WEBVTT 00:01.371 --> 00:03.561 - Okay, Brett, just wanna make sure you can hear us, 00:03.561 --> 00:05.228 and we can hear you. 00:11.729 --> 00:12.981 - I can hear you just fine. 00:12.981 --> 00:14.564 How do you hear me? 00:14.879 --> 00:16.390 - Got you loud and clear. 00:16.390 --> 00:19.341 Just at the outset, for anybody watching on channel two, 00:19.341 --> 00:21.685 I did wanna point out the farewell ceremony 00:21.685 --> 00:22.977 that's taking place right now 00:22.977 --> 00:26.022 for Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James 00:26.022 --> 00:28.265 occurring at Joint Base Andrews 00:28.265 --> 00:30.147 is being live-streamed on a separate channel 00:30.147 --> 00:31.397 on defense.gov. 00:31.857 --> 00:33.591 You can watch it there. 00:33.591 --> 00:35.892 This is being carried in the building here on channel two 00:35.892 --> 00:37.809 as well as also being streamed on a separate channel 00:37.809 --> 00:39.059 on defense.gov. 00:39.443 --> 00:43.543 I'd like to introduce to you Colonel Brett Sylvia. 00:43.543 --> 00:44.491 He's the current commander 00:44.491 --> 00:46.994 of the Second Brigade Combat Team, 00:46.994 --> 00:50.577 101st Airborne Division, Task Force Strike, 00:51.148 --> 00:54.094 which is the roughly 1,700 person unit 00:54.094 --> 00:57.768 responsible for the advise and assist mission in Iraq. 00:57.768 --> 01:00.603 Task Force Strike advisory teams have successfully advised 01:00.603 --> 01:02.851 the Iraqi Security Forces through operations 01:02.851 --> 01:05.434 in Fallujah, Sharqat, Qayyarah, 01:06.017 --> 01:08.471 the occupation of Qayyarah West Airfield, 01:08.471 --> 01:10.477 and they're currently advising during operations 01:10.477 --> 01:11.810 to retake Mosul. 01:12.499 --> 01:13.975 I set that out for you 01:13.975 --> 01:15.291 because I want you to, please, 01:15.291 --> 01:19.458 as you engage in discussion today with Colonel Sylvia, 01:19.823 --> 01:22.359 to keep in mind that's what his role is. 01:22.359 --> 01:23.612 I know we have a lot of other good questions 01:23.612 --> 01:27.410 about things happening in Syria, happening in the skies, 01:27.410 --> 01:29.273 happening with Russia and Turkey and other players. 01:29.273 --> 01:31.494 That's actually not his responsibility, 01:31.494 --> 01:34.707 so I will humbly ask your understanding of that 01:34.707 --> 01:35.874 at the get-go. 01:35.911 --> 01:37.884 We're happy to field those questions for you separately, 01:37.884 --> 01:41.573 either here or with Colonel Dorrian in Baghdad. 01:41.573 --> 01:43.017 Task Force Strike's role is critical 01:43.017 --> 01:44.034 in setting the conditions 01:44.034 --> 01:47.337 for the inevitable military defeat of Iraq, 01:47.337 --> 01:49.587 of ISIS in Iraq, excuse me. 01:49.692 --> 01:53.859 And with that, I'll open it up to you, Colonel Sylvia. 01:59.557 --> 02:00.766 - Good morning. 02:00.766 --> 02:03.017 So, as stated, I'm Colonel Brett G. Sylvia, 02:03.017 --> 02:05.421 the commander of Second Brigade Combat Team 02:05.421 --> 02:08.386 101st Airborne Division, Air Assault. 02:08.386 --> 02:10.170 Here in Operation Inherent Resolve, 02:10.170 --> 02:13.503 I am the commander of Task Force Strike. 02:13.610 --> 02:15.799 We are the one-brigade combat team 02:15.799 --> 02:18.209 deployed forward here in Iraq. 02:18.209 --> 02:19.887 Our primary mission these past nine months 02:19.887 --> 02:22.328 have been to advise and assist 02:22.328 --> 02:24.617 the Iraqi and Kurdish security forces 02:24.617 --> 02:27.617 in the fight to defeat ISIL in Iraq. 02:27.648 --> 02:28.625 I'd like to make a brief statement 02:28.625 --> 02:30.137 about some of the tremendous accomplishments 02:30.137 --> 02:33.619 we've achieved together since our arrival here in May, 02:33.619 --> 02:35.921 and then open it up to your questions. 02:35.921 --> 02:38.835 So, as Lieutenant General Townsend described last month, 02:38.835 --> 02:42.705 2016 has been characterized by the counteroffensive. 02:42.705 --> 02:43.887 Over the course of this year, 02:43.887 --> 02:46.877 this task force found ways to deepen our involvement 02:46.877 --> 02:49.210 with our Iraqi counterparts. 02:49.256 --> 02:52.089 Their success has been our success 02:52.111 --> 02:55.319 as we have been working very closely with one another. 02:55.319 --> 02:56.209 I've gotten many questions 02:56.209 --> 02:58.587 about what the advise and assist mission 02:58.587 --> 03:00.767 actually looks like on the ground. 03:00.767 --> 03:02.873 I'd like to give you a short vignette 03:02.873 --> 03:05.771 to answer this particular question. 03:05.771 --> 03:06.916 We were recently visiting 03:06.916 --> 03:08.656 one of our forward advisory teams 03:08.656 --> 03:12.643 at their joint command post on the outskirts of Mosul. 03:12.643 --> 03:15.974 Captain Dan Fitzgerald and his team advised the commander 03:15.974 --> 03:19.253 of the Iraqi Emergency Response Division. 03:19.253 --> 03:20.586 When we arrived, 03:20.868 --> 03:23.264 they were in the middle of processing a strike. 03:23.264 --> 03:25.276 Inside this small command post, 03:25.276 --> 03:28.566 I saw Iraqi officers and coalition soldiers 03:28.566 --> 03:30.926 huddled around a very small monitor. 03:30.926 --> 03:34.216 The Iraqis were talking on their communication devices 03:34.216 --> 03:35.883 and we were on ours. 03:36.027 --> 03:37.825 They had identified a threat 03:37.825 --> 03:40.325 with a coalition ISR platform, 03:40.462 --> 03:43.042 and together, they were working a strike 03:43.042 --> 03:44.382 to eliminate that threat 03:44.382 --> 03:47.015 before it reached the friendly forces. 03:47.015 --> 03:48.835 The division commander walked in, 03:48.835 --> 03:50.454 verified the threat, 03:50.454 --> 03:52.268 and authorized the strike. 03:52.268 --> 03:54.722 The threat was immediately destroyed. 03:54.722 --> 03:58.025 That is our advise and assist mission in a nutshell. 03:58.025 --> 04:00.935 The Iraqis do the ground maneuver, and we support them 04:00.935 --> 04:03.457 with all the capabilities at our disposal. 04:03.457 --> 04:06.875 We work as one team to accomplish the mission. 04:06.875 --> 04:08.734 We employ this model at various echelons, 04:08.734 --> 04:10.276 from this company commander 04:10.276 --> 04:13.308 all the way to me and my three-star partner. 04:13.308 --> 04:15.223 This model, in my opinion, 04:15.223 --> 04:17.290 has gotten more effective over time 04:17.290 --> 04:20.749 and has yielded greater and greater success. 04:20.749 --> 04:22.463 Over the course of the past nine months, 04:22.463 --> 04:24.938 great things have been accomplished here in Iraq. 04:24.938 --> 04:28.901 It has been our partnership that has achieved these things. 04:28.901 --> 04:31.754 Hundreds of villages and cities have been liberated, 04:31.754 --> 04:35.921 to include Fallujah, Qayyarah, Sharqat, and Qaraqush. 04:36.279 --> 04:37.863 Assistance has been provided 04:37.863 --> 04:40.780 to almost 250,000 displaced persons 04:41.411 --> 04:45.578 and almost 100,000 of these departed their IDP camps 04:45.724 --> 04:47.798 and headed back to their homes. 04:47.798 --> 04:51.482 An assault bridge was put over the Tigris River under fire, 04:51.482 --> 04:53.783 and then three more bridges were constructed 04:53.783 --> 04:56.389 over the Tigris and the Qaza Rivers. 04:56.389 --> 05:00.556 A major airfield was liberated and then restored at Q West, 05:01.046 --> 05:04.185 and we have measurably reduced the effectiveness 05:04.185 --> 05:08.352 of ISIL's primary weapon system, the vehicle-borne IED. 05:09.039 --> 05:11.889 And we've assisted in the targeting of ISIL's drones, 05:11.889 --> 05:14.306 bringing down almost a dozen. 05:14.558 --> 05:16.514 We've done these things together. 