WEBVTT 00:00.717 --> 00:03.600 - Okay, I managed to liberate Admiral Moore 00:03.600 --> 00:05.767 from an interview by VAGO, 00:06.093 --> 00:08.972 so you can start out by giving me credit 00:08.972 --> 00:12.305 for getting us started somewhat on time. 00:13.283 --> 00:16.783 This morning, Admiral Moore was introduced 00:17.624 --> 00:20.291 to an SRO crowd on shipbuilding. 00:21.850 --> 00:24.361 This afternoon, he and his panel 00:24.361 --> 00:27.111 are gonna talk about maintenance. 00:27.551 --> 00:31.551 We started out this symposium with the SWO Boss 00:32.616 --> 00:35.371 talking about how important maintenance was, 00:35.371 --> 00:38.950 how important it was to get rid of the backlog. 00:38.950 --> 00:42.200 Along the way, Vice Admiral Dixon Smith 00:43.952 --> 00:48.119 talked in his discussion of facilities and installations, 00:48.746 --> 00:52.663 specifically about how to renew the waterfront, 00:52.812 --> 00:56.062 working on the resilience of shipyards, 00:56.219 --> 00:57.772 and making investments in things 00:57.772 --> 01:00.605 that would facilitate maintenance. 01:01.104 --> 01:04.128 And then of course the Vice Chief said 01:04.128 --> 01:06.558 the Navy wants maintenance money 01:06.558 --> 01:09.374 before the Navy wants shipbuilding money. 01:09.374 --> 01:11.661 And I think, to the operational sailors, 01:11.661 --> 01:15.828 many of whom were present at lunch as the awardees 01:17.077 --> 01:19.208 for the Surface Navy Association, 01:19.208 --> 01:20.255 I think in their minds 01:20.255 --> 01:24.005 that would be the right kind of priority too. 01:24.986 --> 01:27.548 Admiral Moore obviously since June 01:27.548 --> 01:31.136 has been the Commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command. 01:31.136 --> 01:34.810 He is someone who is an extraordinary engineer 01:34.810 --> 01:36.761 and extraordinary nuclear engineer, 01:36.761 --> 01:39.094 academically, operationally. 01:39.290 --> 01:43.457 I was most impressed in his biography by his commitment to 01:44.370 --> 01:47.787 and imagined ownership of USS Enterprise. 01:49.110 --> 01:52.222 As somebody who steamed in Enterprise's wake 01:52.222 --> 01:56.139 for many months across the course of my career, 01:57.158 --> 02:00.658 his operating, overhauling, and refueling, 02:02.459 --> 02:05.234 and decommissioning Enterprise gives him 02:05.234 --> 02:09.401 a stake that I think is probably unequaled by anybody else. 02:10.144 --> 02:14.254 So, I'm looking forward to this maintenance discussion. 02:14.254 --> 02:17.750 And, with the kinds of changes that have taken place 02:17.750 --> 02:21.917 since November, of course, the different perspectives 02:22.044 --> 02:25.458 that it's now possible to apply to the way 02:25.458 --> 02:27.667 the Navy is going to go forward 02:27.667 --> 02:31.491 and the way the services are going to be funded, 02:31.491 --> 02:33.064 it will be very interesting, at least to me, 02:33.064 --> 02:37.231 and I'm sure to you, to have these people, these experts, 02:37.557 --> 02:41.724 talk about where maintenance is going in their estimation 02:42.481 --> 02:44.981 here in the middle of January. 02:45.033 --> 02:46.033 So, Admiral. 02:46.648 --> 02:48.098 - All right, thank you Lee. 02:48.098 --> 02:48.931 I'm on? 02:48.931 --> 02:52.445 Okay, well thanks to that very kind introduction. 02:52.445 --> 02:54.263 So I did read the Vice Chief's remarks yesterday 02:54.263 --> 02:55.309 about current readiness 02:55.309 --> 02:59.476 and I read SECNAV's remarks afterwards about the fleet 03:01.170 --> 03:02.532 and discussion of Vice Chief's remarks. 03:02.532 --> 03:04.198 And I just want to publicly go on record 03:04.198 --> 03:05.175 saying that I agree with both 03:05.175 --> 03:07.415 the Vice Chief and the Secretary of the Navy. 03:07.415 --> 03:08.404 (audience laughs) 03:08.404 --> 03:10.771 So if you haven't had a chance to see, 03:10.771 --> 03:13.165 I just put out my NAVSEA campaign plan. 03:13.165 --> 03:15.171 It's actually at #therealtommoore 03:15.171 --> 03:16.930 if you want to take a look at that. 03:16.930 --> 03:17.763 That's a joke. 03:17.763 --> 03:18.596 And nobody got it. 03:18.596 --> 03:19.429 So bad. 03:19.429 --> 03:20.709 (audience laughs) 03:20.709 --> 03:24.376 Anyway, so as Lee said, I've been in the job 03:24.385 --> 03:25.891 for about seven months now. 03:25.891 --> 03:27.724 And I do want to talk. 03:27.986 --> 03:30.035 Having a chance to do the Future Readiness Panel, 03:30.035 --> 03:32.475 as I kind of called it this morning, was important. 03:32.475 --> 03:35.042 But I do really want to spend some time this afternoon, 03:35.042 --> 03:38.625 and we have a very distinguished panel here 03:38.835 --> 03:41.116 to talk about the kind of current readiness piece, 03:41.116 --> 03:44.377 and I think that the Vice Chief got at it yesterday 03:44.377 --> 03:45.701 when he talked about the fact that, hey, 03:45.701 --> 03:46.969 the first dollar today 03:46.969 --> 03:49.364 would probably go to current readiness. 03:49.364 --> 03:51.781 And when I came into the job, 03:52.697 --> 03:54.529 it was the number one challenge 03:54.529 --> 03:56.459 that both the Chief of Naval Operations 03:56.459 --> 03:58.937 and the two fleet commanders when I went to talk to them 03:58.937 --> 04:01.187 said, "Hey, this is really, 04:01.543 --> 04:03.798 "our inability to get ships and submarines 04:03.798 --> 04:05.863 "delivered on time is really having an impact." 04:05.863 --> 04:09.158 And if anybody read the article in the paper last week 04:09.158 --> 04:11.939 about, this was the first time that the Navy 04:11.939 --> 04:14.994 had not had a deployed carrier since World War Two, 04:14.994 --> 04:17.537 if that didn't catch your attention, nothing will. 04:17.537 --> 04:19.223 And it was a direct result of our inability 04:19.223 --> 04:21.246 to get the George H. W. Bush 04:21.246 --> 04:23.457 out of Norfolk Naval Shipyard on time. 04:23.457 --> 04:25.754 And this is not meant to be a finger-pointing exercise, 04:25.754 --> 04:29.426 but the fact was she was in for an eight-month availability 04:29.426 --> 04:31.593 and ended up taking us 13. 04:33.028 --> 04:36.361 And that five months, the net result was 04:37.122 --> 04:39.242 Ike stayed on station a little bit longer, 04:39.242 --> 04:40.832 which meant we ran that ship harder, 04:40.832 --> 04:43.370 and more importantly ran the young men and women, 04:43.370 --> 04:45.023 who are out there today volunteering 04:45.023 --> 04:47.397 and wearing the cloth of the nation, harder. 04:47.397 --> 04:48.871 And ultimately she had to come back. 04:48.871 --> 04:52.440 And you still have to get the ship ready to go on an FRP. 04:52.440 --> 04:53.940 And we took a gap. 04:53.952 --> 04:56.369 And so we have A, given time. 04:59.393 --> 05:02.442 NAVSEA, of the 278 ships of the Navy, 05:02.442 --> 05:03.598 probably about one third of them 05:03.598 --> 05:06.332 are either in a private or public availability, 05:06.332 --> 05:07.540 CNO availability, 05:07.540 --> 05:10.181 or in some sort of pier-side CMAV maintenance 05:10.181 --> 05:11.222 that NAVSEA manages. 05:11.222 --> 05:14.318 So what I like to tell my workforce on any given day is, 05:14.318 --> 05:16.149 "Hey, we own, about one third of the fleet today 05:16.149 --> 05:17.335 "is under our control." 05:17.335 --> 05:19.932 So our ability to get those ships and submarines 05:19.932 --> 05:22.932 out on time is critically important. 05:22.995 --> 05:26.912 So, before I turn it over to the speakers here, 05:27.386 --> 05:30.802 what I had been focusing on with my staff 05:30.802 --> 05:33.385 and when I go talk to OPNAV is, 05:34.694 --> 05:37.099 "Hey, there's kind of three key elements here 05:37.099 --> 05:40.042 "to getting us back on track for the on-time delivery 05:40.042 --> 05:40.875 "of ships and submarines." 05:40.875 --> 05:43.125 Number one is to understand 05:46.048 --> 05:48.355 what the true maintenance requirement is. 05:48.355 --> 05:52.324 And we have failed consistently over the last 10 years 05:52.324 --> 05:54.407 to match the requirement, 05:54.721 --> 05:57.092 to articulate what that requirement is, 05:57.092 --> 05:59.424 so that OPNAV could get the funding right. 05:59.424 --> 06:00.818 We have consistently been on the order 06:00.818 --> 06:04.128 of $600 to $700 million a year short in maintenance. 06:04.128 --> 06:05.980 And if you're $600 to $700 million short 06:05.980 --> 06:07.406 in maintenance every year, 06:07.406 --> 06:09.150 you're always gonna have challenges. 06:09.150 --> 06:12.317 So there's a concerted effort underway 06:12.813 --> 06:14.533 on my staff and with the fleet staffs 06:14.533 --> 06:16.195 from the naval shipyards 06:16.195 --> 06:18.845 to try and get our arms around better understanding 06:18.845 --> 06:20.853 what the true maintenance requirement is 06:20.853 --> 06:22.127 at the time that we build the budget 06:22.127 --> 06:24.525 so we can better align those budgets. 06:24.525 --> 06:26.148 And then once I've articulated 06:26.148 --> 06:27.903 what that 100% requirement is, 06:27.903 --> 06:29.812 and I think I owe that to the CNO, 06:29.812 --> 06:31.563 then I can have a discussion with the OPNAV staff 06:31.563 --> 06:33.270 on how much they can afford. 06:33.270 --> 06:34.648 And if they can't afford the full requirement, 06:34.648 --> 06:38.496 then I can tell them, "Okay, but for that amount of money 06:38.496 --> 06:40.263 "here's what I can give you." 06:40.263 --> 06:43.236 And today we're not having that discussion. 06:43.236 --> 06:44.417 So that's piece one. 06:44.417 --> 06:47.064 The second piece is, once you've matched 06:47.064 --> 06:48.430 and given me the controls that I need, 06:48.430 --> 06:50.392 I need the capacity in the naval shipyards 06:50.392 --> 06:52.015 to match the work requirement. 06:52.015 --> 06:54.515 And today the naval shipyards, 06:54.965 --> 06:57.298 I do not match the capacity. 06:57.774 --> 07:00.609 I'm under capacity by several thousand people. 07:00.609 --> 07:03.359 The net result is things run late 07:04.098 --> 07:06.975 or, in for instance the most recent example of USS Boise, 07:06.975 --> 07:08.580 we took a submarine, 07:08.580 --> 07:12.087 which was supposed to go into availability this summer, 07:12.087 --> 07:15.133 and rather than put her in, induct her, 07:15.133 --> 07:17.673 and keep her in the yard for an EOH 07:17.673 --> 07:19.368 that should take about 22 months, 07:19.368 --> 07:20.879 and put her in there for 48 months 07:20.879 --> 07:22.697 'cause I don't have the people, 07:22.697 --> 07:25.574 we made a rational decision not to put her into the yard 07:25.574 --> 07:26.723 and focus on the work that we had 07:26.723 --> 07:28.520 'cause I didn't have the people. 07:28.520 --> 07:30.423 But the downside is I took a submarine 07:30.423 --> 07:32.271 who is now essentially a surface ship, 07:32.271 --> 07:33.955 'cause without the maintenance, 07:33.955 --> 07:34.788 I can't submerge her, 07:34.788 --> 07:37.528 and so I'm gonna take this ship, submarine, 07:37.528 --> 07:38.769 that is still an active-duty ship, 07:38.769 --> 07:40.830 and it's really not available to the combatant commanders. 07:40.830 --> 07:42.074 That's a problem. 07:42.074 --> 07:42.907 And I'm probably gonna put it 07:42.907 --> 07:44.380 in our private sector in two years 07:44.380 --> 07:46.675 at a cost that's significantly higher to me 07:46.675 --> 07:48.659 than if I do it in the public sector. 07:48.659 --> 07:51.002 So the second piece here is to match the capacity 07:51.002 --> 07:53.042 that I need in the naval shipyards. 07:53.042 --> 07:54.139 And we're gonna go work on that. 07:54.139 --> 07:56.600 And then finally the third piece is, 07:56.600 --> 07:58.437 across the board, then we and NAVSEA, 07:58.437 --> 07:59.715 and we and the naval shipyards, 07:59.715 --> 08:01.071 and we and the private sector, 08:01.071 --> 08:03.261 you in the private sector maintenance business, 08:03.261 --> 08:06.114 we have an obligation to get more productive going forward. 08:06.114 --> 08:07.602 That may require some investments. 08:07.602 --> 08:09.569 It requires learning on our part. 08:09.569 --> 08:11.244 But all three of those things are important. 08:11.244 --> 08:14.341 And I can become the most productive workforce in the world, 08:14.341 --> 08:15.477 but without the right capacity 08:15.477 --> 08:17.247 and without the right the funding, 08:17.247 --> 08:18.554 I still can't get there. 08:18.554 --> 08:21.971 So my message to my team and to OPNAV is, 08:22.397 --> 08:23.896 I need to go work on all three of those things. 08:23.896 --> 08:26.153 We're all for working on those things now. 08:26.153 --> 08:28.929 And what I'd like to do is to come down the line here 08:28.929 --> 08:30.414 and let each of the panel members 08:30.414 --> 08:32.616 talk a little about what they're doing 08:32.616 --> 08:34.194 from a maintenance perspective 08:34.194 --> 08:36.024 and how they're kind of aligned to the three things 08:36.024 --> 08:37.266 that I just talked to you about right there. 08:37.266 --> 08:40.653 So, without further ado, I'm gonna start to my left 08:40.653 --> 08:43.364 with Rear-Admiral Jim Downey, who is the commander 08:43.364 --> 08:45.063 of the Navy Regional Maintenance Centers 08:45.063 --> 08:48.293 and also double-hatted as C21 within NAVSEA. 