WEBVTT 00:00.840 --> 00:01.673 - Okay. 00:03.710 --> 00:07.627 Could we have everyone take their seats please? 00:10.627 --> 00:13.627 (people chattering) 00:17.741 --> 00:19.491 Okay, good afternoon, 00:20.122 --> 00:22.378 I'm Rick Ambrose, Executive Vice President 00:22.378 --> 00:25.540 for Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company. 00:25.540 --> 00:27.627 It is my great pleasure to introduce 00:27.627 --> 00:29.044 our next session. 00:29.493 --> 00:31.721 From Piang Yen to Brussels, 00:31.721 --> 00:33.015 frying pan to fire, 00:33.015 --> 00:35.831 and that should excite you for this topic. 00:35.831 --> 00:38.441 Our speaker today is General Curtis Scaparrotti 00:38.441 --> 00:40.939 is no stranger to challenging situations. 00:40.939 --> 00:43.742 He has led combat forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, 00:43.742 --> 00:47.505 overseeing peacekeeping operations on multiple 00:47.505 --> 00:50.509 continents and directed policy inside the bellway 00:50.509 --> 00:52.009 in Washington, DC. 00:52.279 --> 00:54.829 Having recently transitioned from the tremendous 00:54.829 --> 00:57.582 responsibility of overseeing the Korean Peninsula 00:57.582 --> 01:01.144 to his current role as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 01:01.144 --> 01:04.489 General Scaparrotti is confronted with a resurgent Russia, 01:04.489 --> 01:07.778 a migrant crisis of staggering complexity 01:07.778 --> 01:10.438 and a myriad of other strategic threats 01:10.438 --> 01:12.706 such as the recent unrest experience 01:12.706 --> 01:14.789 in the streets of Turkey. 01:15.364 --> 01:17.171 Our moderator, who will keep us 01:17.171 --> 01:19.627 explore General's dynamic environment 01:19.627 --> 01:21.689 is the renowned David Ignatius 01:21.689 --> 01:23.028 a best selling author 01:23.028 --> 01:26.790 and prize winning contributor to the Washington Post. 01:26.790 --> 01:29.465 I'm confident David's robust experience and extreme 01:29.465 --> 01:31.701 understanding of the foreign policy issues 01:31.701 --> 01:34.156 will serve us well this evening. 01:34.156 --> 01:36.720 This promises to be an interesting discussion 01:36.720 --> 01:40.032 so with that I'll turn you over to David. 01:40.032 --> 01:42.282 (clapping) 01:47.555 --> 01:48.638 - Hey thanks. 01:48.887 --> 01:52.050 So, thanks to Rick it's a pleasure to be here 01:52.050 --> 01:54.550 with General Scaparrotti he is 01:54.844 --> 01:58.427 known to his colleagues in uniform as Scap, 01:58.989 --> 02:03.156 on the stage today he's gonna be General Scaparrotti. 02:03.251 --> 02:05.168 - General Scap is good. 02:05.473 --> 02:07.986 - Well I wouldn't dare try that but, 02:07.986 --> 02:11.240 so I asked a colleague who'd served with 02:11.240 --> 02:14.240 General Scaparrotti in uniform today 02:14.660 --> 02:17.243 to describe him in a few words, 02:17.539 --> 02:21.124 and he said simply that he is a soldier soldier 02:21.124 --> 02:24.291 who has served in every tough command. 02:24.562 --> 02:26.701 I'm just gonna briefly list them for you 02:26.701 --> 02:29.072 it's a sort of history of our military 02:29.072 --> 02:31.994 over the last 20 years, he's served in the Balkans, 02:31.994 --> 02:34.465 he served as an Assistant Division Commander 02:34.465 --> 02:37.548 in Iraq in 2003, he's served twice in 02:38.808 --> 02:42.975 Afghanistan as I believe Commander of the 82nd Airborne 02:44.485 --> 02:47.971 ^and then as the number two the Core Commander he was 02:47.971 --> 02:50.186 ^the J3 with SetCom where I first 02:50.186 --> 02:53.639 ^met him serving under General Abizad he was the 02:53.639 --> 02:56.377 ^Joint Staff Director then he went off to command 02:56.377 --> 02:59.294 ^our forces in South Korea now he is 02:59.523 --> 03:03.523 the European commander and the NATO commander so 03:04.664 --> 03:06.747 gonna start with the fire 03:07.548 --> 03:10.145 using our title and then we'll get back to the 03:10.145 --> 03:11.062 frying pan. 03:11.150 --> 03:13.016 Start with Russia, General when you 03:13.016 --> 03:15.516 got out of West Point in 1978, 03:16.178 --> 03:18.178 you had trained to fight 03:18.349 --> 03:21.182 a country called the Soviet Union. 03:21.412 --> 03:23.745 And then that world changed, 03:24.291 --> 03:27.208 and now as you come back to command 03:27.777 --> 03:29.527 our forces in Europe, 03:29.633 --> 03:32.321 we all have this sense that the world has come 03:32.321 --> 03:35.768 full circle, in May when General Scaparrotti 03:35.768 --> 03:38.962 took over his command, he said using a phrase that's 03:38.962 --> 03:41.295 often used I'm told in Korea 03:41.809 --> 03:44.771 that he wanted the US and its allies to be ready to 03:44.771 --> 03:45.938 fight tonight. 03:46.775 --> 03:49.007 Meaning that this is a command now where we have to 03:49.007 --> 03:51.090 think of imminent danger. 03:51.639 --> 03:55.798 And what I ask you to begin by talking about Russia. 03:55.798 --> 03:58.465 And your evaluation of Russia as 03:59.119 --> 04:00.931 a potential adversary. 04:00.931 --> 04:04.179 We've watched Russia deploy new forces, 04:04.179 --> 04:07.429 new doctrine, in the Ukraine and Syria, 04:07.851 --> 04:09.411 I'm interested I know we all are in 04:09.411 --> 04:12.355 what's impressed you, what you're not so impressed by 04:12.355 --> 04:15.032 but more fundamentally what you think as 04:15.032 --> 04:17.538 NATO commander as European commander 04:17.538 --> 04:20.084 what we should do about Russia. 04:20.084 --> 04:22.218 - Well you know thank you David and I appreciate 04:22.218 --> 04:25.526 ^the opportunity to be here today, thank you very much. 04:25.526 --> 04:29.693 ^You know you mention coming out of West Point in '78 04:30.253 --> 04:33.131 ^I actually took Russian as the language 04:33.131 --> 04:35.246 ^at West Point because I thought it'd probably be good 04:35.246 --> 04:36.952 ^and I can learn a little about the culture 04:36.952 --> 04:39.007 ^and the language of my adversary. 04:39.007 --> 04:41.330 So that's how focused I was at the time 04:41.330 --> 04:42.663 when I came out. 04:42.753 --> 04:45.315 Learned the doctrine, knew their formations. 04:45.315 --> 04:47.855 And actually as a young officer went to Reforger 04:47.855 --> 04:49.688 on multiple occasions. 04:50.882 --> 04:53.215 To be prepared to fight 'em. 04:55.145 --> 04:58.213 And something I would share with you as you go through 04:58.213 --> 04:59.130 the career, 04:59.288 --> 05:02.955 I was in Germany with 10th Mountain Division 05:03.366 --> 05:04.616 on an exercise. 05:05.130 --> 05:07.219 I'd been out about two nights 05:07.219 --> 05:08.616 we had done a night infiltration 05:08.616 --> 05:10.764 I was a Major at the time, 05:10.764 --> 05:12.653 and I linked up with a classmate of mine 05:12.653 --> 05:14.009 from West Point by chance 05:14.009 --> 05:15.374 so I came to the edge of the woods 05:15.374 --> 05:16.988 we ran into each other. 05:16.988 --> 05:21.155 And he said Scap did you hear the wall came down today? 05:21.306 --> 05:23.490 I've never forgotten that moment, I was standing there 05:23.490 --> 05:25.990 you know a couple of nights of 05:26.275 --> 05:29.246 hard work and camouflage on and I remember thinking 05:29.246 --> 05:32.579 gosh, you know, this changes everything. 05:33.698 --> 05:36.031 So that was the early years, 05:37.827 --> 05:41.577 and then in '96, '95 we went in December '95, 05:43.818 --> 05:45.689 I led the Airborne Combat Team 05:45.689 --> 05:48.522 into Tuzla as we went into Bosnia. 05:48.794 --> 05:51.391 And, about a month later I did a relief in place 05:51.391 --> 05:53.538 of the area that I was responsible for 05:53.538 --> 05:56.038 to a Russian airborne brigade. 05:56.044 --> 05:57.961 And I remember thinking 05:58.273 --> 06:01.284 not in 100 years would I have thought 06:01.284 --> 06:03.332 particularly when I was going through West Point 06:03.332 --> 06:04.990 that I would actually do a relief in place. 06:04.990 --> 06:07.921 A friendly exchange with a Russian airborne brigade. 06:07.921 --> 06:09.650 And then you come full circle to the job 06:09.650 --> 06:10.733 I have today. 06:11.401 --> 06:12.901 And Russia's back. 06:13.745 --> 06:16.495 So, to get to your question about 06:17.398 --> 06:18.731 them being back. 06:19.472 --> 06:21.469 I'm impressed with the fact that they've 06:21.469 --> 06:23.842 taken a force that really had some serious problems 06:23.842 --> 06:25.592 only a few years ago. 06:26.347 --> 06:28.344 You can see that they've instilled discipline 06:28.344 --> 06:30.349 in their force when you just watch what you can see of 06:30.349 --> 06:32.432 their work, their photos. 06:32.479 --> 06:34.896 The dress of their personnel. 06:37.315 --> 06:40.148 You can see that they're learning. 06:40.327 --> 06:42.183 While much of their doctrine's based 06:42.183 --> 06:44.138 on the early Soviet doctrine, 06:44.138 --> 06:46.560 they are pretty agile of thinking if you look at 06:46.560 --> 06:49.621 the recent writings that their officers are doing. 06:49.621 --> 06:52.120 So they're actually taking a look at the world around them 06:52.120 --> 06:54.956 as they see it and adjusting their doctrine 06:54.956 --> 06:57.703 off that basis which is impressive. 06:57.703 --> 06:59.521 And they're clearly modernizing. 06:59.521 --> 07:00.856 They've reorganized their force 07:00.856 --> 07:02.444 they've made it smaller so it could be 07:02.444 --> 07:03.944 more professional. 07:04.868 --> 07:07.608 They when you look at the weapons systems et cetera 07:07.608 --> 07:09.691 they've been watching us. 07:09.969 --> 07:12.698 And so you mentioned the demonstrations 07:12.698 --> 07:15.663 they've fired long-range precision missiles 07:15.663 --> 07:18.456 from submarines, from surface ships, 07:18.456 --> 07:20.039 from medium bombers 07:21.280 --> 07:24.458 all at Syria they certainly didn't need to launch 'em 07:24.458 --> 07:26.114 from that distance but they did so 07:26.114 --> 07:28.451 so they could one probably train, exercise, 07:28.451 --> 07:30.451 and then demonstrate it. 07:31.323 --> 07:33.869 And so I'm impressed with that as well 07:33.869 --> 07:36.425 so we have an adversary here that we have to take 07:36.425 --> 07:37.675 very seriously. 