01:04:04.630 --> 01:04:06.442
there were days, I remember when I first

01:04:06.442 --> 01:04:08.535
came in 30 years ago, about training

01:04:08.535 --> 01:04:10.470
in our own backyard on the cheap

01:04:10.470 --> 01:04:12.053
and making it real.

01:04:12.519 --> 01:04:14.078
Low crawling away from that kind of training

01:04:14.078 --> 01:04:15.986
sometimes make you feel more hooah about

01:04:15.986 --> 01:04:19.069
being a soldier than going to any TC.

01:04:19.282 --> 01:04:20.688
Just guidance, sir, on how well

01:04:20.688 --> 01:04:23.019
we're doing on this ability.

01:04:23.019 --> 01:04:24.699
- Let me talk about first what you

01:04:24.699 --> 01:04:27.231
talked about last, which is home station training.

01:04:27.231 --> 01:04:28.064
Again,

01:04:29.085 --> 01:04:30.585
you've gotta be very vocal in this in what

01:04:30.585 --> 01:04:32.718
you sound off to us, but from our foxhole,

01:04:32.718 --> 01:04:34.856
you are resourced more than adequately

01:04:34.856 --> 01:04:36.448
to conduct the best.

01:04:36.448 --> 01:04:38.320
I don't want you taking broomsticks out

01:04:38.320 --> 01:04:40.070
and going bang, bang.

01:04:40.573 --> 01:04:42.846
This is an infantry example, not a Civil Affairs example,

01:04:42.846 --> 01:04:44.780
but I don't want you using (laughter) broomsticks.

01:04:44.780 --> 01:04:46.780
I want you using rifles.

01:04:46.887 --> 01:04:49.392
But the goal is realistic, demanding.

01:04:49.392 --> 01:04:51.809
The terms you heard over here

01:04:52.571 --> 01:04:54.153
from First Army is that's the training

01:04:54.153 --> 01:04:56.244
we want you to do at home because it correlates

01:04:56.244 --> 01:04:58.022
right to what you just said about the CTCs

01:04:58.022 --> 01:04:59.438
because if ya don't do that stuff before

01:04:59.438 --> 01:05:02.404
you go to a CTC, you're not gonna come out as well.

01:05:02.404 --> 01:05:04.268
The good news, collectively, from what

01:05:04.268 --> 01:05:05.953
the Army's seen and since I saw you

01:05:05.953 --> 01:05:08.870
a couple years ago, CTC performance

01:05:09.870 --> 01:05:12.744
and T readiness coming out of the box

01:05:12.744 --> 01:05:14.077
are on the rise.

01:05:14.883 --> 01:05:16.656
You heard the chief talk about repetitiveness

01:05:16.656 --> 01:05:17.906
today at lunch.

01:05:17.955 --> 01:05:19.892
The reason why that's happening, more or less,

01:05:19.892 --> 01:05:21.859
is not necessarily because of you as units.

01:05:21.859 --> 01:05:24.438
It's because of you as individuals.

01:05:24.438 --> 01:05:25.976
You probably heard me say this

01:05:25.976 --> 01:05:27.417
when you were at Leavenworth, but the more

01:05:27.417 --> 01:05:29.112
that you go out there, and again, as you all

01:05:29.112 --> 01:05:31.187
keep going up the ladder and you go in

01:05:31.187 --> 01:05:33.289
different grades and different positions,

01:05:33.289 --> 01:05:34.539
the reason why our units are getting better

01:05:34.539 --> 01:05:36.207
right now is because that repetitive nature

01:05:36.207 --> 01:05:38.409
of people going in multiple jobs

01:05:38.409 --> 01:05:39.874
through multiple rotations now over the course

01:05:39.874 --> 01:05:42.063
of these last four-plus years.

01:05:42.063 --> 01:05:44.182
And, by the way, from a FORSCOM perspective,

01:05:44.182 --> 01:05:46.042
when you start to have the same patch

01:05:46.042 --> 01:05:48.974
go through, the same exact unit goes back twice

01:05:48.974 --> 01:05:51.391
in one calendar, fiscal year.

01:05:52.288 --> 01:05:53.431
That's powerful.

01:05:53.431 --> 01:05:55.619
We're on the rise, but I think

01:05:55.619 --> 01:05:57.282
the issue becomes, again, our logistician here,

01:05:57.282 --> 01:05:59.329
our passionate logistician, the issue becomes

01:05:59.329 --> 01:06:01.499
how much is the Onan equipment being the

01:06:01.499 --> 01:06:03.712
shortfall right now and making sure.

01:06:03.712 --> 01:06:04.545
Be cautious.

01:06:04.545 --> 01:06:06.538
Every time, what my battle buddy is talking about,

01:06:06.538 --> 01:06:07.925
every time we tell you to redesign

01:06:07.925 --> 01:06:09.592
and become a different niche capability,

01:06:09.592 --> 01:06:11.567
that means all the second and third order

01:06:11.567 --> 01:06:14.150
effects are, from MOSes to KIT,

01:06:14.195 --> 01:06:15.466
and getting it all at the right place,

01:06:15.466 --> 01:06:16.855
and then getting it all to the,

01:06:16.855 --> 01:06:18.924
what Steph's talking about, the 10/20 standards,

01:06:18.924 --> 01:06:20.918
that's the stuff that gets more complicated,

01:06:20.918 --> 01:06:22.896
the turbulence in the force.

01:06:22.896 --> 01:06:24.814
That's why we're very careful about what happens

01:06:24.814 --> 01:06:27.647
from a four structure perspective.

01:06:28.472 --> 01:06:31.155
That sometimes can be worse than going undeployed.

01:06:31.155 --> 01:06:32.057
But at the end of the day, you all

01:06:32.057 --> 01:06:32.968
are accomplishing it.

01:06:32.968 --> 01:06:34.191
We're seeing it, we're feeling it.