08:48.293 --> 08:49.960 So Jim, over to you. 08:52.587 --> 08:53.853 - Thanks Admiral. 08:53.853 --> 08:55.330 Good afternoon everybody. 08:55.330 --> 08:59.277 Truly appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today. 08:59.277 --> 09:00.813 As the admiral mentioned, 09:00.813 --> 09:03.406 I've got the regional maintenance centers in execution 09:03.406 --> 09:05.931 for the fleet and for Admiral Moore 09:05.931 --> 09:10.098 and the modernization programs in NAVSEA under C21. 09:10.680 --> 09:12.783 Part of that also includes 09:12.783 --> 09:14.744 the foreign military sales efforts 09:14.744 --> 09:18.411 for our ship efforts with our allied navies. 09:18.547 --> 09:21.630 And we own the ships cradle to grave. 09:21.866 --> 09:24.375 That's the basis from which I talk. 09:24.375 --> 09:25.559 There's a slide up there. 09:25.559 --> 09:27.871 It really just pretty much summarizes the key points 09:27.871 --> 09:29.871 out of the CNO's design, 09:29.987 --> 09:32.610 the assistant secretary's priorities, 09:32.610 --> 09:36.726 which have been the same in his long term in office. 09:36.726 --> 09:39.146 And I'm really gonna speak to the center part, 09:39.146 --> 09:40.896 my boss's priorities, 09:41.150 --> 09:44.205 which is pretty clear what my priorities are 09:44.205 --> 09:45.622 whatever he says. 09:45.763 --> 09:48.430 No, it's about on-time delivery. 09:48.591 --> 09:52.499 I modify that to say a couple different versions, 09:52.499 --> 09:54.498 on-time, on-budget delivery, 09:54.498 --> 09:55.600 and I would certainly take it 09:55.600 --> 09:57.242 ahead of schedule and under budget 09:57.242 --> 09:59.492 if you can do that as well. 10:00.209 --> 10:02.126 That's not all in jest. 10:02.565 --> 10:05.010 That really is where we need to go. 10:05.010 --> 10:06.760 To execute that work, 10:07.768 --> 10:11.435 we have global regional maintenance centers. 10:11.757 --> 10:15.924 Our main workforce is in the home ports of course. 10:16.276 --> 10:19.131 Norfolk and San Diego are our largest. 10:19.131 --> 10:22.019 And then we have Mayport down in the Southeast. 10:22.019 --> 10:24.651 We have Rota, Naples, and Bahrain. 10:24.651 --> 10:28.818 And then centers up in the Northwest and out in Hawaii. 10:29.119 --> 10:31.286 On the government workforce part of that, 10:31.286 --> 10:34.892 it's almost 50/50 military and civilian, 10:34.892 --> 10:36.422 about 3,000 military, 10:36.422 --> 10:39.589 a bit over 3,000 on the civilian side. 10:40.272 --> 10:44.439 And of course we don't do that work in any way by ourselves. 10:45.002 --> 10:49.169 On the program side, sponsorship is pretty much 95 and 96 10:50.987 --> 10:52.091 for the modernization programs. 10:52.091 --> 10:52.983 And then of course working 10:52.983 --> 10:54.983 with the fleet maintenance officers 10:54.983 --> 10:58.316 to get the maintenance packages correct. 10:59.903 --> 11:02.007 So what are we working on there? 11:02.007 --> 11:06.174 And I'll talk to some of our risk areas going forward. 11:07.142 --> 11:09.180 The priority one, on-time delivery for NAVSEA, 11:09.180 --> 11:13.057 I really co-lead that effort with Ms. Sharon Smoot, 11:13.057 --> 11:14.958 who's on the panel here with us. 11:14.958 --> 11:17.575 And we are working across public and private yards 11:17.575 --> 11:20.004 on how we share our lessons learned 11:20.004 --> 11:22.799 and how we continue to get effective. 11:22.799 --> 11:26.966 If you sat in the new construction discussion this morning, 11:28.211 --> 11:32.378 the maintenance and mod trends aren't much different. 11:32.420 --> 11:36.587 So if you look at DDG-51s, you've got to look at LPDs. 11:37.569 --> 11:39.128 And what you heard in that session 11:39.128 --> 11:41.844 is how you get steady, predictable work. 11:41.844 --> 11:44.177 The trends on those programs are positive. 11:44.177 --> 11:47.690 We have the same trends on those same programs 11:47.690 --> 11:49.197 in the in-service fleet. 11:49.197 --> 11:50.060 And when I say in-service, 11:50.060 --> 11:53.965 we own about 70, 75% of the whole Navy fleet. 11:53.965 --> 11:56.382 We do all the work in my area 11:57.865 --> 12:00.948 except for the nuclear ships and MSC. 12:02.407 --> 12:05.448 And then we support whatever the nuclear yards need 12:05.448 --> 12:08.690 in the non-nuclear areas of the nuclear ships. 12:08.690 --> 12:10.877 So we see, you hear about cost overruns. 12:10.877 --> 12:12.613 You hear about schedule issues. 12:12.613 --> 12:16.229 But in the DDG-51 area, and the LPD-17 area, 12:16.229 --> 12:19.825 we have very positive trends on how the work is going. 12:19.825 --> 12:21.242 It's not at zero. 12:21.721 --> 12:24.318 It's not at zero on schedule or cost. 12:24.318 --> 12:26.621 For slippage, we're right on track. 12:26.621 --> 12:28.427 But it's trending towards that. 12:28.427 --> 12:30.512 And it's been a continuous effort 12:30.512 --> 12:32.158 over the last five years. 12:32.158 --> 12:34.241 And the last couple years 12:34.849 --> 12:37.005 we're seeing some significant improvements 12:37.005 --> 12:38.922 to where we need to be. 12:39.585 --> 12:43.652 Not necessarily the case in some of the amphib areas, 12:43.652 --> 12:47.652 PCs, MCMs, and multiple different reasons there, 12:48.523 --> 12:52.690 from some challenging ships that have had some breaks 12:53.908 --> 12:57.908 in maintenance planned activities over the years 12:58.258 --> 13:02.425 to smaller quantities and very challenging ships to work on 13:03.119 --> 13:06.274 that force you into, and the PCs and MCMs, 13:06.274 --> 13:07.402 very much serial work 13:07.402 --> 13:09.432 versus concurrent execution of the work. 13:09.432 --> 13:11.873 Very challenging to do some of that work. 13:11.873 --> 13:14.823 As I talk to the larger package of course, 13:14.823 --> 13:18.156 we have a great partnership with SPAWAR. 13:18.699 --> 13:20.724 I see Admiral Ailes is here. 13:20.724 --> 13:22.038 Admiral Small was here. 13:22.038 --> 13:26.040 All the PEOs are involved in getting these packages right. 13:26.040 --> 13:27.725 We talked about new construction this morning, 13:27.725 --> 13:30.438 but this effort in addition to 75% 13:30.438 --> 13:32.224 of the quantity of the ships, 13:32.224 --> 13:34.778 this is 75% of the life of the ship, 13:34.778 --> 13:37.794 where the cost of all these programs executes over here 13:37.794 --> 13:39.924 in the maintenance and modernization side. 13:39.924 --> 13:42.257 So it's very, very important 13:42.568 --> 13:45.422 to achieve the operational on-time delivery. 13:45.422 --> 13:48.408 Some of the areas where we see risk. 13:48.408 --> 13:50.569 Getting the duration correct. 13:50.569 --> 13:52.040 Getting the requirements correct 13:52.040 --> 13:55.808 that Admiral Moore referenced for the availabilities. 13:55.808 --> 13:57.526 Going through that process, 13:57.526 --> 13:59.944 there's been really very significant efforts 13:59.944 --> 14:04.082 over the last few years, and we have gotten better there. 14:04.082 --> 14:07.637 One of my COs is here, Dave Bauer from SURFMEPP. 14:07.637 --> 14:11.646 The SURFMEPP effort stood up five, six years ago. 14:11.646 --> 14:13.887 Leveraging carriers and submarines 14:13.887 --> 14:17.750 is really becoming an exceptional effort in the Navy 14:17.750 --> 14:21.417 in getting us to plan these avails correctly 14:21.552 --> 14:24.269 and getting the entire Navy to stick with the plan. 14:24.269 --> 14:25.512 We're getting into much more 14:25.512 --> 14:27.906 of a directed maintenance approach 14:27.906 --> 14:30.406 in those challenging ship areas to say, 14:30.406 --> 14:31.778 "This maintenance has to be done. 14:31.778 --> 14:32.915 "You cannot defer it." 14:32.915 --> 14:35.417 Very important to go ahead and execute to the plan. 14:35.417 --> 14:39.000 And the duration issues that we are having, 14:39.830 --> 14:41.913 some of it comes down to, 14:42.326 --> 14:44.896 we pretty much know what the modernization work is, 14:44.896 --> 14:46.739 and that work is repeat. 14:46.739 --> 14:50.051 And what I want to see there is learning curve returns 14:50.051 --> 14:52.301 for us on schedule and cost 14:52.362 --> 14:54.711 where we really get more cost effective. 14:54.711 --> 14:58.615 In the open-and-inspect work, the growth in new work, 14:58.615 --> 15:00.618 we need to get better in forecasting, 15:00.618 --> 15:03.517 looking at all of the ships that we have executed 15:03.517 --> 15:06.171 and why don't we have the proper reservations in. 15:06.171 --> 15:09.633 Even if it's at 5, 10, 15% schedule impact, 15:09.633 --> 15:11.235 it's a schedule impact. 15:11.235 --> 15:14.436 And it's really in forecasting the unknown 15:14.436 --> 15:17.686 and balancing that schedule reservation 15:18.901 --> 15:21.889 with not giving the fleet maintenance officers 15:21.889 --> 15:23.447 and the operational commanders 15:23.447 --> 15:26.114 an unreasonably lengthy duration 15:26.451 --> 15:28.935 where we don't return the ships on time. 15:28.935 --> 15:30.876 So, over on the duration side, 15:30.876 --> 15:32.615 getting the requirements right 15:32.615 --> 15:35.843 really is about those correct estimates 15:35.843 --> 15:37.606 and sticking with the plan. 15:37.606 --> 15:40.155 Another piece of that that perturbates the plan, 15:40.155 --> 15:41.680 and I think we've done a lot better on this 15:41.680 --> 15:45.059 over recent years, is late adds to the plan. 15:45.059 --> 15:47.366 If we are not hitting the milestones 15:47.366 --> 15:49.053 and locking those packages, 15:49.053 --> 15:51.911 regardless of the perturbations on some things 15:51.911 --> 15:53.874 that folks will tell you've got to come in 15:53.874 --> 15:55.394 with the latest technology, 15:55.394 --> 15:58.046 you're gonna have deviation from the plan. 15:58.046 --> 16:01.370 And we have to just make sure that the plan has 16:01.370 --> 16:03.011 what the operational commanders need 16:03.011 --> 16:05.394 to meet the threat and go ahead and execute that plan. 16:05.394 --> 16:07.000 So we're seeing that issue, 16:07.000 --> 16:09.175 and we have room for improvement there. 16:09.175 --> 16:12.656 Another issue we see with the terabytes of data we collect 16:12.656 --> 16:16.656 is, change control needs to continue to improve. 16:17.673 --> 16:21.673 What we see around the world, it doesn't matter. 16:21.697 --> 16:23.438 Some of the folks I talk with every day 16:23.438 --> 16:25.776 are probably getting tired of me saying this, 16:25.776 --> 16:27.926 but it doesn't matter what the ship type is. 16:27.926 --> 16:30.314 It doesn't matter who's performing the work. 16:30.314 --> 16:33.571 It doesn't matter where the region is, the home port. 16:33.571 --> 16:34.690 It doesn't matter how long it's been 16:34.690 --> 16:36.668 since you did an avail on the ship. 16:36.668 --> 16:40.835 If you incorporate change after 60% of the avail execution, 16:41.542 --> 16:44.098 you have guaranteed lost operational days. 16:44.098 --> 16:47.389 So there are knees in the curves in the data, 16:47.389 --> 16:49.897 and we need to adhere to that and make sure 16:49.897 --> 16:52.811 that we can see and manage the expectations 16:52.811 --> 16:54.278 with the fleet commanders 16:54.278 --> 16:56.756 if we do need to incorporate that change 16:56.756 --> 16:59.563 and go ahead and adjust schedules. 16:59.563 --> 17:02.744 So getting the requirements right, managing the change, 17:02.744 --> 17:04.574 and the last one I'll say is really, 17:04.574 --> 17:06.171 and we do pretty good on this, 17:06.171 --> 17:08.171 but stick with the plan. 17:08.779 --> 17:11.050 To stick with the plan, what we're doing there 17:11.050 --> 17:13.998 is making sure we have in-depth risk analysis done 17:13.998 --> 17:16.581 both in the planning phase to show what the risks are, 17:16.581 --> 17:18.592 the mitigation plan for those risks, 17:18.592 --> 17:21.535 stick with that plan, and in execution. 17:21.535 --> 17:25.516 Part of an execution is to make sure the fleet understands 17:25.516 --> 17:28.088 to what level we're gonna mitigate those risks 17:28.088 --> 17:30.150 and how we're gonna redeliver that ship. 17:30.150 --> 17:32.475 It may not be green across the board 17:32.475 --> 17:35.558 to 100% original new capability. 17:35.566 --> 17:36.915 But do we all understand 17:36.915 --> 17:38.872 what capability we are returning to? 17:38.872 --> 17:40.296 Have we agreed with that? 17:40.296 --> 17:41.621 And stick with plan. 17:41.621 --> 17:44.538 And as I wrap up on those comments, 17:46.275 --> 17:48.608 and move down the line here, 17:49.553 --> 17:53.720 I will say that it really is a very impressive group 17:54.636 --> 17:58.504 of transparent players here from OPNAV onto the fleet. 17:58.504 --> 18:02.671 It is a pretty impressive thing to see fleet commanders 18:04.205 --> 18:08.372 speaking to each hull's status and how they're executing 18:09.418 --> 18:13.585 and supporting the work and the plan that's going forward. 18:13.941 --> 18:16.748 That I can't speak positively enough about. 18:16.748 --> 18:20.180 The work is challenging, but the Navy knowledge on the work 18:20.180 --> 18:23.469 and the leadership support for it is very clear 18:23.469 --> 18:25.260 and is on track to getting on-time delivery. 18:25.260 --> 18:28.936 So that part really is not part of the perturbation. 18:28.936 --> 18:33.103 So going into 2017, we have a relatively typical workload. 