WEBVTT 00:01.754 --> 00:02.587 - Good morning. 00:02.587 --> 00:03.730 The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today 00:03.730 --> 00:06.648 to receive testimony from General Darren McDew 00:06.648 --> 00:10.486 on the posture of the United States Transportation Command. 00:10.486 --> 00:13.055 TRANSCOM is more than just a functional command 00:13.055 --> 00:16.668 that moves personnel and materiel from place to place. 00:16.668 --> 00:18.357 It's a crucial asset on which 00:18.357 --> 00:21.759 our military's global power projection depends, 00:21.759 --> 00:24.042 and one we must not take for granted. 00:24.042 --> 00:26.099 As General Patton once said, 00:26.099 --> 00:28.416 "The officer who doesn't know his communications 00:28.416 --> 00:32.583 and his supply as well as his tactics is totally useless." 00:33.584 --> 00:35.778 General McDew and his predecessors 00:35.778 --> 00:37.988 have warned Congress for years 00:37.988 --> 00:40.980 that the proliferation of anti-access/area denial 00:40.980 --> 00:44.313 capabilities pose significant challenges 00:44.694 --> 00:47.444 for our transportation and distribution networks 00:47.444 --> 00:49.611 in contested environments. 00:50.247 --> 00:54.414 Put simply, any assumption that TRANSCOM will have 00:54.785 --> 00:58.360 uncontested access to international airspace 00:58.360 --> 01:02.527 and sea lanes in a future conflict is increasingly outdated. 01:04.178 --> 01:06.990 Transport ships and aircraft can be held at risk 01:06.990 --> 01:09.320 over greater and greater distances. 01:09.320 --> 01:11.416 Our logistics networks are centered on 01:11.416 --> 01:15.173 large air and seaports, which serve as efficient hubs, 01:15.173 --> 01:17.307 but are also vulnerable to attack 01:17.307 --> 01:20.748 and then there are threats on the digital battlefield. 01:20.748 --> 01:24.608 Even as cyber intrusions have become increasingly prevalent, 01:24.608 --> 01:28.775 nearly 90% of TRANSCOM's missions are still executed 01:28.936 --> 01:33.103 over unclassified commercial communications networks. 01:33.202 --> 01:35.751 This vulnerability extends operational risk 01:35.751 --> 01:38.119 to every single combatant command 01:38.119 --> 01:41.338 that TRANSCOM supports on a daily basis. 01:41.338 --> 01:43.760 This committee understands that efforts 01:43.760 --> 01:45.731 are currently underway to develop 01:45.731 --> 01:49.171 an overarching, global plan that would articulate 01:49.171 --> 01:52.728 how TRANSCOM would operate in a contested environment, 01:52.728 --> 01:56.588 whether that be in the air, at sea, or in cyberspace. 01:56.588 --> 01:59.429 General, I look forward to an update on this plan today 01:59.429 --> 02:02.424 and ask that you provide as many details as possible 02:02.424 --> 02:05.726 as to preliminary findings of this effort. 02:05.726 --> 02:09.893 I also hope you can discuss TRANSCOM's inaugural war game 02:11.167 --> 02:13.083 which took place last fall, 02:13.083 --> 02:15.807 and examined mobility and distribution operations 02:15.807 --> 02:18.057 in a contested environment. 02:18.097 --> 02:21.498 Too often operational war games focus exclusively 02:21.498 --> 02:25.665 on combat capability and take combat logistics as a given. 02:26.861 --> 02:29.848 Combat capability is obviously important, 02:29.848 --> 02:33.351 but it doesn't matter much if it never arrives to the fight, 02:33.351 --> 02:36.085 or can't be sustained once it does. 02:36.085 --> 02:37.933 I look forward to hearing the lessons learned 02:37.933 --> 02:39.850 in TRANSCOM's war game. 02:41.280 --> 02:43.200 General McDew, it's almost two years 02:43.200 --> 02:46.266 since your confirmation hearing before this committee 02:46.266 --> 02:48.063 and I'm looking forward to hearing the steps 02:48.063 --> 02:50.918 you've taken to address some of our shared concerns 02:50.918 --> 02:53.182 and what more needs to be done. 02:53.182 --> 02:55.460 In particular, this committee understands 02:55.460 --> 02:58.125 the readiness and modernization challenges 02:58.125 --> 03:02.292 across the Department of Defense also affect TRANSCOM. 03:02.531 --> 03:05.114 A look at sealift, for example, 03:05.143 --> 03:06.958 reveals the same downward spiral 03:06.958 --> 03:09.473 we've seen elsewhere in the military. 03:09.473 --> 03:11.344 Budget cuts mean fewer new ships, 03:11.344 --> 03:13.067 existing ships get older, 03:13.067 --> 03:16.071 maintenance gets more expensive and more difficult, 03:16.071 --> 03:18.629 readiness suffers, and more money is siphoned 03:18.629 --> 03:22.657 from future modernization to pay for current readiness. 03:22.657 --> 03:26.824 Military Sealift Command's organic surge sealift fleet 03:26.922 --> 03:30.388 is essential for rapid response in the event of a crisis 03:30.388 --> 03:33.603 or wartime scenario, but the average age of ships 03:33.603 --> 03:36.520 in our surge fleet is now 39 years. 03:37.963 --> 03:39.894 Over a recent five-month period, 03:39.894 --> 03:44.061 less than 60% of sealift ships were able to activate 03:44.286 --> 03:46.205 during planned exercises 03:46.205 --> 03:48.856 due to various maintenance problems. 03:48.856 --> 03:51.421 The requirement for so-called roll-on, roll-off ships 03:51.421 --> 03:55.004 has been relatively stable since the 1990s, 03:55.183 --> 03:58.039 but since Desert Storm, the surge sealift fleet 03:58.039 --> 04:01.789 has been cut nearly in half to just 27 ships. 04:02.509 --> 04:05.677 We're already 10 ships short of the current requirement, 04:05.677 --> 04:09.492 enough to move two full armored brigade combat teams 04:09.492 --> 04:13.659 and over the next six years, another nine will age out. 04:14.047 --> 04:16.352 So while I look forward to hearing how TRANSCOM plans 04:16.352 --> 04:20.122 to address its readiness in modernization challenges, 04:20.122 --> 04:23.955 I do so fully aware that it cannot truly do so 04:24.159 --> 04:27.447 unless we in the Congress step up and do our jobs, 04:27.447 --> 04:29.246 repeal the Budget Control Act, 04:29.246 --> 04:31.333 and provide full and steady funding 04:31.333 --> 04:34.360 to meet our national security requirements. 04:34.360 --> 04:36.643 General McDew, the committee thanks you 04:36.643 --> 04:38.595 for your continued service to the nation 04:38.595 --> 04:41.301 and we look forward to your testimony today. 04:41.301 --> 04:42.267 Senator Reed. 04:42.267 --> 04:43.607 - Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 04:43.607 --> 04:44.844 and welcome General McDew 04:44.844 --> 04:46.311 to the committee of your testimony. 04:46.311 --> 04:47.144 Thank you for your service 04:47.144 --> 04:51.311 and the service of all the men and women of TRANSCOM. 04:52.068 --> 04:56.235 We are knowledgeable and appreciative of the critical role 04:56.377 --> 05:00.544 that TRANSCOM plays and thank you for your leadership. 05:02.732 --> 05:05.230 The work of TRANSCOM may be invisible to many, 05:05.230 --> 05:07.030 but it is critical because it delivers 05:07.030 --> 05:10.599 what our forward deployed personnel need when they need it. 05:10.599 --> 05:12.053 While TRANSCOM performs thousands 05:12.053 --> 05:13.478 of operations successfully, 05:13.478 --> 05:16.265 it is facing a number of daunting challenges. 05:16.265 --> 05:18.047 While all the military is working respond to 05:18.047 --> 05:20.450 potential and actual cyberattacks, 05:20.450 --> 05:23.023 TRANSCOM faces a unique set of cyberthreats 05:23.023 --> 05:25.205 because it must work with private sector entities 05:25.205 --> 05:27.556 in the transportation and shipping industries 05:27.556 --> 05:30.369 to support DOD deployment operations. 05:30.369 --> 05:31.829 Three years ago, the committee issued a report 05:31.829 --> 05:35.282 on certain aspects of TRANSCOM's cybersecurity situation. 05:35.282 --> 05:37.494 General McDew, we'd like to hear what steps 05:37.494 --> 05:39.085 you have taken to respond to the issues 05:39.085 --> 05:40.905 identified in that report 05:40.905 --> 05:42.209 and any other issue you may have identified 05:42.209 --> 05:44.341 since you assumed command. 05:44.341 --> 05:45.376 The Ready Reserve Force, 05:45.376 --> 05:47.104 a group of cargo ships held at readiness 05:47.104 --> 05:49.077 by the Maritime Administration, is aging 05:49.077 --> 05:51.176 and would need to be modernized over the next decade, 05:51.176 --> 05:53.620 as the chairman pointed out eloquently. 05:53.620 --> 05:56.615 DOD also needs to ensure that the Civil Reserve Air fleet, 05:56.615 --> 05:57.948 or CRAF program, 05:58.246 --> 06:01.162 which provides as much as 40% of wartime airlift needs, 06:01.162 --> 06:05.319 remains viable after operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 06:05.319 --> 06:08.114 and will be able to provide needed surge capacity 06:08.114 --> 06:09.281 in the future. 06:09.611 --> 06:11.944 I would appreciate an update on how TRANSCOM intends 06:11.944 --> 06:13.740 to ensures these fleets are ready to meet 06:13.740 --> 06:15.706 the command's requirements. 06:15.706 --> 06:17.268 Our global transportation capability 06:17.268 --> 06:19.591 owned and managed by TRANSCOM has been one of our 06:19.591 --> 06:22.467 asymmetric advantages for many years now. 06:22.467 --> 06:24.612 However, we cannot assume that potential adversaries 06:24.612 --> 06:27.406 will allow us free reign in this area in the future. 06:27.406 --> 06:29.517 General McDew, as you said in your prepared statement 06:29.517 --> 06:31.008 about future conflicts, 06:31.008 --> 06:34.242 "We expect contested global sea lanes and air routes 06:34.242 --> 06:37.607 to a degree we have not faced since World War Two." 06:37.607 --> 06:39.491 We're interested in hearing on how you're addressing 06:39.491 --> 06:41.538 the growing reality that the access you enjoy now 06:41.538 --> 06:43.638 may be increasingly challenged. 06:43.638 --> 06:45.298 General McDew, thank you again for your service 06:45.298 --> 06:47.379 and I look forward to your testimony. 06:47.379 --> 06:48.962 - Welcome, General. 06:51.340 --> 06:52.519 - Thank you very much, Chairman. 06:52.519 --> 06:53.352 I'm glad that you've pointed out 06:53.352 --> 06:54.940 that it's been two years since I've been here, 06:54.940 --> 06:58.123 and if I can, I have a quick opening statement, 06:58.123 --> 06:59.677 but I'd like to say that my daughter-in-law 06:59.677 --> 07:01.094 has forgiven you. 07:01.295 --> 07:03.344 If you remember two years ago, I sat here 07:03.344 --> 07:05.637 and I had a chance to introduce my family, 07:05.637 --> 07:07.559 and over to my left shoulder 07:07.559 --> 07:10.170 was my brand-new grandson Henry. 07:10.170 --> 07:14.133 Henry was a bit of a rotund child at about six months old, 07:14.133 --> 07:17.450 and you pointed out that he had not missed many meals. 07:17.450 --> 07:18.767 (Sen. McCain chuckles) 07:18.767 --> 07:19.860 Most of us got a chuckle, 07:19.860 --> 07:22.622 but my daughter-in-law did not get a chuckle from that. 07:22.622 --> 07:24.655 - Please ask her to accept my apologies. 07:24.655 --> 07:26.739 (Gen. McDew laughs) 07:26.739 --> 07:28.592 It's a beautiful grandchild you have. 07:28.592 --> 07:30.842 - (laughs) 07:31.239 --> 07:32.906 Thank you, Chairman. 07:34.561 --> 07:36.857 But it is now part of the congressional record. 07:36.857 --> 07:39.077 (group laughs) 07:39.077 --> 07:40.826 Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, 07:40.826 --> 07:42.991 and distinguished members of the committee, 07:42.991 --> 07:45.482 it's an honor and a privilege to be here with you today, 07:45.482 --> 07:47.081 representing the men and women 07:47.081 --> 07:49.424 of our United States Transportation Command. 07:49.424 --> 07:51.030 I thank you for your continued support 07:51.030 --> 07:52.858 of our dedicated professionals, 07:52.858 --> 07:54.656 all working together to provide our nation 07:54.656 --> 07:57.971 with a broad range of strategic capabilities and options. 07:57.971 --> 07:59.781 I also want to emphasize the vital role 07:59.781 --> 08:02.281 our commercial industry plays, 08:02.410 --> 08:06.066 what I call our fourth component in our success. 08:06.066 --> 08:07.511 It is worth noting yesterday 08:07.511 --> 08:10.360 was the 30th anniversary of USTRANSCOM's core staff 08:10.360 --> 08:12.437 standing up at Scott Air Force Base, 08:12.437 --> 08:14.695 and we've been going strong ever since. 08:14.695 --> 08:16.765 30 years of history, I can say confidently 08:16.765 --> 08:19.065 that your United States Transportation Command 08:19.065 --> 08:21.869 stands ready to deliver our nation's objectives 08:21.869 --> 08:23.619 anywhere at any time. 08:24.579 --> 08:26.316 We do this in two ways. 08:26.316 --> 08:28.407 We can provide an immediate force tonight 08:28.407 --> 08:30.853 through the use of airlift and air-refueling fleets 08:30.853 --> 08:33.770 and we can provide a decisive force 08:34.016 --> 08:35.384 when needed through the use of 08:35.384 --> 08:38.467 strategic sealift and surface assets. 08:39.101 --> 08:42.296 You see it every time you read or hear the news. 08:42.296 --> 08:44.408 When North Korea increased its provocation 08:44.408 --> 08:48.322 of our Pacific allies, America responded with assistance. 08:48.322 --> 08:50.770 USTRANSCOM delivered that assistance in the form of 08:50.770 --> 08:53.966 missile defense systems, personnel, and support equipment, 08:53.966 --> 08:58.133 moving by sea and air, 3,000 miles across the Pacific Ocean. 08:58.425 --> 09:01.081 When you read about America's brigade combat teams 09:01.081 --> 09:02.226 rolling through Europe, 09:02.226 --> 09:05.548 it was USTRANSCOM's ability to provide a decisive force 09:05.548 --> 09:07.881 to reassure European allies. 09:08.003 --> 09:10.042 When America needed B-2 stealth bombers 09:10.042 --> 09:13.496 to fly 11,000 miles from Missouri to Libya and back, 09:13.496 --> 09:17.025 it was our air refuelers that got them there. 09:17.025 --> 09:20.552 From national disasters to epidemics to acts of war, 09:20.552 --> 09:23.093 the men and women of USTRANSCOM are ready to deliver 09:23.093 --> 09:27.260 this nation's aid, assistance, and indeed hope to the world. 09:28.009 --> 09:30.949 These missions must execute without fail. 09:30.949 --> 09:33.109 All the while these great professionals 09:33.109 --> 09:37.276 quietly manage a myriad of daily tasks around the globe, 09:37.728 --> 09:41.645 most of which, Americans will never read about. 09:42.586 --> 09:45.217 It takes diligence, skill, and innovation to provide 09:45.217 --> 09:47.566 that kind of readiness for America 09:47.566 --> 09:51.733 and the men and women of USTRANSCOM have never let us down. 09:51.915 --> 09:54.510 I'm proud to serve next to them and I say with confidence 09:54.510 --> 09:56.491 that our organization is ready to respond 09:56.491 --> 09:58.324 when our nation calls. 09:58.325 --> 10:01.871 That confidence, however, is not without concern. 10:01.871 --> 10:03.640 The environment we operate in today 10:03.640 --> 10:05.331 is increasingly complex 10:05.331 --> 10:07.393 and we expect future adversaries will be 10:07.393 --> 10:10.019 all the more versatile and dynamic, 10:10.019 --> 10:12.576 forcing us to adapt, change, and evolve. 10:12.576 --> 10:15.061 Furthermore, we are viewing potential adversaries 10:15.061 --> 10:17.327 through a transregional, multidomain 10:17.327 --> 10:19.410 and multifunctional lens. 10:19.587 --> 10:21.788 Properly understanding the potential threats posed by 10:21.788 --> 10:25.121 by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, 10:25.411 --> 10:28.471 as well as violent extremists in a global context 10:28.471 --> 10:32.638 is of utmost concern for our future of national security. 