01:06:34.191 --> 01:06:36.230
It's becoming tangible in the department,

01:06:36.230 --> 01:06:37.147
all compos.

01:06:37.342 --> 01:06:39.098
If we're watching the approach march here,

01:06:39.098 --> 01:06:40.221
it's a good news story.

01:06:40.221 --> 01:06:42.529
The issue is, again, the guidance you got

01:06:42.529 --> 01:06:44.913
from First Army is focus on what you

01:06:44.913 --> 01:06:46.170
can do best at home.

01:06:46.170 --> 01:06:47.581
It'll produce a better CTC.

01:06:47.581 --> 01:06:49.748
When you get out the door,

01:06:49.925 --> 01:06:51.769
you're gonna be more ready to go.

01:06:51.769 --> 01:06:52.970
So far, so good.

01:06:52.970 --> 01:06:55.020
As we've doing the war trains for Korea,

01:06:55.020 --> 01:06:57.267
we're actually, we're in better shape now

01:06:57.267 --> 01:06:59.386
than we thought we were gonna be if we

01:06:59.386 --> 01:07:01.136
had to go with 5015 and what it would take

01:07:01.136 --> 01:07:02.648
to go fight that fight.

01:07:02.648 --> 01:07:03.960
That's the good news.

01:07:03.960 --> 01:07:05.377
It ain't perfect.

01:07:05.841 --> 01:07:07.424
It ain't 100%, but we're in a much better place

01:07:07.424 --> 01:07:09.112
than we thought we were.

01:07:09.112 --> 01:07:10.392
The problem is gonna be, what General Brown

01:07:10.392 --> 01:07:12.690
alluded to, is gonna be how we synchronize

01:07:12.690 --> 01:07:15.804
world demand requirements with war trace requirements.

01:07:15.804 --> 01:07:18.349
The other part of turbulence is the saying

01:07:18.349 --> 01:07:19.954
one minute you're on the TPFDD,

01:07:19.954 --> 01:07:21.670
and the next minute you're on the TPFDD,

01:07:21.670 --> 01:07:23.707
six months later, 12 months later.

01:07:23.707 --> 01:07:24.857
That's the part that starts to get

01:07:24.857 --> 01:07:27.784
a little bit worrisome, how long we can keep you,

01:07:27.784 --> 01:07:30.901
quote, unquote war traced for one particular war plan--

01:07:30.901 --> 01:07:32.782
- So let me roll on in on a couple of those.

01:07:32.782 --> 01:07:33.933
Sir, did you wanna say something?

01:07:33.933 --> 01:07:35.760
- Yeah, just real quick, I just wanna

01:07:35.760 --> 01:07:37.702
reiterate what, 'cause part of your question,

01:07:37.702 --> 01:07:39.867
what the Chief brought up in his talk here

01:07:39.867 --> 01:07:41.480
at the Eisenhower luncheon.

01:07:41.480 --> 01:07:43.566
The revolution in training we had years ago

01:07:43.566 --> 01:07:46.436
when Joe and I were youngsters our there,

01:07:46.436 --> 01:07:48.253
brought on by folks like General Ron Griffith,

01:07:48.253 --> 01:07:50.046
were the combat training centers.

01:07:50.046 --> 01:07:50.963
Revolution.

01:07:51.072 --> 01:07:52.391
It just changed the reality.

01:07:52.391 --> 01:07:53.591
It was unbelievable.

01:07:53.591 --> 01:07:55.542
The scrimmage was tougher than the fight.

01:07:55.542 --> 01:07:56.670
It was incredible.

01:07:56.670 --> 01:07:59.702
The next revolution, I believe, there's no question,

01:07:59.702 --> 01:08:02.389
and Chief talked about it, is the home station training.

01:08:02.389 --> 01:08:04.603
It's things like the synthetic training environment.

01:08:04.603 --> 01:08:06.636
I was working on it a little in my last job at (mumbles).

01:08:06.636 --> 01:08:08.425
Improving simulations.

01:08:08.425 --> 01:08:11.122
Yes, you can go out in the home station

01:08:11.122 --> 01:08:12.740
training area, but right now, you can't get

01:08:12.740 --> 01:08:14.966
the complexity out there unless you spend

01:08:14.966 --> 01:08:16.470
a lotta money, a lotta role play,

01:08:16.470 --> 01:08:18.740
but we need to bring the simulations up

01:08:18.740 --> 01:08:20.324
to where you get that complexity.

01:08:20.324 --> 01:08:22.032
That's the revolution.

01:08:22.032 --> 01:08:24.001
CTCs remain great, the best training we have,

01:08:24.001 --> 01:08:25.902
but how often can you go?

01:08:25.902 --> 01:08:28.337
Home station training is where we need to pick it up.

01:08:28.337 --> 01:08:29.295
That just sorta emphasize.

01:08:29.295 --> 01:08:30.667
The Chief talked about that synthetic

01:08:30.667 --> 01:08:31.818
training environment, so I think that's just

01:08:31.818 --> 01:08:32.818
a key point.

01:08:32.874 --> 01:08:35.124
That's the next revolution.

01:08:35.286 --> 01:08:36.483
- Just two things, if I may.

01:08:36.483 --> 01:08:38.825
I wanna segue off of something General Anderson

01:08:38.825 --> 01:08:41.317
just said about not whipsawing us

01:08:41.317 --> 01:08:44.071
by, if you will, trying to chase the TPFDD

01:08:44.071 --> 01:08:45.352
that keeps moving.

01:08:45.352 --> 01:08:48.345
Part of the RFX design is to be as stable

01:08:48.345 --> 01:08:51.094
as we can be and an intellectual forcing function

01:08:51.094 --> 01:08:53.033
for America's Army Reserve about how we

01:08:53.033 --> 01:08:55.835
look at modernization, how we look at training,

01:08:55.835 --> 01:08:58.046
how we look at manning priorities and policies,

01:08:58.046 --> 01:08:59.848
to make sure that we're focusing, from a

01:08:59.848 --> 01:09:01.609
priority of work, priority of effort

01:09:01.609 --> 01:09:03.480
and managing risk, getting after what we

01:09:03.480 --> 01:09:04.717
gotta be able to do first.

