WEBVTT 00:00.040 --> 00:03.750 a separate the pentagon . The special 00:03.750 --> 00:06.740 Inspector general for Iraq last year 00:06.750 --> 00:09.270 issued an audit criticizing the 00:09.270 --> 00:11.660 logistics for the progress . The Iraqi 00:11.660 --> 00:13.493 army was making an improving its 00:13.493 --> 00:16.480 logistics capability . It identified 00:16.480 --> 00:19.270 this shortfall as a major problem from 00:19.270 --> 00:22.480 where you sit , how much progress is 00:22.480 --> 00:26.250 being made by the Iraqis on that front . 00:27.840 --> 00:29.951 I'll tell you that is not a good news 00:29.951 --> 00:32.860 story . The we need some help from the 00:32.870 --> 00:35.580 Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of 00:35.590 --> 00:38.780 Interior in getting equipment and 00:38.780 --> 00:40.700 supplies to their soldiers and 00:40.700 --> 00:43.930 policemen . Uh Currently we know of 00:43.930 --> 00:46.270 warehouses down in Taji and other 00:46.270 --> 00:49.100 locations that have equipment and the 00:49.100 --> 00:51.160 bureaucracy is worse than I've ever 00:51.160 --> 00:53.920 seen to try to dislodge those that 00:53.920 --> 00:55.920 equipment . We are working with the 00:55.920 --> 00:58.560 embassy through the P . R . T . Team 00:58.560 --> 01:00.650 leader , Stephanie Miley and we will 01:00.650 --> 01:02.770 continue to try to dislodge that 01:02.770 --> 01:05.360 equipment . But again , uh we do need 01:05.360 --> 01:07.249 some help and I have not seen the 01:07.249 --> 01:09.970 progress from the Ministry of Interior 01:09.970 --> 01:11.526 and the Ministry of Defense 01:13.540 --> 01:16.480 shortage is critical at this point or 01:16.480 --> 01:20.050 simply irritating for the long term . 01:21.140 --> 01:23.990 Well , in the short term I lend 01:23.990 --> 01:27.000 equipment to our Iraqi brothers . 01:27.010 --> 01:30.210 Uh and but I can't give it to them to 01:30.210 --> 01:33.380 keep . And so we continue to work the 01:33.380 --> 01:36.360 system to try to get the combat service 01:36.360 --> 01:39.160 support and the supplies to our Iraqi 01:39.160 --> 01:41.600 brothers . Uh We also have problems 01:41.600 --> 01:43.878 with the maintenance side of the house . 01:43.878 --> 01:46.044 And so we have to continue and I think 01:46.044 --> 01:48.300 I think that is the area that if we 01:48.300 --> 01:51.460 could just dislodge that bottleneck , 01:51.740 --> 01:53.830 we could really make some leaps and 01:53.830 --> 01:56.150 bounds with our Iraqi army and Iraqi 01:56.150 --> 01:58.970 police . They are willing , they've got 01:58.970 --> 02:01.770 the will to fight . We also have taught 02:01.770 --> 02:03.960 them and given them skills to fight . 02:03.970 --> 02:05.914 And so now we just need to get the 02:05.914 --> 02:09.050 equipment and the supplies flowing . 02:11.240 --> 02:15.170 Oh , Colonel , I'm carl Osgood 02:15.180 --> 02:17.530 with Executive Intelligence review . 02:17.540 --> 02:19.600 You made connection in your opening 02:19.600 --> 02:21.711 remarks between the disbanding of the 02:21.711 --> 02:23.656 army and declassification with the 02:23.656 --> 02:27.020 unemployment in in in Saladin products . 