05:16.514 --> 05:18.378 The Iraqis have been on the ground, 05:18.378 --> 05:21.076 and we have enabled them both with effective advice 05:21.076 --> 05:22.909 and timely assistance. 05:23.068 --> 05:26.261 This has been a partnership between these Iraqi formations 05:26.261 --> 05:28.056 and Task Force Strike. 05:28.056 --> 05:31.889 As I said, their success has been our success. 05:32.302 --> 05:34.219 We operate as one team. 05:35.336 --> 05:37.627 Before I close, I'd like to tell one story. 05:37.627 --> 05:40.306 On Christmas Day, I attended a service 05:40.306 --> 05:43.005 at the Marahana Church in Qaraqush. 05:43.005 --> 05:45.779 It was the first Christmas service in this church 05:45.779 --> 05:47.279 in over two years. 05:47.810 --> 05:50.342 I sat in a pew next to the operational commanders 05:50.342 --> 05:52.251 currently fighting in Mosul. 05:52.251 --> 05:56.210 They represented each of the Iraqi security forces 05:56.210 --> 05:58.460 and all of whom are Muslim. 05:59.265 --> 06:00.914 The commander of the federal police, 06:00.914 --> 06:03.927 who used his own funds to renovate the church 06:03.927 --> 06:06.317 to have it ready in time for Christmas mass, 06:06.317 --> 06:09.650 pulled me aside just before the service and said 06:09.650 --> 06:13.817 that this was his Christmas gift to me and to my soldiers 06:14.005 --> 06:17.097 for our contributions leading to the liberation 06:17.097 --> 06:18.180 of this area. 06:18.718 --> 06:19.924 Since our arrival in Iraq, 06:19.924 --> 06:22.279 we assisted in the liberation of a patch of Iraq 06:22.279 --> 06:24.442 larger than the state of West Virginia, 06:24.442 --> 06:27.389 but this one event represented much more 06:27.389 --> 06:29.727 than the liberation of physical terrain. 06:29.727 --> 06:32.197 It was a symbol of the cooperation 06:32.197 --> 06:34.947 of all the Iraqi security forces, 06:35.947 --> 06:38.095 a symbol of the contrast between 06:38.095 --> 06:40.649 the tolerance of the real Iraqis 06:40.649 --> 06:42.982 and the intolerance of ISIL, 06:43.486 --> 06:47.653 and a symbol of optimism of what Iraq can be in the future. 06:47.912 --> 06:49.789 In closing, let me say that I am extremely proud 06:49.789 --> 06:51.873 of every member of Task Force Strike 06:51.873 --> 06:54.469 and all they have accomplished these past nine months. 06:54.469 --> 06:58.001 We've provided training, equipment, intelligence, 06:58.001 --> 07:02.168 fire support, and advice to our very capable Iraqi partners. 07:02.434 --> 07:04.742 Everywhere I go and talk with Iraqi leaders, 07:04.742 --> 07:07.924 they go out of their way to talk about their partner, 07:07.924 --> 07:11.052 a strike leader standing side by side with them, 07:11.052 --> 07:14.491 enabling them with coalition expertise and effects, 07:14.491 --> 07:17.510 compelling success, and defeating an enemy 07:17.510 --> 07:19.593 of all people everywhere. 07:19.754 --> 07:22.772 They have truly lived up to our brigade motto: 07:22.772 --> 07:24.194 I am a strike soldier, 07:24.194 --> 07:25.421 I fight where I'm told, 07:25.421 --> 07:27.192 and I win where I fight. 07:27.192 --> 07:28.612 That's all I have for an opening statement. 07:28.612 --> 07:31.010 I'd be happy to take your questions at this time. 07:31.010 --> 07:34.513 - We'll start with Idrees Ali from Reuters. 07:34.513 --> 07:38.451 - Speaking about the capabilities of the ISF in general, 07:38.451 --> 07:40.647 where do you see some of the deficiencies 07:40.647 --> 07:42.301 that they need more work in? 07:42.301 --> 07:45.505 Because as we've seen in the operation to retake Mosul, 07:45.505 --> 07:47.063 other than the CT forces, 07:47.063 --> 07:49.722 there are some serious deficiencies and issues. 07:49.722 --> 07:52.673 So what specifically do you think needs more work 07:52.673 --> 07:55.923 in terms of training and advising them? 08:03.694 --> 08:05.693 - One of the things that we've had the great fortune 08:05.693 --> 08:08.242 of doing over the course of these last nine months 08:08.242 --> 08:09.809 is being able to witness 08:09.809 --> 08:13.976 a great transformation in the Iraqi Security Forces. 08:14.319 --> 08:17.206 When we first began these operations, 08:17.206 --> 08:19.793 the first village that we liberated together 08:19.793 --> 08:21.379 was a small village. 08:21.379 --> 08:23.157 It was called Qarbadon. 08:23.157 --> 08:27.324 And when they went to seize this particular village, 08:28.206 --> 08:31.956 there was no more than 30 to 40 ISIL fighters 08:32.503 --> 08:34.195 that existed in that village, 08:34.195 --> 08:36.362 and they sent an entire brigade 08:36.362 --> 08:38.810 to attack that particular village 08:38.810 --> 08:42.387 because that's what they felt was the combat power 08:42.387 --> 08:46.554 that was required in order to be able to seize that village. 08:47.621 --> 08:49.649 But what we've witnessed now over time 08:49.649 --> 08:52.149 since that day way back in May 08:52.747 --> 08:55.709 is that they have increased their ability 08:55.709 --> 08:58.157 to conduct combined arms maneuver. 08:58.157 --> 09:00.120 It has been a growing capability. 09:00.120 --> 09:02.496 I'm sure you all have heard the stories about Ramadi, 09:02.496 --> 09:05.141 where it was only the counterterrorism services 09:05.141 --> 09:07.101 that were leading the fight 09:07.101 --> 09:11.022 and it was the Iraqi army that had to move in behind them. 09:11.022 --> 09:13.324 They were the only offensive maneuver. 09:13.324 --> 09:16.574 But today, in Mosul, what you'll see is 09:17.018 --> 09:18.904 you'll see the Counterterrorism Service 09:18.904 --> 09:20.737 advancing on one axis, 09:21.275 --> 09:24.445 you'll see the federal police advancing on another axis, 09:24.445 --> 09:25.666 and you'll see the Iraqi army 09:25.666 --> 09:27.833 advancing on a third axis, 09:28.092 --> 09:31.092 each one of them now able to operate 09:31.734 --> 09:34.496 inside of a dense urban environment 09:34.496 --> 09:37.672 and be able to continue to make gains every single day, 09:37.672 --> 09:40.753 make progress every single day against ISIL. 09:40.753 --> 09:44.753 And so it’s not like it was back nine months ago 09:45.369 --> 09:49.536 where they struggled to get true combined arms maneuver 09:49.986 --> 09:52.621 in order to be able to defeat the enemy. 09:52.621 --> 09:54.026 And today, they're doing that. 09:54.026 --> 09:55.989 And every day, they're getting better at that. 09:55.989 --> 09:58.655 As they continue to gain more experience at this, 09:58.655 --> 09:59.955 they gain more confidence. 09:59.955 --> 10:02.313 Their leaders gain greater competence. 10:02.313 --> 10:05.479 And so they continue to make progress, 10:05.479 --> 10:09.396 and it's actually, it's very impressive to see. 10:10.143 --> 10:13.269 - Next, we'll go to Michael Gordon of the New York Times. 10:13.269 --> 10:15.453 - Sir, I was out around Mosul 10:15.453 --> 10:18.208 at the early, first few weeks of this operation. 10:18.208 --> 10:20.557 It's been reported there are is significant attrition 10:20.557 --> 10:24.724 that Iraqi forces have suffered, including the CTS. 10:25.651 --> 10:29.818 What steps have you taken to help the Iraqi forces 10:30.447 --> 10:31.664 deal with this attrition? 10:31.664 --> 10:33.268 What adjustments have been made? 10:33.268 --> 10:35.874 Has it affected plans, training and equipping plans, 10:35.874 --> 10:37.678 replenishment plans for the forces, 10:37.678 --> 10:40.229 and what is the end-strength of the CTS and ISF 10:40.229 --> 10:41.969 in light of these operations? 10:41.969 --> 10:46.136 What's the projected end-strength you'd like to have? 10:53.638 --> 10:56.862 - So, as we're talking about casualties within the ISF, 10:56.862 --> 10:58.905 you know, specific numbers and all, 10:58.905 --> 11:01.147 I'm sure, as you know, we address those 11:01.147 --> 11:03.897 to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. 