01:09:04.717 --> 01:09:05.904
That's the point of this.

01:09:05.904 --> 01:09:07.302
Now, and I've had some conversations

01:09:07.302 --> 01:09:08.346
with some of you in this room.

01:09:08.346 --> 01:09:10.825
I'm gonna get a show of hands here in a minute,

01:09:10.825 --> 01:09:14.129
but about the fact that we gotta be careful

01:09:14.129 --> 01:09:17.839
as we build and as we modify Ready Force X-ray

01:09:17.839 --> 01:09:20.021
that we don't do it so quickly that

01:09:20.021 --> 01:09:21.381
we're whipsawing everybody.

01:09:21.381 --> 01:09:23.207
By the same token, if we got the wrong

01:09:23.207 --> 01:09:25.323
capability in there, for whatever reason,

01:09:25.323 --> 01:09:27.447
either it's no longer relevant to the war plan

01:09:27.447 --> 01:09:29.894
or the goal has changed, that's why we got

01:09:29.894 --> 01:09:31.747
some flexibility and some shock absorber

01:09:31.747 --> 01:09:33.336
built into this model.

01:09:33.336 --> 01:09:35.408
As I said, this is not designed just

01:09:35.408 --> 01:09:36.758
for one war plan.

01:09:36.758 --> 01:09:39.027
This is actually designed based on

01:09:39.027 --> 01:09:40.363
one of two different war plans,

01:09:40.363 --> 01:09:42.543
or some combination thereof.

01:09:42.543 --> 01:09:44.085
We think we got this about right.

01:09:44.085 --> 01:09:46.525
The key is to be to get to the P

01:09:46.525 --> 01:09:49.598
prior to mobilization so ya get to the T

01:09:49.598 --> 01:09:52.815
so ya can get the post-mobilization days down,

01:09:52.815 --> 01:09:54.203
the way General Anderson's talking about.

01:09:54.203 --> 01:09:55.378
That's the point number one.

01:09:55.378 --> 01:09:56.832
Point number two, if you're a soldier

01:09:56.832 --> 01:10:00.924
in America's Army Reserve, put your hand up in the air.

01:10:00.924 --> 01:10:01.924
Keep 'em up.

01:10:02.744 --> 01:10:04.108
I heard the question, and here's the answer

01:10:04.108 --> 01:10:05.441
to the question.

01:10:05.716 --> 01:10:08.333
The leadership in this room is responsible

01:10:08.333 --> 01:10:10.233
for getting after what we need to get after

01:10:10.233 --> 01:10:11.806
in America's Army Reserve.

01:10:11.806 --> 01:10:13.282
The only way this is gonna happen is we

01:10:13.282 --> 01:10:15.569
unleash the power of this team.

01:10:15.569 --> 01:10:16.717
You wanna know how we're doing?

01:10:16.717 --> 01:10:17.726
We're doing a hell of a lot better

01:10:17.726 --> 01:10:19.067
than we were doing a year ago.

01:10:19.067 --> 01:10:20.775
We've done more DREs, we've done more EDREs.

01:10:20.775 --> 01:10:22.103
Keep your hands up.

01:10:22.103 --> 01:10:23.358
(laughter)

01:10:23.358 --> 01:10:25.848
We have DREed transportation battalion headquarters.

01:10:25.848 --> 01:10:27.601
We have EDREed helicopters.

01:10:27.601 --> 01:10:30.434
We have mobilized aviation assets,

01:10:30.627 --> 01:10:33.029
medical assets, we've mobilized and deployed

01:10:33.029 --> 01:10:35.889
two FSTs on zero or very short notice.

01:10:35.889 --> 01:10:37.619
We did the same thing with several transportation assets.

01:10:37.619 --> 01:10:39.171
You can put your hands down.

01:10:39.171 --> 01:10:40.765
- You need to do more shoulder presses.

01:10:40.765 --> 01:10:42.925
Some of 'em were really (laughter) waning there.

01:10:42.925 --> 01:10:45.407
- Last spring, whether you know it or not,

01:10:45.407 --> 01:10:48.957
this team participated in, orchestrated and pulled off

01:10:48.957 --> 01:10:51.957
the largest weapons gunnery exercise

01:10:52.573 --> 01:10:54.337
slash operation in this history of the

01:10:54.337 --> 01:10:57.481
United States Army Reserve since 1908.

01:10:57.481 --> 01:11:01.461
We are gonna replicate that times four this year.

01:11:01.461 --> 01:11:03.006
We're going from one platform,

01:11:03.006 --> 01:11:05.643
which is Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, to four.

01:11:05.643 --> 01:11:07.312
If you aren't tracking this and you aren't

01:11:07.312 --> 01:11:09.005
organizing your formations and getting

01:11:09.005 --> 01:11:11.384
at the individual task that General Twitty

01:11:11.384 --> 01:11:13.967
was talking about, it's on you.

01:11:14.049 --> 01:11:15.946
I'll make sure we're real clear about this.

01:11:15.946 --> 01:11:17.718
This is a conference, this is a conversation,

01:11:17.718 --> 01:11:19.218
this is a meeting.

01:11:19.367 --> 01:11:20.726
We're having a little seminar here,

01:11:20.726 --> 01:11:21.884
but I wanna make sure, since I got the show

01:11:21.884 --> 01:11:23.368
of hands that I wanted to see,

01:11:23.368 --> 01:11:24.666
that everybody understands what General Twitty

01:11:24.666 --> 01:11:26.222
said down there at the end of the table

01:11:26.222 --> 01:11:27.383
and the expectation of the war fighters

01:11:27.383 --> 01:11:28.469
sitting next to me.

01:11:28.469 --> 01:11:29.469
We own this.

