WEBVTT 00:00.933 --> 00:02.571 - All right, we'll go ahead and get started 00:02.571 --> 00:06.321 as it appears to be about the appointed hour. 00:06.689 --> 00:08.705 Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome 00:08.705 --> 00:12.872 to the final panel discussion of the day, Sealift. 00:13.387 --> 00:16.071 Special thanks to LMI for sponsoring 00:16.071 --> 00:18.134 this very important topic. 00:18.134 --> 00:19.801 Thank you, shipmate. 00:20.018 --> 00:21.768 My name is Buz Buzby. 00:22.042 --> 00:23.801 I'm the happen to be the president 00:23.801 --> 00:26.959 of the National Defense Transportation Association, 00:26.959 --> 00:29.398 former commander of Military Sealift Command 00:29.398 --> 00:33.565 and, in general, lover of ships and sailors who sail them. 00:33.698 --> 00:36.243 We have assembled here this afternoon 00:36.243 --> 00:37.998 the principal government stakeholders, 00:37.998 --> 00:41.915 who figure prominently in the sealift equation. 00:42.328 --> 00:46.161 And as you can see it's not just a navy thing. 00:46.486 --> 00:49.436 There are a lot of moving parts across the joint force 00:49.436 --> 00:52.963 and a significant role played by a commercial industry 00:52.963 --> 00:57.130 in our sealift capacity and that's just on a normal day. 00:57.514 --> 01:00.800 Add in the budget challenges faced by the government, 01:00.800 --> 01:04.967 the economic challenges faced by commercial ship operators 01:05.247 --> 01:07.078 and the growing potential that the next 01:07.078 --> 01:09.826 large sealift operation will take place 01:09.826 --> 01:12.076 in a contested environment, 01:13.372 --> 01:15.006 not just the benign environment we saw 01:15.006 --> 01:18.191 during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. 01:18.191 --> 01:20.946 Now you're talking about an issue that gets to the top 01:20.946 --> 01:24.196 of the pile of a lot of people's desks. 01:25.821 --> 01:29.826 Our mission today is to help you understand that we need 01:29.826 --> 01:33.993 to have a fundamentally different discussion about sealift, 01:35.640 --> 01:39.557 and we've maybe had in the last 10 years or so. 01:40.571 --> 01:42.691 It's probably one of the least understood parts 01:42.691 --> 01:45.197 of the Defense Transportation System, 01:45.197 --> 01:48.684 but it is the key enabler to moving our nation's 01:48.684 --> 01:52.351 combat power forward and then sustaining it. 01:53.897 --> 01:58.044 We have a lot to think about and a lot to discuss, 01:58.044 --> 02:00.341 but we have the right folks here to do just that. 02:00.341 --> 02:02.804 We'll hear about the requirements, 02:02.804 --> 02:04.759 we'll hear about the assets 02:04.759 --> 02:07.495 and we'll hear about future plans. 02:07.495 --> 02:10.912 And then we're gonna wanna hear about you 02:11.105 --> 02:15.272 about our panelists after they conclude their presentations. 02:16.506 --> 02:19.269 I will note that we are one panelist short up here, 02:19.269 --> 02:22.102 General McDew was to be here today 02:23.918 --> 02:27.751 and literally just moments ago got called away 02:27.861 --> 02:32.028 for a matter of state that was obviously pretty important 02:32.801 --> 02:35.603 because I know he wanted to be here 02:35.603 --> 02:37.953 and wanted very much to talk about sealift. 02:37.953 --> 02:39.175 See, he's very passionate about it. 02:39.175 --> 02:41.390 Those of you that were at the luncheon today 02:41.390 --> 02:43.140 heard him discuss it. 02:43.372 --> 02:46.058 He has made it his number one priority, 02:46.058 --> 02:50.141 which is pretty amazing for a TRANSCOM commander. 02:50.215 --> 02:53.220 As far as I know, it's the first time that's ever occurred. 02:53.220 --> 02:56.137 He gets sealift and he's very sorry 02:58.505 --> 03:02.672 that he could not be here and sends his apologies. 03:04.486 --> 03:08.414 However, we do have somebody who can fill in and speak 03:08.414 --> 03:11.082 to the area that he was going to speak to, 03:11.082 --> 03:14.291 which was primarily the sealift requirement, 03:14.291 --> 03:17.779 and that is a panelist that was going to be here anyway 03:17.779 --> 03:21.112 and he's now gonna be doing double duty. 03:21.200 --> 03:24.221 And that is one Mr. Scott DiLisio, who heads up 03:24.221 --> 03:27.507 the Strategic Mobility and Combat Logistics Division, 03:27.507 --> 03:29.674 better known as OPNAV N42. 03:30.854 --> 03:33.805 Mr. DiLisio was appointed to the Senior Executive Service 03:33.805 --> 03:37.972 in December of 2006 and has 25 years of Federal Service. 03:39.391 --> 03:42.074 He's responsible for providing sealift 03:42.074 --> 03:44.658 and combat logistics planning, programming 03:44.658 --> 03:48.817 and policy guidance to the deputy chief of naval operations, 03:48.817 --> 03:51.984 fleet readiness and logistics and for, 03:52.299 --> 03:56.466 to the deputy assistant secretary of the navy RDA ships 03:56.913 --> 04:01.069 and to the director for logistics joint chief of staff 04:01.069 --> 04:03.569 for a fleet of over 100 ships. 04:04.123 --> 04:06.874 For those of you who still not, may not have 04:06.874 --> 04:10.457 a good sight picture about what Scott does, 04:11.204 --> 04:14.208 just think of him as the young Jon Kaskin. 04:14.208 --> 04:16.422 (laughter) 04:16.422 --> 04:20.339 There's the old Jon Kaskin for comparison sake. 04:21.758 --> 04:25.112 As a platform sponsor, N42 is responsible for planning 04:25.112 --> 04:28.922 and setting policy for our navy's strategic sealift 04:28.922 --> 04:33.089 and combat logistic forces for the next 30 to 50 years. 04:33.439 --> 04:35.371 They also provide subject matter experts 04:35.371 --> 04:38.415 for all sealift and mobility issue studies 04:38.415 --> 04:40.302 that go on throughout the navy. 04:40.302 --> 04:44.252 So with that, please join me in welcoming Mr. Scott DiLisio. 04:44.252 --> 04:46.669 (applauding) 04:48.613 --> 04:49.946 That wasn't bad. 04:50.596 --> 04:51.846 - That was bad. 04:52.720 --> 04:55.436 By the way, I've never ever called you the old Jon Kaskin. 04:55.436 --> 04:57.686 (laughter) 04:58.028 --> 04:59.838 Matter of fact, there's a lot of things that you told me 04:59.838 --> 05:02.483 that I am living the dream right now, so. 05:02.483 --> 05:04.650 Can you guys hear me okay? 05:05.384 --> 05:08.384 - [Man] Pull a little closer, maybe. 05:08.410 --> 05:10.993 - So if General McDew were here 05:11.524 --> 05:14.759 he would tell you we need more sealift, 05:14.759 --> 05:18.759 he would also tell you that we need new sealift. 05:19.343 --> 05:22.026 He and I suffer a very same fate, 05:22.026 --> 05:23.756 and it's gonna be very difficult for me 05:23.756 --> 05:25.540 to do his part and my part because that makes me 05:25.540 --> 05:28.284 a little schizophrenic because as you know 05:28.284 --> 05:31.811 resourcing is not always making the COCOM happy. 05:31.811 --> 05:35.478 But we have definitely forged a partnership. 05:35.720 --> 05:38.381 TRANSCOM is able to play at a level detail 05:38.381 --> 05:41.798 that they find it painful but they enjoy. 05:42.160 --> 05:44.041 And my partners here are gonna talk to you 05:44.041 --> 05:48.073 about the results of what we're able to do together. 05:48.073 --> 05:50.859 So General McDew wants to move as much of the force 05:50.859 --> 05:53.442 as he can whenever he needs to. 05:53.580 --> 05:54.814 Some very simple requirement. 05:54.814 --> 05:57.276 Sounds like it, except the force is massive 05:57.276 --> 06:00.119 and our force is not necessarily big enough 06:00.119 --> 06:02.369 to move it all in one shot. 06:03.235 --> 06:04.940 Then you add a few other neat features 06:04.940 --> 06:07.940 like getting shot at, cyber attacks, 06:09.279 --> 06:11.937 ways of the world that most of you see 06:11.937 --> 06:13.770 in your everyday life. 06:13.829 --> 06:15.723 Somebody hacks your account. 06:15.723 --> 06:18.777 Just imagine if your account was an engineering plant 06:18.777 --> 06:19.610 on a ship. 06:20.853 --> 06:23.662 So very important things going on. 06:23.662 --> 06:25.271 The general's question is, "What are you doing 06:25.271 --> 06:27.188 "to mitigate the risk?" 06:27.521 --> 06:31.021 So let me start with resourcing variables. 06:31.593 --> 06:33.728 And I closed my notes because it's gonna be tough 06:33.728 --> 06:36.561 to be General McDew with my notes. 06:37.067 --> 06:39.400 Age of a vessel is variable. 06:39.668 --> 06:42.458 And our force is getting fairly old. 06:42.458 --> 06:44.108 The type of vessel is a variable. 06:44.108 --> 06:46.114 We don't have all the same type. 06:46.114 --> 06:48.635 So when you see warships, we try to get close 06:48.635 --> 06:50.359 to the same type as much as we can. 06:50.359 --> 06:51.748 We don't have the luxury when it comes 06:51.748 --> 06:54.415 to auxiliaries in sealift ships. 06:54.803 --> 06:57.071 We have some, but for the most part we have a lot 06:57.071 --> 07:00.571 of configuration proliferation, excuse me. 07:01.768 --> 07:04.671 We have parts needs that are different on almost every ship 07:04.671 --> 07:07.254 because of age, because of wear 07:07.316 --> 07:10.399 and emergent capability that we have. 07:10.773 --> 07:13.372 We have ships all over the world, 07:13.372 --> 07:15.487 we have them all over the United States, 07:15.487 --> 07:17.557 all over the world which means 07:17.557 --> 07:20.307 different capabilities for repair 07:20.480 --> 07:21.910 and yet they all have to be ready, 07:21.910 --> 07:24.658 they all have to locate, they all have to load. 07:24.658 --> 07:26.671 And in the case of the auxiliaries, 07:26.671 --> 07:29.307 they're on the pointy end, they have to win 07:29.307 --> 07:33.307 in order to bring the heavy load in for sealift. 07:33.375 --> 07:37.131 So we get, sealift ships are around 60 plus ships, 07:37.131 --> 07:40.008 in my portfolio I've got over 160 ships total. 07:40.008 --> 07:41.337 (phone ringing) 07:41.337 --> 07:43.185 And that is not my phone. 07:43.185 --> 07:45.191 (laughter) 07:45.191 --> 07:47.258 So back to General McDew. 07:47.258 --> 07:50.248 I wanna move it, I wanna move it as fast as I can, 07:50.248 --> 07:53.612 I wanna go heavy and I wanna take as much as I can. 07:53.612 --> 07:57.662 Over to you, resource sponsor, what are you gonna do? 07:57.662 --> 08:00.351 Well, if you went to the last panel, 08:00.351 --> 08:04.518 I thought one of the speakers had an interesting comment. 08:04.923 --> 08:09.035 He said, "We're in an age where we manage what's left." 08:09.035 --> 08:11.278 And it just so happens that right now 08:11.278 --> 08:13.833 I have to keep everything we have, pinpoint ready, 08:13.833 --> 08:16.448 because it is what we have left. 08:16.448 --> 08:18.031 It's a large force. 08:18.815 --> 08:19.913 And somebody's gonna ask me, 08:19.913 --> 08:22.515 "Well, then it's time to recapitalize, isn't it?" 08:22.515 --> 08:23.432 Yes, it is. 08:24.321 --> 08:27.319 And so with the general, I'm sure he would've, 08:27.319 --> 08:29.191 he probably outed me to lunch, 08:29.191 --> 08:31.201 but with the general we are starting to work 08:31.201 --> 08:35.368 a comprehensive plan to figure out how to rebuild sealift. 08:36.726 --> 08:39.846 And so some of you have a vision on what that might be 08:39.846 --> 08:41.213 'cause you have maybe some knowledge 08:41.213 --> 08:43.588 of what a sealift ship looks like. 08:43.588 --> 08:45.287 What we're gonna build is the sealift ship 08:45.287 --> 08:49.203 for 30 years from now, not today's sealift ship. 08:49.203 --> 08:53.370 So it has capabilities and it has, let's just call it, 08:54.879 --> 08:58.433 quirks about it that you don't see today that make it 08:58.433 --> 09:02.600 more capable for the 30 years we have to go forward. 09:03.472 --> 09:06.162 So now let's get back to resourcing. 09:06.162 --> 09:07.818 The force we have is required. 09:07.818 --> 09:10.698 I can't let it go and it has to be ready. 09:10.698 --> 09:13.698 So age of the ship, the type of ship 09:15.333 --> 09:16.634 and those things that we need to do 09:16.634 --> 09:17.797 to keep that ship ready. 09:17.797 --> 09:21.416 And I'm sure you folks will talk about that a little bit, 09:21.416 --> 09:25.166 how hard it is to do on a constrained budget. 09:25.583 --> 09:29.750 But the budget is constrained over 160 ships, not just 60. 09:32.158 --> 09:34.532 And 160 ships is constrained because it competes 09:34.532 --> 09:37.282 with every warship in the planet. 09:37.510 --> 09:39.936 And so the question now is how do we build 09:39.936 --> 09:43.212 a comprehensive program to rebuild sealift? 