11:04.488 --> 11:06.988 But what I will talk about is, 11:07.631 --> 11:09.697 as we are looking at what happened 11:09.697 --> 11:12.931 in those early days in the attack in Mosul, 11:12.931 --> 11:14.194 like you said, you were there. 11:14.194 --> 11:15.111 You saw it. 11:15.594 --> 11:18.230 What we witnessed was we saw all the, you know, 11:18.230 --> 11:20.807 Daesh's, ISIL's primary weapon system 11:20.807 --> 11:23.057 was that vehicle-borne IED. 11:23.310 --> 11:26.760 And they used it actually with pretty good effectiveness. 11:26.760 --> 11:29.593 One out of every two VBIED attacks 11:30.463 --> 11:33.887 resulted in some type of, some type of casualty, 11:33.887 --> 11:37.970 whether it was vehicles, equipment, or personnel. 11:39.166 --> 11:42.528 And what we have done over time, working together, 11:42.528 --> 11:44.621 is to be able to bring some of our capabilities 11:44.621 --> 11:47.341 and match it with their capabilities. 11:47.341 --> 11:49.519 So within the last couple of weeks, 11:49.519 --> 11:53.649 what we've seen is that effectiveness of the VBIEDs 11:53.649 --> 11:57.816 go down to one in nine or one in six of their VBIED attacks 11:58.410 --> 12:00.827 result in any type of damage, 12:01.521 --> 12:05.688 and that damage is certainly much less than it was before. 12:05.712 --> 12:07.545 And so for both of us, 12:08.046 --> 12:10.764 our involvement with them and our partnership with them, 12:10.764 --> 12:13.597 it has certainly been an evolution 12:13.610 --> 12:15.420 as we have figured out how to be 12:15.420 --> 12:16.953 more effective in our strikes, 12:16.953 --> 12:20.131 more effective in the counter-mobility fight 12:20.131 --> 12:22.042 in order to be able to support them 12:22.042 --> 12:25.794 against each one of the threats that exist in Mosul. 12:25.794 --> 12:29.461 As you know, it's a three-dimensional fight. 12:29.658 --> 12:33.825 They're, you know, ISIL is in the basements of buildings, 12:34.240 --> 12:36.078 on the roofs of buildings, 12:36.078 --> 12:37.613 and around the corners. 12:37.613 --> 12:41.460 And they've had two years to build this defense. 12:41.460 --> 12:43.550 But over time, they've gotten much more effective. 12:43.550 --> 12:45.211 And it's not just the CTS. 12:45.211 --> 12:46.588 It's all the forces 12:46.588 --> 12:49.796 that are much more effective there today. 12:49.796 --> 12:53.104 And they continue to build their own combat power. 12:53.104 --> 12:56.771 And the three-axis advance that you see now, 12:58.682 --> 13:01.984 and really in particular when it began on December 29th, 13:01.984 --> 13:04.472 has taken a lot of pressure off the CTS, 13:04.472 --> 13:06.846 because in the beginning there was, 13:06.846 --> 13:10.084 a lot of the brunt of the attack was on the CTS. 13:10.084 --> 13:12.035 And so that in and of itself has been 13:12.035 --> 13:15.702 a great force protection mechanism for them. 13:17.216 --> 13:20.071 - Next, we'll go to Courtney Kube of NBC News. 13:20.071 --> 13:20.904 - Hi, Colonel. 13:20.904 --> 13:21.862 I wanted to ask you just one thing 13:21.862 --> 13:23.227 from your opening statement. 13:23.227 --> 13:26.935 You mentioned that the task force has been involved 13:26.935 --> 13:30.407 in taking down more than a dozen ISIS drones. 13:30.407 --> 13:34.536 Can you give us, describe what those drones are like, size? 13:34.536 --> 13:37.675 I'm assuming that they were unarmed, but what were they, 13:37.675 --> 13:39.610 what was sort of the mission that they were doing, 13:39.610 --> 13:43.777 and how did the task force assist in taking them down? 13:51.524 --> 13:55.024 - Yeah, the ISIL drones has been something 13:56.317 --> 13:58.567 that has evolved over time. 13:58.628 --> 14:01.545 It is a capability that they've had 14:01.614 --> 14:02.861 for pretty much the duration 14:02.861 --> 14:04.561 of the time that we've been here. 14:04.561 --> 14:07.144 It's commercial, off-the-shelf, 14:07.735 --> 14:10.985 you know, just UAVs that they purchase. 14:11.032 --> 14:13.773 And in the beginning, they had some of these, 14:13.773 --> 14:17.023 they were little bit larger fixed-wing, 14:17.185 --> 14:21.018 you know, no bigger than a five-foot wingspan, 14:21.724 --> 14:25.465 but (audio garbled) up and used for reconnaissance. 14:25.465 --> 14:28.548 As we've made our way into Mosul now, 14:28.598 --> 14:32.765 what we've seen is that they use the smaller drones, 14:33.095 --> 14:35.646 the, you know, quad copters and things, 14:35.646 --> 14:39.646 with a much shorter ability to project them out. 14:40.228 --> 14:43.460 You know, they're up for 45 minutes, an hour, so, 14:43.460 --> 14:45.708 and even that evolution has transitioned 14:45.708 --> 14:47.904 in the beginning of the Mosul campaign 14:47.904 --> 14:49.904 from just reconnaissance 14:50.271 --> 14:53.073 to they are actually putting munitions in them 14:53.073 --> 14:55.906 and dropping munitions on the ISF, 14:56.937 --> 15:01.020 on the Iraqi security forces and their positions. 15:01.304 --> 15:05.471 And so, while I won't go into any of the technical matters, 15:06.066 --> 15:10.103 the technical capabilities that we use on these ISIL drones, 15:10.103 --> 15:11.877 what we have found is that we're able 15:11.877 --> 15:14.521 to bring to bear some of our technical capabilities 15:14.521 --> 15:17.262 and then the Iraqis are able to couple that 15:17.262 --> 15:20.513 with much of their direct fire weapon systems. 15:20.513 --> 15:23.815 And as a result of us working together hand-in-hand, 15:23.815 --> 15:26.477 we've been able to bring down these ISIL drones 15:26.477 --> 15:28.824 and have made them much less effective 15:28.824 --> 15:31.491 than they were in the beginning. 15:32.279 --> 15:33.649 - Could you give us a little bit, 15:33.649 --> 15:34.856 describe a little bit more about the munitions 15:34.856 --> 15:36.552 that they've been putting on them? 15:36.552 --> 15:39.270 And then are you aware that any of these munitions 15:39.270 --> 15:43.437 have resulted in the deaths of any Iraqi security forces? 15:51.222 --> 15:53.472 - Yeah, like I said before, 15:53.604 --> 15:57.687 you know, we don't talk about the ISF casualties. 15:57.791 --> 16:00.458 That's, again, something to take 16:00.460 --> 16:02.434 to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense 16:02.434 --> 16:04.982 for them to be able to address. 16:04.982 --> 16:06.249 I can tell you it has resulted 16:06.249 --> 16:07.681 in the damage to some equipment 16:07.681 --> 16:10.098 and damage of some structures 16:10.385 --> 16:13.089 as well as to some civilian casualties, because certainly, 16:13.089 --> 16:15.153 they're not concerned about whether or not 16:15.153 --> 16:19.320 any of the civilians in Mosul are killed or wounded. 16:20.655 --> 16:22.572 So there has been that. 16:23.469 --> 16:24.727 You know, they are small drones 16:24.727 --> 16:28.810 with small munitions that they've been dropping, 16:29.225 --> 16:31.225 just, you know, akin to 16:32.509 --> 16:35.513 a small little grenade that drops on the ground, 16:35.513 --> 16:39.596 enough for them to be able to do what Daesh does, 16:39.663 --> 16:42.814 and that's just indiscriminate killing. 16:42.814 --> 16:44.014 That's what they do. 16:44.014 --> 16:45.042 But like I said, 16:45.042 --> 16:47.725 their effectiveness has significantly waned 16:47.725 --> 16:49.077 as we have, you know, 16:49.077 --> 16:53.244 worked this counter-UAS fight together with the Iraqis. 