07:37.963 --> 07:40.235 And they're gonna continue to improve in their 07:40.235 --> 07:42.485 capabilities in my opinion. 07:42.948 --> 07:45.105 Now real quickly we can talk quite a bit about 07:45.105 --> 07:47.861 what we need to do, I could probably fill the time with it. 07:47.861 --> 07:50.224 But first of all we have to be strong. 07:50.224 --> 07:53.663 And we also have to look at the world around us 07:53.663 --> 07:55.476 and be prepared to invest 07:55.476 --> 07:57.643 in the force that we need, 07:58.355 --> 08:00.575 to invest in the capabilities that we need 08:00.575 --> 08:02.242 to continue to stretch ourselves 08:02.242 --> 08:04.404 so that we outpace these capabilities that they're 08:04.404 --> 08:05.321 developing. 08:05.819 --> 08:07.691 We need to do that in the United States 08:07.691 --> 08:09.789 and as the secure we need to do it 08:09.789 --> 08:12.039 as a NATO alliance as well. 08:13.116 --> 08:15.897 When you look at Wales in 2014 the summit 08:15.897 --> 08:19.158 and then the Warsaw Summit that we just had 08:19.158 --> 08:23.004 you can see that NATO has realized the challenge. 08:23.004 --> 08:26.343 There was, and I can talk about this if you want 08:26.343 --> 08:28.862 in a minute, they have shown adaptation 08:28.862 --> 08:30.362 between that time. 08:31.408 --> 08:33.831 And then in Wales they reconfirmed our men in 08:33.831 --> 08:36.331 Warsaw, they reconfirmed this. 08:36.909 --> 08:40.563 - I wanna get to Warsaw and the commitments and 08:40.563 --> 08:43.250 how credible they are in just a moment 08:43.250 --> 08:45.995 but I wanna ask you about a subject that's come up 08:45.995 --> 08:49.578 in almost every panel that we've had today. 08:49.617 --> 08:50.867 And that is the 08:52.404 --> 08:54.321 seeming Russian hack of 08:56.169 --> 09:00.246 the DNC and then subsequent disclosure by somebody 09:00.246 --> 09:01.517 of that information. 09:01.517 --> 09:03.223 I don't wanna ask you to 09:03.223 --> 09:05.087 chime in on the details of that, 09:05.087 --> 09:07.366 nobody has all day, but I wanna. 09:07.366 --> 09:08.749 (laughing) 09:08.749 --> 09:10.147 Just a little bit. 09:10.147 --> 09:11.730 But we keep trying. 09:14.375 --> 09:16.696 But I do want to ask you about 09:16.696 --> 09:19.075 what the Russians have been up to 09:19.075 --> 09:22.089 in Europe in your area of responsibility. 09:22.089 --> 09:25.006 There've been repeated news stories 09:25.057 --> 09:26.557 about the Russians 09:27.813 --> 09:28.646 funding 09:31.242 --> 09:32.742 phony news outlets 09:33.337 --> 09:35.754 about Russian contributions to right-wing 09:35.754 --> 09:38.456 political parties in Europe which have had the effect 09:38.456 --> 09:41.786 obviously of destabilizing the political situation. 09:41.786 --> 09:43.203 All sorts of what 09:44.955 --> 09:47.685 Vladimir Putin and his former intelligence colleagues 09:47.685 --> 09:49.435 call active measures. 09:49.482 --> 09:52.148 So this is clearly a country that uses these 09:52.148 --> 09:54.558 active measures, quite apart from whatever happened 09:54.558 --> 09:55.891 in the DNC hack. 09:57.396 --> 09:58.896 So I wanna ask you 09:59.293 --> 10:01.710 as UCOM Commander most of all 10:02.125 --> 10:06.292 what do we do about an adversary that uses those tools? 10:07.316 --> 10:09.649 Are we really able to combat 10:09.871 --> 10:13.132 those kinds of tools and stay faithful to 10:13.132 --> 10:15.132 our own values and laws? 10:16.745 --> 10:18.650 - Well first of all I would just tell ya that 10:18.650 --> 10:22.239 we've been calling this, you know you heard it as 10:22.239 --> 10:23.656 hybrid warfare or 10:24.684 --> 10:27.101 activities short of conflict. 10:28.120 --> 10:29.469 But I would tell ya that you know 10:29.469 --> 10:32.552 we see the activity and in cyberspace 10:33.146 --> 10:35.313 we see influence in Europe 10:36.033 --> 10:39.116 in terms of political parties funding 10:39.330 --> 10:41.663 some misinformation to build 10:44.290 --> 10:46.281 facts on the ground that 10:46.281 --> 10:47.864 really aren't true. 10:48.509 --> 10:50.006 And what I would say to you is 10:50.006 --> 10:53.070 I believe that it's a part of their doctrine. 10:53.070 --> 10:55.300 In essence, when you look at the range 10:55.300 --> 10:57.796 through the spectrum of conflict it begins with 10:57.796 --> 11:01.379 activities below the threshold of conflict. 11:01.941 --> 11:03.895 In order to set conditions and perhaps even 11:03.895 --> 11:04.978 be successful 11:05.569 --> 11:07.832 in their objectives without even 11:07.832 --> 11:09.749 approaching a conflict. 11:11.046 --> 11:12.525 So I think it's part of their doctrine 11:12.525 --> 11:14.956 I think we need to expect to see them continue it. 11:14.956 --> 11:17.502 Personally I think we can deal with it. 11:17.502 --> 11:20.507 It's difficult particularly for the western world 11:20.507 --> 11:23.918 because in the west, you know we believe in 11:23.918 --> 11:26.598 freedom of the press, we believe in being truthful 11:26.598 --> 11:29.003 in the press, we believe in the rule of law. 11:29.003 --> 11:31.573 So, we have difficulty approaching 11:31.573 --> 11:33.240 and countering this. 11:34.820 --> 11:37.145 But we have to and I think the best way we do it is 11:37.145 --> 11:41.312 we need to be very bold about putting a spotlight on it. 11:42.109 --> 11:44.996 That when we know it's true, we make sure it's known 11:44.996 --> 11:47.079 that we get it out there. 11:47.540 --> 11:50.207 The other is that we have to use 11:50.691 --> 11:52.195 the whole of the government approach 11:52.195 --> 11:53.944 both as a country in the United States 11:53.944 --> 11:55.277 but within NATO. 11:55.916 --> 11:59.470 In order to do our own information factual information. 11:59.470 --> 12:02.082 To make sure that that's out there. 12:02.082 --> 12:03.499 To make sure that 12:04.638 --> 12:07.283 you know we are forthright with our partners 12:07.283 --> 12:11.366 in helping them establish democratic institutions 12:12.568 --> 12:14.050 et cetera those are the things we can do 12:14.050 --> 12:15.823 and the final thing David I would say that 12:15.823 --> 12:18.740 you know in Warsaw, NATO and the EU 12:19.723 --> 12:22.414 made a commitment they actually signed an agreement 12:22.414 --> 12:23.831 to work together. 12:23.861 --> 12:28.028 That's pretty remarkable for these two organizations. 12:29.189 --> 12:31.325 But what I think's important about it it's about 12:31.325 --> 12:33.981 cooperation and the understanding that the EU provides 12:33.981 --> 12:36.134 talents and skills and insights 12:36.134 --> 12:38.384 that we don't have in NATO. 12:38.481 --> 12:40.148 It's not what we do. 12:41.278 --> 12:43.493 And together with our security expertise 12:43.493 --> 12:46.388 I think we can do some good things precisely when you 12:46.388 --> 12:49.916 talk about the cyber threat, and you know the threats in 12:49.916 --> 12:51.166 hybrid warfare. 12:51.822 --> 12:55.034 - If I understand you, what you're saying in effect 12:55.034 --> 12:57.289 is that part of what NATO has to do 12:57.289 --> 12:59.568 in combating this adversary with this 12:59.568 --> 13:01.318 set of tactics, is to 13:03.672 --> 13:07.507 employ what people often call information operations. 13:07.507 --> 13:10.313 In other words meet them in that battle space 13:10.313 --> 13:11.739 am I understanding that? 13:11.739 --> 13:13.233 - That's right and if you 13:13.233 --> 13:15.412 look at it with the Russians, 13:15.412 --> 13:17.412 if you look at this with 13:17.420 --> 13:19.170 you know counter ISOL 13:19.259 --> 13:22.838 or counter terrorism which we also have in Europe 13:22.838 --> 13:25.421 you know we have to become more 13:28.599 --> 13:30.182 adept and also more 13:32.001 --> 13:33.668 prepared and willing 13:34.065 --> 13:36.397 to use information operations. 13:36.397 --> 13:38.917 And we can be true to what we always 13:38.917 --> 13:41.695 have professed and that is that we're truthful 13:41.695 --> 13:43.451 in our information operations. 13:43.451 --> 13:46.288 - I wouldn't be faithful to my own profession 13:46.288 --> 13:48.287 if I didn't express anxiety about 13:48.287 --> 13:50.120 information operations 13:50.783 --> 13:52.756 and the possibility that they'll blow back 13:52.756 --> 13:54.839 in ways that hurt us, but 13:55.760 --> 13:58.498 we have laws and I'm sure you'll be thinking carefully 13:58.498 --> 14:00.248 about how to do this. 14:00.311 --> 14:02.584 I wanna ask about the Warsaw Summit 14:02.584 --> 14:05.167 which just finished this month. 14:06.920 --> 14:09.837 The Warsaw Summit was notable to me 14:10.914 --> 14:15.081 for agreement on the rotating deployment of four battalions 14:15.357 --> 14:17.774 in the Baltics and in Poland, 14:18.194 --> 14:22.194 more aggressive step that the Russians have said 14:22.230 --> 14:24.505 they really didn't wanna see happen. 14:24.505 --> 14:26.776 And the idea as it was explained is that 14:26.776 --> 14:29.562 this is a tripwire, much as we used to have 14:29.562 --> 14:32.079 a tripwire in the days of the Soviet Union where 14:32.079 --> 14:33.982 the Soviets couldn't advance without 14:33.982 --> 14:36.678 killing some Americans and risking 14:36.678 --> 14:38.438 a broader conflict that we're gonna 14:38.438 --> 14:41.105 have these four deployed forces. 14:41.316 --> 14:42.983 Not large in number. 14:43.496 --> 14:46.200 I wanna ask you to talk about that but 14:46.200 --> 14:49.671 to be pointed in asking whether it's really credible. 