WEBVTT 00:01.086 --> 00:02.130 - Good morning, everyone. 00:02.130 --> 00:04.483 Today, we're joined by Lieutenant General Stephen Townsend, 00:04.483 --> 00:05.886 who is the Commanding General 00:05.886 --> 00:09.596 of Combined Joint Force, Operation Inherent Resolve. 00:09.596 --> 00:11.789 Before we get started, we'll do a quick radio check. 00:11.789 --> 00:13.789 Sir, how do you hear us? 00:16.885 --> 00:18.118 - I hear you loud and clear. 00:18.118 --> 00:19.701 How do you hear me? 00:19.969 --> 00:21.787 - Sir, we don't have your audio quite yet. 00:21.787 --> 00:24.787 Just please give us one second, sir. 00:29.845 --> 00:31.234 Sir, can you say something again? 00:31.234 --> 00:33.073 - Do you want me to count or something? 00:33.073 --> 00:33.906 - Here we go, we have you, sir. 00:33.906 --> 00:34.739 Thank you. 00:35.782 --> 00:37.888 And, with that, sir, if you have any opening statement, 00:37.888 --> 00:39.638 please go ahead, sir. 00:43.360 --> 00:44.610 - I do, thanks. 00:45.416 --> 00:47.583 Good morning from Baghdad. 00:47.806 --> 00:50.805 In 2014, the world watched in horror 00:50.805 --> 00:54.180 as ISIS seized more than 100,000 square kilometers 00:54.180 --> 00:55.597 of Syria and Iraq 00:56.191 --> 00:57.754 and brought more than seven million people 00:57.754 --> 01:00.004 under its barbaric control. 01:00.668 --> 01:04.477 ISIS was something the world had rarely seen before. 01:04.477 --> 01:06.698 ISIS is the most evil entity 01:06.698 --> 01:09.531 I have encountered in my lifetime. 01:09.712 --> 01:12.403 They did not hide their atrocities. 01:12.403 --> 01:15.556 They tortured, beheaded and burned those 01:15.556 --> 01:17.768 that did not agree with them. 01:17.768 --> 01:19.355 They posted the evidence of their evil 01:19.355 --> 01:22.438 for the world to see on social media. 01:22.544 --> 01:26.711 They enslaved millions under their twisted ideology. 01:27.199 --> 01:30.461 Finally, with the help of coalition air power, 01:30.461 --> 01:33.294 the onslaught of ISIS was stopped. 01:33.939 --> 01:37.022 In 2015, the Iraqis began to regroup, 01:37.408 --> 01:38.433 as a coalition worked 01:38.433 --> 01:42.183 to rebuild, retrain and reequip our partners. 01:42.540 --> 01:46.312 To date, more than 110,000 Iraqi Security Forces 01:46.312 --> 01:48.842 have been trained and equipped by the coalition 01:48.842 --> 01:50.759 to defeat ISIS in Iraq. 01:51.726 --> 01:54.476 In late 2015 and throughout 2016, 01:54.759 --> 01:58.493 the Iraqi Security Forces went on the counteroffensive, 01:58.493 --> 02:01.493 liberating Tikrit, Ramadi, Fallujah, 02:02.498 --> 02:06.581 Qayyarah, Sharqat and countless smaller villages. 02:08.291 --> 02:10.709 When 18th Airborne Corps arrived last August, 02:10.709 --> 02:13.119 the liberation of Mosul was just an idea 02:13.119 --> 02:15.369 and colored lines on a map. 02:16.441 --> 02:19.106 The nine-month-long liberation battle for Mosul 02:19.106 --> 02:20.856 was not an easy task. 02:21.616 --> 02:23.949 It was a brutal urban fight. 02:24.516 --> 02:26.844 But as I've said before here in this conference, 02:26.844 --> 02:29.084 it would have been difficult for any army in the world 02:29.084 --> 02:30.751 to include our army. 02:32.087 --> 02:34.880 Not only did the Iraqi Security Forces have to overcome 02:34.880 --> 02:39.016 a fanatical enemy fighting in dense urban terrain, 02:39.016 --> 02:43.183 but they had to overcome ISIS's use of chemical munitions, 02:43.954 --> 02:48.121 explosive-laden drones, suicide vests, armored car bombs, 02:48.913 --> 02:52.413 and the use of civilians as human shields. 02:53.400 --> 02:55.823 The Iraqi Security Forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga 02:55.823 --> 02:58.490 set the example for all of Iraq. 02:58.931 --> 03:02.311 They proved how resilient and powerful they could be. 03:02.311 --> 03:03.759 They put their differences aside 03:03.759 --> 03:06.575 and worked together toward a common goal. 03:06.575 --> 03:08.037 And now, as you may have heard, 03:08.037 --> 03:11.306 in the past few hours, the Iraqis have achieved 03:11.306 --> 03:14.011 a stunningly swift and decisive victory 03:14.011 --> 03:17.261 in the city of Tal Afar, west of Mosul. 03:19.252 --> 03:23.408 Throughout the fight, the, the ISF did a remarkable job 03:23.408 --> 03:27.056 protecting civilians and evacuating them from the city, 03:27.056 --> 03:27.944 while the United Nations 03:27.944 --> 03:30.293 and the government of Iraq did amazing work 03:30.293 --> 03:33.543 handling the 900,000 displaced persons. 03:34.663 --> 03:36.875 To date, more than a quarter of a million people 03:36.875 --> 03:40.684 have already returned to their homes throughout Iraq. 03:40.684 --> 03:42.824 The coalition, united and strong, was there 03:42.824 --> 03:46.116 every step of the way to support our partners, 03:46.116 --> 03:49.146 but make no mistake about it, this was an Iraqi plan. 03:49.146 --> 03:51.979 This was Iraqis liberating Iraqis. 03:53.352 --> 03:56.036 In Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces, 03:56.036 --> 03:58.746 including the Syrian Arab Coalition, 03:58.746 --> 04:02.413 liberated Tabqa City and Tabqa Dam in April. 04:02.482 --> 04:04.711 And, they're now in the third month of operations 04:04.711 --> 04:06.711 to defeat ISIS in Raqqa, 04:06.761 --> 04:10.223 the global capital of the so-called caliphate. 04:10.223 --> 04:12.811 The fighting is difficult, but they have made much progress 04:12.811 --> 04:15.978 and I have no doubt they will succeed. 04:16.457 --> 04:18.631 You have to remember that the Syrian Democratic Forces are 04:18.631 --> 04:20.669 not the Iraqi Security Forces. 04:20.669 --> 04:24.836 They do not have tanks, helicopters or fighter jets. 04:25.074 --> 04:27.108 They are really an irregular light infantry force 04:27.108 --> 04:30.481 with a comparative handful of light armored vehicles 04:30.481 --> 04:34.115 and heavy weapons, who, with coalition assistance, 04:34.115 --> 04:37.031 are fighting well above the weight class. 04:37.031 --> 04:38.448 They have been and remain 04:38.448 --> 04:42.615 the most effective counter-ISIS fighting force in Syria. 04:43.454 --> 04:45.241 Once the fighting is done in the city, 04:45.241 --> 04:48.735 Raqqa will be handed over to the Raqqa Civilian Council 04:48.735 --> 04:51.902 and the Raqqa Internal Security Force. 04:52.015 --> 04:54.732 These groups of primarily Arab local citizens 04:54.732 --> 04:57.247 will provide local governance and security 04:57.247 --> 04:59.496 so the people of Raqqa can return to their lives 04:59.496 --> 05:01.413 as quickly as possible. 05:02.652 --> 05:05.009 I think what all of this has shown is 05:05.009 --> 05:08.676 that our by, with and through strategy works 05:08.693 --> 05:12.131 when you have capable partners willing to fight. 05:12.131 --> 05:14.756 Our partners in Iraq and Syria, with coalition help, 05:14.756 --> 05:17.539 have made substantial accomplishments 05:17.539 --> 05:19.571 in the fight to defeat ISIS. 05:19.571 --> 05:21.262 Together, we've liberated 05:21.262 --> 05:25.429 approximately 75,000 square kilometers of ISIS-held terrain, 05:25.794 --> 05:28.708 and, more importantly, 5 1/2 million citizens 05:28.708 --> 05:31.958 had been liberated from ISIS captivity. 05:32.274 --> 05:35.197 There have been many sacrifices along the way. 05:35.197 --> 05:38.081 In Iraq, all branches of the Iraqi Security Forces 05:38.081 --> 05:41.126 has suffered their share of casualties. 05:41.126 --> 05:45.043 In Syria, Kurds and Arabs fighting side-by-side 05:45.175 --> 05:47.642 have fought and died every day to defeat ISIS, 05:47.642 --> 05:50.503 and not just for their fellow citizens in Iraq and Syria, 05:50.503 --> 05:52.775 but for those throughout the region 05:52.775 --> 05:55.858 and in every nation around the world. 05:56.065 --> 05:59.315 While thousands of ISF and SDF fighters 05:59.514 --> 06:01.290 have been seriously wounded and killed, 06:01.290 --> 06:03.707 so, too, have many civilians. 06:05.021 --> 06:08.624 The death of civilians weighs heavy on our hearts. 06:08.624 --> 06:10.096 We should never seek to deny this 06:10.096 --> 06:12.513 or hide the true cost of war. 06:13.185 --> 06:15.805 But, I say this with full conviction: 06:15.805 --> 06:17.797 the responsibility for civilian casualties 06:17.797 --> 06:20.464 in Iraq and Syria lies with ISIS 06:20.811 --> 06:24.894 who have brought misery and death to this region. 06:24.913 --> 06:26.644 Our partners in the coalition have done 06:26.644 --> 06:30.108 and will continue to do everything in our power 06:30.108 --> 06:32.358 to preserve innocent lives. 06:33.455 --> 06:35.240 I must also recognize the sacrifices 06:35.240 --> 06:37.149 of our coalition service members 06:37.149 --> 06:39.991 who sacrificed their lives for this cause 06:39.991 --> 06:42.542 and the sacrifice of their families. 06:42.542 --> 06:45.451 There are no words to describe the respect I have for you 06:45.451 --> 06:48.451 and the sorrow I have for your loss. 06:48.864 --> 06:52.623 With that said, our fight to defeat ISIS is not over. 06:52.623 --> 06:55.206 The coalition is strong, united 06:55.839 --> 06:58.304 and will remain committed to our partners 06:58.304 --> 07:01.684 to bring a lasting defeat to ISIS in Iraq and Syria, 07:01.684 --> 07:03.651 to prevent ISIS from exporting their terror 07:03.651 --> 07:07.818 around the world and to protect our own homelands. 07:07.972 --> 07:10.470 Next week, the Army's 18th Airborne Corps will hand over 07:10.470 --> 07:13.509 the coalition reins to Lieutenant General Paul Funk 07:13.509 --> 07:15.842 and his Third Armored Corps. 07:15.940 --> 07:18.893 I am proud of all we have accomplished thus far 07:18.893 --> 07:20.524 and I'm confident Lieutenant General Funk 07:20.524 --> 07:21.603 and his team will continue 07:21.603 --> 07:25.270 to help our partners take the fight to ISIS. 07:25.413 --> 07:28.035 Thanks for this opportunity to talk to you today 07:28.035 --> 07:29.737 and I'll take your questions. 07:29.737 --> 07:30.570 - Thank you, sir. 07:30.570 --> 07:33.234 First, we'll go to Bob Burns from the Associated Press. 07:33.234 --> 07:35.734 - Thank you, General Townsend. 07:35.799 --> 07:39.966 You described the fall of Tal Afar as stunningly swift. 