01:11:30.720 --> 01:11:32.137
We own this risk.

01:11:32.243 --> 01:11:34.043
I'm responsible for making sure I

01:11:34.043 --> 01:11:35.800
generate for the G-3 of the Army,

01:11:35.800 --> 01:11:38.029
for the commander of the First Army

01:11:38.029 --> 01:11:39.360
down here at the end of the table

01:11:39.360 --> 01:11:40.758
and this four star sitting next to me

01:11:40.758 --> 01:11:44.032
the capability that he may need here real quick.

01:11:44.032 --> 01:11:45.913
I'll make sure we're all clear on this.

01:11:45.913 --> 01:11:48.163
This is a conversation, this is an academic setting,

01:11:48.163 --> 01:11:51.111
Roger, and I know this is open source,

01:11:51.111 --> 01:11:52.784
so you can quote me on this, we are gonna

01:11:52.784 --> 01:11:53.840
get this done.

01:11:53.840 --> 01:11:55.614
This is about leadership.

01:11:55.614 --> 01:11:57.547
This is about leadership and the third component

01:11:57.547 --> 01:11:59.102
of the United States Army.

01:11:59.102 --> 01:12:01.160
We are gonna generate for the American people

01:12:01.160 --> 01:12:02.522
what they expect us to generate.

01:12:02.522 --> 01:12:04.252
Hooah.
- [Audience] Hooah.

01:12:04.252 --> 01:12:05.585
- Next question.

01:12:05.719 --> 01:12:07.557
- What about logistics? (laughter)

01:12:07.557 --> 01:12:09.273
- Logistics. (laughter)

01:12:09.273 --> 01:12:10.613
All right, G-4, over to you.

01:12:10.613 --> 01:12:12.243
(laughter)

01:12:12.243 --> 01:12:14.410
- Sir, Alex Fink, 4th ESC.

01:12:14.814 --> 01:12:16.154
- Hang on, hang on.

01:12:16.154 --> 01:12:17.063
Hey, whoa, whoa.

01:12:17.063 --> 01:12:18.336
Let the G-4 have his say.

01:12:18.336 --> 01:12:19.669
- Oh, I'm sorry.

01:12:20.090 --> 01:12:21.423
- I'm good.
- You're good?

01:12:21.423 --> 01:12:22.305
(laughter)

01:12:22.305 --> 01:12:23.489
- You gonna ask him a question?

01:12:23.489 --> 01:12:24.510
- I was, actually.

01:12:24.510 --> 01:12:25.910
- I'm already over my five minutes.

01:12:25.910 --> 01:12:29.247
(laughter) Must be a logistician.

01:12:29.247 --> 01:12:30.164
- Yes, sir.

01:12:30.167 --> 01:12:31.750
For General Luckey.

01:12:32.529 --> 01:12:34.397
What do you think the right mix is of equipment

01:12:34.397 --> 01:12:36.752
that we keep at home station and our motor pools

01:12:36.752 --> 01:12:39.080
and the reserve centers for training purposes,

01:12:39.080 --> 01:12:43.247
and the equipment that we should have in our ECSes

01:12:43.248 --> 01:12:44.831
around the country?

01:12:45.033 --> 01:12:46.639
- You want me to answer that question?

01:12:46.639 --> 01:12:49.706
- Yeah, and I can answer, I'll follow.

01:12:49.706 --> 01:12:51.201
- Both General Twitty and I probably have

01:12:51.201 --> 01:12:52.249
an opinion on this.

01:12:52.249 --> 01:12:55.035
First of all, I wanna take away excuses from all.

01:12:55.035 --> 01:12:56.126
Don't go anywhere.

01:12:56.126 --> 01:12:58.376
(laughter)

01:12:58.409 --> 01:12:59.724
I wanna make sure nobody in this room

01:12:59.724 --> 01:13:01.557
has an excuse to fail.

01:13:02.138 --> 01:13:03.196
I wanna make sure we have no excuse

01:13:03.196 --> 01:13:04.474
not to be awesome.

01:13:04.474 --> 01:13:07.351
The challenge we have is we have centralized,

01:13:07.351 --> 01:13:09.001
to some extent, the sustainment

01:13:09.001 --> 01:13:13.168
of much of our rolling stock and other things in places.

01:13:13.658 --> 01:13:15.342
We did it probably 'cause it was efficient.

01:13:15.342 --> 01:13:17.815
We did it probably 'cause it saved some money.

01:13:17.815 --> 01:13:19.447
We did it 'cause in some cases, we didn't have

01:13:19.447 --> 01:13:22.857
the capacity to sustain our own equipment.

01:13:22.857 --> 01:13:23.989
We made some moves.

01:13:23.989 --> 01:13:26.153
Now, we're not gonna unring that bell all together.

01:13:26.153 --> 01:13:27.733
What I will tell ya is I'm still holding

01:13:27.733 --> 01:13:29.237
the commanders of America's Army Reserve

01:13:29.237 --> 01:13:31.299
responsible for the condition of our equipment.

01:13:31.299 --> 01:13:32.351
Do we have the mix right?

01:13:32.351 --> 01:13:33.398
Probably not exactly.

01:13:33.398 --> 01:13:35.018
The bigger challenge, and General Piggee

01:13:35.018 --> 01:13:35.924
and I talk about this all the time,

01:13:35.924 --> 01:13:38.130
is making sure when we talk about actually deploying

01:13:38.130 --> 01:13:40.398
to go do something, and make sure that

01:13:40.398 --> 01:13:42.333
this capability is where it needs to be on

01:13:42.333 --> 01:13:44.303
the battlefield in time, making sure we got

01:13:44.303 --> 01:13:47.110
the right training sets at the right place.

01:13:47.110 --> 01:13:49.286
The First Army CG and I talk about this all the time.

01:13:49.286 --> 01:13:50.682
Where does the training set need to be?