10:33.145 --> 10:35.016 In each of these scenarios, 10:35.016 --> 10:39.183 logistics plays a critical, but often overlooked role. 10:39.196 --> 10:41.495 Today, USTRANSCOM is critically examining 10:41.495 --> 10:43.752 how we execute our logistics mission 10:43.752 --> 10:46.218 in the contested environments of the future, 10:46.218 --> 10:49.165 a space we haven't had to operate in logistically-speaking 10:49.165 --> 10:51.415 for a very, very long time. 10:51.526 --> 10:54.796 We are exercising and wargaming these logistic scenarios, 10:54.796 --> 10:57.753 forcing planners of every ilk to account 10:57.753 --> 11:01.039 for transportation's vital role and for, 11:01.039 --> 11:03.956 for the first time, potential loss. 11:03.993 --> 11:05.825 Earlier this year, USTRANSCOM held 11:05.825 --> 11:08.483 its first ever contested environment war game, 11:08.483 --> 11:11.376 imagining a scenario where we didn't dominate the skies 11:11.376 --> 11:12.709 or own the seas. 11:13.168 --> 11:15.438 This war game uncovered a surprising amount 11:15.438 --> 11:19.131 of lessons learned, which we've already started to absorb. 11:19.131 --> 11:21.015 We've adapted our tactics, techniques, 11:21.015 --> 11:22.689 and procedures accordingly, 11:22.689 --> 11:25.106 but we still have work to do. 11:25.429 --> 11:26.506 I'm also concerned about our 11:26.506 --> 11:29.125 National Strategic Sealift capability. 11:29.125 --> 11:31.097 Any further delay to the recapitalization 11:31.097 --> 11:33.624 of our Military Sealift fleet creates risk 11:33.624 --> 11:37.206 in our future ability to deploy forces across the globe. 11:37.206 --> 11:39.460 These concerns are compounded further by 11:39.460 --> 11:41.482 Merchant Marine shortages 11:41.482 --> 11:44.459 and the reduction of US flagged vessels. 11:44.459 --> 11:46.041 With today's resources, 11:46.041 --> 11:49.444 we are capable of meeting today's logistics needs, 11:49.444 --> 11:52.701 however we together don't take action soon, 11:52.701 --> 11:55.333 many of our Military Sealift Command vessels 11:55.333 --> 11:57.833 will begin to age out by 2026. 11:58.475 --> 12:02.248 A significant portion of the DOD's wartime cargo capability 12:02.248 --> 12:03.998 moves on these ships. 12:04.475 --> 12:06.670 As a bridging solution and with your approval, 12:06.670 --> 12:08.792 we can purchase used ships 12:08.792 --> 12:11.750 until we can build new ones ourselves. 12:11.750 --> 12:13.952 This won't solve the problem forever 12:13.952 --> 12:16.784 and we will need your help for all of it. 12:16.784 --> 12:18.430 My final concern is the threat of attack 12:18.430 --> 12:20.180 from the cyberdomain. 12:20.249 --> 12:23.779 Although cybersecurity is a DOD-wide focus area, 12:23.779 --> 12:26.191 USTRANSCOM is distinctly vulnerable 12:26.191 --> 12:28.826 because the majority of the command's transportation data 12:28.826 --> 12:30.832 resides within and travels through 12:30.832 --> 12:33.582 the unsecure commercial internet. 12:33.989 --> 12:35.947 Furthermore, unsecure networks and systems 12:35.947 --> 12:38.753 of our commercial transportation service providers, 12:38.753 --> 12:41.562 coupled with critical infrastructure requirements 12:41.562 --> 12:45.229 almost wholly reside outside of our control. 12:45.478 --> 12:47.055 In light of these challenges, 12:47.055 --> 12:50.566 USTRANSCOM is focusing our cyber efforts on discipline, 12:50.566 --> 12:53.733 design, and defense in order to ensure 12:53.820 --> 12:56.893 we continue to accomplish our mission. 12:56.893 --> 12:59.427 The Command is collaborating with US Cyber Command, 12:59.427 --> 13:02.230 DOD agencies, federal cyber organizations, 13:02.230 --> 13:05.183 industry, and academia to identify and mitigate 13:05.183 --> 13:06.850 gaps and shortfalls, 13:07.897 --> 13:09.844 as well as to seize opportunities 13:09.844 --> 13:12.040 to advance our cyber resilience 13:12.040 --> 13:14.540 and improve mission assurance. 13:14.849 --> 13:17.992 I thank you again, Chairman McCain and Ranking Member Reed, 13:17.992 --> 13:19.448 and the members of the committee 13:19.448 --> 13:21.274 for inviting me to speak to you today 13:21.274 --> 13:23.839 to represent this 30-year old Command USTRANSCOM. 13:23.839 --> 13:25.975 Our TRANSCOM team will continue to provide 13:25.975 --> 13:28.276 joint solutions to ensure our nation is able 13:28.276 --> 13:30.609 to deliver an immediate force tonight 13:30.609 --> 13:34.194 and a decisive force when needed anywhere in the world. 13:34.194 --> 13:36.135 I respectfully request my written testimony 13:36.135 --> 13:37.863 be submitted for the record 13:37.863 --> 13:40.029 and I look forward to your questions. 13:40.029 --> 13:40.934 - Thank you. 13:40.934 --> 13:42.145 Without objection. 13:42.145 --> 13:44.228 Thank you very much, sir. 13:45.665 --> 13:47.429 A major concern for the Navy 13:47.429 --> 13:49.541 is the lack of sufficient US flag ships 13:49.541 --> 13:52.709 and robust Merchant Marine to meet future demand. 13:52.709 --> 13:55.459 Is that a major concern of yours? 13:56.464 --> 13:58.297 - Yes, it is, Senator. 13:59.854 --> 14:01.953 - Do we have any plans that you know of 14:01.953 --> 14:03.286 to rectify that? 14:06.216 --> 14:07.795 - Chairman, I believe that we're working very closely 14:07.795 --> 14:08.874 with the United States Navy 14:08.874 --> 14:12.243 and the Navy understands the depth of the problem. 14:12.243 --> 14:16.076 - We have any plans to rectify that shortfall? 14:16.806 --> 14:19.718 - There is a Navy recapitalization plan 14:19.718 --> 14:21.869 that is being built right now. 14:21.869 --> 14:23.634 It should be unveiled in the next few weeks. 14:23.634 --> 14:25.017 I don't want to get ahead of the Navy, 14:25.017 --> 14:28.195 but we worked very closely with them on that. 14:28.195 --> 14:32.335 - The real secret is that our ability to move, supply, 14:32.335 --> 14:35.168 and support modern military forces 14:36.061 --> 14:39.220 to a large degree rests on the support it receives 14:39.220 --> 14:42.303 from private sector companies, right? 14:43.457 --> 14:44.290 - It does. 14:44.791 --> 14:48.541 - And so, suppose we're in a combat scenario. 14:49.476 --> 14:52.574 Can we continue to rely on those private companies 14:52.574 --> 14:56.491 or corporations to supply us with what we need? 14:58.749 --> 15:02.369 - Our US-flagged fleet of ships has been a reliable partner 15:02.369 --> 15:03.369 for decades. 15:04.135 --> 15:06.705 The Merchant Marine Force that does this work 15:06.705 --> 15:09.571 is a viable and proud patriotic unit. 15:09.571 --> 15:13.738 - I guess I'm talking about having to transport the troops 15:16.375 --> 15:19.458 and materiel into a contested region. 15:21.272 --> 15:24.939 Can we rely on these non-military companies, 15:25.483 --> 15:28.900 such as UPS and DHL and Maersk and others 15:30.602 --> 15:32.935 to go into the combat areas? 15:34.770 --> 15:37.623 - Chairman, our first force to go into these 15:37.623 --> 15:40.436 contested environments is our organic aircraft 15:40.436 --> 15:42.883 and our organic sealift ships. 15:42.883 --> 15:46.550 - Yes, and that's some 600 refueling tankers 15:48.082 --> 15:50.499 to transport one combat team, 15:54.736 --> 15:56.236 according to this, 15:57.639 --> 15:59.806 to the information I have. 16:01.158 --> 16:05.299 Do we have the capability to move sufficient number 16:05.299 --> 16:09.132 of individuals and materiel into a combat zone 16:10.234 --> 16:14.401 without relying on civilian sources of transportation? 16:18.311 --> 16:21.554 - Chairman, it depends on what sufficient means. 16:21.554 --> 16:23.174 If we are going to provide technicians-- 16:23.174 --> 16:24.757 - Let's take Korea. 16:25.138 --> 16:28.638 Suppose that a conflict broke out in Korea 16:30.238 --> 16:32.821 and the North Koreans have some 16:34.467 --> 16:36.884 limited anti-ship capability. 16:38.645 --> 16:42.478 Can we rely on those non-military corporations 16:43.926 --> 16:46.676 to go into maritime capabilities, 16:48.518 --> 16:52.351 to go into contested areas, into combat zones? 16:53.874 --> 16:56.108 - Today, Chairman, I would not call upon 16:56.108 --> 16:58.926 the commercial industry to go into a contested environment-- 16:58.926 --> 17:03.093 - So you have sufficient capability to move what we need 17:05.444 --> 17:07.092 without relying on them. 17:07.092 --> 17:08.425 Is that correct? 17:09.529 --> 17:12.026 - We have a sufficient force today 17:12.026 --> 17:14.488 and I've talked to General Vince Brooks and his staff 17:14.488 --> 17:16.169 to provide him what he needs 17:16.169 --> 17:18.508 in the first 30 days organically. 17:18.508 --> 17:20.559 Beyond that, we'll have to continue to assess 17:20.559 --> 17:24.079 how much of the tip fleet continues to flow 17:24.079 --> 17:26.579 and how much of that we can mitigate the threat 17:26.579 --> 17:28.778 by the time we have to get to use of commercial vessels. 17:28.778 --> 17:30.915 - According to what I am told, 17:30.915 --> 17:34.082 it can take 200 C-17 sorties to deploy 17:34.470 --> 17:36.970 a single brigade combat team. 17:37.537 --> 17:40.204 Is that your correct assessment? 17:40.772 --> 17:43.486 - I would not like to argue numbers with you at all, 17:43.486 --> 17:44.500 but I do know that-- 17:44.500 --> 17:45.803 - I'm not arguing. 17:45.803 --> 17:47.493 I'm not getting into an argument. 17:47.493 --> 17:49.340 I'm saying that this is the information 17:49.340 --> 17:52.451 that's provided to us by the Department of Defense. 17:52.451 --> 17:54.118 It's not my opinion. 17:54.789 --> 17:56.180 That's the information that we have 17:56.180 --> 17:58.763 from the Department of Defense. 17:59.408 --> 18:02.485 Are you able to ensure the global force projection 18:02.485 --> 18:06.652 is a primary capability given the assets that we have 18:08.456 --> 18:12.373 and not having to rely on non-DOD capabilities? 18:15.822 --> 18:16.720 - It is not-- 18:16.720 --> 18:18.561 - For, say, a conflict in Korea. 18:18.561 --> 18:19.608 - It is not easy. 18:19.608 --> 18:21.889 However, with a global force 18:21.889 --> 18:24.343 and that's what US Transportation Command is 18:24.343 --> 18:26.145 and we use the forces that are available, 18:26.145 --> 18:28.395 we can do 200 C-17 sorties. 18:29.245 --> 18:32.371 - So, but that you can do 200 in C-17s, 18:32.371 --> 18:35.683 so that gives you one brigade combat team. 18:35.683 --> 18:38.209 I doubt if there's a conflict in Korea 18:38.209 --> 18:42.209 that one brigade combat team would be sufficient 18:42.622 --> 18:46.789 for us to reinforce our forces on the ground in Korea. 18:48.312 --> 18:52.184 What I'm saying, General, is that we are reliant 18:52.184 --> 18:54.581 to a larger and larger degree 18:54.581 --> 18:57.164 on the private sector companies 18:57.723 --> 19:01.723 and there is great question amongst many experts 19:01.870 --> 19:04.749 that we do not have the capability, 19:04.749 --> 19:07.749 say in Korea, say in Eastern Europe, 19:08.429 --> 19:12.512 to resupply and maintain our ability to carry out 19:14.885 --> 19:16.385 success in combat. 19:17.478 --> 19:20.457 Now are you telling me that we can and are 19:20.457 --> 19:21.624 and have that? 19:22.927 --> 19:25.546 - We do not have the capability that I wish we had, 19:25.546 --> 19:26.767 but we have a capability 19:26.767 --> 19:29.518 that can provide a force when needed 19:29.518 --> 19:32.394 and the force that General Brooks is asking me to deliver 19:32.394 --> 19:35.619 can be delivered initially by our organic fleet. 19:35.619 --> 19:37.532 We have put a lot of capability into-- 19:37.532 --> 19:39.674 - Into contested tested areas? 19:39.674 --> 19:41.396 - We've put a lot in the contested area, 19:41.396 --> 19:42.603 in the commercial sector 19:42.603 --> 19:45.936 that we can't rely on in contested area. 19:45.948 --> 19:48.579 But if the initial force can be brought by organic fleets 19:48.579 --> 19:51.087 and then we'll have to see what we can do after that. 19:51.087 --> 19:53.153 It is a challenge because of how we've gotten to 19:53.153 --> 19:54.986 where we've gotten to. 19:56.194 --> 19:58.251 - Well, General, to seek to quote 19:58.251 --> 20:00.087 "see how we can do after that" 20:00.087 --> 20:03.087 is not comforting to this committee. 20:03.566 --> 20:04.649 Senator Reed. 20:05.061 --> 20:06.891 - Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 20:06.891 --> 20:10.039 Let me focus on the issue of cyber which you've brought up 20:10.039 --> 20:12.456 and I brought up my comments, 20:12.752 --> 20:15.411 and as you know, well, the committee did a report 20:15.411 --> 20:19.411 based upon incidents of your private contractors 20:20.019 --> 20:22.519 in June 2012 through June 2013 20:23.072 --> 20:24.710 where there was cyber breaches. 20:24.710 --> 20:28.877 And I thank TRANSCOM 'cause they cooperated in the report 20:29.452 --> 20:33.382 and just a few points emerged that were very critical 20:33.382 --> 20:36.171 and I want to get your sort of sense 20:36.171 --> 20:38.072 of how much progress you've made. 20:38.072 --> 20:39.815 Firstly, there appeared back then 20:39.815 --> 20:41.977 to be confusion within DOD about 20:41.977 --> 20:44.498 what information relating to cyber compromises 20:44.498 --> 20:47.340 of private sector contractors may be lawfully shared. 20:47.340 --> 20:48.385 That's one issue. 20:48.385 --> 20:51.445 Second, TRANSCOM had not provided other DOD components 20:51.445 --> 20:54.748 of the FBI a list of operationally critical contractors 20:54.748 --> 20:56.931 about whom the Command would like to be alerted 20:56.931 --> 20:59.014 when a compromise occurs. 21:00.299 --> 21:02.804 And then there was gaps in cyberreporting requirements 21:02.804 --> 21:04.842 contained in TRANSCOM's contracts. 21:04.842 --> 21:07.672 Although I must give you credit, sir, 21:07.672 --> 21:09.959 because TRANSCOM is the first year DOD component 21:09.959 --> 21:14.042 to require contractors to report cyberintrusions. 21:14.425 --> 21:16.289 Can you comment on these issues, 21:16.289 --> 21:18.706 and in general, where we are? 21:18.801 --> 21:20.051 - Yes, Senator. 21:20.628 --> 21:23.390 We have transformed our view of cyber. 21:23.390 --> 21:26.549 Last year cyber roundtables that we did, 21:26.549 --> 21:29.596 we did three separate sets of cyber roundtables 21:29.596 --> 21:32.992 to get us to a different level of awareness and knowledge. 21:32.992 --> 21:34.373 And what that has driven us to do 21:34.373 --> 21:36.843 is that our contracts are now more cyber aware. 21:36.843 --> 21:39.460 The way we deal with contractors is more cyber aware 21:39.460 --> 21:41.658 and we're asking industry to partner with us 21:41.658 --> 21:44.241 to set a higher cyber standard. 21:44.839 --> 21:48.492 The problem we have sitting in the seam between DOD 21:48.492 --> 21:52.659 and commercial industry is that the rule sets are different. 21:52.946 --> 21:56.208 We can defend that the Department of Defense networks, 21:56.208 --> 21:58.407 but we don't have any control over what happens 21:58.407 --> 22:00.240 in the civil networks, 22:00.483 --> 22:03.625 and sometimes a commercial company is disincentivized 22:03.625 --> 22:05.458 to report an intrusion 22:05.636 --> 22:07.560 and sometimes they don't have the wherewithal 22:07.560 --> 22:10.037 to know that they've had an intrusion. 