14:49.671 --> 14:51.526 The implicit idea is that 14:51.526 --> 14:54.609 we will sacrifice Chicago, let's say, 14:56.814 --> 14:58.981 or Aspen, to save Vilneas. 15:01.137 --> 15:05.304 That our commitment is such that if you trip the wire, 15:05.691 --> 15:08.336 you are in a conflict situation which 15:08.336 --> 15:10.253 Americans are prepared, 15:10.333 --> 15:13.614 so it was always a question in the Cold War 15:13.614 --> 15:16.325 of our credible that was, how credible is it today? 15:16.325 --> 15:18.131 - I think it's credible I mean 15:18.131 --> 15:20.303 what strikes me about Warsaw first of all is 15:20.303 --> 15:22.386 28 nations came together, 15:23.198 --> 15:25.422 they agreed on a communique if you've seen 15:25.422 --> 15:27.827 it's 100 and I think 18 paragraphs. 15:27.827 --> 15:30.705 But they came together and made this commitment. 15:30.705 --> 15:34.651 They recommitted to Article 5 in the Baltics essentially 15:34.651 --> 15:37.777 and said they'll come to defense of those countries. 15:37.777 --> 15:40.325 Now you know you can look at this as a tripwire, 15:40.325 --> 15:42.598 but I look at it as a commitment you know 15:42.598 --> 15:45.053 and within deterrence you've got to have both 15:45.053 --> 15:47.440 the capability and the intent of the will 15:47.440 --> 15:50.271 and it has to be understood in the mind of the adversary. 15:50.271 --> 15:52.726 So this is a way to tell them to demonstrate to them 15:52.726 --> 15:54.991 that we are committed to this, 15:54.991 --> 15:57.560 and we do have the will to defend Europe. 15:57.560 --> 15:59.799 Now the other point I wanna make is 15:59.799 --> 16:02.549 we focus on those four battalions 16:03.369 --> 16:05.209 and enhanced forward presence. 16:05.209 --> 16:07.355 But there's much more to that. 16:07.355 --> 16:09.586 Those battalions are a part of 16:09.586 --> 16:11.419 the individual nations 16:12.748 --> 16:15.244 forces that they have there as their commitment 16:15.244 --> 16:16.577 to NATO as well. 16:17.099 --> 16:19.682 It's a part of our error domain 16:20.355 --> 16:22.585 and the forces that we have there 16:22.585 --> 16:24.639 and NATO and the United States 16:24.639 --> 16:25.806 within Europe. 16:25.839 --> 16:27.752 The maritime domain's part of that, 16:27.752 --> 16:29.502 Cyber's part of that. 16:29.514 --> 16:31.655 28 nations diplomatic capability and information 16:31.655 --> 16:33.822 capability's part of that. 16:34.377 --> 16:37.728 So, deterrence is a much bigger piece of this 16:37.728 --> 16:39.760 than those four battalions. 16:39.760 --> 16:41.250 And that's what creates the turns 16:41.250 --> 16:43.307 you know I think in the mind of Putin 16:43.307 --> 16:46.558 and the Russians, the idea that you don't want to do this. 16:46.558 --> 16:49.532 You won't succeed and the cost is gonna be 16:49.532 --> 16:52.634 far too high compared to any benefit you think 16:52.634 --> 16:53.634 you may get. 16:53.791 --> 16:56.208 - So to push this question of 16:56.387 --> 16:58.970 credibility of this commitment, 16:59.787 --> 17:01.287 let's imagine that 17:02.562 --> 17:06.062 an American political candidate said that. 17:06.847 --> 17:08.162 (laughing) 17:08.162 --> 17:09.669 - Has anybody answered this question today? 17:09.669 --> 17:11.356 (laughing) 17:11.356 --> 17:12.973 - Trying to phrase this in a way that 17:12.973 --> 17:16.268 you won't say I can't possibly comment on that. 17:16.268 --> 17:18.965 Let's imagine that an American politician 17:18.965 --> 17:20.715 not even a candidate, 17:21.053 --> 17:24.886 said that America's willingness to back up its 17:26.712 --> 17:30.212 Article 5 NATO commitment to defend allies 17:30.856 --> 17:33.818 that are under attack would be subject to our review 17:33.818 --> 17:37.030 of whether they've been spending what they promised. 17:37.030 --> 17:39.493 So the way I wanna put the question is 17:39.493 --> 17:41.310 you're a NATO commander. 17:41.310 --> 17:44.323 You are the person that 28 militaries look to 17:44.323 --> 17:46.307 for guidance, so let's say 17:46.307 --> 17:49.967 that one of your counterparts in Europe says to you 17:49.967 --> 17:52.713 General I'm concerned about whether the 17:52.713 --> 17:54.893 American commitment is real, 17:54.893 --> 17:56.932 I read these things in the press, 17:56.932 --> 17:59.637 how do you tell that person I'm sure this happens to you 17:59.637 --> 18:01.661 on every trip you make, how do you tell that person 18:01.661 --> 18:02.828 yes it's real? 18:03.430 --> 18:05.097 - Well first of all, 18:05.571 --> 18:08.654 within NATO and even in Korea and the 18:08.866 --> 18:11.046 alliance there when I was there, 18:11.046 --> 18:14.879 these are ironclad commitments that we've made 18:15.131 --> 18:17.048 within these alliances. 18:17.080 --> 18:19.997 And they look to us for leadership. 18:20.441 --> 18:22.422 Every one of those countries did in both places 18:22.422 --> 18:23.434 that I had been. 18:23.434 --> 18:25.677 And so it's not unusual for them to read our news 18:25.677 --> 18:27.066 from time to time and say, 18:27.066 --> 18:29.436 Scap, what do you think about this? 18:29.436 --> 18:31.708 It's the reassurance that they need 18:31.708 --> 18:33.939 you know in NATO as I said we committed 18:33.939 --> 18:38.106 to NATO many years ago, but we recommitted in Warsaw again 18:39.882 --> 18:43.965 to Article 5, and I'm certain of that commitment. 18:45.083 --> 18:47.555 And one thing they need to know is they can 18:47.555 --> 18:50.293 count on the United States to do what we say 18:50.293 --> 18:51.356 we're gonna do. 18:51.356 --> 18:54.939 - So, just to play the devil's advocate and 18:55.667 --> 18:59.834 thinking of this entirely imaginary political figure 19:00.911 --> 19:03.374 who complains that the Europeans are not 19:03.374 --> 19:06.078 in some cases paying what they promised, 19:06.078 --> 19:09.078 paying their fair share for defense, 19:11.624 --> 19:15.286 isn't that hypothetical political candidate correct 19:15.286 --> 19:16.643 in making that argument? 19:16.643 --> 19:17.901 I mean isn't that true that the 19:17.901 --> 19:21.185 Europeans are not stepping up to the commitments 19:21.185 --> 19:23.001 that they make, so on the other hand of that 19:23.001 --> 19:27.168 how do we say to them you really must do what you promised 19:27.618 --> 19:29.374 or you're gonna risk losing 19:29.374 --> 19:31.791 political support in America. 19:31.930 --> 19:34.051 Quite apart from the unnamed individual. 19:34.051 --> 19:35.487 - Well you know just set aside the 19:35.487 --> 19:37.320 candidate or whatever, 19:38.374 --> 19:41.159 and I'll just tell ya a personal story that you 19:41.159 --> 19:42.826 first of all in NATO 19:43.988 --> 19:46.683 you know I support the idea that we've committed 19:46.683 --> 19:49.600 to a 2% and of that percentage 19:49.621 --> 19:52.449 20% the modernization, it's very important. 19:52.449 --> 19:54.814 Without it, we're not gonna outpace 19:54.814 --> 19:56.638 Russia's modernization. 19:56.638 --> 19:58.202 We've got to have that 19:58.202 --> 20:00.067 in order to provide a credible force 20:00.067 --> 20:02.746 like you talked about so I reinforce that with 'em. 20:02.746 --> 20:05.732 And today in NATO, at Warsaw we've got five countries 20:05.732 --> 20:08.336 out of 28 that have met that 2%. 20:08.336 --> 20:11.253 We've got 22 in this year that have 20:12.525 --> 20:14.775 increased their investment. 20:15.306 --> 20:17.479 So we're turning the corner on this. 20:17.479 --> 20:19.441 And we've got strong commitments from 'em. 20:19.441 --> 20:22.608 What I would say to you though is that 20:23.288 --> 20:25.038 I tell them typically 20:25.651 --> 20:27.901 that look, we have a people 20:28.447 --> 20:31.927 and a Congress with a tough budget as well. 20:31.927 --> 20:34.505 And rightfully so they wanna make sure 20:34.505 --> 20:36.775 their defense money is spent wisely 20:36.775 --> 20:39.522 and that we can take care of our people too. 20:39.522 --> 20:42.068 So you know as a leader of another country, 20:42.068 --> 20:44.659 you have to put your share into this. 20:44.659 --> 20:46.903 You have to do that 'cause when I go back 20:46.903 --> 20:48.335 to testify at Congress, 20:48.335 --> 20:50.015 I get asked these questions, when I go to 20:50.015 --> 20:52.138 Capitol Hill I get asked these questions, 20:52.138 --> 20:54.363 and that's typically what I talk to 'em about. 20:54.363 --> 20:56.184 Their responsibility based on the fact that 20:56.184 --> 20:58.184 we're here to help them, 20:58.453 --> 21:01.110 we've got some tough budget issues as well 21:01.110 --> 21:02.333 they have to do their share. 21:02.333 --> 21:04.630 I just approach it that way. 21:04.630 --> 21:06.834 - Thank you for responding to that 21:06.834 --> 21:09.273 I know that's a tricky issue for 21:09.273 --> 21:12.171 a person serving in uniform to answer. 21:12.171 --> 21:14.448 Another question we've been talking about 21:14.448 --> 21:17.120 all day in different sessions is Turkey 21:17.120 --> 21:19.120 after the military coup. 21:20.290 --> 21:22.290 Turkey is a NATO member, 21:22.662 --> 21:25.624 Turkey's military cooperation is something that's 21:25.624 --> 21:27.541 right on your plate and 21:28.632 --> 21:31.221 that's a complicated issue after there's been 21:31.221 --> 21:33.327 a military coup to have good relations 21:33.327 --> 21:34.827 with the military. 21:35.215 --> 21:36.048 You have 21:36.939 --> 21:39.485 fought alongside Turkish troops 21:39.485 --> 21:41.941 in Afghanistan and you've told me 21:41.941 --> 21:43.487 earlier today that you 21:43.487 --> 21:46.601 since you took over in May have traveled to Turkey 21:46.601 --> 21:50.312 and met with their most senior military leadership. 