16:54.299 --> 16:55.132 - One more. 16:55.132 --> 16:55.974 You haven't seen them trying to deliver 16:55.974 --> 16:58.500 any kind of chemicals or any kind of, 16:58.500 --> 17:02.667 anything like that with these drones, or have you? 17:07.298 --> 17:08.236 - We have not. 17:08.236 --> 17:09.569 We have not, no. 17:10.964 --> 17:13.292 - Next, to Barbara Starr from CNN. 17:13.292 --> 17:14.477 - Colonel, thank you for doing this. 17:14.477 --> 17:16.626 I wanted to follow up a bit 17:16.626 --> 17:19.062 on what Courtney just asked you. 17:19.062 --> 17:20.812 Just so I understand, 17:21.576 --> 17:25.743 you're saying that ISIS has now achieved the ability 17:27.444 --> 17:31.611 to aerial-drop the munitions from the wings of these UAVs? 17:33.608 --> 17:36.775 And do the UAVs go down on the ground, 17:37.169 --> 17:40.220 and then sometimes Iraqis may approach them 17:40.220 --> 17:42.129 and they explode at that point? 17:42.129 --> 17:43.546 Is it both cases? 17:44.030 --> 17:47.983 Or have they, I mean, it sounds fairly concerning 17:47.983 --> 17:50.485 that they would've achieved this capability 17:50.485 --> 17:52.611 to drop this stuff off the wings. 17:52.611 --> 17:56.778 And also, have any of your U.S. troops been wounded, 17:59.786 --> 18:03.536 either by this or in any other circumstances? 18:11.551 --> 18:14.884 - Yeah, so it is, I do want to make sure 18:15.858 --> 18:18.523 that I capture a little bit more accurately 18:18.523 --> 18:20.457 kind of what it is that we're talking about 18:20.457 --> 18:23.124 with regard to these armed UASs. 18:24.370 --> 18:25.459 I'm not sure if you're familiar 18:25.459 --> 18:27.959 with these small quad copters. 18:28.642 --> 18:31.475 You know, probably no bigger than, 18:31.689 --> 18:34.939 you know, a couple of feet in diameter. 18:35.501 --> 18:39.001 So, it's not as if it is a large armed UAV 18:40.518 --> 18:43.574 that's dropping munitions from the wings, 18:43.574 --> 18:44.991 as you described, 18:45.159 --> 18:49.326 but literally a very small quad copter that, you know, 18:50.158 --> 18:54.325 drops a small munition in a somewhat imprecise manner, 18:55.560 --> 18:59.727 in a somewhat crude manner out there on the battlefield. 19:00.604 --> 19:04.525 And that's really what we've seen up to this point. 19:04.525 --> 19:08.275 And, like I said, indiscriminately targeting, 19:08.717 --> 19:11.550 going after Iraqi security forces. 19:12.230 --> 19:15.480 We certainly, to address your question, 19:16.920 --> 19:21.087 there have been no U.S. casualties from any of these UASs. 19:22.865 --> 19:24.801 They're very short-range, 19:24.801 --> 19:28.884 targeting those frontline troops from the Iraqis. 19:30.966 --> 19:35.133 - [Barbara] Any casualties in the time you've been there? 19:42.041 --> 19:43.516 - I'm sorry, I didn't hear that. 19:43.516 --> 19:44.896 Could you say that again? 19:44.896 --> 19:46.740 - Sir, can you just bring us up to date? 19:46.740 --> 19:50.907 Has your unit suffered any wounded during your deployment? 19:58.406 --> 20:01.969 - No, we have had no combat-related injuries, 20:01.969 --> 20:06.065 no combat-related deaths within Task Force Strike. 20:06.065 --> 20:09.565 You know, our advisory role as we partner, 20:10.301 --> 20:12.999 so like I talked about with Captain Fitzgerald 20:12.999 --> 20:14.999 in my opening statement. 20:15.929 --> 20:17.399 You know, Captain Fitzgerald, 20:17.399 --> 20:20.816 his partner is an Iraqi two-star general. 20:21.823 --> 20:25.323 The lowest that we go is one-star generals 20:25.361 --> 20:27.611 who we are partnering with. 20:27.825 --> 20:30.322 So it's one-, two-, three-star generals. 20:30.322 --> 20:32.490 And much like you would imagine, 20:32.490 --> 20:34.568 they are behind the lines. 20:34.568 --> 20:38.158 They're in their command posts, in their headquarters, 20:38.158 --> 20:40.447 and that's where we do our advising. 20:40.447 --> 20:42.532 We are there to assist them 20:42.532 --> 20:45.153 with situational awareness tools. 20:45.153 --> 20:47.387 We're there to help bring precision fires 20:47.387 --> 20:49.727 in support of their operations. 20:49.727 --> 20:52.594 And our effectiveness comes from being co-located 20:52.594 --> 20:56.251 with their decision-makers, their general officers. 20:56.251 --> 20:58.418 And so as you can imagine, 20:58.744 --> 21:01.934 their general officers are not on the front lines, 21:01.934 --> 21:05.001 kicking down doors and shooting people. 21:05.001 --> 21:07.289 And that's where our advisers are. 21:07.289 --> 21:09.581 That's where their best place is, 21:09.581 --> 21:13.748 with those Iraqi commanders behind the front lines, 21:14.555 --> 21:17.722 you know, in those headquarters areas. 21:18.430 --> 21:19.724 - I was noticing, though, 21:19.724 --> 21:21.979 I guess what I was referring to in your fact sheet, 21:21.979 --> 21:23.091 you said your fire battalion 21:23.091 --> 21:25.507 has fired more than 6,000 rounds, 21:25.507 --> 21:29.507 the highest number of PTMs ever fired in combat. 21:30.556 --> 21:33.639 Since you say "ever fired in combat," 21:34.694 --> 21:37.733 over what period of time are you talking about? 21:37.733 --> 21:39.339 Since you were there? 21:39.339 --> 21:41.922 6,000 rounds since you arrived? 21:48.439 --> 21:49.272 - That's right. 21:49.272 --> 21:50.342 That's right. Yes. 21:50.342 --> 21:54.009 So, I'm sure you all remember Fire Base Bell 21:54.943 --> 21:59.110 that was there at the, more than a few months ago. 21:59.187 --> 22:01.576 We fell in immediately on that. 22:01.576 --> 22:05.576 My task force top guns came in, assumed that position. 22:05.576 --> 22:07.003 And from the beginning, 22:07.003 --> 22:10.756 we've been providing precision surface-to-surface, 22:10.756 --> 22:12.173 all-weather fires 22:12.333 --> 22:15.769 in support of Iraqi security force maneuver. 22:15.769 --> 22:19.936 That's been part of our assistance effort to them. 22:21.494 --> 22:23.487 And so, like we talked about, 22:23.487 --> 22:25.820 us bringing strikes forward, 22:27.904 --> 22:29.562 a lot of times people think of that 22:29.562 --> 22:32.895 as just primarily the close-air support, 22:33.102 --> 22:37.269 you know, the Air Force aircraft that are flying overhead. 22:37.489 --> 22:40.293 But there's also an all-weather component. 22:40.293 --> 22:43.710 We've got HIMARS, triple-seven artillery. 22:44.901 --> 22:46.484 We've got Paladins. 22:46.709 --> 22:48.363 All that have been in support 22:48.363 --> 22:51.446 of the Iraqi security force maneuver. 22:51.672 --> 22:53.781 And it is something that we work in concert 22:53.781 --> 22:55.668 with our Iraqi counterparts. 22:55.668 --> 22:57.084 In the beginning when I first got here, 22:57.084 --> 22:59.013 and I talked about Qarbadon, we did, 22:59.013 --> 23:01.130 Qarbadon, Qarbat Jabbar or Hajj Ali. 23:01.130 --> 23:03.799 A series of villages that we went on through. 23:03.799 --> 23:06.852 And my partner, every time that he would want fire support, 23:06.852 --> 23:08.219 he would turn to us and say, 23:08.219 --> 23:10.358 "Can you provide us fire support?" 23:10.358 --> 23:13.563 And I'd say, "Well, you've got your own artillery." 23:13.563 --> 23:14.638 But in the beginning, 23:14.638 --> 23:17.140 as we talk about the maturation of the security forces, 23:17.140 --> 23:19.894 in the beginning they didn't have any trust or confidence 23:19.894 --> 23:22.061 in their artillery forces. 23:22.091 --> 23:23.396 And that's something that 23:23.396 --> 23:25.497 when we talk about our advisory mission, 23:25.497 --> 23:29.664 we've gone forward to co-locate with their artillery 23:30.372 --> 23:31.836 in order to be able to provide 23:31.836 --> 23:33.815 some additional training and instruction 23:33.815 --> 23:37.332 in order to increase the precision of their own fires. 23:37.332 --> 23:39.582 So now, as we are in Mosul, 23:41.366 --> 23:44.783 there is a whole range of kinetic strikes 23:45.057 --> 23:46.232 that could be brought, 23:46.232 --> 23:49.774 some of which are Iraqi and some of which are coalition. 