01:13:50.682 --> 01:13:52.647
Where does the stuff need to be?

01:13:52.647 --> 01:13:54.334
Because depending on where it needs to go,

01:13:54.334 --> 01:13:55.681
tyranny of distance.

01:13:55.681 --> 01:13:57.823
If it isn't already forward deployed,

01:13:57.823 --> 01:13:59.276
we're not get there in time to put it

01:13:59.276 --> 01:14:00.869
into effective operation, so we gotta

01:14:00.869 --> 01:14:02.425
work our way through that.

01:14:02.425 --> 01:14:04.928
The right balance, I don't know.

01:14:04.928 --> 01:14:07.297
The wolf closest to the sled right now

01:14:07.297 --> 01:14:10.141
is for us to identify what do we need where,

01:14:10.141 --> 01:14:12.019
where is it and then get it where it has

01:14:12.019 --> 01:14:15.177
to be for us to get it in time into the place

01:14:15.177 --> 01:14:18.510
we need to put it into effect in combat.

01:14:18.792 --> 01:14:19.709
Over to CG.

01:14:20.497 --> 01:14:21.414
First Army.

01:14:22.148 --> 01:14:23.378
- I'm sorry, you go.

01:14:23.378 --> 01:14:25.343
- No, my only comment is wherever it is,

01:14:25.343 --> 01:14:27.363
it needs to be 10/20.

01:14:27.363 --> 01:14:29.244
To standard, we're ready to go,

01:14:29.244 --> 01:14:31.577
whatever the requirement is.

01:14:32.447 --> 01:14:33.734
That's what I've seen the challenge

01:14:33.734 --> 01:14:34.801
from my perspective is.

01:14:34.801 --> 01:14:36.014
We have tiered readiness, and we cannot

01:14:36.014 --> 01:14:37.514
afford to do that.

01:14:37.566 --> 01:14:39.841
It has to be 10/20, maintained to standard

01:14:39.841 --> 01:14:40.897
wherever it is.

01:14:40.897 --> 01:14:43.230
I agree with your commander.

01:14:44.149 --> 01:14:47.399
- Let me nuance that just a little bit.

01:14:47.649 --> 01:14:49.126
What's up there on that board,

01:14:49.126 --> 01:14:50.694
that is the forcing function for us

01:14:50.694 --> 01:14:52.338
to organization and prioritize how we

01:14:52.338 --> 01:14:55.405
get after stuff because we have stuff sitting

01:14:55.405 --> 01:14:57.822
right now, this is no secret,

01:14:58.531 --> 01:15:00.620
we have stuff sitting in places that, frankly,

01:15:00.620 --> 01:15:02.544
is not at the 10/20 standard.

01:15:02.544 --> 01:15:03.965
It would be great if it could be there,

01:15:03.965 --> 01:15:05.641
but there's other stuff I gotta have

01:15:05.641 --> 01:15:07.293
right now ready to roll.

01:15:07.293 --> 01:15:09.558
Part of this is prioritizing from a

01:15:09.558 --> 01:15:11.490
capacity perspective when I don't know

01:15:11.490 --> 01:15:13.678
what our last manning figures are, in terms of

01:15:13.678 --> 01:15:15.465
full-time support, and based on what the

01:15:15.465 --> 01:15:18.442
actual requirement is versus what we actually got.

01:15:18.442 --> 01:15:20.391
But the bottom line is I wanna make sure

01:15:20.391 --> 01:15:22.203
every piece of the kit that needs to go support

01:15:22.203 --> 01:15:24.872
that capability in the first, say, three months

01:15:24.872 --> 01:15:28.372
of the dogfight is ready to rock and roll.

01:15:28.758 --> 01:15:30.031
To General Piggee's point, I wanna make sure

01:15:30.031 --> 01:15:33.031
that we have looked at Ready Force X

01:15:33.267 --> 01:15:36.517
as a forcing function for managing risk

01:15:36.646 --> 01:15:38.237
across the force to make sure

01:15:38.237 --> 01:15:40.320
we're never late to need.

01:15:40.450 --> 01:15:42.824
- I'll just say that you heard me talk about

01:15:42.824 --> 01:15:45.574
the seven mobilization platforms,

01:15:45.596 --> 01:15:48.627
and then the two that we currently have open.

01:15:48.627 --> 01:15:50.048
What I will tell you, if you take a look

01:15:50.048 --> 01:15:53.131
at where those platforms are located,

01:15:53.637 --> 01:15:55.288
your equipment is not in the place that we

01:15:55.288 --> 01:15:56.621
need to have it.

01:15:57.405 --> 01:16:00.425
General Luckey and I, we have that for a mission.

01:16:00.425 --> 01:16:01.874
We talked yesterday about it.

01:16:01.874 --> 01:16:05.457
We're gonna do some hard homework on trying

01:16:05.497 --> 01:16:07.703
to figure out how we bend equipment to ensure

01:16:07.703 --> 01:16:09.648
that it's in the right place, it's in the

01:16:09.648 --> 01:16:12.231
right place of need in event of

01:16:13.249 --> 01:16:15.332
contingency mobilization.

01:16:16.963 --> 01:16:18.222
That's the next piece of this--

01:16:18.222 --> 01:16:19.918
- Now you're clear, now you're good.

01:16:19.918 --> 01:16:21.208
You're good, man, you can sit down.

01:16:21.208 --> 01:16:22.515
(laughter)

01:16:22.515 --> 01:16:23.682
Next question.

01:16:26.430 --> 01:16:27.890
- Thank you, generals.

01:16:27.890 --> 01:16:30.344
I lead the Association of the United States Army

01:16:30.344 --> 01:16:32.057
overseas chapter in Kuwait.

01:16:32.057 --> 01:16:35.107
I understand this is an academic Army workshop

01:16:35.107 --> 01:16:37.165
or seminar, a conversation, but let me take

01:16:37.165 --> 01:16:39.472
an opportunity that this has held in the

01:16:39.472 --> 01:16:41.888
Association of the United States Army headquarters

01:16:41.888 --> 01:16:44.952
and ask you all how can we be of more support

01:16:44.952 --> 01:16:46.365
in a host nation?