21:50.312 --> 21:53.109 I'm sure you're hoping to go back soon. 21:53.109 --> 21:53.942 - Soon. 21:54.475 --> 21:55.846 - And so I wanna ask 21:55.846 --> 21:58.061 in this very delicate process, 21:58.061 --> 22:00.144 how we could work to keep 22:00.790 --> 22:03.623 Turkey an effective member of NATO 22:04.460 --> 22:07.588 and whether military to military cooperation 22:07.588 --> 22:10.651 which has increased significantly in the last year that 22:10.651 --> 22:14.354 opening of Incirlik Air Base to American operations 22:14.354 --> 22:15.604 was a big deal. 22:16.351 --> 22:18.518 How we can keep that going 22:18.906 --> 22:21.428 or maybe I should ask can we keep that going 22:21.428 --> 22:23.428 in this new environment? 22:23.458 --> 22:25.731 - Oh I think we can, the first thing I think about 22:25.731 --> 22:27.643 when you say how do we keep that going, 22:27.643 --> 22:28.994 it's about relationships. 22:28.994 --> 22:30.661 It's about presence. 22:31.032 --> 22:33.069 It's about being there when they need ya 22:33.069 --> 22:35.082 and working together on hard problems. 22:35.082 --> 22:37.764 In the mil to mil relationship is 22:37.764 --> 22:38.931 very important 22:39.619 --> 22:40.702 in this case. 22:42.184 --> 22:43.684 Turkey itself sits 22:43.845 --> 22:46.959 right at really the crossroads of all the challenges 22:46.959 --> 22:49.246 we see in Europe whether it's the refugee issue 22:49.246 --> 22:51.503 whether it's counter terrorism 22:51.503 --> 22:54.420 whether it's the Russians in Syria. 22:56.040 --> 22:58.801 In every case, they've got the problems 22:58.801 --> 23:01.297 they have a terrorist problem of their own. 23:01.297 --> 23:03.436 So you know it's very important as a NATO ally 23:03.436 --> 23:05.431 that we keep 'em strong and I think we can do that 23:05.431 --> 23:07.564 I would tell ya that it was the first place 23:07.564 --> 23:10.564 that I visited after I took command. 23:11.884 --> 23:14.301 And I spent three days there. 23:14.472 --> 23:17.449 I spent a good deal of time with General Akar 23:17.449 --> 23:20.604 their shad for that reason so that's an indication 23:20.604 --> 23:22.193 of how important it is. 23:22.193 --> 23:24.566 And I've talked to him since the coup. 23:24.566 --> 23:27.233 So you know my intent is is that 23:27.569 --> 23:30.307 you know as soon as I can I'm gonna go back 23:30.307 --> 23:32.637 I'm gonna see him again we've talked since, 23:32.637 --> 23:34.387 and we'll continue to 23:35.533 --> 23:38.446 build where we need to, rebuild a relationship. 23:38.446 --> 23:39.902 Some of the officers that we 23:39.902 --> 23:42.765 have our relationships with in Turkey are now 23:42.765 --> 23:45.932 either detained in some cases retired. 23:47.042 --> 23:49.042 As a result of the coup. 23:50.513 --> 23:53.133 So, we've got some work to do there. 23:53.133 --> 23:55.264 - Is there any way you can share 23:55.264 --> 23:58.178 at least the flavor of your conversation with your 23:58.178 --> 24:00.498 Turkish counterpart after the coup? 24:00.498 --> 24:02.870 I know that would be of interest to people. 24:02.870 --> 24:05.699 - Well I thought it struck me as a positive conversation 24:05.699 --> 24:07.738 and what I mean by that was 24:07.738 --> 24:09.988 you can imagine in his case 24:10.076 --> 24:13.590 he was taken hostage, separated from his wife 24:13.590 --> 24:15.173 as I understand it. 24:16.569 --> 24:18.815 So he had I'm sure a very long night 24:18.815 --> 24:21.122 on Friday night into Saturday when he was rescued by 24:21.122 --> 24:23.601 I think his special operations forces. 24:23.601 --> 24:26.795 But I talked to him several days after that 24:26.795 --> 24:28.128 he was positive. 24:28.560 --> 24:32.060 He admitted that it's stressful right now. 24:33.252 --> 24:37.002 But, we are committed, you have a solid ally, 24:37.607 --> 24:39.774 I appreciate your support, 24:40.619 --> 24:43.547 and he said you can come see me or visit me 24:43.547 --> 24:45.178 as soon as you want. 24:45.178 --> 24:48.190 Which was I think given all that he had to handle 24:48.190 --> 24:50.337 as the chief of their defense at that time was 24:50.337 --> 24:51.754 a generous offer. 24:53.785 --> 24:57.070 - President Erdogan of Turkey is scheduled to meet with 24:57.070 --> 25:00.153 President Putin I think on August 6th 25:00.982 --> 25:02.649 in a week or so, and 25:04.138 --> 25:07.305 I'm curious what you as NATO commander 25:07.972 --> 25:11.389 if there's, and obviously heads of states 25:11.570 --> 25:14.776 meet with each other all the time, friend and foe but 25:14.776 --> 25:17.280 is there anything that would concern you 25:17.280 --> 25:19.780 that might develop Turkey and Russia 25:19.780 --> 25:23.555 have been on a process of improving relationships 25:23.555 --> 25:24.472 lately that 25:26.194 --> 25:29.540 could lead to a point where I assume it would give us 25:29.540 --> 25:33.392 concern from a standpoint of Turkey being a NATO member. 25:33.392 --> 25:36.596 - Yeah, well first of all you know we encouraged 25:36.596 --> 25:38.013 Turkey to try and 25:41.133 --> 25:45.300 recover from the shoot down and solve that problem 25:45.669 --> 25:48.118 with the Russians so it's positive that they're 25:48.118 --> 25:50.170 beyond that now and that they can talk because 25:50.170 --> 25:52.958 they're working in such close proximity with us 25:52.958 --> 25:55.737 on their border in Syria that we really needed 25:55.737 --> 25:57.883 to get beyond that so that was good. 25:57.883 --> 26:00.439 And I think we'll watch closely 26:00.439 --> 26:03.228 in terms of how this relationship develops. 26:03.228 --> 26:06.898 They from my point of view I would be concerned 26:06.898 --> 26:09.301 if it appeared that they were departing from 26:09.301 --> 26:13.064 the values that is the bedrock of the Washington Treaty 26:13.064 --> 26:15.484 and NATO that they're a part of. 26:15.484 --> 26:16.651 A rule of law, 26:17.344 --> 26:20.177 democratic institutions et cetera. 26:20.511 --> 26:23.100 And so that's what we'll watch closely 26:23.100 --> 26:26.769 and we hope that that will go in the right direction. 26:26.769 --> 26:29.599 - I'm gonna ask you a military hardware question 26:29.599 --> 26:31.828 that I think many members of this audience 26:31.828 --> 26:34.817 would be interested in and forgive me if it's 26:34.817 --> 26:36.734 a little bit technical. 26:37.229 --> 26:39.677 But Secretary of Defense Ash Carter 26:39.677 --> 26:41.898 and his Deputy Secretary Bob Work 26:41.898 --> 26:44.731 have talked a good deal and fought 26:44.785 --> 26:47.757 a lot about what they call the Third Offset 26:47.757 --> 26:50.779 strategy it's a strange name but the basic idea is that 26:50.779 --> 26:53.112 deterrence against Russia is 26:54.965 --> 26:57.548 more fragile than it should be. 26:57.702 --> 27:00.016 And that as in the past when we had worries 27:00.016 --> 27:03.276 about deterrence, maybe we should leverage our technologies 27:03.276 --> 27:06.473 so they've said we have enormous advantage 27:06.473 --> 27:09.319 in particular in autonomous systems 27:09.319 --> 27:11.442 our ability to use very advanced 27:11.442 --> 27:14.859 IT to develop systems that are dispersed, 27:16.320 --> 27:17.653 hard to take out 27:19.207 --> 27:20.624 in a single blow. 27:21.244 --> 27:23.299 So as to introduce uncertainty 27:23.299 --> 27:26.637 in the minds of a potential adversary like Russia 27:26.637 --> 27:29.135 that if you take a step you can't be sure 27:29.135 --> 27:31.622 how we might react and I wonder 27:31.622 --> 27:32.789 whether you as 27:33.519 --> 27:37.436 UCOM commander first of all 'cause these are US 27:37.592 --> 27:40.474 systems, whether this seems like a good path 27:40.474 --> 27:43.759 for us to follow, or a little bit echoes of Star Wars, 27:43.759 --> 27:46.904 it's an area where we have such technological leadership 27:46.904 --> 27:49.235 is that the kind of thing we should leverage? 27:49.235 --> 27:51.985 Is it likely to be stabilizing or 27:52.380 --> 27:55.417 some people argue it could be really destabilizing. 27:55.417 --> 27:57.774 - Yeah, well first of all I think it is the way 27:57.774 --> 28:00.461 we should go, and you know when you look at 28:00.461 --> 28:02.658 deterrence in the Cold War and you compare it to today 28:02.658 --> 28:05.212 a lot has changed, I think it's much more complex today 28:05.212 --> 28:07.342 than it was in the Cold War in the sense that 28:07.342 --> 28:10.925 you know you have the speed of information. 28:11.456 --> 28:14.310 Tighter decision space, but one of the other things is 28:14.310 --> 28:16.760 technology, at that time we had some clear 28:16.760 --> 28:18.343 technological leads 28:18.803 --> 28:20.568 that gave us a great advantage in terms of 28:20.568 --> 28:24.735 credibility and will and uncertainty in their mind. 28:26.291 --> 28:29.624 And, technology today is more dispersed, 28:30.274 --> 28:33.500 not only to nation states but to non-state actors et cetera. 28:33.500 --> 28:36.171 So we need to stay ahead of that. 28:36.171 --> 28:38.285 And I think it is important 28:38.285 --> 28:41.896 in our deterrent strategy but it's also important in 28:41.896 --> 28:43.751 helping us in the way we fight, 28:43.751 --> 28:47.251 how we deal with the speed of information, 28:48.057 --> 28:50.224 the amount of information, 28:50.275 --> 28:53.106 the closed decision space we have to make decisions now 28:53.106 --> 28:54.856 our senior leaders do 28:54.871 --> 28:56.726 what we would have perhaps a week in the past 28:56.726 --> 28:59.731 that may be hours or best days today. 28:59.731 --> 29:01.648 And you know the machine 29:01.648 --> 29:05.215 and human interface et cetera can help us with those 29:05.215 --> 29:06.132 things too. 29:08.286 --> 29:09.949 - So I wanna ask one more question about 29:09.949 --> 29:11.616 European NATO issues 29:13.246 --> 29:16.246 and then move a little more broadly. 