23:49.774 --> 23:52.685 And we've been there in order to support. 23:52.685 --> 23:56.509 Clearly, we have a great precision fires capability, 23:56.509 --> 23:57.697 whether it's air-delivered 23:57.697 --> 23:59.416 or whether it's surface-to-surface. 23:59.416 --> 24:01.719 And so when we talk about the precision fires 24:01.719 --> 24:02.725 that have been delivered, 24:02.725 --> 24:04.940 the greatest number in combat ever, 24:04.940 --> 24:08.018 that's because of new precision-fires capability 24:08.018 --> 24:10.800 that has come to even our own Army 24:10.800 --> 24:14.717 and our ability to deliver very accurate fires, 24:14.848 --> 24:16.523 which is particularly important 24:16.523 --> 24:18.661 as we're fighting in an urban area, 24:18.661 --> 24:20.510 in order to be able to go through 24:20.510 --> 24:21.999 the very deliberate process 24:21.999 --> 24:24.582 to limit any collateral damage. 24:27.669 --> 24:30.782 - [Barbara] How many rounds of ground fire, on average, 24:30.782 --> 24:34.115 what would you say, out of 6,000 rounds, 24:34.289 --> 24:35.771 and it's the highest ever, 24:35.771 --> 24:39.771 how many ground combat rounds a day do you fire? 24:49.440 --> 24:53.607 - I only caught the last portion of your question there. 24:53.770 --> 24:55.353 So, you're asking, 24:56.002 --> 24:59.752 what percentage of these are precision-fires? 24:59.897 --> 25:01.548 Is that your question? 25:01.548 --> 25:02.572 - [Barbara] Sure. Sorry. 25:02.572 --> 25:05.634 I'm just asking, you say you're firing 6,000 rounds 25:05.634 --> 25:08.840 in combat, according to your fact sheet. 25:08.840 --> 25:11.840 So if it's 6,000 rounds, on average, 25:13.351 --> 25:15.834 give me your best calculation. 25:15.834 --> 25:17.851 What would you say you fire, 25:17.851 --> 25:19.861 and maybe it was more in the beginning, 25:19.861 --> 25:23.316 what would you say, how many rounds on average a day 25:23.316 --> 25:26.649 in this ground combat that you describe? 25:34.623 --> 25:37.780 - I'm not prepared to tell you, I guess, 25:37.780 --> 25:41.947 what the daily average is on the rounds that are fired. 25:42.184 --> 25:45.517 I will say that we are firing more today 25:46.837 --> 25:49.170 than we were six months ago. 25:49.499 --> 25:53.666 Today, as we are supporting multiple axes and their maneuver 25:55.815 --> 25:59.416 as they are maneuvering in and around Mosul, 25:59.416 --> 26:03.465 certainly we are firing more today than six months ago, 26:03.465 --> 26:06.372 when we were just supporting, you know, 26:06.372 --> 26:10.539 the maneuver of one division, taking one village at a time. 26:11.792 --> 26:12.959 And so we are. 26:13.187 --> 26:15.104 We are there supporting 26:15.836 --> 26:19.739 as part of a whole range of kinetic strike capability, 26:19.739 --> 26:21.635 precision fires capability, 26:21.635 --> 26:25.552 that we provide to the Iraqis every single day. 26:26.683 --> 26:29.850 - Next to David Martin from CBS News. 26:30.071 --> 26:32.316 - You said you had reduced the effectiveness 26:32.316 --> 26:34.066 of vehicle-borne IEDs 26:37.754 --> 26:39.496 from one in two that cause damage 26:39.496 --> 26:43.044 to, and you said one and nine or one in six. 26:43.044 --> 26:45.055 So just wondering, clarify, 26:45.055 --> 26:48.305 is it one in nine, or is it one in six? 26:48.339 --> 26:52.506 And besides dropping the bridge spans cross the Tigris, 26:54.448 --> 26:56.346 what else have you done 26:56.346 --> 26:59.513 to reduce the effectiveness of VBIEDs? 27:07.564 --> 27:10.481 - I think this is a great new story 27:11.169 --> 27:13.524 in terms of our advisory effort 27:13.524 --> 27:17.218 and really working together with the Iraqis on this one. 27:17.218 --> 27:21.385 So, as you know, the VBIEDs have a tremendous impact, 27:24.217 --> 27:25.920 not only in terms of casualties, 27:25.920 --> 27:28.390 but they've got a great psychological impact 27:28.390 --> 27:30.750 when you've got an explosion of that size 27:30.750 --> 27:34.833 that go off in proximity to soldiers of any kind. 27:35.258 --> 27:38.841 And so really getting after the VBIED fight 27:39.135 --> 27:41.597 has been an important one for us. 27:41.597 --> 27:43.949 And so what we have been working together 27:43.949 --> 27:47.934 with our Iraqi counterparts are a whole range of things 27:47.934 --> 27:51.265 in order to be able to be more effective. 27:51.265 --> 27:53.445 One of them is just increasing 27:53.445 --> 27:56.195 the number of anti-tank munitions 27:57.490 --> 27:59.967 that our Iraqi counterparts have. 27:59.967 --> 28:04.134 There's an equipping program that we do that has allowed us 28:04.325 --> 28:07.108 to increase the numbers of these munitions 28:07.108 --> 28:08.483 in the hands of the Iraqis 28:08.483 --> 28:10.721 that are there on the front lines. 28:10.721 --> 28:12.871 The second thing is working through 28:12.871 --> 28:15.788 even some very rudimentary methods, 28:17.418 --> 28:19.918 like road spikes or hedgehogs, 28:22.047 --> 28:25.427 you know, string and wire out along the roads. 28:25.427 --> 28:29.594 There's a natural pace of operations that occurs each day 28:30.074 --> 28:33.074 where you attack and, at some point, 28:33.516 --> 28:37.035 you gotta kind of establish a defensive line 28:37.035 --> 28:39.484 and then prepare for the next day. 28:39.484 --> 28:42.484 But now, when they slow that advance 28:43.312 --> 28:45.241 and decide this is the point that we're gonna stop, 28:45.241 --> 28:48.658 and kind of refit until we push on again, 28:48.882 --> 28:52.500 they put out these counter-mobility measures, 28:52.500 --> 28:55.040 put these things out there on the ground. 28:55.040 --> 28:58.707 As we've seen, these VBIEDs come in any form 28:58.852 --> 29:01.087 of a sedan or truck or anything, 29:01.087 --> 29:03.098 and some of these elementary methods 29:03.098 --> 29:05.990 help to be able to stop their advance 29:05.990 --> 29:07.846 or slow their advance to the point 29:07.846 --> 29:09.869 where they can be targeted. 29:09.869 --> 29:14.036 And the other thing that we do is we do some terrain denial. 29:14.227 --> 29:18.394 There are at times some high-speed avenues of approach 29:18.480 --> 29:21.773 that are difficult to put some of these road spikes in, 29:21.773 --> 29:25.356 and so we'll put some craters in the roads, 29:26.962 --> 29:30.668 very large potholes that a vehicle would have to slow down 29:30.668 --> 29:32.735 or would have to maneuver around 29:32.735 --> 29:36.489 or potentially even, if it's a heavily-laden vehicle, 29:36.489 --> 29:38.900 would get stuck inside these areas. 29:38.900 --> 29:41.060 And so then the ISF are able to then 29:41.060 --> 29:43.560 engage them much more quickly. 29:44.385 --> 29:47.785 The reason why I said one-to-nine and one-to-six 29:47.785 --> 29:51.952 is because we do it on kind of a two-week average. 29:52.415 --> 29:54.176 And over the course of the last month, 29:54.176 --> 29:58.343 it was one-to-nine, and then we've had one-to-six lately. 29:59.130 --> 30:00.481 Some of that's just dependent 30:00.481 --> 30:02.492 on how fluid the battlefield is, 30:02.492 --> 30:04.574 and so sometimes that percentage changed. 30:04.574 --> 30:08.741 But regardless, going from 50% to these larger percentages 30:09.325 --> 30:12.158 has been a significant win for us. 30:14.207 --> 30:15.273 And at the same time, 30:15.273 --> 30:17.804 even the ones that do have some effectiveness, 30:17.804 --> 30:20.092 the relative effectiveness has been less 30:20.092 --> 30:22.197 in terms of the number of casualties 30:22.197 --> 30:26.114 or the amount of equipment that's been damaged. 30:27.937 --> 30:31.095 - Next to Bill Hennigan with the Los Angeles Times. 