22:10.037 --> 22:12.827 Those things need to be squared away, 22:12.827 --> 22:14.774 so we're partnering with Cybercom 22:14.774 --> 22:18.941 and also the interagency to see where the FBI and DHS 22:18.983 --> 22:22.409 can maybe look at those intrusions differently. 22:22.409 --> 22:24.245 I'm having a meeting with them later this week 22:24.245 --> 22:26.278 because I believe the commercial viability 22:26.278 --> 22:27.594 of the company is one thing, 22:27.594 --> 22:29.244 national security is another, 22:29.244 --> 22:31.804 and because a company is intruded upon, 22:31.804 --> 22:35.304 it's not always just a commercial problem. 22:36.438 --> 22:40.546 - Are you planning to suggest legislative proposals 22:40.546 --> 22:43.082 that would give you or give the Department of Defense 22:43.082 --> 22:45.726 more authority in this regard or clarify its authority? 22:45.726 --> 22:47.873 Maybe clarification is a better word. 22:47.873 --> 22:51.331 - I'm not sure that the DOD needs more authority, 22:51.331 --> 22:53.807 but I believe that the bridging of the gap between 22:53.807 --> 22:57.273 DOD and the rest of federal government is needing to happen 22:57.273 --> 22:59.702 and to see where we can square that away. 22:59.702 --> 23:03.202 - We follow up on the two of the questions 23:03.415 --> 23:06.082 that Senator McCain asked first. 23:07.229 --> 23:10.812 As we move to more emphasis on the Pacific, 23:11.038 --> 23:12.528 particularly North Korea, 23:12.528 --> 23:14.662 there's the issue of platform, 23:14.662 --> 23:18.761 both air and sea, but there's also the issue of facilities. 23:18.761 --> 23:21.653 Do you have an assessment of the needs for docks 23:21.653 --> 23:24.706 or air fields that have to be repaired or remediated 23:24.706 --> 23:27.706 so that you can continue to operate? 23:28.755 --> 23:31.701 - We do a regular annual assessment, a rotating assessment, 23:31.701 --> 23:32.534 through every year 23:32.534 --> 23:36.451 and we publish an en route master plan of ports 23:36.923 --> 23:39.423 and rail all around the world. 23:40.019 --> 23:43.072 We believe we have sufficient facilities globally 23:43.072 --> 23:45.368 to handle most contingencies. 23:45.368 --> 23:47.488 Unfortunately, until you get into the fight, 23:47.488 --> 23:49.889 you don't know specifics about which exact ones 23:49.889 --> 23:51.368 you're going to need when 23:51.368 --> 23:52.729 because you don't know what the enemy 23:52.729 --> 23:53.901 is going to take away from you. 23:53.901 --> 23:55.712 So based on initial assessments we did, 23:55.712 --> 23:57.933 and then we continue to assess as the enemy moves 23:57.933 --> 23:59.464 and we counter-move. 23:59.464 --> 24:02.054 We believe that in the early days, 24:02.054 --> 24:05.554 as we provide ways to mitigate the threat, 24:06.386 --> 24:08.724 maybe we have greater access in some places 24:08.724 --> 24:10.703 that we don't think of using now 24:10.703 --> 24:14.224 and we have to be resilient enough to go to those places. 24:14.224 --> 24:18.000 - And with regard to the issue of ships particularly 24:18.000 --> 24:21.250 or aircraft going into contested areas, 24:22.134 --> 24:25.217 do you have any contractual authority 24:25.820 --> 24:27.903 to compel them to do that 24:28.434 --> 24:30.579 or do they have an opportunity in the contract 24:30.579 --> 24:32.079 to simply decline? 24:35.043 --> 24:36.710 - So, it's two-fold. 24:36.894 --> 24:39.199 We also have a responsibility to them 24:39.199 --> 24:40.491 to not send them into harm's way 24:40.491 --> 24:42.362 if they're not prepared to go, 24:42.362 --> 24:45.519 in particular with the Civil Reserve Air fleet. 24:45.519 --> 24:46.632 Right now the FAA, 24:46.632 --> 24:48.482 the FAA trusts us to make the determination 24:48.482 --> 24:50.899 of when a place is sufficient 24:52.240 --> 24:54.353 to send in a commercial aircraft. 24:54.353 --> 24:56.020 We owe that to them. 24:56.143 --> 24:58.376 We also owe them a little bit better training 24:58.376 --> 24:59.968 on tactics and procedures 24:59.968 --> 25:02.968 and maybe some way of how to operate 25:02.985 --> 25:04.828 in a convoy environment. 25:04.828 --> 25:07.563 My Military Sealift Command commander right now 25:07.563 --> 25:09.226 is trying to work with commercial industry 25:09.226 --> 25:12.139 to see where we can strengthen their ability to operate 25:12.139 --> 25:15.909 at least on the edges of the contested environment. 25:15.909 --> 25:18.172 - And again, is there any consideration 25:18.172 --> 25:20.149 to legislation that might give you 25:20.149 --> 25:23.816 more appropriate authorities in this regard, 25:23.889 --> 25:26.103 because the problem that the Germans point out 25:26.103 --> 25:27.603 is a real problem. 25:27.913 --> 25:29.952 - The problem is indeed real. 25:29.952 --> 25:32.725 We have gone down the path of trying to work with industry 25:32.725 --> 25:35.013 because they've been beside us for a long time 25:35.013 --> 25:37.390 and we believe they will want to, 25:37.390 --> 25:40.393 but we don't want to put a ship in harm's way. 25:40.393 --> 25:42.062 Because losing the ship is worse 25:42.062 --> 25:44.180 than not sailing the ship. 25:44.180 --> 25:45.095 - Thank you. 25:45.095 --> 25:47.095 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 25:50.107 --> 25:53.895 - General McDew, one of the problems that we have 25:53.895 --> 25:56.788 when you're trying to move this equipment, 25:56.788 --> 25:58.807 the function that you perform, 25:58.807 --> 26:00.909 it's either by sea or by air. 26:00.909 --> 26:04.326 Air obviously is one that meets the needs 26:04.380 --> 26:06.650 because you don't have to allow the time 26:06.650 --> 26:10.317 that normally you'd have to be dealing with. 26:10.510 --> 26:13.433 But we also know the risk that's out there. 26:13.433 --> 26:17.404 We know the surface-to-air capability of the enemy. 26:17.404 --> 26:19.567 We know the air-to-air capability, 26:19.567 --> 26:21.067 we know those problems that exist, 26:21.067 --> 26:23.616 and as was pointed out by the Chairman 26:23.616 --> 26:25.699 in his opening statement. 26:25.914 --> 26:29.664 We aren't able to handle the capacity by air, 26:31.413 --> 26:33.419 so it ends up being by ship, 26:33.419 --> 26:35.801 then you have problems there too. 26:35.801 --> 26:38.380 So with the age of our fleets right now, 26:38.380 --> 26:40.213 39 years for the ships 26:40.641 --> 26:43.566 and then when you look at the C-5s and C-17s, 26:43.566 --> 26:45.554 you look at what we're doing right now 26:45.554 --> 26:46.690 in Tinker Air Force Base, 26:46.690 --> 26:50.409 trying to take the KC-135s down to the skeleton 26:50.409 --> 26:52.636 and then just rebuilding them. 26:52.636 --> 26:56.136 How big of a problem do you see this today 26:57.307 --> 26:59.992 and as you look into the future to perform the functions 26:59.992 --> 27:02.650 that you're supposed to be performing 27:02.650 --> 27:04.829 with just the sheer age of this stuff? 27:04.829 --> 27:08.674 You know, the KC-46 won't be around for some time 27:08.674 --> 27:12.841 to relieve this, so what kind of a problem is this? 27:14.275 --> 27:17.861 - Senator, recapitalizing all of those fleets 27:17.861 --> 27:18.944 is a problem. 27:19.593 --> 27:22.415 Doing it underneath the the budget constraints we've had 27:22.415 --> 27:24.498 will be nearly impossible 27:24.515 --> 27:28.682 and also we owe the Congress possibly better numbers. 27:29.617 --> 27:33.325 I have been part of propelling some numbers of tankers 27:33.325 --> 27:36.481 that are needed to provide help around the globe, 27:36.481 --> 27:37.898 numbers of ships. 27:38.031 --> 27:39.959 Well, our contested environment war game 27:39.959 --> 27:42.937 tells us that those numbers may not be sufficient, 27:42.937 --> 27:45.223 because we have never in the history of 27:45.223 --> 27:49.194 that I can remember planned for attrition of our logistics, 27:49.194 --> 27:51.827 and we haven't fought for 70-plus years 27:51.827 --> 27:55.013 an adversary that can that can do that. 27:55.013 --> 27:57.628 And so age is one level of attrition, 27:57.628 --> 28:00.176 the enemy action is another level of attrition, 28:00.176 --> 28:02.101 lack of sufficient maintenance 28:02.101 --> 28:04.501 so that it is reliable is another. 28:04.501 --> 28:06.173 And the tanker problem, 28:06.173 --> 28:08.830 if we're going to go after 12 airplanes a year 28:08.830 --> 28:10.997 of the KC-46 of recapping, 28:11.089 --> 28:13.583 that's gonna produce risk long-term 28:13.583 --> 28:16.803 as these airplanes continue to age as we recap. 28:16.803 --> 28:17.720 - Well, that's true. 28:17.720 --> 28:19.527 That's also as you're making the decisions now, 28:19.527 --> 28:23.345 I can remember when we're making decisions on the C-17. 28:23.345 --> 28:25.274 Remember we talked about it one time. 28:25.274 --> 28:28.165 It was going to be 210, then it was going to be 100. 28:28.165 --> 28:32.332 And anyway, Cheney came along and actually increased that 28:34.771 --> 28:37.152 but every time you make those changes, 28:37.152 --> 28:38.985 you are affecting risk 28:39.165 --> 28:41.565 and that's the thing that concerns me now. 28:41.565 --> 28:43.702 The Chairman brought out our reliance 28:43.702 --> 28:46.806 upon the private sector in some of these areas. 28:46.806 --> 28:49.979 I was reading in your prepared statement, 28:49.979 --> 28:51.731 now I'll just repeat it here: 28:51.731 --> 28:54.280 "Unfortunately, a US-flagged international commercial fleet 28:54.280 --> 28:57.371 "and Mariner pool has shrunk over time. 28:57.371 --> 28:59.033 "While we have contingency plans, 28:59.033 --> 29:00.667 "further reductions may cause us 29:00.667 --> 29:02.645 "to investigate other options, 29:02.645 --> 29:05.396 "such as using more foreign flagged 29:05.396 --> 29:08.789 "international commercial vessels manned by foreign crews 29:08.789 --> 29:10.956 "during the crisis of war. 29:11.181 --> 29:13.477 "American shipping companies continue to reflect vessels 29:13.477 --> 29:15.144 "to foreign nations, 29:15.429 --> 29:18.482 diminishing the size of our commercial fleet." 29:18.482 --> 29:21.506 Now we had said that our commercial fleet 29:21.506 --> 29:25.456 should be able to take care of some 90% of the need. 29:25.456 --> 29:28.039 My concern is every bit as much 29:30.389 --> 29:33.159 the reliance upon the other countries 29:33.159 --> 29:36.465 as it is being reliant upon the private sector. 29:36.465 --> 29:38.382 Do you agree with that? 29:40.071 --> 29:41.556 - Senator, we have always been a nation 29:41.556 --> 29:43.843 that has had a large enough maritime fleet 29:43.843 --> 29:45.528 and we've been a maritime country 29:45.528 --> 29:47.412 and we've always had the ability to do that 29:47.412 --> 29:49.681 indigenous to US flag vessels. 29:49.681 --> 29:51.441 - Yeah, but that's what we've always been able to do. 29:51.441 --> 29:52.622 That's not the case now. 29:52.622 --> 29:53.898 - We are in jeopardy now. 29:53.898 --> 29:55.045 Now we're at about 80 ships-- 29:55.045 --> 29:57.122 - So this is a new threat that wasn't there before 29:57.122 --> 29:58.872 and I agree with that 29:59.304 --> 30:01.462 and I'm concerned about that. 30:01.462 --> 30:03.462 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 30:03.599 --> 30:04.944 - [Sen. McCain] Senator Shaheen. 30:04.944 --> 30:07.180 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman and General McDew. 30:07.180 --> 30:08.248 Thank you for being here. 30:08.248 --> 30:11.813 I certainly appreciate what you said in your statement 30:11.813 --> 30:13.649 about the importance of TRANSCOM 30:13.649 --> 30:16.491 to any action we take anywhere in the world, 30:16.491 --> 30:20.551 so thank you and everyone who serves in TRANSCOM. 30:20.551 --> 30:24.718 As I know you're aware, the 157th Air Refueling Guard Wing 30:26.259 --> 30:30.426 is at Pease in New Hampshire and we are one of those places 30:32.796 --> 30:36.296 that's gonna first get the KC-46A tankers. 30:37.742 --> 30:40.403 And I've had a chance to go up with the 157th 30:40.403 --> 30:44.403 and watch them refuel and am amazed at the skill 30:44.708 --> 30:48.291 and precision that all of those fliers have 30:49.789 --> 30:53.956 and how important it is to have that refueling capability 30:54.683 --> 30:57.629 as we're looking at what we need to do 30:57.629 --> 30:59.046 around the world. 30:59.457 --> 31:01.250 And while I appreciate what you said about 31:01.250 --> 31:05.417 our problems aren't going to be solved by the KC-46, 31:06.980 --> 31:08.623 can you talk about how important it is 31:08.623 --> 31:11.123 to have those planes delivered 31:11.411 --> 31:14.121 and I know the delivery data slipped a little bit, 31:14.121 --> 31:17.204 so what are we doing to make sure that they're coming in 31:17.204 --> 31:19.954 on time where we need them to go? 31:21.310 --> 31:24.227 - Senator, behind the cyber threat, 31:24.931 --> 31:28.262 tanker recap is probably my number one priority. 31:28.262 --> 31:30.414 If there was one thing that keeps me awake at night 31:30.414 --> 31:32.977 and that's the ability to provide the air fueling support 31:32.977 --> 31:35.856 that we need globally, to respond anywhere around the world 31:35.856 --> 31:38.094 at the time of our choosing. 31:38.094 --> 31:41.771 The 157th is one of those units we can count on to do that. 31:41.771 --> 31:45.538 The KC-46 recap or recapping tankers writ large 31:45.538 --> 31:48.533 is a very, very important program that can't be allowed 31:48.533 --> 31:50.033 to slip much more. 31:50.517 --> 31:52.180 We're already assuming some level of risk 31:52.180 --> 31:54.627 and that's before we learned about the things 31:54.627 --> 31:57.091 that we have going on in contested environments. 31:57.091 --> 31:59.706 We don't plan for losing tankers 31:59.706 --> 32:03.873 and if we don't recap them, any loss is more catastrophic. 32:04.149 --> 32:05.149 - Thank you. 32:05.273 --> 32:07.322 I certainly agree with that. 32:07.322 --> 32:09.981 I know that when we were in Afghanistan and Iraq, 32:09.981 --> 32:11.715 one of the challenges that we had 32:11.715 --> 32:13.804 at the height of those conflicts 32:13.804 --> 32:16.887 has been the ability to have our fuel 32:17.909 --> 32:22.076 keep up with the actions that were going on in the field 32:23.387 --> 32:26.274 and one of the things that I think the military has done 32:26.274 --> 32:30.441 an excellent job of is research into alternatives, 32:31.012 --> 32:35.179 ways to make us less dependent on those fuel lines, 32:36.578 --> 32:39.911 and particularly foreign sources of oil. 32:39.949 --> 32:41.655 Can you talk a little bit about 32:41.655 --> 32:45.218 how you see the importance of those alternative fuels 32:45.218 --> 32:48.008 as you're looking at TRANSCOM's future? 32:48.008 --> 32:50.269 - Senator, I believe that a level of resilience 32:50.269 --> 32:52.973 across the entire portfolio is needed. 32:52.973 --> 32:55.173 The ability to have different sources of fuel, 32:55.173 --> 32:56.556 the ability to have different methods 32:56.556 --> 32:58.556 of delivering that fuel. 32:58.783 --> 33:02.169 DLA and all of our partners really work hard at that. 33:02.169 --> 33:04.667 I think it's important that we can't be just reliant 33:04.667 --> 33:06.917 on one source for anything. 33:06.956 --> 33:09.957 - And are you concerned about the progress 33:09.957 --> 33:13.145 that they're making or how are we doing? 33:13.145 --> 33:16.440 Is there any branch that's falling behind 33:16.440 --> 33:19.162 that we need to be worried about? 