07:42.171 --> 07:45.748 I'm wondering, has the apparent acceleration 07:45.748 --> 07:48.831 of ISIS's collapse in Iraq translated 07:49.525 --> 07:51.608 into accelerating success 07:53.258 --> 07:56.841 against ISIS in Syria, as well, in any way? 08:03.929 --> 08:06.681 - So, your question is about, as I understand it, 08:06.681 --> 08:10.193 is about has the swift victory in Tal Afar, 08:10.193 --> 08:13.860 have we seen that translate to similar gains 08:14.088 --> 08:15.797 elsewhere in Iraq and Syria? 08:15.797 --> 08:18.047 I don't think that we have. 08:18.266 --> 08:20.343 The Iraqi Security Forces prepared 08:20.343 --> 08:22.426 in a very deliberate way, 08:23.428 --> 08:26.555 a focused way, for the battle of Tal Afar. 08:26.555 --> 08:29.830 Several things went our way in the battle of Tal Afar. 08:29.830 --> 08:32.247 Tal Afar was largely isolated 08:32.473 --> 08:34.487 from the rest of Iraq and Syria 08:34.487 --> 08:36.975 for about seven or eight months. 08:36.975 --> 08:41.142 Since early in the Mosul fight, Tal Afar was surrounded. 08:42.710 --> 08:45.627 There was strife between the Iraqi, 08:45.932 --> 08:50.099 between local ISIS fighters and foreign ISIS fighters 08:50.849 --> 08:53.182 and we saw that playing out. 08:54.228 --> 08:56.037 Also, I think the coalition did a lot 08:56.037 --> 08:58.454 of shaping fires in Tal Afar, 08:58.524 --> 09:01.079 a lot of precision strikes on leaders 09:01.079 --> 09:03.103 and special military capabilities. 09:03.103 --> 09:05.665 And then, finally, and probably most importantly, 09:05.665 --> 09:07.796 the Iraqi Security Forces attacked 09:07.796 --> 09:09.963 with a great deal of power 09:10.406 --> 09:13.406 on five axes of attack into Tal Afar 09:15.204 --> 09:16.592 and they were able to maintain 09:16.592 --> 09:19.062 that same pressure on all axes 09:19.062 --> 09:23.229 and I think this caused the sudden collapse of ISIS there. 09:24.675 --> 09:25.707 While I'd like to say 09:25.707 --> 09:28.535 that we would see this elsewhere in Iraq and Syria, 09:28.535 --> 09:31.142 we're not really planning for that. 09:31.142 --> 09:34.225 We're planning for tough fights ahead 09:34.984 --> 09:38.833 and we think that's probably the best way to approach it. 09:38.833 --> 09:41.492 - Next, to Michael Gordon with the New York Times. 09:41.492 --> 09:44.145 - Sir, just following up on your last point 09:44.145 --> 09:46.111 on the tough fights ahead, 09:46.111 --> 09:50.159 looking towards the Middle Euphrates River Valley, 09:50.159 --> 09:52.142 it seems there are two sets of issues there. 09:52.142 --> 09:55.994 One is how to de-conflict military operations there 09:55.994 --> 10:00.161 with Syrian government forces, Russian air operations, 10:00.990 --> 10:02.907 Iranian-backed militias 10:03.732 --> 10:06.399 and, also, which force that you, 10:07.388 --> 10:09.928 that the United States supports will do the fighting, 10:09.928 --> 10:12.107 how to make a force like the SDF, 10:12.107 --> 10:13.281 which has a Kurdish element, 10:13.281 --> 10:15.754 acceptable to the local population, 10:15.754 --> 10:18.425 perhaps by incorporating more Arabs. 10:18.425 --> 10:20.885 Can you please address these two points? 10:20.885 --> 10:23.413 Have you worked out deconfliction arrangements 10:23.413 --> 10:26.413 with the Russians for the operations 10:26.693 --> 10:29.776 in the Middle Euphrates River Valley? 10:29.885 --> 10:31.764 And, which force will do the fighting there? 10:31.764 --> 10:33.990 And, how are you going to make that force acceptable 10:33.990 --> 10:35.990 to the local population? 10:40.635 --> 10:42.516 - Okay, thanks, Michael. 10:42.516 --> 10:46.090 So, first your question, you know, you've pointed out 10:46.090 --> 10:48.423 that the final stand of ISIS 10:50.259 --> 10:52.906 will be in the Middle Euphrates River Valley. 10:52.906 --> 10:56.573 Now, that's the area that lies on both sides 10:57.309 --> 10:59.476 of the Iraq-Syrian border, 11:00.603 --> 11:04.770 from about Deir ez-Zor in Syria down to Rawah in Iraq, 11:05.599 --> 11:07.266 over 250 kilometers. 11:10.383 --> 11:13.038 All these forces will converge there. 11:13.038 --> 11:15.587 If ISIS is making their last stand, you're pointing out 11:15.587 --> 11:17.509 that all the forces will converge there 11:17.509 --> 11:20.842 and how will we de-conflict all of that? 11:22.066 --> 11:25.733 We've actually had some practice doing this. 11:26.102 --> 11:30.269 You may recall, back in February, all these same actors 11:30.982 --> 11:34.315 converged around the town called al-Bab, 11:34.551 --> 11:36.634 up to the east of Aleppo, 11:37.082 --> 11:40.332 and we de-conflicted that successfully. 11:40.975 --> 11:45.142 Then, you may recall, probably in the May, June timeframe, 11:47.236 --> 11:51.403 all these same actors converged again south of Raqqa, 11:52.138 --> 11:56.305 in the area of Tabqa, the city and Tabqa Airfield. 11:57.060 --> 11:58.650 We were able to work through that then 11:58.650 --> 12:02.817 and those rehearsals, if you will, have allowed us 12:03.400 --> 12:06.823 to come up with measures that seem to work. 12:06.823 --> 12:10.885 So, we're having a conversation with the Russians. 12:10.885 --> 12:14.476 We're trying to de-conflict this in the future. 12:14.476 --> 12:18.643 And, we have lines that are agreed to that will cover 12:20.058 --> 12:23.891 much of the Middle Euphrates River Valley now, 12:24.054 --> 12:25.506 not all of it yet, 12:25.506 --> 12:27.432 but we'll get to that when the time comes. 12:27.432 --> 12:29.765 So, I'm reasonably confident 12:30.446 --> 12:33.779 that we'll be able to work through this. 12:33.955 --> 12:36.154 Everyone that's converging down there is trying 12:36.154 --> 12:39.081 to defeat ISIS as the first priority 12:39.081 --> 12:43.060 and we'll use that to our advantage to work through it. 12:43.060 --> 12:45.227 Your second question about 12:45.443 --> 12:49.443 how will we ensure that there's a suitable force 12:50.011 --> 12:52.106 to go to this area and liberate this area? 12:52.106 --> 12:54.566 Well, first of all, I'm not sure 12:54.566 --> 12:57.816 it's our responsibility to ensure that. 12:58.665 --> 13:00.342 I think what we have is 13:00.342 --> 13:03.759 we're supporting Syrians liberating Syria 13:04.429 --> 13:08.596 and our Syrian partners have shown a remarkable facility 13:09.962 --> 13:12.462 for finding suitable partners. 13:14.068 --> 13:17.422 In fact, I watched them do this in Manbij, 13:17.422 --> 13:19.693 I watched them do this in Tabqa 13:19.693 --> 13:23.860 and now I'm watching them do it for the third time in Raqqa. 13:24.507 --> 13:27.174 And, you mentioned a Kurd force, 13:28.680 --> 13:32.056 but the Syrian Democratic Forces comprise 13:32.056 --> 13:36.056 of about 50,000 fighters, half of whom are Arabs 13:36.232 --> 13:39.565 and what I've watched with this force is 13:39.677 --> 13:43.844 that they, first of all, solicit volunteers and recruits 13:43.988 --> 13:46.332 from the area to be liberated 13:46.332 --> 13:48.346 and they form the leading elements 13:48.346 --> 13:50.929 of the force from those people. 13:52.664 --> 13:55.953 So, I think that they'll, they'll do this much the same way 13:55.953 --> 13:57.739 they're doing it in Raqqa. 13:57.739 --> 14:01.906 They'll recruit people from the Deir ez-Zor Province 14:03.340 --> 14:05.575 in the Middle Euphrates River Valley 14:05.575 --> 14:07.931 and they'll be part of the campaign 14:07.931 --> 14:12.098 and I'm reasonably confident, based on past history, 14:12.929 --> 14:15.438 that they'll find a force, they'll make a force 14:15.438 --> 14:18.445 that's acceptable to the people down there. 14:18.445 --> 14:21.034 I'll just give you a little vignette we see playing out 14:21.034 --> 14:23.867 around Raqqa and Tabqa, every day. 14:27.319 --> 14:31.486 It doesn't really matter what that force is comprised of, 14:31.763 --> 14:35.930 you know, the ethnic background, the religious background. 14:36.015 --> 14:37.963 What we see is we see people fleeing 14:37.963 --> 14:41.022 towards our Syrian partners, every day. 14:41.022 --> 14:45.189 They're fleeing from ISIS towards our Syrian partners. 14:45.549 --> 14:47.887 They're fleeing from the Syrian regime 14:47.887 --> 14:50.137 towards our Syrian partners 14:50.464 --> 14:54.297 because they know that there's a safety there. 14:54.744 --> 14:57.411 So anyway, with that experience, 14:59.709 --> 15:00.944 I'm reasonably confident 15:00.944 --> 15:03.986 that that force will also find suitable partners 15:03.986 --> 15:08.153 to defeat ISIS in the Middle Euphrates River Valley. 15:08.611 --> 15:10.591 - Next to Idrees Ali from Reuters. 15:10.591 --> 15:13.619 - General, when we were in Baghdad last week, 15:13.619 --> 15:15.317 with all the briefings and all that we got, 15:15.317 --> 15:16.964 the impression that I got was 15:16.964 --> 15:18.552 that Tal Afar would be a tough fight. 15:18.552 --> 15:21.341 There were about 2,000 ISIS fighters 15:21.341 --> 15:23.258 in and around the city. 15:23.409 --> 15:24.242 So, I mean, what happened? 15:24.242 --> 15:25.711 What happened with those fighters 15:25.711 --> 15:27.940 since it's, obviously was sort of, encircled? 15:27.940 --> 15:30.976 Where did they, you know, did you kill all 2,000? 15:30.976 --> 15:33.187 Sort of, how was it swifter than, 15:33.187 --> 15:34.336 why was it swifter than you thought? 15:34.336 --> 15:37.919 And then I have another follow-up on Syria. 15:42.043 --> 15:44.680 - Yeah, I remember our discussion a week or so ago 15:44.680 --> 15:46.013 here in Baghdad. 15:46.774 --> 15:49.150 I think what I said is we estimate there's somewhere 15:49.150 --> 15:52.817 between 1,000 and 2,000 fighters in Tal Afar 15:53.635 --> 15:57.802 and, quite honestly, our initial battle damage assessment is 15:58.354 --> 16:02.521 over a thousand enemy fighters killed or captured already, 16:03.275 --> 16:05.525 probably 500 to 700 of them 16:06.225 --> 16:09.646 in the neighborhood of Tal Afar City itself. 16:09.646 --> 16:13.229 And then, those remaining fighters withdrew 16:14.069 --> 16:16.652 from Tal Afar City to the north 16:16.877 --> 16:20.033 and they withdrew some 10 or 20 kilometers 16:20.033 --> 16:21.598 to some pretty rough country 16:21.598 --> 16:24.574 and some small villages to the north of Tal Afar 16:24.574 --> 16:27.110 and, in that process, we think we've killed 16:27.110 --> 16:29.610 somewhere between 300 and 500, 16:30.657 --> 16:34.652 so somewhere between 1,000 and 1,200 enemy fighters 16:34.652 --> 16:36.616 we think that we've killed. 