09:43.212 --> 09:46.129 And that's what the partners and I, 09:46.244 --> 09:48.827 with General McDew's influence, 09:49.493 --> 09:51.716 are gonna have to do over the next year. 09:51.716 --> 09:55.314 We're going to have to put our program on the table. 09:55.314 --> 09:56.808 (indistinct talking) 09:56.808 --> 09:59.251 And over the next year, we'll have to figure out 09:59.251 --> 10:01.001 how to get resourced. 10:01.638 --> 10:03.882 So now what's the important piece, 10:03.882 --> 10:07.049 keeping the current force ready to go. 10:07.430 --> 10:10.549 We have a budget in place right now that does that. 10:10.549 --> 10:12.607 You'll see a little bit of an increase in the budget 10:12.607 --> 10:16.774 for current sealift vessels and auxiliaries for that matter. 10:17.169 --> 10:19.763 So we're starting to make sure that material condition 10:19.763 --> 10:23.930 doesn't drive us to a ship that we cannot activate. 10:24.629 --> 10:27.252 These folks on either side of me will get a chance 10:27.252 --> 10:29.905 to activate more often to prove that their ships 10:29.905 --> 10:33.537 actually are ready to go 'cause we are entering in 10:33.537 --> 10:35.449 to a sense of urgency that's a little higher 10:35.449 --> 10:37.032 than we're used to. 10:39.031 --> 10:43.198 So, then you say, "Well, how much do sealift ships cost?" 10:45.291 --> 10:48.512 Well, I'm gonna walk you through a list of things. 10:48.512 --> 10:49.832 And you probably didn't think about this, 10:49.832 --> 10:53.999 but sealift, as a resource, everybody think ships. 10:54.462 --> 10:56.850 So we talked about age of the ship, 10:56.850 --> 11:00.531 we now have dry dock results we gotta pay attention to. 11:00.531 --> 11:03.337 We have certification partners that are under fire. 11:03.337 --> 11:06.587 ABS, Coast Guard these are our partners 11:06.659 --> 11:09.826 that keep our ships certified and safe 11:09.897 --> 11:11.796 and ready to go to sea. 11:11.796 --> 11:14.527 So if they're pressurized, we're pressurized. 11:14.527 --> 11:16.060 It'd be a hell of a thing for me not to be able 11:16.060 --> 11:19.436 to have a ship sail because the certification agent 11:19.436 --> 11:22.963 had been cut to the point of not having us as a priority. 11:22.963 --> 11:24.880 Pretty important stuff. 11:25.836 --> 11:27.888 Schedules, schedules top everything. 11:27.888 --> 11:31.890 If the ship needs to be put in a dry dock, then it goes. 11:31.890 --> 11:33.798 If it needs to be put out on a mission, 11:33.798 --> 11:36.281 the question is which one takes precedence. 11:36.281 --> 11:38.305 Right now, the dry dock does. 11:38.305 --> 11:40.790 In the future, we may not be so kind to our ships 11:40.790 --> 11:42.623 and we may have to go. 11:43.041 --> 11:44.791 Cash flow and timing. 11:45.262 --> 11:47.945 I could tell you all about resourcing at the Pentagon. 11:47.945 --> 11:49.904 All I need to do is burst into tears for about 11:49.904 --> 11:53.534 10 solid minutes and you pretty much have the picture. 11:53.534 --> 11:57.367 Ship support, engineering, talent Engineering. 11:57.619 --> 12:01.362 Spare parts, repair and maintenance capabilities. 12:01.362 --> 12:03.575 And I'm talking not just in the office, 12:03.575 --> 12:06.750 I'm talking about in the shipyards all over the world. 12:06.750 --> 12:09.583 Tooling, test equipment, training, 12:11.293 --> 12:13.755 exercises and activations have to rise 12:13.755 --> 12:15.185 because right now our results 12:15.185 --> 12:16.344 are not where we want them to be 12:16.344 --> 12:19.427 so we're gonna have to exercise more. 12:20.040 --> 12:21.066 Does anybody know what the difference 12:21.066 --> 12:24.733 between fully operational and reserve means? 12:26.108 --> 12:27.977 So fully operational means you're out there 12:27.977 --> 12:28.810 every single day. 12:28.810 --> 12:30.739 For deployed, we have ships that run 12:30.739 --> 12:32.397 with the strike groups in the ARGs 12:32.397 --> 12:36.041 and they fortify those warfighting capabilities 12:36.041 --> 12:38.893 pointy end, no kidding getting shot at 12:38.893 --> 12:42.610 and we do it with merchant mariners every single day. 12:42.610 --> 12:45.633 I have command ships that are hybrid crewed, 12:45.633 --> 12:47.848 I have submarine tenders that are hybrid crewed 12:47.848 --> 12:50.988 so that means that not only is the uniformed fighter there 12:50.988 --> 12:55.071 but the hybrid merchant mariner is there as well. 12:55.442 --> 12:56.275 Same heat. 12:59.411 --> 13:01.744 Then we talk about location. 13:02.111 --> 13:04.048 So the mariner wants to know where am I going, 13:04.048 --> 13:06.465 how long am I gonna be there. 13:06.911 --> 13:09.323 Is there an industrial support where I'm going? 13:09.323 --> 13:10.867 Is the water deep enough? 13:10.867 --> 13:11.700 Big ships. 13:12.839 --> 13:14.908 Can I get everything I need? 13:14.908 --> 13:17.663 Do I have to get my parts through customs? 13:17.663 --> 13:20.870 And stuff today that's almost foreign to our DNA 13:20.870 --> 13:22.406 if you're fighting a war. 13:22.406 --> 13:23.793 You're like, "Okay, I think I'm gonna clear 13:23.793 --> 13:25.773 "customs pretty easily." 13:25.773 --> 13:28.517 Maybe not so much if the country you're working with 13:28.517 --> 13:30.184 isn't participating. 13:30.208 --> 13:33.788 Things are a little strange today and those things cause 13:33.788 --> 13:36.455 resource problems and variables. 13:37.770 --> 13:40.135 So General McDew says, "Hey, that's great, I got it. 13:40.135 --> 13:42.656 "You're gonna have to figure that out." 13:42.656 --> 13:45.255 And the next class of ships is gonna be needed 13:45.255 --> 13:46.588 and needed soon. 13:46.698 --> 13:48.349 Jon, you and I have talked about ship building. 13:48.349 --> 13:50.599 Quick, we gotta do it soon. 13:51.534 --> 13:53.335 We also gotta keep our mariners. 13:53.335 --> 13:55.684 Our mariner health is important or we won't have anybody 13:55.684 --> 13:57.915 to man the ships when we build them. 13:57.915 --> 14:01.335 So if you got a chance to listen to the last panel, 14:01.335 --> 14:05.502 there's some pretty dire pieces of information in there 14:06.402 --> 14:07.685 that you should pay attention to. 14:07.685 --> 14:09.184 If you didn't get to go, you ought to go back 14:09.184 --> 14:12.064 and look at the slides because we continue 14:12.064 --> 14:13.897 to admire the problem. 14:14.562 --> 14:16.312 We haven't solved it. 14:16.542 --> 14:18.161 And so now it's time to solve the problem 14:18.161 --> 14:20.158 or we won't have a sealift capability 14:20.158 --> 14:22.825 because the mariners won't come. 14:24.686 --> 14:28.603 Anybody worried about port cost, canal passage? 14:30.599 --> 14:32.648 That's kinda sporty when you have a really big ship 14:32.648 --> 14:34.981 full of warfighting machine. 14:35.015 --> 14:37.093 We gotta pay attention to it. 14:37.093 --> 14:40.676 Worldwide concerns, no warning activations. 14:41.612 --> 14:43.619 And the task to bring the fight, 14:43.619 --> 14:45.454 I don't think everybody realizes 14:45.454 --> 14:48.037 sealift brings the fight heavy. 14:50.732 --> 14:54.195 So the resource that I'm talking to you about today, 14:54.195 --> 14:57.941 and I have spent almost no time on it in the, 14:57.941 --> 15:01.104 almost five years I've been in this seat, 15:01.104 --> 15:04.487 is these are not even ships I'm talking about, 15:04.487 --> 15:08.300 I'm talking about the people of the Maritime Administration 15:08.300 --> 15:09.679 and I'm talking about the people 15:09.679 --> 15:11.575 of the Military Sealift Command 15:11.575 --> 15:13.570 and then I'm talking about the user community 15:13.570 --> 15:17.161 that I think Nancy is gonna help us with a little bit, 15:17.161 --> 15:21.201 those are the resources that I'm trying to keep alive. 15:21.201 --> 15:25.368 And if we don't keep them alive I don't have ships anymore. 15:27.044 --> 15:29.597 So I think General McDew would tell you, 15:29.597 --> 15:31.207 and by the way if I'm sitting in for him 15:31.207 --> 15:33.096 I understand I was great at lunch. 15:33.096 --> 15:35.120 (laughter) 15:35.120 --> 15:37.704 But he's a good friend, he's very concerned, 15:37.704 --> 15:39.817 he's an avid supporter of this, and I know 15:39.817 --> 15:42.142 because he spends a lot of time yelling at me 15:42.142 --> 15:44.787 to get the resources protected and up 15:44.787 --> 15:46.794 so that we can do our job. 15:46.794 --> 15:49.811 And I know if I need the help he'll come and give it to me 15:49.811 --> 15:51.717 and the folks around me. 15:51.717 --> 15:54.967 And, Buz, I think I'll hold it at that. 16:00.012 --> 16:01.145 - All right, thanks, Scott. 16:01.145 --> 16:04.224 Appreciate the remarks and some hope there, hopefully, 16:04.224 --> 16:08.391 for the future of our Merchant Marine and recapitalizing. 16:08.444 --> 16:11.675 We'll perhaps hear a little bit more about that later. 16:11.675 --> 16:13.610 Our next panelist is General McDew's 16:13.610 --> 16:15.852 maritime component commander. 16:15.852 --> 16:19.125 He also happens to be the navy commander 16:19.125 --> 16:21.792 of the Military Sealift Command. 16:22.687 --> 16:23.937 He owns assets. 16:24.224 --> 16:26.181 He's gonna talk about those things 16:26.181 --> 16:28.636 that Scott was just talking about. 16:28.636 --> 16:30.430 Rear Admiral Dee Mewbourne 16:30.430 --> 16:33.097 is a 1982 Naval Academy graduate 16:33.425 --> 16:35.637 and has commanded an air squadron, 16:35.637 --> 16:39.155 three aircraft carriers and amphibious ship, 16:39.155 --> 16:40.794 two carrier strike groups 16:40.794 --> 16:43.511 and a naval service training command. 16:43.511 --> 16:47.623 He knows a little bit about ships, even as for an aviator. 16:47.623 --> 16:51.040 He took command of MSC in August of 2016. 16:51.792 --> 16:54.705 Please join me in welcoming Rear Admiral Dee Mewbourne. 16:54.705 --> 16:57.122 (applauding) 17:00.643 --> 17:02.300 - Thanks, Buz, and thank you all. 17:02.300 --> 17:04.737 You know, I came with a thesis that is 17:04.737 --> 17:07.791 that sealift is integral to national security. 17:07.791 --> 17:10.910 And I will start sort of developing that thesis 17:10.910 --> 17:13.036 by taking us back to World War II 17:13.036 --> 17:17.203 in a battle that we call now the Battle of the Atlantic. 17:17.402 --> 17:19.792 Not really a battle in the classic sense 17:19.792 --> 17:22.112 and that it wasn't fought over a single place 17:22.112 --> 17:25.112 in a single period in days or weeks, 17:25.200 --> 17:27.387 but really measured in years. 17:27.387 --> 17:29.637 You know, from 1939 to 1945 17:29.994 --> 17:31.815 and span the entire Atlantic Ocean 17:31.815 --> 17:35.982 and it was really a battle against our wills, I would say. 17:36.582 --> 17:39.499 Our will to move supplies and goods 17:41.036 --> 17:44.286 in order to reinforce the war in Europe 17:45.716 --> 17:48.964 and, of course, the Nazi will to prevent that. 17:48.964 --> 17:51.394 And we kinda know the outcome of it. 17:51.394 --> 17:55.253 I think that Winston Churchill, he observed in his memoir 17:55.253 --> 17:58.052 that the Battle of the Atlantic was the dominating factor 17:58.052 --> 17:59.719 all through the war. 18:00.895 --> 18:04.312 And so we started with about 1,340 ships, 18:05.018 --> 18:07.815 is what the stats are that I looked up, 18:07.815 --> 18:10.689 and when the war ended we had a merchant fleet 18:10.689 --> 18:11.522 that was-- 18:12.764 --> 18:14.484 These impressions that he left me 18:14.484 --> 18:17.863 now as I walk the (mumbles) waterfront are very powerful 18:17.863 --> 18:20.472 and especially in the job that I'm in now. 18:20.472 --> 18:22.810 As I think about that same Atlantic Ocean 18:22.810 --> 18:26.802 and what the future may hold, for the marines, right, 18:26.802 --> 18:29.802 the very mariners that work for MSC, 18:30.285 --> 18:34.452 I guess it gives me a sense of duty and obligation 18:35.188 --> 18:39.021 that maybe that is quite honed by his service. 18:40.471 --> 18:44.638 I also, this was mentioned, I've had the opportunity 18:44.789 --> 18:46.687 to command three aircraft carriers, 18:46.687 --> 18:49.226 one of which was the Dwight D. Eisenhower. 18:49.226 --> 18:51.862 And in that tour I learned this quote from Ike 18:51.862 --> 18:54.560 that I thought was something again that is, 18:54.560 --> 18:56.310 it means a lot to me. 18:56.336 --> 18:59.205 He said that history does not long entrust 18:59.205 --> 19:02.201 the care of the freedom to the weak or the timid. 19:02.201 --> 19:03.644 You've heard the quote, I'm sure. 19:03.644 --> 19:05.682 And again, it's something that resonates. 