30:31.095 --> 30:32.345 - Hey, Colonel. 30:32.450 --> 30:35.830 These dozen drones that you mentioned before, 30:35.830 --> 30:38.913 when did you first start seeing this, 30:38.918 --> 30:40.413 when did you first start taking them down? 30:40.413 --> 30:42.403 And when did they first have the capability 30:42.403 --> 30:44.236 of dropping munitions? 30:53.204 --> 30:57.020 - Well, so, like I said, even after we first got here, 30:57.020 --> 30:59.429 this is a capability that ISIL has had 30:59.429 --> 31:01.512 to be able to fly drones. 31:01.551 --> 31:03.301 It's the same ability 31:04.277 --> 31:07.860 that any 13-year-old kid in the states has. 31:08.079 --> 31:10.579 He can get online and purchase 31:10.920 --> 31:14.295 some type of unmanned aerial vehicle and put it up. 31:14.295 --> 31:16.205 And so that's what Daesh has been doing, 31:16.205 --> 31:18.872 ISIL's been doing for some time. 31:18.982 --> 31:21.114 And even in the beginning when we were first here, 31:21.114 --> 31:22.863 sometimes these things would fly over 31:22.863 --> 31:24.896 and our counterparts would, 31:24.896 --> 31:27.708 through small arms they would shoot them down 31:27.708 --> 31:28.719 and bring them down. 31:28.719 --> 31:32.372 So they've been coming down for a little while. 31:32.372 --> 31:36.539 But it wasn't until we got closer and closer to Mosul 31:36.924 --> 31:39.174 that we really began to see 31:40.404 --> 31:43.237 not only the increase in quantity, 31:43.293 --> 31:45.810 but the frequency of their flights. 31:45.810 --> 31:49.977 And then really that's when we saw them using them 31:50.161 --> 31:53.038 in an armed fashion in order to be able to drop them 31:53.038 --> 31:56.955 on our Iraqi counterparts on their front lines. 31:57.320 --> 31:59.636 And so that has been something that has evolved. 31:59.636 --> 32:02.599 It was, it's almost like popcorn, right? 32:02.599 --> 32:04.516 You know, you see one, 32:05.045 --> 32:07.091 and then you don't see another one for a little while, 32:07.091 --> 32:08.816 and then you see another one, and then you see another one. 32:08.816 --> 32:12.413 And so actually, it has increased in frequency. 32:12.413 --> 32:15.150 Or it did increase in frequency, I guess I should say, 32:15.150 --> 32:19.317 until very recently, both as we have now been more engaged 32:20.015 --> 32:22.929 with our partners in helping out with this fight. 32:22.929 --> 32:26.679 And so now we've seen that, we've seen their use drop off, 32:26.679 --> 32:29.960 and at the same time as the Iraqis have taken more ground 32:29.960 --> 32:31.293 inside of Mosul. 32:32.522 --> 32:35.909 Most recently, elements of the federal police 32:35.909 --> 32:38.742 moved into an area and captured up 32:39.187 --> 32:43.354 what appeared to be kind of a UAV launch and recovery site, 32:44.943 --> 32:47.055 where they collected up a bunch of UAV parts 32:47.055 --> 32:50.661 that when ISIL was in such a hurry to depart the area, 32:50.661 --> 32:53.411 they left all these things there. 32:53.441 --> 32:56.400 And so, obviously, their effectiveness 32:56.400 --> 32:58.564 and the quantities available to them 32:58.564 --> 33:00.624 have certainly decreased over time. 33:00.624 --> 33:03.003 Number one, as they've been shot out of the sky, 33:03.003 --> 33:07.170 brought down, or as these areas have been taken over. 33:08.310 --> 33:09.143 - Thanks. 33:09.604 --> 33:11.498 And as you approach the Tigris here, 33:11.498 --> 33:14.581 what challenges do you see going west 33:15.186 --> 33:19.269 as you push into the districts west of the river? 33:28.851 --> 33:29.684 - Yeah. 33:30.563 --> 33:32.646 So I'm sure you've heard, 33:32.949 --> 33:35.755 I think it was in an Iraqi press release yesterday. 33:35.755 --> 33:39.213 They believe they're between 70% and 80% complete 33:39.213 --> 33:40.749 with eastern Mosul. 33:40.749 --> 33:41.666 And really, 33:42.995 --> 33:45.662 in terms of kind of the doctrinal definition of defeat, 33:45.662 --> 33:49.168 you can say that there has been a defeat there 33:49.168 --> 33:51.519 because they have certainly broken their will to fight, 33:51.519 --> 33:55.686 to continue to really fight in earnest in eastern Mosul. 33:57.093 --> 33:58.922 And so the Iraqi security forces 33:58.922 --> 34:00.832 continue to make great progress there. 34:00.832 --> 34:04.249 And so, naturally, the fight is not over. 34:04.291 --> 34:08.458 There's a lot of fight that's left to do in western Mosul. 34:09.066 --> 34:12.566 There has been an extensive defensive work 34:13.290 --> 34:15.760 that has been done in western Mosul. 34:15.760 --> 34:18.433 They have certainly been working on that area, 34:18.433 --> 34:22.082 and even in some cases have greater defenses built 34:22.082 --> 34:25.343 in western Mosul than they did in eastern Mosul. 34:25.343 --> 34:29.426 And I think you’ve seen recently, they completed, 34:29.607 --> 34:31.352 not the complete destruction, 34:31.352 --> 34:34.275 but have certainly even done more destruction 34:34.275 --> 34:35.908 to a couple of the bridges lately 34:35.908 --> 34:40.075 to ensure that they could try to delay the advance 34:40.348 --> 34:44.515 of the Iraqi security forces over to the west side. 34:46.053 --> 34:49.567 But I'll tell you that the Iraqi security forces, 34:49.567 --> 34:52.414 as I said, they have a tremendous capability. 34:52.414 --> 34:54.581 That capability has grown. 34:54.726 --> 34:57.657 They've gotten better at this urban fight. 34:57.657 --> 35:00.136 They know what they're getting themselves into. 35:00.136 --> 35:03.803 And they know that they have, in many cases, 35:03.867 --> 35:07.867 broken the will of many of these Daesh fighters. 35:08.463 --> 35:09.940 And we hear a lot more and more 35:09.940 --> 35:12.607 about many of them running away. 35:13.688 --> 35:15.370 And certainly when ISIL hears 35:15.370 --> 35:17.373 that they've got fighters running away, 35:17.373 --> 35:18.873 they execute them. 35:19.238 --> 35:21.432 So I don't know what incentive that gives to people 35:21.432 --> 35:23.932 to continue to fight for them, 35:24.153 --> 35:26.661 but certainly that's just another indication 35:26.661 --> 35:28.328 of how they operate. 35:29.086 --> 35:32.836 But, the ISF have more than enough capability 35:33.692 --> 35:37.075 to get around to the west side and to begin that fight. 35:37.075 --> 35:39.936 They certainly don't need those bridges 35:39.936 --> 35:42.456 in order to be able to get over there. 35:42.456 --> 35:44.273 They've demonstrated in the past 35:44.273 --> 35:46.606 that they can build bridges. 35:47.094 --> 35:50.261 You know, like I talked about earlier, 35:50.552 --> 35:54.469 we have provided advising at multiple echelons. 35:54.711 --> 35:58.125 One of the things that we've done is bridge advising. 35:58.125 --> 36:00.035 And so when they first put in 36:00.035 --> 36:02.482 that first bridge over the Tigris, 36:02.482 --> 36:03.970 we were there to advise them 36:03.970 --> 36:06.268 and provide some technical capabilities 36:06.268 --> 36:08.435 in putting that bridge in. 36:08.442 --> 36:09.922 And then they put a second bridge in, 36:09.922 --> 36:13.167 and we were there to advise them on that second bridge. 36:13.167 --> 36:16.872 But then they put in a third and a fourth bridge 36:16.872 --> 36:20.039 without us there, without us advising. 36:20.065 --> 36:23.237 They've grown in their capability to do these things. 36:23.237 --> 36:24.963 And I'm confident that they'll be able 36:24.963 --> 36:26.398 to continue to do that 36:26.398 --> 36:29.285 as they bring forces from the east side to the west side 36:29.285 --> 36:31.785 when they're ready to do that. 36:32.397 --> 36:35.824 - Okay. Next to Corey Dickstein, Stars and Stripes. 