02:27.020 --> 02:29.910 If I understood you correctly . Uh , 02:29.920 --> 02:33.320 how I mean , how important do you think 02:33.320 --> 02:36.870 it is to roll back the effects of these 02:36.880 --> 02:39.250 measures to actually dealing with the 02:39.260 --> 02:41.600 with the insurgency and the and the 02:41.610 --> 02:45.610 problem of violence ? Well , 02:45.610 --> 02:48.960 I think it's very important . The if 02:48.960 --> 02:51.540 you take a look inside Tikrit , you 02:51.540 --> 02:54.300 have many former generals , very 02:54.300 --> 02:58.260 educated teachers and politicians 02:58.640 --> 03:01.710 and uh and and so I I can't go down the 03:01.710 --> 03:04.190 street without bumping into a former 03:04.190 --> 03:08.000 general officer . And all of them have 03:08.000 --> 03:10.580 been members of the Bath Party . But 03:10.580 --> 03:12.747 there's a difference between an active 03:12.747 --> 03:15.190 member and just a member of the party 03:15.190 --> 03:17.570 and I think that the central government 03:17.570 --> 03:19.792 realizes that and they're continuing to 03:19.792 --> 03:22.430 work on reconciliation . Uh , but I 03:22.430 --> 03:25.080 think it's moving pretty slow and right 03:25.080 --> 03:27.620 now are Sunni population here are very 03:27.620 --> 03:29.820 patient , but I don't know how long 03:29.820 --> 03:32.060 they're going to hold out on that . As 03:32.060 --> 03:34.780 I stated in my opening statement , some 03:34.780 --> 03:38.210 of these former Baptists are really pro 03:38.210 --> 03:41.260 Saddamists and those , those 03:41.260 --> 03:44.390 individuals have been actively involved 03:44.400 --> 03:47.330 in the fight against this . So what do 03:47.330 --> 03:50.050 you attribute the difficulties in 03:50.050 --> 03:53.450 getting supply and equipment for 03:53.450 --> 03:57.200 your Iraqi forces ? There was a similar 03:57.200 --> 04:00.140 situation in Anbar where police and 04:00.140 --> 04:02.630 others were not getting paid and it was 04:02.640 --> 04:04.800 believed that it was because the 04:04.810 --> 04:07.840 Ministry of Material was Shia dominated . 04:07.850 --> 04:11.430 Do you believe that there are sectarian 04:11.430 --> 04:13.570 discrimination involved in your 04:13.580 --> 04:15.870 inability to get those supplies for the 04:15.870 --> 04:19.060 Iraqi forces ? Yeah . Mhm . 04:21.740 --> 04:23.796 I think there's a little bit of that 04:23.796 --> 04:27.320 involved . I've had a um 04:27.330 --> 04:31.240 my battalion support or my brigade 04:31.240 --> 04:34.140 support battalion put together a log 04:34.140 --> 04:36.380 team , logistics team to go out and 04:36.380 --> 04:38.790 take a look at where the problems 04:38.790 --> 04:42.340 really lie . And what we found is 04:42.350 --> 04:45.310 there is some sectarian issues there , 04:45.320 --> 04:47.487 but we've , what we've really found is 04:47.487 --> 04:50.660 a bureaucracy where typos on a 04:50.660 --> 04:53.350 memo will get turned back . Now , 04:53.350 --> 04:55.730 whether you attribute that to sectarian , 04:55.740 --> 04:58.150 I don't know , but I will tell you that 04:58.160 --> 04:59.938 the , the bureaucracy to try to 04:59.938 --> 05:02.850 dislodge supplies and equipment 05:03.140 --> 05:06.710 is not , is pretty , pretty large there . 05:06.710 --> 05:09.650 So we're trying to work through that 05:09.660 --> 05:12.680 with our mid teams at , on my level and 05:12.680 --> 05:14.958 also at the brigade level . And I mean , 05:14.958 --> 05:17.970 the division level and uh and also men 05:17.970 --> 05:20.830 sticky and will continue to work uh 05:20.840 --> 05:23.280 through all the levels , to coach our 05:23.280 --> 05:25.760 Iraqi brothers , uh to do the right 05:25.770 --> 05:28.700 thing and make sure these supplies and 05:28.710 --> 05:31.060 equipment get down to the lowest level ? 