WEBVTT 00:15.610 --> 00:16.616 - Well good afternoon, everybody. 00:16.616 --> 00:19.178 It's Friday afternoon, well I'm impressed 00:19.178 --> 00:23.291 that there's so many here, it's a slow news day in DC, 00:23.291 --> 00:24.358 I don't know. 00:24.358 --> 00:25.413 Well listen, thank you very much 00:25.413 --> 00:27.404 for coming out this afternoon, I really appreciate it. 00:27.404 --> 00:29.936 It's a great opportunity to speak 00:29.936 --> 00:32.569 on behalf of those who work everyday in AFRICOM 00:32.569 --> 00:36.149 and I really do view this as a great opportunity. 00:36.149 --> 00:38.031 I don't really have any significant opening remarks, 00:38.031 --> 00:39.536 what I just want to mention to you 00:39.536 --> 00:42.536 is that on April 18-20 in Stuttgart, 00:43.058 --> 00:45.540 AFRICOM will sponsor what I believe 00:45.540 --> 00:47.992 will be the first ever Chief of Defense Conference 00:47.992 --> 00:50.952 for all of the Chiefs of Defense on the continent. 00:50.952 --> 00:53.452 We've invited over 50 to come, 00:53.607 --> 00:57.191 and the purpose is really to discuss, among other things, 00:57.191 --> 01:01.235 the global violent extremist organizations and responses. 01:01.235 --> 01:03.664 But moreover, we're very interested 01:03.664 --> 01:06.456 in listening to our African partners, 01:06.456 --> 01:08.351 what some of their concerns are, 01:08.351 --> 01:10.268 and what they would like from AFRICOM, 01:10.268 --> 01:12.120 to see more of or less of. 01:12.120 --> 01:14.180 And give them an opportutnity to come together 01:14.180 --> 01:16.501 and share their thoughts and ideas. 01:16.501 --> 01:17.834 We don't want them to come to Stuttgart 01:17.834 --> 01:19.397 just for us to talk to them. 01:19.397 --> 01:21.158 We want them to come to Stuttgart 01:21.158 --> 01:22.963 so we can hear their message. 01:22.963 --> 01:25.525 And that's gonna be in late April, 01:25.525 --> 01:27.276 and we're very, very excited about that. 01:27.276 --> 01:29.548 Again I think it's the first time that's taken place. 01:29.548 --> 01:33.012 And so I just wanted to mention that before we get started. 01:33.012 --> 01:35.776 With that, I can go ahead and take questions. 01:35.776 --> 01:36.684 Talita, thank you. 01:36.684 --> 01:38.511 - Thank you General, and thanks a lot for doing this, 01:38.511 --> 01:39.529 we really appreciate it. 01:39.529 --> 01:43.589 I wanted to ask you about US authorities for Somalia. 01:43.589 --> 01:47.702 The Pentagon, the US has asked for great authority 01:47.702 --> 01:51.702 to do more and more flexibility with air strikes 01:52.389 --> 01:55.806 and with helping local forces in Somalia. 01:56.841 --> 01:58.337 I'm wondering if you can talk about 01:58.337 --> 01:59.720 why you think that's necessary, 01:59.720 --> 02:02.998 what will that give you, what will that allow you to, 02:02.998 --> 02:04.478 why that's important? 02:04.478 --> 02:07.465 And would that increase the likelihood 02:07.465 --> 02:10.512 of civilian causalities, do you believe? 02:10.512 --> 02:12.057 - Thanks very much for that question. 02:12.057 --> 02:14.666 There's a couple different aspects I'd like to explore, 02:14.666 --> 02:15.668 if you don't mind. 02:15.668 --> 02:17.806 The first one is, and I think it's obvious, 02:17.806 --> 02:19.818 that really regardless of combatant commander 02:19.818 --> 02:21.342 was sitting here this afternoon, 02:21.342 --> 02:22.180 I think they would all tell you 02:22.180 --> 02:25.428 that it's very important and very helpful 02:25.428 --> 02:27.675 for us to have a little bit more flexibility, 02:27.675 --> 02:29.988 a little bit more time in the terms 02:29.988 --> 02:31.283 of the decision making process, 02:31.283 --> 02:34.671 and allow us to, if it's in fact counter ISIS, 02:34.671 --> 02:36.786 or in our case in Somalia, Al-Shabaab, 02:36.786 --> 02:39.832 it'll allow us to prosecute targets in a more rapid fashion. 02:39.832 --> 02:43.745 So that obviously is something that we advocate for 02:43.745 --> 02:45.966 and it will, if we were given that opportutnity, 02:45.966 --> 02:48.103 given those permissions and authorities, 02:48.103 --> 02:49.473 will be very helpful to us. 02:49.473 --> 02:51.565 Now the second thing I want to mention on that 02:51.565 --> 02:54.710 with regards to certainty and a level of certainty, 02:54.710 --> 02:56.377 I think it's very, very important 02:56.377 --> 02:58.631 and if we're given that authority, 02:58.631 --> 03:00.761 that the level of certainty we have 03:00.761 --> 03:04.928 when a bomb or missile leaves the rail of an airplane, 03:05.465 --> 03:09.064 that we know exactly who we are attacking on the ground. 03:09.064 --> 03:12.154 It's very, very important that the level of certainty 03:12.154 --> 03:13.965 that we have demonstrated in AFRICOM, 03:13.965 --> 03:17.465 whether it be in Sirte, in southern Libya, 03:17.788 --> 03:19.612 it's very, very important that we have 03:19.612 --> 03:22.311 a very high degree of certainty in order to 03:22.311 --> 03:25.728 really mitigate or eliminate in all total 03:25.753 --> 03:26.755 civilian casualties. 03:26.755 --> 03:28.807 And by the way I may have said this before, 03:28.807 --> 03:32.532 the group of our soldiers, sailor, airmen, and marines 03:32.532 --> 03:34.980 who actually you know do this, 03:34.980 --> 03:37.858 the actually execution at some of these missions, 03:37.858 --> 03:39.330 I mean their professional maturity is something 03:39.330 --> 03:41.144 that I think is very, very positive, 03:41.144 --> 03:42.859 and I think we need to underscore that. 03:42.859 --> 03:44.903 As an example, during the Sirte campaign, 03:44.903 --> 03:47.333 I really only had to make about four or five decisions 03:47.333 --> 03:48.902 at my level with regards to when 03:48.902 --> 03:51.121 or when not strike a target. 03:51.121 --> 03:53.836 The majority of that is down at a very lower level. 03:53.836 --> 03:56.107 And I think it's important to understand when you're 03:56.107 --> 03:58.718 in an urban environment like Sirte was, 03:58.718 --> 04:00.725 in order to prosecute these targets, 04:00.725 --> 04:03.385 you've gotta power down the decision making authority 04:03.385 --> 04:05.355 in order to be responsive. 04:05.355 --> 04:07.308 And I can give a handful of examples 04:07.308 --> 04:09.687 when I was in the Operation Center 04:09.687 --> 04:12.213 where I witnessed that the operator's either 04:12.213 --> 04:14.124 pulled a missile off the target 04:14.124 --> 04:17.291 or just stopped the mission completely 04:17.494 --> 04:20.921 when someone or something came into the view of the camera 04:20.921 --> 04:22.835 that we weren't sure who or what it was. 04:22.835 --> 04:24.649 So it's very, very important obviously 04:24.649 --> 04:26.827 the cardinal rule In these type of engagements 04:26.827 --> 04:28.939 is to not make more any enemies than you already have, 04:28.939 --> 04:31.195 and I think we go to great pains to do that. 04:31.195 --> 04:33.619 The final thing I would say with regards to Somalia, 04:33.619 --> 04:34.810 which I think is unique to us, 04:34.810 --> 04:36.709 is we've got some significant issues 04:36.709 --> 04:39.408 with regards to the famine, and what that means 04:39.408 --> 04:41.040 in terms of large numbers of people 04:41.040 --> 04:44.010 moving around a combat zone or a battlefield, 04:44.010 --> 04:45.488 and what that means to us. 04:45.488 --> 04:46.988 So within AFRICOM, 04:47.021 --> 04:49.506 we've really kinda war gamed this already. 04:49.506 --> 04:51.845 We've had detailed discussions, 04:51.845 --> 04:53.494 we've war gamed our procedures, 04:53.494 --> 04:56.759 because with the various non-governmental organizations 04:56.759 --> 04:59.249 who must work in a famine type environment, 04:59.249 --> 05:00.987 must maintain their neutrality, 05:00.987 --> 05:04.534 must have freedom of action, it's very, very important 05:04.534 --> 05:06.149 that we have a common operating picture 05:06.149 --> 05:07.481 as to where they are. 05:07.481 --> 05:09.252 Because it's our responsibility to make sure 05:09.252 --> 05:11.318 that we don't have any catastrophes, 05:11.318 --> 05:13.216 and we don't take out a group of people 05:13.216 --> 05:15.906 who is moving to find water or food. 05:15.906 --> 05:18.111 So we are very, very conscious of that. 05:18.111 --> 05:19.886 We take that into our planning. 05:19.886 --> 05:23.886 But I think this idea of large numbers of people 05:23.906 --> 05:27.554 moving to where the food might be or water might be, 05:27.554 --> 05:29.971 is an aspect of whatever authorities, 05:29.971 --> 05:31.761 even the authorities we have today, 05:31.761 --> 05:34.019 we have to take that into account. 05:34.019 --> 05:36.323 And that's something we take very, very seriously 05:36.323 --> 05:38.312 and we've talked in great detail about. 05:38.312 --> 05:39.145 So in sum, those three things. 05:39.145 --> 05:42.190 More authorities, more responsiveness. 05:42.190 --> 05:45.347 We do go to great lengths to understand 05:45.347 --> 05:48.145 and the level of certainty is something that we 05:48.145 --> 05:49.614 you know that we have, 05:49.614 --> 05:52.027 and I think that we have to be very cognizant of the fact 05:52.027 --> 05:54.302 that of the famine and of the impact it has 05:54.302 --> 05:56.329 inside a battle zone and inside Somalia. 05:56.329 --> 05:58.644 - Well just as a follow up, how has the threat changed 05:58.644 --> 06:02.811 such that you think these greater authorities are necessary? 06:03.155 --> 06:05.390 - Well I wouldn't say the threat in this particular case 06:05.390 --> 06:08.035 we'll just mention Al-Shabaab, the threat hasn't changed. 