36:35.824 --> 36:37.800 - Hey, sir, appreciate your doing this. 36:37.800 --> 36:39.942 I wanted to see, you said, obviously, 36:39.942 --> 36:42.192 that the vehicle-borne IEDs 36:42.508 --> 36:45.294 have been less effective recently. 36:45.294 --> 36:47.473 Do you have maybe an estimate 36:47.473 --> 36:49.317 of how often they're using them? 36:49.317 --> 36:50.281 I'm sure it's daily, 36:50.281 --> 36:52.698 but can you say how often ISF 36:53.435 --> 36:55.809 is coming into contact with them? 36:55.809 --> 36:58.476 And are they becoming more crude 36:59.106 --> 37:02.773 as territory is taken and things are cleared 37:04.504 --> 37:07.004 that they've held for a while? 37:15.486 --> 37:17.298 - Today, to be honest with you, 37:17.298 --> 37:19.298 I read an article today, 37:19.996 --> 37:23.589 Major General Maan, who is one of the commanders 37:23.589 --> 37:25.396 of the Counterterrorism Service, 37:25.396 --> 37:27.123 I think he said it best. 37:27.123 --> 37:28.702 He said in the beginning, 37:28.702 --> 37:31.952 we would see as many as 10 VBIEDs a day 37:32.124 --> 37:34.139 against our frontline troops, 37:34.139 --> 37:37.639 and today, we see no more than one or two, 37:38.926 --> 37:41.825 and on some days, we don't see any. 37:41.825 --> 37:45.799 And you're right, they have become much more crude. 37:45.799 --> 37:48.067 When we were fighting on the outskirts of Mosul 37:48.067 --> 37:51.400 before we even got into the city proper, 37:51.526 --> 37:55.102 we like to call them those Mad Max-looking VBIEDs. 37:55.102 --> 37:57.102 They had taken vehicles, 37:57.217 --> 38:01.384 they had put steel plating all around these things 38:01.421 --> 38:04.282 and just had a small little porthole 38:04.282 --> 38:07.091 that the driver would be able to see through. 38:07.091 --> 38:11.258 They would try to ram these things into the Iraqi defenses. 38:11.877 --> 38:15.044 And today, we don't see those anymore. 38:15.334 --> 38:18.667 Like you said, they are much more crude. 38:19.778 --> 38:22.111 To some degree, that's good, 38:22.238 --> 38:23.980 because they have less capability 38:23.980 --> 38:26.030 to break through barriers. 38:26.030 --> 38:27.197 In some cases, 38:27.351 --> 38:29.503 it does make it even a little bit more difficult 38:29.503 --> 38:31.287 because they look like every other sedan 38:31.287 --> 38:32.888 that's on the street, 38:32.888 --> 38:35.235 and so sometimes, it can be difficult, 38:35.235 --> 38:38.384 (audio garbled) the Iraqi security forces 38:38.384 --> 38:41.622 have shown great restraint and great care 38:41.622 --> 38:45.789 in being able to safeguard not only the people of Mosul, 38:46.464 --> 38:49.365 the civilians that are still there in Mosul, 38:49.365 --> 38:51.168 but even their property. 38:51.168 --> 38:53.711 And so that has, in some cases, 38:53.711 --> 38:57.876 even made it just a little bit more difficult on them. 38:57.876 --> 39:00.209 - And then on the artillery, 39:00.838 --> 39:02.805 you said your artillery battalion 39:02.805 --> 39:06.972 has worked directly with the Iraqi artillery forces. 39:07.708 --> 39:11.875 Can you talk at all to how the Iraqi artillery has advanced? 39:14.335 --> 39:18.168 Are they able to strike with similar precision 39:18.355 --> 39:20.522 to our artillery soldiers? 39:22.647 --> 39:24.815 And then can you kind of also tell 39:24.815 --> 39:28.815 how precise can a Paladin or a triple-seven get? 39:29.427 --> 39:33.594 Can you take out a VBIED with an artillery strike like that? 39:44.185 --> 39:47.097 - So, first of all, I'm not gonna go into the specifics, 39:47.097 --> 39:48.030 as you could imagine, 39:48.030 --> 39:51.363 on exactly how precise our artillery is, 39:52.396 --> 39:54.055 given some of the specifications 39:54.055 --> 39:56.420 on the rounds and things that we have. 39:56.420 --> 39:57.722 But what I will say 39:57.722 --> 40:01.472 is that they have been able to strike VBIEDs, 40:01.780 --> 40:05.613 they have been able to take out a mortar team, 40:06.423 --> 40:10.340 which is two guys standing around a mortar tube 40:10.659 --> 40:14.826 and been able to strike them with great precision. 40:15.210 --> 40:19.210 They have been able to put rounds in some places 40:20.830 --> 40:23.997 that have allowed us to destroy Daesh, 40:24.105 --> 40:25.855 and at the same time, 40:25.998 --> 40:29.165 safeguard structures or even civilians 40:29.768 --> 40:31.851 that may have been close, 40:34.604 --> 40:36.687 not too close, but close. 40:37.454 --> 40:38.553 Can the Iraqis do that? 40:38.553 --> 40:40.987 They don't have the same type of equipment. 40:40.987 --> 40:42.425 While they do have some Paladins, 40:42.425 --> 40:44.390 they have an earlier version of Paladins. 40:44.390 --> 40:45.622 They don't have the same kind of rounds 40:45.622 --> 40:47.455 and things that we do. 40:48.072 --> 40:50.586 But they have become much more precise 40:50.586 --> 40:52.919 in terms of what they've been able to do. 40:52.919 --> 40:55.169 They don't necessarily have 40:55.342 --> 40:58.509 the same precision that we do, though. 41:00.201 --> 41:01.034 - Okay. 41:01.034 --> 41:04.184 Next, we'll go to Kasim Ileri with Anadolu News Agency. 41:04.184 --> 41:06.684 - Sir, thanks for doing this. 41:06.859 --> 41:09.159 During your operations around Mosul, 41:09.159 --> 41:11.492 have you had any interaction 41:11.665 --> 41:15.415 with the forces trained by Turkey in Bashiqa? 41:26.119 --> 41:27.286 - Yes, I have. 41:28.589 --> 41:31.922 So, there are some Sunni tribal fighters 41:35.088 --> 41:37.505 that were trained in Bashiqa. 41:37.838 --> 41:41.088 And they are currently fully integrated 41:41.163 --> 41:42.966 in with the Iraqi army, 41:42.966 --> 41:47.133 and with the 16th Iraqi Army Division on the northern axis. 41:47.897 --> 41:50.638 They have been used as a hold force. 41:50.638 --> 41:53.101 So after the 16th Iraqi Army Division 41:53.101 --> 41:54.988 has pushed through certain areas, 41:54.988 --> 41:57.655 has cleared those areas of ISIL, 41:58.048 --> 42:01.155 they were able to move some of these tribal fighters 42:01.155 --> 42:03.072 and to hold that ground 42:03.748 --> 42:07.748 to prevent any infiltration of ISIL behind them. 42:10.387 --> 42:14.387 So I have had that limited interaction with them 42:14.732 --> 42:17.315 only through the 16th Division. 42:18.822 --> 42:22.531 - What was your impression about their capabilities? 42:22.531 --> 42:24.364 Are they trained well? 42:33.993 --> 42:38.126 - They've proven that they were able to hold that ground 42:38.126 --> 42:39.959 behind the Iraqi army. 42:41.381 --> 42:43.961 Certainly, I'm getting my information second-hand 42:43.961 --> 42:47.513 from the commander of the 16th Iraqi Army Division. 42:47.513 --> 42:50.013 And they are fully integrated. 42:50.942 --> 42:54.723 Those tribal fighters are not there by themselves. 42:54.723 --> 42:57.964 They're there with the Iraqi army soldiers 42:57.964 --> 43:02.131 who really do kind of provide the overall backbone 43:02.502 --> 43:05.585 for the security forces in that area. 43:06.525 --> 43:08.255 So that's really the only assessment 43:08.255 --> 43:10.505 that I can provide on them. 43:11.876 --> 43:15.626 - And finally to Luis Martinez from ABC News. 43:15.902 --> 43:16.735 - Hi, Colonel. 43:16.735 --> 43:17.806 Thanks for doing this briefing. 43:17.806 --> 43:19.995 I want to ask you about the federal police. 43:19.995 --> 43:22.946 How are they being utilized in the fight in Mosul? 43:22.946 --> 43:24.886 Are they a holding force now? 43:24.886 --> 43:27.780 Are they being used as a combat force? 43:27.780 --> 43:29.036 How many of them are there? 43:29.036 --> 43:33.203 What's your role in advising them as they operate in Mosul? 