29:16.375 --> 29:19.205 I had dinner Tuesday night before coming out here 29:19.205 --> 29:22.541 with a Russian defense analyst I'm gonna put 29:22.541 --> 29:25.845 quotation marks around that 'cause you never know. 29:25.845 --> 29:27.318 (laughing) 29:27.318 --> 29:28.985 And this fellow said 29:30.197 --> 29:32.901 you know you Americans are so focused on the Baltics 29:32.901 --> 29:34.384 and protecting the Baltics. 29:34.384 --> 29:38.301 People around Putin accept that the Baltics are 29:38.335 --> 29:42.039 in NATO and that's not what we're thinking about. 29:42.039 --> 29:44.452 That's not how we're deploying our forces, 29:44.452 --> 29:46.869 we're thinking about Ukraine. 29:47.014 --> 29:48.679 That's our focus, that's the real issue 29:48.679 --> 29:49.512 for us. 29:49.746 --> 29:53.155 So, I wanna ask you to talk about Ukraine and 29:53.155 --> 29:55.238 start with this question, 29:57.233 --> 30:00.064 our Secretary of State is trying very hard to 30:00.064 --> 30:02.481 rehabilitate and push through 30:04.399 --> 30:06.247 the immense process for 30:06.247 --> 30:09.950 stabilizing Ukraine and creating a kind of balance 30:09.950 --> 30:12.829 a more decentralized political set up there. 30:12.829 --> 30:15.956 Satisfying some of the Russian concerns. 30:15.956 --> 30:19.706 From your perspective as a military commander 30:19.811 --> 30:21.978 would that kind of outcome 30:22.542 --> 30:25.459 where the Minsk process was adopted 30:25.519 --> 30:29.097 lead to a stable Ukraine that would be a stable 30:29.097 --> 30:32.097 buffer or would it lead to perpetual 30:33.378 --> 30:35.863 instability among these fragments? 30:35.863 --> 30:37.331 How do you look at that? 30:37.331 --> 30:38.496 - Well first of all we 30:38.496 --> 30:41.932 hope that we can work through the Minsk Agreement and 30:41.932 --> 30:43.599 find stability there 30:44.120 --> 30:46.867 'cause stability on eastern flank or anywhere 30:46.867 --> 30:50.495 in Europe for instance is very important to us. 30:50.495 --> 30:52.382 The Russians today in many of these areas 30:52.382 --> 30:54.049 like that or Georgia 30:54.397 --> 30:57.980 tend to keep this turmoil kind of churning. 30:57.995 --> 31:00.047 And that to day to day in Europe 31:00.047 --> 31:02.004 is not a good thing and it's a place where 31:02.004 --> 31:05.382 you can have conflict because a miscalculation 31:05.382 --> 31:08.861 whatever so we need to find a way to bring some 31:08.861 --> 31:10.694 stability to the area. 31:12.081 --> 31:13.581 And then secondly, 31:15.411 --> 31:19.047 we wanna reinforce the sovereignty of a country. 31:19.047 --> 31:21.519 That, you know that's really what we stand for 31:21.519 --> 31:23.436 in the Baltics as well. 31:23.540 --> 31:25.913 Is that nations have a right to determine 31:25.913 --> 31:28.000 the government that they want to have. 31:28.000 --> 31:31.038 And that's simply in a basis what we support. 31:31.038 --> 31:33.205 And, you know I think that 31:33.761 --> 31:35.678 that's our way forward. 31:36.182 --> 31:38.722 It will in the end depend on how the Russians 31:38.722 --> 31:40.077 approach it though. 31:40.077 --> 31:42.074 - And give us your military assessment 31:42.074 --> 31:43.574 of Ukraine itself. 31:43.979 --> 31:45.146 The government 31:46.251 --> 31:48.501 it's a very fractious place 31:48.761 --> 31:50.253 it's a place where 31:50.253 --> 31:52.170 all reporting says that 31:52.575 --> 31:54.257 corruption is a big problem. 31:54.257 --> 31:56.972 Are they moving toward a better ability to 31:56.972 --> 32:00.389 defend themselves, to use modern weapons, 32:00.506 --> 32:04.673 they have this enormous military threat to their east 32:05.249 --> 32:07.007 how do you think they're doing? 32:07.007 --> 32:09.093 - Well there's no question that they're working hard 32:09.093 --> 32:10.858 to build a better defense and 32:10.858 --> 32:12.448 our soldiers that work with 'em 32:12.448 --> 32:15.094 say that they're very focused, they're tough, 32:15.094 --> 32:19.011 they're good folks to train with and work with. 32:20.020 --> 32:21.437 That's one point. 32:22.545 --> 32:24.907 Two, they're in a very tight spot. 32:24.907 --> 32:26.722 You know even what this last week 32:26.722 --> 32:28.139 there was greater 32:28.334 --> 32:32.049 action along the line they took some higher casualties. 32:32.049 --> 32:36.216 So they need our help in terms of that defensive posture. 32:36.692 --> 32:38.647 And then finally in terms of the government 32:38.647 --> 32:40.561 we're working with them as well 32:40.561 --> 32:41.899 to move them toward reform 32:41.899 --> 32:44.232 and democratic institutions. 32:44.754 --> 32:47.292 And as you know, that's been somewhat difficult. 32:47.292 --> 32:51.459 They have some issues there with corruptions et cetera 32:51.694 --> 32:53.694 that we are leading them 32:55.425 --> 32:56.258 to reform. 32:58.253 --> 33:00.159 And they're gonna need to do that to continue to 33:00.159 --> 33:01.415 I think have our help. 33:01.415 --> 33:03.921 - Ukraine is not a NATO member but 33:03.921 --> 33:07.631 what's the extent of our military to military 33:07.631 --> 33:09.548 relationship with them? 33:09.820 --> 33:11.952 Are we able to train their officers, 33:11.952 --> 33:15.119 to help them use the weapons they have 33:15.288 --> 33:18.117 from the various sources more effectively? 33:18.117 --> 33:20.555 Or are we foreclosed from that? 33:20.555 --> 33:23.222 - No we're actually assisting in 33:23.411 --> 33:25.661 training for communications 33:27.273 --> 33:28.940 small unit weaponry, 33:31.958 --> 33:34.964 counter IED, things that they need in order to 33:34.964 --> 33:38.297 reinforce the line of contact et cetera. 33:39.917 --> 33:42.428 So it's not full it's not offensive by any means, 33:42.428 --> 33:44.158 but it's defensive and it's helpful 33:44.158 --> 33:46.658 to the task they have at hand. 33:46.790 --> 33:49.669 - So the title of this session you'll remember is 33:49.669 --> 33:52.502 From the Frying Pan Into the Fire, 33:53.631 --> 33:55.994 and I left the frying pan which is 33:55.994 --> 33:58.691 General Scaparrotti's previous command in 33:58.691 --> 34:02.127 the Korean Peninsula, for later in our conversation 34:02.127 --> 34:03.926 but I do wanna ask you to 34:03.926 --> 34:06.212 speak a little bit about it. 34:06.212 --> 34:08.808 When you think about what the next president 34:08.808 --> 34:11.725 will inherit, will have on the desk 34:11.738 --> 34:12.905 after January, 34:15.558 --> 34:18.513 high on that list although we don't talk about it 34:18.513 --> 34:21.013 very often is the reality that 34:22.066 --> 34:24.553 North Korea led by a very belligerent 34:24.553 --> 34:26.636 seemingly unstable leader 34:27.574 --> 34:31.157 will soon in the term of the next president 34:31.978 --> 34:35.188 have the ability to deliver a nuclear weapon 34:35.188 --> 34:39.355 onto US territory in terms of all of the reporting that 34:39.917 --> 34:40.750 we see. 34:42.079 --> 34:45.496 Which is really quite disturbing prospect 34:46.614 --> 34:49.502 so I'd like to ask you you were deeply involved in 34:49.502 --> 34:51.760 decisions when you were out there about how 34:51.760 --> 34:54.638 South Korea and the region can defend itself better. 34:54.638 --> 34:57.138 Starting point for me would be 34:58.233 --> 35:00.262 is the situation which North Korea 35:00.262 --> 35:03.883 can deliver a miniaturized nuclear weapon atop 35:03.883 --> 35:05.988 intermediate range missile 35:05.988 --> 35:08.311 onto Okanawa let's say or onto US territory, 35:08.311 --> 35:10.978 is that an acceptable situation? 35:12.014 --> 35:15.834 Should we allow ourselves to be in that situation 35:15.834 --> 35:17.497 in effect held hostage by 35:17.497 --> 35:20.080 a very unpredictable adversary? 35:20.337 --> 35:22.042 - I think that North Korea's one 35:22.042 --> 35:23.709 ^a country that today 35:26.104 --> 35:28.581 ^and in the time that KJU's been in power, 35:28.581 --> 35:30.390 ^he has been very focused-- 35:30.390 --> 35:31.401 ^- [David] Kim Jong Un. 35:31.401 --> 35:32.386 ^- Kim Jong Un, 35:32.386 --> 35:33.719 he's been very-- 35:34.300 --> 35:35.996 - [David] Known to his friends and adversaries 35:35.996 --> 35:36.829 as KJU. 35:36.829 --> 35:37.662 - KJU. 35:37.662 --> 35:39.554 (laughing) 35:39.554 --> 35:42.536 He is young and he's brash as you noted. 35:42.536 --> 35:45.869 But he's also very focused on developing 35:46.288 --> 35:49.223 his military capability in specific ways 35:49.223 --> 35:51.580 that he knows is difficult for us. 35:51.580 --> 35:54.517 So he's very focused on developing his ballistic missile 35:54.517 --> 35:57.007 capability, in the last couple of weeks 35:57.007 --> 35:59.702 we've seen him fire three missiles in one day. 35:59.702 --> 36:02.272 He's picked up the pace of this. 36:02.272 --> 36:04.579 And you know my estimate is is that 36:04.579 --> 36:07.466 he's testing and he's solving problems. 36:07.466 --> 36:10.883 He has submarine launch ballistic missile 36:11.569 --> 36:13.749 that he's working on as well. 36:13.749 --> 36:16.420 And then he has a nuclear capability that he's 36:16.420 --> 36:18.087 continuing to build. 36:18.759 --> 36:20.796 And so, you know, I've said this before 36:20.796 --> 36:22.920 I think that we need to continue 36:22.920 --> 36:24.842 in every way that we can, 36:24.842 --> 36:26.789 to put pressure on this country 36:26.789 --> 36:29.039 and to bring them to follow 36:29.438 --> 36:33.105 United Nations Security Council resolutions. 36:34.728 --> 36:36.958 What I am concerned about is 36:36.958 --> 36:39.508 I'm very concerned about what he has today 36:39.508 --> 36:41.135 but I'm more concerned about what he will have in 36:41.135 --> 36:42.802 three or four years. 36:43.233 --> 36:46.298 When he has a proven intercontinental capability. 36:46.298 --> 36:47.715 When he's perhaps 36:48.666 --> 36:51.905 figured out the submarine launch capability. 