WEBVTT 00:01.340 --> 00:04.860 Good afternoon , I would first like to 00:04.860 --> 00:06.804 start with some comments about the 00:06.804 --> 00:09.020 release and subsequent publication of 00:09.020 --> 00:11.440 classified military documents earlier 00:11.440 --> 00:14.370 this week . First , as the president 00:14.370 --> 00:16.640 stated the problems identified and 00:16.640 --> 00:18.730 issues raised in these documents 00:18.730 --> 00:21.320 relating to the war in Afghanistan have 00:21.320 --> 00:22.987 been well known in and out of 00:22.987 --> 00:26.240 government for some time . In fact , it 00:26.240 --> 00:28.296 was the recognition of many of these 00:28.296 --> 00:30.351 challenges that led the president to 00:30.351 --> 00:32.296 conduct an extensive review of our 00:32.296 --> 00:34.530 Afghan strategy last year , which 00:34.530 --> 00:36.752 concluded that our mission there needed 00:36.752 --> 00:38.870 a fundamentally new approach . These 00:38.870 --> 00:41.250 documents represent a mountain of raw 00:41.250 --> 00:44.720 data and individual impressions most 00:44.720 --> 00:47.710 several years old , devoid of context 00:47.720 --> 00:50.680 or analysis . They do not represent 00:50.680 --> 00:53.500 official positions or policy and they 00:53.500 --> 00:55.500 do not , in my view , fundamentally 00:55.500 --> 00:57.667 call into question the efficacy of our 00:57.667 --> 00:59.889 current strategy in Afghanistan and its 00:59.889 --> 01:03.360 prospects for success . Having said all 01:03.360 --> 01:06.230 that , the battlefield consequences of 01:06.230 --> 01:08.640 the release of these documents are 01:08.640 --> 01:11.440 potentially severe and dangerous for 01:11.440 --> 01:14.630 our troops , our allies and Afghan 01:14.630 --> 01:17.270 partners and may well damage our 01:17.270 --> 01:19.380 relationships and reputation in that 01:19.390 --> 01:22.280 key part of the world intelligence 01:22.280 --> 01:24.360 sources and methods , as well as 01:24.360 --> 01:26.430 military tactics techniques and 01:26.430 --> 01:29.080 procedures , will become known to our 01:29.080 --> 01:32.080 adversaries . This department is 01:32.080 --> 01:33.960 conducting a thorough aggressive 01:33.960 --> 01:36.320 investigation to determine how this 01:36.320 --> 01:39.240 leak occurred , to identify the person 01:39.250 --> 01:42.380 or persons responsible and to assess 01:42.380 --> 01:44.102 the content of the information 01:44.102 --> 01:46.650 compromised . We have a moral 01:46.650 --> 01:48.428 responsibility to do everything 01:48.428 --> 01:50.790 possible to mitigate the consequences 01:50.800 --> 01:53.320 for our troops and our partners down 01:53.320 --> 01:55.960 range , especially those who have 01:55.960 --> 01:58.370 worked with and put their trust in us 01:58.380 --> 02:01.270 in the past , who now may be targeted 02:01.270 --> 02:04.790 for retribution . Yesterday I 02:04.790 --> 02:07.820 called FBI director robert Mueller and 02:07.820 --> 02:09.931 asked for the FBI's assistance in our 02:09.931 --> 02:12.960 investigation as a partner . It is 02:12.960 --> 02:14.682 important that we have all the 02:14.682 --> 02:16.780 resources we need to investigate and 02:16.780 --> 02:19.260 assess this breach of national security . 02:20.610 --> 02:22.777 Furthermore , the department is taking 02:22.777 --> 02:24.888 action in theater to prevent a repeat 02:24.888 --> 02:27.050 of such a breach . To include 02:27.050 --> 02:29.272 tightening procedures for accessing and 02:29.272 --> 02:31.383 transporting classified information . 