43:44.315 --> 43:46.459 - First of all, I'll say the federal police 43:46.459 --> 43:49.376 has proven to be a critical portion 43:51.028 --> 43:54.028 of the overall Iraqi security forces 43:54.119 --> 43:56.702 that are engaged in this fight. 43:56.706 --> 43:58.315 And if I could just step back just a little bit 43:58.315 --> 44:00.453 and frame what we're talking about 44:00.453 --> 44:02.265 when we talk about the police. 44:02.265 --> 44:04.177 I know some of you are aware of this, 44:04.177 --> 44:05.010 but I just want to make sure 44:05.010 --> 44:07.384 that we kind of frame it appropriately. 44:07.384 --> 44:10.149 We have local police who are those 44:10.149 --> 44:12.232 who grow up in that area, 44:13.489 --> 44:14.993 work for the ministry of interior, 44:14.993 --> 44:18.209 and they are, if you will, cops on the beat. 44:18.209 --> 44:20.959 We have Nineveh provincial police 44:21.040 --> 44:24.790 who are kind of a little bit of a step above. 44:25.473 --> 44:29.046 They're not tied to a checkpoint on the street or anything. 44:29.046 --> 44:31.373 They're the ones that are able to move around 44:31.373 --> 44:33.706 and more along the lines of, 44:34.846 --> 44:36.186 if you will in the United States, 44:36.186 --> 44:40.353 kind of the state troopers who have some mobility there. 44:40.937 --> 44:43.236 And then you've got the federal police, 44:43.236 --> 44:46.819 who are trained by the Italian carabinieri. 44:46.878 --> 44:48.313 They're a gendarmerie. 44:48.313 --> 44:51.146 They are, really, a high-end force 44:52.841 --> 44:56.674 who has the capability for offensive maneuver. 44:57.271 --> 45:01.438 They have vehicles and equipment and weapon systems 45:01.804 --> 45:04.495 that make them much more than police 45:04.495 --> 45:07.578 and really kind of straddle the line. 45:07.910 --> 45:12.077 They're more like an army unit with policing authorities. 45:14.465 --> 45:16.453 And so the federal police, 45:16.453 --> 45:18.708 in kind of a little partnership 45:18.708 --> 45:21.791 with the emergency response division, 45:22.114 --> 45:25.328 who is currently falling under the federal police, 45:25.328 --> 45:29.495 they have proven to be a very effective fighting force. 45:29.632 --> 45:31.592 I know that in the past, 45:31.592 --> 45:33.463 they served perhaps a little bit different role 45:33.463 --> 45:35.431 in places like Fallujah. 45:35.431 --> 45:39.014 But here, they have, this is the first time 45:39.214 --> 45:41.279 that we have advised them. 45:41.279 --> 45:45.029 And it has been really a fruitful partnership 45:46.133 --> 45:47.383 in all regards. 45:48.399 --> 45:50.361 And so, as a result, what we have seen 45:50.361 --> 45:53.492 and I talked about that day in the church 45:53.492 --> 45:57.456 where we had all of the Iraqi security forces together. 45:57.456 --> 45:59.408 When I think about the greatest achievement 45:59.408 --> 46:02.760 or the greatest accomplishment of my time here 46:02.760 --> 46:04.760 has been the integration 46:04.782 --> 46:07.095 of each one of these Iraqi security forces. 46:07.095 --> 46:10.262 And so today, you'll see that the CTS, 46:10.706 --> 46:12.059 the Counterterrorism Services 46:12.059 --> 46:15.005 have given forces up to the Iraqi army, 46:15.005 --> 46:16.106 to the northern access, 46:16.106 --> 46:20.238 in order to be able to facilitate their clearance. 46:20.238 --> 46:23.724 You've got fed pol forces and Counterterrorism Services 46:23.724 --> 46:26.607 that meet each day in order to be able to synchronize 46:26.607 --> 46:28.350 and coordinate maneuvers 46:28.350 --> 46:30.957 as they are in support of one another 46:30.957 --> 46:33.457 in their clearance operations. 46:33.866 --> 46:36.767 Something that I don't think we've ever seen before, 46:36.767 --> 46:40.600 that degree of synchronization and cooperation 46:41.402 --> 46:43.816 amongst these Iraqi security forces. 46:43.816 --> 46:46.465 And I'm very proud to say that Task Force Strike 46:46.465 --> 46:48.719 and our advisers and our adviser teams, 46:48.719 --> 46:50.912 company commanders, battalion commanders, 46:50.912 --> 46:54.185 they've been there with each one of these elements, 46:54.185 --> 46:56.435 facilitating this crosstalk 46:56.555 --> 46:58.968 and this coordination and this synchronization. 46:58.968 --> 47:02.809 And over time, I'd like to say that we played a role 47:02.809 --> 47:05.796 in being able to bring each one of them together. 47:05.796 --> 47:09.346 And so the rapid gains that we've seen since 29 December, 47:09.346 --> 47:11.501 in my opinion, are a direct result 47:11.501 --> 47:14.875 of all of them working together in synchronization 47:14.875 --> 47:17.023 to be able to achieve the effects 47:17.023 --> 47:20.940 and the great success of the last couple weeks. 47:21.855 --> 47:24.284 - If I could follow on real quick. 47:24.284 --> 47:26.309 Around that timeframe, the 29th of December, 47:26.309 --> 47:27.940 I guess there was discussion of a second phase 47:27.940 --> 47:29.523 going inside Mosul. 47:29.666 --> 47:33.101 There was talk about the federal police's role in, 47:33.101 --> 47:34.413 as part of that operation. 47:34.413 --> 47:35.734 Were they always a part of the operation? 47:35.734 --> 47:37.339 Or were they brought in as an add-on 47:37.339 --> 47:41.256 because of the situation, the holding situation 47:41.329 --> 47:44.912 that had taken place in Mosul at that time? 47:52.539 --> 47:54.565 - Yes, so the federal police have always been part 47:54.565 --> 47:56.739 of this Mosul counteroffensive. 47:56.739 --> 48:00.636 On the 17th of October, the federal police were, 48:00.636 --> 48:03.803 they owned one of the axes of advance, 48:03.868 --> 48:06.701 and liberated almost 56 kilometers 48:10.027 --> 48:12.860 of what we used to call MSR Tampa, 48:13.184 --> 48:16.107 between MSR Tampa and the Tigris River. 48:16.107 --> 48:19.607 A very impressive move, multiple villages. 48:21.205 --> 48:23.535 We count villages a little bit different, 48:23.535 --> 48:24.688 but I think if you asked them, 48:24.688 --> 48:27.214 they'll tell you they liberated almost 100 villages 48:27.214 --> 48:29.631 through that particular area. 48:29.823 --> 48:31.890 And then they achieved what it was 48:31.890 --> 48:33.538 that they were initially asked to do. 48:33.538 --> 48:35.846 They met their limit of advance. 48:35.846 --> 48:38.606 They were there to set up some blocking positions 48:38.606 --> 48:41.106 and to support from that side. 48:43.430 --> 48:45.677 And then, and so, like you talked about, 48:45.677 --> 48:49.199 yeah, we did go to a phase two on December 29th, 48:49.199 --> 48:52.649 and there was a reorganization of the combat power. 48:52.649 --> 48:56.551 And so then the federal police then did bring forces 48:56.551 --> 48:58.409 from the west side of the Tigris 48:58.409 --> 49:00.263 over to the east side of the Tigris 49:00.263 --> 49:03.513 in order to be able to add combat power 49:03.625 --> 49:06.208 to the fight there on the east, 49:06.287 --> 49:09.538 as we had seen ISIL move in combat power 49:09.538 --> 49:11.556 from the west to the east as well. 49:11.556 --> 49:14.091 And so that addition of combat power, 49:14.091 --> 49:16.548 the development of a refined plan, 49:16.548 --> 49:19.837 and the ability to move forward in order to be able 49:19.837 --> 49:23.337 to make the rapid gains that we see today. 49:25.144 --> 49:27.517 - And with that, we will call it a day. 49:27.517 --> 49:30.377 Colonel Sylvia, thank you very much for your time 49:30.377 --> 49:33.444 and for coming to Baghdad to do this. 49:33.444 --> 49:35.769 And we wish you all the best of luck 49:35.769 --> 49:37.113 in the fight to re-take Mosul 49:37.113 --> 49:40.613 and look forward to seeing you again soon. 49:45.786 --> 49:48.703 - It's been my pleasure, thank you.