06:08.035 --> 06:11.012 The threat is still there, but I think that it's fair to say 06:11.012 --> 06:14.762 that our ability to strike Al-Shabaab targets 06:14.981 --> 06:17.429 in this particular instance will have an impact 06:17.429 --> 06:20.181 on their ability to continue what they're trying to do. 06:20.181 --> 06:22.150 I mean with the new government in there, 06:22.150 --> 06:24.997 President Farmajo, we have an opportutnity here 06:24.997 --> 06:28.175 to move forward, he's you know a dual US citizen, 06:28.175 --> 06:31.141 he worked in Buffalo, New York for 10 years or so, 06:31.141 --> 06:33.768 he's got his Masters degree from the University of Buffalo. 06:33.768 --> 06:36.257 He was a former Prime Minister in Somalia, 06:36.257 --> 06:38.023 he's obviously now the President. 06:38.023 --> 06:41.291 He understands how it's important to pay the military. 06:41.291 --> 06:44.963 He understands what corruption does and does not do for you, 06:44.963 --> 06:46.047 for the federal government. 06:46.047 --> 06:48.584 So we have a great opportutnity to work with him. 06:48.584 --> 06:52.739 And we look forward to continuing our counter terrorism part 06:52.739 --> 06:54.620 because the strategy inside Somalia, 06:54.620 --> 06:57.453 our continuation of CT operations, 06:58.360 --> 07:00.475 and specifically against Al-Shabaab, 07:00.475 --> 07:02.410 is a big part of our strategy. 07:02.410 --> 07:03.243 Please. 07:03.250 --> 07:05.647 - General, Lucas Tomlinson, Fox News. 07:05.647 --> 07:08.396 What can you tell us about ISIS in Libya? 07:08.396 --> 07:10.649 You've dropped a lot of bombs on the group since August, 07:10.649 --> 07:12.262 do they remain a threat? 07:12.262 --> 07:14.020 Can you provide us with an update? 07:14.020 --> 07:15.770 - Well, thanks Lucas. 07:15.889 --> 07:17.181 I think the first thing I would say is 07:17.181 --> 07:21.348 anywhere you have a weak or unstable or no government, 07:22.523 --> 07:24.187 that's a breeding ground for ISIS. 07:24.187 --> 07:27.491 And consequently with the situation in Libya as it is, 07:27.491 --> 07:28.807 ISIS has not left. 07:28.807 --> 07:31.856 And so the second point I would make is, 07:31.856 --> 07:35.569 with all the different factions inside Libya, 07:35.569 --> 07:37.535 and whether it's the Government of National Accord 07:37.535 --> 07:41.421 or the House of Representatives, that drama that continues, 07:41.421 --> 07:44.702 one thing that unites pretty much everybody in Libya 07:44.702 --> 07:46.656 to include those two organizations as well as 07:46.656 --> 07:49.073 the various misrotten militias and the like. 07:49.073 --> 07:50.838 One thing that unites them is idea 07:50.838 --> 07:53.551 that no ISIS is wanted inside Libya. 07:53.551 --> 07:55.822 So we continue to develop intelligence, 07:55.822 --> 07:59.197 even after Sirte of course and the 18 January strike. 07:59.197 --> 08:00.666 They have not left. 08:00.666 --> 08:03.332 We continue to watch, we continue to observe, 08:03.332 --> 08:05.957 to develop the intelligence, and if requested by 08:05.957 --> 08:07.948 at this time the Government of National Accord, 08:07.948 --> 08:09.694 for assistance again, we'll provide that. 08:09.694 --> 08:12.052 - What can you tell us overall about the terrorist threat 08:12.052 --> 08:14.003 on the continent of Africa? 08:14.003 --> 08:16.065 Is it increasing, decreasing, staying the same? 08:16.065 --> 08:17.765 - Well it's hard to characterize it 08:17.765 --> 08:20.647 whether it's increasing or decreasing. 08:20.647 --> 08:24.165 You know we have, I characterize it this way. 08:24.165 --> 08:28.165 If you view ISIS in Iraq and Syria as core ISIS, 08:28.630 --> 08:30.990 I think a good way to characterize ISIS 08:30.990 --> 08:33.657 on the African continent is a global ISIS. 08:33.657 --> 08:35.589 You have groups that affiliate. 08:35.589 --> 08:37.292 or want to affiliate with ISIS. 08:37.292 --> 08:39.686 You have groups that have been provided funding 08:39.686 --> 08:42.015 and training and so forth from ISIS. 08:42.015 --> 08:44.621 The interesting thing though about ISIS on the continent is 08:44.621 --> 08:46.665 and this is what our job is, our job is to make sure 08:46.665 --> 08:50.338 that those organizations, whether they're ISIS affiliated, 08:50.338 --> 08:54.505 AQ, Al-Qaeda affiliated, or various terrorist groups, 08:55.465 --> 08:57.132 or insurgent groups. 08:57.328 --> 08:59.997 It's our job to make sure that those groups 08:59.997 --> 09:02.747 stay internal to those countries, 09:03.336 --> 09:05.553 or internal to those regions and that they don't 09:05.553 --> 09:09.298 grow beyond, move into Europe, move into the homeland. 09:09.298 --> 09:11.185 One of the things that we try to do right now, 09:11.185 --> 09:13.555 by, with, and through our partners to a large degree. 09:13.555 --> 09:16.874 By, with, and through our partners, is to make sure 09:16.874 --> 09:19.993 that those VEO organizations and ISIS or Al-Qaeda 09:19.993 --> 09:22.131 or whatever the group is described as, 09:22.131 --> 09:24.592 want to make sure our pressure on the network 09:24.592 --> 09:27.060 keeps those problems tamped down. 09:27.060 --> 09:28.358 - Finally what can you tell us about the Russian presence 09:28.358 --> 09:30.941 in Western Egypt or even Libya? 09:31.055 --> 09:32.956 - Well I think it's common knowledge, 09:32.956 --> 09:34.864 certainly in the open press, that Russians 09:34.864 --> 09:38.660 and their desire to influence the activities inside Libya. 09:38.660 --> 09:42.410 We obviously know that Haftar visited Russia. 09:42.671 --> 09:45.245 We also know Haftar was on board a Russian carrier 09:45.245 --> 09:47.180 while it was in the Met here a month or so ago. 09:47.180 --> 09:49.834 And we also know that Seraj visited Russia 09:49.834 --> 09:51.172 here recently as well. 09:51.172 --> 09:53.798 And so it indicates, the things I would say, 09:53.798 --> 09:56.381 is that the Russians and Hafta, 09:56.815 --> 10:00.903 I think that linkage is undeniable at this point in time. 10:00.903 --> 10:03.486 I think that Seraj was looking, 10:04.040 --> 10:05.766 when his visit for the Russians 10:05.766 --> 10:08.514 was looking to try to get those two together. 10:08.514 --> 10:12.490 Because we talk about a political solution inside Libya. 10:12.490 --> 10:16.128 You know we always have said that it's never going to be 10:16.128 --> 10:18.930 a military solution, but you have define what that means. 10:18.930 --> 10:21.298 And if you're going to have a political solution right now 10:21.298 --> 10:23.493 inside Libya, the requirement for, 10:23.493 --> 10:26.885 and not to personalize this, I think we make a big mistake 10:26.885 --> 10:29.952 if we try to personalize this Haftar verus Seraj, 10:29.952 --> 10:31.801 you know we should talk in terms of 10:31.801 --> 10:34.354 House of Representatives, Libya National Army, 10:34.354 --> 10:36.784 and the Government of National Accord. 10:36.784 --> 10:40.034 That said, those two individuals though 10:40.351 --> 10:41.880 are gonna have to get together, 10:41.880 --> 10:43.762 and come to some kind of accommodation. 10:43.762 --> 10:46.273 Because the larger issue here I think at the moment is 10:46.273 --> 10:48.440 the fact that it's such a, 10:49.393 --> 10:53.496 it's such a volatile environment right now inside Libya 10:53.496 --> 10:55.579 that one of the things that, in my view, 10:55.579 --> 10:56.726 what we need to do is make sure that this 10:56.726 --> 10:58.646 doesn't evolve into a all out civil war. 10:58.646 --> 11:00.864 And you're going to have to have those two individuals, 11:00.864 --> 11:02.853 who represent those two entities, 11:02.853 --> 11:06.376 come together to make this happen at this point. 11:06.376 --> 11:09.793 Please, I'll come over here next I guess. 11:09.972 --> 11:11.335 - Thank you General. 11:11.335 --> 11:14.476 On your coming meeting with your African partners, 11:14.476 --> 11:16.888 one of the things that we always hear from them 11:16.888 --> 11:18.342 is that they want more equipment 11:18.342 --> 11:20.666 and more training for their forces. 11:20.666 --> 11:24.303 So do you see AFRICOM possibly doing more of that? 11:24.303 --> 11:26.774 And does DoD have the resources currently 11:26.774 --> 11:30.234 to do more training and equipping of foreign partners? 11:30.234 --> 11:31.067 Thank you. 11:31.368 --> 11:33.471 - Thank you, so first of all I think it's important, 11:33.471 --> 11:35.928 regardless of pretty much where we are, 11:35.928 --> 11:37.233 whether it's Somalia, 11:37.233 --> 11:39.648 where UAE and Turkey provides training. 11:39.648 --> 11:42.898 Whether it's in Mali, where the French are heavily involved 11:42.898 --> 11:43.950 as well as others. 11:43.950 --> 11:46.681 Whether it's inside you know Libya at the moment, 11:46.681 --> 11:48.316 and others who are doing the training there, 11:48.316 --> 11:50.533 whether it be the EU with the Coast Guard and so forth. 11:50.533 --> 11:52.080 I think it's important to underscore, 11:52.080 --> 11:53.796 there are a lot of partners who are there 11:53.796 --> 11:55.074 who are conducting training, 11:55.074 --> 11:56.477 it's not just the United States. 11:56.477 --> 11:59.851 It's a large country, there's plenty of work to be done, 11:59.851 --> 12:01.802 and I think it's important that we underscore 12:01.802 --> 12:05.142 and acknowledge that we have a lot of global partners 12:05.142 --> 12:06.580 who participate as well. 12:06.580 --> 12:09.830 In my visits and my travels, everybody, 12:10.697 --> 12:13.028 every country, all senior officials 12:13.028 --> 12:15.906 really would like to have the United States forces 12:15.906 --> 12:17.978 train, advise, and equip them. 12:17.978 --> 12:20.356 And I think we have to acknowledge that's a compliment 12:20.356 --> 12:22.671 to our forces, they do a very good job at this 12:22.671 --> 12:25.094 and they set a very, very high standard. 