18:35.857 --> 18:38.806 We have about three dozen ships at avail right now 18:38.806 --> 18:40.806 and over 119 in planning 18:41.116 --> 18:44.191 and hundreds of intermediate-level activities 18:44.191 --> 18:47.024 to go ahead and execute worldwide. 18:47.175 --> 18:48.323 We'll stick with that plan 18:48.323 --> 18:51.406 and can't get to on-time soon enough. 18:51.912 --> 18:55.888 And we'll continue to share those metrics and hit that goal. 18:55.888 --> 18:56.721 Thank you. 18:57.054 --> 18:57.887 - Thanks Jim. 18:57.887 --> 19:00.311 Okay, next up is Rear-Admiral Moises Toteller, 19:00.311 --> 19:03.209 who is the Navy Undersea Warfare Center Commander 19:03.209 --> 19:05.463 and also double-hatted as CO7, 19:05.463 --> 19:09.419 where he owns all the planning for submarine maintenance. 19:09.419 --> 19:12.002 - All right, so good afternoon. 19:12.885 --> 19:13.718 Excuse me. 19:13.718 --> 19:14.726 So it's a pleasure to be here. 19:14.726 --> 19:16.463 Last year when I was here I talked a little bit 19:16.463 --> 19:20.630 about the challenges, at least that the submarine force 19:20.954 --> 19:23.726 is going to have in the future as we age, 19:23.726 --> 19:26.143 as the SSNs and our SSBNs age 19:27.993 --> 19:30.367 and ensuring that we get the requisite life 19:30.367 --> 19:34.534 out of each of the platforms in order to support the fleet. 19:35.982 --> 19:38.621 So this year I change it a little bit. 19:38.621 --> 19:42.017 Again, the boss's number one priority of course 19:42.017 --> 19:44.600 is getting submarines and ships 19:44.736 --> 19:47.236 out of availabilities on time. 19:47.575 --> 19:51.187 The focus, at least from a Submarine Team One perspective, 19:51.187 --> 19:52.305 has always been that. 19:52.305 --> 19:56.043 Trying to maximize the operational availability 19:56.043 --> 19:57.543 of our submarines. 19:57.665 --> 20:01.082 Hence the new direction and the new light 20:02.714 --> 20:06.047 that's been focused on NAVSEA as a whole 20:08.088 --> 20:11.588 in actually trying to improve our A sub O. 20:13.656 --> 20:16.613 As you know, Admiral Moore talked to it 20:16.613 --> 20:18.663 a little bit in his introduction, 20:18.663 --> 20:21.746 the mismatch between the requirements 20:23.091 --> 20:27.258 when we plan that availability in our budgeting process 20:27.928 --> 20:31.614 and when we get to the point where we're in execution, 20:31.614 --> 20:34.781 we are typically $600 to $700 million, 20:36.233 --> 20:39.596 like the boss said, off in our requirements. 20:39.596 --> 20:40.846 So why is that? 20:42.441 --> 20:45.473 So there is a new asserted effort to go off 20:45.473 --> 20:49.140 and do a deep dive into trying to figure out 20:49.348 --> 20:51.348 why we are where we are. 20:51.725 --> 20:54.558 So Vice Admiral Moore has directed 20:55.120 --> 20:57.045 that we have a planning summit. 20:57.045 --> 21:00.373 So we will have a planning summit in February, 21:00.373 --> 21:01.612 the second week of February, 21:01.612 --> 21:04.862 where we get together, the OPNAV staff, 21:05.015 --> 21:07.432 C21, CMRC, NAVC04, the fleet, 21:09.381 --> 21:12.964 to discuss the various planning activities, 21:12.981 --> 21:16.812 SURFMEPP, SUBMEPP, and the carrier planning activities, 21:16.812 --> 21:19.270 to go off and try to figure out 21:19.270 --> 21:22.603 why we haven't really changed the needle 21:23.961 --> 21:28.128 in our ability to reduce the amount of lost A sub O days. 21:32.455 --> 21:34.777 So the goal is kind of threefold. 21:34.777 --> 21:37.694 One is to determine the root causes 21:38.388 --> 21:40.046 of that requirement mismatch. 21:40.046 --> 21:41.590 So we're gonna look at the adequacy 21:41.590 --> 21:44.030 of our class maintenance plans 21:44.030 --> 21:46.511 and our technical foundation papers 21:46.511 --> 21:50.678 right amongst the carrier folks, the surface folks, 21:51.007 --> 21:52.496 and the submarine folks, 21:52.496 --> 21:54.395 and try to figure out if there are lessons learned 21:54.395 --> 21:56.726 amongst that to see how we can get better 21:56.726 --> 22:00.393 in the planning piece of our availabilities. 22:01.272 --> 22:05.189 And then review our processes that are required 22:06.257 --> 22:09.059 to drive those mismatches to zero. 22:09.059 --> 22:13.142 So look at our historical patterns by ship class. 22:13.353 --> 22:14.686 Look at metrics. 22:15.015 --> 22:17.097 What are the right metrics to track? 22:17.097 --> 22:19.257 And again, the high-velocity learning piece 22:19.257 --> 22:21.460 is something that's important 22:21.460 --> 22:23.502 in this planning summit as well. 22:23.502 --> 22:26.669 So SURFMEPP does a good job doing its, 22:29.205 --> 22:30.593 Team Sub does the same thing. 22:30.593 --> 22:34.176 Carrier planning activities are doing that. 22:34.493 --> 22:37.890 And I know the planning activities talk amongst themselves, 22:37.890 --> 22:39.535 but again, the lessons learned, 22:39.535 --> 22:42.952 how we can accelerate the lessons learned 22:44.393 --> 22:47.310 from one planning activity to another planning activity 22:47.310 --> 22:49.643 to lessen the lost A sub O's 22:50.638 --> 22:53.471 is also a desired outcome of this. 22:55.301 --> 22:57.551 A second part of what I do, 22:58.981 --> 23:01.158 and this is in my warfare center hat, 23:01.158 --> 23:05.287 is this was under the direction of Vice Admiral Hilarides 23:05.287 --> 23:07.071 when he was NAVSEA Commander is, 23:07.071 --> 23:09.407 he gave the edict to the warfare centers 23:09.407 --> 23:12.053 to go off and look at how the warfare centers 23:12.053 --> 23:15.970 could help the shipyards in some of the aspects 23:16.510 --> 23:20.677 in reducing, in aiding us in eliminating some lost A sub O. 23:23.663 --> 23:27.324 So the warfare centers over the past two years 23:27.324 --> 23:30.206 went out and visited all the various shipyards 23:30.206 --> 23:34.123 and spent about $2.5 million of our 219 funding 23:35.991 --> 23:37.991 to go off and figure out 23:38.019 --> 23:42.106 some of the innovative ideas out there to go off and tackle 23:42.106 --> 23:45.670 that would help the shipyards in their efficiency. 23:45.670 --> 23:48.867 And so that's actually bearing a lot of fruit 23:48.867 --> 23:51.931 in that working with Sharon and NAVSEA04, 23:51.931 --> 23:55.116 we now have the Shipyard Innovation Fund, 23:55.116 --> 23:58.265 and she has actually ponied up some money as well 23:58.265 --> 24:01.182 so that the efforts that we started 24:01.658 --> 24:05.211 under the warfare centers could bear some fruit 24:05.211 --> 24:08.128 and try to come up with other eyes. 24:10.336 --> 24:12.806 I consider this the less sexy part of what we do. 24:12.806 --> 24:16.481 I mean acquisition is all the, gets the limelight. 24:16.481 --> 24:19.576 But it's what we could do in the shipyards 24:19.576 --> 24:22.014 to help reduce the amount of time it takes 24:22.014 --> 24:26.181 to do certain tasks to bear fruit on a lot of what we do 24:26.418 --> 24:30.168 in helping the efficiencies in the shipyards. 24:30.983 --> 24:33.308 There are other innovative efforts 24:33.308 --> 24:35.297 that folks are also looking at. 24:35.297 --> 24:37.880 But what I ask each of you here, especially industry, 24:37.880 --> 24:42.047 is a lot of this work is happening at the warfare centers. 24:42.053 --> 24:44.854 I'm sure from an industry perspective 24:44.854 --> 24:47.271 there are ideas that you guys have 24:47.271 --> 24:48.688 that can help us. 24:50.619 --> 24:51.677 It's not really my task. 24:51.677 --> 24:55.152 It's more of a Sharon in a NAVSEA04 aspect. 24:55.152 --> 24:56.801 But there has got to be ideas out there 24:56.801 --> 24:59.028 that we could bring to fruition 24:59.028 --> 25:02.930 that actually help us in our execution in the shipyards. 25:02.930 --> 25:05.503 So, with that, I'll turn it over to Sharon. 25:05.503 --> 25:06.982 - [Admiral Moore] Okay, thanks Moises. 25:06.982 --> 25:08.707 Okay, now I'll introduce Sharon Smoot, 25:08.707 --> 25:11.763 who is the Director of Industrial Operations, NAVSEA04. 25:11.763 --> 25:12.596 Sharon? 25:12.933 --> 25:14.544 - Good afternoon everybody. 25:14.544 --> 25:17.377 It's my pleasure to share with you 25:17.443 --> 25:18.640 that I lead this workforce 25:18.640 --> 25:21.864 of over 35,000 military and civilian personnel 25:21.864 --> 25:24.862 in the four naval shipyards across the country. 25:24.862 --> 25:26.597 And every day, these men and women 25:26.597 --> 25:29.770 perform some of the most difficult work we do 25:29.770 --> 25:30.999 in the Department of the Navy 25:30.999 --> 25:34.263 and certainly within NAVSEA in support of our Navy. 25:34.263 --> 25:38.430 We repair, maintain, modernize, refuel, and inactivate 25:38.488 --> 25:41.321 primarily nuclear craft carriers and submarines 25:41.321 --> 25:44.622 inside the public yards in support of our fleet's readiness 25:44.622 --> 25:46.539 to execute our mission. 25:47.349 --> 25:49.765 We maintain strong partnerships with industry. 25:49.765 --> 25:52.981 I am more dependent on them than ever before 25:52.981 --> 25:56.083 for the very reasons that Vice Admiral Moore 25:56.083 --> 26:00.006 shared with you earlier on the sizing of the public yards. 26:00.006 --> 26:02.714 But I depend on them not just for shipboard maintenance 26:02.714 --> 26:04.917 and modernization, the AIT work they do. 26:04.917 --> 26:06.933 I depend on them for the supplier base 26:06.933 --> 26:09.565 that they also represent, our vendors, 26:09.565 --> 26:10.538 and all of the efforts 26:10.538 --> 26:14.038 that we're doing under innovation efforts. 26:15.661 --> 26:18.175 Some of the best ideas are out there in industry 26:18.175 --> 26:19.650 and the academic community, 26:19.650 --> 26:23.733 and we need to tap into that stronger and faster. 26:24.518 --> 26:26.335 Some of the best practices in new technology 26:26.335 --> 26:28.495 and our workforce is brought in by this new innovation, 26:28.495 --> 26:32.159 giving the workforce that I have the pleasure of leading 26:32.159 --> 26:35.712 the tools they need to be successful in serving this Navy. 26:35.712 --> 26:38.525 We've hired inside the public shipyards 26:38.525 --> 26:42.025 over 14,000 people in the last five years. 26:43.135 --> 26:46.715 I've not done that, and I've not hired as many people 26:46.715 --> 26:50.882 I think in one year, over 5,000 people in one year. 26:50.978 --> 26:54.561 That presents both a tremendous opportunity 26:54.671 --> 26:57.679 because of the talent that we brought in. 26:57.679 --> 27:00.238 It also provides a little bit of a challenge for me 27:00.238 --> 27:02.984 in how quickly I can get that workforce 27:02.984 --> 27:05.419 with that demographics up to speed 27:05.419 --> 27:07.401 to do the workload that we're doing right now, 27:07.401 --> 27:11.318 which is at a peak inside the public shipyards. 27:11.967 --> 27:13.532 So I'm focused on several areas, 27:13.532 --> 27:14.723 and I'll try not to repeat 27:14.723 --> 27:17.890 what my other panel members have said. 27:17.936 --> 27:20.270 Delivering ships out on time, 27:20.270 --> 27:22.023 stabilizing our workload, 27:22.023 --> 27:25.558 balancing that workload's requirements with the capacity. 27:25.558 --> 27:27.398 And as Admiral Moore stated, 27:27.398 --> 27:29.458 we are below capacity for the work 27:29.458 --> 27:32.152 that's in my program of record right now. 27:32.152 --> 27:34.569 And Boise, one of the reasons 27:35.490 --> 27:38.760 we did not induct her inside Norfolk Naval Shipyard, 27:38.760 --> 27:41.598 because we did not have the capacity, the people, 27:41.598 --> 27:44.555 to put on that boat to make forward progress on 27:44.555 --> 27:46.722 in delivering her on time. 27:47.127 --> 27:49.044 Improving our planning. 27:49.989 --> 27:51.592 Identifying, generating requirements 27:51.592 --> 27:54.408 and getting that right up front is a piece of it. 27:54.408 --> 27:56.058 The piece that I also do is 27:56.058 --> 27:58.573 in generating the planning products 27:58.573 --> 28:01.007 that I have to go do the execution of the work. 28:01.007 --> 28:03.478 These are the technical documents that I do, 28:03.478 --> 28:06.478 how I resource each of the projects, 28:06.614 --> 28:08.511 how I discipline this team 28:08.511 --> 28:10.539 to follow the project management fundamentals 28:10.539 --> 28:13.603 that we use on the waterfronts every day. 28:13.603 --> 28:16.419 Included in that is logistics and, as I said, 28:16.419 --> 28:19.611 our partners with our vendor base, our suppliers, 28:19.611 --> 28:23.700 all the way to how I bring in and move material around 28:23.700 --> 28:25.412 so that I get the right pieces and parts 28:25.412 --> 28:28.412 to the waterfront at the right time. 28:29.120 --> 28:33.253 I also am focused on investing in this infrastructure. 28:33.253 --> 28:35.106 We have some of the oldest infrastructure 28:35.106 --> 28:38.243 in our public yards in the Department of Navy. 28:38.243 --> 28:41.940 Most of my buildings are well over 68 years old, 28:41.940 --> 28:44.357 well, well over 68 years old. 28:44.504 --> 28:46.289 I have a layout of a plant 28:46.289 --> 28:49.372 that was designed for building ships. 