05:33.940 --> 05:36.980 Can you give us a sense of the , of the 05:36.980 --> 05:40.170 overall strength of your Iraqi units in 05:40.180 --> 05:42.291 when I was lost in tom tomorrow , but 05:42.291 --> 05:44.660 that was a while ago . There were 05:44.670 --> 05:48.250 difficulty getting the numbers actually 05:48.250 --> 05:50.472 on duty . There might be quite a few on 05:50.472 --> 05:52.583 the books , but very few are actually 05:52.583 --> 05:54.194 showing up . Can you give me 05:54.194 --> 05:56.306 measurements of strength of the Iraqi 05:56.306 --> 05:58.550 army and police in terms of on the 05:58.550 --> 06:00.550 books versus those who are actually 06:00.550 --> 06:01.760 working day to day ? 06:04.340 --> 06:08.040 uh normally our units run somewhere 06:08.040 --> 06:11.540 around 90% strength um as far as 06:11.540 --> 06:14.480 present for duty strength , that 06:14.490 --> 06:16.601 there's a number of variables that go 06:16.601 --> 06:18.768 into that . One of them is there leave 06:18.768 --> 06:21.970 policy ? Uh And I've been talking to 06:21.970 --> 06:24.137 the commanders on the ground to try to 06:24.137 --> 06:27.510 get them to understand that the Iraqi 06:27.510 --> 06:29.750 army needs to fight for their country . 06:29.750 --> 06:31.750 We're helping them and they need to 06:31.750 --> 06:33.806 help themselves . Uh Currently , the 06:33.806 --> 06:36.260 division here has Apollo leave policy 06:36.260 --> 06:39.230 of 10 working days and then five days 06:39.230 --> 06:43.050 off . Uh The Ministry of Defence 06:43.050 --> 06:46.320 policy is 21 days on seven days 06:46.320 --> 06:49.110 off . But if you talk to the commanders 06:49.110 --> 06:51.221 on the ground , they'll tell you that 06:51.221 --> 06:53.620 because of the issues that the chairman 06:53.620 --> 06:55.620 and the Secretary of Defense talked 06:55.620 --> 06:57.787 about and that's having to get paid in 06:57.787 --> 07:00.730 cash and go home and get the pay to 07:00.730 --> 07:03.850 their families . Uh those issues will 07:03.850 --> 07:07.070 cause those soldiers to quit if they 07:07.070 --> 07:09.440 don't get home frequently enough to pay 07:09.440 --> 07:11.410 their families . So what it really 07:11.410 --> 07:13.780 becomes is right now we've settled with 07:13.780 --> 07:17.310 a 10 and five which does reduce their 07:17.320 --> 07:20.920 combat present for duty strength . But 07:20.920 --> 07:24.640 I will uh will caveat that by saying 07:24.650 --> 07:26.870 that in the operations that they've 07:26.870 --> 07:29.940 conducted what would take me a company 07:29.940 --> 07:33.180 to execute they'll put two companies 07:33.180 --> 07:35.480 against it . They've got the skills , 07:35.490 --> 07:37.657 they've got the will to fight and they 07:37.657 --> 07:39.840 are getting after it out on the on in 07:39.840 --> 07:43.450 the area . And so uh though it does 07:43.450 --> 07:45.730 affect them . The commanders have been 07:45.730 --> 07:48.530 working very hard around those issues . 07:48.540 --> 07:51.510 I think it will improve once they get 07:51.520 --> 07:55.060 the pay situation more automated and 07:55.060 --> 07:57.282 they figure out how they're going to do 07:57.282 --> 08:01.130 that . Right . Carl mike 08:01.130 --> 08:03.570 may . Well Fox News a third U . S . 08:03.570 --> 08:07.380 Military helicopter uh went down 08:07.380 --> 08:09.730 today during the past couple of weeks 08:09.740 --> 08:12.290 as the U . S . Military commander in 08:12.290 --> 08:15.140 Iraq . Uh how much does this concern 08:15.140 --> 08:18.900 you ? Is there a way to uh counteract 08:18.900 --> 08:21.890 this ? Uh any assessment from being 08:21.890 --> 08:24.360 close to where this is happening ? 