12:25.094 --> 12:26.852 But we can't be everywhere. 12:26.852 --> 12:30.852 And so training is one of the things that we do. 12:31.192 --> 12:34.621 So I think it's a compliment when they ask us to do it. 12:34.621 --> 12:35.885 Equipment is another story. 12:35.885 --> 12:38.507 And you have to kind of break it down almost by country 12:38.507 --> 12:40.920 in terms of what the asks are, 12:40.920 --> 12:43.587 what their ability to absorb is, 12:44.042 --> 12:47.132 and do they have the logistical, for example, 12:47.132 --> 12:51.299 a logistical infrastructure to maintain what we give them? 12:51.800 --> 12:53.946 So for example, you can take a country like Tunisia, 12:53.946 --> 12:57.211 that and AFRICOM does not do this by the way. 12:57.211 --> 12:59.965 This comes from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency 12:59.965 --> 13:02.997 inside OSD, this weapon sales and that type of thing. 13:02.997 --> 13:05.793 We get asked, can they handle this, 13:05.793 --> 13:07.898 do you think they need this, and so forth. 13:07.898 --> 13:10.845 But the details and the ownership of those programs 13:10.845 --> 13:13.928 are really outside AFRICOM's purview. 13:14.021 --> 13:16.008 I think it's important to understand though 13:16.008 --> 13:20.113 that whether you're selling a country jet fighters or tanks 13:20.113 --> 13:23.395 or simply MRAPs, the country has to be able to absorb 13:23.395 --> 13:26.159 whatever capability you're giving them. 13:26.159 --> 13:28.718 And I think that's a big thing that we have to watch. 13:28.718 --> 13:30.187 The second thing I would just say is 13:30.187 --> 13:32.928 and I think I said this in testimony last week, 13:32.928 --> 13:36.798 is that I would not, certainly not ever advocate 13:36.798 --> 13:38.660 to change the rules and how we, 13:38.660 --> 13:40.810 you know how that system is set up. 13:40.810 --> 13:42.637 But I think on the African continent, 13:42.637 --> 13:46.137 when you have you know the top 50 you know 13:46.222 --> 13:48.450 whatever the State Department's scale is, 13:48.450 --> 13:51.447 the top 50 poorest countries on the planet, 13:51.447 --> 13:53.734 there's a huge number of African countries on there. 13:53.734 --> 13:56.249 I think we have seven or eight of the top 15 13:56.249 --> 13:59.753 and 33 out of the top 50 are African countries on that list. 13:59.753 --> 14:02.835 If we are going to work by, with, and through 14:02.835 --> 14:07.002 and ask our partners to assist us in the VEO operations, 14:13.025 --> 14:15.814 then we've got to find a way to provide support 14:15.814 --> 14:18.637 to them for first of all to give them what they need, 14:18.637 --> 14:21.918 and secondly to demonstrate that our commitment 14:21.918 --> 14:23.964 to their effort is genuine. 14:23.964 --> 14:26.264 Because if we don't provide them the equipment they need 14:26.264 --> 14:28.834 to counter ISIS, if you were Chad for example 14:28.834 --> 14:30.971 and you needed something to counter ISIS 14:30.971 --> 14:34.561 in the Lake Chad Basin region, we gotta find a way 14:34.561 --> 14:36.318 to give them what they need. 14:36.318 --> 14:40.485 Even though their ability to pay sometimes is difficult. 14:40.504 --> 14:42.135 - Is China possibly providing equipment 14:42.135 --> 14:43.767 to African countries? 14:43.767 --> 14:44.849 Have you seen that? 14:44.849 --> 14:48.560 - Well China, I mean the short answer is yes. 14:48.560 --> 14:49.875 There are weapons sales. 14:49.875 --> 14:52.341 The Russian, the Chinese, I mean this is common knowledge. 14:52.341 --> 14:53.767 Some different countries. 14:53.767 --> 14:55.717 But I would say that if the question is 14:55.717 --> 14:57.377 having to do, has that been an obstacle 14:57.377 --> 15:00.314 and a problem for us at the moment, I would say no. 15:00.314 --> 15:01.147 Please. 15:02.199 --> 15:04.837 - I think, I'm not sure I understood exactly 15:04.837 --> 15:08.004 about or I'm from France, I apologize. 15:08.825 --> 15:12.325 I think you mentioned about the strikes in Somalia? 15:12.325 --> 15:15.534 Do you have now new authority to carry out 15:15.534 --> 15:17.794 those strikes or is it still 15:17.794 --> 15:20.627 something that is being discussed? 15:21.371 --> 15:24.203 - Liyba is a unique place for AFRICOM 15:24.203 --> 15:25.475 in terms of authorities. 15:25.475 --> 15:27.023 - [Reporter] Somalia, sorry Somalia. 15:27.023 --> 15:28.819 - So the question then is, do we have new authority? 15:28.819 --> 15:31.986 - You mentioned that you, the project. 15:32.787 --> 15:33.626 - [General] Right. 15:33.626 --> 15:35.766 - So is it a project, or is it something that you have? 15:35.766 --> 15:36.766 - I think I understand. 15:36.766 --> 15:39.160 So what we have today in Somalia, 15:39.160 --> 15:41.513 is we have the ability for collective self defense. 15:41.513 --> 15:44.430 So if we have armed ISR up overtop, 15:44.696 --> 15:47.330 and we are training, advising, assisting, 15:47.330 --> 15:50.176 and accompanying one of our surrogate forces there, 15:50.176 --> 15:53.509 and the situation gets into what we call 15:54.135 --> 15:57.547 collective self defense, then we are authorized to use that. 15:57.547 --> 16:00.296 But that's not an offensive capability. 16:00.296 --> 16:02.648 This is a defensive capability to be used judiciously 16:02.648 --> 16:04.884 when the situation on the ground arises 16:04.884 --> 16:07.747 when that particular force can not take on 16:07.747 --> 16:11.580 the opposition with their own organic weapons. 16:11.898 --> 16:14.313 So it's kind of an extremist authority that we have. 16:14.313 --> 16:16.912 That's what we have today inside Somalia. 16:16.912 --> 16:17.745 Please. 16:18.389 --> 16:21.300 - Sir, this is Kassam Ader with Anadolu Agency, 16:21.300 --> 16:22.832 the Turkish News Agency. 16:22.832 --> 16:26.667 I will have follow up on the ISIS presence in Libya. 16:26.667 --> 16:30.834 You've said that we know that they have not left Libya, 16:30.928 --> 16:34.177 can you tell us, do you have any estimate 16:34.177 --> 16:37.010 about their numbers or force size? 16:37.445 --> 16:40.322 Are they holding any territory in Libya or not? 16:40.322 --> 16:43.621 - So you know after the Sirte operation, 16:43.621 --> 16:46.067 I'm very hesitant to try to put a number 16:46.067 --> 16:47.487 on how many are there. 16:47.487 --> 16:49.322 I mean I think if you go back to Sirte, 16:49.322 --> 16:51.514 that started in August of last year 16:51.514 --> 16:53.966 and ended in December of last year. 16:53.966 --> 16:56.043 I think what we probably did at the outset 16:56.043 --> 16:58.151 is we probably underestimated the number of ISIS 16:58.151 --> 17:00.220 who were there and probably overestimated 17:00.220 --> 17:02.393 the number of civilians who were still left. 17:02.393 --> 17:05.058 And it's you know an educated guess, 17:05.058 --> 17:07.676 I mean these analysts go through and they 17:07.676 --> 17:10.407 don't just make this up you know they have 17:10.407 --> 17:13.063 ways to get to these numbers, but they're just a number. 17:13.063 --> 17:16.834 I would say inside Libya today, if you take way 17:16.834 --> 17:19.943 the East, the Benghazi area where really Haftar and the LNA 17:19.943 --> 17:22.736 have been fighting and you concentrate where 17:22.736 --> 17:24.951 we have had most of our effort. 17:24.951 --> 17:27.606 I mean if you wanted to throw a number on top of it 17:27.606 --> 17:30.367 and you said 100, 200, you know that's fine. 17:30.367 --> 17:32.564 I think the point is and the trendline is 17:32.564 --> 17:34.002 that the numbers are down. 17:34.002 --> 17:35.671 And the point is and the trendline 17:35.671 --> 17:37.824 is that their ability to occupy, 17:37.824 --> 17:41.263 or their desire to occupy real estate is probably not there. 17:41.263 --> 17:43.711 I mean I think that if you had to characterize it, 17:43.711 --> 17:45.258 they're probably in small groups, 17:45.258 --> 17:47.616 they're staying off the communication lines, 17:47.616 --> 17:49.483 they don't want to surface and talk, 17:49.483 --> 17:52.983 they're just trying to maintain a presence 17:53.341 --> 17:56.161 because they don't want to leave and they're not gonna 17:56.161 --> 17:58.548 gather in large groups and make a you know 17:58.548 --> 18:00.048 an obvious target. 18:00.258 --> 18:02.591 - Then just a followup then. 18:03.157 --> 18:07.324 The flow of migrants from Libya to Europe and to Turkey, 18:09.256 --> 18:12.432 today we also heard that about 12 refugees 18:12.432 --> 18:14.385 sank off shore at Turkey. 18:14.385 --> 18:17.260 Could you tell us about the African efforts 18:17.260 --> 18:20.343 dealing with that problem of the flow 18:21.522 --> 18:23.171 of migration of migrants? 18:23.171 --> 18:25.373 - So obviously this migrant problem is a huge issue. 18:25.373 --> 18:28.137 If you start at the you know out in the water, 18:28.137 --> 18:30.261 so to speak, you know the European Union 18:30.261 --> 18:32.661 is training and working with the Libyan Coast Guard, 18:32.661 --> 18:34.982 to bring a capacity and capability up there 18:34.982 --> 18:36.404 to combat it that way. 18:36.404 --> 18:38.479 But I think, and I don't have a good answer, 18:38.479 --> 18:40.681 but I think it's just important to at least understand 18:40.681 --> 18:44.764 the problem from the standpoint that these routes 18:44.765 --> 18:48.348 that the migrants and these traffickers use 18:48.469 --> 18:51.371 have been in the African continent historically 18:51.371 --> 18:52.931 for many, many, many years. 