28:49.512 --> 28:51.814 Haven't built any ships in a public shipyard 28:51.814 --> 28:53.481 in a very long time. 28:53.516 --> 28:55.421 So the investments the Navy's making 28:55.421 --> 28:57.904 to modernize the physical plant 28:57.904 --> 29:00.633 to invest in our IT infrastructure, 29:00.633 --> 29:02.947 to modernize the capital equipment 29:02.947 --> 29:04.860 that this workforce is using 29:04.860 --> 29:08.212 to put new tools, automated tools, robotics, 29:08.212 --> 29:11.175 all of that new cutting-edge technology, 29:11.175 --> 29:13.493 a lot of which we're leveraging inside Navy 29:13.493 --> 29:15.933 with our partnership with our warfare centers 29:15.933 --> 29:18.783 but also in industry with private industry 29:18.783 --> 29:19.779 that's building ships 29:19.779 --> 29:21.807 and other industries that are not associated 29:21.807 --> 29:24.974 with ship maintenance or shipbuilding. 29:26.222 --> 29:27.616 We're going wide and broad 29:27.616 --> 29:29.627 in industry and academic community 29:29.627 --> 29:31.696 and tapping into this country's 29:31.696 --> 29:33.473 scientific knowledge to make sure 29:33.473 --> 29:36.009 that I give this workforce a fighting chance 29:36.009 --> 29:39.842 to be as innovative, as efficient, as possible 29:39.901 --> 29:43.663 in order to meet the commitments that we have for the Navy. 29:43.663 --> 29:47.146 So, some of the the other areas we're working on, 29:47.146 --> 29:49.448 including disciplined processes, 29:49.448 --> 29:50.825 eliminating work stoppages, 29:50.825 --> 29:54.275 I mean, getting down to the, "Are we executing our plan 29:54.275 --> 29:56.607 "that we lay out, validating that the plan 29:56.607 --> 29:58.555 "is actually a good plan?" 29:58.555 --> 30:00.638 Then execute to the plan. 30:00.795 --> 30:04.514 We must continue to invest, investing in infrastructure, 30:04.514 --> 30:05.573 but more importantly for me, 30:05.573 --> 30:08.995 investing in this workforce that we've brought on board. 30:08.995 --> 30:13.162 We placed a tremendous effort in developing, expanding, 30:13.657 --> 30:16.595 what we refer to as learning centers in the public shipyards 30:16.595 --> 30:20.097 where we've taken parts of ships, ship's components, 30:20.097 --> 30:23.715 and developed mock-ups where this workforce can learn 30:23.715 --> 30:26.882 and practice in a safe-to-learn environment 30:26.882 --> 30:29.840 and get proficient at doing the work that they're doing 30:29.840 --> 30:34.007 before I put them on the ship to actually weld, fit pipe, 30:34.252 --> 30:38.419 and do all of the work that these artisans are trained 30:39.028 --> 30:39.861 to go do. 30:39.861 --> 30:43.070 And we're seeing returns on that investment. 30:43.070 --> 30:44.904 So by using these mock-ups of these components 30:44.904 --> 30:47.063 and ship systems, we give them 30:47.063 --> 30:49.406 what they need to learn faster. 30:49.406 --> 30:50.996 Instead of taking one to two years 30:50.996 --> 30:54.201 to get someone we've hired out of the classroom 30:54.201 --> 30:55.920 and onto the waterfront, 30:55.920 --> 30:59.753 we're doing it in weeks, in up to four months. 31:00.282 --> 31:01.369 Not in all cases. 31:01.369 --> 31:03.213 I have some part of my workforce 31:03.213 --> 31:05.397 that require even more training 31:05.397 --> 31:08.360 because of the complexity of some of the nuclear work we do. 31:08.360 --> 31:11.312 But for the large part, we are accelerating 31:11.312 --> 31:13.338 getting that workforce through training 31:13.338 --> 31:16.088 and being productive on the ship. 31:16.118 --> 31:20.006 I've been in this business for over 30 years now. 31:20.006 --> 31:21.703 I don't like to admit that in public, 31:21.703 --> 31:23.099 and I realize I just did, 31:23.099 --> 31:24.963 (audience laughs) 31:24.963 --> 31:27.796 but I'm still in awe of the talent 31:27.825 --> 31:29.699 that we have in our industrial base, 31:29.699 --> 31:32.587 both in the public sector and private sector. 31:32.587 --> 31:34.998 And I hope everybody appreciates 31:34.998 --> 31:39.165 what that workforce does for this country everyday, 31:39.570 --> 31:42.110 as they're the ones at the pointy end of the spear 31:42.110 --> 31:43.422 getting it done for us. 31:43.422 --> 31:45.552 They're passionate about the work, 31:45.552 --> 31:47.799 they understand the Navy's mission, 31:47.799 --> 31:50.829 and they are a critical part of the force behind the fleet. 31:50.829 --> 31:52.200 Thank you so much. 31:52.200 --> 31:53.094 - [Vice Admiral Moore] Okay, thanks Sharon. 31:53.094 --> 31:53.927 For those of you who don't know, 31:53.927 --> 31:56.705 Sharon was only 10 when she started working at NAVSEA, 31:56.705 --> 31:59.082 so, to make you feel a little bit better. 31:59.082 --> 32:01.521 So it's my pleasure also to introduce our Coast Guard here. 32:01.521 --> 32:03.976 Rear-Admiral Bruce Baffer is the Assistant Commandant 32:03.976 --> 32:05.171 for Engineering and Logistics. 32:05.171 --> 32:06.720 And Bruce, welcome to the panel. 32:06.720 --> 32:07.898 We'll go over to you. 32:07.898 --> 32:08.898 - Thank you. 32:09.194 --> 32:11.308 First I just want to say thanks to Admiral Moore 32:11.308 --> 32:15.151 for inviting us and also to SNA for giving us this platform. 32:15.151 --> 32:18.417 We use this platform to communicate with industry. 32:18.417 --> 32:21.445 And we tend not to attract as much press by ourselves, 32:21.445 --> 32:23.316 so by combining and partnering 32:23.316 --> 32:26.293 with the Navy and with the SNA, it gives us a good platform. 32:26.293 --> 32:28.041 I've been speaking on these panels 32:28.041 --> 32:29.499 for, I don't know, five, six years. 32:29.499 --> 32:31.377 And I've always talked about OPC. 32:31.377 --> 32:32.816 This gave us a platform 32:32.816 --> 32:34.682 to talk about our acquisition strategy, 32:34.682 --> 32:36.609 communicate with industry, 32:36.609 --> 32:38.880 communicate a very different acquisition strategy 32:38.880 --> 32:40.756 that was using better buying power. 32:40.756 --> 32:42.923 And it's worked out great. 32:43.013 --> 32:44.605 It's worked out fantastic. 32:44.605 --> 32:46.022 We were down-selected. 32:46.022 --> 32:47.436 We're in detail design. 32:47.436 --> 32:49.460 It's the biggest program in Coast Guard history. 32:49.460 --> 32:51.316 It's the biggest program in DHS history. 32:51.316 --> 32:53.735 So we couldn't be prouder of it. 32:53.735 --> 32:56.288 So it's going well, and I know it's because of, 32:56.288 --> 32:58.321 this SNA panel was a big piece of it. 32:58.321 --> 32:59.747 So thank you for that. 32:59.747 --> 33:01.626 But now that I'm not in acquisitions, I'm in maintenance, 33:01.626 --> 33:04.435 I'm not gonna talk about OPC anymore. 33:04.435 --> 33:05.785 Admiral Haycock talked about Polar. 33:05.785 --> 33:09.658 That's the new big thing on our plate that he's working on. 33:09.658 --> 33:11.732 But I'm into maintenance now and sustainability. 33:11.732 --> 33:13.285 So I'm gonna talk about money 33:13.285 --> 33:16.276 and how we make some of those money-based decisions. 33:16.276 --> 33:18.570 We all know about the bathtub curb 33:18.570 --> 33:20.403 and the lifecycle cost 33:20.765 --> 33:22.858 of any asset's all based on sustainment. 33:22.858 --> 33:24.269 It's not the acquisition cost. 33:24.269 --> 33:25.369 So if you look at it, 33:25.369 --> 33:28.952 acquisition cost, fixed cost, or sunk cost, 33:29.302 --> 33:30.135 can't get that back. 33:30.135 --> 33:31.058 It's already spent. 33:31.058 --> 33:31.891 The crew's on board the ship. 33:31.891 --> 33:33.011 You've already paid them. 33:33.011 --> 33:34.592 You can't take them off. 33:34.592 --> 33:36.546 Fuel, okay, it's a variable cost, 33:36.546 --> 33:39.213 but it's relatively non-material 33:40.359 --> 33:42.548 when you're looking at the lifecycle cost. 33:42.548 --> 33:43.528 The only thing that's left is really 33:43.528 --> 33:45.702 the maintenance accounts, the maintenance costs. 33:45.702 --> 33:48.947 So we always tend to go there first and try to squeeze that. 33:48.947 --> 33:51.246 Well, one of the things that's going on is, 33:51.246 --> 33:53.670 obviously we've been hearing a lot about 33:53.670 --> 33:55.330 operating government like a business, 33:55.330 --> 33:56.449 especially since the election. 33:56.449 --> 33:58.582 We want to operate the government like a business. 33:58.582 --> 33:59.999 The Coast Guard, the last three years, 33:59.999 --> 34:01.452 we've gotten a clean financial audit. 34:01.452 --> 34:03.432 We've spent a lot of time doing our books, 34:03.432 --> 34:05.194 doing our financial statements, 34:05.194 --> 34:06.636 and we've had to think like a business. 34:06.636 --> 34:08.455 So I wanted to talk a little bit about 34:08.455 --> 34:11.706 how maintenance funds, the maintenance activities, 34:11.706 --> 34:13.690 would be looked at from an accounts point of view 34:13.690 --> 34:15.839 rather than an operational commander. 34:15.839 --> 34:17.908 Right now, we've got two fleets in the Coast Guard. 34:17.908 --> 34:20.547 We've got our new fleet, our national security cutters, 34:20.547 --> 34:22.792 and our fast-response cutters, brand-new, 34:22.792 --> 34:24.986 coming out the door on time, on schedule. 34:24.986 --> 34:25.834 We're very proud of them. 34:25.834 --> 34:27.780 They're doing a great job underway. 34:27.780 --> 34:29.029 We've also got the legacy fleet. 34:29.029 --> 34:30.778 We've got the 40-year-old Polar Star 34:30.778 --> 34:32.566 breaking ice in the Antarctic today. 34:32.566 --> 34:35.349 They're 10 miles into a 68-mile run, 34:35.349 --> 34:36.182 but they're still working 34:36.182 --> 34:38.756 so we're crossing our fingers on that. 34:38.756 --> 34:39.589 Ice still breaking. 34:39.589 --> 34:41.855 We've got our 45-year-old HEC fleet, 34:41.855 --> 34:42.975 our high-endurance cutters, 34:42.975 --> 34:45.232 that's being replaced by the NSCs. 34:45.232 --> 34:47.579 We've got our 50-year-old 210-foot cutters. 34:47.579 --> 34:50.248 So we've got new ones and old ones. 34:50.248 --> 34:52.915 And we're maintaining them both. 34:52.928 --> 34:54.799 Well, when you're talking about the drug war, 34:54.799 --> 34:56.289 and I'm gonna talk specifically about the drug war, 34:56.289 --> 34:58.683 'cause it's easy to calculate a return on investment. 34:58.683 --> 35:02.850 It's easy to quantify drugs because there's a street value, 35:03.376 --> 35:05.099 and you can figure out how much you got. 35:05.099 --> 35:06.935 It's not like saving lives. 35:06.935 --> 35:08.415 It's hard to put a value on a life. 35:08.415 --> 35:11.497 So I'm gonna talk about drugs a little bit. 35:11.497 --> 35:14.625 The business of counter-narcotics trafficking is big. 35:14.625 --> 35:17.505 Coast Guard's been setting records right and left. 35:17.505 --> 35:18.338 Last year was a record. 35:18.338 --> 35:19.171 So far this year, 35:19.171 --> 35:23.338 we've already interdicted 40 tons this fiscal year. 35:23.514 --> 35:24.766 So it's gonna be another record. 35:24.766 --> 35:26.349 We see that coming. 35:26.394 --> 35:28.255 So anything we can put, if it floats, 35:28.255 --> 35:30.072 it's in the Western Hemisphere, 35:30.072 --> 35:33.176 it's off the Eastern Pacific, it's chasing drugs right now. 35:33.176 --> 35:34.919 So everything we've got is out there. 35:34.919 --> 35:36.850 Operational commander would like to have 35:36.850 --> 35:38.152 a national security cutter. 35:38.152 --> 35:40.892 They've got all the intel capability, all the tools. 35:40.892 --> 35:44.493 They've got every club in the bag out there doing the job. 35:44.493 --> 35:46.058 We've also got our 210-foot cutters. 35:46.058 --> 35:47.493 Well, they don't want those so much, 35:47.493 --> 35:48.402 but you know what? 35:48.402 --> 35:49.504 You've got to be present to play. 35:49.504 --> 35:52.337 It's just like going to MGM Grand. 35:52.461 --> 35:54.911 If you're not there, you're not playing. 35:54.911 --> 35:55.813 You've got to be there. 35:55.813 --> 35:59.438 There's no deterrent effect at the pier with counter-drugs. 35:59.438 --> 36:01.897 You've got to be there to interdict. 36:01.897 --> 36:06.064 So, if you connect a 210 to a national security cutter, 36:07.127 --> 36:08.516 you can leverage that capability 36:08.516 --> 36:10.035 that the new cutter brings you 36:10.035 --> 36:11.794 by putting an old cutter with you. 36:11.794 --> 36:13.494 Well, okay, so they're not very fast. 36:13.494 --> 36:14.584 They don't have as long legs. 36:14.584 --> 36:15.881 They're 50 years old. 36:15.881 --> 36:17.685 They do have a use-of-force helicopter. 36:17.685 --> 36:20.219 They do have our new over-the-horizon cutter boats, 36:20.219 --> 36:22.462 so they've got the same interdiction capability 36:22.462 --> 36:25.212 as the national security cutters. 36:25.233 --> 36:27.110 Well, how would an account look at that? 36:27.110 --> 36:29.435 National security cutter, $600 million. 36:29.435 --> 36:30.736 Design life of 30 years. 36:30.736 --> 36:34.096 That's $20 million per year, straight-line depreciation. 36:34.096 --> 36:37.465 So, say they come back with $200 million worth of drugs, 36:37.465 --> 36:40.460 they'll divide that by $20 million in depreciation. 36:40.460 --> 36:41.629 That's a 10-to-one payback. 36:41.629 --> 36:42.462 Okay, that's pretty good. 36:42.462 --> 36:43.379 We'll take that. 36:43.379 --> 36:44.664 That's running like a business. 36:44.664 --> 36:47.510 Well, let's look at that 50-year-old 210-foot cutter. 