33:19.162 --> 33:22.440 - You know, with technology, always faster is better 33:22.440 --> 33:25.455 but sometimes the journey is important 33:25.455 --> 33:28.837 as you're going down new innovative paths, 33:28.837 --> 33:32.318 so I can't tell anybody that that it's falling behind, 33:32.318 --> 33:34.788 but I think research and development on different ways 33:34.788 --> 33:37.717 of doing fuels is going to be important. 33:37.717 --> 33:40.717 - And just following up a little bit 33:42.044 --> 33:43.794 on the cyber concern, 33:45.738 --> 33:48.554 what more can we do on this committee 33:48.554 --> 33:51.887 to support the efforts to address cyber, 33:52.840 --> 33:56.792 both the intrusions and the cyberattacks that we're seeing 33:56.792 --> 34:00.321 and how can we help encourage the private sector 34:00.321 --> 34:03.581 that we're relying on to come to the table? 34:03.581 --> 34:05.377 Do we need to give you more authority? 34:05.377 --> 34:07.807 Do we need to take action that's going to address 34:07.807 --> 34:09.390 the private sector? 34:09.964 --> 34:11.799 What should this committee be looking at 34:11.799 --> 34:13.799 to support your efforts? 34:13.990 --> 34:16.232 - I would ask, Senator, that this committee 34:16.232 --> 34:18.134 and all the committees in Congress, 34:18.134 --> 34:19.714 as well as the American public 34:19.714 --> 34:21.864 become as paranoid about the cyber threat 34:21.864 --> 34:23.235 as I have become. 34:23.235 --> 34:26.009 - [Sen. Shaheen] Oh, I think we're pretty paranoid actually. 34:26.009 --> 34:28.414 - I'm not sure in the commercial industry 34:28.414 --> 34:31.414 that every CEO sees the cyber threat 34:31.444 --> 34:34.886 as something beyond their commercial viability 34:34.886 --> 34:37.447 and I'm not sure every CEO understands 34:37.447 --> 34:41.068 that it's CEO business and not the IT departments 34:41.068 --> 34:42.485 of each business. 34:43.681 --> 34:44.588 - Thank you. 34:44.588 --> 34:46.265 A very important observation. 34:46.265 --> 34:48.265 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 34:49.023 --> 34:50.245 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 34:50.245 --> 34:54.012 General Magoo, thank you for your service to our country. 34:54.012 --> 34:56.186 A unique and significant part of the nation's 34:56.186 --> 34:58.878 air mobility resources, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, 34:58.878 --> 35:01.023 as the chairman has indicated, 35:01.023 --> 35:03.323 commonly referred to as CRAF, 35:03.323 --> 35:05.298 the average American may be surprised to know 35:05.298 --> 35:07.796 that in 1991's Operation Desert Storm, 35:07.796 --> 35:11.963 60% of all deployed troops and 25% of all cargo airlift 35:12.641 --> 35:16.808 went by commercial carriers, not military airlift. 35:17.258 --> 35:21.425 At the time, the Air Force had about 330 C-5s and C-141s 35:23.784 --> 35:25.478 for strategic airlift. 35:25.478 --> 35:27.504 Today, your posture statement says 35:27.504 --> 35:31.671 the CRAF requirement has grown from 60 to 90% 35:32.591 --> 35:36.758 for all passengers and from 25 to 40% of all cargo. 35:38.130 --> 35:41.606 Meanwhile, the latest numbers that I've been shown, 35:41.606 --> 35:45.773 there there are roughly 280 C-5s and C-17s in the inventory 35:47.555 --> 35:48.972 for this mission. 35:49.132 --> 35:52.549 This reduction of 50 aircraft since 1991, 35:52.823 --> 35:55.567 combined with the erosion of sealift availability 35:55.567 --> 35:59.140 tells me that our ability to project military power 35:59.140 --> 36:02.635 is increasingly tied to our commercial air segment, 36:02.635 --> 36:04.324 blurring the lines between military 36:04.324 --> 36:06.391 and non-military organizations that are required 36:06.391 --> 36:07.949 for national defense. 36:07.949 --> 36:09.715 Specifically, you've noted that one of 36:09.715 --> 36:12.323 the greatest challenges that TRANSCOM faces 36:12.323 --> 36:16.490 is from cyberattacks, because it's not a DOD entity, 36:17.258 --> 36:20.289 the Civil Reserve Air Fleet resides outside 36:20.289 --> 36:22.706 the direct reach of Cybercom. 36:23.584 --> 36:26.308 How can we make certain that this fleet receives 36:26.308 --> 36:28.281 the same level of cyber defense 36:28.281 --> 36:30.531 as our strategic air units? 36:33.486 --> 36:35.572 - Right now, I have no mechanism to ensure that 36:35.572 --> 36:36.905 that can happen. 36:37.645 --> 36:39.254 I do not have the authority to compel 36:39.254 --> 36:42.334 a commercial industry to bring their standards 36:42.334 --> 36:44.653 up to the level that we have inside 36:44.653 --> 36:48.820 nor we are we assured exactly what that standard is. 36:49.611 --> 36:52.122 We do know that inside the Department of Defense, 36:52.122 --> 36:55.053 US Cybercom and others have established a standard 36:55.053 --> 36:58.139 that we believe that our networks are protected. 36:58.139 --> 37:01.721 Outside, I guarantee you that every CEO thinks 37:01.721 --> 37:05.113 that they have the level they think they need. 37:05.113 --> 37:08.485 Reconciling what they think and what reality is 37:08.485 --> 37:09.568 is important. 37:09.719 --> 37:13.459 Sharing information across from DOD to commercial industry 37:13.459 --> 37:16.867 or federal government to commercial industry is one. 37:16.867 --> 37:19.437 I can talk to CEOs and I've talked to some 37:19.437 --> 37:23.354 that have no idea that they have been attacked. 37:23.487 --> 37:24.904 That's a problem. 37:24.954 --> 37:27.933 So before you can assure that there is protected, 37:27.933 --> 37:29.289 they have to have the wherewithal to know 37:29.289 --> 37:31.179 that they've been attacked. 37:31.179 --> 37:32.843 - The Department of Homeland Security, 37:32.843 --> 37:35.893 which is charged with protecting critical infrastructure, 37:35.893 --> 37:39.893 defines it as the assets, systems, and networks, 37:40.187 --> 37:42.399 whether physical or virtual, 37:42.399 --> 37:45.369 so vital to the United States that their incapacitation 37:45.369 --> 37:48.077 or destruction would have a debilitating effect 37:48.077 --> 37:50.695 on security, national economic security, 37:50.695 --> 37:52.662 national public health or safety, 37:52.662 --> 37:54.583 or any combination thereof. 37:54.583 --> 37:56.058 My question, I guess, would be 37:56.058 --> 37:58.756 given our significant reliance on CRAF, 37:58.756 --> 38:02.467 would you consider it to be critical infrastructure? 38:02.467 --> 38:05.681 - I would and I would also broaden the definition. 38:05.681 --> 38:06.748 There are many more things 38:06.748 --> 38:09.502 because of the risks we've taken in the portfolio 38:09.502 --> 38:11.732 over the last couple decades, 38:11.732 --> 38:14.800 many more things are in the private sector. 38:14.800 --> 38:18.321 All of those things I rely upon for national security 38:18.321 --> 38:21.418 and many of those things aren't thought of that way 38:21.418 --> 38:23.001 on a regular basis. 38:24.193 --> 38:26.341 - Are there any other non-military elements 38:26.341 --> 38:28.003 critical to TRANSCOM's mission 38:28.003 --> 38:31.472 that you would consider critical infrastructure? 38:31.472 --> 38:33.113 - Critical, I don't want to get into 38:33.113 --> 38:34.398 the actual definition of critical, 38:34.398 --> 38:37.258 but there are elements of commercial everyday use, 38:37.258 --> 38:40.925 road, rail, seaports, that are all critical. 38:41.219 --> 38:43.043 When we need to go to war as a nation, 38:43.043 --> 38:44.793 they're all critical. 38:45.509 --> 38:48.351 - What interaction does on TRANSCOM have 38:48.351 --> 38:50.996 with the Department of Homeland Security 38:50.996 --> 38:53.496 regarding such infrastructure? 38:54.425 --> 38:55.605 - Most of our links are through 38:55.605 --> 38:57.372 the Department of Transportation. 38:57.372 --> 39:00.153 We do have links to the Department of Homeland Security. 39:00.153 --> 39:01.450 We meet regularly. 39:01.450 --> 39:03.968 I've got a liaison officer from both the FBI 39:03.968 --> 39:07.718 and we work extensively with the interagency. 39:09.444 --> 39:12.641 The problem is I don't know if we have sung loud enough. 39:12.641 --> 39:15.451 We have just learned a number of things ourselves 39:15.451 --> 39:18.086 over the last year about how vulnerable we are 39:18.086 --> 39:19.800 and we've learned some things over the last year 39:19.800 --> 39:21.699 on how we can protect ourselves better. 39:21.699 --> 39:23.691 Now we're able to be a better partner, I believe, 39:23.691 --> 39:25.274 in the interagency. 39:25.490 --> 39:26.967 - General, thank you. 39:26.967 --> 39:28.967 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 39:30.949 --> 39:32.606 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 39:32.606 --> 39:33.781 General, it's good to see you. 39:33.781 --> 39:36.031 Thank you for your service. 39:36.200 --> 39:38.700 I want to talk about Red Hill, 39:38.889 --> 39:41.666 the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility 39:41.666 --> 39:44.769 at Joint Base Pearl Harbor is a key component 39:44.769 --> 39:47.987 of the Navy's operations in the Pacific and Asia 39:47.987 --> 39:51.111 to provide secure underground fuel storage 39:51.111 --> 39:52.944 for ships and aircraft 39:53.464 --> 39:55.523 and it is of vital strategic importance. 39:55.523 --> 39:56.961 For anyone who hasn't visited 39:56.961 --> 39:59.379 the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility, 39:59.379 --> 40:01.477 it is massive and the engineering feat 40:01.477 --> 40:05.365 to create that facility is in the order of Hoover Dam, 40:05.365 --> 40:08.255 so we're talking about a huge facility. 40:08.255 --> 40:10.863 Can you discuss the impact that the secure storage facility 40:10.863 --> 40:13.859 has on the reliability and resilience of refueling 40:13.859 --> 40:15.109 in the Pacific, 40:15.512 --> 40:19.679 and what would happen if this facility were closed? 40:22.940 --> 40:25.626 - I can't speak directly to that one. 40:25.626 --> 40:28.126 That would be more in the purview of DLA, 40:28.126 --> 40:31.188 our partners at Defense Logistics Agency. 40:31.188 --> 40:33.338 However, anything that lessens our ability 40:33.338 --> 40:35.611 to have fuel available in the Pacific region 40:35.611 --> 40:38.980 is detrimental to our ability to go to war. 40:38.980 --> 40:41.138 - Have you ever visited this facility? 40:41.138 --> 40:42.710 - Not directly, Senator. 40:42.710 --> 40:44.840 - If you ever get to Hawaii, please do so. 40:44.840 --> 40:46.858 I'm sure you do get to Hawaii, 40:46.858 --> 40:47.691 so do so. 40:48.084 --> 40:50.386 The Air Force has been using Active Associate Units 40:50.386 --> 40:51.636 for many years. 40:51.650 --> 40:53.035 These can be very strong units, 40:53.035 --> 40:54.750 showing the collaborative capabilities 40:54.750 --> 40:57.864 of joint active duty and Guard organizations. 40:57.864 --> 41:01.565 What are your thoughts on Active Associate Units 41:01.565 --> 41:05.732 and could you use more in the tanker and airlift fleet? 41:06.569 --> 41:08.972 - Senator, Active Associate Units have been part 41:08.972 --> 41:11.034 of our DNA in the transportation business 41:11.034 --> 41:12.284 since the '60s. 41:13.386 --> 41:16.618 They've been a viable way of augmenting and strengthening 41:16.618 --> 41:20.346 our ability to provide air refueling, in particular, 41:20.346 --> 41:21.263 in airlift. 41:21.604 --> 41:24.033 I think it's vital going forward that every unit 41:24.033 --> 41:26.359 and I believe the Air Force has this part of their plan, 41:26.359 --> 41:29.512 every unit the KC-46 will be associated in some way. 41:29.512 --> 41:31.595 We can do more with many. 41:32.513 --> 41:35.031 Some units are better at this than others 41:35.031 --> 41:37.270 and have a proven track record. 41:37.270 --> 41:39.981 Some need some help, and as we go forward, 41:39.981 --> 41:42.029 I believe that we'll get better and better 41:42.029 --> 41:44.362 at doing this in the future. 41:44.976 --> 41:47.504 - Admiral Harris testified before SASC last week 41:47.504 --> 41:49.462 that of the five global challenges 41:49.462 --> 41:52.616 that currently drive US defense planning and budgeting, 41:52.616 --> 41:55.175 four are in the Asia-Pacific region. 41:55.175 --> 41:57.731 How does tyranny of distance in the Asia-Pacific region 41:57.731 --> 42:00.647 impact your planning for the projection of forces 42:00.647 --> 42:02.921 and sustainment in the region, 42:02.921 --> 42:04.809 and how would those plans be modified 42:04.809 --> 42:06.837 if more than one global challenge 42:06.837 --> 42:10.096 needed to be immediately addressed in the region? 42:10.096 --> 42:13.807 - I don't like to disagree with my good friend Harry Harris 42:13.807 --> 42:17.703 and I understand why he focuses on that particular region, 42:17.703 --> 42:19.480 but I tend to focus on the globe 42:19.480 --> 42:22.001 and there's not one of those problem sets 42:22.001 --> 42:24.622 that isn't resident everywhere on the globe, 42:24.622 --> 42:28.705 and so from my portfolio, it is a global problem. 42:28.736 --> 42:30.274 It is a transregional problem 42:30.274 --> 42:32.804 and we need to be able to make sure 42:32.804 --> 42:36.483 that every combatant commander that has a region 42:36.483 --> 42:40.073 understands that there may not be the primary effort 42:40.073 --> 42:44.006 depending on what what's happening around the globe. 42:44.006 --> 42:46.617 - So since you look at the threats globally, 42:46.617 --> 42:50.784 and of course PCOM represents 51% of the the world's area, 42:52.420 --> 42:55.505 and so especially with the threat of North Korea, 42:55.505 --> 42:58.353 how do you go about determining what resources 42:58.353 --> 43:01.440 you would place with regard to the needs 43:01.440 --> 43:03.773 of our combatant commanders? 43:04.183 --> 43:06.509 - We respond to the the priority set 43:06.509 --> 43:08.575 by the Secretary of Defense 43:08.575 --> 43:10.332 and through the Joint Staff, 43:10.332 --> 43:12.132 and so the priority of effort must be set, 43:12.132 --> 43:14.345 and right now, the priority of effort is 43:14.345 --> 43:18.262 providing General Vince Brooks and Harry Harris 43:18.663 --> 43:22.180 the resources they need to ensure that they can respond to 43:22.180 --> 43:25.612 whatever provocative actions are taken by North Korea. 43:25.612 --> 43:28.021 If they're no longer the priority of effort, 43:28.021 --> 43:29.245 we swing to some other part of the world. 43:29.245 --> 43:33.359 We don't have the resources to be everywhere for everybody. 43:33.359 --> 43:35.687 - And so you say right now the priority area 43:35.687 --> 43:39.437 is the DMZ and Pacific Command, Harry Harris. 43:41.468 --> 43:43.528 - Well, I may have misspoken slightly. 43:43.528 --> 43:45.028 So I did say that. 43:45.596 --> 43:49.763 I am giving a lot of effort to Harry Harris and Vince Brooks 43:49.802 --> 43:51.773 because I know that they've got a challenge 43:51.773 --> 43:54.440 that they're facing immediately. 43:54.840 --> 43:58.358 Scaparrotti, Votel, all of them have issues 43:58.358 --> 43:59.641 that they're dealing with 43:59.641 --> 44:02.178 and we try to work around the globe for all of them. 44:02.178 --> 44:03.079 - Thank you. 44:03.079 --> 44:03.912 This question has come up before, 44:03.912 --> 44:06.662 our reliance on commercial assets 44:06.922 --> 44:09.324 for power projection and sustainment 44:09.324 --> 44:12.157 and if sea lanes and air lanes are compromised, 44:12.157 --> 44:15.483 how will the US either defend our commercial partners 44:15.483 --> 44:18.983 or assume a larger role in transportation? 