18:52.931 --> 18:55.414 And I think there's, what we've look at at AFRICOM 18:55.414 --> 18:58.521 recently and it's just a very interesting phenomenon, 18:58.521 --> 18:59.442 and I'm not sure how we're gonna 18:59.442 --> 19:01.053 use this information yet is, 19:01.053 --> 19:03.573 but the business aspect of migrants. 19:03.573 --> 19:06.465 And how if you take a country like Niger for example, 19:06.465 --> 19:09.166 where the average salary is like $400 a year, 19:09.166 --> 19:11.180 and you do the math with what we think 19:11.180 --> 19:14.787 the charges are along the way for migrants, if you will, 19:14.787 --> 19:17.607 coming out of Nigeria, up in through Niger, 19:17.607 --> 19:19.398 and moving up into Libya. 19:19.398 --> 19:22.324 Everybody along the way is part of the business. 19:22.324 --> 19:25.345 I mean there are drivers, there are hotels to stay at, 19:25.345 --> 19:26.976 and eventually you get to a point where 19:26.976 --> 19:30.241 you're paying somebody, maybe around $4,000 19:30.241 --> 19:32.773 to put you on a boat to get you out in the water. 19:32.773 --> 19:35.315 And if you look at the numbers in the last week or so, 19:35.315 --> 19:37.709 and you look at the numbers on an annual basis, 19:37.709 --> 19:40.103 and you do some math with those dollar figures, 19:40.103 --> 19:42.214 you can see that this is millions and millions 19:42.214 --> 19:44.661 and maybe even billion dollar industry. 19:44.661 --> 19:46.744 And so this is livelihood 19:46.916 --> 19:49.456 for a lot of the people along the way, 19:49.456 --> 19:51.937 to include government officials and the like. 19:51.937 --> 19:54.701 So this phenomena and you know it's hard to 19:54.701 --> 19:56.212 come up with a profile of you know whether 19:56.212 --> 19:58.471 are these ISIS fighters, are these people 19:58.471 --> 20:00.257 looking for a job and so forth? 20:00.257 --> 20:03.079 But there's a lot of data that we see, 20:03.079 --> 20:05.443 indicates that people will take a risk, 20:05.443 --> 20:07.693 they'll collect some money, 20:08.020 --> 20:10.394 they'll have the money they have, 20:10.394 --> 20:12.026 they'll get themselves up into Europe 20:12.026 --> 20:13.606 and if possible they can get a job. 20:13.606 --> 20:16.945 Eventually provide remittances back to where they came from, 20:16.945 --> 20:19.437 and maybe eventually get their family into Europe. 20:19.437 --> 20:22.502 But this is a huge business aspect to this, 20:22.502 --> 20:24.363 there's a huge dollar figure to this, 20:24.363 --> 20:26.948 that has been there for many, many years. 20:26.948 --> 20:28.408 Now that doesn't solve the problem, 20:28.408 --> 20:30.484 but I think it at least helps us 20:30.484 --> 20:34.651 to a certain degree understand what the problem is. 20:34.902 --> 20:36.295 Please in the back. 20:36.295 --> 20:39.251 - Can you go back on to the Russia Libya question 20:39.251 --> 20:41.223 for a minute and a couple other things? 20:41.223 --> 20:44.306 On that, can you be any more specific 20:44.452 --> 20:48.619 about what you see the Russians doing on the ground? 20:49.708 --> 20:51.378 Are they crossing the border 20:51.378 --> 20:54.248 from that base in Egypt into Libya? 20:54.248 --> 20:56.454 What are they doing inside Libya? 20:56.454 --> 20:57.970 Are they delivering weapons? 20:57.970 --> 21:01.135 Are they conduction overhead surveillance? 21:01.135 --> 21:04.402 - You know, Margaret it's very difficult 21:04.402 --> 21:06.640 to answer that question from a classification standpoint. 21:06.640 --> 21:08.802 I would just say that they are on the ground. 21:08.802 --> 21:10.953 They are trying to influence the action. 21:10.953 --> 21:14.370 We watch what they do with great concern. 21:14.856 --> 21:18.261 And you know in addition to the military side of this 21:18.261 --> 21:22.137 we've seen some recent activity in business ventures, 21:22.137 --> 21:25.699 whether it's oil, whether it's weapon sales 21:25.699 --> 21:27.029 that perhaps were stopped when 21:27.029 --> 21:28.504 the Gaddafi regime took place. 21:28.504 --> 21:30.705 There's several aspects here that are very important. 21:30.705 --> 21:33.601 I would say influence is the most significant. 21:33.601 --> 21:37.768 But at the same time, there's some business activities 21:38.546 --> 21:42.713 that are ongoing and we just need to understand that. 21:43.285 --> 21:45.453 - When you say on the ground, when you said that to be clear 21:45.453 --> 21:48.062 you mean on the ground inside Libya, right? 21:48.062 --> 21:48.895 Not Egypt. 21:49.946 --> 21:53.071 - I would just say that there are Russians 21:53.071 --> 21:54.849 on the ground in the area. 21:54.849 --> 21:57.783 - Okay my other question is on Somalia, if I may. 21:57.783 --> 22:01.650 When the administration announced several days ago 22:01.650 --> 22:05.817 the ban on taking electronic devices with batteries 22:07.708 --> 22:11.083 into passenger cabins, they cited Al-Shabaab 22:11.083 --> 22:13.583 and the threat from Al-Shebab. 22:14.207 --> 22:16.322 In particular the attack that happened 22:16.322 --> 22:18.388 with the Somali aircraft, 22:18.388 --> 22:22.221 as one of the factors in making that decision. 22:22.324 --> 22:24.991 So what can you tell us possibly 22:25.800 --> 22:28.633 about the capability of Al-Shabaab 22:31.303 --> 22:34.470 to threaten airliners with these types 22:34.513 --> 22:36.263 of explosive devices? 22:36.339 --> 22:39.672 Or do you see it as strictly Al-Shabaab, 22:40.515 --> 22:44.598 or have you now seen AQAP migrate that capability 22:45.607 --> 22:47.940 to Al-Shabaab, or even ISIS? 22:48.729 --> 22:52.312 What can you tell us about that base threat 22:52.555 --> 22:54.638 in coming out of Somalia? 22:54.852 --> 22:57.178 - Well I think that the best way to characterize 22:57.178 --> 22:58.678 would be this way. 22:59.242 --> 23:02.573 You know with the election of a new President in Somalia, 23:02.573 --> 23:05.219 and what that brings in opportunities that 23:05.219 --> 23:08.719 it also brings, Al-Shabaab needs to decide 23:09.959 --> 23:12.511 how they want to deal with that. 23:12.511 --> 23:15.692 Does Al-Shabaab want to continue to try to 23:15.692 --> 23:17.609 attack, attack, attack? 23:18.034 --> 23:19.955 Does Al-Shabaab want to try to figure out 23:19.955 --> 23:22.969 how they can perhaps reconcile with the new government? 23:22.969 --> 23:25.495 And what are their capabilities, 23:25.495 --> 23:28.885 visa vie, what the African Union and mission in Somalia 23:28.885 --> 23:31.931 is trying to do as well as the forces 23:31.931 --> 23:33.960 from the Somalian National Security forces, 23:33.960 --> 23:35.117 how they're trying to combat that. 23:35.117 --> 23:37.230 I think that one of things you're seeing right now 23:37.230 --> 23:39.715 is Al-Shabaab continues to try to do, 23:39.715 --> 23:42.004 I hate to use the word spectacular, 23:42.004 --> 23:43.879 because I'm not sure that's a fair word to characterize. 23:43.879 --> 23:46.293 But they continue to attack in the Mogadishu area 23:46.293 --> 23:48.743 to demonstrate that the new federal government 23:48.743 --> 23:51.826 is weak and can not you know mitigate 23:51.868 --> 23:56.035 or can not break their cycle of violence, if you will. 23:56.285 --> 23:58.769 So I think that it's important that we 23:58.769 --> 24:01.102 stay after Al-Shabaab, I think the CT part 24:01.102 --> 24:03.018 as I described earlier still will 24:03.018 --> 24:04.474 remain part of our strategy. 24:04.474 --> 24:06.997 But I think that at this particular time, 24:06.997 --> 24:11.080 Al-Shabaab, and let me just step back too to say, 24:11.272 --> 24:14.289 the famine is affecting their operations as well. 24:14.289 --> 24:17.269 I mean there's reports that their soldiers 24:17.269 --> 24:20.498 aren't being paid, they're not able to charge taxes 24:20.498 --> 24:24.665 to the villages because there's no money to be made. 24:24.672 --> 24:26.931 There's some reports where Al-Shabaab, 24:26.931 --> 24:28.882 in terms of information operation campaign, 24:28.882 --> 24:32.109 is trying to demonstrate through social media, 24:32.109 --> 24:34.133 that they are handing out food and water. 24:34.133 --> 24:36.666 So the famine has a very significant impact, 24:36.666 --> 24:38.960 not only on the Somalia people, 24:38.960 --> 24:42.472 but Al-Shabaab and their ability to continue their attacks. 24:42.472 --> 24:44.658 - Respectfully, could I try the question one more time? 24:44.658 --> 24:45.610 - [General] You can but I'm probably 24:45.610 --> 24:46.907 not going to answer it, either. 24:46.907 --> 24:48.107 - Well let me just try it, (chuckling) 24:48.107 --> 24:49.989 because there'll be a transcript of this. 24:49.989 --> 24:54.156 Can Al-Shabaab make these types of explosive devices? 24:55.262 --> 24:59.429 And do you see AQAP influence, operatives, or technology 25:01.298 --> 25:04.415 in Somalia with the Al-Shabaab organization? 25:04.415 --> 25:06.816 - Look I think Al-Shabaab has demonstrated 25:06.816 --> 25:08.269 they can do this in the past. 25:08.269 --> 25:11.747 I think that you know they have demonstrated 25:11.747 --> 25:13.149 this capability and capacity. 25:13.149 --> 25:14.743 So I think it's something that we just 25:14.743 --> 25:17.910 continue to watch, have to stay after. 25:17.914 --> 25:19.355 Let's go back here, please. 25:19.355 --> 25:20.188 - Thank you General. 25:20.188 --> 25:22.863 Last year in October, it was reported that 25:22.863 --> 25:26.196 the US was flying drones out of Tunisia. 25:26.203 --> 25:28.120 Is that still the case? 25:28.132 --> 25:30.710 And I contacted the Embassy back then, 25:30.710 --> 25:32.964 and they said well it's just a training operation. 25:32.964 --> 25:35.131 Can you comment on drones? 