WEBVTT 00:00.340 --> 00:02.451 well as we've been hearing has been a 00:02.451 --> 00:04.451 wave of violence in Baghdad today , 00:04.451 --> 00:06.670 there have been two car bombs , a US 00:06.670 --> 00:08.781 air strike and the kidnapping and the 00:08.781 --> 00:11.470 insurgency shows little sign of abating . 00:11.480 --> 00:14.080 Let's talk now to someone tasked with 00:14.090 --> 00:16.146 fighting the insurgents , the Senate 00:16.146 --> 00:18.146 Colonel evangelist Smileys unit has 00:18.146 --> 00:20.201 been involved in heavy combat on the 00:20.201 --> 00:22.146 streets of Baghdad this week in an 00:22.146 --> 00:24.146 operation named Tomahawk Strike and 00:24.146 --> 00:26.312 Colonel you've been fighting alongside 00:26.312 --> 00:28.360 Iraqi troops . We're gonna very bad 00:28.360 --> 00:30.920 press in the new york times this week . 00:30.930 --> 00:33.320 How would you describe the capabilities 00:33.320 --> 00:35.487 of the Iraqi troops have been fighting 00:35.487 --> 00:38.980 alongside ? Well , I would tell you 00:38.980 --> 00:40.980 that we've been partnered with that 00:40.980 --> 00:43.036 particular Iraqi brigade for several 00:43.036 --> 00:44.702 months and they have improved 00:44.702 --> 00:47.210 exponentially over the months and that 00:47.220 --> 00:49.330 that particular report I think was a 00:49.330 --> 00:52.090 snapshot of one spot on the battlefield 00:52.100 --> 00:54.300 And when you multiply the multiple 00:54.300 --> 00:56.467 units that were out there at the squad 00:56.467 --> 00:58.689 platoon level overall , I will tell you 00:58.689 --> 01:00.744 that the Iraqi army brigade that was 01:00.744 --> 01:02.411 partnered with us was able to 01:02.411 --> 01:04.467 accomplish their mission and achieve 01:04.467 --> 01:06.633 the desired effects of the operation . 01:06.633 --> 01:09.970 Well , the new york times snapshot as 01:09.970 --> 01:13.340 you call it characterized the Iraqis as 01:13.350 --> 01:15.183 unprofessional , undisciplined , 01:15.183 --> 01:17.440 unreliable and not all that courageous 01:17.450 --> 01:20.840 are , here's what I would tell you . 01:20.850 --> 01:23.610 My vantage point as the commanders is 01:23.610 --> 01:25.610 probably a lot greater than in that 01:25.610 --> 01:27.610 particular snapshot And when you're 01:27.610 --> 01:29.800 trying to to cross cultural lines , 01:29.810 --> 01:32.110 language barriers , different skill 01:32.110 --> 01:34.280 sets and capabilities sets and pull 01:34.280 --> 01:36.336 that all together and then execute a 01:36.336 --> 01:39.240 brigade sized operation with a pretty 01:39.240 --> 01:41.518 large , significant number of soldiers , 01:41.518 --> 01:43.740 uh , that is tough when we just do that 01:43.740 --> 01:45.851 unilaterally . So when you combine it 01:45.851 --> 01:47.518 and take all those factors in 01:47.518 --> 01:49.407 consideration . Yes , it's it's a 01:49.407 --> 01:49.180 challenge and it's tough to get from 01:49.190 --> 01:51.301 point A to point B . So at the end of 01:51.301 --> 01:53.412 the day , if the violence levels were 01:53.412 --> 01:55.190 reduced and we accomplished our 01:55.190 --> 01:57.357 objectives and I'm extremely satisfied 01:57.357 --> 02:00.170 with that , are your men actually ever 02:00.170 --> 02:03.440 at risk because of the failings of the 02:03.440 --> 02:07.370 Iraqi troops ? I mean , will you take 02:07.370 --> 02:09.426 orders from the Iraqis , even though 02:09.426 --> 02:11.426 it's against your better judgment , 02:11.426 --> 02:13.940 here's how this works when we're 02:13.940 --> 02:16.180 combined . We have leaders at all 02:16.180 --> 02:18.530 levels . For example , I am I I am 02:18.530 --> 02:20.474 joined at the hip with the brigade 02:20.474 --> 02:22.586 commander . I have company commanders 02:22.586 --> 02:24.586 that are engaged with the battalion 02:24.586 --> 02:26.697 commanders on down the line , down to 02:26.697 --> 02:28.919 the lowest soldiers and when the orders 02:28.919 --> 02:31.141 are communicated to the various units , 02:31.141 --> 02:33.363 again , we combat through the different 02:33.363 --> 02:35.197 friction points if you will , uh 02:35.197 --> 02:37.419 cultural language etcetera , and we get 02:37.419 --> 02:39.641 it done . That's that's about as simple 02:39.641 --> 02:42.270 as I can make it for you . Yeah , the 02:42.270 --> 02:44.550 entire presidential strategy , 02:44.560 --> 02:46.727 President Bush's strategy now that the 02:46.727 --> 02:49.430 surge , the big hit to get the 02:49.430 --> 02:51.870 insurgents who are holding Baghdad to 02:51.870 --> 02:54.410 ransom is based on the premise that the 02:54.410 --> 02:56.940 Iraqis will take the lead . Are they 02:56.940 --> 03:00.570 going to be up to it ? Well , um , 03:00.580 --> 03:03.480 I won't address uh , the strategic 03:03.480 --> 03:05.647 implications of things so much because 03:05.647 --> 03:07.813 my Foxhole is is is a lot smaller than 03:07.813 --> 03:09.591 that . I will tell you that the 03:09.591 --> 03:11.591 operation there on Haifa Street was 03:11.591 --> 03:13.702 Iraqi plan and it was the Iraqis that 03:13.702 --> 03:15.924 reached out to us and ask for coalition 03:15.924 --> 03:18.160 support . And my battalion was tagged 03:18.160 --> 03:20.049 with responsibility for providing 03:20.049 --> 03:21.938 support the Iraqis . So if you're 03:21.938 --> 03:24.049 asking me if Iraqis can take the lead 03:24.049 --> 03:26.382 and we'll take the lead , I'll tell you . 03:26.382 --> 03:28.810 Yes . Mhm . Little smiley . Thank you 03:28.810 --> 03:30.550 for speaking to us .