36:51.905 --> 36:54.238 And he is built more nuclear 36:55.107 --> 36:58.024 devices, so it's a serious problem. 36:58.454 --> 37:00.787 - We had just today a little 37:01.058 --> 37:01.891 news item 37:03.289 --> 37:06.360 that I mentioned earlier to General Scaparrotti where 37:06.360 --> 37:07.840 a top North Korean diplomat 37:07.840 --> 37:10.762 said that the US in adopting one of these 37:10.762 --> 37:14.179 measures intended to pressure North Korea 37:14.207 --> 37:16.457 and sanctioning Kim Jong Un 37:16.887 --> 37:20.304 economically had in this diplomat's words 37:21.672 --> 37:23.255 crossed a red line. 37:24.550 --> 37:26.550 And, that famous phrase, 37:28.046 --> 37:31.002 and that if the US and South Korea went ahead 37:31.002 --> 37:33.348 with the plan military actions I think it's next month, 37:33.348 --> 37:35.236 but if they went ahead with this military exercise 37:35.236 --> 37:38.907 there were a risk of war and this is a declaration of war 37:38.907 --> 37:40.445 et cetera, et cetera. 37:40.445 --> 37:42.026 You've dealt with a lot of 37:42.026 --> 37:46.162 threats from North Korea, how do you respond to that 37:46.162 --> 37:47.411 kind of rhetoric? 37:47.411 --> 37:48.494 - Personally? 37:48.991 --> 37:50.415 - [David] Yeah, as a commander. 37:50.415 --> 37:52.248 - Doesn't surprise me. 37:53.830 --> 37:56.839 You know what we do is we watch who says it, 37:56.839 --> 37:59.676 what they say, those kinds of things. 37:59.676 --> 38:02.649 You know we've watched particularly North Korea long enough 38:02.649 --> 38:04.978 that there's patterns to this so 38:04.978 --> 38:06.975 that's one way we look at it 38:06.975 --> 38:09.580 so I always go back and take a look at that pretty close. 38:09.580 --> 38:13.059 This is not unexpected, we put a sanction on Kim Jung Un 38:13.059 --> 38:14.642 as I understand it. 38:15.280 --> 38:16.960 I think that's great. 38:16.960 --> 38:18.567 It needed to be done, 38:18.567 --> 38:20.542 and I think we need to continue the pressures 38:20.542 --> 38:22.803 along sanctions working with our allies. 38:22.803 --> 38:24.303 And by other means 38:24.583 --> 38:27.496 to continue to put pressure on them 38:27.496 --> 38:29.785 and convince him that there's a different way. 38:29.785 --> 38:32.091 And hopefully bring China into this mix as well 38:32.091 --> 38:33.995 because they're an important partner 38:33.995 --> 38:35.802 in solving this problem we've got 38:35.802 --> 38:37.010 in North Korea. 38:37.010 --> 38:39.513 And it's a problem for them as well. 38:39.513 --> 38:40.589 - When you were in 38:40.589 --> 38:42.006 the Korea command 38:42.859 --> 38:47.026 a strong advocate of the theater missile defense system 38:47.503 --> 38:50.482 known as THAD which is now in the process of 38:50.482 --> 38:53.878 being deployed, how much protection does that give 38:53.878 --> 38:56.795 to us and our friends in the region 38:57.322 --> 38:59.252 against this very unpredictable threat? 38:59.252 --> 39:03.252 - It's a very important system to put in because 39:03.516 --> 39:05.516 one has they have a very 39:07.050 --> 39:11.044 significant ballistic missile capability in North Korea 39:11.044 --> 39:12.908 particularly short range that 39:12.908 --> 39:14.408 can hit our forces 39:15.088 --> 39:18.304 and Korean forces and citizens in South Korea. 39:18.304 --> 39:21.220 What the THAD brings to us is a high altitude 39:21.220 --> 39:22.970 intercept capability. 39:22.994 --> 39:24.577 A better system for 39:27.821 --> 39:30.654 determining you know our defensive 39:31.624 --> 39:33.541 strategy, in an attack. 39:35.893 --> 39:39.104 Okay because of its connection and radar to others. 39:39.104 --> 39:42.124 And it gives us some capabilities that 39:42.124 --> 39:43.890 provide better protection 39:43.890 --> 39:46.246 to South Korea not to mention that it's 39:46.246 --> 39:48.059 an area defense not a point defense 39:48.059 --> 39:49.690 so I can't go into too much 39:49.690 --> 39:51.447 but I would just say that I was very 39:51.447 --> 39:54.467 insistent that we try and bring THAD in 39:54.467 --> 39:58.270 because of the capability that it brings to the peninsula 39:58.270 --> 40:00.517 and I'm glad to see that it's going forward. 40:00.517 --> 40:02.267 - The Chinese it said 40:03.023 --> 40:03.856 hate THAD, 40:04.603 --> 40:07.686 and worry that it's a threat to their 40:08.366 --> 40:10.866 capabilities, and to which our 40:11.605 --> 40:13.748 most senior diplomats have said 40:13.748 --> 40:16.761 okay then help us solve the North Korean problem 40:16.761 --> 40:19.344 if you're concerned about THAD. 40:19.992 --> 40:22.138 - [Scaparrotti] That's correct. 40:22.138 --> 40:22.971 - So. 40:23.535 --> 40:25.201 (laughing) 40:25.201 --> 40:26.201 So I want to 40:27.931 --> 40:30.269 close my part of this conversation 40:30.269 --> 40:32.407 then we'll turn to the audience 40:32.407 --> 40:35.157 by asking you to step back just a 40:35.228 --> 40:37.478 ^little bit general, you are 40:42.352 --> 40:43.852 ^a prime example of 40:44.516 --> 40:46.974 ^the generation of US Army officers, 40:46.974 --> 40:50.872 ^US military officers, who've lived through this generation 40:50.872 --> 40:54.226 of war, the Army's been at war for 13 years. 40:54.226 --> 40:57.606 I asked Ryan Crocker I don't know if Ryan is here, 40:57.606 --> 41:00.226 but asked him earlier today he knows General Scaparrotti 41:00.226 --> 41:01.059 well from 41:02.581 --> 41:04.770 Afghanistan and other places 41:04.770 --> 41:06.900 and I just asked him what he remembered about 41:06.900 --> 41:09.190 serving with you and he said 41:09.190 --> 41:11.107 the thing he remembered 41:11.643 --> 41:13.560 best but most painfully 41:13.817 --> 41:16.322 was going with you to Bagram Air Base 41:16.322 --> 41:19.072 for the departure ceremonies when 41:19.915 --> 41:22.872 dead Americans were loaded onto planes to 41:22.872 --> 41:23.705 come home. 41:24.085 --> 41:25.333 And that's what you and your 41:25.333 --> 41:28.230 colleagues in uniform have been living with now 41:28.230 --> 41:29.894 for all these years. 41:29.894 --> 41:32.250 And I wanna ask you to reflect 41:32.250 --> 41:35.642 with this audience on what you've been living through, 41:35.642 --> 41:37.905 on what that's been like for you as a 41:37.905 --> 41:42.072 commander on your hopes that we'll enter a different period 41:42.216 --> 41:44.163 in which we're not a country 41:44.163 --> 41:46.580 seemingly perpetually at war. 41:46.668 --> 41:49.455 And just what this period of our history 41:49.455 --> 41:51.288 has been like for you. 41:52.218 --> 41:54.468 - One is you mention Bagram 41:56.056 --> 41:59.628 as an 82nd Commander there you have Bagram Air Field 41:59.628 --> 42:02.961 that's where we do the return of remains 42:03.523 --> 42:07.023 for departure from the country to go home. 42:07.415 --> 42:08.248 And, 42:10.239 --> 42:12.739 if you're the commander there, 42:13.366 --> 42:15.582 there's almost a day that doesn't go by 42:15.582 --> 42:17.297 in the time that I was there, 42:17.297 --> 42:20.880 that you didn't have one of the ceremonies. 42:21.093 --> 42:23.343 It's unbelievably difficult 42:23.625 --> 42:26.220 on the folks that go through that. 42:26.220 --> 42:28.741 And, it's something that has effected me 42:28.741 --> 42:30.256 I'll never forget it. 42:30.256 --> 42:32.423 But it's representative of 42:32.461 --> 42:34.625 the sacrifice that I have seen 42:34.625 --> 42:37.708 in you know over a decade of war now. 42:39.271 --> 42:42.465 And we can't forget that even today what we decide 42:42.465 --> 42:44.612 to do as senior leaders, there's soldiers, sailors, 42:44.612 --> 42:47.673 air men, and marines at the other end of that decision. 42:47.673 --> 42:49.340 And they're gonna do what we tell 'em to do 42:49.340 --> 42:51.442 but they also are willing to pay a heavy price for it so 42:51.442 --> 42:53.715 we've got to keep that in mind too. 42:53.715 --> 42:57.465 That just reminds me that where we need to be 42:58.259 --> 43:00.322 we need to resolve conflicts 43:00.322 --> 43:02.778 and we need to get to a peaceful solution. 43:02.778 --> 43:04.278 Because, I've seen 43:05.319 --> 43:06.152 too much. 43:07.313 --> 43:11.480 And there's no one that has done what our troopers have done 43:11.957 --> 43:14.612 what our service members have done over the past 10 years 43:14.612 --> 43:17.041 that will come back and say they're unaffected. 43:17.041 --> 43:18.791 I don't believe that. 43:19.812 --> 43:22.551 - I know we're all moved to hear that. 43:22.551 --> 43:25.896 I think something that we worry about sometimes 43:25.896 --> 43:28.063 even as we celebrate these 43:28.782 --> 43:32.461 remarkable sacrifices that the military has made is that 43:32.461 --> 43:35.002 the military in America's becoming almost a separate 43:35.002 --> 43:36.752 tribe, it has its own 43:38.337 --> 43:42.504 rituals, it's a family, we love that family but it's 43:42.616 --> 43:44.699 sometimes feels separate. 43:45.437 --> 43:46.900 Do you worry about that? 43:46.900 --> 43:48.614 That the military is too separate 43:48.614 --> 43:50.645 from the rest of American life? 43:50.645 --> 43:52.658 - I do worry about, I worry about 43:52.658 --> 43:54.650 it's not just the military either 43:54.650 --> 43:56.265 I worry about service. 43:56.265 --> 43:59.848 You know, because we are a volunteer force, 44:00.018 --> 44:02.665 you know 1% serves, and I think 44:02.665 --> 44:05.528 in a democracy we have to think very hard 44:05.528 --> 44:06.445 about that. 44:07.118 --> 44:09.476 Now you might not necessarily serve in the military, 44:09.476 --> 44:12.502 but I think I've thought a lot lately about this 44:12.502 --> 44:14.500 I think service to your country even if it's 44:14.500 --> 44:17.695 for a year or two in some means is a value 44:17.695 --> 44:19.559 particularly in a democracy 44:19.559 --> 44:21.500 and we ought to consider that. 44:21.500 --> 44:23.750 (clapping) 44:29.453 --> 44:32.660 - So, on that note we're gonna go to the audience. 