19:05.682 --> 19:07.755 And that you also have heard that if you seek peace, 19:07.755 --> 19:09.088 prepare for war. 19:09.471 --> 19:11.352 And so I carry those two things 19:11.352 --> 19:13.852 in the image of my dad with me 19:14.113 --> 19:16.835 as I come in to the job here at MSC. 19:16.835 --> 19:19.048 And putting it all together, then the obligation 19:19.048 --> 19:21.303 to protect the mariners of the future, 19:21.303 --> 19:23.751 if there is a Battle of the Atlantic 2. 19:23.751 --> 19:26.246 And making sure that if we do seek peace 19:26.246 --> 19:28.162 that we're preparing for war. 19:28.162 --> 19:30.923 And that history does not entrust the care of freedom 19:30.923 --> 19:32.762 to people who are weak or timid. 19:32.762 --> 19:35.241 And that is that I can't afford to be weak or timid, right, 19:35.241 --> 19:38.242 because I do feel like that it's my time, 19:38.242 --> 19:40.767 at least in sharing with all of you in this room, 19:40.767 --> 19:44.511 and we're entrusted with the care of freedom. 19:44.511 --> 19:47.178 MSC is a fantastic organization. 19:47.212 --> 19:49.378 It has a global mission: we empower 19:49.378 --> 19:51.878 global warfighting capability. 19:52.008 --> 19:54.967 We support the joint warfighter anywhere in the world, 19:54.967 --> 19:57.426 across the full spectrum of operations. 19:57.426 --> 20:01.593 We provide assured on-time logistics 24/7, 365. 20:03.239 --> 20:06.156 And I think that the mission of MSC 20:06.840 --> 20:09.239 is represented at least in me, to me 20:09.239 --> 20:11.902 by this image that's over on the left hand side. 20:11.902 --> 20:15.807 It's an image that I created when I first got to MSC. 20:15.807 --> 20:19.974 I'm a very visual learner and so for me to have an image 20:20.134 --> 20:22.917 that kinda represents a lot of elements 20:22.917 --> 20:26.127 is something that I find kinda powerful. 20:26.127 --> 20:30.294 So we created something that would help me tell the story 20:30.989 --> 20:34.506 of what I saw as my vision for MSC during my tenure. 20:34.506 --> 20:38.013 If you would allow me just to kinda describe this picture 20:38.013 --> 20:40.263 as I see it metaphorically. 20:40.328 --> 20:42.389 You know, the picture, first of all, I would say 20:42.389 --> 20:44.767 that it is a picture, not a painting, 20:44.767 --> 20:48.017 of one of our sealift ships as she was, 20:48.071 --> 20:51.457 I think it was taken maybe even from a ship 20:51.457 --> 20:54.731 of one of our coalition partners, I'm told. 20:54.731 --> 20:57.663 But the ship is, what it represents to me 20:57.663 --> 21:00.496 is obviously a ship that's mighty, 21:00.705 --> 21:04.872 it's in great shape and it sort of represents readiness 21:06.320 --> 21:09.974 and the need to preserve that readiness, that wholeness. 21:09.974 --> 21:13.711 And also I know you can't see 'em, but if you could zoom in 21:13.711 --> 21:15.325 you would see all these mariners, right. 21:15.325 --> 21:18.800 Men and women of conviction who have given 21:18.800 --> 21:22.173 some portion of their life to the service of their country 21:22.173 --> 21:25.166 and something that they believe is greater than them, 21:25.166 --> 21:26.249 some calling. 21:26.357 --> 21:30.524 And those young mariners, those mariners old and young 21:30.731 --> 21:34.231 are out there doing what we ask them to do 21:34.493 --> 21:37.667 very professionally, right, assured logistics 21:37.667 --> 21:39.500 anywhere in the world. 21:39.540 --> 21:42.092 And then the other thing it represents to me 21:42.092 --> 21:45.509 is you can see that the seas are roiling. 21:45.925 --> 21:49.925 So obviously there is something about the system 21:50.635 --> 21:53.968 that they're in that there's a challenge 21:54.046 --> 21:57.629 to the seas that that ship is in right now. 21:58.347 --> 22:02.180 And what I would ask you to do is, if you can, 22:02.835 --> 22:06.608 imagine with me that you could zoom out a little bit. 22:06.608 --> 22:10.623 And my question to you, given the state of the world, 22:10.623 --> 22:13.789 and that this is sort of a metaphorical representation 22:13.789 --> 22:16.039 of MSC, where is the storm? 22:17.927 --> 22:21.418 And to me, the storm is actually to the right hand side, 22:21.418 --> 22:23.257 off the bow of the ship. 22:23.257 --> 22:25.116 That the ship is sailing into the storm 22:25.116 --> 22:28.050 and that's represented sort of by representing 22:28.050 --> 22:31.379 the challenges that the ship or the MSC faces, 22:31.379 --> 22:33.462 the industry faces today. 22:33.665 --> 22:35.988 The first of which I think is mentioned a lot, 22:35.988 --> 22:38.882 it was mentioned by General McDew and Scott just now 22:38.882 --> 22:42.088 and even Buz in the opening, and that is that 22:42.088 --> 22:45.005 we are sailing in contested waters. 22:45.676 --> 22:47.863 The debate whether we will ever sail 22:47.863 --> 22:49.368 in contested waters again or something 22:49.368 --> 22:52.451 is I think over with, if nothing more 22:52.885 --> 22:54.767 than what happened with the Swift 22:54.767 --> 22:56.294 in the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb. 22:56.294 --> 22:59.976 And the fact today that we have put out advisories 22:59.976 --> 23:02.975 to the mariners that are sailing those waters. 23:02.975 --> 23:05.164 And then, of course, there's things that we're still 23:05.164 --> 23:08.382 seeing piracy off Somalia, you've seen that. 23:08.382 --> 23:12.549 And then you have the rise of near peers, or peers 23:13.664 --> 23:17.629 in the Pacific or Putinism or expansionism that things, 23:17.629 --> 23:20.638 the resurgency in Russia, as well as the challenges 23:20.638 --> 23:22.900 that we're seeing in cyberspace. 23:22.900 --> 23:24.939 And then on top of that we add challenges 23:24.939 --> 23:27.652 whether it's the budget or the health of our mariner force, 23:27.652 --> 23:30.046 the world economy and the list goes on. 23:30.046 --> 23:32.225 And the seas in which that we operate, I think, 23:32.225 --> 23:34.664 then are getting more contested 23:34.664 --> 23:38.237 or they're more challenged than ever before. 23:38.237 --> 23:40.679 I produced a strategy when I got to MSC, 23:40.679 --> 23:42.664 it was called the Voyage Plan. 23:42.664 --> 23:46.831 And as its name implies, it is a top level document 23:47.206 --> 23:49.556 about where we are and where we're going. 23:49.556 --> 23:51.992 In fact you can Google it or whatever, 23:51.992 --> 23:54.246 you can find it online or on our website. 23:54.246 --> 23:57.471 And it basically describes what I think 23:57.471 --> 24:00.304 where MSC is going over my tenure. 24:00.524 --> 24:04.691 And in there, I put, I listed what I call the Four Pillars 24:05.221 --> 24:07.203 that those tenets or those elements 24:07.203 --> 24:09.170 on which the entire organization 24:09.170 --> 24:11.539 I think rest each and every day. 24:11.539 --> 24:15.706 It's our people, our platforms, our processes and partners. 24:15.992 --> 24:19.295 And I think that the first three are pretty self-explanatory 24:19.295 --> 24:22.483 that we couldn't do what we do without them. 24:22.483 --> 24:26.650 It's the fourth P, the partners, it's why I'm here today. 24:27.716 --> 24:31.300 I'm here because of you, the partners that we have, 24:31.300 --> 24:34.015 whether you represent the shipbuilding industry 24:34.015 --> 24:37.554 or repair maritime unions, operating companies, 24:37.554 --> 24:41.721 the maritime schools, laboratories, analysts, think tanks, 24:42.228 --> 24:46.395 advocacy groups, federal, state, local government agencies 24:47.186 --> 24:51.353 all of you partner with MSC to ensure that we can do 24:51.748 --> 24:55.689 what it is that we're trying to, that we do around the world 24:55.689 --> 24:58.352 with assured maritime logistics. 24:58.352 --> 25:00.234 So I need your help, we need your help 25:00.234 --> 25:03.860 in solving these complex challenges that face MSC. 25:03.860 --> 25:06.406 For example, if you represent maritime unions 25:06.406 --> 25:08.623 the question might be, "How do train mariners 25:08.623 --> 25:12.113 "to be ready to operate in a contested environment?" 25:12.113 --> 25:14.940 If you're a shipbuilder, maybe, "How do you build a platform 25:14.940 --> 25:19.107 "that's ready to last for 30 years and survive in combat?" 25:19.499 --> 25:22.323 If you're a ship repair industry, "How can you improve 25:22.323 --> 25:26.336 "your ability to get ships out of your yard on time," right, 25:26.336 --> 25:30.003 because we are getting more and more demand. 25:30.025 --> 25:33.726 If you're an industry, "What innovation can you, 25:33.726 --> 25:35.785 "that will come from you to help MSC 25:35.785 --> 25:37.952 "meet its global mission?" 25:38.188 --> 25:40.411 If you're in the military, the question might be, 25:40.411 --> 25:42.379 "How do you incorporate seaborne logistics 25:42.379 --> 25:45.098 "into planning an experimentation," right, 25:45.098 --> 25:48.499 and, "wargaming with realistic maritime logistic factors 25:48.499 --> 25:50.166 "such as attrition?" 25:51.437 --> 25:53.486 How do we harden our cyber interfaces 25:53.486 --> 25:55.569 especially with industry? 25:55.620 --> 25:58.209 And how do we do this great collaboration 25:58.209 --> 26:01.486 in information sharing while still keeping 26:01.486 --> 26:04.486 operation security at the forefront? 26:04.887 --> 26:06.621 The bottomline is that there's a lot of questions 26:06.621 --> 26:07.788 for all of us. 26:08.386 --> 26:10.843 And I tell you what, if you've got ideas 26:10.843 --> 26:12.676 I have time to listen. 26:13.350 --> 26:16.823 The motto at the bottom is "united we sail" 26:16.823 --> 26:18.406 and I created that. 26:18.987 --> 26:21.872 Because I think that it had a couple of, 26:21.872 --> 26:24.598 it's short and sweet and I can remember it, 26:24.598 --> 26:28.765 but it has elements in it that matter a lot to me. 26:28.999 --> 26:32.499 My tenure really is all about unification, 26:33.550 --> 26:36.467 unity of focus and unity of effort. 26:37.051 --> 26:39.398 And acting, I believe that if we act as one 26:39.398 --> 26:42.370 with a clear and a shared vision of our end-state 26:42.370 --> 26:46.537 and perform as a championship team, we will not fail. 26:46.707 --> 26:50.457 Ready, relevant and resolute: united we sail. 26:51.792 --> 26:53.792 And united includes you. 26:54.498 --> 26:56.447 Thank you, I look forward to your questions. 26:56.447 --> 26:58.484 And I have a team here from MSC, 26:58.484 --> 27:01.578 if there's really hard ones I'll have to phone a friend 27:01.578 --> 27:03.828 but thank you for your attention. 27:03.828 --> 27:06.245 (applauding) 27:10.613 --> 27:12.363 - Thank you, Admiral. 27:12.927 --> 27:17.094 Our next panelist is the other government sealift owner. 27:17.414 --> 27:20.535 Mr. Kevin Tokarski is the US Maritime Administration, 27:20.535 --> 27:24.153 Associate Administrator for Strategic Sealift. 27:24.153 --> 27:27.403 He is a 1984 graduate of Fort Schuyler, 27:27.553 --> 27:30.009 holds a US Coast Guard license 27:30.009 --> 27:31.442 and was selected to serve 27:31.442 --> 27:34.775 in the Senior Executive Service in 2008. 27:35.437 --> 27:38.361 As associate administrator, his responsibilities include: 27:38.361 --> 27:42.262 government owned capabilities in the Ready Reserve Force 27:42.262 --> 27:44.677 and the National Defense Reserve Fleet, 27:44.677 --> 27:46.945 cargo and commercial sealift capabilities 27:46.945 --> 27:49.695 in the Maritime Security Program, 27:49.847 --> 27:52.702 (mumbles) cargo preference programs. 27:52.702 --> 27:55.761 He also deals in emergency preparedness and response, 27:55.761 --> 27:58.631 ship disposal and supporting the nation's 27:58.631 --> 28:02.592 seven maritime academies and workforce development. 28:02.592 --> 28:04.678 He supports several military planning 28:04.678 --> 28:07.727 for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 28:07.727 --> 28:11.339 as chairman of the Transport Group for ocean shipping. 28:11.339 --> 28:14.245 Please join me in welcoming Mr. Kevin Tokarski. 28:14.245 --> 28:15.078 - Thanks. 28:15.099 --> 28:17.516 (applauding) 28:19.076 --> 28:21.903 Thank you very much and I thank all of the audience here 28:21.903 --> 28:25.121 for participating and sitting in on this late, 28:25.121 --> 28:26.131 on a Tuesday afternoon. 28:26.131 --> 28:29.840 I think we're standing between you and a reception, 28:29.840 --> 28:31.880 but I really do appreciate. 28:31.880 --> 28:33.933 This is a bit of a homecoming, I think, for us 28:33.933 --> 28:36.903 in the sealift community to have you here with us. 28:36.903 --> 28:39.820 As Admiral Buzby mentioned, my role 28:40.619 --> 28:42.472 in the Maritime Administration, 28:42.472 --> 28:45.044 in the Department of Transportation, 28:45.044 --> 28:47.105 about 75% of our work is really to make sure 28:47.105 --> 28:49.241 that we've got a sealift capability 28:49.241 --> 28:50.552 to be able to support the nation. 