25:36.094 --> 25:37.480 - Sure, I certainly can. 25:37.480 --> 25:39.467 And would just start by saying that 25:39.467 --> 25:42.706 Tunisia as far as our African partners go, 25:42.706 --> 25:44.006 is really one of the bright spots. 25:44.006 --> 25:47.366 I mean think that they are making great attempts 25:47.366 --> 25:49.675 to transform their military into more 25:49.675 --> 25:50.624 of a counter terrorism force. 25:50.624 --> 25:52.785 We work very closely with them, 25:52.785 --> 25:55.407 and they are very, very good partner. 25:55.407 --> 25:58.824 You know flying ISR drones out of Tunisia 26:00.788 --> 26:02.635 has been taking place for quite some time. 26:02.635 --> 26:05.419 And I forget the exact time frame, I'd have to check this, 26:05.419 --> 26:08.206 but you know the Washington Post story 26:08.206 --> 26:10.455 that said flying from the secret base in Tunisia. 26:10.455 --> 26:12.997 It's not a secret base, and it's not our base. 26:12.997 --> 26:14.287 It's the Tunisians' base. 26:14.287 --> 26:17.023 And you know they're a fledgling democracy 26:17.023 --> 26:21.190 and nobody ever expected that to just be a secret. 26:21.912 --> 26:23.975 But it was something that they had to deal with 26:23.975 --> 26:24.897 then in the press because there's some 26:24.897 --> 26:27.716 political ramifications in some of these cases, 26:27.716 --> 26:29.668 and Tunisia's being one of them. 26:29.668 --> 26:33.835 And I think that we fly out of there, it's not a secret. 26:34.143 --> 26:37.459 But we are very respectful to the Tunisians' desires 26:37.459 --> 26:39.942 in terms of you know how we support them, 26:39.942 --> 26:42.304 and the fact that we have a low profile 26:42.304 --> 26:43.440 and that type of thing. 26:43.440 --> 26:46.422 And I think the key though, and the bottom line 26:46.422 --> 26:48.069 of that whole Tunisia story is, 26:48.069 --> 26:49.056 it's not our base. 26:49.056 --> 26:51.016 We have no intention of establishing a base there. 26:51.016 --> 26:53.184 We are there in conjunction with them, 26:53.184 --> 26:55.012 and to a certain degree at their request. 26:55.012 --> 26:56.411 And we are working with them, 26:56.411 --> 26:58.808 and I think that's the best way to characterize it. 26:58.808 --> 27:00.978 - One followup of a different subject. 27:00.978 --> 27:03.011 Picking up on Sandra's question. 27:03.011 --> 27:05.029 Do you have any military to military 27:05.029 --> 27:07.112 relationships with China? 27:07.160 --> 27:09.182 Do you talk with any of their people at all? 27:09.182 --> 27:11.932 - Well look, so as you well know, 27:12.879 --> 27:17.046 the base in Djibouti is roughly several miles from our base. 27:17.336 --> 27:20.569 And our commander down there, we have a two star general 27:20.569 --> 27:23.412 who commands the task force for East Africa 27:23.412 --> 27:26.374 routinely has the Chinese on the base, 27:26.374 --> 27:28.291 as an engagement piece. 27:28.463 --> 27:30.213 He has met with them. 27:30.866 --> 27:33.741 So the short answer is if that's a mil to mil engagement, 27:33.741 --> 27:34.658 we have it. 27:34.723 --> 27:36.674 I mean I think without getting into great detail 27:36.674 --> 27:39.771 on the whole China's Djibouti piece at the moment, 27:39.771 --> 27:42.910 we're there, they're there, they're a couple miles away. 27:42.910 --> 27:45.126 It's the first time that they've ventured into 27:45.126 --> 27:48.874 a base overseas, and you know there's certain, 27:48.874 --> 27:50.911 we're both learning as that goes. 27:50.911 --> 27:54.584 But I think that to establish a relationship with them, 27:54.584 --> 27:58.218 and you know try to work with them where we can, 27:58.218 --> 28:00.628 is something that is a positive and we should 28:00.628 --> 28:02.323 you know try to keep doing. 28:02.323 --> 28:03.990 Please, in the back. 28:04.034 --> 28:06.046 - [Reporter] General, two questions on Somalia. 28:06.046 --> 28:08.669 First on Al-Shabaab, do you asses 28:08.669 --> 28:11.829 that they have the intent to attack outside the region now? 28:11.829 --> 28:14.746 And to attack the US, the homeland? 28:14.892 --> 28:17.651 - Well I think a lot of these groups, Al-Shabaab included, 28:17.651 --> 28:19.456 has the intention to do that. 28:19.456 --> 28:21.365 It's a question of whether they have the capacity 28:21.365 --> 28:22.648 or capability to do that. 28:22.648 --> 28:26.423 And Al-Shabaab has not really demonstrated that, 28:26.423 --> 28:28.538 you know by the Kenyan border is a different story, 28:28.538 --> 28:30.095 to a certain degree. 28:30.095 --> 28:32.530 But I think the intent is always there. 28:32.530 --> 28:35.511 It's a question of capacity and capability really, 28:35.511 --> 28:37.428 more than it is intent. 28:37.461 --> 28:39.771 - And then back on Talita's original question 28:39.771 --> 28:41.675 about the authorities, I'm still a little unclear. 28:41.675 --> 28:45.756 So has the White House approved this new authority 28:45.756 --> 28:48.900 for AFRICOM and if so, can you just give us a sense 28:48.900 --> 28:51.871 of exactly what it is that was approved? 28:51.871 --> 28:54.085 - Well so first of all, the White House has not approved 28:54.085 --> 28:57.036 anything on this yet, and so for me to kinda 28:57.036 --> 28:58.819 you know project what it may or may not say 28:58.819 --> 29:00.267 is probably at this point in time, 29:00.267 --> 29:02.434 not the smart thing to do. 29:02.692 --> 29:04.129 I would just tell you though again, 29:04.129 --> 29:06.686 I think it's fair to say, to characterize it, 29:06.686 --> 29:10.269 if we get some type of approval eventually, 29:10.963 --> 29:14.518 that gives us authorities, it'll give us more flexibility, 29:14.518 --> 29:16.992 it'll give us you know, we'll have the ability 29:16.992 --> 29:18.963 to operate probably quicker. 29:18.963 --> 29:22.495 And I think that with that though comes the at the same time 29:22.495 --> 29:25.212 this is really the point I want to make, 29:25.212 --> 29:28.462 we have a very, very strong requirement 29:28.797 --> 29:32.292 to make sure that we utilize that authority appropriately. 29:32.292 --> 29:35.240 We are not gonna turn Somalia into a free fire zone. 29:35.240 --> 29:38.147 We have to make sure that the levels of certainty 29:38.147 --> 29:42.314 that have been there previously, those are not changed. 29:43.044 --> 29:45.552 - But when you talk about gaining more flexibility 29:45.552 --> 29:49.719 and more time, not having inherent resources to AFRICOM, 29:51.125 --> 29:52.622 how does that impact? 29:52.622 --> 29:54.645 Do you think that with these new authorities, 29:54.645 --> 29:57.212 assuming they're granted that it will come some, 29:57.212 --> 29:59.561 especially now that we have all this extra money 29:59.561 --> 30:01.303 that may be coming to the DoD budget, 30:01.303 --> 30:03.053 do you anticipate getting more resources 30:03.053 --> 30:04.923 that will be inherent to AFRICOM 30:04.923 --> 30:08.423 that you could use for this kind of fight? 30:09.548 --> 30:12.351 - This might be heresy for a COCOM to say this, 30:12.351 --> 30:14.405 but I will say in the case of Somalia right now, 30:14.405 --> 30:16.486 we have adequate resources that if we were given 30:16.486 --> 30:19.258 some type of new authority, unless something 30:19.258 --> 30:21.423 significantly changed on the ground with Al-Shabaab 30:21.423 --> 30:25.006 we have adequate resources to support this. 30:26.344 --> 30:27.177 Please. 30:27.300 --> 30:28.909 - [Reporter] Thank you General, 30:28.909 --> 30:29.931 Al Krietzer here of C Power Magazine. 30:29.931 --> 30:31.036 You mentioned the famine. 30:31.036 --> 30:33.339 20 some years ago when there was a famine 30:33.339 --> 30:36.253 we went in to try to stop the gangsters 30:36.253 --> 30:39.150 you know from interrupting the relief supplies. 30:39.150 --> 30:40.390 What's the situation now? 30:40.390 --> 30:43.090 Is the humanitarian relief organizations 30:43.090 --> 30:45.558 able to get any food to the people 30:45.558 --> 30:48.225 who are fleeing the famine area? 30:48.402 --> 30:51.301 And is there a need for additional security 30:51.301 --> 30:53.884 like we did you know back then? 30:54.066 --> 30:55.589 - Thanks, that's a great question. 30:55.589 --> 30:58.246 And if you don't mind, I'm gonna kind of take us up here 30:58.246 --> 30:59.287 and then bring it down. 30:59.287 --> 31:02.584 So one of the most significant missions AFRICOM has 31:02.584 --> 31:04.889 is the whole idea of crisis response. 31:04.889 --> 31:08.208 And I try to describe crisis response as a dual sided coin. 31:08.208 --> 31:10.088 On one hand, there's the kinetic side, 31:10.088 --> 31:12.789 there's the strikes in Libya, there's the potential, 31:12.789 --> 31:14.703 or the strikes that we've done in Somalia, 31:14.703 --> 31:16.711 the kinetic type of crisis response. 31:16.711 --> 31:19.125 And that's something that from the military side, 31:19.125 --> 31:21.312 everybody understands and we do it well. 31:21.312 --> 31:22.705 The other side of that coin though 31:22.705 --> 31:24.484 is the crisis response that has to do with 31:24.484 --> 31:27.324 humanitarian disastrous, you know pandemics, 31:27.324 --> 31:29.364 the Ebola crisis, that type of thing. 31:29.364 --> 31:32.571 Because even though things have changed, 31:32.571 --> 31:34.792 life has changed in the 10 years 31:34.792 --> 31:36.889 AFRICOM has been in existence, 31:36.889 --> 31:38.996 that was one of the fundamental pillars 31:38.996 --> 31:40.946 when this command was stood up. 31:40.946 --> 31:44.051 This ability to use soft power, was a big part 31:44.051 --> 31:46.341 of what this command as supposed to do. 31:46.341 --> 31:49.462 And to a large degree that has not changed. 