44:32.660 --> 44:35.993 And I will recognize hands as I see them 44:36.054 --> 44:39.221 in the front row, my friend Kim Dojer. 44:44.167 --> 44:45.162 - [Voiceover] Hi, Kim Dojer. 44:45.162 --> 44:46.163 - I know you Kim. 44:46.163 --> 44:47.887 - [Voiceover] With The Daily Beast and CNN. 44:47.887 --> 44:50.201 So, could we expand a bit on 44:50.201 --> 44:51.201 some of your 44:51.556 --> 44:54.195 challenges coming up with Russia 44:54.195 --> 44:56.250 in terms of the missile shield 44:56.250 --> 44:58.189 that has been installed in Romania, 44:58.189 --> 44:59.869 will be installed in Poland. 44:59.869 --> 45:02.952 The spokesman for Putin has said some 45:03.356 --> 45:05.504 very dire things about it being a threat. 45:05.504 --> 45:06.337 - Yeah. 45:06.507 --> 45:08.735 - [Voiceover] Do they know it's not a threat? 45:08.735 --> 45:10.180 Is this a rhetorical counterattack? 45:10.180 --> 45:11.945 Or are they gonna use this to 45:11.945 --> 45:14.041 try to separate you from some of 45:14.041 --> 45:15.142 the Baltic allies? 45:15.142 --> 45:17.328 - Well first of all I think they will use it 45:17.328 --> 45:18.579 or try to use it. 45:18.579 --> 45:20.584 They'll use almost anything they believe they can 45:20.584 --> 45:24.084 to separate you know countries within NATO 45:25.402 --> 45:28.396 I mean, that's one of Putin's objectives 45:28.396 --> 45:31.319 is to try to create friction among the allies. 45:31.319 --> 45:33.158 So I think he'd use that anyway. 45:33.158 --> 45:35.819 The question of whether they really believe it's a threat. 45:35.819 --> 45:39.249 That's an interesting question for me because 45:39.249 --> 45:41.749 it's a missile defense system. 45:43.984 --> 45:47.437 It's not positioned in a place that if it were 45:47.437 --> 45:50.784 offensive system, it's not positioned in a position that 45:50.784 --> 45:53.470 as a defensive system that it can really 45:53.470 --> 45:55.803 impact at all their systems, 45:56.102 --> 45:59.265 I other words, impact their strategic deterrence. 45:59.265 --> 46:00.598 I'm certain that 46:02.658 --> 46:05.863 their military leaders should know that. 46:05.863 --> 46:08.683 So that's why I say it's an interesting question to me 46:08.683 --> 46:10.421 I would like to fully understand it. 46:10.421 --> 46:13.526 Now, having said that, those who understand the Russians 46:13.526 --> 46:16.606 and those who have talked to the Russians recently 46:16.606 --> 46:19.101 you know I think this could very well be true 46:19.101 --> 46:21.607 their leadership just simply does not believe 46:21.607 --> 46:24.337 that this is just a defensive system. 46:24.337 --> 46:26.004 Because you have the 46:28.175 --> 46:32.102 system itself can be used for an offensive capability. 46:32.102 --> 46:34.519 It's not structured that way, 46:34.848 --> 46:37.622 it doesn't have the technical nor the software 46:37.622 --> 46:38.705 to do it, but 46:40.408 --> 46:42.658 I am told they believe that 46:43.712 --> 46:45.384 we're not being truthful about that 46:45.384 --> 46:47.804 and that can in fact be the case. 46:47.804 --> 46:49.554 What's it really for? 46:50.726 --> 46:51.559 - So. 46:51.742 --> 46:53.516 - They can believe that in other words, so. 46:53.516 --> 46:55.420 - I wanna ask John Negraponti 46:55.420 --> 46:59.587 and then ma'am and there was a gentleman here in the far 46:59.641 --> 47:01.886 but first, Ambassador Negraponti. 47:01.886 --> 47:03.358 - Yeah let me clarify something 47:03.358 --> 47:04.798 though there's a way I said that, 47:04.798 --> 47:06.097 what I meant by that was. 47:06.097 --> 47:07.386 (laughing) 47:07.386 --> 47:08.711 'Cause I heard somebody react to that, 47:08.711 --> 47:10.225 I'm not suggesting it's anything other 47:10.225 --> 47:11.806 than a missile defense system that's what it is. 47:11.806 --> 47:13.806 They may not believe us. 47:16.792 --> 47:17.890 Yes it's defending 47:17.890 --> 47:20.253 basically from the Middle East. 47:20.253 --> 47:21.975 It's not a worry on them it doesn't have 47:21.975 --> 47:23.563 the capability to do that. 47:23.563 --> 47:26.563 And we've been quite clear about it. 47:26.717 --> 47:27.775 - [Voiceover] Thank you General, 47:27.775 --> 47:29.108 John Negraponti, 47:29.215 --> 47:31.298 if this were 40 years ago 47:32.345 --> 47:33.678 we'd be thinking 47:34.741 --> 47:37.962 at least somewhat about triangular relationships between 47:37.962 --> 47:41.212 ourselves, the Soviet Union, and China. 47:41.855 --> 47:44.960 And I was wondering if you had any thoughts on the 47:44.960 --> 47:48.114 sort of geo strategic relationship between 47:48.114 --> 47:51.236 Russia and China and is there any risk 47:51.236 --> 47:52.903 that we might end up 47:54.264 --> 47:55.764 in the short-term. 47:57.984 --> 48:01.495 - Thank you sir, you know one of the things 48:01.495 --> 48:02.912 that I note about 48:03.260 --> 48:05.491 China and Russia is if you listen to their 48:05.491 --> 48:09.084 message to us, there are some similarities in the sense 48:09.084 --> 48:11.834 that China in the south China Sea 48:12.322 --> 48:13.572 claims that the 48:17.068 --> 48:20.301 international norms that we've established 48:20.301 --> 48:22.956 are constricting of what they see 48:22.956 --> 48:25.877 as their rightful territory and sphere of influence. 48:25.877 --> 48:28.544 Does that sound familiar I mean, 48:28.707 --> 48:30.621 that's what you hear Putin say about 48:30.621 --> 48:31.920 particularly in the east in the Baltics 48:31.920 --> 48:33.900 that's their sphere of influence 48:33.900 --> 48:37.345 that the western set of rules is actually constricting 48:37.345 --> 48:40.678 the way that they would like to operate. 48:40.931 --> 48:43.770 And so there's some similarities as you hear both 48:43.770 --> 48:46.925 leaders talk, that's of a concern in the sense that 48:46.925 --> 48:49.369 they could come together on this 48:49.369 --> 48:50.901 I guess is what I'm saying. 48:50.901 --> 48:52.551 So I think we have to work hard to develop 48:52.551 --> 48:54.295 relationships with both of them 48:54.295 --> 48:56.711 and make sure that we're having quite candid 48:56.711 --> 48:59.124 communication with 'em so that we understand each other. 48:59.124 --> 49:02.186 - There's a gentleman all the way on the 49:02.186 --> 49:05.026 far right against, yes standing against the 49:05.026 --> 49:09.193 mesh of our tent if we can get a microphone over there. 49:10.566 --> 49:11.733 Okay go ahead. 49:12.872 --> 49:14.585 - [Voiceover] Andrea Howard I'm Naval Academy 49:14.585 --> 49:15.752 class of 2015. 49:16.498 --> 49:17.511 - Go Army beat Navy. 49:17.511 --> 49:18.870 - [Voiceover] Beat Army sir. 49:18.870 --> 49:21.054 - I wanted to get that in first 49:21.054 --> 49:22.674 'cause I knew you were probably coming. 49:22.674 --> 49:25.095 - [Voiceover] Yes sir it was coming at the end. 49:25.095 --> 49:26.111 (laughing) 49:26.111 --> 49:27.975 So General this talk has taken a bit of a 49:27.975 --> 49:29.681 traditional flavor focusing on 49:29.681 --> 49:32.743 deterrence currently and the capabilities of our 49:32.743 --> 49:34.847 adversaries like Russia and North Korea, 49:34.847 --> 49:37.162 to what extent is NATO and UCOM 49:37.162 --> 49:39.801 embracing and addressing human security issues 49:39.801 --> 49:41.801 like the refugee crisis? 49:41.896 --> 49:44.136 - Thank you, I'm glad you asked the question 49:44.136 --> 49:45.932 'cause I really wanted to get at 49:45.932 --> 49:48.432 in Warsaw, what you saw mostly 49:48.779 --> 49:49.946 publicized was 49:51.566 --> 49:53.656 about deterrence and about the Baltics 49:53.656 --> 49:56.146 and enhanced forward presence. 49:56.146 --> 49:58.390 But actually they made some very I think significant 49:58.390 --> 49:59.390 decisions to 50:01.461 --> 50:03.461 support what we call the 50:04.192 --> 50:06.609 NATO Strategic Defense South. 50:07.828 --> 50:10.683 Okay so it's a framework that's been developed 50:10.683 --> 50:13.104 that addresses the challenges to Europe 50:13.104 --> 50:15.058 from the south and those are primarily 50:15.058 --> 50:17.648 the issues of the refugee crisis, 50:17.648 --> 50:19.148 counter terrorism, 50:19.504 --> 50:21.837 counter transnational crime. 50:23.930 --> 50:27.013 Counter WMD, the issues that Europe's 50:28.665 --> 50:30.529 struggling with and other areas. 50:30.529 --> 50:32.462 And so Warsaw addressed a 360 50:32.462 --> 50:34.629 not just the Russia front. 50:34.707 --> 50:36.554 Now, what came out of that 50:36.554 --> 50:38.469 will eventually be in order to me 50:38.469 --> 50:41.155 is the sad cure to a system ways that 50:41.155 --> 50:43.203 NATO can assist and I think we can do that 50:43.203 --> 50:45.659 from maritime operations for instance 50:45.659 --> 50:47.846 as we're doing in the AG and 50:47.846 --> 50:48.679 with EU. 50:50.577 --> 50:53.406 And that operation has been very successful, 50:53.406 --> 50:55.073 you know last summer 50:55.355 --> 50:56.188 we had 50:57.634 --> 50:59.717 I think on order of about 50:59.889 --> 51:02.745 probably 60 I'm thinking about 60,000 51:02.745 --> 51:04.995 come across through Greece. 51:06.457 --> 51:08.178 Over a three month period. 51:08.178 --> 51:09.817 April, May, and June. 51:09.817 --> 51:12.150 This year, it's below 6,000. 51:12.563 --> 51:15.104 So we're talking a 90% reduction 51:15.104 --> 51:17.898 as a result of the operations there. 