36:47.510 --> 36:50.010 It's depreciated 20 years ago. 36:50.040 --> 36:51.329 It's no longer depreciation. 36:51.329 --> 36:53.323 Okay, so they're not as good as the NSC. 36:53.323 --> 36:55.458 Maybe they don't get as much. 36:55.458 --> 36:58.044 They get $100 million worth of drugs. 36:58.044 --> 37:00.360 Well, $100 million divided by zero is infinity. 37:00.360 --> 37:03.466 That return on investment can't even be calculated, 37:03.466 --> 37:04.852 because that thing is 20 years past 37:04.852 --> 37:07.019 its designed service life. 37:07.125 --> 37:09.228 And if you think about cutter mortality, 37:09.228 --> 37:11.184 it's just like human mortality. 37:11.184 --> 37:12.149 It's a normal curve. 37:12.149 --> 37:14.111 You get your expected life expectancy. 37:14.111 --> 37:16.351 That's the cutter design time. 37:16.351 --> 37:18.532 The human, it's a normal curve. 37:18.532 --> 37:20.324 Some folks, if they maintain themselves, 37:20.324 --> 37:22.372 if they practice healthy lifestyles, 37:22.372 --> 37:25.186 if they go to checkups, if they pay the maintenance, 37:25.186 --> 37:26.913 they'll be out on the right-hand tail. 37:26.913 --> 37:28.156 That's what we all ascribe to. 37:28.156 --> 37:31.466 Let's be on the right-hand tail of that normal curve. 37:31.466 --> 37:33.339 Unhealthy lifestyle, they don't do the maintenance, 37:33.339 --> 37:34.382 they don't see the doctor, 37:34.382 --> 37:35.591 they're gonna be on the left-hand side. 37:35.591 --> 37:37.223 Cutters are no different. 37:37.223 --> 37:39.220 So, why is it that an accountant 37:39.220 --> 37:41.075 will look at our 210-foot cutters and say, 37:41.075 --> 37:41.995 "We want more of those. 37:41.995 --> 37:43.276 "We want more 50-year-old cutters, 37:43.276 --> 37:45.006 "'cause look at that return on investment 37:45.006 --> 37:47.498 "as opposed to the new national security cutters." 37:47.498 --> 37:49.555 Well, that's how a business would look at it. 37:49.555 --> 37:50.388 But 37:54.259 --> 37:57.016 we can't maintain those 50-year-old cutters forever. 37:57.016 --> 38:00.422 They're gonna go away no matter how much we maintain them. 38:00.422 --> 38:02.245 The only reason we've been able to get past 38:02.245 --> 38:03.524 that designed service life, 38:03.524 --> 38:05.835 and these cutters haven't been slept. 38:05.835 --> 38:07.565 We just did two midlifes. 38:07.565 --> 38:11.529 So, I mean, as Click and Clack, the Car Talk guys, 38:11.529 --> 38:12.792 they would say they're in the third half 38:12.792 --> 38:14.542 of their program now. 38:15.084 --> 38:16.072 That's what they would call it. 38:16.072 --> 38:17.360 And that's where they're at. 38:17.360 --> 38:18.468 We just did two midlifes. 38:18.468 --> 38:20.683 We put the maintenance into them. 38:20.683 --> 38:23.237 And we're able to operate them out to 50 years 38:23.237 --> 38:25.269 and still get operational results from them. 38:25.269 --> 38:27.013 So that's what we're doing now. 38:27.013 --> 38:28.095 But the only reason we can do that 38:28.095 --> 38:30.595 is because of the maintenance. 38:31.751 --> 38:34.188 Who's seen that, remember that FRAM commercial 38:34.188 --> 38:36.625 with the pay me now or pay me later byline? 38:36.625 --> 38:38.175 Yeah, I know I'm not the only old guy here. 38:38.175 --> 38:39.307 You guys remember that. 38:39.307 --> 38:41.465 Yeah, that was the all-time best commercial. 38:41.465 --> 38:43.558 The guy's over the front of the hood of his car, 38:43.558 --> 38:46.665 and he's got that five-dollar FRAM oil filter in his hand. 38:46.665 --> 38:49.536 He says, "Pay me now, five-dollar FRAM oil filter." 38:49.536 --> 38:52.130 And he takes a yank on his chain-lift, 38:52.130 --> 38:54.083 and the engine rises up half an inch. 38:54.083 --> 38:55.397 "Or you can pay me later." 38:55.397 --> 38:57.484 That's the business we're in right now. 38:57.484 --> 38:59.205 Pay me now or pay me later. 38:59.205 --> 39:01.192 That's what I have to do within the Coast Guard 39:01.192 --> 39:03.387 to try to fight for the maintenance dollars. 39:03.387 --> 39:07.554 And frankly, I'm benefiting now from my predecessors 39:08.005 --> 39:09.962 who made that argument successfully. 39:09.962 --> 39:12.045 And that's why we've got the 50-year-old cutters 39:12.045 --> 39:14.352 that are still operationally effective. 39:14.352 --> 39:17.730 One last story about those 50-year-old cutters. 39:17.730 --> 39:20.017 The first-in-class Reliance, it's a Reliance class, 39:20.017 --> 39:22.282 that was my first ship when I was a student engineer. 39:22.282 --> 39:23.264 I was 20 years old. 39:23.264 --> 39:24.931 It was 20 years old. 39:25.283 --> 39:28.112 We couldn't get past Guantanamo without breaking down. 39:28.112 --> 39:29.621 We would leave from Cape Canaveral. 39:29.621 --> 39:31.145 We'd break down in Guantanamo. 39:31.145 --> 39:34.230 They were designed for 14-days to 21-days patrols. 39:34.230 --> 39:35.892 That's what they were designed for. 39:35.892 --> 39:37.225 Doing fisheries. 39:37.297 --> 39:38.506 We'd break down in Guantanamo. 39:38.506 --> 39:40.528 We'd come back to Base Miami Beach. 39:40.528 --> 39:41.361 We'd get fixed up. 39:41.361 --> 39:42.567 The we'd float back up the Gulf Stream 39:42.567 --> 39:44.030 and park it at Canaveral. 39:44.030 --> 39:45.807 And that's the end of patrol. 39:45.807 --> 39:48.028 Return on investment was zero, okay? 39:48.028 --> 39:49.735 That's when it was 20 years old. 39:49.735 --> 39:50.948 It's fifty years old now. 39:50.948 --> 39:52.227 It's our oldest 210. 39:52.227 --> 39:53.978 It got underway last September from Maine, 39:53.978 --> 39:55.602 went down through the Caribbean, 39:55.602 --> 39:58.125 through the Panama Canal, out to the East Pac, 39:58.125 --> 39:59.744 did a whole patrol through the East Pac, 39:59.744 --> 40:01.781 brought back drugs, brought back detainees, 40:01.781 --> 40:04.059 did the whole mission, back through the Panama canal, 40:04.059 --> 40:06.544 and all the way back up to Maine, routinely, 40:06.544 --> 40:08.961 without any big major issues. 40:09.110 --> 40:11.366 We expect that of those ships now. 40:11.366 --> 40:12.199 So you look back. 40:12.199 --> 40:13.632 You go, "Why can that ship do that now 40:13.632 --> 40:15.017 "that it's 50 years old, 40:15.017 --> 40:17.598 "when it couldn't do it when it was 20 years old?" 40:17.598 --> 40:20.606 What's the return on investment on that ship right now? 40:20.606 --> 40:22.797 So let me just leave you with a couple thoughts. 40:22.797 --> 40:24.489 One, maintenance pays. 40:24.489 --> 40:26.718 You can pay me now or pay me later. 40:26.718 --> 40:29.445 But maintenance drives operational availability. 40:29.445 --> 40:32.282 Operational availability drives mission performance. 40:32.282 --> 40:35.023 And mission performance drives that return on investment. 40:35.023 --> 40:36.404 And that's what the American taxpayer 40:36.404 --> 40:38.359 demands and requires of their Coast Guard. 40:38.359 --> 40:39.192 Thank you. 40:39.260 --> 40:40.850 - [Vice Admiral Moore] Okay, thanks Bruce. 40:40.850 --> 40:44.409 I'm taking copious notes on return on investment here. 40:44.409 --> 40:48.190 Thank God I didn't know that before we retired CV in '65. 40:48.190 --> 40:51.023 (audience laughs) 40:51.093 --> 40:51.962 And thanks for clarifying 40:51.962 --> 40:54.008 that it is possible two have two midlifes. 40:54.008 --> 40:56.359 I was just trying to do the math on that. 40:56.359 --> 40:57.574 I would also note for the record 40:57.574 --> 40:59.229 that the Coast Guard was the first person 40:59.229 --> 41:02.979 to bring up the new casino in Washington, DC. 41:03.468 --> 41:04.468 Okay, sorry. 41:05.762 --> 41:09.608 So we're also glad to have our ultimate customer here, 41:09.608 --> 41:10.441 the fleet. 41:10.441 --> 41:11.387 And so I'd like to turn it over 41:11.387 --> 41:12.470 to Rear-Admiral Mark Whitney, 41:12.470 --> 41:15.778 who is the N43 working for Admiral Davidson. 41:15.778 --> 41:16.872 Mark, over to you. 41:16.872 --> 41:18.451 - Good afternoon everybody. 41:18.451 --> 41:19.412 Thanks for the opportunity 41:19.412 --> 41:22.381 to come and give you the fleet perspective. 41:22.381 --> 41:25.400 And so, throughout this conference already, 41:25.400 --> 41:26.461 you've heard from Admiral Rowden, 41:26.461 --> 41:27.545 you've heard from the Vice Chief, 41:27.545 --> 41:29.034 you've heard from SECNAV. 41:29.034 --> 41:32.059 I believe my boss is gonna be talking at the banquet dinner. 41:32.059 --> 41:34.751 So I'm not gonna presuppose the fleet perspective. 41:34.751 --> 41:35.584 So I'm gonna give you 41:35.584 --> 41:38.173 the fleet maintenance officer perspective. 41:38.173 --> 41:40.652 So, quite simply, it comes down to the fact 41:40.652 --> 41:42.638 that there's a reason why maintenance 41:42.638 --> 41:44.888 is the first phase of OFRP. 41:48.241 --> 41:50.972 Accomplishing the maintenance and modernization 41:50.972 --> 41:54.088 right up front, right at the very beginning, 41:54.088 --> 41:57.211 is what sets our sailors up for success 41:57.211 --> 42:00.726 throughout their training workups and deployment. 42:00.726 --> 42:02.643 You have to start there 42:02.859 --> 42:06.942 in order to get to success at the end in mission. 42:07.053 --> 42:11.220 So the title of this was also tied to delivering on time. 42:11.928 --> 42:15.761 So, delivering the right maintenance to a ship 42:16.081 --> 42:19.581 gives the sailors the trust in their ship. 42:20.029 --> 42:22.385 Delivering the right modernization gives them 42:22.385 --> 42:24.855 the tools that we want them to have 42:24.855 --> 42:28.821 to pace the threat while they're out on deployment. 42:28.821 --> 42:31.270 Delivering all of that on time gives them 42:31.270 --> 42:33.942 the training opportunity to then figure out 42:33.942 --> 42:36.921 how to win and fight and fight through, 42:36.921 --> 42:40.338 hopefully not when they're on deployment. 42:40.523 --> 42:43.960 So this is all about giving them the right tools, 42:43.960 --> 42:45.877 the right capabilities, 42:46.421 --> 42:50.543 the right opportunities to be successful on deployment. 42:50.543 --> 42:51.482 What we've all seen, though, 42:51.482 --> 42:54.315 is when we do not deliver on time, 42:55.612 --> 42:57.779 we start making tradeoffs. 42:57.793 --> 42:59.932 And in most cases, some of that risk 42:59.932 --> 43:03.515 has always been taken in the training time. 43:04.183 --> 43:08.086 Not without understanding what those risks are, 43:08.086 --> 43:09.353 but that's something that, 43:09.353 --> 43:12.550 as we continue to see the change in the demand 43:12.550 --> 43:14.455 for the fleet and the mission sets 43:14.455 --> 43:16.786 that the fleet is gonna have to be facing, 43:16.786 --> 43:20.780 sometimes those risks are gonna now be unacceptable. 43:20.780 --> 43:21.613 So that's something 43:21.613 --> 43:23.750 that we're gonna have to all think about. 43:23.750 --> 43:26.158 So, as I've listened to my peers here 43:26.158 --> 43:28.417 and the panelists talk about it, 43:28.417 --> 43:31.615 and you may hear my boss talk about it, 43:31.615 --> 43:34.532 readiness, capability, and capacity 43:35.222 --> 43:37.972 are inextricably linked together. 43:38.472 --> 43:41.760 We have historically viewed them as separate silos 43:41.760 --> 43:44.431 and have paid attention to them somewhat independently. 43:44.431 --> 43:46.198 We'll put a little here in readiness. 43:46.198 --> 43:48.549 We'll take a little bit away from capability. 43:48.549 --> 43:51.299 Or we'll sacrifice some capacity. 43:51.758 --> 43:54.460 In order for us to ultimately be successful, 43:54.460 --> 43:56.189 we're gonna have to do a much better job 43:56.189 --> 43:59.108 at balancing between all three of those. 43:59.108 --> 44:02.790 And the priorities that Admiral Moore spoke to up front, 44:02.790 --> 44:04.748 some of the things that we're working on to make sure 44:04.748 --> 44:07.239 that we're clearly articulating, 44:07.239 --> 44:08.859 clearly articulating requirement, 44:08.859 --> 44:10.908 clearly articulating risks, 44:10.908 --> 44:12.606 that's exactly what seniors need 44:12.606 --> 44:15.233 in order to make effective decisions. 44:15.233 --> 44:18.816 So, based on that, I'm ready for questions. 44:18.836 --> 44:19.669 Thank you. 44:21.317 --> 44:23.380 - Okay, so just a couple, 44:23.380 --> 44:24.481 I'll follow up on a couple things. 44:24.481 --> 44:27.051 Then I'll throw some additional thoughts out here 44:27.051 --> 44:28.551 to the panel here. 44:28.601 --> 44:30.596 So, we talked at the beginning 44:30.596 --> 44:33.429 about improvements in productivity 44:33.912 --> 44:35.320 and the CNO and his design 44:35.320 --> 44:36.950 for maintaining maritime superiority. 44:36.950 --> 44:39.216 Talks about high-velocity learning. 44:39.216 --> 44:41.182 Or achieve high-velocity learning. 44:41.182 --> 44:43.409 And it's also in the NAVSEA campaign plan 44:43.409 --> 44:46.127 to create a high-velocity learning environment. 44:46.127 --> 44:48.544 I'd like the panel to address 44:49.553 --> 44:53.107 in each of your respective areas, if you care to, 44:53.107 --> 44:54.670 where you see us going 44:54.670 --> 44:56.475 in terms of high-velocity learning 44:56.475 --> 44:59.198 and how is that philosophy impacting our ability 44:59.198 --> 45:02.118 to train our workforce and get more productive today. 