44:19.608 --> 44:21.853 - Senator, one of the reasons that I started calling 44:21.853 --> 44:24.120 the commercial industry my fourth component, 44:24.120 --> 44:25.172 I've got an Air component, 44:25.172 --> 44:26.379 I've got an Army component, 44:26.379 --> 44:27.883 I've got a Navy component, 44:27.883 --> 44:30.777 but a very important component that we have not looked at it 44:30.777 --> 44:33.018 that way is commercial industry. 44:33.018 --> 44:34.610 Some of my predecessors actually wouldn't even 44:34.610 --> 44:37.611 call them our partners, wouldn't say the term out loud, 44:37.611 --> 44:39.944 and I understand why they did it at the time, 44:39.944 --> 44:42.760 but today's environment, I have to and must 44:42.760 --> 44:46.384 rely on this commercial industry to get things done. 44:46.384 --> 44:50.551 And so we owe them a better view of their resilience. 44:50.776 --> 44:53.428 We owe them a better view of how they're going to contend 44:53.428 --> 44:54.971 in contested environments 44:54.971 --> 44:57.368 and we owe that to them in partnering with them. 44:57.368 --> 44:59.573 - So you're taking specific steps to bring them more 44:59.573 --> 45:02.711 into an understanding of the challenges 45:02.711 --> 45:03.794 that we face? 45:04.375 --> 45:06.395 - Absolutely, and through organizations like 45:06.395 --> 45:08.234 the National Defense Transportation Association, 45:08.234 --> 45:10.070 which most of them are members of, 45:10.070 --> 45:12.544 we work on subcommittees to try to get after these problems. 45:12.544 --> 45:13.459 - Thank you. 45:13.459 --> 45:15.459 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 45:15.864 --> 45:16.827 - Thank you, Mr. Chair. 45:16.827 --> 45:18.410 General, it is good to see you. 45:18.410 --> 45:20.433 Thanks for being here and your grandson, 45:20.433 --> 45:22.279 I'm sure, is quite lovely. 45:22.279 --> 45:24.231 My own daughter we called her Chubbo Bubbo 45:24.231 --> 45:26.564 when she was a baby as well, 45:26.666 --> 45:30.177 but thank you for your testimony this morning. 45:30.177 --> 45:31.646 I do appreciate you being here. 45:31.646 --> 45:34.718 As a transportation officer, I do have a lot of respect 45:34.718 --> 45:38.297 and understanding of the important role that TRANSCOM plays 45:38.297 --> 45:41.151 for all of us that have served in uniform, 45:41.151 --> 45:42.511 so thank you so much. 45:42.511 --> 45:44.943 The risk you described from the cyber threats 45:44.943 --> 45:48.930 to the refueling shortfalls could have incredible impacts 45:48.930 --> 45:50.963 on our national security. 45:50.963 --> 45:52.833 I'm glad we're addressing those today. 45:52.833 --> 45:54.355 You mentioned in your testimony 45:54.355 --> 45:58.522 that your tankers are conducting aerial refueling operations 45:58.782 --> 46:02.949 every five minutes over the skies of Iraq and Afghanistan, 46:03.382 --> 46:06.256 and when I hear about that, I think about how we are 46:06.256 --> 46:09.710 misallocating fourth-generation fighter jets and tankers 46:09.710 --> 46:13.877 to bomb a pickup truck when they could be keeping Russia 46:14.046 --> 46:15.379 or China at bay. 46:16.059 --> 46:18.833 To me, it highlights why the services need to continue 46:18.833 --> 46:22.583 pursuing highly lethal and low-cost solutions 46:23.250 --> 46:26.628 in one theater to allow better use of high-cost technologies 46:26.628 --> 46:28.878 where they are needed most. 46:29.589 --> 46:31.082 Can you describe to me, General, 46:31.082 --> 46:34.913 how pursuing more cost-effective tactics on the battlefield 46:34.913 --> 46:37.033 can help alleviate some of the stress 46:37.033 --> 46:39.283 that we've put on TRANSCOM? 46:41.999 --> 46:44.507 - First of all, Senator, thanks very much. 46:44.507 --> 46:46.184 There's a bunch of folks in the cornfields of Illinois 46:46.184 --> 46:48.213 right now that loved every statement you had to say 46:48.213 --> 46:51.106 about the wonders of the transporters. 46:51.106 --> 46:53.056 You know what we do, I believe, 46:53.056 --> 46:55.220 does keep the four-plus-one parties 46:55.220 --> 46:57.125 and our enemies at bay. 46:57.125 --> 47:00.857 They understand that we still have the capacity 47:00.857 --> 47:05.024 to bring a decisive force or an immediate force when needed. 47:05.785 --> 47:08.906 I still believe that most adversaries get that. 47:08.906 --> 47:10.797 We are challenged at how well we can do it, 47:10.797 --> 47:12.864 how long we can do it, but I still believe 47:12.864 --> 47:14.614 it causes them pause. 47:14.853 --> 47:18.012 Going forward, how long will it stay that way? 47:18.012 --> 47:20.012 Innovation will help us. 47:20.166 --> 47:22.318 We've got to get after autonomy. 47:22.318 --> 47:24.466 We've got to get after a lot of different ways 47:24.466 --> 47:28.192 that we can use cheaper methods in some regions 47:28.192 --> 47:30.487 because we will never have enough resources 47:30.487 --> 47:34.376 to place them in every region around the world permanently. 47:34.376 --> 47:35.209 - Truly. 47:35.273 --> 47:37.211 Thank you, I appreciate that. 47:37.211 --> 47:40.072 And General, US Special Operations Teams 47:40.072 --> 47:42.498 are some of the most-utilized forces 47:42.498 --> 47:44.722 against our current enemies, but unfortunately 47:44.722 --> 47:48.119 their remote locations and need for secrecy 47:48.119 --> 47:52.007 create quite a unique transportation challenge. 47:52.007 --> 47:54.452 As you probably know, the Special Forces team 47:54.452 --> 47:57.986 that led the American invasion in Afghanistan 47:57.986 --> 48:02.153 rode in on horseback, and just tying in with that, 48:03.321 --> 48:06.571 what challenges do you face in TRANSCOM 48:06.608 --> 48:10.775 when you're seeking to support our special operators? 48:11.232 --> 48:12.846 - One is to let General Thomas know 48:12.846 --> 48:14.567 that I don't have horses. 48:14.567 --> 48:15.571 - [Sen. Ernst] (laughs) 48:15.571 --> 48:17.404 No stables, no horses. 48:18.172 --> 48:20.380 - General Thomas and his team 48:20.380 --> 48:23.520 and our team at TRANSCOM talk regularly. 48:23.520 --> 48:25.702 We understand that they're in small places 48:25.702 --> 48:28.619 with small teams doing big business 48:29.072 --> 48:30.746 and so we work very closely with them 48:30.746 --> 48:34.462 on both how they contract, how they supply themselves, 48:34.462 --> 48:37.563 and we try to make sure that we're giving them 48:37.563 --> 48:39.478 the value of our expertise. 48:39.478 --> 48:42.090 They do a lot of things well, we do this well. 48:42.090 --> 48:43.708 - Mm-hmm, mm-hmm, very good. 48:43.708 --> 48:45.208 I appreciate that. 48:46.608 --> 48:49.392 You had given some inspiring remarks 48:49.392 --> 48:52.003 on innovative thinking last month, 48:52.003 --> 48:53.697 telling your service members that you needed 48:53.697 --> 48:56.976 true innovation and not just technology, 48:56.976 --> 48:58.801 and I do agree with that. 48:58.801 --> 49:00.578 I also agree with your remarks about 49:00.578 --> 49:03.161 our failing acquisition system. 49:03.215 --> 49:06.878 As you say, taking 10 years to develop a weapon system 49:06.878 --> 49:09.476 will leave us behind our adversaries, 49:09.476 --> 49:12.640 and how is that failing acquisition system 49:12.640 --> 49:16.473 impacting TRANSCOM, and what can we do better? 49:17.720 --> 49:20.884 - It's a broad problem, as you know, Senator. 49:20.884 --> 49:22.389 One of the things is everything from 49:22.389 --> 49:24.629 how we train our acquisition professionals 49:24.629 --> 49:27.136 who do the best they can with the tools that are given 49:27.136 --> 49:29.386 to giving them better tools 49:29.862 --> 49:32.964 and then giving them different expectations. 49:32.964 --> 49:35.328 Sometimes commanders need to be more involved with 49:35.328 --> 49:38.364 setting an expectation for what's going to come 49:38.364 --> 49:41.211 out of that acquisition process and how quickly, 49:41.211 --> 49:43.266 and then sometimes we have to press the system, 49:43.266 --> 49:47.433 because on the edges of the regulations are opportunities 49:47.505 --> 49:50.231 and maybe we haven't explored all the edges, 49:50.231 --> 49:52.153 but we do need to get after better training 49:52.153 --> 49:53.323 and better tools. 49:53.323 --> 49:54.261 - Fantastic. 49:54.261 --> 49:56.262 Thank you, General for being here today. 49:56.262 --> 49:58.012 Thank you, Mr. Chair. 49:59.274 --> 50:00.179 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 50:00.179 --> 50:01.891 First, General, I didn't know until today 50:01.891 --> 50:04.120 that you spent your first five years in the Air Force 50:04.120 --> 50:05.724 at Loring Air Force. 50:05.724 --> 50:07.914 - [Gen. McDew] Actually, five-and-a-half years, six winters. 50:07.914 --> 50:09.141 - Five-and-a-half years, six winters, 50:09.141 --> 50:11.812 and I always knew you were a man of insight, 50:11.812 --> 50:13.107 intellect, and character 50:13.107 --> 50:14.612 and now I understand where it came from. 50:14.612 --> 50:17.779 Aroostook County will do that for you. 50:17.879 --> 50:21.462 I also understand Senator Shaheen mentioned 50:23.277 --> 50:24.288 an air refueling-- 50:24.288 --> 50:27.479 - [Sen. McCain] I think need the regular order here. 50:27.479 --> 50:30.812 - I won't violate Rule 19, Mr. Chairman, 50:31.962 --> 50:34.895 but I have to mention 101st Air Refueling Wing 50:34.895 --> 50:35.728 in Bangor. 50:36.271 --> 50:37.104 - [Sen. McCain] Maine-iac. 50:37.104 --> 50:40.353 - I was with the Chairman in Qatar a couple of years ago 50:40.353 --> 50:42.469 and they were proudly serving there 50:42.469 --> 50:45.050 and we affectionately referred to them as the Maine-iacs 50:45.050 --> 50:47.383 and they do a wonderful job. 50:47.951 --> 50:49.728 In fact I flew one of their, 50:49.728 --> 50:51.295 they actually allowed me to fly the boom 50:51.295 --> 50:52.393 in one of the planes. 50:52.393 --> 50:54.136 For some reason, they didn't allow me to fly the boom 50:54.136 --> 50:56.551 when there was a jet aircraft attached to it. 50:56.551 --> 50:58.092 - [Gen. McDew] I appreciate that. 50:58.092 --> 51:00.862 - Yes, well, I thought you might want to know that. 51:00.862 --> 51:04.450 I know Senator Rounds talked a bit about the cyber issue 51:04.450 --> 51:07.345 and I'm gravely concerned, because as you've testified, 51:07.345 --> 51:11.512 your capacity is very dependent upon commercial partners. 51:12.443 --> 51:16.193 And you said that every CEO says they're safe 51:16.256 --> 51:18.173 and I don't believe it, 51:18.937 --> 51:23.104 and I hope that you can do more than admonish them. 51:24.826 --> 51:27.180 I would hope that we have these contracts with them 51:27.180 --> 51:28.573 which they believe are profitable, 51:28.573 --> 51:29.876 that's why they enter into them, 51:29.876 --> 51:33.141 but the contracts in my view should have conditions 51:33.141 --> 51:34.749 to take seriously this threat, 51:34.749 --> 51:37.082 because this could be a critical disruption 51:37.082 --> 51:40.398 that would absolutely devastate our ability to respond 51:40.398 --> 51:41.398 to a crisis. 51:42.757 --> 51:45.101 - Senator, one of the first steps, we believe, 51:45.101 --> 51:48.133 is setting a clear cybersecurity standard. 51:48.133 --> 51:50.171 That standard has to continue to evolve 51:50.171 --> 51:52.232 as we learn more and the tools get better 51:52.232 --> 51:54.080 on how do we defend networks, 51:54.080 --> 51:56.064 so it can't be a static requirement. 51:56.064 --> 51:57.939 The next thing we probably need to get to 51:57.939 --> 52:00.880 is some level of third-party verification 52:00.880 --> 52:03.500 that companies are complying with said standard, 52:03.500 --> 52:05.557 and we're not there yet, but we're working with industry 52:05.557 --> 52:07.776 right now to try to get after both of those. 52:07.776 --> 52:09.791 - And testing the system, 52:09.791 --> 52:11.859 wargaming or testing the system 52:11.859 --> 52:14.031 to be sure that it actually will work 52:14.031 --> 52:17.317 under a stressful condition, a red team kind of approach, 52:17.317 --> 52:20.350 which I know that other areas of the government do 52:20.350 --> 52:22.179 and I think it's been very effective. 52:22.179 --> 52:24.664 So that's an area of vulnerability I hope 52:24.664 --> 52:28.831 that you will really focus upon because, when we need it, 52:29.166 --> 52:32.554 we've got to have that commercial capacity there. 52:32.554 --> 52:34.243 - And senators, you know right now, 52:34.243 --> 52:35.154 we have no authority to compel 52:35.154 --> 52:36.694 commercial industry to do that, 52:36.694 --> 52:37.840 not nor am I seeking it. 52:37.840 --> 52:39.711 Right now we're working with them to collaboratively 52:39.711 --> 52:42.808 get to a place and also working with DHS and FBI 52:42.808 --> 52:44.893 to try to help them push that. 52:44.893 --> 52:46.248 - Well, but I would suggest do, 52:46.248 --> 52:48.498 you have contracts with these folks, 52:48.498 --> 52:52.223 and they're getting paid high-test US dollars, 52:52.223 --> 52:55.723 and that gives you some power to make some 52:55.957 --> 52:57.821 pretty serious requirements, 52:57.821 --> 53:00.828 and I urge you to set your General Counsel loose 53:00.828 --> 53:01.995 on that issue. 53:03.779 --> 53:05.434 Let me go back to the war game, 53:05.434 --> 53:08.330 which I understand you participated in. 53:08.330 --> 53:10.663 Was it successful, and well, 53:11.204 --> 53:12.450 I'll leave the question at that 53:12.450 --> 53:14.496 and then we'll explore the answer. 53:14.496 --> 53:16.878 - You know, when I first started doing war games 53:16.878 --> 53:19.397 and exercises as a young officer, 53:19.397 --> 53:22.036 success was defined differently. 53:22.036 --> 53:23.517 As I'm a little bit more senior, 53:23.517 --> 53:24.819 now I've become a senior citizen 53:24.819 --> 53:26.626 in the United States military, 53:26.626 --> 53:29.751 success is a level of knowledge attained at the end of it 53:29.751 --> 53:31.582 that you can do something with. 53:31.582 --> 53:33.623 - Exactly, that was going to be my question. 53:33.623 --> 53:36.065 Success is not winning, success is learning. 53:36.065 --> 53:38.821 - And so that journey was so profitable for us 53:38.821 --> 53:42.229 as a command that I can't even put a dollar figure on it. 53:42.229 --> 53:45.273 It is now driving everything we think about 53:45.273 --> 53:48.686 mission assurance in our portfolio, everything. 53:48.686 --> 53:50.558 - Well, let me ask about a specific problem 53:50.558 --> 53:52.328 that I think we're all facing, 53:52.328 --> 53:54.388 we're certainly facing in the Air Force generally, 53:54.388 --> 53:56.960 and it faces you both in commercial and Air Force, 53:56.960 --> 54:00.513 the pilot shortage, the looming pilot shortage. 54:00.513 --> 54:04.680 Isn't that essentially a kind of a logistical challenge? 54:05.159 --> 54:08.166 We can't get troops places if we don't have pilots 54:08.166 --> 54:09.896 and there's a shortage. 54:09.896 --> 54:12.659 Senator Cotton and I are having a meeting on this 54:12.659 --> 54:15.142 in the next several weeks in the Air Force, 54:15.142 --> 54:17.283 but it's happening on the commercial side as well. 54:17.283 --> 54:18.744 Is this a concern? 54:18.744 --> 54:20.108 - It is a concern. 