51:17.898 --> 51:20.161 So I think assistance throughout the Mediterranean 51:20.161 --> 51:22.166 can help particularly where you see refugees 51:22.166 --> 51:23.965 coming from north Africa across into 51:23.965 --> 51:25.970 southern Europe, and you see terrorists 51:25.970 --> 51:29.549 or the movement of weapons of mass destruction 51:29.549 --> 51:33.716 weaponry as a part of criminal organizations as well. 51:33.909 --> 51:37.205 So we are addressing it, and you'll see more on that as we 51:37.205 --> 51:40.183 work our way through the orders from the NATO alliance to 51:40.183 --> 51:44.350 North Atlantic Council to lessen our forces and shape. 51:45.652 --> 51:47.069 - And what I hope 51:48.346 --> 51:50.810 we will be able to describe as a 51:50.810 --> 51:52.477 post-ISIS world with 51:53.358 --> 51:56.525 region bordering NATO and such turmoil 51:57.493 --> 52:00.168 do you think NATO can be a force for 52:00.168 --> 52:01.251 restabilizing 52:03.067 --> 52:04.234 its periphery? 52:05.589 --> 52:07.304 Is that something this is a military alliance, 52:07.304 --> 52:09.151 it's not a traditional military job, 52:09.151 --> 52:12.068 would you be comfortable with that? 52:12.323 --> 52:15.305 - Obviously what we go into is again 52:15.305 --> 52:17.409 in North Atlantic Council that's policy 52:17.409 --> 52:20.422 I act on the directives they give me as the sacquer. 52:20.422 --> 52:22.589 But for instance at Warsaw 52:22.669 --> 52:25.822 we had deterrence and defense was a major theme, 52:25.822 --> 52:28.405 and we had projecting stability 52:28.961 --> 52:30.542 which we haven't talked about much but 52:30.542 --> 52:33.793 NATO's been in that business for a while as well. 52:33.793 --> 52:36.724 You know in Kosovo we have forces there today 52:36.724 --> 52:38.305 we went into Kosovo. 52:38.305 --> 52:39.669 In Afghanistan we're training 52:39.669 --> 52:41.509 advise and assist today. 52:41.509 --> 52:42.956 We're looking at potentially doing 52:42.956 --> 52:44.813 partnership capacity building 52:44.813 --> 52:46.146 in perhaps Iraq. 52:47.817 --> 52:50.150 If invited perhaps in Libya. 52:50.469 --> 52:53.125 And, that in a sense is projecting stability 52:53.125 --> 52:54.690 so that we solve those problems 52:54.690 --> 52:56.460 outside of our borders, 52:56.460 --> 52:58.044 and thereby keep our 52:58.044 --> 53:00.127 security in tact as well. 53:00.492 --> 53:03.295 And obviously within the countries 53:03.295 --> 53:06.548 within NATO the 28 nations we have a good deal of experience 53:06.548 --> 53:08.579 in stability offs as well. 53:08.579 --> 53:11.695 - So we can see a NATO deployment in Iraq 53:11.695 --> 53:14.112 and in Libya down the road as 53:16.004 --> 53:18.582 those fragmented countries try to 53:18.582 --> 53:21.022 get back to something more stable. 53:21.022 --> 53:23.354 - Well I don't know again that's not-- 53:23.354 --> 53:24.698 - I know it's a policy decision. 53:24.698 --> 53:27.196 - I'm not making that projection for NATO 53:27.196 --> 53:29.535 I can't do that, I'm just saying that we have 53:29.535 --> 53:32.088 the capability to do that and we at least 53:32.088 --> 53:34.359 at Warsaw said that we would take some steps 53:34.359 --> 53:36.026 at Iraq's invitation 53:37.274 --> 53:39.607 to do some specific training 53:39.828 --> 53:42.624 primarily to help them with the skills they need 53:42.624 --> 53:46.041 post conflict in the areas that have been 53:46.711 --> 53:49.044 recaptured from counter ISIL 53:49.081 --> 53:50.880 that's primarily what they wanted to start with 53:50.880 --> 53:53.125 as well as mine clearing et cetera. 53:53.125 --> 53:54.458 That's the first step. 53:54.458 --> 53:55.864 There may be more that we can do 53:55.864 --> 53:57.804 if they ask us to do so. 53:57.804 --> 54:00.590 - The gentleman here on my far right. 54:00.590 --> 54:02.315 - Jonathan Knox Candy Group 54:02.315 --> 54:04.002 General Scaparrotti first of all 54:04.002 --> 54:05.743 forgive me for being so far away, 54:05.743 --> 54:07.423 please take this gap as a symbolic 54:07.423 --> 54:08.673 Atlantic Ocean. 54:08.721 --> 54:10.954 (laughing) 54:10.954 --> 54:13.698 Prior to Brexit, the United Kingdom 54:13.698 --> 54:16.147 was actively campaigning in Europe 54:16.147 --> 54:18.314 against the European Army. 54:18.524 --> 54:20.357 And in fact ultimately 54:20.379 --> 54:23.296 United Kingdom had a veto for that. 54:23.534 --> 54:25.589 In two years time approximately 54:25.589 --> 54:27.319 the UK loses that veto 54:27.319 --> 54:29.617 and it's highly likely that there will be 54:29.617 --> 54:31.367 a European Union Army 54:31.622 --> 54:32.705 of some sort. 54:33.493 --> 54:35.142 How confusing will that be 54:35.142 --> 54:38.561 to the military slash political situation in Europe 54:38.561 --> 54:40.978 and how will that dilute NATO 54:41.657 --> 54:43.824 and decrease its efficacy? 54:45.501 --> 54:48.380 - Well first of all you know I would just say up front that 54:48.380 --> 54:52.213 each of the nations in NATO have one military. 54:53.723 --> 54:57.056 And so, the intent is going forward that 54:57.127 --> 54:59.923 we have a very close working relationship 54:59.923 --> 55:02.004 and to the extent that they do operations 55:02.004 --> 55:03.850 and as you know they do today 55:03.850 --> 55:06.407 that we have a complementary and close relationship 55:06.407 --> 55:08.412 because we really don't have the capability 55:08.412 --> 55:11.662 to not be complementary and not be wise 55:11.798 --> 55:14.304 in how we use all the forces that we have. 55:14.304 --> 55:15.611 That's the first point I would make 55:15.611 --> 55:17.964 the second is is that again back to Warsaw. 55:17.964 --> 55:21.797 The agreement to cooperate between EU and NATO 55:22.934 --> 55:25.122 is very important for many reasons, 55:25.122 --> 55:27.994 and you sided one so that we do have a relationship 55:27.994 --> 55:31.364 that we are used to we become used to working together 55:31.364 --> 55:33.952 and we can consider these things 55:33.952 --> 55:35.202 in the best way 55:37.514 --> 55:39.853 I would say just as we did in the Aegean operations 55:39.853 --> 55:42.414 they asked for our assistance we did that 55:42.414 --> 55:45.596 in about 96 hours' time which those of you 55:45.596 --> 55:47.346 that know NATO that's 55:48.149 --> 55:49.482 lightning speed. 55:50.346 --> 55:52.763 So you know, we're moving and 55:54.523 --> 55:57.111 we're adapting and we're getting better. 55:57.111 --> 55:59.215 - So the woman here who has the microphone 55:59.215 --> 56:01.355 and then go to you sir for the final question. 56:01.355 --> 56:03.080 - Thank you General and Mr. Ignatius. 56:03.080 --> 56:05.982 I wanted to ask what you could share with us 56:05.982 --> 56:07.815 about the relationship 56:08.637 --> 56:11.007 friendship military relationship 56:11.007 --> 56:13.424 between North Korea and Iran. 56:18.007 --> 56:20.679 - [David] Good question, not often asked. 56:20.679 --> 56:21.512 - Yeah. 56:22.934 --> 56:26.267 There is a relationship between the two. 56:29.477 --> 56:30.310 And, it is 56:33.359 --> 56:36.548 probably you know we think complementary 56:36.548 --> 56:39.048 and particularly their missile 56:39.110 --> 56:40.110 arrangement. 56:43.196 --> 56:46.113 And we've seen indications of that. 56:46.391 --> 56:47.915 So, you know that is 56:47.915 --> 56:49.415 always of concern. 56:50.293 --> 56:52.293 And we watch it closely, 56:53.165 --> 56:55.777 so that's about as much as I can say about it 56:55.777 --> 56:57.317 that there is a relationship there 56:57.317 --> 56:58.924 and that we have been watching it. 56:58.924 --> 56:59.757 - Sir. 56:59.955 --> 57:03.078 (speaking in a foreign language) 57:03.078 --> 57:05.250 - [Voiceover] Al Cannon from Charleston, South Carolina, 57:05.250 --> 57:06.833 three quick points. 57:07.104 --> 57:08.176 - Sir let me ask you, 57:08.176 --> 57:09.293 'cause we're running out of time 57:09.293 --> 57:10.278 just one quick point. 57:10.278 --> 57:12.306 - [Voiceover] Just three quick points, 57:12.306 --> 57:15.060 distribution and Russians throughout the republics. 57:15.060 --> 57:17.940 The historic vulnerability from Russia's perspective 57:17.940 --> 57:20.709 of the Baltic state in Poland corridor 57:20.709 --> 57:23.876 and Kaliningrad, to what extent is the 57:25.029 --> 57:28.150 issue of Russian citizens within the Baltic states 57:28.150 --> 57:31.483 a factor in what NATO's trying to do and 57:32.685 --> 57:34.102 Russia's efforts? 57:36.730 --> 57:38.310 - Well it's a factor because it's 57:38.310 --> 57:41.143 what the Russians in this activity 57:41.240 --> 57:42.723 below the threshold of conflict, 57:42.723 --> 57:44.436 it's who they're appealing to it's who they're 57:44.436 --> 57:46.019 trying to influence 57:46.076 --> 57:47.743 in the Baltic states 57:48.489 --> 57:50.753 with some of these information operations 57:50.753 --> 57:53.420 activity with parties et cetera. 57:53.549 --> 57:55.271 So it's of concern to us. 57:55.271 --> 57:57.916 Now the other part is is working with those governments. 57:57.916 --> 58:00.583 How do you ensure that you bring 58:01.053 --> 58:03.136 those of Russian heritage 58:04.917 --> 58:06.730 fully into your government 58:06.730 --> 58:08.545 so that they also are a part of 58:08.545 --> 58:09.795 that democracy? 58:12.306 --> 58:15.044 - So, General Scaparrotti told me that he really 58:15.044 --> 58:17.294 really has to leave at six. 58:17.972 --> 58:20.245 Because he's gotta fly back tonight to 58:20.245 --> 58:21.578 Europe, and then 58:22.799 --> 58:24.299 wonderfully, he is 58:26.719 --> 58:29.457 not a scheduled flight but he's a four star general. 58:29.457 --> 58:31.438 (laughing) 58:31.438 --> 58:35.008 Wonderfully he is on his way to do some work in Italy, 58:35.008 --> 58:36.425 but also to visit 58:36.448 --> 58:39.095 the place where the Scaparrottis are from 58:39.095 --> 58:40.095 in Italy so, 58:41.158 --> 58:42.962 we hope he has a great trip back 58:42.962 --> 58:45.375 and we all I know join me in thanking him 58:45.375 --> 58:46.666 for a wonderful trip. 58:46.666 --> 58:47.666 - Thank you. 58:47.747 --> 58:49.997 (clapping)