16:36.616 --> 16:39.616 The Kurdish Peshmerga have estimated 16:39.817 --> 16:43.984 they've killed somewhere between 130 and 170 fighters 16:44.381 --> 16:47.814 trying to flee through, northward and northwest, 16:47.814 --> 16:50.554 through the Kurdish defensive lines. 16:50.554 --> 16:54.721 So, there was a pretty good isolation around Tal Afar 16:55.569 --> 16:59.236 and the Iraqi Security Forces and the coalition went there 16:59.236 --> 17:01.648 to annihilate the ISIS forces 17:01.648 --> 17:05.777 that were there in Tal Afar and I think we've done that. 17:05.777 --> 17:06.860 I think that, 17:08.818 --> 17:10.672 I think there are probably some still hiding 17:10.672 --> 17:14.491 in the very rough country to the north of Tal Afar, 17:14.491 --> 17:18.158 but not in large numbers, would be my guess. 17:18.547 --> 17:20.945 And, I think we've accounted for a lot of them. 17:20.945 --> 17:22.097 - And, just to follow up 17:22.097 --> 17:25.847 on this ISIS convoy going into eastern Syria, 17:26.008 --> 17:27.513 I mean, I get that, sort of. 17:27.513 --> 17:31.680 It's within the law of armed conflict to strike, you know, 17:31.698 --> 17:34.990 if it's ISIS fighters and not necessarily hit the convoy, 17:34.990 --> 17:37.283 but the criticism is that, morally, you know, 17:37.283 --> 17:40.866 striking convoy with 300 women and children 17:41.088 --> 17:42.647 just to, sort of, make a point 17:42.647 --> 17:45.294 because they can obviously go around where you struck, 17:45.294 --> 17:47.584 is not the correct way to go about doing this. 17:47.584 --> 17:49.634 If you could, sort of, tell us the rationale 17:49.634 --> 17:52.918 and why you decided to, you know, temporarily, 17:52.918 --> 17:57.085 sort of, block this convoy with women and children. 18:01.329 --> 18:03.412 - Okay, so, first of all, 18:05.632 --> 18:08.465 this is a convoy of ISIS fighters. 18:09.811 --> 18:11.410 They, we believe some of them have 18:11.410 --> 18:13.993 their family members with them. 18:14.228 --> 18:16.145 These are ISIS fighters 18:16.297 --> 18:19.464 that the Syrian regime cut a deal with 18:19.543 --> 18:21.293 to move through Syria 18:22.014 --> 18:26.181 from their western border with Lebanon, through Syria 18:27.365 --> 18:29.448 and put them off on buses 18:30.062 --> 18:32.896 on their eastern border next to Iraq. 18:32.896 --> 18:34.852 That's what they're doing. 18:34.852 --> 18:38.335 So, we decided to go look for these buses and we found them. 18:38.335 --> 18:39.695 And, let me make it clear, 18:39.695 --> 18:42.862 we have not struck this convoy at all. 18:44.311 --> 18:48.478 No women and children have been harmed on this convoy, 18:48.677 --> 18:49.752 although I'd very much like 18:49.752 --> 18:52.999 to get at the ISIS fighters on that convoy. 18:52.999 --> 18:54.602 We've resisted that. 18:54.602 --> 18:55.750 What we have done is 18:55.750 --> 18:59.917 we've seen the Syrian regime bring these ISIS fighters, 19:00.196 --> 19:04.363 with their machine guns, which they posted on social media, 19:04.505 --> 19:08.672 pictures of masked terrorists on Greyhound-like buses 19:11.391 --> 19:13.392 with their machine guns in their laps. 19:13.392 --> 19:14.741 And, you can check it on social media 19:14.741 --> 19:16.741 and see it for yourself. 19:17.411 --> 19:19.653 So, we didn't make a deal with ISIS, 19:19.653 --> 19:22.788 and we're going to pursue ISIS wherever we find them. 19:22.788 --> 19:26.121 So, they stopped on the, near Abu Kamal, 19:26.719 --> 19:29.492 on the eastern, in the eastern part of Syria 19:29.492 --> 19:31.508 and along the border with Iraq, 19:31.508 --> 19:34.591 and they waited to link up with ISIS. 19:35.038 --> 19:37.055 And so, we watched, and when ISIS came out 19:37.055 --> 19:40.074 to link up with them, we started striking ISIS. 19:40.074 --> 19:42.812 And, again, we haven't struck the convoy, 19:42.812 --> 19:46.580 but we have struck every ISIS fighter and/or vehicle 19:46.580 --> 19:49.319 that has tried to approach that convoy 19:49.319 --> 19:51.819 and we'll continue to do that. 19:53.161 --> 19:55.131 - Next, to Joe Tabet from Al Hurra. 19:55.131 --> 19:57.252 - Thank you, Major. General Townsend, 19:57.252 --> 19:59.244 thank you for doing this. 19:59.244 --> 20:02.848 My question, I want to go back to your opening statement. 20:02.848 --> 20:05.181 You mentioned many victories 20:07.431 --> 20:08.863 over the last two years, 20:08.863 --> 20:12.446 from Fallujah to Mosul to Shaddadi, Manbij, 20:13.828 --> 20:17.156 my question for you is, what do you think, 20:17.156 --> 20:21.323 how the United States, what the United States need to do 20:22.376 --> 20:25.293 to safeguard what has been achieved 20:26.429 --> 20:28.846 in the last two, three years? 20:30.174 --> 20:34.341 What's your vision in regards to the post-counter-ISIS? 20:36.954 --> 20:39.093 Do you see a long-term commitment 20:39.093 --> 20:42.843 for the United States in both Iraq and Syria? 20:50.841 --> 20:54.970 - Okay, so I think, as I understand your question, 20:54.970 --> 20:57.536 a little hard time hearing it, but I think you ask: 20:57.536 --> 21:01.703 what does the United States need to do to secure the victory 21:02.648 --> 21:05.315 in Iraq and Syria post-conflict? 21:07.276 --> 21:11.359 First of all, we need to focus on defeating ISIS. 21:11.698 --> 21:15.865 There are still about 1 1/2, two million people 21:18.131 --> 21:19.714 under ISIS bondage. 21:21.622 --> 21:25.622 There's still more than 25,000 square kilometers 21:26.046 --> 21:29.629 held by ISIS, some major population centers 21:30.491 --> 21:31.991 in Iraq and Syria. 21:32.449 --> 21:35.964 And so, have to focus first on the defeat of ISIS, 21:35.964 --> 21:37.964 military defeat of ISIS. 21:38.246 --> 21:40.163 Then, I think it's less 21:42.442 --> 21:44.357 about what the United States must do, 21:44.357 --> 21:48.524 but first, it's about what Iraq and Syria must do. 21:48.912 --> 21:50.662 In Iraq, for example, 21:51.662 --> 21:54.662 I think part of the rise of ISIS was 21:56.237 --> 21:59.987 disenfranchised peoples, most of them Sunnis, 22:00.479 --> 22:03.446 who looked at Baghdad and they didn't see their government 22:03.446 --> 22:07.209 representing them or their interests or their future. 22:07.209 --> 22:10.792 And, I think that's probably the most important thing 22:10.792 --> 22:13.976 that the people of Iraq, the government of Iraq has to do, 22:13.976 --> 22:18.143 is it has to reach out, reconcile, bring all Iraqis together 22:19.680 --> 22:22.680 and be the government of all Iraqis. 22:24.266 --> 22:28.266 So, that's probably the second thing: beat ISIS, 22:28.434 --> 22:30.517 then the Iraqi government 22:31.707 --> 22:32.540 has to 22:35.028 --> 22:36.320 represent all Iraqis. 22:36.320 --> 22:38.938 In Syria, it's a harder question, 22:38.938 --> 22:42.995 and I think that there's probably a lot of diplomacy 22:42.995 --> 22:44.578 that has to happen. 22:45.020 --> 22:46.917 I think, for Syria, I'm just going to focus 22:46.917 --> 22:51.084 on defeating ISIS and let, give time for the diplomats 22:51.450 --> 22:55.617 to work through to find a solution to the way ahead there. 22:57.132 --> 23:00.299 As far as a longer-term presence here, 23:02.115 --> 23:05.382 I think there is a desire, I know that there is a desire, 23:05.382 --> 23:07.692 for that on the part of the Iraqi government 23:07.692 --> 23:10.192 and the Iraqi Security Forces. 23:10.375 --> 23:14.375 And, our government has engaged in conversations 23:15.442 --> 23:17.752 with the Iraqi Security Forces 23:17.752 --> 23:21.752 and I'm hopeful that an arrangement will be made 23:22.417 --> 23:24.010 to that end in the future. 23:24.010 --> 23:27.760 I think that, you know, we saw what happened, 23:27.969 --> 23:30.636 we all saw what happened in 2011 23:31.212 --> 23:33.795 when we parted ways completely. 23:34.085 --> 23:36.697 And, personally, I, my personal view is 23:36.697 --> 23:38.438 I don't want to, I wouldn't want to repeat that, 23:38.438 --> 23:42.137 so I think that our governments will work out something 23:42.137 --> 23:43.427 that will work for the future. 23:43.427 --> 23:46.503 But, I think the main thing is we have to defeat ISIS 23:46.503 --> 23:48.698 and Baghdad's got to reach out 23:48.698 --> 23:50.419 and put their arms around all Iraqis 23:50.419 --> 23:53.993 and I, my sense is that the Iraqi leaders that I deal with, 23:53.993 --> 23:56.287 that's exactly what they want to do. 23:56.287 --> 23:57.619 - Question, sir, 23:57.619 --> 24:01.786 do you still see any importance in capturing Baghdadi? 24:08.062 --> 24:12.229 - I think you said, any importance in capturing Baghdadi. 24:12.275 --> 24:14.108 So, look, I'd be happy 24:14.733 --> 24:16.400 to capture Baghdadi. 24:18.491 --> 24:20.658 I don't know who wouldn't. 24:21.123 --> 24:25.290 I think I'd be just as equally satisfied just killing him 24:25.417 --> 24:27.473 and, if he's alive out there somewhere, 24:27.473 --> 24:28.766 we're looking for him every day. 24:28.766 --> 24:30.009 I don't think he's dead. 24:30.009 --> 24:32.287 We're looking for him every day. 24:32.287 --> 24:33.852 When we find him, I think we'll probably 24:33.852 --> 24:36.102 just try to kill him first, 24:36.705 --> 24:38.554 probably not worth all the trouble 24:38.554 --> 24:40.387 to try to capture him. 24:40.437 --> 24:43.520 That's my own personal thought on it. 24:44.913 --> 24:46.708 - Next, to Tom Bowman from National Public Radio. 24:46.708 --> 24:47.541 - Hey, General, I wonder 24:47.541 --> 24:49.474 if you could get back to the convoy for a second. 24:49.474 --> 24:52.293 You talked about these buses that you're not hitting 24:52.293 --> 24:54.864 and any ISIS vehicles that come up near them, 24:54.864 --> 24:55.904 you'll take those out. 24:55.904 --> 24:59.042 So, are these buses still in the same location? 24:59.042 --> 25:02.186 Are they essentially just kind of trapped there? 