54:20.108 --> 54:21.738 We're actually showing shortages across 54:21.738 --> 54:24.250 several places in our portfolio for Mariners 54:24.250 --> 54:26.500 to pilots to truck drivers. 54:26.931 --> 54:28.783 Each of those has its own problems 54:28.783 --> 54:31.200 in the manpower solution area 54:31.452 --> 54:33.375 Right now, the Air Force Chief of Staff 54:33.375 --> 54:35.267 and the Commander of Air Mobility Command 54:35.267 --> 54:38.064 is trying to meet with the CEOs of the major airlines 54:38.064 --> 54:41.273 to get after how they might partner differently 54:41.273 --> 54:43.273 to improve that problem. 54:43.978 --> 54:46.015 - Final question, are you comfortable 54:46.015 --> 54:48.712 with the relationship with the commercial industry 54:48.712 --> 54:51.795 on the sealift-side, on the air side, 54:53.944 --> 54:55.794 that they'll be there when we need them, 54:55.794 --> 54:57.794 I guess is the question. 54:57.796 --> 55:00.192 - I am, I am confident, Senator, 55:00.192 --> 55:04.027 but I am also confident that they don't know where there is. 55:04.027 --> 55:05.901 I'm confident we haven't fully defined 55:05.901 --> 55:08.318 the there for them yet enough 55:08.504 --> 55:10.683 and we've not thought our way through 55:10.683 --> 55:14.225 what does it mean to go to war reliant upon 55:14.225 --> 55:18.285 this much commercial activity in a contested environment. 55:18.285 --> 55:20.903 - I would suggest that wargaming and stress testing 55:20.903 --> 55:23.741 would be very important, particularly where you don't have 55:23.741 --> 55:25.822 direct control over these assets. 55:25.822 --> 55:27.936 - We're with you and we're working on it right now. 55:27.936 --> 55:30.519 - Thank you very much, General. 55:30.792 --> 55:31.690 - Thank you, Mr. Chair. 55:31.690 --> 55:34.137 General McDew, thank you for being here. 55:34.137 --> 55:37.970 Just to briefly touch on the cyber discussion. 55:38.088 --> 55:42.088 If I were planning a way to disrupt your ability 55:43.591 --> 55:45.886 to play your role in the logistics chain, 55:45.886 --> 55:47.112 it'd be one of the first places 55:47.112 --> 55:49.815 I'd go find the supplier network. 55:49.815 --> 55:53.659 You know, if you go back and take a look at the exercise, 55:53.659 --> 55:55.492 the 580 Stryker tires, 55:56.838 --> 55:58.720 I don't know how much you have in inventory, 55:58.720 --> 56:01.581 but if that's scaled to a large engagement 56:01.581 --> 56:03.077 or large deployment, 56:03.077 --> 56:05.720 I'd go after whatever that supply chain looks like 56:05.720 --> 56:07.901 and try to disrupt their ability to communicate 56:07.901 --> 56:09.818 with your organization. 56:10.409 --> 56:13.603 The one question I'd like to get an answer to though 56:13.603 --> 56:16.436 is that I think if you're going to 56:17.369 --> 56:20.244 try to get that it's the weakest link 56:20.244 --> 56:22.690 and if the DOD feels relatively comfortable 56:22.690 --> 56:26.223 that they are protecting their systems, that's great, 56:26.223 --> 56:28.388 but if major suppliers in the supply chain 56:28.388 --> 56:31.885 are vulnerable, then it doesn't really matter. 56:31.885 --> 56:35.230 It just means that you're not going to be able to execute. 56:35.230 --> 56:38.063 So why wouldn't we start creating, 56:39.171 --> 56:41.838 and within your acquisitions hat 56:42.326 --> 56:46.493 or with your expertise in acquisitions, a tie breaker? 56:47.047 --> 56:49.186 If we've got to come up with standards, 56:49.186 --> 56:50.524 and I get the third party. 56:50.524 --> 56:54.120 I used to be in a firm that did ethical hack testing, 56:54.120 --> 56:56.764 so you need third party verification, 56:56.764 --> 56:58.632 but why not a tiebreaker between 56:58.632 --> 57:01.572 potential contractors that depends upon 57:01.572 --> 57:05.572 their level of sophistication and penetrability? 57:06.559 --> 57:09.141 And why wouldn't you be seeking the authorities 57:09.141 --> 57:11.980 if it's necessary for you to have that baked in 57:11.980 --> 57:15.228 to any kind of acquisition contracts or RFPs 57:15.228 --> 57:17.561 or selections going forward? 57:18.310 --> 57:20.819 - I believe we have the authority right now to bake it in. 57:20.819 --> 57:24.156 We may not have the full knowledge on how to bake it in 57:24.156 --> 57:26.454 and so we're working on those very things. 57:26.454 --> 57:28.081 I've challenged my acquisition team 57:28.081 --> 57:30.010 to some of those very things, 57:30.010 --> 57:31.927 but we found over time, 57:32.206 --> 57:35.070 if the commercial industry is my fourth component, 57:35.070 --> 57:38.034 it's better to work with them than against them, 57:38.034 --> 57:40.270 and so we believe that we're working together, 57:40.270 --> 57:41.648 maybe not as quickly as we want 57:41.648 --> 57:44.313 and so I may have to turn the heat up a little bit 57:44.313 --> 57:47.698 and the first heat is to set a clear definitive 57:47.698 --> 57:50.781 cyber standard that evolves over time 57:51.260 --> 57:53.232 and then go after third-party verification 57:53.232 --> 57:55.899 to ensure they're in compliance. 57:55.952 --> 57:58.138 - Senator King brought up the learnings 57:58.138 --> 58:00.221 from the recent exercise, 58:02.655 --> 58:04.488 but with the 12 ships, 58:05.589 --> 58:07.435 five failures and already mentioned 58:07.435 --> 58:08.935 the Stryker tires. 58:09.532 --> 58:12.217 I'm not sure if just learning is winning. 58:12.217 --> 58:15.050 I think if you were to scale that, 58:15.613 --> 58:18.362 I mean this is obviously a war game. 58:18.362 --> 58:21.055 There's not the added level of complexity 58:21.055 --> 58:23.900 of actually going into a contested area, 58:23.900 --> 58:25.881 and that by itself can create distractions 58:25.881 --> 58:28.081 and probably cause a higher failure rate 58:28.081 --> 58:31.331 just because things are moving quickly. 58:32.152 --> 58:35.488 So how are we and it looks like based on what I've read 58:35.488 --> 58:38.655 that it did look like it was a lack of training 58:38.655 --> 58:40.994 on the part of contractors for some of 58:40.994 --> 58:42.187 at least for the Strykers, 58:42.187 --> 58:44.604 I'm not sure about the ships. 58:44.974 --> 58:47.178 Where you get the resources to do that? 58:47.178 --> 58:50.006 How do you actually get them trained up to a level 58:50.006 --> 58:51.710 to where you can rely on this 58:51.710 --> 58:55.377 pretty significant component on contractors? 58:57.713 --> 59:01.726 - You know, any place that we look inside of our portfolio, 59:01.726 --> 59:04.036 we're struggling on a regular basis with 59:04.036 --> 59:07.932 how do you get beyond what you can do on a daily basis? 59:07.932 --> 59:10.656 I have sufficient manpower and expertise 59:10.656 --> 59:13.239 to do our job every single day, 59:13.609 --> 59:16.806 and under sequestration, we lost some manpower, 59:16.806 --> 59:19.636 but we're still sufficient to do that work every day. 59:19.636 --> 59:21.739 What we're struggling with right now 59:21.739 --> 59:23.682 is our ability to think forward, 59:23.682 --> 59:25.682 our ability to innovate, 59:25.897 --> 59:28.885 our ability to come after resiliency standards 59:28.885 --> 59:31.385 and to be resilient ourselves. 59:31.590 --> 59:33.984 We've gotten so efficient and lean 59:33.984 --> 59:36.329 that some of this stuff just takes more time 59:36.329 --> 59:40.412 because you don't have the people there to do it. 59:40.605 --> 59:43.157 - It seems to me, based on some responses 59:43.157 --> 59:44.874 to some of the other members, 59:44.874 --> 59:48.374 that we have the ability for a short term, 59:49.462 --> 59:51.747 to basically be able to support in 59:51.747 --> 59:53.004 a short-term environment, 59:53.004 --> 59:54.757 but if we got into a protracted environment, 59:54.757 --> 59:56.582 it doesn't sound like you have a high level of confidence 59:56.582 --> 59:59.028 that whatever we may be able to perform 59:59.028 --> 01:00:00.190 over some period of time, 01:00:00.190 --> 01:00:01.669 that we could do on a sustained basis. 01:00:01.669 --> 01:00:03.827 Is that fair to characterize your comments that way? 01:00:03.827 --> 01:00:06.817 - I think some of it is I'm a bit inarticulate 01:00:06.817 --> 01:00:08.497 and I'm trying not to pin myself down 01:00:08.497 --> 01:00:11.080 by specifying a period of time. 01:00:12.390 --> 01:00:16.557 Protracted is a word that can mean anything to anybody. 01:00:17.525 --> 01:00:20.472 Is it one month, two months, six months? 01:00:20.472 --> 01:00:21.885 In some of the conflicts, 01:00:21.885 --> 01:00:24.054 depending on the level of classification, 01:00:24.054 --> 01:00:27.460 we can go up to six months fairly easily. 01:00:27.460 --> 01:00:30.504 Beyond six months, there's a challenge. 01:00:30.504 --> 01:00:32.030 So it depends on what conflict 01:00:32.030 --> 01:00:34.790 and what the level of contested environment there is 01:00:34.790 --> 01:00:37.407 as how far that protraction can be. 01:00:37.407 --> 01:00:39.324 - Thank you, Mr. Chair. 01:00:40.749 --> 01:00:41.917 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:00:41.917 --> 01:00:43.875 General McDew, great to have you here. 01:00:43.875 --> 01:00:45.506 Before I ask you a few questions, 01:00:45.506 --> 01:00:48.373 I have to join some of my colleagues in giving accolades 01:00:48.373 --> 01:00:50.430 to the Michigan Air National Guard 01:00:50.430 --> 01:00:54.597 and to our 127th Air Refueling group out of Selfridge. 01:00:54.988 --> 01:00:59.067 - Can I get the Chairman to acknowledge one thing? 01:00:59.067 --> 01:01:00.626 During confirmation hearing, 01:01:00.626 --> 01:01:03.580 he chastised me because I actually said nice things 01:01:03.580 --> 01:01:06.307 about all the units as every senator brought up their units. 01:01:06.307 --> 01:01:08.186 I have refrained from doing that this time. 01:01:08.186 --> 01:01:09.694 (Sen. Peters laughs) 01:01:09.694 --> 01:01:12.710 - [Sen. McCain] Impressive improvement. 01:01:12.710 --> 01:01:14.067 - Well, I will give those acolytes, 01:01:14.067 --> 01:01:15.493 and I appreciate your nod 01:01:15.493 --> 01:01:17.958 that they are doing a great job, General. 01:01:17.958 --> 01:01:20.620 My question, General McDew, is that China has made 01:01:20.620 --> 01:01:24.787 significant investments globally in ports and railways, 01:01:25.998 --> 01:01:29.148 and by some estimates, China has some degree of investment 01:01:29.148 --> 01:01:33.148 in nearly two-thirds of the world's top 50 ports 01:01:33.271 --> 01:01:37.438 which handle 67% of the global container volume. 01:01:37.678 --> 01:01:39.916 The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 01:01:39.916 --> 01:01:42.829 or CFIUS, reviews transactions that result in 01:01:42.829 --> 01:01:46.003 control of US businesses by foreign entities 01:01:46.003 --> 01:01:48.436 to determine if there could be an impact 01:01:48.436 --> 01:01:50.186 on national security. 01:01:50.935 --> 01:01:53.373 The CFIUS does not have a role if there is not 01:01:53.373 --> 01:01:57.293 a US nexus for an investment merger or takeover, 01:01:57.293 --> 01:02:00.059 and I know you have a very deep understanding 01:02:00.059 --> 01:02:02.640 of the link between investments in strategic assets 01:02:02.640 --> 01:02:05.485 and US national security, but my question is 01:02:05.485 --> 01:02:08.494 should analysts in the US government and military 01:02:08.494 --> 01:02:10.984 pay more attention to foreign investment 01:02:10.984 --> 01:02:14.597 in strategic assets like ports around the world? 01:02:14.597 --> 01:02:16.737 - Yes, Senator. (chuckles) 01:02:16.737 --> 01:02:19.570 - And could you elaborate, please? 01:02:19.606 --> 01:02:23.773 - You know, in my business, I didn't know the 2/3 number, 01:02:24.286 --> 01:02:26.436 but I can't imagine, I don't see many ports 01:02:26.436 --> 01:02:30.341 around the world where the Chinese aren't investing. 01:02:30.341 --> 01:02:34.091 And I know that on one level in this country, 01:02:35.031 --> 01:02:37.114 we're linked economically 01:02:37.636 --> 01:02:39.898 and they're not an adversary today, 01:02:39.898 --> 01:02:42.832 but they have potential to be one in the future. 01:02:42.832 --> 01:02:45.409 Anybody that is investing globally in ports, 01:02:45.409 --> 01:02:48.460 and if we're a maritime nation, we ought to be concerned 01:02:48.460 --> 01:02:51.822 about their feelings about freedom of access 01:02:51.822 --> 01:02:54.822 and how we operate around the globe, 01:02:55.249 --> 01:02:57.025 and they have not shown that freedom of access 01:02:57.025 --> 01:03:00.358 means the same to them as it does to us. 01:03:01.145 --> 01:03:02.583 - So are you concerned then 01:03:02.583 --> 01:03:04.954 about the potential for strategic investments 01:03:04.954 --> 01:03:08.601 by other nations could have on your ability to operate? 01:03:08.601 --> 01:03:10.507 Is that what I'm hearing from your answer? 01:03:10.507 --> 01:03:12.465 - I am and that's one of the reasons 01:03:12.465 --> 01:03:14.388 that I spend a great amount of my time 01:03:14.388 --> 01:03:17.022 traveling around the world, and in particular, 01:03:17.022 --> 01:03:19.019 working with the State Department, 01:03:19.019 --> 01:03:21.768 strengthening relationships that we have in countries 01:03:21.768 --> 01:03:23.655 and having them fully understand 01:03:23.655 --> 01:03:26.584 why those relationships are important 01:03:26.584 --> 01:03:28.868 and their ports and their rail infrastructure 01:03:28.868 --> 01:03:30.451 is important to us. 01:03:30.532 --> 01:03:31.365 - Yeah. 01:03:31.628 --> 01:03:32.971 Well, we've we've talked a great deal 01:03:32.971 --> 01:03:36.456 about some of your challenges in terms of capacity 01:03:36.456 --> 01:03:39.488 to move both fuel and especially heavy material 01:03:39.488 --> 01:03:41.488 with sealift operations. 01:03:43.252 --> 01:03:46.098 If you'd talk a little bit about pre-positioned forces 01:03:46.098 --> 01:03:47.446 and the importance of that. 01:03:47.446 --> 01:03:48.996 Certainly that's one way to deal with 01:03:48.996 --> 01:03:50.866 the challenges of moving something from A to B 01:03:50.866 --> 01:03:54.282 is to already have moved it to B prior to a conflict. 01:03:54.282 --> 01:03:58.430 We have challenges in Europe to move heavy material, 01:03:58.430 --> 01:04:01.960 should we see increased aggressive behavior there, 01:04:01.960 --> 01:04:05.070 and certainly with what's happening in Korea as well. 01:04:05.070 --> 01:04:08.084 Please discuss the importance of pre-positioned forces 01:04:08.084 --> 01:04:11.860 and do you believe that perhaps we should consider 01:04:11.860 --> 01:04:15.341 increasing the amount of pre-positioned equipment 01:04:15.341 --> 01:04:17.924 in various strategic locations? 01:04:19.123 --> 01:04:21.078 - Well, I believe first, Senator, 01:04:21.078 --> 01:04:23.835 we need a clear strategy of what we want to achieve 01:04:23.835 --> 01:04:25.752 in a particular region. 01:04:25.868 --> 01:04:27.666 That strategy that needs to be informed 01:04:27.666 --> 01:04:30.332 by the resourcing to do whatever that strategy 01:04:30.332 --> 01:04:31.999 would call us to do. 01:04:32.026 --> 01:04:33.985 Pre-positioning forces have always been 01:04:33.985 --> 01:04:36.235 important resources for us. 01:04:37.723 --> 01:04:39.299 They've become more important 01:04:39.299 --> 01:04:42.667 as we've withdrawn forces from places around the world 01:04:42.667 --> 01:04:45.044 and brought them back into the CONUS, 01:04:45.044 --> 01:04:47.743 because now we're now a projecting force. 