01:16:46.365 --> 01:16:48.756
We do many events to support the morale

01:16:48.756 --> 01:16:50.339
and professional development for the

01:16:50.339 --> 01:16:53.106
young heroes, in coordination with their leaders.

01:16:53.106 --> 01:16:54.793
If there's anything we can do more

01:16:54.793 --> 01:16:56.671
for their readiness, specifically,

01:16:56.671 --> 01:16:59.587
it will be great because we have been.

01:16:59.587 --> 01:17:01.009
I'm from Egypt, based in Kuwait.

01:17:01.009 --> 01:17:03.747
I have the experience in my own region.

01:17:03.747 --> 01:17:06.414
I really would like to have this

01:17:06.953 --> 01:17:11.120
more synergy to support our constituents in Kuwait.

01:17:11.618 --> 01:17:12.981
- Did you bring a checkbook with ya?

01:17:12.981 --> 01:17:14.775
(laughter)

01:17:14.775 --> 01:17:15.608
- Sorry?

01:17:16.463 --> 01:17:17.772
- Did you bring a checkbook?

01:17:17.772 --> 01:17:19.765
(laughter) - Not really.

01:17:19.765 --> 01:17:21.113
- He's my little brother.

01:17:21.113 --> 01:17:22.366
Just don't pay attention to him.

01:17:22.366 --> 01:17:24.616
(laughter)

01:17:26.105 --> 01:17:28.136
- I think that we do a good bit of that,

01:17:28.136 --> 01:17:30.002
but not nearly as much as we should.

01:17:30.002 --> 01:17:31.611
There's capability exists all throughout

01:17:31.611 --> 01:17:33.887
the Middle East that exists there.

01:17:33.887 --> 01:17:35.669
High-tech companies that have capability

01:17:35.669 --> 01:17:37.042
that we have very limited here in the State

01:17:37.042 --> 01:17:38.823
or don't have the resources.

01:17:38.823 --> 01:17:40.869
I could go through a number of examples.

01:17:40.869 --> 01:17:42.551
I won't do that, but there is capability,

01:17:42.551 --> 01:17:44.396
to your point, that exists in those

01:17:44.396 --> 01:17:45.848
partner nations throughout the Middle East

01:17:45.848 --> 01:17:48.243
that we ought to take more advantage of.

01:17:48.243 --> 01:17:50.128
It's all about information and education, I think.

01:17:50.128 --> 01:17:51.608
That's one of the things that I do

01:17:51.608 --> 01:17:54.449
when I talk to all of the sustainment commanders

01:17:54.449 --> 01:17:55.557
to make sure they are aware that

01:17:55.557 --> 01:17:56.900
that's a capability that does exist,

01:17:56.900 --> 01:17:58.389
and we ought to take advantage of that.

01:17:58.389 --> 01:17:59.222
Thank you.

01:17:59.222 --> 01:18:01.135
- Sorry to interrupt, but it's not only about

01:18:01.135 --> 01:18:02.330
the capabilities and information.

01:18:02.330 --> 01:18:04.871
It has to be from trusted sources.

01:18:04.871 --> 01:18:08.256
This is something I have seen very important

01:18:08.256 --> 01:18:10.169
and we can provide at the AUSA because

01:18:10.169 --> 01:18:11.331
it's a family.

01:18:11.331 --> 01:18:12.538
- Great, thank you.

01:18:12.538 --> 01:18:13.954
- Great question.

01:18:13.954 --> 01:18:14.954
- Thank you.

01:18:15.198 --> 01:18:16.781
- I would also add.

01:18:16.991 --> 01:18:19.612
There's obviously the teamwork required,

01:18:19.612 --> 01:18:21.538
but there are sometimes some agreements

01:18:21.538 --> 01:18:22.957
that can be very powerful.

01:18:22.957 --> 01:18:24.790
For example, in Korea,

01:18:25.391 --> 01:18:28.304
we have agreements, or logistics that we

01:18:28.304 --> 01:18:29.554
repair forward.

01:18:30.387 --> 01:18:33.393
The Korean, the ROK government, will pay

01:18:33.393 --> 01:18:34.559
a good percentage of that.

01:18:34.559 --> 01:18:36.962
It's actually cheaper for us to repair it forward.

01:18:36.962 --> 01:18:39.390
We had a tank that had a fire, for example,

01:18:39.390 --> 01:18:42.264
and was like several million to bring it back and fix it.

01:18:42.264 --> 01:18:43.637
We fixed it forward for, I think

01:18:43.637 --> 01:18:45.554
it was 500,000 or less.

01:18:46.024 --> 01:18:49.038
Still a lot, but saved a heck of a lot.

01:18:49.038 --> 01:18:50.717
Those type of agreements are there.

01:18:50.717 --> 01:18:53.022
There's another agreement in Japan, for example,

01:18:53.022 --> 01:18:55.014
where the government, the workers,

01:18:55.014 --> 01:18:57.181
US Army Japan on the base,

01:18:57.242 --> 01:19:00.575
they're paid by the government in Japan.

01:19:01.149 --> 01:19:03.149
For us, it's tremendous.

01:19:03.159 --> 01:19:05.409
There might be some things.

01:19:05.582 --> 01:19:07.302
General Anderson was joking about a checkbook,

01:19:07.302 --> 01:19:10.589
but those certainly are significant contributions.

01:19:10.589 --> 01:19:11.695
They make a big difference.

01:19:11.695 --> 01:19:13.576
Folks are saying, "Hey, you're forward there.

01:19:13.576 --> 01:19:14.577
"Are they contributing?"

01:19:14.577 --> 01:19:15.826
They're contributing a lot.