25:02.186 --> 25:03.853 And, talk about this 25:04.316 --> 25:08.399 as a, I would guess, reoccurring problem for you. 25:09.713 --> 25:11.857 ISIS could continue doing this kind of thing, 25:11.857 --> 25:15.697 move out of a, let's say, Raqqa or someplace else 25:15.697 --> 25:19.315 with their family members or civilians on their vehicles, 25:19.315 --> 25:20.998 and you're not going to be able to strike them, 25:20.998 --> 25:23.498 kind of what we saw in Manbij. 25:28.762 --> 25:31.012 - Okay, well, first of all, 25:31.555 --> 25:34.664 I'd point out that we did see that in Manbij, 25:34.664 --> 25:36.939 but it hasn't always worked out that way for ISIS. 25:36.939 --> 25:40.856 So, for example, the example in Fallujah, Iraq, 25:41.316 --> 25:43.399 ISIS tried to leave there 25:43.693 --> 25:47.026 and we were able to strike their convoys 25:48.290 --> 25:52.457 and essentially slaughter ISIS fighters in large numbers. 25:52.993 --> 25:56.410 In Manbij, there was a different outcome. 25:57.674 --> 26:00.924 In Tabqa, back in April, May timeframe, 26:02.840 --> 26:06.673 they tried to execute a negotiated withdrawal. 26:08.308 --> 26:09.992 We weren't party to that agreement 26:09.992 --> 26:13.159 and we struck their withdrawing column 26:14.031 --> 26:16.038 to the extent that we could, 26:16.038 --> 26:19.705 so trying to dissuade that type of activity. 26:19.737 --> 26:20.979 This is a little bit different. 26:20.979 --> 26:22.510 This is not really a breakout; 26:22.510 --> 26:24.143 this is sort of a break-in. 26:24.143 --> 26:26.893 So, they talked their way out of, 26:27.095 --> 26:30.155 with the Syrian regime, out of western Syria 26:30.155 --> 26:32.527 and they've gone now to the east side 26:32.527 --> 26:35.335 and the Syrian regime appears to be quite happy 26:35.335 --> 26:39.502 to deliver them right to Abu Kamal on the Iraqi border. 26:39.884 --> 26:41.669 I know that the government of Iraq 26:41.669 --> 26:45.379 doesn't appreciate that much and we don't appreciate it 26:45.379 --> 26:48.160 and we weren't a party to the deal. 26:48.160 --> 26:51.243 So, what's become of the buses there? 26:51.415 --> 26:52.846 They actually started moving back 26:52.846 --> 26:55.263 towards the interior of Syria 26:56.014 --> 26:59.014 and, so, we're just letting them go. 26:59.618 --> 27:03.618 If they try to get to the edge of ISIS territory 27:05.970 --> 27:08.303 and link up with ISIS there, 27:08.478 --> 27:11.012 we'll work hard to disrupt that. 27:11.012 --> 27:11.845 - But how? 27:11.845 --> 27:14.432 Again, what, crater the roads, prevent them from moving? 27:14.432 --> 27:15.849 What will you do? 27:20.648 --> 27:22.014 - Well, we have all kinds of ways 27:22.014 --> 27:24.582 and I'd prefer that ISIS find out about that 27:24.582 --> 27:26.999 when they make their attempt. 27:27.774 --> 27:30.865 - Next, to Laurie Mylroie with Kurdistan 24. 27:30.865 --> 27:32.615 - Thank you, General. 27:32.784 --> 27:36.036 You were just in Erbil and met with President Barzani. 27:36.036 --> 27:39.119 Could you tell us about that meeting? 27:44.291 --> 27:48.458 - Yes, I was in Erbil and I met with President Barzani. 27:49.242 --> 27:51.613 - What did you, could you tell us something 27:51.613 --> 27:54.446 about what you discussed with him? 27:58.974 --> 27:59.807 - Well... 28:02.346 --> 28:04.596 Well, we discussed the war. 28:04.621 --> 28:07.621 We discussed the Tal Afar operation. 28:09.714 --> 28:12.964 We discussed Mosul and Mosul's security 28:13.284 --> 28:16.024 and we discussed a range of other topics, 28:16.024 --> 28:20.191 most of which I'm a partner on, but not the lead for, 28:20.478 --> 28:23.715 and so I'll let others talk about those topics. 28:23.715 --> 28:25.304 - Are you satisfied with the contribution 28:25.304 --> 28:26.977 of the Peshmerga to the war? 28:26.977 --> 28:29.144 - Thousand, about the war. 28:35.563 --> 28:37.271 Yes, I think I heard your question. 28:37.271 --> 28:38.745 Am I satisfied with the contribution 28:38.745 --> 28:40.226 of the Peshmerga towards the war? 28:40.226 --> 28:41.059 Yes. 28:41.059 --> 28:45.088 So, people probably don't have a good appreciation for this, 28:45.088 --> 28:46.671 but I certainly do. 28:48.639 --> 28:51.222 The Peshmerga were instrumental 28:51.868 --> 28:54.618 in stopping the onslaught of ISIS 28:55.317 --> 28:56.734 in 2014 and 2015. 28:57.915 --> 28:59.901 Across much of Northern Iraq, 28:59.901 --> 29:03.818 it was the Kurdish Peshmerga who held the line. 29:04.322 --> 29:08.145 And so, they've been holding that line ever since, 29:08.145 --> 29:09.306 for three years, 29:09.306 --> 29:12.003 and I think people kind of lose sight of that. 29:12.003 --> 29:15.529 It seems like the Kurds aren't doing anything, 29:15.529 --> 29:16.650 they're defending still, 29:16.650 --> 29:19.788 across hundreds of kilometers of Iraq, 29:19.788 --> 29:22.371 in contact with ISIS every day. 29:23.365 --> 29:27.249 I saw them do incredible work for the liberation of Mosul, 29:27.249 --> 29:30.432 especially for the initial stages of Mosul. 29:30.432 --> 29:32.756 They, they coordinated very effectively 29:32.756 --> 29:36.420 and constructively with the Iraqi Security Forces 29:36.420 --> 29:38.334 and they allowed the Iraqi Security Forces 29:38.334 --> 29:42.167 to stage for the attack in Kurdish-held areas. 29:43.395 --> 29:45.882 The Peshmerga then made the initial attacks 29:45.882 --> 29:48.715 to advance the FLOT towards Mosul, 29:48.917 --> 29:51.006 the Forward Line Of Troops towards Mosul, 29:51.006 --> 29:55.173 and allow the Iraqi Security Forces to close with the city 29:55.346 --> 29:57.112 and make their assault into the city, 29:57.112 --> 29:58.545 their breach into the city, 29:58.545 --> 30:02.659 without loss prior to actually getting to the breach point. 30:02.659 --> 30:05.576 These are very key accomplishments. 30:06.687 --> 30:09.594 They also liberated a number of towns and villages 30:09.594 --> 30:11.511 around Mosul from ISIS. 30:13.401 --> 30:17.318 Since then, they have been containing Tal Afar, 30:17.952 --> 30:22.119 for example, and the Hawija pocket for nine months. 30:22.240 --> 30:25.677 And now and most recently, in the Battle of Tal Afar, 30:25.677 --> 30:27.379 I'd mentioned earlier 30:27.379 --> 30:31.296 that they've killed somewhere between 130, 170, 30:32.937 --> 30:35.515 and with some loss to Peshmerga. 30:35.515 --> 30:39.432 There were ISIS attacks on their defensive line 30:39.627 --> 30:43.513 to try to break from encirclement out of Tal Afar. 30:43.513 --> 30:46.596 Some of these attacks involved women, 30:47.187 --> 30:50.854 female suicide bombers, who killed Peshmerga 30:50.917 --> 30:55.084 who were trying to let the women and children escape, 30:55.712 --> 30:59.052 and, instead, female ISIS suicide bombers 30:59.052 --> 31:02.706 exploded themselves and killed the Peshmerga soldiers. 31:02.706 --> 31:05.716 They've held a stalwart defense, there, north of Tal Afar 31:05.716 --> 31:07.984 and have shaped the battlefield there 31:07.984 --> 31:11.354 and attrited the escaping enemy to a significant degree. 31:11.354 --> 31:13.521 So, I'm, I am pretty happy 31:13.654 --> 31:15.815 with the contributions of the Peshmerga 31:15.815 --> 31:18.066 and there'll be more contributions 31:18.066 --> 31:20.233 as we look towards Hawija, 31:20.380 --> 31:22.745 which is contained to the east 31:22.745 --> 31:25.578 entirely by the Kurdish Peshmerga. 31:25.960 --> 31:27.648 - [Laurie] Thank you very much, sir. 31:27.648 --> 31:29.326 - Now, Tony Capaccio with Bloomberg. 31:29.326 --> 31:30.159 - Hi, sir. 31:30.344 --> 31:31.615 We have heard in Washington 31:31.615 --> 31:35.156 that the White House has decentralized decision-making, 31:35.156 --> 31:39.219 tactical decision-making, down to your level and below, 31:39.219 --> 31:42.469 more than the Obama administration had. 31:42.595 --> 31:45.896 Brett McGurk has laid this out a few times in Washington. 31:45.896 --> 31:48.965 Can you give a couple of practical examples 31:48.965 --> 31:51.279 of how this decentralization has helped 31:51.279 --> 31:55.112 in your campaign to so-called annihilate ISIS? 31:55.199 --> 31:59.366 And then, I have a follow-up on a different subject. 32:03.680 --> 32:07.847 - Okay, I will say that the current administration 32:08.786 --> 32:11.369 has pushed decision-making down 32:11.980 --> 32:14.507 into the military chain of command 32:14.507 --> 32:17.189 and I don't know of a commander in our armed forces 32:17.189 --> 32:19.606 that doesn't appreciate that. 32:20.687 --> 32:24.437 I'll prefer not to go into specific examples. 32:26.443 --> 32:28.443 I will say that probably 32:31.332 --> 32:33.189 a key result of that is 32:33.189 --> 32:36.439 that we don't get second-guessed a lot. 32:37.251 --> 32:39.973 Our judgment here on the battlefield 32:39.973 --> 32:42.556 in the forward areas is trusted 32:42.775 --> 32:45.192 and we don't get 20 questions 32:47.019 --> 32:49.023 with every action that happens on the battlefield 32:49.023 --> 32:50.979 and every action that we take. 32:50.979 --> 32:52.562 And, again, I think 32:54.910 --> 32:57.135 every commander that I know of 32:57.135 --> 33:01.302 appreciates being given the authority and responsibility 33:01.947 --> 33:06.030 and then the trust and backing to implement that. 33:07.134 --> 33:09.217 So, that's what I'll say. 33:09.813 --> 33:11.232 You had a follow-up question? 33:11.232 --> 33:13.419 - On the Expeditionary Targeting Force, 33:13.419 --> 33:16.916 we don't hear a lot about that, but what impact broadly 33:16.916 --> 33:19.323 has that Special Operations Force had 33:19.323 --> 33:23.490 on shaping the battlefields in Mosul, Raqqa, Tal Afar? 33:24.855 --> 33:28.671 You mentioned precision strikes against leaders in Tal Afar. 33:28.671 --> 33:29.964 Were those strikes executed 33:29.964 --> 33:33.047 by the Expeditionary Targeting Force? 33:40.492 --> 33:42.274 - I won't really talk about the operations 33:42.274 --> 33:44.691 of any of our specific units. 33:45.357 --> 33:48.096 Suffice it to say, we have a lot of capabilities here 33:48.096 --> 33:49.429 and we use them. 33:49.967 --> 33:53.800 As far as your question about the role of SOF, 33:54.310 --> 33:55.643 now, SOF has been, 33:55.643 --> 33:57.010 Special Operations Forces, 33:57.010 --> 34:00.207 both US and coalition Special Operations Forces 34:00.207 --> 34:03.095 and we had a significant coalition contribution 34:03.095 --> 34:05.095 with Special Operations, 34:05.955 --> 34:07.740 they've been significant. 