45:02.118 --> 45:05.170 And I'll just throw that open to the panel. 45:05.170 --> 45:08.463 - So I'll talk specific to the public shipyards 45:08.463 --> 45:11.047 in the initiative of high-velocity learning. 45:11.047 --> 45:14.231 It's tied a lot to the investments we've made 45:14.231 --> 45:16.735 in our production workforce training 45:16.735 --> 45:18.776 in these learning centers. 45:18.776 --> 45:21.168 So, high-velocity learning is not just, 45:21.168 --> 45:22.918 "Let's learn faster." 45:23.089 --> 45:25.790 It's also about the method that we use to learn. 45:25.790 --> 45:29.790 It's about understanding how to see the problems 45:30.060 --> 45:34.227 and solve the problems, not just mitigate the problems. 45:35.020 --> 45:37.372 And so the example that we use with our workforce, 45:37.372 --> 45:39.239 who is on the waterfront every day, 45:39.239 --> 45:41.141 looking past things that are in the way 45:41.141 --> 45:44.044 and getting around things that don't work for them, 45:44.044 --> 45:48.094 is instead of driving around the pothole in the street, 45:48.094 --> 45:50.487 fix the pothole so the person that comes behind you 45:50.487 --> 45:53.739 doesn't have to land in it or drive around it too. 45:53.739 --> 45:56.723 My workforce lives in an environment 45:56.723 --> 46:00.021 where there are inefficiencies is all around us. 46:00.021 --> 46:02.554 And they have learned over years 46:02.554 --> 46:04.745 to work around those inefficiencies. 46:04.745 --> 46:07.911 So we are teaching them how to be vocal 46:07.911 --> 46:10.958 and identify to us what's not working for them, 46:10.958 --> 46:12.859 what processes are not working for them, 46:12.859 --> 46:14.970 what policies are getting in their way. 46:14.970 --> 46:17.104 Whatever it is, bring it to me, 46:17.104 --> 46:19.948 and I will work on removing that thing 46:19.948 --> 46:22.671 that's getting in the way of us being productive. 46:22.671 --> 46:26.004 Another aspect of high-velocity learning 46:26.319 --> 46:29.739 is how quickly we are sharing best practices 46:29.739 --> 46:33.181 and lessons learned across the industrial base. 46:33.181 --> 46:37.025 Not just public shipyards, across the entire command, 46:37.025 --> 46:40.141 across each enterprise, across the Navy, 46:40.141 --> 46:42.295 across the Department of Defense, 46:42.295 --> 46:45.578 and in some cases across all of the agencies. 46:45.578 --> 46:48.453 'Cause there's commonality in a lot of what we do, 46:48.453 --> 46:50.987 whether we're maintaining tanks, 46:50.987 --> 46:53.594 maintaining aircraft, maintaining ships. 46:53.594 --> 46:57.108 And we are not learning from each other fast enough 46:57.108 --> 46:59.775 to get up in front of the curve. 47:04.797 --> 47:06.130 - Yes, thanks for the question, Sir. 47:06.130 --> 47:09.297 Speaking for the private side of this, 47:09.530 --> 47:12.901 and I probably failed to recognize in my opening remarks, 47:12.901 --> 47:17.068 my main partners here are all of our private shipyards. 47:17.407 --> 47:19.469 They operate in an extreme 47:19.469 --> 47:22.469 high-velocity environment right now. 47:22.496 --> 47:24.512 The environment I put them in is, 47:24.512 --> 47:28.227 they get contracts awarded at about A minus 60, 47:28.227 --> 47:31.383 60 days before starting the availability. 47:31.383 --> 47:34.966 And that's the goal, to get it to 60 to 90. 47:35.822 --> 47:39.572 So, to allow them to be a bit more effective, 47:40.268 --> 47:44.018 and to effect the material flow in that work, 47:44.422 --> 47:48.005 I've got to double that award at a minimum. 47:48.737 --> 47:52.237 So, to leverage the velocity that's there, 47:52.362 --> 47:55.533 I've got to improve on the award cycle. 47:55.533 --> 47:58.533 On the planning for the maintenance, 47:58.822 --> 48:02.405 from really our core force multiplier here, 48:04.687 --> 48:08.687 the sailors on the ship and sailors in the RMCs, 48:09.612 --> 48:12.535 we have a really significant training program, 48:12.535 --> 48:16.197 the NAMPS program, underway, does the eye-level maintenance 48:16.197 --> 48:17.852 to a significant degree. 48:17.852 --> 48:21.233 It really does the teach a man to fish issue. 48:21.233 --> 48:24.880 They teach the sailors how to properly prepare their CSMPs 48:24.880 --> 48:27.079 and how to maintain their equipment. 48:27.079 --> 48:30.329 So, I've got to continue on that effort 48:30.929 --> 48:33.497 and pick up the pace there a bit 48:33.497 --> 48:37.497 so that we get as far in advance quality package 48:37.985 --> 48:42.152 that comes in from what the crew knows about the ship. 48:42.534 --> 48:45.784 The other area to effect HVL really is, 48:47.049 --> 48:50.855 we have a long way to go on our IT infrastructure 48:50.855 --> 48:54.594 for the work we do together, the work we share, 48:54.594 --> 48:57.965 or the terabytes and terabytes of data that we all have 48:57.965 --> 49:01.757 about what has occurred in the availabilities. 49:01.757 --> 49:05.924 That is, we have a mountain to climb there, to be candid. 49:06.015 --> 49:09.298 There have been some improvements in recent years. 49:09.298 --> 49:12.673 But all the right parties don't have access 49:12.673 --> 49:14.907 to all of the right information. 49:14.907 --> 49:16.574 Therefore, the analysis hasn't been done 49:16.574 --> 49:20.381 to figure out how we go quicker with that information. 49:20.381 --> 49:23.932 So, a couple of areas that we need to work on there. 49:23.932 --> 49:24.765 But I'll say again 49:24.765 --> 49:26.733 that the training related to the sailor piece 49:26.733 --> 49:29.983 is really on a positive path right now, 49:30.662 --> 49:32.854 a fivefold increase in the throughput 49:32.854 --> 49:36.870 of the trailers and training in the last five years. 49:36.870 --> 49:40.203 - So, from a warfare center perspective, 49:41.362 --> 49:45.529 I've been amazed here the last, I want to say six months, 49:46.727 --> 49:48.639 so talking about IT systems, 49:48.639 --> 49:52.667 so I don't know if many of you are familiar with Infusion, 49:52.667 --> 49:54.667 a tool that was actually 49:58.272 --> 50:01.105 a SPAWAR tool that NAVSEA piloted, 50:03.261 --> 50:05.195 at least at the warfare center up at Newport 50:05.195 --> 50:07.174 about three or four months ago. 50:07.174 --> 50:11.244 And speaking of how, this is a generational thing too, 50:11.244 --> 50:15.411 so the millennials, and when you look at a warfare center 50:15.936 --> 50:18.765 at least in the undersea warfare center, 50:18.765 --> 50:20.795 about five, six, 7,000 folks, 50:20.795 --> 50:23.078 but you combine all the warfare centers, 50:23.078 --> 50:27.245 and we're up at 20,000, workforce of about 20,000 folks. 50:27.272 --> 50:29.280 And you look at the percentage of millennials, 50:29.280 --> 50:31.811 and honestly it took off like fire. 50:31.811 --> 50:33.644 So I kind of liken it, 50:35.852 --> 50:37.974 if the older generation gets out of the way, 50:37.974 --> 50:39.997 the younger generation will figure out 50:39.997 --> 50:41.757 how to do high-velocity learning. 50:41.757 --> 50:43.579 So we actually have a tool in place now 50:43.579 --> 50:45.755 that has actually grown pretty well 50:45.755 --> 50:48.088 amongst the warfare centers. 50:48.240 --> 50:52.000 So it's first a tool that allows the government 50:52.000 --> 50:54.891 within the government lifeline to do a Wiki. 50:54.891 --> 50:57.058 So you've got a Wiki page. 50:57.296 --> 50:59.729 And I've never used Wiki really other 50:59.729 --> 51:02.700 than Googling for something and Wikipedia shows up. 51:02.700 --> 51:05.272 But the younger generation knows how to use this stuff. 51:05.272 --> 51:06.105 And chat. 51:06.379 --> 51:10.302 And the young lady up at Newport that actually showed me 51:10.302 --> 51:14.469 how this tool worked, it was amazing how energetic she was. 51:16.342 --> 51:18.830 And she gave me an example of a project 51:18.830 --> 51:20.364 that she was working on. 51:20.364 --> 51:22.829 And she tried to go within the division 51:22.829 --> 51:24.871 to find an answer to a specific problem. 51:24.871 --> 51:26.517 And no one really knew the answer. 51:26.517 --> 51:29.547 And she put something out on Infusion 51:29.547 --> 51:32.239 and within an hour she had a response 51:32.239 --> 51:34.825 from somewhere across the United States 51:34.825 --> 51:36.684 working in a different warfare center. 51:36.684 --> 51:38.786 So I think we have a long way to go. 51:38.786 --> 51:42.953 But Infusion is a tool at least the warfare centers can use 51:43.630 --> 51:46.880 to help in that high-velocity learning. 51:50.294 --> 51:51.721 - You know, when it comes to high-velocity learning, 51:51.721 --> 51:54.955 what we've found is, it's all about repetition 51:54.955 --> 51:56.329 and going down the learning curve. 51:56.329 --> 51:57.852 And this is frankly something we learned 51:57.852 --> 51:59.852 from the private sector. 52:00.002 --> 52:02.309 New build, it's about the learning curve 52:02.309 --> 52:06.177 and the power that learning curve gives you with repetition. 52:06.177 --> 52:07.790 Historically at the Coast Guard yard, 52:07.790 --> 52:09.707 we've got our own yard, 52:09.873 --> 52:13.381 the ship would go in there and it would have a budget set. 52:13.381 --> 52:15.514 And they would work till they ran out of money. 52:15.514 --> 52:16.846 And then it would go back out. 52:16.846 --> 52:18.217 So then the next ship would go in, 52:18.217 --> 52:20.438 do similar work at the same budget. 52:20.438 --> 52:21.893 And they would work. 52:21.893 --> 52:22.726 They would run out of money. 52:22.726 --> 52:23.580 Then it would go out. 52:23.580 --> 52:25.362 And so then when you looked at that, you'd say, 52:25.362 --> 52:27.773 "We have a zero learning curve at the Coast Guard yard." 52:27.773 --> 52:31.411 Because they would just work until they were out of money. 52:31.411 --> 52:32.761 Then the next would come in. 52:32.761 --> 52:33.896 So we did a couple of things. 52:33.896 --> 52:35.959 One, we started treating the yard 52:35.959 --> 52:38.626 as a contractor, as fixed scope. 52:38.817 --> 52:40.348 You've got the fixed scope. 52:40.348 --> 52:42.598 And the ship goes in there. 52:42.653 --> 52:45.287 And then when that scope is done, the ship leaves out. 52:45.287 --> 52:49.224 So we expect to see reduced labor hours on each one. 52:49.224 --> 52:50.236 The other thing we did is, 52:50.236 --> 52:53.881 the work that we're giving the yard is repetitive in nature. 52:53.881 --> 52:55.723 They're doing all of our midlifes. 52:55.723 --> 52:56.597 So we're doing midlifes 52:56.597 --> 52:58.897 to 140-foot ice-breaking tugs right now. 52:58.897 --> 53:00.430 They're doing all nine of them. 53:00.430 --> 53:01.581 And we're seeing learning curves 53:01.581 --> 53:03.458 between the first one, the second one, the third one. 53:03.458 --> 53:06.626 We're doing the same thing with the 225-foot buoy tenders. 53:06.626 --> 53:09.353 The 175-foot buoy tenders will be right behind. 53:09.353 --> 53:12.703 But the idea is to use the work at the yard 53:12.703 --> 53:14.995 that goes on over and over and over 53:14.995 --> 53:18.695 and take the advantages of that learning curve. 53:18.695 --> 53:20.537 Not just send it out to a commercial yard, 53:20.537 --> 53:22.092 to nine different commercial yards 53:22.092 --> 53:25.797 and suffer the first in class or the first availability, 53:25.797 --> 53:27.430 the first midlife nine different times. 53:27.430 --> 53:28.970 So we do those at the yard. 53:28.970 --> 53:32.909 The other thing we did is, we took our 87-foot patrol boats, 53:32.909 --> 53:34.826 our small patrol boats. 53:35.237 --> 53:37.515 We've got 69 of those things. 53:37.515 --> 53:39.690 We are always turning those things around. 53:39.690 --> 53:42.235 So we've always got two patrol boats at the yard. 53:42.235 --> 53:45.120 And every 30 days, one of them wraps up. 53:45.120 --> 53:47.078 So we have the same crew that goes from one, 53:47.078 --> 53:48.207 does the overhaul, 53:48.207 --> 53:50.217 moves right to the next one, does the overhaul, 53:50.217 --> 53:51.733 the next one comes in. 53:51.733 --> 53:53.812 So by just, it's a perpetual cycle, 53:53.812 --> 53:55.773 and we're really interested to see 53:55.773 --> 53:57.267 how low we can get that learning curve, 53:57.267 --> 53:59.167 'cause at some point it's gonna taper down. 53:59.167 --> 54:01.932 But it's been really aggressive so far. 54:01.932 --> 54:05.515 And so, we're using the value and the power 54:05.834 --> 54:07.220 of a learning curve 54:07.220 --> 54:09.641 in a government facility is really where we're trying 54:09.641 --> 54:13.641 to put the high-velocity learning into practice. 54:13.730 --> 54:16.084 - So my only comment would be, 54:16.084 --> 54:17.900 I agree with everything that everybody said here, 54:17.900 --> 54:20.994 and the challenge for leadership is to make the status quo 54:20.994 --> 54:24.577 more challenging than trying something new. 54:25.916 --> 54:26.778 Have you heard that? 54:26.778 --> 54:28.038 - I have heard that before. 54:28.038 --> 54:29.538 Yeah, I like that. 54:31.250 --> 54:33.635 Okay, so second thing, and then we'll open up the floor 54:33.635 --> 54:35.205 to anybody who might have questions out there. 