01:04:47.743 --> 01:04:50.460 With that, as you said, having stuff already at B 01:04:50.460 --> 01:04:52.293 is very, very helpful. 01:04:53.002 --> 01:04:57.167 To ensure that each one of those stocks is fully upgraded, 01:04:57.167 --> 01:04:59.131 i.e., is it new equipment, 01:04:59.131 --> 01:05:01.274 is it equipment that has least been tested, 01:05:01.274 --> 01:05:03.700 is all of the equipment sets there? 01:05:03.700 --> 01:05:06.941 All of that's important and they're all placed together. 01:05:06.941 --> 01:05:07.843 - Thank you, General. 01:05:07.843 --> 01:05:09.010 Appreciate it. 01:05:10.638 --> 01:05:12.234 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:05:12.234 --> 01:05:14.070 General, thank you for your service 01:05:14.070 --> 01:05:16.434 and dedication to the country. 01:05:16.434 --> 01:05:18.714 Last week Admiral Harry Harris 01:05:18.714 --> 01:05:20.825 addressed the resources requirements 01:05:20.825 --> 01:05:24.992 to conduct military operations in the Asia Pacific 01:05:25.123 --> 01:05:27.373 in the event of hostilities 01:05:27.431 --> 01:05:30.603 and he told this committee that he had the forces in place 01:05:30.603 --> 01:05:33.770 to quote "fight tonight if necessary," 01:05:33.953 --> 01:05:36.188 but that what concerned him was the quote 01:05:36.188 --> 01:05:40.355 "follow-on resources and how those follow-on resources 01:05:41.367 --> 01:05:45.534 would get to the region in terms of airlift and sealift." 01:05:45.781 --> 01:05:49.698 General, do you share Admiral Harris' concerns? 01:05:51.451 --> 01:05:54.941 - I believe that Admiral Harris has a right to be concerned 01:05:54.941 --> 01:05:56.691 because it's his AOR, 01:05:58.043 --> 01:06:00.253 and I believe that he has a point to be made 01:06:00.253 --> 01:06:03.371 in that any time we have to project a force, 01:06:03.371 --> 01:06:05.962 we ought to be concerned on how it's going to get there. 01:06:05.962 --> 01:06:08.640 We are no longer assured that everything that we send 01:06:08.640 --> 01:06:11.941 from the CONUS will arrive at its point of destination. 01:06:11.941 --> 01:06:13.750 It could be because it's old, 01:06:13.750 --> 01:06:16.022 it could be because weather, 01:06:16.022 --> 01:06:18.284 it could be because the enemy had a vote. 01:06:18.284 --> 01:06:19.414 So I am concerned. 01:06:19.414 --> 01:06:21.545 Now from my discussions with him 01:06:21.545 --> 01:06:24.045 and with General Vince Brooks, 01:06:24.244 --> 01:06:26.385 the immediate follow-on forces that he needs, 01:06:26.385 --> 01:06:28.385 we're ready to send him. 01:06:28.624 --> 01:06:31.649 - So what most worries you with respect to 01:06:31.649 --> 01:06:35.816 our ability to flow resources into the Asia Pacific theater? 01:06:36.101 --> 01:06:39.028 - Our ability to rely upon the commercial industry 01:06:39.028 --> 01:06:41.377 which we'll have to rely on over time 01:06:41.377 --> 01:06:45.114 and how long the environment remains contested 01:06:45.114 --> 01:06:46.614 and to what level. 01:06:47.157 --> 01:06:49.057 Each of those are a bit of unknowns 01:06:49.057 --> 01:06:51.261 and how we'll maneuver through that space 01:06:51.261 --> 01:06:52.819 is going to be vitally important 01:06:52.819 --> 01:06:56.986 for how long protraction is and what protraction will mean. 01:06:57.883 --> 01:07:01.050 - So let's shift to a different topic. 01:07:01.962 --> 01:07:05.701 The past decades, the United States has had the luxury 01:07:05.701 --> 01:07:09.868 of having secure air and sea lines of communication. 01:07:10.189 --> 01:07:11.856 Given the increasing 01:07:11.884 --> 01:07:16.051 anti-access/aerial denial efforts of China, 01:07:17.040 --> 01:07:19.252 there's a chance we could be denied that luxury 01:07:19.252 --> 01:07:21.002 in a future conflict. 01:07:21.478 --> 01:07:23.611 A recent article by Dean Cheng 01:07:23.611 --> 01:07:26.498 as a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation 01:07:26.498 --> 01:07:28.848 posited that quote "the ability of the Chinese 01:07:28.848 --> 01:07:32.286 "to deploy substantial forces into the Central Pacific 01:07:32.286 --> 01:07:36.453 "would place American logistics and support forces at risk. 01:07:36.741 --> 01:07:40.175 "The loss of one or more underway replenishment ships 01:07:40.175 --> 01:07:42.207 "would rapidly curtail the ability 01:07:42.207 --> 01:07:45.574 "of American surface forces, including aircraft carriers, 01:07:45.574 --> 01:07:46.574 to operate." 01:07:48.712 --> 01:07:52.879 What is TRANSCOM's plan to replenish ships and aircraft 01:07:53.134 --> 01:07:57.301 in the event that we must fight our way into an area 01:07:58.678 --> 01:08:02.200 where anti-access/aerial denial has succeeded? 01:08:02.200 --> 01:08:03.911 - Senator, without getting into 01:08:03.911 --> 01:08:05.627 too much level of classification, 01:08:05.627 --> 01:08:07.646 I tell you we're in new territory. 01:08:07.646 --> 01:08:10.715 As you said, we've not been in this place in decades 01:08:10.715 --> 01:08:14.132 and so I believe that the Navy in particular, 01:08:14.132 --> 01:08:18.299 the Air Force, are both working on plans that get back 01:08:19.234 --> 01:08:21.558 to dominating those domains, 01:08:21.558 --> 01:08:24.568 but realizing that the logistics infrastructure 01:08:24.568 --> 01:08:27.152 has not been challenged for so long. 01:08:27.152 --> 01:08:28.821 It's just a new place for us 01:08:28.821 --> 01:08:30.126 and we're having to go after that. 01:08:30.126 --> 01:08:33.098 I believe that we're making progress, 01:08:33.098 --> 01:08:35.848 not as fast as we all want to be. 01:08:37.869 --> 01:08:40.693 - On another topic, one of the critical backgrounds 01:08:40.693 --> 01:08:44.860 of Air Mobility Command is the tactical airlift capacity 01:08:45.895 --> 01:08:47.728 of the C-130 Hercules. 01:08:48.564 --> 01:08:50.481 The 136th Airlift Wing, 01:08:50.727 --> 01:08:52.830 part of the Texas Air National Guard, 01:08:52.830 --> 01:08:54.967 and you're free to defy the Chairman 01:08:54.967 --> 01:08:56.144 and praise them vociferously, 01:08:56.144 --> 01:08:58.101 (Sen. McCain laughs) 01:08:58.101 --> 01:09:02.268 is flying C-130H's and performing extraordinarily well. 01:09:03.320 --> 01:09:07.130 You expressed concern in your House testimony last month 01:09:07.130 --> 01:09:10.005 that quote "continued modernization efforts 01:09:10.005 --> 01:09:13.338 "in our C-130H fleet must be prioritized 01:09:14.385 --> 01:09:17.408 "as a relatively inexpensive means of maintaining 01:09:17.408 --> 01:09:18.991 critical capacity." 01:09:19.433 --> 01:09:22.516 Could you expand on those sentiments? 01:09:22.954 --> 01:09:25.996 - I believe that one of the things we've got to look at 01:09:25.996 --> 01:09:29.435 as we look at our tactical airlift capability 01:09:29.435 --> 01:09:32.435 is to ensure that all of those units 01:09:32.515 --> 01:09:36.682 that fly those those airplanes have the wherewithal 01:09:37.354 --> 01:09:39.485 to fly in the new airspace 01:09:39.485 --> 01:09:43.652 and are modern enough to continue to be a viable resource. 01:09:43.718 --> 01:09:46.385 I was an old C-130 pilot myself. 01:09:46.471 --> 01:09:47.804 I flew E Models. 01:09:48.037 --> 01:09:49.401 If anybody had an E Model today, 01:09:49.401 --> 01:09:51.782 I'd say we need to retire them all, they're all gone. 01:09:51.782 --> 01:09:54.449 Depending on which level of age, 01:09:54.586 --> 01:09:56.418 it's just a matter of a software upgrade, 01:09:56.418 --> 01:09:58.702 so I believe we're okay and I would make sure 01:09:58.702 --> 01:10:01.771 that we're not overprioritizing C-130s 01:10:01.771 --> 01:10:04.938 to the detriment of tankers right now, 01:10:05.066 --> 01:10:07.878 because that's a higher priority need for me. 01:10:07.878 --> 01:10:10.628 - [Sen. Cruz] Thank you, General. 01:10:11.806 --> 01:10:13.714 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:10:13.714 --> 01:10:15.797 Good to see you, General, 01:10:16.153 --> 01:10:18.890 and I know well that cornfield you referenced. 01:10:18.890 --> 01:10:23.057 It looks familiar since it is right across the border. 01:10:23.740 --> 01:10:27.172 I understand the importance of Scott Air Force Base, 01:10:27.172 --> 01:10:28.921 not just to TRANSCOM and our military, 01:10:28.921 --> 01:10:31.504 but to the region in St. Louis, 01:10:31.871 --> 01:10:35.633 and I am a big fan of all the work you do there 01:10:35.633 --> 01:10:39.514 and I'm pleased that we're having this hearing today. 01:10:39.514 --> 01:10:42.469 Let's talk a little bit about contested environments 01:10:42.469 --> 01:10:45.636 and airlift in contested environments. 01:10:45.744 --> 01:10:49.911 Since my colleague from Texas was talking about his unit, 01:10:50.321 --> 01:10:52.844 I know you know I'm going to mention the 139th, 01:10:52.844 --> 01:10:54.876 because as you're well aware, 01:10:54.876 --> 01:10:57.462 this is an international training school 01:10:57.462 --> 01:10:59.988 for resupply in contested environments 01:10:59.988 --> 01:11:02.571 and that's obviously Rosecrans, 01:11:02.789 --> 01:11:06.243 once again, right in the heart of America. 01:11:06.243 --> 01:11:08.784 We call it the Top Gun of airlift. 01:11:08.784 --> 01:11:10.653 I think that's an accurate description 01:11:10.653 --> 01:11:12.873 since I've run into people who have been trained 01:11:12.873 --> 01:11:15.554 at Rosecrans literally all over the world, 01:11:15.554 --> 01:11:19.467 particularly when I've been to Iraq and Afghanistan. 01:11:19.467 --> 01:11:22.967 Could you talk a little bit about the plan 01:11:23.695 --> 01:11:25.862 for testing new equipment, 01:11:27.080 --> 01:11:29.520 that we're going to have dedicated training, 01:11:29.520 --> 01:11:31.847 rather than having to pull these aircraft 01:11:31.847 --> 01:11:33.895 out of units for training, 01:11:33.895 --> 01:11:37.228 that they are trying to cite for C-130Hs 01:11:39.451 --> 01:11:42.978 each a different variant with a training wing 01:11:42.978 --> 01:11:45.507 and we are hopeful obviously that 01:11:45.507 --> 01:11:47.450 that would get cited at St. Joe 01:11:47.450 --> 01:11:49.775 because of the inherent capabilities we have 01:11:49.775 --> 01:11:52.164 and the advantage of the location 01:11:52.164 --> 01:11:54.834 and the already international clientele we have 01:11:54.834 --> 01:11:57.424 in terms of our allies getting trained 01:11:57.424 --> 01:12:00.928 in this important resupplying in contested environments. 01:12:00.928 --> 01:12:04.511 Talk to me if you would about 139th Airlift 01:12:05.190 --> 01:12:07.175 and the training that goes on there 01:12:07.175 --> 01:12:10.005 and what your view is of that capability 01:12:10.005 --> 01:12:13.922 in terms of training and contested environment. 01:12:14.130 --> 01:12:17.559 - I believe that the instructors we have at Rosecrans 01:12:17.559 --> 01:12:21.142 are some of the best in the C-130 business. 01:12:21.256 --> 01:12:22.877 They have a lot of experience. 01:12:22.877 --> 01:12:24.689 They've been flying the airplane for a long time 01:12:24.689 --> 01:12:27.796 and they're steeped in tactics, techniques, and procedures 01:12:27.796 --> 01:12:29.213 for the aircraft. 01:12:29.322 --> 01:12:32.122 So it is a resource that we've got to rely on 01:12:32.122 --> 01:12:36.211 as we go talking more broadly about contested environments. 01:12:36.211 --> 01:12:38.165 I've tasked Air Mobility Command 01:12:38.165 --> 01:12:41.415 to lead a Contested Environment Summit. 01:12:41.734 --> 01:12:43.987 I would hope that they, and I got to believe that they, 01:12:43.987 --> 01:12:47.133 will have Rosecrans members there to help us get after 01:12:47.133 --> 01:12:51.050 solutions to our contested environment war game 01:12:52.496 --> 01:12:53.476 level of learning. 01:12:53.476 --> 01:12:56.448 We learned a bunch of things that should scare us. 01:12:56.448 --> 01:12:58.998 Now we're going after what we do about it 01:12:58.998 --> 01:13:03.165 and how do we fix and mitigate some of these concerns? 01:13:04.709 --> 01:13:07.247 - Let me talk a little bit about your testimony, 01:13:07.247 --> 01:13:08.640 which I found stunning, 01:13:08.640 --> 01:13:12.057 was a shortage of 75,000 licensed drivers 01:13:12.288 --> 01:13:14.281 in the trucking industry 01:13:14.281 --> 01:13:16.057 and understanding how important this is 01:13:16.057 --> 01:13:20.224 for our capabilities in terms of supply and resupply. 01:13:21.000 --> 01:13:24.214 The projected shortfall is due to increase 01:13:24.214 --> 01:13:26.464 to 890,000 drivers by 2027. 01:13:29.034 --> 01:13:31.410 The current shortage has the trucking industry 01:13:31.410 --> 01:13:34.644 operating at a 95% capacity every day, 01:13:34.644 --> 01:13:37.445 which basically leaves no surge capacity 01:13:37.445 --> 01:13:41.220 for high-volume DOD requirements in a time of conflict 01:13:41.220 --> 01:13:44.229 without severely disrupting commercial services 01:13:44.229 --> 01:13:45.644 across the country, 01:13:45.644 --> 01:13:47.641 which is a whole other price we would have to pay 01:13:47.641 --> 01:13:50.724 in our economy if that were the case. 01:13:50.871 --> 01:13:53.227 While I want to make sure that we are making it 01:13:53.227 --> 01:13:55.312 as easy as possible for trained military 01:13:55.312 --> 01:13:58.062 to transition into civilian life, 01:13:59.162 --> 01:14:01.689 and obviously we've got a lot of great truck drivers 01:14:01.689 --> 01:14:02.760 that are trained in the military, 01:14:02.760 --> 01:14:06.340 once again, trained in my state at Fort Leonard Wood. 01:14:06.340 --> 01:14:08.923 I'm worried that even if we put 01:14:09.286 --> 01:14:11.605 every single truck driver we trained in the military 01:14:11.605 --> 01:14:14.005 into the civilian trucking industry, 01:14:14.005 --> 01:14:15.742 we're still not going to have enough. 01:14:15.742 --> 01:14:18.644 So let me ask you, have you all looked, 01:14:18.644 --> 01:14:20.393 I worry about driverless trucks 01:14:20.393 --> 01:14:23.486 in terms of what it's going to do to jobs in this country 01:14:23.486 --> 01:14:26.675 but have you all begun to talk about in the future 01:14:26.675 --> 01:14:30.232 the use of driverless trucks in this capacity 01:14:30.232 --> 01:14:33.270 and could you speak to that for a few moments? 01:14:33.270 --> 01:14:35.236 - Senator, we've actually looked at autonomy 01:14:35.236 --> 01:14:37.175 across our broad portfolio, 01:14:37.175 --> 01:14:40.842 from ships to trains to trucks to airplanes. 01:14:41.350 --> 01:14:43.850 We believe that you must have that level 01:14:43.850 --> 01:14:47.519 of technological advancement as you go forward. 01:14:47.519 --> 01:14:48.814 Somewhere along the way, 01:14:48.814 --> 01:14:51.055 we're losing the young men and women 01:14:51.055 --> 01:14:53.082 who grow up wanting to be truck drivers 01:14:53.082 --> 01:14:55.681 and airplane drivers and train drivers. 01:14:55.681 --> 01:14:57.440 and so with the lack of capacity. 01:14:57.440 --> 01:15:00.042 the technology will have to take over. 01:15:00.042 --> 01:15:03.091 We just have to have this technology going forward 01:15:03.091 --> 01:15:05.092 and I believe that the advances being made 01:15:05.092 --> 01:15:06.665 by some in the civil sector 01:15:06.665 --> 01:15:08.150 is pretty impressive. 01:15:08.150 --> 01:15:09.812 - It is and and I know that we've got 01:15:09.812 --> 01:15:12.818 some autonomous buses going now and other trucks. 