34:07.740 --> 34:09.774 They have, in the earlier days, 34:09.774 --> 34:13.357 they were probably the weight of the effort 34:13.793 --> 34:15.300 because nations were willing 34:15.300 --> 34:16.982 to put special operations troops 34:16.982 --> 34:18.403 where they were not willing 34:18.403 --> 34:21.570 to put, maybe, general purpose forces. 34:22.778 --> 34:26.243 So, in Iraq, they've been absolutely instrumental 34:26.243 --> 34:30.160 in shaping this fight over the last three years 34:30.205 --> 34:34.122 and in specifically targeting enemy key leaders 34:34.256 --> 34:36.486 and special military capabilities 34:36.486 --> 34:39.730 like their chemical warfare enterprise, 34:39.730 --> 34:43.730 their drone enterprise, those are some examples. 34:44.048 --> 34:48.215 External operations plotting and planning are other examples 34:48.413 --> 34:52.580 of where the special operations forces contribute greatly. 34:52.748 --> 34:55.665 I'd like to put rest, a little bit, 34:56.265 --> 35:00.432 this thought that SOF are doing all the work over here. 35:00.656 --> 35:04.073 With the approach of the Mosul operation, 35:05.566 --> 35:07.708 the Iraqi Security Forces involved, 35:07.708 --> 35:10.623 that formation became much too large for SOF 35:10.623 --> 35:12.623 to be the only advisers. 35:12.902 --> 35:17.069 And so, over time, we have committed more and more advisers 35:17.600 --> 35:20.038 from the general purpose forces. 35:20.038 --> 35:21.788 And, the two brigades 35:22.655 --> 35:26.622 from the 18th Airborne Corps that I've worked with here, 35:26.622 --> 35:28.127 2nd Brigade of the 101st 35:28.127 --> 35:31.039 and 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne, 35:31.039 --> 35:33.727 had a very substantial role in the battle of Mosul. 35:33.727 --> 35:36.727 In fact, during the battle of Mosul, 35:38.026 --> 35:41.455 their, the general purpose forces' role eclipsed that 35:41.455 --> 35:43.976 of the SOF, not, their role didn't eclipse them, 35:43.976 --> 35:48.143 but their size of their force in the fight eclipsed 35:48.294 --> 35:50.722 that, those Special Operating Forces. 35:50.722 --> 35:52.847 Now, in Syria, it's still a little bit different. 35:52.847 --> 35:56.669 We have added special, general purpose forces there, 35:56.669 --> 36:00.836 but by and large, our Syrian campaign has started in 2014 36:01.071 --> 36:04.904 as a mostly Special Operations Forces endeavor 36:05.277 --> 36:07.444 and it still remains that. 36:08.073 --> 36:10.240 However, I was just there, 36:12.622 --> 36:14.205 yesterday, in fact, 36:14.348 --> 36:18.515 and I saw general purpose force and special operators 36:18.681 --> 36:22.444 working together side-by-side on the battlefield in Syria. 36:22.444 --> 36:25.611 It's still largely, though, a SOF-led, 36:26.293 --> 36:29.709 the character of the operation is Special Operations Forces. 36:29.709 --> 36:31.317 There's a lot of general purpose forces 36:31.317 --> 36:33.299 over there in support, though. 36:33.299 --> 36:35.336 - At Tal Afar, the precision strikes 36:35.336 --> 36:37.419 against the ISIS leaders, 36:37.705 --> 36:41.872 were those executed by SOF forces or Iraqi general purpose? 36:48.868 --> 36:50.535 - So, our enterprise 36:53.201 --> 36:55.715 for striking high-value individuals 36:55.715 --> 36:58.632 or ISIS leaders is very integrated. 37:00.888 --> 37:02.296 You'd be hard-pressed to say 37:02.296 --> 37:04.232 it's a special operations process 37:04.232 --> 37:07.560 or it's a general purpose force process. 37:07.560 --> 37:09.207 It's too integrated for that. 37:09.207 --> 37:13.374 It's very much blended, our strike enterprise here. 37:14.407 --> 37:16.824 Most of the precision strikes 37:17.396 --> 37:21.563 against known ISIS leaders is conducted by the coalition, 37:23.257 --> 37:27.238 although the Iraqis do have some capabilities to do that 37:27.238 --> 37:31.160 and they will identify a key leader on the battlefield 37:31.160 --> 37:35.327 and they will make a precision strike on these leaders. 37:35.397 --> 37:39.005 These are enabling and enhancing capabilities. 37:39.005 --> 37:40.922 These are not decisive. 37:41.253 --> 37:42.920 What was decisive is 37:45.110 --> 37:48.999 tens of thousands of Iraqi Security Forces attacking 37:48.999 --> 37:51.249 on five axes simultaneously 37:51.753 --> 37:54.190 into Tal Afar like a steamroller. 37:54.190 --> 37:56.273 That's what was decisive. 37:58.269 --> 38:00.348 - Now, to Barbara Starr with CNN. 38:00.348 --> 38:03.445 - General Townsend, to go back to Joe's question 38:03.445 --> 38:05.445 on Baghdadi, you seemed, 38:06.895 --> 38:08.065 you were definitive. 38:08.065 --> 38:10.565 You said you think he's alive. 38:11.452 --> 38:13.702 So, you believe he's alive. 38:13.746 --> 38:16.280 So, can you elaborate a little bit 38:16.280 --> 38:20.447 at the end of your tour here, because you're leaving, 38:20.606 --> 38:23.726 what makes you come to the conclusion he's alive? 38:23.726 --> 38:27.309 Does that suggest you know where he may be, 38:28.263 --> 38:30.405 even if you can't tell us? 38:30.405 --> 38:33.905 And, you also seem to be fairly definitive 38:34.546 --> 38:37.546 that the orders are, first, to kill; 38:37.569 --> 38:40.389 capture if you can, but you'd rather see him killed. 38:40.389 --> 38:42.653 So is that the orders your troops are, 38:42.653 --> 38:45.653 you know, basically operating under? 38:50.555 --> 38:53.220 - Okay, Barbara, thanks for the question. 38:53.220 --> 38:56.684 I seem to remember my last Pentagon press conference 38:56.684 --> 38:59.726 when you were very interested also in Baghdadi's whereabouts 38:59.726 --> 39:01.680 and what we were going to do with him, then. 39:01.680 --> 39:05.190 This is a, this is apparently a hobby of yours, Barbara. 39:05.190 --> 39:08.690 So, look, I really don't know where he is. 39:08.692 --> 39:10.890 I think this is the same answer I gave last time. 39:10.890 --> 39:12.140 I really don't. 39:12.868 --> 39:13.942 Do I believe he's alive? 39:13.942 --> 39:14.775 Yes. Why? 39:15.300 --> 39:17.905 Because I've seen no convincing evidence, 39:17.905 --> 39:21.405 intelligence or open source or other rumor 39:21.775 --> 39:24.192 or otherwise, that he's dead, 39:24.371 --> 39:27.371 so, therefore, I believe he's alive. 39:27.707 --> 39:30.012 There are also some indicators in intelligence channels 39:30.012 --> 39:31.576 that he's still alive. 39:31.576 --> 39:32.576 Where is he? 39:33.050 --> 39:34.415 I don't have a clue. 39:34.415 --> 39:38.582 He could be anywhere in the world, for all I know. 39:39.087 --> 39:40.207 Here's what I think. 39:40.207 --> 39:43.624 I think he's somewhere in Iraq and Syria. 39:43.704 --> 39:45.044 I think he's probably somewhere 39:45.044 --> 39:46.595 in the Middle Euphrates River Valley. 39:46.595 --> 39:49.345 Remember, I think the Secretary of Defense said it 39:49.345 --> 39:52.809 last week, or so, and I said it just a few minutes ago, 39:52.809 --> 39:54.249 the last stand of ISIS will be 39:54.249 --> 39:57.279 in the Middle Euphrates River Valley. 39:57.279 --> 40:00.445 That's where they believe their last sanctuary is, 40:00.445 --> 40:04.278 so I think he's probably somewhere down there. 40:04.806 --> 40:08.036 That's just an educated guess made after, you know, 40:08.036 --> 40:10.459 doing this for a year and scratching off a whole, 40:10.459 --> 40:13.454 he's not in Mosul, he's not in Tal Afar, 40:13.454 --> 40:15.156 I don't think he's in Raqqa anymore. 40:15.156 --> 40:17.004 So, just kind of reducing the list 40:17.004 --> 40:18.737 of possible places where he could be, 40:18.737 --> 40:21.818 I kind of conclude he's in the MERV somewhere. 40:21.818 --> 40:24.433 We're looking for him every day. 40:24.433 --> 40:28.600 - If I could follow up, so my question, as a reporter to you 40:29.105 --> 40:31.417 - [General] The, there, go ahead. 40:31.417 --> 40:32.250 - Thanks. 40:32.250 --> 40:33.712 My question as a reporter to you is, 40:33.712 --> 40:34.545 you have just said 40:34.545 --> 40:37.651 you do have intelligence indicators he's alive, 40:37.651 --> 40:41.315 so that informs what you said is your guess. 40:41.315 --> 40:45.482 You do have reason to believe, as a commanding general? 40:49.175 --> 40:51.766 - Yes, I said I thought he was alive. 40:51.766 --> 40:53.382 - And, my question to follow that up, 40:53.382 --> 40:55.829 when you say you believe he's likely in the Euphrates, 40:55.829 --> 40:57.766 Middle Euphrates River Valley, 40:57.766 --> 41:00.266 you had said to Michael Gordon 41:00.517 --> 41:03.476 that you are working on deconfliction with the Russians 41:03.476 --> 41:07.265 in advance there, if I understood you correctly. 41:07.265 --> 41:08.761 Could you expand a little bit? 41:08.761 --> 41:12.400 When you say deconfliction, we have mostly understood that 41:12.400 --> 41:16.567 to mean air operations in the near term across Syria 41:18.154 --> 41:20.576 sort of on a day-to-day or an operational basis. 41:20.576 --> 41:24.703 Is this now a different type of deconfliction discussion 41:24.703 --> 41:28.286 you're having with the Russians in advance? 41:28.363 --> 41:31.613 Are you, sort of, dividing up the areas 41:32.197 --> 41:34.906 in the Middle Euphrates River Valley 41:34.906 --> 41:35.739 where you're going to operate? 41:35.739 --> 41:37.749 It seems a bit different, 41:37.749 --> 41:40.999 but perhaps I'm misunderstanding there. 41:44.677 --> 41:48.094 - Okay, so, the, prior to about February, 41:50.973 --> 41:54.188 the deconfliction that we were doing with the Russians was 41:54.188 --> 41:57.021 done exclusively by our Air Force, 41:59.041 --> 42:01.624 air forces, central air forces, 42:02.247 --> 42:05.330 and they were talking to the Russians 42:05.501 --> 42:07.160 to de-conflict air operations. 42:07.160 --> 42:10.538 Starting with the convergence of the FLOTs 42:10.538 --> 42:13.984 that I mentioned earlier around al-Bab in February, 42:13.984 --> 42:18.151 we saw, suddenly, the need for a ground component for that. 42:18.666 --> 42:20.849 We started thinking about how to go about doing that 42:20.849 --> 42:22.963 and we started looking to get the resources. 42:22.963 --> 42:25.549 We had to have some special telephone lines 42:25.549 --> 42:28.572 and we had to find the right interpreters. 42:28.572 --> 42:31.889 We kept working on that, kind of, slowly. 