54:35.205 --> 54:38.372 So, coming from the acquisition world, 54:39.662 --> 54:42.412 in the new construction industry, 54:42.764 --> 54:44.910 industry often is incentivized 54:44.910 --> 54:47.365 to make investments in their facility, 54:47.365 --> 54:49.712 because it drives the cost of their product down 54:49.712 --> 54:51.174 and therefore makes them more profitable. 54:51.174 --> 54:53.318 Or, by making investments in the facility, 54:53.318 --> 54:54.624 they get more additional work. 54:54.624 --> 54:56.707 For instance, if they add 54:57.122 --> 54:59.474 additional blast and coke facilities, 54:59.474 --> 55:02.141 they might get work on Columbia. 55:03.359 --> 55:05.820 Things like that, we don't have the same similar analogy 55:05.820 --> 55:08.903 over on the repair side of the house, 55:09.513 --> 55:11.233 clearly not in the naval shipyard side, 55:11.233 --> 55:14.174 and probably to a limited extent in the private sector side. 55:14.174 --> 55:16.488 So I'm interested in your thoughts 55:16.488 --> 55:20.655 on what investments need to be made in your particular area 55:21.649 --> 55:24.663 and how we might incentivize the government 55:24.663 --> 55:27.996 to make those investments going forward. 55:32.516 --> 55:35.766 - I'll take that one on first, Admiral. 55:35.779 --> 55:37.222 I'm not sure, how many folks 55:37.222 --> 55:38.896 are here from the private yards? 55:38.896 --> 55:40.979 Can you raise your hands? 55:41.870 --> 55:44.620 A common issue I tend to hear is, 55:45.277 --> 55:49.444 stable predictable work is what benefits us the most. 55:50.538 --> 55:53.912 They tend to not get into the facility issues. 55:53.912 --> 55:57.245 The facility issues are to be competitive 55:57.245 --> 56:00.745 and required that the yard is facilitized. 56:01.634 --> 56:03.230 But I'm sure there are issues there 56:03.230 --> 56:05.814 that we can probably incentivize them 56:05.814 --> 56:08.857 to come forward with what the key areas are. 56:08.857 --> 56:11.607 The theme I get over and over is, 56:12.761 --> 56:16.261 the change within the avail is number two, 56:16.417 --> 56:18.250 but it's year to year. 56:18.328 --> 56:20.745 And a larger incentive there, 56:21.634 --> 56:25.801 very difficult issue to plan with annual appropriations. 56:26.606 --> 56:30.773 We buy the modernization efforts via three-year money. 56:31.062 --> 56:34.376 And that generally works on getting the equipment procured. 56:34.376 --> 56:37.207 And we execute the balance of all that work in the yard 56:37.207 --> 56:38.945 with annual appropriations. 56:38.945 --> 56:42.909 And depends upon how the budget goes for that year. 56:42.909 --> 56:45.411 Very, very hard to meet the requirement 56:45.411 --> 56:46.849 of stable, predictable work 56:46.849 --> 56:49.485 when you couple all of those elements. 56:49.485 --> 56:52.485 I think that's one area that we can, 56:53.800 --> 56:54.968 getting these requirements right 56:54.968 --> 56:57.379 as we go across the 355 number, 56:57.379 --> 57:01.546 I think that will bring a lot of benefits to everybody. 57:03.549 --> 57:07.716 - So, in the public shipyards where we are responsible, 57:09.215 --> 57:11.359 in partnership with CNIC and NAVFAC 57:11.359 --> 57:13.859 for the actual infrastructure, 57:14.186 --> 57:16.503 the investments we need to make and we are making 57:16.503 --> 57:18.894 is in modernizing those facilities. 57:18.894 --> 57:21.114 There are challenges with those facilities 57:21.114 --> 57:22.577 because of how old they are 57:22.577 --> 57:24.734 and the standards that we are required to keep 57:24.734 --> 57:26.886 in each of the geographic regions 57:26.886 --> 57:29.240 working with the local communities. 57:29.240 --> 57:31.655 But we are making those investments 57:31.655 --> 57:35.506 and integrating those big investments and MILCOMs 57:35.506 --> 57:38.195 with the actual work that we're doing on a waterfront. 57:38.195 --> 57:40.635 So we need to continue doing that. 57:40.635 --> 57:43.684 That gives everybody a safe and modern facility to work in 57:43.684 --> 57:47.851 and allows me to have an opportunity to redo the laydown 57:48.404 --> 57:49.659 so that the flow of work 57:49.659 --> 57:52.659 in our backshops are more effective. 57:53.445 --> 57:57.046 The other areas are in our industrial plan equipment. 57:57.046 --> 58:00.379 I have some very old, very old equipment 58:01.426 --> 58:03.517 that desperately needs replacing. 58:03.517 --> 58:06.118 And we compete for those dollars inside Navy, 58:06.118 --> 58:08.201 just like everybody else. 58:08.554 --> 58:12.304 So my ability to offer return on investments. 58:12.914 --> 58:16.081 When I can put in 3D-imaging equipment 58:17.440 --> 58:19.850 where I can automatically give that information 58:19.850 --> 58:23.267 to another tool that can, with precision, 58:24.193 --> 58:26.443 do the pipe-bending for me, 58:26.816 --> 58:30.055 where I get first-time fit up correctly for shipboard, 58:30.055 --> 58:31.735 that's where I need to go. 58:31.735 --> 58:34.735 Where I can take out of my backshops 58:34.990 --> 58:37.823 the hand-cutting, gasket, O-moles, 58:39.205 --> 58:40.773 wooden moles we used to use 58:40.773 --> 58:44.940 and replace that with automatic digital cutting machines, 58:45.274 --> 58:47.443 taking a three-and-a-half-day job 58:47.443 --> 58:50.193 down to three-and-a-half minutes, 58:50.454 --> 58:53.512 that's the immediate return on investment I need to make. 58:53.512 --> 58:55.658 I need to get this workforce, 58:55.658 --> 58:59.531 with help from industry and academic community, 58:59.531 --> 59:03.698 and how to use not just the exoskeleton technology 59:04.498 --> 59:08.665 but robotic technology that can get in confined spaces, 59:09.585 --> 59:12.418 that can do welding in tight areas 59:12.446 --> 59:15.895 and get me first-time quality all the time, 59:15.895 --> 59:18.906 eliminating some of the uncomfortable environments 59:18.906 --> 59:20.656 that I put people in, 59:20.726 --> 59:24.143 and to some extent, or to a large extent, 59:24.793 --> 59:26.013 getting to first-time quality, 59:26.013 --> 59:28.011 eliminating some of the human error 59:28.011 --> 59:30.927 that is just indigenous in the work that we do. 59:30.927 --> 59:32.503 So those are just a few examples 59:32.503 --> 59:36.253 of where we could take some investments today 59:37.588 --> 59:38.528 in the infrastructure 59:38.528 --> 59:42.695 and what the return on those investments would be. 59:42.957 --> 59:44.009 - It was great to hear you say "return on investment", 59:44.009 --> 59:47.134 'cause that's how we use it, we sell it. 59:47.134 --> 59:50.271 If you can demonstrate the return on investment, 59:50.271 --> 59:52.688 and the maintenance pays back 59:53.161 --> 59:55.277 in terms of operational availability, 59:55.277 --> 59:57.026 then it sells and it sells itself. 59:57.026 --> 01:00:01.193 And we're able to get the funding to facilitate our yard. 01:00:02.758 --> 01:00:06.677 - Okay, with that we'll open up the floor to any questions 01:00:06.677 --> 01:00:08.677 that anybody might have. 01:00:11.600 --> 01:00:13.936 - [Questioner] Pat Piercey, SURFLANT. 01:00:13.936 --> 01:00:17.285 So, I want to first thank the maintenance community, 01:00:17.285 --> 01:00:18.696 because I've been the benefactor 01:00:18.696 --> 01:00:20.326 of what our professionals have done 01:00:20.326 --> 01:00:22.636 in our public and private shipyards, 01:00:22.636 --> 01:00:24.703 complex overhaul, two years, 01:00:24.703 --> 01:00:26.445 inactivation of a CGN, 01:00:26.445 --> 01:00:29.362 ROH on a cruiser, SRA on a cruiser, 01:00:30.021 --> 01:00:33.002 a cruiser modernization, a DP on a carrier, 01:00:33.002 --> 01:00:35.835 and a P on a carrier, all on time. 01:00:36.483 --> 01:00:39.464 So, as we're working together as a team, 01:00:39.464 --> 01:00:43.602 I want to be able to go and say to the young officers here, 01:00:43.602 --> 01:00:47.308 when they come back and they say 10, 20 years down the road, 01:00:47.308 --> 01:00:49.532 "I've had the same experience, all on time." 01:00:49.532 --> 01:00:52.541 So what is it that the fleet, the waterfront, 01:00:52.541 --> 01:00:56.121 what can the waterfront do as part of the team here 01:00:56.121 --> 01:00:57.951 to get us to where we want to be: 01:00:57.951 --> 01:01:00.951 on time or earlier and under budget? 01:01:06.542 --> 01:01:08.221 - Thanks for the question, Pat. 01:01:08.221 --> 01:01:10.191 And great to see you here. 01:01:10.191 --> 01:01:11.986 We usually are discussing other things 01:01:11.986 --> 01:01:14.069 than these nice pleasant, 01:01:14.441 --> 01:01:16.695 we're talking about how we get boilers finished 01:01:16.695 --> 01:01:18.377 on Kearsarge or Wasp. 01:01:18.377 --> 01:01:21.658 Now, I can't say, not because we're in a public forum, 01:01:21.658 --> 01:01:25.658 what a great teammate and leader the admiral is. 01:01:25.834 --> 01:01:27.667 Great, great community. 01:01:27.667 --> 01:01:30.084 You know, one thing I do say, 01:01:31.342 --> 01:01:34.810 and it goes to some of my deficiencies in planning, 01:01:34.810 --> 01:01:36.855 I do generally tend to hear, 01:01:36.855 --> 01:01:39.345 "Hey, things got added by the port engineer." 01:01:39.345 --> 01:01:42.762 Or, "There was not a great quality CSMP." 01:01:43.308 --> 01:01:45.571 My response back to my team is, well, 01:01:45.571 --> 01:01:48.357 if we've heard about that 50 times over, 01:01:48.357 --> 01:01:51.746 why wasn't there a reservation over in the planning process 01:01:51.746 --> 01:01:52.996 to handle that? 01:01:53.430 --> 01:01:56.763 So, some of those common late-add issues 01:01:57.247 --> 01:02:00.181 more in the maintenance area always need work. 01:02:00.181 --> 01:02:03.352 But it does not seem to be a major perturbation 01:02:03.352 --> 01:02:04.950 of what we're doing. 01:02:04.950 --> 01:02:08.033 And I also say, nor does there appear 01:02:08.291 --> 01:02:11.708 to be major perturbations in the baseline 01:02:12.031 --> 01:02:14.634 to meet the fleet commander's baseline requirements 01:02:14.634 --> 01:02:15.884 for the threat. 01:02:17.335 --> 01:02:20.415 I will say there are a lot of hands in the mix 01:02:20.415 --> 01:02:24.279 in putting the contract, or the work package, together. 01:02:24.279 --> 01:02:25.112 I do see that, 01:02:25.112 --> 01:02:27.638 whether they're small changes or large changes, 01:02:27.638 --> 01:02:29.022 there are many different levels. 01:02:29.022 --> 01:02:30.573 And you sit there as a flag officer, 01:02:30.573 --> 01:02:32.032 you think you're in charge of all of it, 01:02:32.032 --> 01:02:34.112 and you find out you're in charge of none of it. 01:02:34.112 --> 01:02:36.857 About 16 different people wrote jobs in 01:02:36.857 --> 01:02:38.711 two weeks before we awarded the contract. 01:02:38.711 --> 01:02:41.478 So I think we all need to work harder together 01:02:41.478 --> 01:02:45.645 on visibility and configuration management on that baseline 01:02:46.134 --> 01:02:50.301 and adhering to the baseline in executing the plan. 01:02:53.154 --> 01:02:54.757 - Yes Sir, over here. 01:02:54.757 --> 01:02:55.593 - [Questioner] Good afternoon. 01:02:55.593 --> 01:02:56.426 I'm Mark Kipps. 01:02:56.426 --> 01:02:59.071 I'm here from Bremerton, Washington, 01:02:59.071 --> 01:03:01.515 home to the largest naval shipyard. 01:03:01.515 --> 01:03:03.265 Ms. Moot, I represent 01:03:03.857 --> 01:03:07.190 the Puget Sound Ship Repair Association. 01:03:07.388 --> 01:03:09.805 And I'm asking this question, 01:03:10.289 --> 01:03:13.269 really it was teed up for me by Admiral Downey. 01:03:13.269 --> 01:03:17.359 So this is probably mostly for Admiral Downey and Ms. Smoot, 01:03:17.359 --> 01:03:19.776 and possibly Admiral Whitney. 01:03:21.687 --> 01:03:23.626 We've heard over and over at several forums, 01:03:23.626 --> 01:03:24.459 this one included, 01:03:24.459 --> 01:03:27.992 that the naval shipyards are very stressed. 01:03:27.992 --> 01:03:30.992 We have a process now with industry. 01:03:31.157 --> 01:03:34.074 Navy's meeting regularly with CNRMC 01:03:34.617 --> 01:03:37.390 to talk about things like workload for private sector 01:03:37.390 --> 01:03:41.140 and how do you keep a robust industrial base. 01:03:41.613 --> 01:03:43.106 But the question that occurred to me 01:03:43.106 --> 01:03:45.625 at our meeting with Admiral Downey on Tuesday 01:03:45.625 --> 01:03:47.961 was that, in a port like ours, 01:03:47.961 --> 01:03:50.104 wherein the naval shipyard's very large, 01:03:50.104 --> 01:03:52.664 private sector is relatively small. 01:03:52.664 --> 01:03:53.649 And we will go through periods 01:03:53.649 --> 01:03:56.288 where we know the naval shipyard is struggling 01:03:56.288 --> 01:03:58.072 to get their workload accomplished, 01:03:58.072 --> 01:04:01.989 yet the private sector is in dire need of work. 01:04:02.448 --> 01:04:04.426 And I'm wondering what we might be able to do, 01:04:04.426 --> 01:04:07.042 what your thoughts are on what we might be able to do 01:04:07.042 --> 01:04:10.197 to find a more holistic way to look at 01:04:10.197 --> 01:04:11.764 both the private sector workload, 01:04:11.764 --> 01:04:13.536 the shipyard workload. 01:04:13.536 --> 01:04:17.703 Take the work, compare it to the graphs that CNRMC produces, 01:04:19.524 --> 01:04:21.913 and could we get earlier into discussions 01:04:21.913 --> 01:04:26.080 on where the private sector could help the naval shipyard 01:04:26.193 --> 01:04:28.610 with their workload problems. 