28:50.552 --> 28:52.811 So when I say that, I mean federal ships, 28:52.811 --> 28:56.191 as part of that portfolio, the commercial industry, 28:56.191 --> 28:57.749 the maritime education and training 28:57.749 --> 29:01.916 to include the support to seven maritime academies 29:01.969 --> 29:05.386 as well as our industry training schools. 29:05.716 --> 29:07.141 You know, I thought I was gonna have Admiral, 29:07.141 --> 29:09.285 excuse me, General McDew here, 29:09.285 --> 29:10.889 and I was kinda be sitting between a guy 29:10.889 --> 29:12.938 who's got a resource requirement 29:12.938 --> 29:15.098 or resource control, if you will, 29:15.098 --> 29:17.664 as well as a guy who has a requirement that's pretty high. 29:17.664 --> 29:19.617 And that's oftentimes the balance that we're having 29:19.617 --> 29:21.207 in the sealift portfolio. 29:21.207 --> 29:24.547 It changes in evolving nature of our business 29:24.547 --> 29:26.643 because we'll never have everything we need, 29:26.643 --> 29:28.761 whether it's funding or the modern ships 29:28.761 --> 29:30.323 and the capabilities that we have. 29:30.323 --> 29:32.516 So we strive with the resources that we have 29:32.516 --> 29:34.562 which includes the people and the ships 29:34.562 --> 29:38.479 to be able to maintain that nation's portfolio. 29:38.773 --> 29:42.940 So I was thinking, this is 2017, it's been 40 years actually 29:44.371 --> 29:46.297 when the nation decided that we needed to have 29:46.297 --> 29:48.547 a surge sealift capability. 29:48.572 --> 29:50.347 And so it was the Department of the Navy, 29:50.347 --> 29:52.056 there's no TRANSCOM then, it's Department of the Navy 29:52.056 --> 29:55.510 and the Maritime Administration that came together and said, 29:55.510 --> 29:58.632 "We need to take some ships that are coming out 29:58.632 --> 30:00.864 "of the commercial industry that no longer have 30:00.864 --> 30:02.140 "the kind of capabilities. 30:02.140 --> 30:04.867 That they saw a decline in the commercial flag fleet. 30:04.867 --> 30:06.586 And to be able to set those aside 30:06.586 --> 30:08.716 and park 'em in a reserve fleets 30:08.716 --> 30:09.549 and we're gonna maintain them 30:09.549 --> 30:11.507 in a higher state of readiness. 30:11.507 --> 30:14.161 We're gonna maintain where we never activate 'em, 30:14.161 --> 30:16.229 we don't have any crews onboard but, yeah, 30:16.229 --> 30:18.361 we'll have a five-day readiness. 30:18.361 --> 30:21.306 So we got tested in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 30:21.306 --> 30:22.306 We did okay. 30:23.255 --> 30:27.005 Not as good as we wanted, but we drastically, 30:27.450 --> 30:30.393 and I'll say, revolutionized what we did with sealift 30:30.393 --> 30:31.787 from Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 30:31.787 --> 30:32.869 So if that's what you think of 30:32.869 --> 30:34.673 and what you remember from sealift, 30:34.673 --> 30:36.366 that's not what it is today. 30:36.366 --> 30:38.906 It's dramatically different in terms of the investment 30:38.906 --> 30:43.073 that we've done and how we maintain that portfolio. 30:43.595 --> 30:44.841 But it's interesting when you go back 30:44.841 --> 30:47.649 and you go back a little bit farther in history, 30:47.649 --> 30:50.646 in the Spanish-American war, and what happened then? 30:50.646 --> 30:54.795 We didn't have a sealift industry to be able to call from 30:54.795 --> 30:57.721 and we struggled with being able to support our forces 30:57.721 --> 30:59.221 deployed overseas. 30:59.317 --> 31:02.138 So Congress said, "We need to change that a little bit." 31:02.138 --> 31:04.897 And so actually when they started the implementation 31:04.897 --> 31:08.446 of moving government cargo on commercial vessels 31:08.446 --> 31:11.946 to try to retain a capability within the commercial fleet. 31:11.946 --> 31:15.680 So when I look at sealift, you can tell by my dialect 31:15.680 --> 31:17.793 I'm looking at commercial and federal 31:17.793 --> 31:19.232 that have to work together. 31:19.232 --> 31:21.151 And we've got to support both together. 31:21.151 --> 31:24.139 So I've got a role in DOT that works on supporting that 31:24.139 --> 31:27.467 and that does include trying to sustain the fleet 31:27.467 --> 31:29.976 both with a cargo and as well as 31:29.976 --> 31:33.143 with direct stipend payments for that. 31:34.208 --> 31:37.458 So the RRF had been around for 40 years 31:39.859 --> 31:43.859 and my colleagues and I are working to extend it 31:44.122 --> 31:45.685 so that we've got ships in our fleet 31:45.685 --> 31:49.852 that are gonna be around for about 55 to 60 years. 31:49.915 --> 31:52.045 And while the vessels, generally we've acquired them 31:52.045 --> 31:53.756 and the model was that we acquired ships 31:53.756 --> 31:55.756 that were used but good. 31:56.707 --> 31:59.710 They had still some unique capabilities with them. 31:59.710 --> 32:02.375 We invested a little bit in them. 32:02.375 --> 32:04.319 But the big thing that we did 32:04.319 --> 32:06.461 that we changed after the first Gulf War 32:06.461 --> 32:08.719 is we put mariners onboard those ships, 32:08.719 --> 32:10.266 mostly engineers on the deck. 32:10.266 --> 32:14.433 I recognize that we're kind of in a maintenance mode 32:14.777 --> 32:16.860 for these sealift assets. 32:16.925 --> 32:19.441 And that really is, that's the readiness enabler, 32:19.441 --> 32:22.478 is those individuals that are part of our crew 32:22.478 --> 32:24.456 onboard those ships today. 32:24.456 --> 32:28.623 Now I got a challenge with them too, because they cost money 32:29.803 --> 32:32.548 and my cost in the balance of the program 32:32.548 --> 32:36.345 is how we right size the right positions onboard the ship 32:36.345 --> 32:39.235 to maintain that within the resources that we have 32:39.235 --> 32:41.355 to be able to pay for dry dockings. 32:41.355 --> 32:45.522 And as we're seeing our cost are going up significantly 32:45.736 --> 32:47.428 in the industrial base just to maintain 32:47.428 --> 32:50.261 these assets with that capability. 32:53.688 --> 32:56.605 Let's go to the next slide, please. 32:58.047 --> 33:00.097 So as I mentioned, we looked at the ships 33:00.097 --> 33:04.180 that are in the US flag trade and the industrial, 33:04.185 --> 33:05.602 our US flag base. 33:05.676 --> 33:07.593 The 81 ships that are in the international trade. 33:07.593 --> 33:09.590 If you're in the last panel, I'm gonna repeat all that 33:09.590 --> 33:11.890 but 97 ships also, large ships, 33:11.890 --> 33:13.130 that are in the Jones Act trade, 33:13.130 --> 33:14.561 and why do we count those ships? 33:14.561 --> 33:16.729 Particularly we count them because we're looking 33:16.729 --> 33:19.690 at the mariner base that we're going to draw from 33:19.690 --> 33:21.292 when we activate these ships. 33:21.292 --> 33:24.280 When I need 1,900 mariners in four days, 33:24.280 --> 33:26.107 I've gotta find people on the beach. 33:26.107 --> 33:28.453 And that beach comprises of those mariners 33:28.453 --> 33:31.750 that are in vacation or leave that are coming off of sailing 33:31.750 --> 33:35.033 on those roughly 200 ships, large vessels, 33:35.033 --> 33:36.789 meaning they're holding their credentials 33:36.789 --> 33:39.333 to be able to meet our baseline needs. 33:39.333 --> 33:41.978 You heard General McDew talk about that at lunch today. 33:41.978 --> 33:43.561 We are on the edge. 33:43.821 --> 33:47.988 We are on the edge of having enough mariners for that. 33:48.224 --> 33:50.132 So tied to that, one of the programs that we do 33:50.132 --> 33:52.706 is supporting the Maritime Security Program. 33:52.706 --> 33:56.269 So I support 60 ships in international trade 33:56.269 --> 33:58.257 to sail under that flag. 33:58.257 --> 34:00.425 Now there's about 11 others that do it too 34:00.425 --> 34:02.848 because they're able to find some cargo 34:02.848 --> 34:04.270 and they continue working. 34:04.270 --> 34:07.389 But that size has continued to decrease 34:07.389 --> 34:10.254 and we lost 20% of that fleet, US flag fleet, 34:10.254 --> 34:13.087 just in the last five years alone. 34:13.193 --> 34:15.886 So we're gonna, strengthening the MSP 34:15.886 --> 34:19.636 we want and we've asked the Congress for full 34:20.206 --> 34:22.451 appropriation to the full authorized level 34:22.451 --> 34:24.034 of the MSP program. 34:24.063 --> 34:27.217 But I know, we had talked about General McDew 34:27.217 --> 34:29.018 and our leadership in the agency, 34:29.018 --> 34:32.851 I'm really focused on what's MSP 4.0 gonna be? 34:34.065 --> 34:35.230 The program that we've been doing for in essence 34:35.230 --> 34:36.730 the last 30 years, 34:37.262 --> 34:39.017 I'm not sure that's gonna meet the needs going forward 34:39.017 --> 34:39.850 and in the future. 34:39.850 --> 34:43.813 I'm not sure it's gonna be as flexible to the desires 34:43.813 --> 34:46.646 of TRANSCOM for the types of ships 34:46.726 --> 34:49.114 and the ability to be able to adapt that fleet 34:49.114 --> 34:50.256 under short notice. 34:50.256 --> 34:53.054 So we're already thinking ahead of 2025 34:53.054 --> 34:55.087 because it's gonna take us that much time 34:55.087 --> 34:57.535 to be able to figure out what is the next solution 34:57.535 --> 35:00.351 for retaining our US flag commercial fleets. 35:00.351 --> 35:03.664 So that's available to be able to meet DOD's needs 35:03.664 --> 35:05.293 and that I'm also gonna be able to have it 35:05.293 --> 35:08.153 sized large enough so that can get enough mariners 35:08.153 --> 35:10.070 for the fleet for that. 35:12.845 --> 35:14.751 I think that on this slide, I would ask you 35:14.751 --> 35:16.334 a question on that. 35:16.444 --> 35:18.611 Do you think that matters? 35:19.645 --> 35:22.533 Do you think that matters as a maritime nation 35:22.533 --> 35:25.142 that we sit in the international realm we're representing 35:25.142 --> 35:27.774 81 ships in the international community 35:27.774 --> 35:31.049 against the 50,000 flag vessels that are out there? 35:31.049 --> 35:32.470 I think it matters. 35:32.470 --> 35:34.008 (mumbles) you get to see power. 35:34.008 --> 35:35.455 But I'll also tell you I think it matters 35:35.455 --> 35:39.165 from a sense of having a low cost flag presence 35:39.165 --> 35:41.362 where we don't have to send a Gray Hull. 35:41.362 --> 35:43.456 And if we have more flagships that we're flying, 35:43.456 --> 35:47.256 moving in the South China Sea and having a greater presence 35:47.256 --> 35:49.616 that's American presence in those areas 35:49.616 --> 35:53.414 where we don't have to send navy Gray Hull ships 35:53.414 --> 35:56.107 to be able to exercise freedom of navigation. 35:56.107 --> 36:00.017 I think it matters quite a bit for economic security, 36:00.017 --> 36:03.628 international security and as well as our national security. 36:03.628 --> 36:04.545 Next slide. 36:08.389 --> 36:12.056 So we talked about, I'm looking at our mariners 36:12.056 --> 36:14.953 and where we they come from in our commercial fleet, 36:14.953 --> 36:18.828 I'll tell you we're on yellow and a stop light chart 36:18.828 --> 36:22.995 flashing into red zone right now with the available pool. 36:23.041 --> 36:25.724 We're looking at how we're gonna be able 36:25.724 --> 36:27.630 to meet our mariner requirements. 36:27.630 --> 36:29.341 We're broadening our aperture. 36:29.341 --> 36:31.222 We're looking at the Strategic Sealift Officers 36:31.222 --> 36:34.457 so this is a pool of graduates from our maritime academies 36:34.457 --> 36:36.205 that have a service obligation. 36:36.205 --> 36:39.280 Most of them stay current with their license 36:39.280 --> 36:41.096 for about eight years and then they get out 36:41.096 --> 36:42.450 of the reserve program. 36:42.450 --> 36:46.617 But it is a pool, it's a pool mostly of entry level officers 36:47.467 --> 36:49.124 but there are some in there. 36:49.124 --> 36:50.842 And a fair number of them are already accounted 36:50.842 --> 36:54.135 in our pool of the actively sailing mariners, 36:54.135 --> 36:55.801 but we wanna look at that and see how we can make sure 36:55.801 --> 36:57.761 that we can tailor that and we tailor them 36:57.761 --> 36:59.928 for the sealift community. 37:00.435 --> 37:03.263 If you can move to the next slide, there you go. 37:03.263 --> 37:04.096 Thank you. 37:04.201 --> 37:07.444 It fits with the visual I'm talking about, mariners. 37:07.444 --> 37:10.610 No, that is not General McDew in Merchant Marine khakis. 