08:25.840 --> 08:28.190 Yes that's a very good question . Uh 08:28.200 --> 08:30.367 The great thing about our military and 08:30.367 --> 08:32.860 our army is that after every event we 08:32.860 --> 08:36.650 do act after action reviews and we try 08:36.650 --> 08:39.320 to find out if there's better ways uh 08:39.330 --> 08:42.610 for us better techniques , tactics or 08:42.610 --> 08:45.720 procedures for us to execute or if we 08:45.720 --> 08:47.950 just found there was a mistake made . 08:48.040 --> 08:51.140 And so I fully expect that the 08:51.140 --> 08:53.660 commanders it didn't happen in my area . 08:53.670 --> 08:55.670 But I fully expect that the lessons 08:55.670 --> 08:59.010 learned from the tragedy , tragedy of 08:59.010 --> 09:01.121 the helicopter crashes will be passed 09:01.121 --> 09:04.690 on to me so that we can take 09:04.700 --> 09:07.750 action in our area just to make sure 09:07.760 --> 09:10.680 that we are putting are not putting our 09:10.680 --> 09:13.080 soldiers at undue risk and we protect 09:13.080 --> 09:16.870 them the best we can get the 09:16.870 --> 09:19.480 other mixed amounts journalist mike 09:19.480 --> 09:21.591 mounts with CNN if I could go back on 09:21.591 --> 09:23.813 the equipment issue you've been talking 09:23.813 --> 09:26.360 about . Can you tell us something about 09:26.840 --> 09:29.007 what the equipment shortages shortages 09:29.007 --> 09:31.229 are that the Eye and the Eye are having 09:31.229 --> 09:33.173 and what kind of equipment are you 09:33.173 --> 09:35.284 actually lending to them ? And what's 09:35.284 --> 09:38.500 the shortage problem ? What's the 09:38.500 --> 09:41.790 effectiveness um or the lack of 09:41.790 --> 09:43.512 effective effectiveness that's 09:43.512 --> 09:46.200 happening ? That's the the Iraqi troops 09:46.200 --> 09:49.550 are are having for the shortage 09:50.270 --> 09:54.160 but that an english expect mhm 09:54.640 --> 09:57.310 Some of the shortage not are not 09:57.310 --> 10:00.400 apparent in the in the near term . Uh 10:00.410 --> 10:03.130 but they do affect their ability to 10:03.130 --> 10:05.200 fight in the long term . Uh For one 10:05.200 --> 10:07.590 thing is training ammunition . Uh It's 10:07.590 --> 10:09.312 very difficult to get training 10:09.312 --> 10:11.368 ammunition and we're working through 10:11.368 --> 10:13.701 the system to do that . Armored Humvees , 10:13.701 --> 10:17.650 armored vehicles that is they 10:17.660 --> 10:19.771 do not have the armored vehicles that 10:19.771 --> 10:22.160 they should have . Uh And we lend them 10:22.170 --> 10:26.080 our our Humvees are armored Humvees 10:26.090 --> 10:28.600 for operations so that they will be 10:28.600 --> 10:32.230 protected . But there are some other 10:32.230 --> 10:34.800 shortages , weapons shortages which 10:34.800 --> 10:37.090 we're working through especially with 10:37.090 --> 10:40.970 the police force . Um As you know the 10:40.980 --> 10:44.890 the original mandate from 10:44.900 --> 10:47.330 C . E . Pat was to equip 10:47.340 --> 10:50.750 5830 policemen in Solid . I 10:50.750 --> 10:53.560 mean that was based on the 10:53.570 --> 10:57.100 population of Portland Oregon , which 10:57.100 --> 10:59.520 is about 1.2 million . Well , as you 10:59.520 --> 11:01.353 know , the security situation in 11:01.353 --> 11:03.576 Portland Oregon is a lot different than 11:03.576 --> 11:06.910 it is here and so in solid dean , we 11:06.910 --> 11:10.690 have close to 12,000 policemen and 11:10.700 --> 11:12.478 they are only being equipped by 11:12.478 --> 11:16.410 coalition forces to the tune of 5830 . 