42:31.889 --> 42:35.889 This became a real priority in the May timeframe 42:36.138 --> 42:39.678 with the convergence of these forces, again, 42:39.678 --> 42:42.773 south of Tabqa, as I previously mentioned. 42:42.773 --> 42:46.940 It was there, in the convergence of forces around Tabqa, 42:47.945 --> 42:50.028 where we understood this, 42:50.852 --> 42:52.871 there is definitely a ground component 42:52.871 --> 42:54.621 to this deconfliction 42:54.764 --> 42:58.431 and if we want to avoid inadvertent clashes, 42:58.912 --> 43:03.079 linking up on the battlefield with another friendly element, 43:03.709 --> 43:04.939 known friendly element, 43:04.939 --> 43:07.257 that you actually have a link-up plan with is 43:07.257 --> 43:11.213 a very dangerous operation, well-known in our military 43:11.213 --> 43:13.282 that it's difficult to link up with someone 43:13.282 --> 43:17.449 while in contact with the enemy and especially in the dark. 43:17.882 --> 43:20.958 So, it gets even tougher when you have a force 43:20.958 --> 43:24.458 that may be something other than friendly, 43:25.731 --> 43:27.161 not necessarily an adversary, 43:27.161 --> 43:28.383 but something other than friendly, 43:28.383 --> 43:30.039 and you don't have great communications with them 43:30.039 --> 43:32.248 and you don't have an agreed-upon plan. 43:32.248 --> 43:34.292 Well, then, and then you add the enemy there 43:34.292 --> 43:37.073 and it becomes fraught with friction. 43:37.073 --> 43:40.215 So, we knew we had to have this deconfliction system 43:40.215 --> 43:44.220 and we have now acquired that, at the CJTF headquarters. 43:44.220 --> 43:46.133 So, now there's two nodes 43:46.133 --> 43:48.984 for deconfliction with the Russians. 43:48.984 --> 43:52.297 The Air Force, the air component has their node 43:52.297 --> 43:56.464 and we now have a node here at the CJTF headquarters, 43:57.105 --> 43:57.938 so we can do that. 43:57.938 --> 44:00.438 So, I think that this becomes, 44:01.032 --> 44:04.181 this, it becomes almost a daily fact of life. 44:04.181 --> 44:05.936 In fact, we probably talk to the Russians, 44:05.936 --> 44:08.619 between the air component and my headquarters, 44:08.619 --> 44:09.719 we talk to the Russians, 44:09.719 --> 44:13.086 somebody's talking to the Russians multiple times a day 44:13.086 --> 44:15.586 to de-conflict our operations. 44:16.224 --> 44:19.040 So, I think that's, we've got the system in place, 44:19.040 --> 44:22.790 we need to do it and it's just a fact of life 44:22.907 --> 44:26.345 as we operate in greater proximity to each other 44:26.345 --> 44:28.946 in the Middle Euphrates River Valley. 44:28.946 --> 44:30.384 - Can I just make sure I understand? 44:30.384 --> 44:32.336 Have you already established 44:32.336 --> 44:35.253 your deconfliction zones in the ERV 44:35.869 --> 44:37.952 or is that still to come? 44:38.216 --> 44:40.026 Your deconfliction with the Russians, do you, 44:40.026 --> 44:42.776 have you divided it up with them? 44:45.857 --> 44:48.524 - Well, so, remember that I said 44:48.751 --> 44:52.584 we've established some measures south of Raqqa 44:52.974 --> 44:55.057 and those measures extend 44:56.640 --> 44:58.307 to the east of Raqqa 44:59.445 --> 45:02.362 and since about the middle of June, 45:04.050 --> 45:06.750 second week of June, they've held 45:06.750 --> 45:09.083 and we haven't had friction. 45:09.819 --> 45:11.874 They've observed the measures we put in place 45:11.874 --> 45:13.183 and we've observed the measures 45:13.183 --> 45:16.550 and our partners have observed the measures we put in place. 45:16.550 --> 45:19.586 And, the discussions every day, really, 45:19.586 --> 45:20.953 are just to make sure 45:20.953 --> 45:22.976 that everybody knows what everybody's doing 45:22.976 --> 45:25.634 and not to trip on each other, really, 45:25.634 --> 45:27.272 and that the measures are still in place 45:27.272 --> 45:28.511 and we're all observing them. 45:28.511 --> 45:31.481 That's kind of how the conversations go. 45:31.481 --> 45:35.481 There, I told you that we've already established 45:35.913 --> 45:37.433 the measures that are in place 45:37.433 --> 45:40.350 that go down into the MERV, a ways. 45:41.221 --> 45:43.433 I won't be any more specific than that 45:43.433 --> 45:45.543 and there'll be other discussions. 45:45.543 --> 45:48.290 When the time comes, we'll work out other measures 45:48.290 --> 45:50.561 in the future that will cover the entire area 45:50.561 --> 45:52.571 that needs to be covered. 45:52.571 --> 45:56.516 - Now, to Corey Dickstein with Stars and Stripes. 45:56.516 --> 45:58.854 - Thanks for doing this, sir. 45:58.854 --> 46:02.431 I want to ask, on the Iraqi Security Forces, 46:02.431 --> 46:04.546 they've obviously improved immensely 46:04.546 --> 46:06.653 in the last couple of years, 46:06.653 --> 46:09.320 since ISIS overran them in 2014, 46:11.534 --> 46:14.784 but that, in 2014, they were largely a, 46:16.489 --> 46:19.989 you know, a US-trained and equipped force. 46:20.206 --> 46:23.153 So, my question is, what is different, 46:23.153 --> 46:27.320 as, you know, we're nearing the end of ISIS in Iraq, 46:27.682 --> 46:30.066 what's different about the Iraqi Security Forces today 46:30.066 --> 46:32.816 than it was when we left in 2011? 46:34.343 --> 46:37.182 And, what do they need to continue to improve on 46:37.182 --> 46:40.682 to ensure ISIS or a similar group doesn't, 46:41.695 --> 46:45.806 you know, reclaim territory somewhere in the country 46:45.806 --> 46:46.973 in the future? 46:52.535 --> 46:55.955 - Okay, so your question is about, you know, 46:55.955 --> 46:57.870 the Iraqi Security Forces 46:57.870 --> 47:01.202 and what's different now than about them in 2014. 47:01.202 --> 47:04.202 I think you have to go back to 2011, 47:04.476 --> 47:08.309 when the coalition and the Iraqis parted ways. 47:10.005 --> 47:14.172 I think what I can gather from looking at the period 47:15.031 --> 47:17.114 from 2011 to 2014 or 2013 47:19.760 --> 47:23.927 is that the Iraqi Security Forces largely stopped training, 47:25.780 --> 47:28.215 I'm not really sure what the mechanism of that, 47:28.215 --> 47:29.543 what the reason behind that was, 47:29.543 --> 47:33.293 but they did very little training after 2011. 47:33.906 --> 47:36.239 And, there was a significant 47:40.510 --> 47:42.847 change-out, turbulence, personnel turbulence, 47:42.847 --> 47:44.625 and particularly in their leadership ranks 47:44.625 --> 47:46.973 and I think the previous Iraqi government 47:46.973 --> 47:51.140 was more interested in putting leaders into position 47:52.896 --> 47:55.729 who were of like mind than, maybe, 47:56.908 --> 48:00.908 leaders who would, by merit, protect the nation. 48:02.797 --> 48:06.849 So then, we saw, you know, ISIS arrive on the scene 48:06.849 --> 48:08.182 and you see some dynamics there, 48:08.182 --> 48:09.599 but, at the time, 48:09.890 --> 48:13.640 ISIS, like a juggernaut, kind of gained steam 48:13.790 --> 48:17.021 as they rolled across Syria and into Iraq 48:17.021 --> 48:19.878 and I think, in the minds of the Iraqis, 48:19.878 --> 48:21.878 they were ten feet tall. 48:22.593 --> 48:24.276 We know that Mosul fell 48:24.276 --> 48:28.193 to probably less than a thousand ISIS fighters. 48:28.924 --> 48:31.591 We know that Ramadi was largely, 48:33.913 --> 48:35.246 given up to ISIS 48:37.762 --> 48:39.845 and the army was battered 48:41.644 --> 48:45.207 and bruised and nearly defeated on the outskirts of Baghdad 48:45.207 --> 48:46.874 in the fall of 2014. 48:48.027 --> 48:49.360 So what changed? 48:49.899 --> 48:52.610 Well, first of all, the coalition arrived, 48:52.610 --> 48:55.303 so they had some partners to help them. 48:55.303 --> 48:59.028 And, it's always, you know, better to fight your enemies 48:59.028 --> 49:00.626 with the help of others 49:00.626 --> 49:04.053 and so the coalition arrived and started helping. 49:04.053 --> 49:07.812 We also started, we arrived and started training 49:07.812 --> 49:09.729 and training them again 49:10.084 --> 49:11.412 and there's, you know, 49:11.412 --> 49:13.897 professional armies, when they're not fighting, 49:13.897 --> 49:15.604 they're training to fight. 49:15.604 --> 49:16.689 And, if they're doing something other 49:16.689 --> 49:17.903 than training to fight, 49:17.903 --> 49:21.799 they're not going to be a successful or a victorious army. 49:21.799 --> 49:24.591 I think, also, the government of Iraq also realized 49:24.591 --> 49:26.848 that they needed leaders who can get the job done 49:26.848 --> 49:31.015 and they started reappointing leaders to key positions 49:31.181 --> 49:34.498 that would be able to command in battle successfully. 49:34.498 --> 49:38.665 So, that rebuilding process went on in 2014 and 2015 49:39.860 --> 49:41.421 and then, in late 2015, 49:41.421 --> 49:45.002 the Iraqi Security Forces went on the attack again 49:45.002 --> 49:47.919 and they haven't lost ground since. 49:49.202 --> 49:53.176 Basically, they've been taking ground back ever since 49:53.176 --> 49:57.177 and ISIS has not gained new ground in that timeframe 49:57.177 --> 49:58.672 and you can see it. 49:58.672 --> 50:01.862 And then, I think there's another dynamic here that happens. 50:01.862 --> 50:05.612 As an army wins battles, its confidence grows 50:05.954 --> 50:09.806 and I think that they're at a place, right now, 50:09.806 --> 50:12.075 where, after the victory in Mosul, 50:12.075 --> 50:16.242 I, they fought for nine continuous months in Mosul. 50:21.246 --> 50:24.110 That's a remarkable feat for any army 50:24.110 --> 50:28.277 and they've emerged from that stronger, battle-hardened. 50:29.358 --> 50:31.001 They're trained, they went into it trained, 50:31.001 --> 50:33.342 they've emerged from it battle-hardened. 50:33.342 --> 50:34.779 Their leaders have learned a lot. 50:34.779 --> 50:36.596 Their soldiers have learned a lot 50:36.596 --> 50:38.998 and they have a level of confidence, now, 50:38.998 --> 50:42.831 that I saw play our in the Battle of Tal Afar. 50:43.377 --> 50:45.579 I don't think they're overconfident. 50:45.579 --> 50:46.864 They're not there, and that's a danger, 50:46.864 --> 50:48.845 but they're, they're a battle-hardened 50:48.845 --> 50:51.262 and confident security force. 