37:10.610 --> 37:12.321 (laughter) 37:12.321 --> 37:14.015 That's actually my friend Fred Wally 37:14.015 --> 37:15.768 who's one of our merchant ship captains 37:15.768 --> 37:18.435 up on the Cape W's in Baltimore. 37:18.557 --> 37:20.205 He's been with our program for, 37:20.205 --> 37:22.288 probably about as long as I have. 37:22.288 --> 37:24.693 He's been in a number of activations in that with us. 37:24.693 --> 37:26.518 He's a good role model. 37:26.518 --> 37:28.843 For someone who comes from West Africa 37:28.843 --> 37:33.010 who came via the UK into the US and US Merchant Marine, 37:33.584 --> 37:35.538 and I understand he's gonna be our newest ensign 37:35.538 --> 37:38.223 in the Strategic Sealift Officer program. 37:38.223 --> 37:41.576 He knew some friends, former administrator of ours 37:41.576 --> 37:43.993 which was, it was kinda neat. 37:44.294 --> 37:46.763 So we don't have enough, we're looking at 37:46.763 --> 37:49.758 what other options we have available to us. 37:49.758 --> 37:51.824 So we activate steam ships. 37:51.824 --> 37:54.734 I've got 20, 23 steam ships in the RRF program, 37:54.734 --> 37:56.308 I have more, I have twice as many steam ships 37:56.308 --> 37:58.442 as there are in the commercial fleet. 37:58.442 --> 38:00.113 Where am I getting the mariners and the proficiency? 38:00.113 --> 38:03.172 So we're looking at things like taking engineers 38:03.172 --> 38:05.802 and doubling up when we do have a steam ship activation 38:05.802 --> 38:07.627 because I need to work on the proficiency 38:07.627 --> 38:09.345 of some of those first assistants 38:09.345 --> 38:10.794 and those second assistants 38:10.794 --> 38:12.540 so they can get more steam time 38:12.540 --> 38:15.069 to be able to upgrade and retain that proficiency. 38:15.069 --> 38:16.332 It's a small investment. 38:16.332 --> 38:17.695 It's a small investment that we need to do 38:17.695 --> 38:20.362 on our soft tissue, if you will. 38:23.941 --> 38:26.677 We're also looking at how we can work on the training, 38:26.677 --> 38:29.637 working with the Maritime Labor Unions. 38:29.637 --> 38:32.237 We visited with them to see if there may be some things 38:32.237 --> 38:36.358 that we can use from a shoreside simulator training base 38:36.358 --> 38:38.488 to be able to try to increase some proficiency 38:38.488 --> 38:39.759 to actually tie directly back 38:39.759 --> 38:42.139 to our sealift capable vessels. 38:42.139 --> 38:44.503 And I'd be remiss if I didn't mention, 38:44.503 --> 38:47.607 when we talk about training, that we are looking at 38:47.607 --> 38:50.737 how we're gonna recapitalize our school ship training fleet. 38:50.737 --> 38:54.904 The Empire State SUNY Maritime College is 54 years old, 38:55.723 --> 38:58.558 the Kennedy from Mass Maritime's turning 50 38:58.558 --> 39:00.445 that's how we're training the world's finest 39:00.445 --> 39:01.578 Merchant Marine officers on ships 39:01.578 --> 39:03.232 that are 50 plus years old. 39:03.232 --> 39:05.451 I think that needs to change a little bit too. 39:05.451 --> 39:06.689 We're trying to work with the Congress, 39:06.689 --> 39:09.326 we've got great congressional support bicameral, 39:09.326 --> 39:11.326 both sides of the aisle. 39:11.610 --> 39:13.336 I just don't have support near that place, 39:13.336 --> 39:14.173 near the White House. 39:14.173 --> 39:16.340 I forgot what the name is. 39:16.370 --> 39:18.613 But we're working on that, we're trying to get the attention 39:18.613 --> 39:21.663 to it because it matters that we've got the base 39:21.663 --> 39:24.508 and that we're making the future investment 39:24.508 --> 39:25.925 for our mariners. 39:26.332 --> 39:30.499 And it's not lost on me that if you looked at PayScale.com 39:30.515 --> 39:33.126 recently the rankings in it that came out 39:33.126 --> 39:36.356 from the 2,000 universities and colleges in the country, 39:36.356 --> 39:37.383 a couple of the maritime schools 39:37.383 --> 39:39.534 are right up there on the top, 39:39.534 --> 39:41.666 above Harvey Mudd, above the Ivy League schools 39:41.666 --> 39:42.911 in terms of earning potential. 39:42.911 --> 39:45.715 So the nation likes these graduates, 39:45.715 --> 39:48.509 rewards them with very well-paying careers 39:48.509 --> 39:50.156 and that it's a smart investment 39:50.156 --> 39:51.551 I think for the future. 39:51.551 --> 39:54.204 I'm gonna finish on one final historical note. 39:54.204 --> 39:56.590 Last week, it was the 75th anniversary 39:56.590 --> 39:58.625 of the sinking of an American vessel 39:58.625 --> 40:00.855 called the City of New York. 40:00.855 --> 40:04.105 And the ship was sunk in March of 1942, 40:04.528 --> 40:06.278 so we weren't in yet. 40:06.416 --> 40:10.095 But it sank Merchant Marine crew onboard that ship. 40:10.095 --> 40:12.399 There was a doctor who was one of the crew members, 40:12.399 --> 40:15.732 Dr. Conley and he was injured pretty bad 40:17.484 --> 40:18.626 getting into the lifeboat, 40:18.626 --> 40:20.705 had a couple of broken ribs in that 40:20.705 --> 40:23.200 but he was able to tend to a number of the injured crew. 40:23.200 --> 40:25.851 They lost about, I think around 20 crew members 40:25.851 --> 40:27.302 were killed on the vessel. 40:27.302 --> 40:31.302 Had passengers, he delivers a baby in a lifeboat 40:31.359 --> 40:32.623 and it became a story of that. 40:32.623 --> 40:35.373 Well, he passed away in the 1950s 40:35.824 --> 40:39.439 but at the American Merchant Marine Veterans Association 40:39.439 --> 40:42.471 in Reno last week we presented to his son 40:42.471 --> 40:45.099 and his grandson the Meritorious Service Medal, 40:45.099 --> 40:47.483 which is the highest medal for the US Merchant Marine. 40:47.483 --> 40:49.150 Thank you very much. 40:49.213 --> 40:51.630 (applauding) 40:55.961 --> 40:57.544 - Thank you, Kevin. 40:57.636 --> 41:01.803 Our final panelist this afternoon is Ms. Nancy Harned, 41:01.895 --> 41:06.062 Executive Director of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command. 41:06.114 --> 41:09.864 Ms. Harned entered government service in 1985 41:10.230 --> 41:14.397 and was promoted to Senior Executive Service in May 2007. 41:14.705 --> 41:18.108 In her current role, she oversees the portion NECC 41:18.108 --> 41:22.264 called the Naval Expeditionary Logistic Support Group. 41:22.264 --> 41:26.431 NAVELSG is a vital enabler of Maritime Prepositioning Forces 41:27.512 --> 41:31.318 and Joint Logistics Over the Shore operations, 41:31.318 --> 41:33.170 they support maritime forces ashore 41:33.170 --> 41:36.013 providing expeditionary cargo handling services, 41:36.013 --> 41:37.430 for surface, air, 41:37.964 --> 41:41.464 and terminal operations, tactical fueling, 41:41.507 --> 41:44.701 ordnance handling and reporting in support of worldwide 41:44.701 --> 41:48.618 Naval, Joint, interagency, and combined forces. 41:49.177 --> 41:52.050 Please join me in welcoming Ms. Nancy Harned. 41:52.050 --> 41:54.467 (applauding) 41:56.695 --> 41:58.118 - Good afternoon everybody. 41:58.118 --> 42:01.241 I'm very honored to have this opportunity to talk to you 42:01.241 --> 42:04.469 and tell you a little bit about NECC and our forces 42:04.469 --> 42:07.304 and how we support the sealift mission 42:07.304 --> 42:10.167 and how we are also a consumer of sealift, 42:10.167 --> 42:13.686 because that's an important piece of how we operate. 42:13.686 --> 42:17.167 So NECC, the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command 42:17.167 --> 42:18.581 is a type of command. 42:18.581 --> 42:22.324 Our mission is to organize, man, train and equip 42:22.324 --> 42:25.491 the navy's expeditionary combat forces 42:25.501 --> 42:28.894 which includes the Expeditionary Logistics Support Group 42:28.894 --> 42:30.594 that Buz referred to. 42:30.594 --> 42:34.427 We also have the EOD folks, we have the Navy's 42:34.723 --> 42:37.125 construction forces the CB's, 42:37.125 --> 42:39.709 we have the Coastal Riverine Forces, 42:39.709 --> 42:42.056 we also have a few smaller things 42:42.056 --> 42:45.413 such as the Navy Expeditionary Intelligence Command 42:45.413 --> 42:48.822 and the Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center. 42:48.822 --> 42:52.239 So the forces themselves have been around 42:52.360 --> 42:53.478 for a long, long time. 42:53.478 --> 42:56.428 The CB has just celebrated their 75th anniversary. 42:56.428 --> 42:58.813 There's an article about them in today's show daily 42:58.813 --> 43:01.205 if you're looking for some good reading. 43:01.205 --> 43:03.610 The type command NECC has only been around 43:03.610 --> 43:05.110 since 2006 though. 43:05.620 --> 43:08.403 So part of our mission at NECC, as I said, 43:08.403 --> 43:11.403 is to organize, man, train and equip 43:11.858 --> 43:13.910 to bring commonality as much as we can 43:13.910 --> 43:16.816 to these forces which are very different. 43:16.816 --> 43:20.983 But the forces themselves they really have a unique niche 43:21.208 --> 43:25.375 in many navy operations including the sealift operation. 43:26.229 --> 43:29.308 The Navy's Expeditionary Combat Forces that I mentioned, 43:29.308 --> 43:32.070 they can operate and sustain themselves, 43:32.070 --> 43:34.111 they can protect themselves in austere 43:34.111 --> 43:35.973 and challenging environments. 43:35.973 --> 43:37.846 They can provide for their own security, 43:37.846 --> 43:39.977 they can also provide security to others 43:39.977 --> 43:42.706 which really is part of their mission. 43:42.706 --> 43:45.584 They create the expeditionary infrastructure 43:45.584 --> 43:47.220 that are required by naval forces 43:47.220 --> 43:50.053 to conduct and sustain operations. 43:50.254 --> 43:54.197 So as far as the sealift mission goes NECC's role 43:54.197 --> 43:57.705 in helping the sealift mission is really that part 43:57.705 --> 44:00.907 where you're trying to get the stuff off the ship 44:00.907 --> 44:04.490 so it can be at a place where it can safely 44:04.840 --> 44:07.986 and reliably sustain those who are ashore 44:07.986 --> 44:10.726 and sustain what needs to happen from the shore 44:10.726 --> 44:12.393 and back out to sea. 44:12.796 --> 44:16.221 So the chart that I have up there on the screen 44:16.221 --> 44:19.335 is a picture that shows the navy support element, 44:19.335 --> 44:21.343 whose job it is to support 44:21.343 --> 44:23.502 the maritime prepositioning offload 44:23.502 --> 44:25.923 and follow on sustainment operations. 44:25.923 --> 44:28.048 And the reason I've depicted it in blue and green 44:28.048 --> 44:32.215 is to kind of explain that all those forces don't belong 44:32.755 --> 44:36.922 to NECC, only the ones that I am showing in green. 44:37.181 --> 44:40.510 We report through the commander of the navy support element, 44:40.510 --> 44:44.677 who's part of the Navy Surface Forces, SURFOR or SURFPAC, 44:45.287 --> 44:47.954 as their administrative control. 44:48.102 --> 44:50.334 But the other blue pieces there on the chart, 44:50.334 --> 44:52.396 you have the Beachmaster units, 44:52.396 --> 44:54.277 the Amphibious Construction Battalions 44:54.277 --> 44:56.402 and the Assault Craft Units all three of those 44:56.402 --> 44:59.225 belong to the surface forces as well. 44:59.225 --> 45:01.773 When NECC participates in this mission 45:01.773 --> 45:04.204 we participate with those units 45:04.204 --> 45:07.650 so it's the Navy Cargo Handling Battalions 45:07.650 --> 45:10.213 and our Coastal Riverine Force, whose job it is 45:10.213 --> 45:13.290 to provide the seaward defense of the operation 45:13.290 --> 45:17.052 and possibly the port that we might be going into. 45:17.052 --> 45:21.219 Navy Cargo Handling Battalions, their job is to unload 45:21.318 --> 45:25.485 and unpack ships, to build the logistics points ashore. 45:26.059 --> 45:29.892 They also build and operate fuel sites ashore. 45:29.964 --> 45:32.351 They also have a mission to protect the airports 45:32.351 --> 45:34.768 and to do aircraft unloading, 45:36.047 --> 45:39.230 but that's not quite what our topic is today. 45:39.230 --> 45:41.438 So if we go on to the next slide, I'll talk a little bit 45:41.438 --> 45:44.605 about what the rest of the NECC forces 45:45.990 --> 45:49.509 and how they support the rest of the mission as well. 45:49.509 --> 45:53.092 So NECC's sealift roles from our other unit 45:53.277 --> 45:55.670 include the operations where we are helping 45:55.670 --> 45:58.130 to set the conditions for the offload, 45:58.130 --> 46:00.221 where we're helping in the actual offload 46:00.221 --> 46:01.638 and then beyond the offload. 46:01.638 --> 46:04.229 So you see the pieces of our forces 46:04.229 --> 46:06.200 that I mentioned a little bit earlier. 