01:19:15.826 --> 01:19:17.816
If you've ever seen anywhere, even nicer

01:19:17.816 --> 01:19:20.555
than when I was in incredible Heidelberg, Germany,

01:19:20.555 --> 01:19:23.179
which was amazing, but it's incredible,

01:19:23.179 --> 01:19:24.429
Camp Humphreys.

01:19:24.591 --> 01:19:28.538
It's about 90% paid for by the ROK government.

01:19:28.538 --> 01:19:30.458
Tune of about $9 billion.

01:19:30.458 --> 01:19:31.541
Unbelievable.

01:19:31.904 --> 01:19:33.423
There are things that can be done that make

01:19:33.423 --> 01:19:34.840
a huge difference

01:19:36.158 --> 01:19:38.192
in readiness and ability.

01:19:38.192 --> 01:19:39.749
Again, that little bit of savings,

01:19:39.749 --> 01:19:40.971
that contribution.

01:19:40.971 --> 01:19:43.605
It also gets ya closer with your ally,

01:19:43.605 --> 01:19:45.743
your partner nation, because

01:19:45.743 --> 01:19:48.238
they're heavily involved in everything we're doing.

01:19:48.238 --> 01:19:50.203
It's not us and them, it's together.

01:19:50.203 --> 01:19:51.297
- But thanks for what you do,

01:19:51.297 --> 01:19:53.058
take care of our soldiers there,

01:19:53.058 --> 01:19:55.386
on the morale, welfare, well-being.

01:19:55.386 --> 01:19:56.698
But what General Brown is talking about,

01:19:56.698 --> 01:19:57.778
the training.

01:19:57.778 --> 01:20:00.126
We're talking about the logistic infrastructure,

01:20:00.126 --> 01:20:01.226
the training infrastructure.

01:20:01.226 --> 01:20:02.821
There are huge shortfalls right now

01:20:02.821 --> 01:20:04.761
at Udairi Range from many, many, many,

01:20:04.761 --> 01:20:06.582
many, many, many years of what you've

01:20:06.582 --> 01:20:07.778
provided us there.

01:20:07.778 --> 01:20:08.760
But in terms of investments from a

01:20:08.760 --> 01:20:12.427
training infrastructure, as well as exercise

01:20:12.501 --> 01:20:14.551
infrastructure, things like that will allow us

01:20:14.551 --> 01:20:17.736
to leverage training readiness while either

01:20:17.736 --> 01:20:18.946
permanently stationed in Kuwait

01:20:18.946 --> 01:20:20.582
or passing through Kuwait.

01:20:20.582 --> 01:20:22.044
As you know, many people go through Kuwait

01:20:22.044 --> 01:20:25.393
to go onward to many other parts of the world over there.

01:20:25.393 --> 01:20:27.645
We can certainly use help there.

01:20:27.645 --> 01:20:29.732
- I think we've probably gone a little over time.

01:20:29.732 --> 01:20:32.267
But before we pop smoke all together,

01:20:32.267 --> 01:20:33.350
so thanks for the questions.

01:20:33.350 --> 01:20:35.611
I just wanna roll the table, run the table real quick

01:20:35.611 --> 01:20:38.043
and just let everybody a chance to take us home

01:20:38.043 --> 01:20:38.933
a little bit.

01:20:38.933 --> 01:20:41.248
Steph, if you wanna, anything you wanna close out with?

01:20:41.248 --> 01:20:42.363
You good?
- No, I'm good.

01:20:42.363 --> 01:20:43.196
- Aundre?

01:20:43.257 --> 01:20:44.879
- Just thank you for what you do every day.

01:20:44.879 --> 01:20:48.046
What I'd ask is when there are issues,

01:20:48.075 --> 01:20:49.310
please being 'em to my attention.

01:20:49.310 --> 01:20:51.476
I can't help for what I don't know.

01:20:51.476 --> 01:20:53.389
As I visit your formations, I'm always

01:20:53.389 --> 01:20:54.792
learning the challenges out there,

01:20:54.792 --> 01:20:56.460
so I'd ask you just to elevate those

01:20:56.460 --> 01:20:57.469
to my attention.

01:20:57.469 --> 01:21:00.196
I'm happy to plug in where I can help,

01:21:00.196 --> 01:21:02.294
and I'm very proud of what you all, great teammates.

01:21:02.294 --> 01:21:03.206
Thank you very much.

01:21:03.206 --> 01:21:04.439
- General Anderson.

01:21:04.439 --> 01:21:06.161
- I thank you for your service, your leadership,

01:21:06.161 --> 01:21:08.797
your sacrifice, your partnership.

01:21:08.797 --> 01:21:10.936
Been with you all over the world, multiple places.

01:21:10.936 --> 01:21:12.720
Again, it's about being seamless

01:21:12.720 --> 01:21:14.170
and one team, one fight, I think.

01:21:14.170 --> 01:21:17.174
I hope you feel the steps of total Army now

01:21:17.174 --> 01:21:18.285
over these past couple years.

01:21:18.285 --> 01:21:20.348
It had gotten pretty low a couple of years ago.

01:21:20.348 --> 01:21:21.715
I think it's pretty powerful right now.

01:21:21.715 --> 01:21:23.750
But, again, we're committed to you.

01:21:23.750 --> 01:21:25.183
We are side by side with you.

01:21:25.183 --> 01:21:27.482
All I ask is the same thing that my chief,

01:21:27.482 --> 01:21:28.419
war battle buddies tell you.

01:21:28.419 --> 01:21:29.772
When you're with us, when you see us,

01:21:29.772 --> 01:21:33.143
wherever we happen to be, exercises, unit visits,

01:21:33.143 --> 01:21:35.766
training center rotations, pre-command course,

01:21:35.766 --> 01:21:37.602
please continue to sound off.

01:21:37.602 --> 01:21:38.577
We have to know.