11:16.420 --> 11:18.380 Now , the government of Iraq has 11:18.380 --> 11:21.560 started to equip them , but as I stated , 11:21.570 --> 11:23.810 we really need to get the Minister of 11:23.810 --> 11:27.150 Interior uh to start pushing equipment 11:27.160 --> 11:30.360 and supplies down to these uh policeman , 11:32.340 --> 11:36.170 I got a quick follow up on that 11:36.180 --> 11:39.290 and Colonel as a quick follow is the 11:39.300 --> 11:41.411 barring of equipment , Is that having 11:41.411 --> 11:43.320 any effect on on your day to day 11:43.320 --> 11:45.700 operations ? Is that causing operations 11:45.710 --> 11:47.850 to suffer on your end ? 11:48.840 --> 11:51.480 Uh If I understood the question 11:51.480 --> 11:53.830 correctly , is the shortages of 11:53.830 --> 11:57.020 equipment having an impact on day to 11:57.020 --> 11:58.964 day operations . Is that correct ? 12:00.540 --> 12:03.350 Well , on your end ? Well , if you've 12:03.360 --> 12:06.550 got to give some of your equipment to 12:06.560 --> 12:09.250 the Iraqi troops , is that having uh an 12:09.260 --> 12:11.640 adverse effect on you , you all being 12:11.650 --> 12:15.350 able to carry out operations ? No , 12:15.350 --> 12:18.360 it's no , it is not . Um as you know , 12:18.370 --> 12:20.780 not all my troopers leave the wire at 12:20.780 --> 12:22.930 any given time and so , but the 12:22.930 --> 12:25.040 equipment can and so we continue to 12:25.040 --> 12:27.207 maintain the equipment and rotate it , 12:27.207 --> 12:30.820 but it is not affecting our ability to 12:30.830 --> 12:32.160 protect our soldiers . 12:35.170 --> 12:37.337 Excuse time . We asked to allocate for 12:37.337 --> 12:39.392 this and we know that you've already 12:39.392 --> 12:41.559 adjusted your schedule to be here with 12:41.559 --> 12:44.210 us this morning . Um , so let me bring 12:44.210 --> 12:46.490 it to an end by throwing back to you 12:46.500 --> 12:48.480 and uh letting you finish with any 12:48.480 --> 12:50.480 final comments or thoughts that you 12:50.480 --> 12:54.480 might have . Um thank you very much . 12:54.490 --> 12:56.657 It's been a good morning . I just want 12:56.657 --> 12:58.712 to say a couple of things . First of 12:58.712 --> 13:01.960 all , it's an honor and a privilege to 13:01.960 --> 13:05.440 serve with and to lead uh some of the 13:05.450 --> 13:08.210 finest men and women that America has 13:08.210 --> 13:11.740 to offer . And even though there is 13:11.750 --> 13:13.900 political debate on whether we should 13:13.900 --> 13:17.120 be in Iraq , these men and women are 13:17.120 --> 13:19.160 hardworking . They're dedicated , 13:19.640 --> 13:23.340 they're courageous and every single day 13:23.340 --> 13:25.507 they're making a difference here . And 13:25.507 --> 13:27.729 so I'm very proud of them as I know you 13:27.729 --> 13:31.130 are . Uh and secondly , I just want to 13:31.130 --> 13:33.710 say thanks to our families back home 13:33.720 --> 13:36.540 and for their sacrifices . They're 13:36.540 --> 13:38.707 shouldering more than their fair share 13:38.707 --> 13:40.980 of the load while we're over here 13:40.990 --> 13:44.010 fighting for our country in Iraq . And 13:44.010 --> 13:46.340 so I just appreciate what they're doing 13:46.340 --> 13:48.720 back home and that's that's really all 13:48.720 --> 13:52.310 I have to say thank you , well , thank 13:52.310 --> 13:54.477 you again and thank you for everything 13:54.477 --> 13:56.588 that you're doing and hopefully we'll 13:56.588 --> 13:58.477 get another opportunity to have a 13:58.477 --> 14:00.477 session like this with you in a few 14:00.477 --> 14:02.560 months . I'd like that . Thank you .