46:06.200 --> 46:09.243 Our EOD guys they help when there needs to be 46:09.243 --> 46:11.076 water space clearance. 46:11.114 --> 46:13.364 So underneath the EOD unit, 46:13.402 --> 46:16.288 we have our Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit. 46:16.288 --> 46:20.455 So the EOD forces clear areas of explosives obviously 46:20.943 --> 46:23.305 and render safe, any explosives that they might find. 46:23.305 --> 46:26.818 The MDSU guys as we call them, they might be responsible 46:26.818 --> 46:29.650 for clearing obstacles and things. 46:29.650 --> 46:32.253 So the underwater construction teams, 46:32.253 --> 46:35.121 who you see with the dotted line up to the CBs, 46:35.121 --> 46:39.161 their job both, they have a job in setting conditions 46:39.161 --> 46:42.215 where installations might need repairing, 46:42.215 --> 46:44.798 poor repair that kind of thing. 46:44.878 --> 46:47.296 They also have a role in the actual offload 46:47.296 --> 46:49.963 when the, on the amphibious side 46:50.634 --> 46:54.416 setting up the amphibious both liquid transfer system, 46:54.416 --> 46:58.515 the MDSU guys would help repair and sustain those. 46:58.515 --> 47:00.120 So I already mentioned the units that support 47:00.120 --> 47:01.316 in the actual offload. 47:01.316 --> 47:02.989 The expeditionary logistic support group, 47:02.989 --> 47:05.322 the Coastal Riverine Forces. 47:05.356 --> 47:08.356 And then beyond the offload, the CBs 47:09.539 --> 47:13.475 would help improve the seaports and the airport throughput. 47:13.475 --> 47:17.183 So all of NECCs forces play roles here and there 47:17.183 --> 47:19.100 in the sealift mission. 47:19.221 --> 47:21.633 But as it's been discussed many times 47:21.633 --> 47:24.047 that all of this was sort of designed 47:24.047 --> 47:26.989 with a permissive environment in mind. 47:26.989 --> 47:29.247 That's not to say, when I mentioned the EOD, 47:29.247 --> 47:31.578 folks would be clearing minds and obstacles, 47:31.578 --> 47:34.342 obviously that's somewhat of a contested environment. 47:34.342 --> 47:37.009 But probably not in an operation 47:37.066 --> 47:41.233 where their actually being in a live fire kinda situation. 47:42.240 --> 47:44.706 So the navy's thinking hard about this mission. 47:44.706 --> 47:47.091 How are we gonna operate in the contested environment, 47:47.091 --> 47:51.258 not just out on the open ocean but as we need to bring 47:51.425 --> 47:53.175 materials into shore. 47:53.632 --> 47:57.799 So at NECC, we're working hard with the rest of the navy 47:57.886 --> 47:59.755 and the Marine Corps, in concepts 47:59.755 --> 48:03.052 like the distributed maritime operations, 48:03.052 --> 48:05.800 (mumbles) operations in a contested environment 48:05.800 --> 48:09.182 and the Marine Corps' expeditionary advanced basis 48:09.182 --> 48:12.718 where the idea is to disperse as much as possible, 48:12.718 --> 48:16.718 not to provide fixed locations as much as we can 48:17.522 --> 48:18.901 that become target. 48:18.901 --> 48:22.651 As the Marine Corps says, "To get off the X." 48:22.699 --> 48:26.032 So NECCs forces can play a role in that. 48:26.975 --> 48:30.574 The Riverine forces with our Mark VI patrol boats 48:30.574 --> 48:32.982 that is one of our newest capabilities. 48:32.982 --> 48:36.744 It's an armored boat, not very big, it's only 80 foot 48:36.744 --> 48:40.684 but that's big for our Riverine forces so they can provide 48:40.684 --> 48:42.591 much more of a force protection role 48:42.591 --> 48:44.403 in that kind of a mission. 48:44.403 --> 48:46.891 The challenge there will be that we only have 12 of them 48:46.891 --> 48:49.974 so we can't spread 12 boats very far. 48:50.941 --> 48:52.629 And that's the similar challenge that we have 48:52.629 --> 48:54.373 with the rest of our forces. 48:54.373 --> 48:58.017 We only have seven cargo handling battalions, 48:58.017 --> 49:00.490 six of which are in the reserve force 49:00.490 --> 49:01.877 so we have additional challenges 49:01.877 --> 49:03.867 with activating our reserves 49:03.867 --> 49:07.034 getting them to where they need to be. 49:07.861 --> 49:10.128 But we have the capabilities and, as I said, 49:10.128 --> 49:12.362 we're working hard with the rest of the navy 49:12.362 --> 49:14.987 and with the Marine Corps in developing these concepts 49:14.987 --> 49:17.453 and being realistic about when and where we can be 49:17.453 --> 49:19.120 where we need to be. 49:20.010 --> 49:21.422 I said at the beginning that we're also 49:21.422 --> 49:23.926 a consumer of sealift so I'll just talk 49:23.926 --> 49:25.926 a little bit about that. 49:26.146 --> 49:28.063 NECC force is by and large can't get 49:28.063 --> 49:30.095 to where they need to go by themselves. 49:30.095 --> 49:32.696 We need sealift, we also need airlift. 49:32.696 --> 49:35.249 The heaviest pieces of our forces 49:35.249 --> 49:37.999 are our cargo handling battalions 49:38.624 --> 49:40.712 and also the CB equipment. 49:40.712 --> 49:44.627 The CBs have two sets of equipment to support two battalions 49:44.627 --> 49:46.606 that are on our (mumbles) ships. 49:46.606 --> 49:48.874 So that equipment is forward 49:48.874 --> 49:51.124 that the personnel can fall in on. 49:51.124 --> 49:54.243 However, the rest of the CBs who are either 49:54.243 --> 49:57.224 most of them stateside, a few forward deployed 49:57.224 --> 50:00.175 they will need strategic sealift to get the rest 50:00.175 --> 50:02.334 of their equipment to where they are. 50:02.334 --> 50:04.644 They'll also need intratheater sealift 50:04.644 --> 50:07.056 to move the equipment around. 50:07.056 --> 50:09.677 Our Coastal Riverine Forces, as I said, 50:09.677 --> 50:13.096 we have the new capability in our Mark VI patrol boat 50:13.096 --> 50:17.096 but that boat is intended for 24-hour operations 50:17.208 --> 50:19.341 so it will need intratheater sealift 50:19.341 --> 50:22.714 to get those boats to where they need to be. 50:22.714 --> 50:25.790 The rest of our forces are somewhat lighter weight: 50:25.790 --> 50:28.952 the EOD folks, the underwater construction teams, 50:28.952 --> 50:31.237 the rest of the Coastal Riverine Forces boats 50:31.237 --> 50:33.656 and their equipment so they can either use 50:33.656 --> 50:35.151 airlift or sealift. 50:35.151 --> 50:38.151 However, we know that in the airlift 50:40.258 --> 50:41.932 situation that there's 50:41.932 --> 50:45.007 just as much of a limited resource problem there as well 50:45.007 --> 50:47.925 so we're looking hard at the airlift 50:47.925 --> 50:50.092 and sealift needs as well. 50:50.706 --> 50:52.956 So with that, I will close. 50:54.797 --> 50:58.426 To remind you, NECC is a very capable force. 50:58.426 --> 51:00.252 We had to play a key role in the sealift, 51:00.252 --> 51:02.563 but we also really rely on sealift 51:02.563 --> 51:04.508 to get us to where we need to be. 51:04.508 --> 51:05.341 Thank you. 51:05.371 --> 51:06.204 - Thank you. 51:06.204 --> 51:08.621 (applauding) 51:11.752 --> 51:12.831 All right, thank you panel. 51:12.831 --> 51:15.572 And it's now time for counterbattering. 51:15.572 --> 51:17.261 So we're opening up to the audience 51:17.261 --> 51:21.428 for any questions you might have for any of our panel. 51:25.799 --> 51:27.421 - [Audience] Thank you all for what you do. 51:27.421 --> 51:30.254 I know that funding is never easy. 51:30.497 --> 51:33.767 And especially in forces that don't get a lot 51:33.767 --> 51:35.850 of daylight in the media. 51:37.378 --> 51:40.378 So my question is pertaining to what 51:40.829 --> 51:42.829 Ms. Harned talked about. 51:42.837 --> 51:45.318 Distributed lethality has been a concept 51:45.318 --> 51:49.485 that the Surface Navy Association and talking about, 51:49.774 --> 51:52.734 (mumbles) has been talking for a few years, 51:52.734 --> 51:56.144 but that obviously requires distributed logistics. 51:56.144 --> 51:59.310 And on top of all of the things that Mr. DiLisio 51:59.310 --> 52:02.605 has already explained are the challenges, 52:02.605 --> 52:05.938 how much bigger alone is that to achieve 52:08.337 --> 52:10.055 the distributed logistics that are needed 52:10.055 --> 52:13.522 to make distributed lethality into a real thing? 52:13.522 --> 52:17.689 From the MSC standpoint, from the requirement standpoint 52:17.810 --> 52:20.435 is there a role that you're hoping that MARAD plays? 52:20.435 --> 52:23.518 Where is that one your list of things 52:24.615 --> 52:27.448 that haven't been funded properly? 52:28.884 --> 52:30.245 - I know everybody's looking at me. 52:30.245 --> 52:31.897 (laughter) 52:31.897 --> 52:35.564 So here's what I would tell you, and I think 52:36.001 --> 52:38.538 based on the other (mumbles) 52:38.538 --> 52:39.705 you know this. 52:39.979 --> 52:44.146 But we studied the demand signal for combat logistics 52:44.527 --> 52:47.694 that Admiral Mewbourne's folks provide 52:48.016 --> 52:49.719 to whatever the size and the fleet is 52:49.719 --> 52:53.632 and that includes the introduction of new ships, 52:53.632 --> 52:55.728 whether that be a large ship, new destroyer, 52:55.728 --> 52:58.561 whether that be a small ship, LCS. 52:59.626 --> 53:01.894 But these folks also participate in the CONOPS 53:01.894 --> 53:04.906 and the TTP Development or the tactics. 53:04.906 --> 53:08.315 And so since you can't always take a ship 53:08.315 --> 53:11.358 and modernize it instantly, to do what you need to do 53:11.358 --> 53:13.651 against the threat, sometimes what you can do 53:13.651 --> 53:14.677 is you can change the behavior 53:14.677 --> 53:17.177 on how we operate those ships. 53:17.377 --> 53:18.277 I'll be honest with you. 53:18.277 --> 53:20.676 If you think I'm gonna give you those here, I'm not. 53:20.676 --> 53:22.561 But I will tell you, if you think we're gonna operate 53:22.561 --> 53:25.575 like we're used to, I wouldn't tell you to think again. 53:25.575 --> 53:26.899 We're a lot smarter than that. 53:26.899 --> 53:28.478 I think you'd be really proud of your navy 53:28.478 --> 53:31.170 if you saw some of the things we were doing today. 53:31.170 --> 53:33.170 And I'll leave it there. 53:35.402 --> 53:36.985 - [Buz Buzby] Okay. 53:37.183 --> 53:38.016 Yes, ma'am. 53:38.016 --> 53:38.849 - [Jessica] Good afternoon. 53:38.849 --> 53:39.942 My name is Jessica Glassie and I, too went 53:39.942 --> 53:42.071 to SUNY Maritime so shoutout, yes. 53:42.071 --> 53:43.338 (laughter) 53:43.338 --> 53:44.671 A couple points. 53:45.583 --> 53:49.083 The first one, you talk a lot about labor. 53:49.857 --> 53:52.377 I sailed on my license for a very short time 53:52.377 --> 53:55.960 as an engineer, I did go through the unions 53:57.200 --> 53:58.513 but I had some questions. 53:58.513 --> 53:59.911 So here are some solutions, right, 53:59.911 --> 54:02.356 here are some ideas for you all. 54:02.356 --> 54:05.059 One, make it easier for folks like me 54:05.059 --> 54:07.588 to keep my Merchant Marines license. 54:07.588 --> 54:08.575 Make it easier. 54:08.575 --> 54:11.167 If I'm gonna go shoreside and work a power plant job 54:11.167 --> 54:13.819 because they pay better and I can stay home and have kids, 54:13.819 --> 54:15.901 make it easier for me to keep my Merchant Marine license 54:15.901 --> 54:18.238 if you want me to go back to sea. 54:18.238 --> 54:20.960 Make it easier for the Merchant Marine officers 54:20.960 --> 54:22.603 who are doing reserve time. 54:22.603 --> 54:25.349 I've a lot of classmates, I'm in my 40s, 54:25.349 --> 54:26.994 a lot of them let their license go 54:26.994 --> 54:28.741 because of all the hoops to jump through 54:28.741 --> 54:30.898 to keep their licenses current. 54:30.898 --> 54:33.679 Make it easier; you will have a bigger pool. 54:33.679 --> 54:37.846 You'll have a bigger pool of those of us in the gen x range. 54:39.699 --> 54:42.732 Make the training easier for them to upgrade 54:42.732 --> 54:44.399 or keep their quals. 54:44.598 --> 54:47.653 Make it easier for folks coming out of the Coast Guard 54:47.653 --> 54:51.153 or Navy to come in to the Merchant Marine. 54:51.782 --> 54:54.865 They have the skills; make it easier. 54:55.300 --> 54:58.406 Maybe work with those of us here in the industry, 54:58.406 --> 55:01.654 a lot of my classmates also go into the power industry, 55:01.654 --> 55:04.883 power plant industry, maybe work with them 55:04.883 --> 55:08.106 on some other training programs (mumbles) 55:08.106 --> 55:10.337 and stuff like that and you would be able to help 55:10.337 --> 55:13.143 keep the workforce with the right quals 55:13.143 --> 55:14.726 and right training. 55:15.791 --> 55:17.815 Again, this is Jessica's own opinion, right, 55:17.815 --> 55:21.982 this is from me being in the maritime industry for 20 years 55:22.303 --> 55:25.383 and job hopping and doing different things. 