01:21:38.577 --> 01:21:40.463
I ask you, paid public announcement,

01:21:40.463 --> 01:21:41.546
again, not to

01:21:42.711 --> 01:21:45.321
overload this, you've gotta use the SRU,

01:21:45.321 --> 01:21:48.266
your USR reporting, to inform the Army staff

01:21:48.266 --> 01:21:50.705
about what your challenges are.

01:21:50.705 --> 01:21:52.431
I think you know what the quads are on there

01:21:52.431 --> 01:21:53.989
with your people, with your equipment,

01:21:53.989 --> 01:21:56.533
with your training, but use that process

01:21:56.533 --> 01:21:59.631
to help inform the Army staff so we can help you.

01:21:59.631 --> 01:22:02.007
If you don't tell us, we're not mind readers.

01:22:02.007 --> 01:22:03.963
But we are committed to making sure that you

01:22:03.963 --> 01:22:05.859
go out the door just like anybody else,

01:22:05.859 --> 01:22:06.777
go do your mission.

01:22:06.777 --> 01:22:08.938
You're ready to go do it, you go accomplish it

01:22:08.938 --> 01:22:10.276
and you come home in one piece.

01:22:10.276 --> 01:22:12.430
God bless you, keep up the good work.

01:22:12.430 --> 01:22:15.557
- There are complex challenges out there.

01:22:15.557 --> 01:22:16.840
As you get older, it's unbelievable.

01:22:16.840 --> 01:22:18.528
You just think it can't get more complex.

01:22:18.528 --> 01:22:20.465
(laughter) Boy, it's unbelievable.

01:22:20.465 --> 01:22:22.454
The pace of things and the challenges out there

01:22:22.454 --> 01:22:23.704
are incredible.

01:22:24.243 --> 01:22:27.585
The good news is people are our advantage.

01:22:27.585 --> 01:22:31.050
As I go around, I was in China a while ago.

01:22:31.050 --> 01:22:33.639
I took a picture of a brigade headquarters.

01:22:33.639 --> 01:22:34.825
It was the nicest brigade headquarters,

01:22:34.825 --> 01:22:36.270
nicest motor pool I'd ever seen.

01:22:36.270 --> 01:22:37.660
Sent it to General Milley.

01:22:37.660 --> 01:22:40.973
Then I ended up in Okinawa on the way back,

01:22:40.973 --> 01:22:43.364
seeing some of our great Patriot air defenders

01:22:43.364 --> 01:22:45.390
protecting us from missiles from all over the world.

01:22:45.390 --> 01:22:47.670
They were in a 1953 motor pool.

01:22:47.670 --> 01:22:49.084
Patriots sticking out.

01:22:49.084 --> 01:22:50.334
Gravel and mud.

01:22:50.731 --> 01:22:51.976
I sent another picture of that and said,

01:22:51.976 --> 01:22:53.787
"Okay, come on. (laughter)

01:22:53.787 --> 01:22:55.934
"We gotta do better than this."

01:22:55.934 --> 01:22:58.684
But the good news is while others

01:22:59.040 --> 01:23:01.119
may be investing more money, they don't

01:23:01.119 --> 01:23:03.603
have the advantage we have, the incredible,

01:23:03.603 --> 01:23:04.974
for us, American solider.

01:23:04.974 --> 01:23:06.279
I would put that our whole military,

01:23:06.279 --> 01:23:08.736
the people, but for us, the American soldier.

01:23:08.736 --> 01:23:10.445
It's the greatest team in the world.

01:23:10.445 --> 01:23:12.834
It's a great team because of all three components,

01:23:12.834 --> 01:23:14.852
the incredible strengths they bring to it,

01:23:14.852 --> 01:23:17.019
Active, Guard and Reserve.

01:23:17.127 --> 01:23:19.602
I'm awful proud to be a part of that team.

01:23:19.602 --> 01:23:21.177
If you wanna come out to the Pacific, see me.

01:23:21.177 --> 01:23:23.503
I have a little recruiting table here (laughter) afterwards.

01:23:23.503 --> 01:23:26.237
(laughter) You might start in Hawaii,

01:23:26.237 --> 01:23:28.230
end up in a bunker in Korea, but that's all right.

01:23:28.230 --> 01:23:30.480
(laughter)

01:23:31.361 --> 01:23:32.559
You get a little bit of time.

01:23:32.559 --> 01:23:33.947
You get a little bit of time in Hawaii.

01:23:33.947 --> 01:23:36.137
But anyway, we really appreciate all you do.

01:23:36.137 --> 01:23:36.980
Greatest team in the world.

01:23:36.980 --> 01:23:38.127
I'm awful proud to be a part of it.

01:23:38.127 --> 01:23:38.960
Thanks.

01:23:39.014 --> 01:23:40.925
- Thanks, everybody, for being here.

01:23:40.925 --> 01:23:42.535
Really appreciate the panel taking the time

01:23:42.535 --> 01:23:46.156
to come out here and help me walk through this.

01:23:46.156 --> 01:23:48.880
Again, if you're a soldier in America's Army Reserve

01:23:48.880 --> 01:23:50.192
out there, just know you're part of a team

01:23:50.192 --> 01:23:52.131
building the most capable, combat ready,

01:23:52.131 --> 01:23:53.513
lethal federal reserve force in the history

01:23:53.513 --> 01:23:54.385
of the United States of America.

01:23:54.385 --> 01:23:55.299
We're gonna do it.

01:23:55.299 --> 01:23:56.850
It's gonna take leadership, energy and execution.

01:23:56.850 --> 01:23:58.214
We gotta get after this, but I appreciate

01:23:58.214 --> 01:23:59.275
everybody being here.

01:23:59.275 --> 01:24:00.859
Hooah.
- [Audience] Hooah.

01:24:00.859 --> 01:24:03.109
(applause)

01:24:06.788 --> 01:24:07.705
- Good job.

01:24:09.246 --> 01:24:11.163
Do this again sometime.

01:24:12.112 --> 01:24:14.445
(laughter)