31:49.462 --> 31:53.629 So, as a result of that, we have been very aggressive 31:54.669 --> 31:56.696 in our dialogues and discussions 31:56.696 --> 32:00.279 with USAID, non-governmental organizations, 32:00.444 --> 32:03.407 the Somalia government through our embassy, 32:03.407 --> 32:05.910 that's actually located in Kenya 32:05.910 --> 32:07.329 but it works out of Mogadishu, 32:07.329 --> 32:10.984 we have been very aggressive in trying to determine 32:10.984 --> 32:15.151 what we can do to contribute, to assist in this famine. 32:16.645 --> 32:17.816 Because if for no other reason, 32:17.816 --> 32:20.348 obviously there's the human suffering part of this, 32:20.348 --> 32:21.913 and that's certainly you know a big reason 32:21.913 --> 32:23.643 as to why we're interested and concerned, 32:23.643 --> 32:27.413 but on the other hand, the brand new Somalian government, 32:27.413 --> 32:29.944 national government, needs to demonstrate 32:29.944 --> 32:31.803 that they can deal with this problem. 32:31.803 --> 32:33.458 Because if you think about it for a minute, 32:33.458 --> 32:36.223 if you're a 21-year-old young girl in Somalia, 32:36.223 --> 32:38.376 you have never experienced what a federal government 32:38.376 --> 32:40.999 can do, you don't know what it's supposed to do. 32:40.999 --> 32:43.965 And so if you go through all this and you have elections, 32:43.965 --> 32:46.074 and you have a federal government and they can not 32:46.074 --> 32:49.020 contribute positively to this catastrophe 32:49.020 --> 32:50.798 then why you have them, 32:50.798 --> 32:53.259 and their job will become that much more difficult. 32:53.259 --> 32:54.683 So the second point that I'm trying to make 32:54.683 --> 32:57.827 is that it's very important that this famine 32:57.827 --> 33:00.452 is taken care of, obviously for the human suffering part, 33:00.452 --> 33:04.619 but for the ability for the federal national government 33:05.832 --> 33:08.071 of Somalia to move forward. 33:08.071 --> 33:12.238 Now interestingly, from the side of the mechanics of this, 33:12.570 --> 33:14.635 I mean there's a lot that's been learned 33:14.635 --> 33:17.189 since the you know the post, since the marines 33:17.189 --> 33:18.835 went ashore there many years ago. 33:18.835 --> 33:21.905 And of course there was a famine there 2011. 33:21.905 --> 33:25.208 So what we have, and I'm sure that there will be problems 33:25.208 --> 33:27.446 as this goes on, I mean think about this for a minute. 33:27.446 --> 33:29.143 In that region, 22 million people, 33:29.143 --> 33:32.360 6.2 million people inside Somalia itself, 33:32.360 --> 33:35.008 those are large numbers that are affected by this. 33:35.008 --> 33:38.925 And so it's a significant, significant problem. 33:39.797 --> 33:41.923 But I think the government agencies, 33:41.923 --> 33:44.305 the non-government agencies, and USAID 33:44.305 --> 33:45.742 have learned a lot of lessons over the year, 33:45.742 --> 33:49.689 and so there is, I don't want to use these words adequate, 33:49.689 --> 33:50.984 but let's just say there's a, 33:50.984 --> 33:54.234 there's a good amount of food and water 33:55.616 --> 33:57.310 that are pre-staged and it's not like 33:57.310 --> 33:59.106 we haven't seen this movie before. 33:59.106 --> 34:00.576 So there's been lessons learned, 34:00.576 --> 34:02.582 and I think you know one of the concerns 34:02.582 --> 34:04.161 always is distribution. 34:04.161 --> 34:05.885 I mean you know you see the pictures 34:05.885 --> 34:08.038 of food that's spoiling on the dock somewhere 34:08.038 --> 34:09.841 because you can get a lot there, 34:09.841 --> 34:11.810 but then the distribution becomes very difficult. 34:11.810 --> 34:13.425 Bad roads, not enough trucks, whatever. 34:13.425 --> 34:16.619 All I will tell you is this, we have offered our assistance 34:16.619 --> 34:19.423 first of all with assets that we have. 34:19.423 --> 34:22.390 And at the moment, people acknowledge that, 34:22.390 --> 34:23.642 and groups acknowledge that, 34:23.642 --> 34:26.114 governmental agencies acknowledge that. 34:26.114 --> 34:28.338 But there's no requirement for us to do that. 34:28.338 --> 34:31.234 Meanwhile we have been communicating, 34:31.234 --> 34:33.037 in fact I just talked to the chairman, 34:33.037 --> 34:34.918 General Dunford about this yesterday, 34:34.918 --> 34:36.761 and in my reports to the Secretary. 34:36.761 --> 34:39.392 We've highlighted this, so they're well aware of this. 34:39.392 --> 34:42.160 Because we want to make sure that if it gets really bad 34:42.160 --> 34:44.608 and we have to, and we're asked to do things, 34:44.608 --> 34:46.333 which would require assets 34:46.333 --> 34:48.370 that we currently don't have with us, 34:48.370 --> 34:50.958 we want to make sure that that has already been told 34:50.958 --> 34:52.848 and we're not starting from ground zero there either. 34:52.848 --> 34:56.015 So in sum, it's a significant problem. 34:56.102 --> 34:58.343 The government of Somalia needs to demonstrate 34:58.343 --> 34:59.446 they can assist. 34:59.446 --> 35:02.218 The NGO organizations and our own State Department, 35:02.218 --> 35:05.468 and USAID are postured to take this on. 35:05.924 --> 35:07.627 We have offered our help, 35:07.627 --> 35:10.875 but so far have not been asked to contribute. 35:10.875 --> 35:12.828 - [Reporter] Another on that one there, 35:12.828 --> 35:15.245 on the recent ship hijacking. 35:16.115 --> 35:17.874 The first time you know-- 35:17.874 --> 35:19.707 - Since 2012, I think. 35:20.362 --> 35:22.991 - [Reporter] Let's draw on naval patrols, 35:22.991 --> 35:24.741 international effort, 35:24.852 --> 35:28.415 do they need to restore that international effort? 35:28.415 --> 35:31.724 Or was this a one time thing, you don't think 35:31.724 --> 35:34.626 we're gonna have another epidemic of hijacking? 35:34.626 --> 35:35.999 - So what the terrorist organization, 35:35.999 --> 35:38.412 or in this case a Somalia pirate organization, 35:38.412 --> 35:40.187 I would never say this is a one time thing. 35:40.187 --> 35:41.569 But we're not at a point yet where I think 35:41.569 --> 35:43.780 we need to kind of sound the alarm. 35:43.780 --> 35:45.987 The European Union still does patrol those waters 35:45.987 --> 35:49.417 and you're right, there hasn't been a hijacking, 35:49.417 --> 35:51.956 for I want to say 2012 but we can get 35:51.956 --> 35:53.521 that exact number for you. 35:53.521 --> 35:56.402 But let me just say this about this particular incident. 35:56.402 --> 35:59.055 First of all this was a very small ship 35:59.055 --> 36:01.829 that had oil that was moving from one place to, 36:01.829 --> 36:03.245 I think it was going to Somalia. 36:03.245 --> 36:06.208 It had a very low free board, not a lot of security, 36:06.208 --> 36:08.791 small vessel, so it's a pretty, 36:08.855 --> 36:12.255 let's just say a pretty intriguing target 36:12.255 --> 36:14.005 if you were a pirate. 36:14.650 --> 36:16.759 The second thing I would say is that there's issues 36:16.759 --> 36:20.926 with fishing, and limits, and you know outside agencies 36:21.041 --> 36:23.311 coming in on that part of Somalia there, 36:23.311 --> 36:25.420 there Horn of Africa, the Puntland area up there, 36:25.420 --> 36:27.370 where the people's livelihood is fishing. 36:27.370 --> 36:30.537 And if these outside trollers come in, 36:30.552 --> 36:33.138 drop their net close to shoreline, 36:33.138 --> 36:34.760 you can understand what the problem is. 36:34.760 --> 36:37.453 So there's a combination of those things, 36:37.453 --> 36:40.523 and then whether or not, it was resolved. 36:40.523 --> 36:44.131 I mean the crew was let go and the pirates left, 36:44.131 --> 36:46.002 whether there was ransom paid or not 36:46.002 --> 36:47.762 is something I don't have any idea. 36:47.762 --> 36:50.380 But I think there are several factors that 36:50.380 --> 36:53.963 based on what I just said, small ship, oil, 36:54.296 --> 36:57.886 close to the coast, fishing has been a problem there, 36:57.886 --> 36:59.469 off limits fishing. 36:59.739 --> 37:01.161 And so I think it's too early to say 37:01.161 --> 37:03.075 that now we have an epidemic. 37:03.075 --> 37:05.618 But it did catch our attention. 37:05.618 --> 37:07.118 Please, Mr Martin. 37:07.656 --> 37:11.823 - [Reporter] Has the hunt for General Kony reached 37:12.081 --> 37:15.434 the point of diminishing returns and if so, 37:15.434 --> 37:18.267 what do you intend to do about it? 37:18.382 --> 37:19.753 - Well I think, as you well know, 37:19.753 --> 37:22.217 since 2011 we've had an ongoing effort 37:22.217 --> 37:25.550 to hunt for Joesph Kony and his bandits. 37:26.049 --> 37:28.799 Over those years, the task force, 37:30.005 --> 37:34.005 which has members of the countries around there, 37:34.022 --> 37:37.556 Uganda, South Sudan, the Democrat Republic of Congo, 37:37.556 --> 37:40.641 Central Africa Republic, and our forces 37:40.641 --> 37:41.885 have contributed to that effort. 37:41.885 --> 37:44.194 Over the last five or six years we've taken 37:44.194 --> 37:48.277 really several hundred, maybe 1000 of Kony's team 37:49.002 --> 37:50.011 off the battlefield. 37:50.011 --> 37:51.288 Some reports will tell you we've gotten 37:51.288 --> 37:53.295 four of the five top lieutenants. 37:53.295 --> 37:55.617 He's down now, actually for the past couple of years 37:55.617 --> 37:57.408 if you go back and read the reports, 37:57.408 --> 37:59.629 AFRICOM has pretty much said this same thing 37:59.629 --> 38:01.278 for almost the last three years, 38:01.278 --> 38:03.321 down to about 100 people, survival mode, 38:03.321 --> 38:06.196 Kony's not an issue, he's irrelevant, and so forth. 