01:15:12.818 --> 01:15:15.095 Have you reached out to some of the companies 01:15:15.095 --> 01:15:17.590 that are doing this to see if it would be possible 01:15:17.590 --> 01:15:19.755 for you all to do some pilot work, 01:15:19.755 --> 01:15:22.338 maybe over on the base at Scott 01:15:22.748 --> 01:15:24.812 to begin to get your arms around 01:15:24.812 --> 01:15:26.810 what driverless trucks would feel like 01:15:26.810 --> 01:15:30.393 in terms of your need to supply our troops? 01:15:31.400 --> 01:15:33.525 - Most of that work is being done in the services 01:15:33.525 --> 01:15:35.805 and the organized training equip role. 01:15:35.805 --> 01:15:38.328 The Army is working a lot on autonomous vehicles, 01:15:38.328 --> 01:15:40.765 the Navy has some autonomous vehicles, 01:15:40.765 --> 01:15:42.921 and the Air Force is also working with 01:15:42.921 --> 01:15:46.567 some semi-autonomous and autonomous work through DARPA. 01:15:46.567 --> 01:15:47.400 - Great. 01:15:47.539 --> 01:15:49.539 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:15:49.929 --> 01:15:51.283 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman 01:15:51.283 --> 01:15:53.295 and thank you for being here, General. 01:15:53.295 --> 01:15:55.875 I want to quickly ask about the importance 01:15:55.875 --> 01:15:58.208 of our non-military agencies 01:15:58.854 --> 01:16:00.797 and assistance to your mission. 01:16:00.797 --> 01:16:04.630 TRANSCOM maintains a presence around the world 01:16:05.062 --> 01:16:07.800 and we need other countries' ports 01:16:07.800 --> 01:16:09.967 and rail and road networks 01:16:10.225 --> 01:16:12.479 to be upgraded and to be secure 01:16:12.479 --> 01:16:15.868 so that those countries can receive our military equipment 01:16:15.868 --> 01:16:18.612 and we rely on diplomatic agreements 01:16:18.612 --> 01:16:22.031 with other countries for our pre-positioned equipment. 01:16:22.031 --> 01:16:24.065 So I just want to ask, General, 01:16:24.065 --> 01:16:27.679 would a reduction in funding to the civilian agencies 01:16:27.679 --> 01:16:31.539 and programs that enable your global distribution networks 01:16:31.539 --> 01:16:34.122 make your job easier or harder? 01:16:36.719 --> 01:16:40.565 - Senator, our job as a co-comm with global responsibilities 01:16:40.565 --> 01:16:44.108 relies on every partner we can get our hands on. 01:16:44.108 --> 01:16:46.712 One of our biggest partners is the State Department 01:16:46.712 --> 01:16:49.169 and a lot of interagency partners around the globe, 01:16:49.169 --> 01:16:52.050 because they help us build relationships in areas 01:16:52.050 --> 01:16:54.160 that we can't be at on a regular basis 01:16:54.160 --> 01:16:55.900 and you can't build a relationship when 01:16:55.900 --> 01:16:57.111 you need a relationship. 01:16:57.111 --> 01:16:57.944 - Right. 01:16:58.078 --> 01:17:00.276 So I take it the answer is it would make your job 01:17:00.276 --> 01:17:01.109 a lot harder. 01:17:01.109 --> 01:17:01.942 - [Gen. McDew] It would make it little harder. 01:17:01.942 --> 01:17:03.416 - Make a little harder. 01:17:03.416 --> 01:17:06.197 I agree with this and I point out that the administration 01:17:06.197 --> 01:17:09.180 is seeking significant reduction to the Department of State 01:17:09.180 --> 01:17:10.347 and to US AID. 01:17:11.695 --> 01:17:14.252 Of course, our military is critically important 01:17:14.252 --> 01:17:16.056 to our security but we can't forget 01:17:16.056 --> 01:17:20.056 that non-military programs are critical enablers 01:17:20.439 --> 01:17:24.131 of the military to do the jobs that you need to do. 01:17:24.131 --> 01:17:26.869 Now, General, I also want ask you another question. 01:17:26.869 --> 01:17:28.529 When you testified in front of the House 01:17:28.529 --> 01:17:30.784 Armed Services Committee several weeks ago, 01:17:30.784 --> 01:17:34.951 you said that getting C-5s out of the backup inventory 01:17:35.311 --> 01:17:38.811 was your number one priority for the NDAA. 01:17:39.758 --> 01:17:43.925 The upgraded C-5 is currently our only cargo aircraft 01:17:44.755 --> 01:17:48.922 that can make a transcontinental flight without refueling. 01:17:49.246 --> 01:17:52.442 So, General, would having those additional C-5s 01:17:52.442 --> 01:17:55.025 back in inventory help mitigate 01:17:55.441 --> 01:17:58.024 your aerial refueling challenge 01:17:58.188 --> 01:18:01.375 by providing more capacity to move cargo 01:18:01.375 --> 01:18:03.542 without needing to refuel? 01:18:04.170 --> 01:18:07.041 - Well, I believe we can also do a transcontinental flight 01:18:07.041 --> 01:18:09.208 with a C-17, but the C-5s, 01:18:10.246 --> 01:18:12.892 we need those additional C-5s back in the inventory. 01:18:12.892 --> 01:18:15.279 I believe the Air Force has just recently committed 01:18:15.279 --> 01:18:18.446 to doing that over the next few years, 01:18:18.696 --> 01:18:20.724 so that will be very, very helpful. 01:18:20.724 --> 01:18:23.009 - All right, and can you just expand just a little bit 01:18:23.009 --> 01:18:25.286 on the importance of the C-5, 01:18:25.286 --> 01:18:28.352 why the C-5 is a critical piece of equipment for you 01:18:28.352 --> 01:18:30.102 to get your job done? 01:18:30.623 --> 01:18:32.976 - It's the totality of the mission set. 01:18:32.976 --> 01:18:35.908 First, we have limited numbers of strategic assets. 01:18:35.908 --> 01:18:38.569 The C-5 provides an outsize cargo capability 01:18:38.569 --> 01:18:40.819 and a long-range capability 01:18:40.846 --> 01:18:43.407 and having been on the receiving end 01:18:43.407 --> 01:18:46.740 at a deployed location of a C-5's stuff, 01:18:47.119 --> 01:18:50.954 there's nothing like a C-5 load full of stuff arriving, 01:18:50.954 --> 01:18:53.071 time after time after time, 01:18:53.071 --> 01:18:55.490 if you're standing up at operation quickly. 01:18:55.490 --> 01:18:56.323 - Right. 01:18:56.387 --> 01:18:57.504 I understand it is the only aircraft 01:18:57.504 --> 01:19:00.087 that can carry two Abrams tanks 01:19:00.256 --> 01:19:04.407 or that it can carry six helicopters simultaneously, 01:19:04.407 --> 01:19:06.511 so I take it that's a good boost to efforts 01:19:06.511 --> 01:19:07.436 on the ground. 01:19:07.436 --> 01:19:08.335 - That's a good thing. 01:19:08.335 --> 01:19:09.238 - That's right, good. 01:19:09.238 --> 01:19:10.247 I just want to say, 01:19:10.247 --> 01:19:12.888 making sure that we have every available C-5 01:19:12.888 --> 01:19:14.991 seems pretty important to me, 01:19:14.991 --> 01:19:17.021 not to mention the fact that we have invested 01:19:17.021 --> 01:19:18.898 a lot of money to upgrade them 01:19:18.898 --> 01:19:20.849 and now they're sitting on the ramp. 01:19:20.849 --> 01:19:23.850 The economics of that just don't add up. 01:19:23.850 --> 01:19:26.738 Westover Air Reserve Base in Massachusetts 01:19:26.738 --> 01:19:28.988 has eight of these aircraft 01:19:29.161 --> 01:19:31.135 and the people there tell me that these planes 01:19:31.135 --> 01:19:34.052 are in use pretty much all the time 01:19:34.669 --> 01:19:37.432 and I'm sure they would welcome additional C-5s 01:19:37.432 --> 01:19:39.449 to be able to work on their mission. 01:19:39.449 --> 01:19:40.616 So, thank you. 01:19:40.973 --> 01:19:42.973 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:19:44.868 --> 01:19:46.785 - Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 01:19:46.927 --> 01:19:48.781 Thank you, General for your service. 01:19:48.781 --> 01:19:51.540 I would like to focus a little bit on a topic 01:19:51.540 --> 01:19:55.373 that has been raised before, the cyber threat, 01:19:55.762 --> 01:19:59.262 and ask specifically about your experience 01:19:59.465 --> 01:20:02.465 so far with some of the contractors. 01:20:03.627 --> 01:20:06.460 Are they required to report to you 01:20:07.790 --> 01:20:11.957 incidents or episodes of cyberattack by a nation-state? 01:20:14.233 --> 01:20:16.411 - I believe that's a federal requirement, 01:20:16.411 --> 01:20:18.522 but they are required to report. 01:20:18.522 --> 01:20:20.855 - And do they report to you? 01:20:21.180 --> 01:20:25.347 - I believe they report to an organization called DC3. 01:20:29.172 --> 01:20:31.975 I'd have to get back to you on what that stands for. 01:20:31.975 --> 01:20:33.761 We speak in acronyms and sometimes you forget 01:20:33.761 --> 01:20:36.018 what the acronym actually stands for, 01:20:36.018 --> 01:20:37.854 but they actually report through an organization, 01:20:37.854 --> 01:20:40.354 I believe, that's part of DHS. 01:20:40.793 --> 01:20:41.736 - Part of what, sorry? 01:20:41.736 --> 01:20:43.909 - The Department of Homeland Security. 01:20:43.909 --> 01:20:47.528 - So they don't report to the Department of Defense. 01:20:47.528 --> 01:20:48.982 - Not that I'm aware of. 01:20:48.982 --> 01:20:51.774 - But they're under contract with the Department of Defense. 01:20:51.774 --> 01:20:52.607 - Right. 01:20:52.808 --> 01:20:55.725 - Why aren't they reporting to you? 01:20:56.996 --> 01:20:59.680 - Let me be more clear about that afterwards. 01:20:59.680 --> 01:21:01.738 I'll get back to you on the record for that, 01:21:01.738 --> 01:21:05.070 but I'm trying to remember exactly the reporting chain. 01:21:05.070 --> 01:21:06.900 The reporting requirement may be dual 01:21:06.900 --> 01:21:09.317 and I don't want to misspeak. 01:21:10.606 --> 01:21:14.773 - I'm somewhat surprised that they are carrying out 01:21:15.056 --> 01:21:19.223 an essential national security and defense mission, 01:21:20.656 --> 01:21:24.156 they're under attack just as they would be 01:21:24.556 --> 01:21:28.355 if they were conducting a convoy in Afghanistan, 01:21:28.355 --> 01:21:31.558 and the Department of Defense is not informed directly. 01:21:31.558 --> 01:21:34.808 - Well, part of it, Senator, is attack. 01:21:36.314 --> 01:21:38.367 So let's talk about attack for a second. 01:21:38.367 --> 01:21:41.599 So let's say today, and I hate to name a company, 01:21:41.599 --> 01:21:43.763 because it'll get somebody in trouble. 01:21:43.763 --> 01:21:46.993 If someone is not necessarily contracted with us 01:21:46.993 --> 01:21:49.726 and they get attacked, that's the same as if 01:21:49.726 --> 01:21:52.839 they're actually contracted with us and they get attacked. 01:21:52.839 --> 01:21:55.601 So I don't care where they report to, 01:21:55.601 --> 01:21:57.990 because if an adversary gets on their network 01:21:57.990 --> 01:21:59.773 and stays on their network, 01:21:59.773 --> 01:22:01.099 it doesn't matter whether they're actually 01:22:01.099 --> 01:22:02.804 doing my work at the time 01:22:02.804 --> 01:22:05.811 when the adversary moves laterally through their network 01:22:05.811 --> 01:22:08.621 and potentially invades my network. 01:22:08.621 --> 01:22:10.263 - And that's exactly the reason, General, 01:22:10.263 --> 01:22:12.327 why I think they should be reporting to you, 01:22:12.327 --> 01:22:15.077 because even if they're attacked, 01:22:16.994 --> 01:22:18.301 well, let me put it differently. 01:22:18.301 --> 01:22:21.978 It makes no difference whether they do civilian 01:22:21.978 --> 01:22:24.061 as well as military work. 01:22:24.545 --> 01:22:28.628 If they're attacked, it is an attack on a network 01:22:29.042 --> 01:22:33.209 that is performing national security military work 01:22:33.315 --> 01:22:36.122 and potentially not only undermines 01:22:36.122 --> 01:22:37.826 the function they do for you 01:22:37.826 --> 01:22:41.409 but gains entry into your computer networks 01:22:41.756 --> 01:22:44.883 and the Department of Defense computer networks. 01:22:44.883 --> 01:22:47.966 So I'm somewhat at a loss to know why 01:22:49.928 --> 01:22:53.345 they are not instantaneously telling you, 01:22:53.468 --> 01:22:56.794 "We've been attacked by Russia or China." 01:22:56.794 --> 01:22:58.127 - Part of it is, 01:22:59.114 --> 01:23:01.531 I can't do anything about it. 01:23:02.011 --> 01:23:04.583 This organization that they would report to 01:23:04.583 --> 01:23:07.083 has partnerships and alliances 01:23:07.929 --> 01:23:09.893 with the Department of Defense. 01:23:09.893 --> 01:23:12.410 So the Department of Homeland Security 01:23:12.410 --> 01:23:15.910 in their role to have the the non-DOD side 01:23:16.313 --> 01:23:20.480 of cyber defense is partnered with DOD and Cybercom, 01:23:21.782 --> 01:23:25.677 so that organization that would respond to an attack 01:23:25.677 --> 01:23:27.260 is linked that way. 01:23:28.557 --> 01:23:32.140 My organization would be interested to know 01:23:32.171 --> 01:23:35.588 that that that company has been attacked, 01:23:35.928 --> 01:23:37.943 but we would rely on others 01:23:37.943 --> 01:23:39.724 to do something about it. 01:23:39.724 --> 01:23:40.663 We would like to know 01:23:40.663 --> 01:23:42.898 because then it would tell us what we could do 01:23:42.898 --> 01:23:45.407 with that organization going forward. 01:23:45.407 --> 01:23:46.966 - Well, I would think for a variety of reasons 01:23:46.966 --> 01:23:47.886 you'd like to know. 01:23:47.886 --> 01:23:49.266 Have you ever asked, 01:23:49.266 --> 01:23:52.033 and have you ever sought that information? 01:23:52.033 --> 01:23:53.532 - Yeah, so that information sharing 01:23:53.532 --> 01:23:54.925 is what I'm really talking about. 01:23:54.925 --> 01:23:57.645 We have good information sharing in some areas. 01:23:57.645 --> 01:24:00.699 It can be better across in the entire spectrum, 01:24:00.699 --> 01:24:03.058 because most of the time the attack 01:24:03.058 --> 01:24:05.207 or the intrusion takes place 01:24:05.207 --> 01:24:07.938 and no one thinks is an attack or an intrusion. 01:24:07.938 --> 01:24:11.855 It can look like a harmless mechanical failure. 01:24:13.012 --> 01:24:14.506 - Well, let me ask you this. 01:24:14.506 --> 01:24:17.923 Would you like that information directly? 01:24:18.850 --> 01:24:20.416 - I think I do need it directly. 01:24:20.416 --> 01:24:23.202 I don't need it as quickly as Cybercom needs it 01:24:23.202 --> 01:24:24.535 or DHS needs it, 01:24:24.847 --> 01:24:26.121 but I do need the information. 01:24:26.121 --> 01:24:28.576 - Well, you do need it directly. 01:24:28.576 --> 01:24:31.862 When you talk about you don't need it as quickly, 01:24:31.862 --> 01:24:33.869 if it's made available to them, 01:24:33.869 --> 01:24:35.135 it has to be made available to you. 01:24:35.135 --> 01:24:36.218 - Absolutely. 01:24:36.359 --> 01:24:37.192 - Thank you. 01:24:37.192 --> 01:24:38.857 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:24:38.857 --> 01:24:40.048 - The unfortunate thing, Senator, 01:24:40.048 --> 01:24:42.715 is that the speed of this domain 01:24:42.917 --> 01:24:46.691 doesn't purport well to how we do information sharing. 01:24:46.691 --> 01:24:48.691 Things happen so quickly 01:24:48.747 --> 01:24:50.766 and we've got to not think about sharing, 01:24:50.766 --> 01:24:54.266 we just have to share in a classified way. 01:24:54.279 --> 01:24:56.779 - [Sen. Blumenthal] Thank you. 01:25:00.194 --> 01:25:03.611 - All I can say is that we need to share. 01:25:03.998 --> 01:25:06.581 We also need to have an ability 01:25:07.372 --> 01:25:09.688 to either your organization or someone 01:25:09.688 --> 01:25:12.438 to respond and to try to prevent, 01:25:14.851 --> 01:25:16.770 which is one of the major issues 01:25:16.770 --> 01:25:20.187 that this committee is having to address, 01:25:21.415 --> 01:25:24.498 since the last administration didn't. 01:25:25.361 --> 01:25:26.194 Jack? 01:25:26.431 --> 01:25:27.649 - [Sen. Reed] Ah, no sir. 01:25:27.649 --> 01:25:28.482 No comment. 01:25:28.482 --> 01:25:30.159 - Thank you, General. 01:25:30.159 --> 01:25:31.055 - [Gen. McDew] Thank You, Chairman. 01:25:31.055 --> 01:25:31.888 Thank you.