01:04:30.895 --> 01:04:35.062 - Thank you for that question and good to see you again. 01:04:35.628 --> 01:04:38.123 I would tell you just to keep the dialogue open 01:04:38.123 --> 01:04:41.040 in each port that we're working in. 01:04:42.140 --> 01:04:44.511 The workload graphs, both public and private, 01:04:44.511 --> 01:04:46.401 are important for us to assess, 01:04:46.401 --> 01:04:49.654 understanding where there is capacity and capability 01:04:49.654 --> 01:04:53.821 and what contracts are available for all of our partners 01:04:54.146 --> 01:04:56.396 to compete on is important. 01:04:58.606 --> 01:05:02.023 We make our workload needs known by port. 01:05:04.423 --> 01:05:07.930 And we use the contracting process to identify 01:05:07.930 --> 01:05:11.977 what workforce or work we're looking for help on. 01:05:11.977 --> 01:05:15.394 But keep talking to us about what you see 01:05:15.723 --> 01:05:18.806 in your profile or your business base 01:05:18.873 --> 01:05:20.799 of work ebbing and flowing 01:05:20.799 --> 01:05:24.205 as I'm aware it is doing in multiple ports. 01:05:24.205 --> 01:05:27.182 And we'll keep working together to see if we can stabilize. 01:05:27.182 --> 01:05:29.432 It's for all of our benefit 01:05:29.576 --> 01:05:32.609 to have predictable, stable requirements. 01:05:32.609 --> 01:05:35.543 We need you there and we're thankful 01:05:35.543 --> 01:05:38.751 that we have that industry in Bremerton 01:05:38.751 --> 01:05:42.001 supporting topside work on carriers now 01:05:42.202 --> 01:05:44.869 and as they are in several ports 01:05:45.044 --> 01:05:47.504 that we have carriers home-ported. 01:05:47.504 --> 01:05:50.451 There are a few other limitations on what workforce, 01:05:50.451 --> 01:05:52.094 what industry I can bring in 01:05:52.094 --> 01:05:54.862 and how much work I can do on nuclear submarines. 01:05:54.862 --> 01:05:59.029 But our nuclear carriers, we're all in it together. 01:05:59.144 --> 01:06:00.727 - [Mark] Thank you. 01:06:01.927 --> 01:06:02.760 - [Questioner] Good afternoon. 01:06:02.760 --> 01:06:03.662 Captain Sean Kerns. 01:06:03.662 --> 01:06:07.412 I'm the PRECOM XO of Michael Monsoor DDG 1001 01:06:08.353 --> 01:06:10.038 not a shipbuilding question really. 01:06:10.038 --> 01:06:13.015 Just in discussions with peers on the waterfront 01:06:13.015 --> 01:06:15.579 who either are in the midst of avails 01:06:15.579 --> 01:06:17.579 or coming out of avails. 01:06:18.040 --> 01:06:19.603 And I think this may somewhat relate 01:06:19.603 --> 01:06:21.853 to the well-known challenge 01:06:22.814 --> 01:06:24.696 that we're facing in industry with the departure 01:06:24.696 --> 01:06:28.363 of a highly experienced but aging work force 01:06:28.389 --> 01:06:31.918 and a generation of sailors that are getting out 01:06:31.918 --> 01:06:34.918 that didn't grow up in a SIMA world. 01:06:36.723 --> 01:06:40.239 That one of the drivers pushing ships beyond deadlines, 01:06:40.239 --> 01:06:43.322 unavails, is rework, not growth work. 01:06:43.399 --> 01:06:47.066 And I wonder what your thoughts are on that. 01:06:50.297 --> 01:06:51.130 - Good to see you. 01:06:51.130 --> 01:06:52.547 How's 1001 doing? 01:06:52.704 --> 01:06:53.704 - [Sean] The crew's doing great Sir. 01:06:53.704 --> 01:06:55.162 - Awesome, awesome. 01:06:55.162 --> 01:06:59.329 So we're talking rework of ships in service, right? 01:06:59.560 --> 01:07:00.977 - [Sean] Yes Sir. 01:07:01.486 --> 01:07:04.486 - Well, and I'll ask Sharon as well. 01:07:06.323 --> 01:07:08.490 I don't see a lot of that. 01:07:10.127 --> 01:07:11.329 I'm coming out of, folks, 01:07:11.329 --> 01:07:13.287 about a decade of new construction. 01:07:13.287 --> 01:07:16.757 I don't see much of that at all on the in-service side. 01:07:16.757 --> 01:07:20.924 I do see, in unique cases, some procedural issues, 01:07:22.717 --> 01:07:26.884 in whether we have done the preps to go to the next phase 01:07:27.014 --> 01:07:30.816 of the execution, but I'm not seeing a lot of rework. 01:07:30.816 --> 01:07:34.983 It shows me that the yards are learning within the yard, 01:07:37.021 --> 01:07:39.854 and they're executing that effort. 01:07:40.258 --> 01:07:44.425 So I will tell you, I don't have huge rework numbers. 01:07:44.612 --> 01:07:48.342 My numbers are really in the growth and new work area. 01:07:48.342 --> 01:07:50.695 - So I would agree with that comment. 01:07:50.695 --> 01:07:54.095 While we do track that, both from industry, 01:07:54.095 --> 01:07:56.397 the public shipyard and ship's force, 01:07:56.397 --> 01:07:58.220 when we're executing maintenance, 01:07:58.220 --> 01:08:01.961 it's not the largest part of things that I'm wrestling with. 01:08:01.961 --> 01:08:05.804 Ensuring that we understand the material condition 01:08:05.804 --> 01:08:07.226 of the ship coming in, 01:08:07.226 --> 01:08:09.001 meaning what we have identified as CSMP, 01:08:09.001 --> 01:08:11.929 what you know is working right or what's not working right. 01:08:11.929 --> 01:08:13.542 And we have that covered 01:08:13.542 --> 01:08:16.723 when we're doing the work definition period, 01:08:16.723 --> 01:08:18.640 a part of our planning. 01:08:18.810 --> 01:08:21.094 That gives us all the fighting chance 01:08:21.094 --> 01:08:23.832 of getting everything identified as best we can up front 01:08:23.832 --> 01:08:26.415 and integrated into a schedule. 01:08:27.155 --> 01:08:29.738 It happens, and I know we have. 01:08:30.315 --> 01:08:31.148 We're all human. 01:08:31.148 --> 01:08:32.565 We make mistakes. 01:08:32.854 --> 01:08:35.754 I'm more concerned about the stuff that breaks 01:08:35.754 --> 01:08:38.647 at the most inopportune time that's driving schedule 01:08:38.647 --> 01:08:40.314 that nobody touched. 01:08:40.918 --> 01:08:43.375 And that's the challenge for the entire community 01:08:43.375 --> 01:08:46.351 to get in front of the predictability of the material, 01:08:46.351 --> 01:08:48.184 condition of the ship. 01:08:48.361 --> 01:08:49.510 The amount of growth work. 01:08:49.510 --> 01:08:52.188 We are getting surprised by that sometimes. 01:08:52.188 --> 01:08:53.666 Our ships are aging. 01:08:53.666 --> 01:08:55.433 I'll just take off the table 01:08:55.433 --> 01:08:56.666 that our workforce is not aging. 01:08:56.666 --> 01:09:00.083 We are all standing still, staying young. 01:09:00.956 --> 01:09:05.123 But it's other things that are perturbating the plan 01:09:05.787 --> 01:09:08.287 more than the quality of work. 01:09:09.120 --> 01:09:13.287 There are larger things out there that we need to tackle. 01:09:15.229 --> 01:09:16.284 - I think we have time, unfortunately, 01:09:16.284 --> 01:09:17.267 for only one more question. 01:09:17.267 --> 01:09:19.018 Sir, I think you were next. 01:09:19.018 --> 01:09:21.535 - [Questioner] Matt McLachlan with Rolls-Royce Services. 01:09:21.535 --> 01:09:24.409 I applaud the return to focus on on-time availabilities. 01:09:24.409 --> 01:09:26.420 I remember a time when it was the norm. 01:09:26.420 --> 01:09:29.201 And there's a lot of things that can derail 01:09:29.201 --> 01:09:30.788 an availability schedule. 01:09:30.788 --> 01:09:34.955 A couple of those are an incorrect or incomplete work spec, 01:09:35.832 --> 01:09:39.999 PCP, duration to getting PCPs correct and approved, 01:09:41.283 --> 01:09:43.323 process control procedures, 01:09:43.323 --> 01:09:46.156 and longer lead time on materials. 01:09:46.866 --> 01:09:49.543 In the early days of the cruiser program, 01:09:49.543 --> 01:09:50.962 the Navy made an investment 01:09:50.962 --> 01:09:53.782 in the AEGIS Common Equipment Warehouse, 01:09:53.782 --> 01:09:57.179 which main focus was to mitigate risk duration 01:09:57.179 --> 01:09:58.762 for availabilities. 01:09:59.380 --> 01:10:02.651 Over the years, the Burke class and the San Antonio class 01:10:02.651 --> 01:10:04.610 leveraged those class-common equipments 01:10:04.610 --> 01:10:07.527 through the private planning yards, 01:10:07.560 --> 01:10:08.488 but the focus moved away 01:10:08.488 --> 01:10:11.568 from maintenance availability duration 01:10:11.568 --> 01:10:13.568 to kitting for material. 01:10:13.584 --> 01:10:17.751 Is there any constituency on the part of the service 01:10:18.042 --> 01:10:19.792 to review that model, 01:10:20.578 --> 01:10:23.915 stage the equipment that we know we're gonna need, 01:10:23.915 --> 01:10:24.975 particularly now with the move back 01:10:24.975 --> 01:10:27.225 to fixed-price environment. 01:10:28.396 --> 01:10:30.663 Second part of the question is, 01:10:30.663 --> 01:10:32.374 and probably second and third, 01:10:32.374 --> 01:10:36.541 is there any intent to leverage the expertise of major OEMs 01:10:38.113 --> 01:10:41.401 in getting process control procedures right the first time, 01:10:41.401 --> 01:10:44.852 as well as reviewing class-standard work templates 01:10:44.852 --> 01:10:46.788 and/or specific work specifications 01:10:46.788 --> 01:10:48.992 to make sure that they're correct 01:10:48.992 --> 01:10:50.321 from a configuration standpoint, 01:10:50.321 --> 01:10:53.238 get the right parts the first time. 01:10:53.244 --> 01:10:55.860 - Okay, is there a fourth and fifth part to the question? 01:10:55.860 --> 01:10:56.693 (audience laughs) 01:10:56.693 --> 01:10:59.237 I just want to check before I get started here. 01:10:59.237 --> 01:11:02.037 So your question on material management is the key. 01:11:02.037 --> 01:11:03.459 I think anybody that's been through an availability 01:11:03.459 --> 01:11:05.919 would know that part of having the right plan 01:11:05.919 --> 01:11:07.904 is having the right material in place. 01:11:07.904 --> 01:11:10.967 I do think, you know, the AEGIS model is a good one. 01:11:10.967 --> 01:11:13.935 The submarines over the year through to TRIPER program 01:11:13.935 --> 01:11:16.799 on the boomers has been something that's been successful, 01:11:16.799 --> 01:11:19.185 the longer aircraft carrier availabilities through CARPER. 01:11:19.185 --> 01:11:22.949 So we are looking at opportunities to do that, 01:11:22.949 --> 01:11:24.125 to kind of resurrect some of that 01:11:24.125 --> 01:11:27.003 that does require a little bit of investment up front. 01:11:27.003 --> 01:11:30.397 The other thing is, we've gotten some experts in 01:11:30.397 --> 01:11:33.146 to kind of look at material management workflow 01:11:33.146 --> 01:11:34.562 both in the naval shipyards, for instance, 01:11:34.562 --> 01:11:36.828 we know that's an area that causes work stoppage 01:11:36.828 --> 01:11:37.972 in the middle. 01:11:37.972 --> 01:11:41.450 And finally the last thing is, there's a concerted effort. 01:11:41.450 --> 01:11:43.847 I am now starting to meet with Lieutenant General Bush, 01:11:43.847 --> 01:11:46.014 who's the Director of DLA, 01:11:46.881 --> 01:11:50.887 and try and get DLA and NAVSUB all kind of working together 01:11:50.887 --> 01:11:53.177 so that the supply systems themselves, 01:11:53.177 --> 01:11:56.395 which can be more flexible and more agile 01:11:56.395 --> 01:11:58.311 in the work environments that we're working in today. 01:11:58.311 --> 01:12:00.510 So I think your point's well taken. 01:12:00.510 --> 01:12:02.639 I think we are taking action in that particular area 01:12:02.639 --> 01:12:04.674 to try and drive that investment. 01:12:04.674 --> 01:12:06.231 So I thank you for that question. 01:12:06.231 --> 01:12:09.322 As far as the tech specs and the ECPs, 01:12:09.322 --> 01:12:12.187 we have tried to drive home technical authority 01:12:12.187 --> 01:12:14.187 into NAVSEA headquarters 01:12:14.433 --> 01:12:17.152 and by the standup of the regional maintenance centers 01:12:17.152 --> 01:12:18.621 and really kind of grow those back 01:12:18.621 --> 01:12:20.339 to what was kind of SIMA-like organizations 01:12:20.339 --> 01:12:24.256 that we were used to when you and I were young. 01:12:24.282 --> 01:12:27.452 Those organizations now have waterfront technical expertise 01:12:27.452 --> 01:12:29.309 which allows us to get those specs written 01:12:29.309 --> 01:12:30.746 and negotiated and handled. 01:12:30.746 --> 01:12:32.824 And I think you're starting to see some of that 01:12:32.824 --> 01:12:34.118 pay off up front. 01:12:34.118 --> 01:12:36.191 So thanks for the question. 01:12:36.191 --> 01:12:37.575 So, unfortunately, we've run out of time. 01:12:37.575 --> 01:12:39.760 I'd like to thank the panel today 01:12:39.760 --> 01:12:41.596 for spending time talking to you 01:12:41.596 --> 01:12:43.715 about current readiness and fleet maintenance. 01:12:43.715 --> 01:12:45.721 So we've appreciated the opportunity to talk with you, 01:12:45.721 --> 01:12:47.833 and I'm sure they're available afterwards 01:12:47.833 --> 01:12:48.923 if you'd like to talk to each of one of them 01:12:48.923 --> 01:12:49.786 a little bit further. 01:12:49.786 --> 01:12:50.869 So thank you. 01:12:50.869 --> 01:12:53.869 (audience applauds) 01:12:59.019 --> 01:13:00.646 - Okay, we'll take a couple of minutes here 01:13:00.646 --> 01:13:02.173 to turn over the panels. 01:13:02.173 --> 01:13:04.901 And then we're gonna talk about the comments 01:13:04.901 --> 01:13:07.169 at the end of this that are always furnished 01:13:07.169 --> 01:13:09.836 by our expert outside observers.