38:06.196 --> 38:08.395 So we've been saying that now for several years. 38:08.395 --> 38:11.607 We've reached a point, and some of the figures that you see 38:11.607 --> 38:15.212 as low as 600 million, as high as almost $800 million 38:15.212 --> 38:17.879 spent on that overall operation. 38:17.960 --> 38:20.710 It's at a point now where really, 38:20.765 --> 38:24.412 when we have that size of unit, which is not very large, 38:24.412 --> 38:27.178 you know in the size of Texas or California, 38:27.178 --> 38:28.764 trying to find Kony, we've probably done, 38:28.764 --> 38:30.661 not probably, we have done a lot of damage 38:30.661 --> 38:32.328 to his organization. 38:32.348 --> 38:35.542 And so if you take a look at what you would suspect 38:35.542 --> 38:37.944 to be Kony's health and all that I've just described, 38:37.944 --> 38:39.602 and say okay where do we go from here? 38:39.602 --> 38:42.495 Now we're obviously, the first question obviously 38:42.495 --> 38:43.718 is well what about a vacuum? 38:43.718 --> 38:45.111 If you guys stop now, what happens? 38:45.111 --> 38:46.934 Can he reemerge and so forth? 38:46.934 --> 38:48.410 Obviously that's a concern to us, 38:48.410 --> 38:50.469 and so what we want to concentrate on here, 38:50.469 --> 38:54.582 is as we move into perhaps the final stages of this, 38:54.582 --> 38:56.997 is that we have steady state transition plan, 38:56.997 --> 39:00.997 that number one keeps our interests in the area, 39:01.950 --> 39:04.080 for example through engagements, 39:04.080 --> 39:06.765 through you know continuing the relationships 39:06.765 --> 39:08.961 that we built, providing intelligence 39:08.961 --> 39:10.889 as appropriate and when required. 39:10.889 --> 39:13.056 You know that's something that we want to cement. 39:13.056 --> 39:14.855 We've talked with our partners in that region, 39:14.855 --> 39:17.932 Uganda for example, we've talked to them 39:17.932 --> 39:19.990 about where we're going and how we're proceeding. 39:19.990 --> 39:22.687 But the bottom line is, I think that you know 39:22.687 --> 39:23.819 this thing is coming to, 39:23.819 --> 39:27.152 it's coming to an end, to be very frank. 39:27.388 --> 39:29.691 And we made a lot of progress. 39:29.691 --> 39:32.372 We're concerned about a potential vacuum, 39:32.372 --> 39:34.539 you know I don't see how you can not have that thought. 39:34.539 --> 39:36.648 But we think that we have a plan in place 39:36.648 --> 39:39.164 for a steady state, sustainable transition 39:39.164 --> 39:42.215 that will not only look out for Kony or any other groups 39:42.215 --> 39:45.344 that would emerge in that part of the country. 39:45.344 --> 39:48.177 The bottom line is this operation, 39:48.253 --> 39:52.048 although not achieving the ability to get Kony himself, 39:52.048 --> 39:54.907 has essentially taken that group off the battlefield. 39:54.907 --> 39:56.824 And for the last several years, 39:56.824 --> 39:59.011 they've really been reduced to irrelevance. 39:59.011 --> 40:02.011 - With this steady state replacement 40:03.506 --> 40:07.423 that you're talking about, that would no longer 40:07.770 --> 40:09.648 be anything that could be characterized 40:09.648 --> 40:12.815 as a hunt for Kony, it would be simply 40:15.550 --> 40:19.250 a presence that was there to detect a resurgence 40:19.250 --> 40:21.583 of the LRA, is that correct? 40:22.958 --> 40:24.467 - I think what I would say to that, 40:24.467 --> 40:26.401 is I think it's important, 40:26.401 --> 40:27.893 and we've talked with our partners there, 40:27.893 --> 40:29.674 I mean it's up to, they still want to continue. 40:29.674 --> 40:31.742 The Ugandans for example still want to continue, 40:31.742 --> 40:34.362 because they provide the bulk of the forces to this effort. 40:34.362 --> 40:35.924 If they still want to continue that, 40:35.924 --> 40:38.289 and they want to call it a hunt, that's up to them. 40:38.289 --> 40:41.781 But I think from our perspective, the steady state would, 40:41.781 --> 40:44.391 you would not call it a hunt anymore. 40:44.391 --> 40:48.224 It's to maintain, let's just say, the level of 40:49.220 --> 40:52.112 that type of group, that type of activity, 40:52.112 --> 40:55.580 in that area, maintaining it where it is today. 40:55.580 --> 40:56.413 Please. 40:56.620 --> 40:57.721 - Thank you General. 40:57.721 --> 41:01.638 We see ISIS losing territory in Iraq and Syria. 41:01.735 --> 41:04.790 Are you seeing combatants come into your region? 41:04.790 --> 41:06.390 - You know it's interesting, 41:06.390 --> 41:09.465 if you'd asked that question like six or seven months ago, 41:09.465 --> 41:10.745 I mean that was the plan. 41:10.745 --> 41:13.578 That was the open source ideology. 41:13.723 --> 41:15.943 Don't come to Iraq and Syria, go to Libya. 41:15.943 --> 41:19.528 Libya is where our backup plan is if Iraq and Syria fail. 41:19.528 --> 41:20.950 You don't see that anymore. 41:20.950 --> 41:24.117 And you know we don't see that report. 41:24.216 --> 41:28.383 I can't, I wouldn't characterize this, I would say this. 41:29.505 --> 41:32.048 There's a lot of movement of foreign fighters right now, 41:32.048 --> 41:34.774 and I think that the whole issue of reconciliation 41:34.774 --> 41:37.008 is something that's gonna come to the surface here 41:37.008 --> 41:38.624 in the next six months or so, 41:38.624 --> 41:42.207 whether that's out of the Al-Shabaab arena, 41:42.513 --> 41:44.913 whether that's I wouldn't say ISIS, 41:44.913 --> 41:48.330 but in the Al-Shabaab forest where really 41:48.336 --> 41:51.314 you know many of the soldiers whether it's ISIS, 41:51.314 --> 41:54.078 West Africa, or Al-Shabaab, these are young guys 41:54.078 --> 41:55.889 from these countries who just 41:55.889 --> 41:57.473 need a livelihood and need a job. 41:57.473 --> 41:59.175 Ideology is not the driver there. 41:59.175 --> 42:02.104 They want to reconcile, there's already been 42:02.104 --> 42:04.313 indications that through some of our efforts 42:04.313 --> 42:07.230 that they welcome the opportutnity. 42:07.477 --> 42:09.724 So these countries are gonna need to be able 42:09.724 --> 42:11.144 to deal with that problem. 42:11.144 --> 42:15.311 So reconciliation's on the headline, is on the radar screen. 42:16.092 --> 42:18.115 I think it's something that'll happen in the future. 42:18.115 --> 42:20.191 But you know, there's a lot of movement, 42:20.191 --> 42:21.686 I would hate to characterize 42:21.686 --> 42:24.519 that ISIS is all coming to Africa. 42:24.802 --> 42:26.651 We've got plenty there already. 42:26.651 --> 42:28.386 - [Reporter] Are you seeing some? 42:28.386 --> 42:32.553 - Well i think we always do, I think the issue of, 42:32.670 --> 42:34.141 if you take Somalia for example, 42:34.141 --> 42:36.079 AQ which is in the northern part up there, 42:36.079 --> 42:38.369 there's always movement back and forth between Yemen. 42:38.369 --> 42:42.099 Whether or not there's large numbers coming from 42:42.099 --> 42:45.436 the Middle East to Libya and places like that, 42:45.436 --> 42:47.045 I would just tell you today that 42:47.045 --> 42:50.233 large numbers are something that we haven't seen. 42:50.233 --> 42:51.066 Please. 42:51.247 --> 42:53.330 - Lou Martinez, ABC News. 42:54.489 --> 42:57.911 During the siege of Sirte, the American Special Forces 42:57.911 --> 42:59.684 that were assisted in the Serotta Brigade, 42:59.684 --> 43:02.129 they had been a presence prior to that. 43:02.129 --> 43:04.650 What is the US presence in that part of Libya today? 43:04.650 --> 43:05.730 What is their role, 43:05.730 --> 43:08.017 what future activities do you plan for them? 43:08.017 --> 43:09.970 And just going back to the numbers 43:09.970 --> 43:12.389 that you cited earlier about ISIS strength, 43:12.389 --> 43:14.189 am I correct in hearing you said that 43:14.189 --> 43:15.657 the estimate is now that there are 43:15.657 --> 43:18.907 between 100 and 200 ISIS left in Libya? 43:19.176 --> 43:20.438 - Yeah, I think that's fair. 43:20.438 --> 43:24.563 I don't think that, yeah that's probably a fair number. 43:24.563 --> 43:26.283 Let me just make a couple statements 43:26.283 --> 43:29.251 about the people on the ground in Sirte. 43:29.251 --> 43:32.809 So I think early on, because I took over in July 43:32.809 --> 43:35.613 and about 10 days later this operation started. 43:35.613 --> 43:37.474 So a lot of this is just kind of fresh in my mind, 43:37.474 --> 43:39.018 just cus it's kind of the early days 43:39.018 --> 43:41.018 of my tenure at AFRICOM. 43:41.591 --> 43:44.287 I think initially there was a lot of discussion 43:44.287 --> 43:47.058 about do we have people on the ground in Libya? 43:47.058 --> 43:49.345 And that was kind of a story for a while. 43:49.345 --> 43:51.812 Because you know it was newsworthy. 43:51.812 --> 43:55.000 But the point I want to make is that when you conduct 43:55.000 --> 43:59.167 a precision, air strike, close air support operation 44:01.442 --> 44:03.215 in an urban environment, 44:03.215 --> 44:07.382 with the requirements to not have civilian casualties, 44:07.975 --> 44:09.821 with the requirements to be careful 44:09.821 --> 44:12.039 about infrastructure destruction and the like, 44:12.039 --> 44:14.759 you can't do an operation like that 44:14.759 --> 44:17.596 without someone one the ground to interface, to work. 44:17.596 --> 44:19.213 So I mean I just think it's important to understand 44:19.213 --> 44:20.882 that you have to have that contact, 44:20.882 --> 44:22.992 you have to have that face to face. 44:22.992 --> 44:25.568 Because if you think about it for a minute, 44:25.568 --> 44:27.568 you have let's just say, 44:28.284 --> 44:31.272 aircraft drones coming from all over the planet. 