55:25.383 --> 55:27.442 Second, I worked for Colonna's Shipyard 55:27.442 --> 55:29.359 so I do do ship repair. 55:29.754 --> 55:33.257 Make it easier for us to figure out what you want repaired. 55:33.257 --> 55:35.747 We know you wanna come out on time, 55:35.747 --> 55:37.922 but sometimes you have such a huge laundry list, 55:37.922 --> 55:39.255 it's impossible. 55:39.573 --> 55:42.101 We need to be able to have the better open communications 55:42.101 --> 55:44.351 during the bidding process. 55:44.567 --> 55:46.572 And lots of times you all don't want that 55:46.572 --> 55:49.030 because you want the lowest price possible. 55:49.030 --> 55:50.838 The lowest price possible is not gonna get you 55:50.838 --> 55:52.493 the best product and it's not gonna get 55:52.493 --> 55:54.326 your ship out on time. 55:55.004 --> 55:59.171 Be realistic about what you want fixed; prioritize. 55:59.412 --> 56:01.265 And those of us here in the ship repair world, 56:01.265 --> 56:02.535 we'll work with you. 56:02.535 --> 56:05.728 We have folks who are experts at fixing ships. 56:05.728 --> 56:07.549 If you could invite some of us to help you 56:07.549 --> 56:09.184 with these lists in prioritization 56:09.184 --> 56:11.684 that we would gladly help you. 56:11.883 --> 56:14.242 Again, two cents just for the peanut gallery. 56:14.242 --> 56:17.030 Thank you for being here, thank you for opening it up. 56:17.030 --> 56:18.447 Oh, and pay, MSC. 56:19.782 --> 56:22.032 (laughter) 56:23.095 --> 56:24.237 Again, I have a lot of classmates, 56:24.237 --> 56:26.713 we all like to talk and tell sea stories. 56:26.713 --> 56:29.215 MSC, you're not known for your PayScale, 56:29.215 --> 56:32.408 especially with the other mariners on other ships, 56:32.408 --> 56:34.229 even the foreign class vessels 56:34.229 --> 56:37.711 or the ships here are still flagged in our fleet. 56:37.711 --> 56:40.734 And you're not known to have nice time schedules. 56:40.734 --> 56:43.406 You need to let those folks set a time. 56:43.406 --> 56:45.436 Six months, nine months, 12 months 56:45.436 --> 56:48.343 you extend a lot of the times that folks 56:48.343 --> 56:49.762 are away from their families. 56:49.762 --> 56:51.647 You need to make sure that if you tell them 56:51.647 --> 56:52.480 they're gonna be able to get home 56:52.480 --> 56:53.671 they're gonna be able to get home, 56:53.671 --> 56:57.838 especially the engineers, you're burning some of them out 56:58.260 --> 57:02.427 just doing their length of span of their service, so. 57:03.534 --> 57:05.423 Sorry y'all, but (laughter). 57:05.423 --> 57:07.367 It's real life experience, right? 57:07.367 --> 57:08.420 (applauding) 57:08.420 --> 57:09.420 - Thank you. 57:10.166 --> 57:13.172 - If I could just respond to a couple of things in there. 57:13.172 --> 57:16.642 And right on, thank you, Jessica, for those comments. 57:16.642 --> 57:18.522 We have thought about, very seriously, 57:18.522 --> 57:20.715 about how we can make things easier 57:20.715 --> 57:23.207 for the retention of mariner licenses. 57:23.207 --> 57:26.819 We recognize that that is a big challenge, particularly. 57:26.819 --> 57:29.897 And we're having a broader discussion with that 57:29.897 --> 57:30.953 including with the Coast Guard who is 57:30.953 --> 57:33.160 the regulatory body and the issuing 57:33.160 --> 57:35.553 on the credentials part of that. 57:35.553 --> 57:38.604 So today, the Maritime Administration, I think, 57:38.604 --> 57:42.402 we're the largest provider of reserve training 57:42.402 --> 57:44.788 for the Strategic Sealift Officer program. 57:44.788 --> 57:46.723 We bring those folks in, they're on the deckplate 57:46.723 --> 57:48.548 and our ships working with our chief engineers 57:48.548 --> 57:52.020 so we do thousands of mandates training today for the navy 57:52.020 --> 57:52.999 to be able to support that. 57:52.999 --> 57:56.224 It's good for us, it's great for the individuals 57:56.224 --> 57:58.228 because they're back on with their initial training 57:58.228 --> 58:00.236 was wasn't in being a Merchant Marine officer 58:00.236 --> 58:03.134 and that's a valuable opportunity for that. 58:03.134 --> 58:06.634 The idea about how to incentivize retirees 58:07.919 --> 58:10.513 or those who got out of the industry to keep their license. 58:10.513 --> 58:13.049 We've looked at that and actually we had 58:13.049 --> 58:14.742 the last administration made that request 58:14.742 --> 58:17.060 a couple times at Congress to get some money 58:17.060 --> 58:19.094 to allowing us to do that, to be able to set up 58:19.094 --> 58:20.752 some kind of training programs. 58:20.752 --> 58:24.397 We're even sponsoring additional billets on US flagships, 58:24.397 --> 58:27.300 that would be in my words they're a myriad billet 58:27.300 --> 58:29.190 but we're using them as a training base 58:29.190 --> 58:31.523 so that people can go out there and sail for, 58:31.523 --> 58:33.393 it's not an added cost in the ship owner, 58:33.393 --> 58:35.306 I'm paying for it but then someone's able 58:35.306 --> 58:36.653 to be able to keep credential up 58:36.653 --> 58:38.081 and we have a short string on them. 58:38.081 --> 58:39.890 If we need them we can call them back. 58:39.890 --> 58:41.431 And the last thing for Navy, Coast Guard 58:41.431 --> 58:43.256 and other, in army personnel 58:43.256 --> 58:44.965 that are departing their services 58:44.965 --> 58:47.056 we've had I think great effort 58:47.056 --> 58:51.223 with Military Sealift Command John Thackrah helping us, 58:51.473 --> 58:53.809 Committee on the Marine Transportation System 58:53.809 --> 58:55.664 called military to mariner. 58:55.664 --> 58:58.139 And the services had made some great progress, 58:58.139 --> 59:00.972 the army the coast guard, the navy 59:01.081 --> 59:03.070 to be able to take departing members, 59:03.070 --> 59:06.174 giving them the certification so that they can walk in 59:06.174 --> 59:07.715 to the National Maritime Center 59:07.715 --> 59:10.122 and be able to get a mariner credential. 59:10.122 --> 59:12.372 And that's some good ideas. 59:12.609 --> 59:14.125 - [Buz] And I would add that Mr. Chuck Nygaard 59:14.125 --> 59:15.581 sitting right here in the second row 59:15.581 --> 59:18.549 has been instrumental in that effort 59:18.549 --> 59:22.216 from the industry so thanks for that, Chuck. 59:23.730 --> 59:24.647 Jon Kaskin. 59:25.783 --> 59:27.520 - [Jon] As the old Scott DiLisio, 59:27.520 --> 59:31.187 I have a question for Kevin and the Admiral. 59:32.919 --> 59:36.647 I'm an old Cold War air as some folks in the audience, 59:36.647 --> 59:39.647 and although General McDew mentioned 59:40.077 --> 59:41.858 that it's been 70 years since we're worried 59:41.858 --> 59:44.775 about contested waters for sealift. 59:46.176 --> 59:49.273 When I was in the Pentagon we did studies, 59:49.273 --> 59:50.774 the Center for Naval Analyses, 59:50.774 --> 59:54.941 did studies on attrition going across the Atlantic 59:54.977 --> 59:58.144 against the Soviet threat at the time. 59:59.630 --> 01:00:02.141 Even with escorts it wasn't a pretty picture 01:00:02.141 --> 01:00:04.967 but at least certainly it was a lot better 01:00:04.967 --> 01:00:07.112 than it is without escorts. 01:00:07.112 --> 01:00:10.195 And the navy has zero frigates today, 01:00:11.190 --> 01:00:13.664 our allies they were gonna contribute 01:00:13.664 --> 01:00:17.307 to support those convoy operations with escorts, 01:00:17.307 --> 01:00:19.683 they don't have large fleets anymore. 01:00:19.683 --> 01:00:23.850 So how are we addressing the movement of forces back then 01:00:24.768 --> 01:00:25.829 in the Cold War? 01:00:25.829 --> 01:00:27.674 Well, the first part of the solution 01:00:27.674 --> 01:00:30.517 was having 10 divisions in 10 days in Europe. 01:00:30.517 --> 01:00:33.217 Four at our station there and six had their hardware 01:00:33.217 --> 01:00:34.668 already in warehouses 01:00:34.668 --> 01:00:38.579 and all we had to do was fly the forces across the ocean. 01:00:38.579 --> 01:00:40.829 The second part of it is that it was NATO 01:00:40.829 --> 01:00:44.105 was going to be providing a list of 600 ships, 01:00:44.105 --> 01:00:46.408 400 of which they would be making available 01:00:46.408 --> 01:00:48.741 for the reinforcing sealift. 01:00:49.020 --> 01:00:51.698 This is before we had to build up our LMSRs 01:00:51.698 --> 01:00:53.539 and (mumbles) and all the rest of it. 01:00:53.539 --> 01:00:56.292 It was a NATO program to provide the sealift 01:00:56.292 --> 01:00:58.722 because even back then our requirement 01:00:58.722 --> 01:01:00.639 was like 10 ships in 10 days. 01:01:00.639 --> 01:01:02.780 And that was what the Ready Reserve Force 01:01:02.780 --> 01:01:04.723 has original established. 01:01:04.723 --> 01:01:08.890 So if we're gonna go back to the Cold War of mentality, 01:01:09.349 --> 01:01:12.912 now what, and attrition is a real possibility, 01:01:12.912 --> 01:01:15.990 had there been discussions and going back to reopening 01:01:15.990 --> 01:01:19.198 some of these old mechanisms on how we were actually 01:01:19.198 --> 01:01:21.524 gonna address that threat, which was not to try 01:01:21.524 --> 01:01:23.191 to steam through it. 01:01:24.690 --> 01:01:26.273 - Is that one mine? 01:01:27.088 --> 01:01:29.422 - If I could just at least address a little bit 01:01:29.422 --> 01:01:30.255 on the NATO side. 01:01:30.255 --> 01:01:31.088 You're right. 01:01:31.088 --> 01:01:32.490 Today, the mantra with the NATO 01:01:32.490 --> 01:01:34.727 is that each nation deploys themselves. 01:01:34.727 --> 01:01:37.618 And so the dilemma that I see as a guy across the Atlantic 01:01:37.618 --> 01:01:40.381 is they're all competing against the same marketplace, 01:01:40.381 --> 01:01:42.015 they have no assured access. 01:01:42.015 --> 01:01:43.656 And so when I go there I talk about, 01:01:43.656 --> 01:01:45.849 "You need to have contingency contracts 01:01:45.849 --> 01:01:47.332 "like we have in Visa. 01:01:47.332 --> 01:01:49.833 "You need to have assured access to sealift." 01:01:49.833 --> 01:01:52.426 They don't even like the word assured access. 01:01:52.426 --> 01:01:55.035 And so I'm fighting, not fighting but struggling with it 01:01:55.035 --> 01:01:57.852 to try to get to those points about how they can have 01:01:57.852 --> 01:01:58.907 those kind of instruments. 01:01:58.907 --> 01:02:02.390 You're right, the number of ships today that NATO pledges 01:02:02.390 --> 01:02:05.140 it's about, I shouldn't say zero, 01:02:05.405 --> 01:02:08.880 there's one project and they've got five ships 01:02:08.880 --> 01:02:11.012 that are under some kind of a string 01:02:11.012 --> 01:02:12.506 to be able to pull that. 01:02:12.506 --> 01:02:13.339 So it is a challenge. 01:02:13.339 --> 01:02:16.420 So when we look at going back and relooking 01:02:16.420 --> 01:02:18.848 at how we would do sealift, it's trying to take 01:02:18.848 --> 01:02:21.379 some of the lessons learned I think that we have today 01:02:21.379 --> 01:02:23.040 to be able to try to do that. 01:02:23.040 --> 01:02:25.287 But remember, our NATO partners 01:02:25.287 --> 01:02:26.641 they don't really have a fleet out there 01:02:26.641 --> 01:02:28.711 of their own flagships, very little. 01:02:28.711 --> 01:02:30.458 And so their controlled part of it 01:02:30.458 --> 01:02:32.208 they don't have that. 01:02:34.103 --> 01:02:35.389 - [Jon] So you're saying that's not 01:02:35.389 --> 01:02:37.583 one of the solution to resurrecting the NATO. 01:02:37.583 --> 01:02:41.750 Sealift (mumbles) they don't have the resources either. 01:02:42.346 --> 01:02:44.666 What are the options for protection? 01:02:44.666 --> 01:02:47.999 I think my quick reading of the various, 01:02:48.516 --> 01:02:51.933 for structure analysis, the 350 ship navy 01:02:53.602 --> 01:02:56.205 was structured not providing the escorts 01:02:56.205 --> 01:03:00.372 across the Atlantic Ocean, it was focused on other areas. 01:03:00.728 --> 01:03:03.918 I think it was the old 600 ship navy that was large enough 01:03:03.918 --> 01:03:06.418 to be able to provide escorts, 01:03:06.460 --> 01:03:09.079 as well as fighting another scenarios. 01:03:09.079 --> 01:03:12.570 So, Admiral, are people coming up with any ideas 01:03:12.570 --> 01:03:14.429 on how we're going to address 01:03:14.429 --> 01:03:16.419 the potential aspects of attrition 01:03:16.419 --> 01:03:18.652 or is it still an area where people 01:03:18.652 --> 01:03:22.819 are just thinking about it and not come up with solutions? 