50:51.713 --> 50:53.548 And, there's still work to be done. 50:53.548 --> 50:56.061 There's more training to be done 50:56.061 --> 51:00.054 and we'll do our after-action review of Tal Afar. 51:00.054 --> 51:01.328 And, what I saw them do is 51:01.328 --> 51:03.885 I saw them apply the lessons of Mosul to Tal Afar 51:03.885 --> 51:06.435 and we're going to help them apply 51:06.435 --> 51:09.583 the lessons of Tal Afar and Mosul to their next fight. 51:09.583 --> 51:13.261 So, I think that's the big difference, really, 51:13.261 --> 51:15.594 good leadership by necessity 51:16.821 --> 51:20.988 and hard training and then some battlefield experience. 51:22.798 --> 51:24.625 - Next, to Ryan Browne, CNN. 51:24.625 --> 51:26.172 - Hello, General, thank you for doing this. 51:26.172 --> 51:28.783 I just want to follow up on the reports of clashes 51:28.783 --> 51:30.366 in the area around Manbij 51:30.366 --> 51:33.509 between coalition forces and Turkish-backed rebels. 51:33.509 --> 51:36.065 Are you confident that you've been able to communicate 51:36.065 --> 51:38.074 with Turkey, your counterparts in Turkey, 51:38.074 --> 51:40.175 to get them to stop their proxies 51:40.175 --> 51:41.832 from doing that kind of thing? 51:41.832 --> 51:43.735 Or are you changing or adjusting, 51:43.735 --> 51:45.853 kind of, the coalition presence there 51:45.853 --> 51:49.770 to prevent those kind of clashes in the future? 51:55.243 --> 51:59.243 - Okay, so we actually haven't had these clashes 52:00.526 --> 52:03.943 that you're referring to now in probably, 52:04.176 --> 52:08.343 I think, about 10 days or so and what we were seeing 52:09.087 --> 52:10.670 about two weeks ago 52:11.668 --> 52:15.501 were some of the Free Syrian Army, opposition. 52:17.929 --> 52:20.092 Syrian opposition fighters, 52:20.092 --> 52:24.175 in the area controlled by the Turk military, were 52:26.234 --> 52:29.067 firing upon the Manbij area there, 52:30.749 --> 52:34.916 where there are some US forces, coalition forces there. 52:35.576 --> 52:38.993 We identified this to our Turkish allies, 52:40.034 --> 52:42.617 our NATO allies, Turkey, and they have, 52:42.617 --> 52:44.461 I think, taken the appropriate measures 52:44.461 --> 52:46.628 to get that under control. 52:47.304 --> 52:50.304 Turkey is a member of the coalition. 52:51.005 --> 52:52.994 They've been a valuable member, 52:52.994 --> 52:55.623 a valuable partner in the fight against ISIS, 52:55.623 --> 52:58.206 in, particularly in northern Syria, 52:58.206 --> 53:02.289 where they liberated, with Syrian partner forces, 53:04.249 --> 53:08.332 a significant chunk of Northern Syria, to include 53:09.832 --> 53:13.832 the iconic capital of the ISIS caliphate, Dabiq, 53:15.331 --> 53:19.498 and the city of al-Bab, just to mention a few places. 53:20.340 --> 53:24.257 So, Turkey's done great work with the coalition 53:25.580 --> 53:29.747 and I think that they've gotten that under control 53:30.308 --> 53:33.725 and I think we had some opposition units, 53:34.250 --> 53:36.588 elements there on their side, 53:36.588 --> 53:39.671 that were kind of acting on their own 53:39.882 --> 53:43.339 and I believe it's gotten, it's been put under control now, 53:43.339 --> 53:44.893 and we, like I said, it's been quiet now 53:44.893 --> 53:49.060 for going on, I think, about 10 days, maybe a little longer. 53:49.691 --> 53:50.723 - [Corey] Thank you. 53:50.723 --> 53:53.258 - Next, to Jennifer Griffin from Fox News. 53:53.258 --> 53:55.056 - Hi, General Townsend. 53:55.056 --> 53:58.874 Your time in Iraq has overlapped two administrations 53:58.874 --> 54:01.016 in this fight against ISIS. 54:01.016 --> 54:03.734 Can you tell us what the biggest difference 54:03.734 --> 54:04.839 in the last six months, 54:04.839 --> 54:07.111 in terms of being a commanding general 54:07.111 --> 54:09.965 and the way the ISIS fight was pursued, 54:09.965 --> 54:13.645 how different it is from the prior administration? 54:13.645 --> 54:17.812 What is the biggest difference for you as a commander? 54:22.406 --> 54:23.239 - Hmm, 54:25.912 --> 54:29.495 well, I think that some of the differences, 54:30.630 --> 54:32.559 look, both administrations, 54:32.559 --> 54:34.852 as would any US administration, 54:34.852 --> 54:37.581 both administrations were, I think, all-in 54:37.581 --> 54:40.331 on defeating ISIS in this region. 54:40.553 --> 54:44.720 Now, that's why this CJTF was stood up three years ago. 54:46.336 --> 54:49.253 So, I think that is common to both, 54:51.369 --> 54:55.536 and macro, I think, the approach has been very similar. 54:56.535 --> 54:58.011 There are some specific instances 54:58.011 --> 55:00.325 which I kind of talked about with an earlier, 55:00.325 --> 55:02.742 answer to an earlier question 55:02.838 --> 55:07.005 that I think the current administration has empowered 55:08.594 --> 55:12.761 the chain of command to make more decisions on their own 55:14.829 --> 55:18.996 and has then given top cover to the chain of command, 55:19.055 --> 55:21.261 I think, for the decisions that are being made. 55:21.261 --> 55:24.607 And, I think that's important and that has, 55:24.607 --> 55:26.940 just that alone, has effects 55:26.985 --> 55:30.273 that reverberate throughout a military organization. 55:30.273 --> 55:34.440 When they feel like they've been given the authority 55:35.259 --> 55:38.759 and the trust to act and act aggressively, 55:39.305 --> 55:41.472 then commanders now don't, 55:41.692 --> 55:45.255 aren't constantly calling back to higher headquarters 55:45.255 --> 55:48.828 asking for permission, but they're free to act 55:48.828 --> 55:52.411 and I think that's probably very empowering 55:52.729 --> 55:55.848 for any commander in our armed forces. 55:55.848 --> 55:56.953 - [Jennifer] Thank you. 55:56.953 --> 55:59.791 - Now, to Paul Handley, Agence France-Presse. 55:59.791 --> 56:03.788 - Hi, General, when we were in Erbil, last week, 56:03.788 --> 56:06.887 an official of the Peshmerga suggested 56:06.887 --> 56:11.054 that they had hoped you would go to Hawija ahead of Tal Afar 56:11.584 --> 56:15.751 and he said that after Tal Afar, that should be next. 56:15.867 --> 56:18.686 Is that on the menu for the next actions 56:18.686 --> 56:20.436 and are the ISF ready 56:20.752 --> 56:23.857 or do they need a break before they go there? 56:23.857 --> 56:27.024 And then, I have a separate follow-up. 56:32.283 --> 56:34.595 - The Iraqi Security Forces will be ready 56:34.595 --> 56:37.538 for their next operation and I'd prefer not to discuss 56:37.538 --> 56:41.705 the sequence of our operations here in this open source, 56:42.480 --> 56:44.313 open media forum here. 56:45.530 --> 56:47.727 ISIS is probably watching, as well, 56:47.727 --> 56:49.652 and they'd probably appreciate me telling you 56:49.652 --> 56:51.023 where our next operation will be, 56:51.023 --> 56:53.026 so I'll just, I'll take a pass on that one. 56:53.026 --> 56:53.859 Thank you. 56:53.859 --> 56:54.774 What's your follow-up? 56:54.774 --> 56:57.176 - Oh, on that, the Peshmerga official, 56:57.176 --> 56:58.945 although he was speaking through an interpreter, 56:58.945 --> 57:02.302 seemed a little bit anxious to get going there. 57:02.302 --> 57:04.719 They seemed maybe even peeved 57:05.269 --> 57:07.769 that it hadn't gone there yet. 57:14.300 --> 57:16.267 - I'm sorry, I'm not following your, 57:16.267 --> 57:19.032 I didn't get that at all, something about an interpreter, 57:19.032 --> 57:19.865 hadn't gone there yet? 57:19.865 --> 57:21.513 I'm sorry, I didn't understand what you said. 57:21.513 --> 57:22.763 - The Peshmerga official was speaking 57:22.763 --> 57:24.917 through an interpreter, so we couldn't, 57:24.917 --> 57:27.552 you know, be sure of his feelings, 57:27.552 --> 57:30.023 but he, they, he sounded a little bit peeved 57:30.023 --> 57:33.273 that there wasn't a move yet on Hawija. 57:38.421 --> 57:41.821 - Okay (laughing), so, there's a guy 57:41.821 --> 57:44.014 who's talking to an interpreter 57:44.014 --> 57:47.181 and we're not really sure what he said 57:47.312 --> 57:48.979 and he seemed peeved 57:51.610 --> 57:53.700 and you want me to comment on that? 57:53.700 --> 57:55.226 Like I said, I'll pass. 57:55.226 --> 57:57.300 And, what's your follow-up question? 57:57.300 --> 57:58.967 - Okay, on the buses 58:00.883 --> 58:05.050 with the ISIS fighters, are those buses moving now? 58:05.459 --> 58:07.459 Where are they in Syria? 58:07.489 --> 58:10.739 And why didn't you just block their way 58:10.963 --> 58:13.130 and, say, starve them out? 58:23.952 --> 58:26.869 - Okay, I think you asked me where, 58:29.003 --> 58:31.280 I'm sorry, probably not coming in real clear, 58:31.280 --> 58:35.447 but I think you asked me where ISIS fighters are in Syria 58:35.539 --> 58:38.729 and then something about starve them out. 58:38.729 --> 58:42.896 So, I'll give it, I'll try to answer your question 58:43.190 --> 58:45.189 as best as I understand it. 58:45.189 --> 58:48.272 Where are the ISIS fighters in Syria? 58:49.436 --> 58:52.436 Right now, they're in Eastern Syria. 58:52.841 --> 58:55.203 The fighters that I'm most concerned with 58:55.203 --> 58:58.786 go from Raqqa, sort of north-central Syria, 58:59.594 --> 59:01.584 and they go down the Euphrates River Valley 59:01.584 --> 59:04.167 to the southeast, to Abu Kamal. 59:05.174 --> 59:09.341 And then, they extend southward into the Hamad Desert area 59:12.018 --> 59:16.185 and they extend northward up towards a town called Shaddadi 59:16.350 --> 59:19.497 and there's a river there called the Khabur River. 59:19.497 --> 59:22.497 And, they generally lay in that area 59:24.008 --> 59:28.175 along the Euphrates River Valley and the Khabur River Valley 59:29.280 --> 59:31.818 in this area we call the Middle Euphrates River Valley 59:31.818 --> 59:35.401 and they extend into Western Anbar in Iraq. 59:37.852 --> 59:39.852 So, that's where ISIS is 59:40.313 --> 59:44.033 and that's where our campaign is focused on driving 59:44.033 --> 59:46.107 into that middle Euphrates River valley, 59:46.107 --> 59:48.033 where, and if you recall, I mentioned 59:48.033 --> 59:50.855 and the Secretary of Defense mentioned about a week ago, 59:50.855 --> 59:54.083 that's where we envision their last stand will be made. 59:54.083 --> 59:56.232 Then, as far as your concern, 59:56.232 --> 59:57.812 your question about starving them out, 59:57.812 --> 01:00:01.979 I didn't quite get that, but this is a huge, huge area. 01:00:03.337 --> 01:00:06.202 And, there is significant agriculture 01:00:06.202 --> 01:00:08.148 that goes on in this area, 01:00:08.148 --> 01:00:11.229 livestock being raised, crops being grown, 01:00:11.229 --> 01:00:13.743 so when they're in a small city, 01:00:13.743 --> 01:00:16.759 you can have some ability to starve them out 01:00:16.759 --> 01:00:18.148 and now that's when we try to, 01:00:18.148 --> 01:00:21.028 what we do is we isolate these towns. 