44:31.272 --> 44:33.925 You've got people that are making decisions 44:33.925 --> 44:36.657 in various locations all over the planet. 44:36.657 --> 44:38.524 You need to have somebody on the ground, 44:38.524 --> 44:41.098 talking to these people, to make sure we can do it 44:41.098 --> 44:43.785 with the skill and the precision that's required. 44:43.785 --> 44:46.509 And these guys have helped in that. 44:46.509 --> 44:49.441 Now, one of the things that we said, 44:49.441 --> 44:50.974 when before the operation was over, 44:50.974 --> 44:53.013 we came out in the Fall, I want to say November. 44:53.013 --> 44:56.510 We came out and we came up in the building and said, 44:56.510 --> 44:58.751 when Sirte ends this is what we are gonna do. 44:58.751 --> 45:01.216 Calling it a strategy is probably a stretch, 45:01.216 --> 45:03.717 but this is our way forward in Libya. 45:03.717 --> 45:06.524 And one of the things that we said we're going to 45:06.524 --> 45:08.593 continue to keep people on the ground. 45:08.593 --> 45:10.375 We're going to continue to develop 45:10.375 --> 45:11.895 the intelligence that's there. 45:11.895 --> 45:14.220 So you know and that's what we've done, 45:14.220 --> 45:16.579 among other, we had five things we were going to do. 45:16.579 --> 45:17.841 But two big things, 45:17.841 --> 45:19.389 we were going to keep a presence on the ground, 45:19.389 --> 45:20.929 because you have to have that there. 45:20.929 --> 45:24.001 And we're going to develop intelligence 45:24.001 --> 45:27.084 and take out targets when they arise. 45:27.352 --> 45:29.351 So that's what happened on 18 January. 45:29.351 --> 45:32.804 It took us roughly a month, we were in no hurry. 45:32.804 --> 45:34.187 But using the assets that we had, 45:34.187 --> 45:37.772 we developed the targets, we developed a level of certainty 45:37.772 --> 45:40.329 that we knew what we were striking. 45:40.329 --> 45:42.828 And we did it on the 18th because 45:42.828 --> 45:45.495 time really wasn't a big factor. 45:45.775 --> 45:48.652 It's a consideration, but it wasn't the driving factor 45:48.652 --> 45:49.730 of what we did. 45:49.730 --> 45:52.373 But yes, I think it's fair to say 45:52.373 --> 45:54.111 that we have some people on the ground, 45:54.111 --> 45:56.103 and you couldn't do these things without that. 45:56.103 --> 45:57.720 - And the plan is to maintain them 45:57.720 --> 45:59.901 as a persistent force for the near future? 45:59.901 --> 46:01.518 - Well we're gonna maintain a force 46:01.518 --> 46:05.268 that has the ability to develop intelligence, 46:05.741 --> 46:08.824 work with various groups as required, 46:11.348 --> 46:13.791 to warrant to us to be able to assist 46:13.791 --> 46:17.958 if required again with the GNA to take out ISIS targets. 46:18.171 --> 46:19.902 - [Man] We're about out of time. 46:19.902 --> 46:22.292 We're gonna make this the last one, Andy? 46:22.292 --> 46:25.007 - Thanks General, Andy deGrandpre with Military Times. 46:25.007 --> 46:28.392 There are 700 troops in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, 46:28.392 --> 46:29.544 are they your responsibility? 46:29.544 --> 46:30.377 - They're not. 46:30.377 --> 46:32.770 I mean interestingly, as you probably know that 46:32.770 --> 46:34.492 of the 54 countries in Africa, 46:34.492 --> 46:36.825 that one belongs to CENTCOM. 46:37.762 --> 46:41.929 But that said, if you have to have trans-regional approach, 46:42.401 --> 46:44.407 and trans-regional mindset that this problem. 46:44.407 --> 46:46.981 We watch and we coordinate and we talk 46:46.981 --> 46:49.286 to CENTCOM all the time about activities in Egypt. 46:49.286 --> 46:51.839 Because the border with Libya's right there 46:51.839 --> 46:54.485 and there's a lot of activity going on in that area. 46:54.485 --> 46:56.031 Yes, so we we watch it closely. 46:56.031 --> 46:57.582 - Well there's an effort in Congress right now 46:57.582 --> 47:00.439 to declare it a combat zone so that those troops 47:00.439 --> 47:03.557 can start to collect their hazardous duty pay tax free. 47:03.557 --> 47:05.606 Would you say you support that? 47:05.606 --> 47:07.647 - On the Sinai or in Libya? 47:07.647 --> 47:09.081 - [Reporter] In Sinai. 47:09.081 --> 47:11.017 Okay well I can't address the Sinai, 47:11.017 --> 47:14.191 but in Libya we have put that forward a while back. 47:14.191 --> 47:16.441 And it's still in staffing, 47:16.873 --> 47:19.714 because we dropped bombs for four and a half months, 47:19.714 --> 47:21.931 I don't know how you not call that a combat zone 47:21.931 --> 47:23.298 to be quite frank. 47:23.298 --> 47:25.320 So we have pushed that forward, 47:25.320 --> 47:27.451 and that's a process that just takes a while, 47:27.451 --> 47:29.457 and I couldn't tell you where it is at the moment. 47:29.457 --> 47:30.864 - [Reporter] Thanks. 47:30.864 --> 47:32.173 - I'll take one more to me. 47:32.173 --> 47:33.006 - [Reporter] Quick question (rustling drowns out reporter) 47:33.006 --> 47:34.550 with Al Jazeera English. 47:34.550 --> 47:36.817 The drone base in Niger, is that still under construction? 47:36.817 --> 47:39.734 When's it expected to be completed? 47:40.119 --> 47:41.955 - So this kind of gets back 47:41.955 --> 47:44.041 to the Tunisia question as well. 47:44.041 --> 47:45.343 And I'm going to just start by saying, 47:45.343 --> 47:47.849 that because of the size of Africa, 47:47.849 --> 47:50.850 because of the time and space and the distances, 47:50.850 --> 47:53.334 when it comes to especially crisis response type activities, 47:53.334 --> 47:57.100 we need access in various places on the continent. 47:57.100 --> 48:00.640 And so that's kind of the overarching theme here. 48:00.640 --> 48:04.140 And the Nigerians have been good partners, 48:04.321 --> 48:06.555 we are not building a base there. 48:06.555 --> 48:09.792 We are, it's common knowledge, it's in the media, 48:09.792 --> 48:11.231 that we are at Agadez. 48:11.231 --> 48:13.126 We are working with them to provide an area 48:13.126 --> 48:16.023 in a location where we can operate from. 48:16.023 --> 48:20.190 And again it gets back to this issue of time and space 48:22.050 --> 48:26.217 and the ability to maximize the ISR assets that we have 48:28.015 --> 48:30.114 so we have more time over the target, 48:30.114 --> 48:32.572 and less time flying back and forth 48:32.572 --> 48:33.698 to where they originated from, 48:33.698 --> 48:36.148 so we get the most bang for our buck. 48:36.148 --> 48:38.876 - Isn't that a separate US drone base 48:38.876 --> 48:40.194 that's something that's operated 48:40.194 --> 48:41.434 with the government of Niger? 48:41.434 --> 48:42.824 - It's not separate, 48:42.824 --> 48:45.903 we only have one permanent installation on the continent, 48:45.903 --> 48:47.622 and that's Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. 48:47.622 --> 48:50.908 Places like in Tunisia, and places like in Niger, 48:50.908 --> 48:52.344 these are not our bases. 48:52.344 --> 48:56.427 We build, we work, we enhance their capabilities. 48:56.725 --> 48:59.641 But these belong to the governments of those countries. 48:59.641 --> 49:01.323 They're not ours, and we have no intention 49:01.323 --> 49:02.990 of making them ours. 49:03.813 --> 49:05.490 - [Reporter] Is there flying drones 49:05.490 --> 49:07.103 from that base in Tunisia right now? 49:07.103 --> 49:08.432 - The bases she referred to, the answer's no. 49:08.432 --> 49:10.265 It's not complete yet. 49:10.601 --> 49:12.165 - [Reporter] And just going back to 49:12.165 --> 49:13.902 the authorities in Somalia, 49:13.902 --> 49:16.106 did the last administration prevent 49:16.106 --> 49:18.607 some of these authorities from happening? 49:18.607 --> 49:19.874 - You know look, I don't want to get into 49:19.874 --> 49:23.122 a discussion about what the last administration did. 49:23.122 --> 49:24.614 All I can just tell you is that 49:24.614 --> 49:25.922 from my experience in AFRICOM, 49:25.922 --> 49:28.755 when we had requirements, desires, 49:30.091 --> 49:32.758 or intentions to strike targets, 49:34.121 --> 49:35.738 we also had what we needed. 49:35.738 --> 49:37.726 Both assets wise and authority wise. 49:37.726 --> 49:39.309 It wasn't an issue. 49:40.015 --> 49:41.718 - [Reporter] So why do you need new authorities? 49:41.718 --> 49:42.883 - Well the authorities, 49:42.883 --> 49:46.146 what these authorities might do if they're approved, 49:46.146 --> 49:48.693 and I don't know what the final product will be. 49:48.693 --> 49:50.068 I would say that the process 49:50.068 --> 49:52.089 might be a little bit streamlined. 49:52.089 --> 49:54.504 And the authorities are powered down to the COCOMs 49:54.504 --> 49:56.460 as opposed to coming back up here. 49:56.460 --> 49:58.140 I mean that's the big, significant thing. 49:58.140 --> 50:00.466 I mean the COCOMs have the ability to say look, 50:00.466 --> 50:03.504 yes, no, and that's really what I think 50:03.504 --> 50:05.314 to a large degree this is all about. 50:05.314 --> 50:06.897 This is not, again, 50:08.206 --> 50:12.346 I want to emphasize we have a requirement for certainty, 50:12.346 --> 50:14.763 this is not a change tactics, 50:16.114 --> 50:18.475 this is not to change the face of how we do this, 50:18.475 --> 50:21.897 but I think the Combatant Commanders, myself included, 50:21.897 --> 50:23.849 are more than capable of making judgements 50:23.849 --> 50:26.314 and determinations on some of these targets 50:26.314 --> 50:29.120 and I'm well capable and we are all well capable 50:29.120 --> 50:30.877 of making those calls. 50:30.877 --> 50:31.710 Okay. 50:32.493 --> 50:35.160 - [Reporter] Thank you, General. 50:35.640 --> 50:37.473 - Thank you very much.