01:03:24.150 --> 01:03:26.348 - Well, I would say that we're in the nascent stage 01:03:26.348 --> 01:03:29.009 is what I would call it, at least what my exposure to it 01:03:29.009 --> 01:03:30.286 has been so far. 01:03:30.286 --> 01:03:34.111 You know, just this past week I read the 1987 CNA study 01:03:34.111 --> 01:03:36.010 that maybe that you're referring to. 01:03:36.010 --> 01:03:38.419 You know, and it was said in, it was written in 1987 01:03:38.419 --> 01:03:40.670 and it was said in 1990 and it looked at 01:03:40.670 --> 01:03:42.587 a sort of a scenario set in Europe 01:03:42.587 --> 01:03:43.982 that you're talking about where, 01:03:43.982 --> 01:03:46.114 and this is just after the wall fell 01:03:46.114 --> 01:03:48.781 and then it's a secret document, 01:03:49.336 --> 01:03:51.180 it was like covered here. 01:03:51.180 --> 01:03:53.969 But the gist of it was if we had to take 01:03:53.969 --> 01:03:57.129 an awful lot of movement, move a lot of ships over to Europe 01:03:57.129 --> 01:03:59.288 we had to do it on short order. 01:03:59.288 --> 01:04:02.049 What would be the possible attrition 01:04:02.049 --> 01:04:04.094 based on certain sets of conditions 01:04:04.094 --> 01:04:06.208 like how wide these locks are 01:04:06.208 --> 01:04:09.791 or how much convoy we provide and so forth. 01:04:10.273 --> 01:04:12.743 And I agree with you, it's a pretty staggering, 01:04:12.743 --> 01:04:15.576 it would be a challenge back then. 01:04:15.649 --> 01:04:19.733 And that was 1987 with Soviet era, well, with the submarines 01:04:19.733 --> 01:04:22.243 of that day using torpedoes only. 01:04:22.243 --> 01:04:24.799 So you fast forward now to where we are today 01:04:24.799 --> 01:04:27.525 with modern weaponry and it would, 01:04:27.525 --> 01:04:29.488 I believe that the Battle of the Atlantic 2 01:04:29.488 --> 01:04:32.071 would be extremely challenging. 01:04:33.778 --> 01:04:35.569 There are studies that are going on, 01:04:35.569 --> 01:04:39.564 there are CONOPS types of planning that we're looking at. 01:04:39.564 --> 01:04:41.528 Fleet forces that has, for example, 01:04:41.528 --> 01:04:44.820 that have formed a team and is looking at that 01:04:44.820 --> 01:04:46.903 in coordination with CNA. 01:04:47.779 --> 01:04:50.281 I was talking to, just shooting notes back and forth 01:04:50.281 --> 01:04:52.287 with (mumbles) over the weekend 01:04:52.287 --> 01:04:53.650 and he said that that they 01:04:53.650 --> 01:04:55.900 now are looking at updating 01:04:56.810 --> 01:04:59.526 that particular study I'm talking about. 01:04:59.526 --> 01:05:01.471 So I think the answer is, well, 01:05:01.471 --> 01:05:03.163 I know that the answer is yes 01:05:03.163 --> 01:05:07.330 but I say nascent only because we don't have anything 01:05:07.456 --> 01:05:10.873 as mature as a study that I saw from '87, 01:05:12.412 --> 01:05:16.579 but there's a clear desire to wanna do a review of that 01:05:17.216 --> 01:05:21.383 based upon modern threats and also the loads on the ships. 01:05:21.959 --> 01:05:25.784 You know, it's probably not lost on anyone in this audience 01:05:25.784 --> 01:05:29.871 that when you take a ro-ro or two ro-ros that I have 01:05:29.871 --> 01:05:33.273 like a (mumbles) ro-ro, two of them 01:05:33.273 --> 01:05:35.192 will carry a brigade combat team. 01:05:35.192 --> 01:05:37.694 And so when you're talking about losing one ship 01:05:37.694 --> 01:05:39.770 in today's environment that's an enormous amount 01:05:39.770 --> 01:05:41.103 of combat power. 01:05:41.191 --> 01:05:43.847 The loss of one ship and one soul is way too many, 01:05:43.847 --> 01:05:46.514 I would never dispute that fact. 01:05:46.807 --> 01:05:50.795 But nowadays, I would think that the loss of a ship 01:05:50.795 --> 01:05:53.557 we're talking about that has an enormous capability 01:05:53.557 --> 01:05:57.057 is something that has everyone's attention 01:05:57.472 --> 01:05:59.478 including General McDew's and you saw, 01:05:59.478 --> 01:06:00.559 you heard it today at lunch, right? 01:06:00.559 --> 01:06:01.734 He used attrition, I didn't count, 01:06:01.734 --> 01:06:03.608 I think maybe it's three or four times, right? 01:06:03.608 --> 01:06:07.063 And this is in private conversation, we chuckled, 01:06:07.063 --> 01:06:09.329 he says, he thinks he's the first TRANSCOM commander 01:06:09.329 --> 01:06:10.870 that's ever used that word. 01:06:10.870 --> 01:06:15.037 And it may be so, that is that the reality, on his watch, 01:06:16.484 --> 01:06:18.402 is that to prepare for the future 01:06:18.402 --> 01:06:20.760 means you must think about attrition. 01:06:20.760 --> 01:06:24.220 And I'm reminded, I have this wonderful picture 01:06:24.220 --> 01:06:28.387 of all the symbology taken on the third of March in 2003. 01:06:30.561 --> 01:06:31.910 And it's a picture of, we call it 01:06:31.910 --> 01:06:34.014 the common operating picture, 01:06:34.014 --> 01:06:37.721 there's a 167 ships that are OPCON to MSC on that day 01:06:37.721 --> 01:06:41.241 and I keep that graphic as a reminder, "Am I ready?" 01:06:41.241 --> 01:06:44.574 Am I ready to assume OPCON of 167 ships? 01:06:45.280 --> 01:06:49.000 But I can tell you in my discussions with all the partners, 01:06:49.000 --> 01:06:51.984 people are very proud of what they did in 2003, 01:06:51.984 --> 01:06:56.151 and so am I as an American, of what we can do in 2003. 01:06:56.804 --> 01:07:00.006 But I will tell you, that's not the contested environment 01:07:00.006 --> 01:07:04.173 I'm talking about, right, or we're talking about today. 01:07:04.228 --> 01:07:05.751 Sure, the battlefield was contested 01:07:05.751 --> 01:07:08.367 but not the seas on which those ships travel. 01:07:08.367 --> 01:07:10.499 So there is, I think there is, 01:07:10.499 --> 01:07:13.573 I know there are a lot of work being done 01:07:13.573 --> 01:07:16.656 to analyze the problem and to come up 01:07:18.687 --> 01:07:22.095 with innovative solutions like Scott was talking about 01:07:22.095 --> 01:07:23.594 with tactics, techniques, procedures, 01:07:23.594 --> 01:07:25.797 hardware solutions if that's needed. 01:07:25.797 --> 01:07:29.199 And in the software solutions that is within the training 01:07:29.199 --> 01:07:31.463 of the mariners themselves to give them the skills 01:07:31.463 --> 01:07:35.630 that they need in order to meet that challenge head on. 01:07:36.409 --> 01:07:38.392 - [Jon] Thank you very much and I'm glad somebody 01:07:38.392 --> 01:07:42.076 read that study that helps sponsor it a long time ago. 01:07:42.076 --> 01:07:45.332 - Let me give you one more, just so the new Jon Kaskin 01:07:45.332 --> 01:07:47.582 can walk through something. 01:07:48.089 --> 01:07:50.672 The assumption that going back, 01:07:50.786 --> 01:07:52.453 you don't wanna relive history or make mistakes 01:07:52.453 --> 01:07:54.405 you've already learned through. 01:07:54.405 --> 01:07:58.401 I would submit to you that if you think that the war 01:07:58.401 --> 01:08:01.568 is a single dimensional kinetic event, 01:08:01.573 --> 01:08:03.688 that's where you should think differently. 01:08:03.688 --> 01:08:05.659 The war is a multidimensional event 01:08:05.659 --> 01:08:09.826 that has almost nothing to do with kinetic exchange 01:08:09.989 --> 01:08:12.148 if you even know when it started. 01:08:12.148 --> 01:08:15.604 There are some people that think it started already. 01:08:15.604 --> 01:08:17.923 And so what I would suggest to you 01:08:17.923 --> 01:08:20.364 is that not everything about the next war 01:08:20.364 --> 01:08:24.114 is gonna be brute force or landing a brigade, 01:08:24.224 --> 01:08:26.599 it might be thinking out, foxing it out, 01:08:26.599 --> 01:08:30.099 tacticing your enemy on one or many planes 01:08:31.848 --> 01:08:35.866 So the studies we're conducting today are complex. 01:08:35.866 --> 01:08:37.577 Some of them have to do with sealift, 01:08:37.577 --> 01:08:40.494 some of them have to do with space. 01:08:41.664 --> 01:08:43.138 I don't wanna go into a lot of detail 01:08:43.138 --> 01:08:46.963 but all I would tell you is if you believe that your navy 01:08:46.963 --> 01:08:49.366 is sitting on its haunches doing nothing 01:08:49.366 --> 01:08:51.409 and waiting to be told how to do this, 01:08:51.409 --> 01:08:54.892 I assure you this is being looked at very carefully. 01:08:54.892 --> 01:08:58.809 And the next war is not, the next war is brutal 01:08:59.337 --> 01:09:03.504 compared to anything, anybody in this room has experienced. 01:09:04.231 --> 01:09:06.814 It's brutal in both directions. 01:09:09.103 --> 01:09:10.204 - [Buz] We probably got time for one more. 01:09:10.204 --> 01:09:11.301 Captain Nygaard. 01:09:11.301 --> 01:09:13.471 - [Chuck] Yeah, hey, thanks for the shoutout 01:09:13.471 --> 01:09:14.638 about the M2M. 01:09:14.727 --> 01:09:17.968 I just wanted to give a quick sort of update 01:09:17.968 --> 01:09:20.235 on what's going on and there has been some neat progress. 01:09:20.235 --> 01:09:23.354 But for us, for me, I was fortunate enough 01:09:23.354 --> 01:09:26.920 to be given the leeway to sort of pursue this 01:09:26.920 --> 01:09:29.619 because when I started working at Crowley 01:09:29.619 --> 01:09:33.120 there was a requirement to hire some captains 01:09:33.120 --> 01:09:36.037 and some officers and then I heard, 01:09:37.224 --> 01:09:38.619 well, we couldn't hire from the Navy 01:09:38.619 --> 01:09:40.660 because nobody has the quals, I mean sort of, 01:09:40.660 --> 01:09:43.594 nobody lives that, everybody lives that. 01:09:43.594 --> 01:09:46.345 But the point is now it's kinda come full circle with us 01:09:46.345 --> 01:09:49.968 because at Crowley we're trying to hire and we can't 01:09:49.968 --> 01:09:51.485 because of the lack of credentials 01:09:51.485 --> 01:09:55.652 so we're just sort of doing this just to find hires. 01:09:56.118 --> 01:09:59.792 Now having said that, the National Defense Authorization Act 01:09:59.792 --> 01:10:03.956 came out and some of the wording that came out of it 01:10:03.956 --> 01:10:05.352 came from the listening session, 01:10:05.352 --> 01:10:07.180 two listening sessions last year 01:10:07.180 --> 01:10:11.011 with Cong. Hunter and Cong. Garamendi that led that 01:10:11.011 --> 01:10:13.611 and helped that and then Sen. Blumenthal got involved. 01:10:13.611 --> 01:10:17.778 And so the wording now says that 180 days, within 180 days 01:10:18.082 --> 01:10:22.165 of the National Defense Authorization Act signing 01:10:22.447 --> 01:10:26.614 that the Navy will report out, the Navy and Coast Guard 01:10:26.847 --> 01:10:30.007 will report out to Congress and the center 01:10:30.007 --> 01:10:32.895 of Armed Service Committee on progress and way ahead 01:10:32.895 --> 01:10:35.272 for credentialing, which is good news, 01:10:35.272 --> 01:10:38.189 except that right now I don't think 01:10:39.707 --> 01:10:42.040 the Navy is ready for what's 01:10:43.844 --> 01:10:46.570 probably gonna happen if they come out and say, 01:10:46.570 --> 01:10:50.690 "Okay, Navy, cool website is the answer," and it's not. 01:10:50.690 --> 01:10:52.830 And so that's one of the things, 01:10:52.830 --> 01:10:54.181 so what we're dealing with here 01:10:54.181 --> 01:10:56.764 is the National Maritime Center 01:10:57.752 --> 01:11:00.669 or how much they validate and bless 01:11:01.434 --> 01:11:03.845 on what veterans have experienced 01:11:03.845 --> 01:11:06.092 and how much does the Navy flex 01:11:06.092 --> 01:11:09.766 and change their school so there are dual qualifications. 01:11:09.766 --> 01:11:12.656 That's the kinda hard stuff that's gotta get worked out, 01:11:12.656 --> 01:11:15.337 but the Star Center down in Dania 01:11:15.337 --> 01:11:16.835 has made some really good progress. 01:11:16.835 --> 01:11:21.002 So there's a lot of things happening in the right direction, 01:11:21.149 --> 01:11:25.316 but keep an eye on the 180 days, we'll get interesting 01:11:26.725 --> 01:11:29.620 and I guess one of us will write an article 01:11:29.620 --> 01:11:32.405 to kinda update everybody on what really happens. 01:11:32.405 --> 01:11:34.238 But anyway, thank you. 01:11:35.006 --> 01:11:35.974 - Thank you, Chuck. 01:11:35.974 --> 01:11:36.957 And unfortunately, that brings us 01:11:36.957 --> 01:11:38.943 to the end of our discussion. 01:11:38.943 --> 01:11:41.449 I wanna thank the panel again, very much. 01:11:41.449 --> 01:11:42.727 I'd like to thank the Navy League, 01:11:42.727 --> 01:11:44.947 I'd like to thank LMI for sponsoring it 01:11:44.947 --> 01:11:48.663 and thank you all for your loyalty check for being here 01:11:48.663 --> 01:11:51.768 late an afternoon prior to the reception. 01:11:51.768 --> 01:11:53.208 Thank you all very much. 01:11:53.208 --> 01:11:55.625 (applauding)