01:00:21.028 --> 01:00:22.819 And, in fact, Tal Afar, 01:00:22.819 --> 01:00:26.562 there were significant food shortages in Tal Afar 01:00:26.562 --> 01:00:30.229 by the time the attack unfolded on Tal Afar. 01:00:31.888 --> 01:00:34.388 But in the middle Euphrates River Valley, 01:00:34.388 --> 01:00:38.076 they can't really be, you can't really just contain 01:00:38.076 --> 01:00:41.649 the whole Euphrates River Valley and starve them out. 01:00:41.649 --> 01:00:42.498 It's too big. 01:00:42.498 --> 01:00:43.762 It's too complex. 01:00:43.762 --> 01:00:46.919 It's too diverse and they can grow crops 01:00:46.919 --> 01:00:49.336 and raise livestock in there. 01:00:49.467 --> 01:00:51.999 I probably didn't understand your question correctly, 01:00:51.999 --> 01:00:54.055 so if I didn't, ask it again. 01:00:54.055 --> 01:00:56.835 - Sir, this is Major Rankine-Galloway from Public Affairs. 01:00:56.835 --> 01:00:59.035 The question was: what is the current position 01:00:59.035 --> 01:01:01.266 of the buses in question in Syria? 01:01:01.266 --> 01:01:03.064 And, what efforts have you made, 01:01:03.064 --> 01:01:04.689 have you made an effort to starve them out 01:01:04.689 --> 01:01:05.522 and have you made an effort 01:01:05.522 --> 01:01:08.302 to communicate with the people on those buses? 01:01:08.302 --> 01:01:09.135 Over. 01:01:14.965 --> 01:01:15.882 - Oh, okay. 01:01:16.118 --> 01:01:19.785 So, last, when I walked into this conference 01:01:20.247 --> 01:01:23.377 about an hour ago, the buses were on the move. 01:01:23.377 --> 01:01:27.277 They had turned and had driven back into regime-held areas. 01:01:27.277 --> 01:01:30.418 When we first started this event, yesterday, 01:01:30.418 --> 01:01:32.119 they were just on the boundary 01:01:32.119 --> 01:01:35.524 of where ISIS and the forward line of troops, 01:01:35.524 --> 01:01:38.941 where ISIS and the regime-held areas meet 01:01:40.410 --> 01:01:42.825 and they were just on the regime side of that boundary 01:01:42.825 --> 01:01:45.384 and they were waiting for transportation 01:01:45.384 --> 01:01:47.467 to come out of Abu Kamal, 01:01:47.532 --> 01:01:49.733 ISIS transportation, and pick them up 01:01:49.733 --> 01:01:53.816 and take them into Abu Kamal on the Iraqi border. 01:01:54.602 --> 01:01:57.155 It was our judgment that that was a situation 01:01:57.155 --> 01:02:00.523 we couldn't allow to unfold without trying to disrupt it, 01:02:00.523 --> 01:02:02.026 which we did successfully. 01:02:02.026 --> 01:02:03.467 Those buses have since turned 01:02:03.467 --> 01:02:06.884 and gone back into the interior of Syria. 01:02:07.781 --> 01:02:10.402 I'm not sure we still, within the last hour, 01:02:10.402 --> 01:02:13.030 I don't know if we still have a bead on them 01:02:13.030 --> 01:02:14.613 and where they are. 01:02:15.148 --> 01:02:18.731 We have not, we've watched the regime come, 01:02:18.840 --> 01:02:21.828 someone has come and resupplied the buses 01:02:21.828 --> 01:02:22.880 with food and water. 01:02:22.880 --> 01:02:24.459 We've observed that. 01:02:24.459 --> 01:02:26.583 We didn't try to interfere with that. 01:02:26.583 --> 01:02:28.516 So, we're able to differentiate 01:02:28.516 --> 01:02:31.349 between ISIS approaching the buses 01:02:32.526 --> 01:02:36.693 and regime, pro-regime elements approaching the buses, 01:02:37.190 --> 01:02:40.856 mostly by where the vehicles that are approaching 01:02:40.856 --> 01:02:42.623 and the people that are approaching come from, 01:02:42.623 --> 01:02:44.915 we're able to figure out who's who. 01:02:44.915 --> 01:02:46.532 So, we have not tried to interfere 01:02:46.532 --> 01:02:49.282 with all approaches to the buses. 01:02:49.643 --> 01:02:51.711 And, the pro-regime forces have done that 01:02:51.711 --> 01:02:52.934 and resupplied them. 01:02:52.934 --> 01:02:55.748 I would imagine life is getting kind of hard on those buses 01:02:55.748 --> 01:02:58.498 after two and a half days or more 01:02:58.685 --> 01:03:00.009 largely cooped-up in those buses, 01:03:00.009 --> 01:03:01.286 driving around in the desert. 01:03:01.286 --> 01:03:03.357 We have not tried to communicate with them. 01:03:03.357 --> 01:03:04.568 That's ISIS on those buses. 01:03:04.568 --> 01:03:06.829 We don't communicate with ISIS. 01:03:06.829 --> 01:03:09.604 We have communicated with the Russians 01:03:09.604 --> 01:03:13.521 and I think that the Russians are basically telling us 01:03:13.521 --> 01:03:15.347 that that's not their activity 01:03:15.347 --> 01:03:17.255 and they're not responsible for that. 01:03:17.255 --> 01:03:19.353 So, we're striking, let me make it clear: 01:03:19.353 --> 01:03:21.677 we haven't tried to strike the buses. 01:03:21.677 --> 01:03:23.886 We're not in charge of what's going on in those buses. 01:03:23.886 --> 01:03:25.471 We're not talking to the buses. 01:03:25.471 --> 01:03:27.062 But, what we are doing is we're watching 01:03:27.062 --> 01:03:29.501 and when we see ISIS come out of their holes 01:03:29.501 --> 01:03:33.521 and make themselves a target, we take advantage of that. 01:03:33.521 --> 01:03:34.546 - We are at just over an hour, 01:03:34.546 --> 01:03:35.888 so, General, thank you very much. 01:03:35.888 --> 01:03:39.555 Do you have any closing words for the group? 01:03:42.934 --> 01:03:45.312 - Yeah, thanks, thanks for your questions. 01:03:45.312 --> 01:03:48.645 I think this is probably the fifth time, 01:03:49.256 --> 01:03:51.088 I think, over the course of a year, 01:03:51.088 --> 01:03:53.655 that I've addressed this forum. 01:03:53.655 --> 01:03:56.072 I think it's probably the third or fourth time 01:03:56.072 --> 01:03:58.108 that I've addressed Barbara Starr's question 01:03:58.108 --> 01:04:00.025 about where's Baghdadi. 01:04:00.311 --> 01:04:02.065 Barbara, I look forward to our next time 01:04:02.065 --> 01:04:05.242 that we can chat about Baghdadi's whereabouts. 01:04:05.242 --> 01:04:06.785 I'll just finish with this. 01:04:06.785 --> 01:04:10.952 This has been a remarkable year, a challenging year, 01:04:12.124 --> 01:04:14.291 a rewarding year, as well, 01:04:15.684 --> 01:04:18.235 challenging because I think that, 01:04:18.235 --> 01:04:20.934 as I mentioned in my opening statement, 01:04:20.934 --> 01:04:25.101 ISIS is an evil entity like I have never encountered before, 01:04:27.045 --> 01:04:28.744 like the world, thankfully, 01:04:28.744 --> 01:04:31.827 the world rarely sees evil like ISIS. 01:04:33.780 --> 01:04:37.947 And so, we're engaged on this campaign to defeat ISIS 01:04:39.504 --> 01:04:42.587 and I'm convicted about the campaign. 01:04:43.227 --> 01:04:45.727 I'm a believer in the campaign 01:04:48.109 --> 01:04:52.276 and would be quite happy to stay involved in this fight. 01:04:53.885 --> 01:04:57.052 So, I think that it's been challenging 01:04:57.646 --> 01:04:59.896 because it's very difficult 01:04:59.935 --> 01:05:02.389 and because of some of the questions that you all ask, 01:05:02.389 --> 01:05:06.556 you, you highlighted some of these difficulties, you know? 01:05:06.915 --> 01:05:08.835 You've got an Iraqi government, 01:05:08.835 --> 01:05:11.465 you've got a Syrian civil war going on, 01:05:11.465 --> 01:05:13.798 you've got all these actors, 01:05:14.563 --> 01:05:18.230 Russians and Iranians and Lebanese Hezbollah 01:05:18.404 --> 01:05:21.654 and, you name it, lots of actors there, 01:05:24.527 --> 01:05:27.694 religions and sects and ethnic groups. 01:05:28.677 --> 01:05:30.204 It's really challenging. 01:05:30.204 --> 01:05:32.524 It's been very rewarding, at the same time, 01:05:32.524 --> 01:05:36.524 to watch our partner forces liberate their lands 01:05:37.724 --> 01:05:39.974 and their people from ISIS. 01:05:40.832 --> 01:05:43.558 It's been, it's been rewarding to see the turnaround 01:05:43.558 --> 01:05:45.414 that one of you asked me about, earlier, 01:05:45.414 --> 01:05:46.997 the Iraqi Security Forces, 01:05:46.997 --> 01:05:51.164 this remarkable transformation of the Iraqi Security Forces 01:05:51.607 --> 01:05:54.029 into one of the most capable security forces, I think, 01:05:54.029 --> 01:05:56.219 in the Middle East, right now. 01:05:56.219 --> 01:05:59.523 So, that's been very rewarding, to watch that, 01:05:59.523 --> 01:06:03.273 and also to see the capital of ISIS and Mosul 01:06:06.039 --> 01:06:08.432 liberated from their clutches 01:06:08.432 --> 01:06:12.265 and to see the global capital of ISIS in Raqqa 01:06:13.309 --> 01:06:15.168 more than half liberated 01:06:15.168 --> 01:06:18.674 and under assault by our Syrian partners there, 01:06:18.674 --> 01:06:21.456 so it's been very rewarding, as well. 01:06:21.456 --> 01:06:23.857 And, I'll just finish by saying 01:06:23.857 --> 01:06:25.613 that the world should know 01:06:25.613 --> 01:06:29.124 that this campaign is not close to being finished. 01:06:29.124 --> 01:06:32.104 There is very hard work ahead to do. 01:06:32.104 --> 01:06:35.362 There's hard fighting and sacrifice ahead, 01:06:35.362 --> 01:06:38.862 but this is right for these two countries. 01:06:38.930 --> 01:06:41.627 This work is right for this region 01:06:41.627 --> 01:06:45.044 and this work is right for our homelands, 01:06:46.181 --> 01:06:50.264 the security of all the nations of the coalition. 01:06:51.759 --> 01:06:54.099 That's why we've got to stay on this. 01:06:54.099 --> 01:06:55.031 And, I'd just ask 01:06:55.031 --> 01:06:58.571 that all the members of the coalition stay, again, 01:06:58.571 --> 01:07:02.571 stay strong and united as we continue this fight 01:07:03.022 --> 01:07:05.887 against this evil scourge that is ISIS. 01:07:05.887 --> 01:07:06.720 Thank you. 01:07:07.177 --> 01:07:08.646 - Sir, all of us at the Pentagon wish you 01:07:08.646 --> 01:07:10.271 and your headquarters a safe return home. 01:07:10.271 --> 01:07:12.021 Thank you very much.