02:32.540 --> 02:34.930 As a general proposition . We endeavor 02:34.930 --> 02:37.480 to push access to sensitive battlefield 02:37.480 --> 02:39.760 information down to where it is most 02:39.760 --> 02:42.680 useful on the front lines . Where as a 02:42.680 --> 02:44.513 practical matter there are fewer 02:44.513 --> 02:46.690 restrictions and controls than at rear 02:46.690 --> 02:49.240 headquarters . In the wake of this 02:49.240 --> 02:51.407 incident , it will be a real challenge 02:51.407 --> 02:53.420 to strike the right balance between 02:53.420 --> 02:56.170 security and providing our front line 02:56.170 --> 02:59.660 troops the information they need . The 02:59.660 --> 03:02.050 U . S . Military success over the years 03:02.050 --> 03:04.690 rests on the abilities and integrity of 03:04.690 --> 03:06.760 its men and women in uniform and our 03:06.760 --> 03:09.320 trust in them . This trust is 03:09.320 --> 03:11.431 represented by the fact that relative 03:11.431 --> 03:13.780 to other countries , armed forces are 03:13.780 --> 03:15.780 military culture is one that on the 03:15.780 --> 03:18.970 battlefield places great responsibility 03:18.970 --> 03:21.550 on the shoulders of even junior service 03:21.550 --> 03:23.940 members to include entrusting them with 03:23.940 --> 03:26.650 sensitive information . The american 03:26.650 --> 03:29.950 way of war depends upon it but to earn 03:29.950 --> 03:32.061 and maintain that trust , we must all 03:32.061 --> 03:34.570 be responsible in handling protecting 03:34.930 --> 03:37.152 and safeguarding our nation's secrets . 03:38.540 --> 03:40.762 For years . There has been what I would 03:40.762 --> 03:43.750 call appropriate criticism of excessive 03:43.750 --> 03:46.860 classification and over classification 03:46.870 --> 03:50.700 of information . However , this recent 03:50.700 --> 03:52.790 release of documents is a pointed 03:52.790 --> 03:55.600 reminder that much secret information 03:55.600 --> 03:58.290 is treated as such , to protect sources 03:58.290 --> 04:01.000 of information , to protect the lives 04:01.000 --> 04:03.620 of our men and women in uniform , to 04:03.620 --> 04:06.180 deny our enemies the information about 04:06.180 --> 04:09.090 our military operations and to preserve 04:09.090 --> 04:11.034 our relationships with friends and 04:11.034 --> 04:14.330 allies . This recent massive breach 04:14.500 --> 04:16.860 should be a reminder to all entrusted 04:16.860 --> 04:18.740 with our secrets that there are 04:18.740 --> 04:21.410 potentially dramatic and grievously 04:21.410 --> 04:24.200 harmful consequences of violations of 04:24.200 --> 04:27.440 trust and responsibility . We will 04:27.440 --> 04:30.020 aggressively investigate and wherever 04:30.020 --> 04:33.020 possible prosecute such violations . 04:33.030 --> 04:36.140 Chairman , thank you . Mr Secretary . I 04:36.140 --> 04:38.362 certainly share your concerns about the 04:38.362 --> 04:40.660 recklessness with which classified 04:40.660 --> 04:42.660 documents were both leaked and then 04:42.660 --> 04:46.100 posted online . As I said earlier this 04:46.100 --> 04:48.820 week , I'm appalled by this behavior 04:48.830 --> 04:51.360 and frankly outraged that anyone in 04:51.360 --> 04:53.200 their right mind would think it 04:53.200 --> 04:55.390 valuable to make public even one 04:55.390 --> 04:58.470 sensitive report , let alone tens of 04:58.470 --> 05:01.670 thousands of them about a war that is 05:01.670 --> 05:04.450 being waged . Yes , the documents are 05:04.450 --> 05:06.910 old and essentially raw inputs to our 05:06.910 --> 05:10.170 intelligence and operations apparatus . 05:10.170 --> 05:12.190 And yes , much of what has been 05:12.190 --> 05:14.134 revealed has already been commonly 05:14.134 --> 05:16.670 understood by the public or otherwise 05:16.670 --> 05:20.590 covered in the media . I can assure you , 05:20.600 --> 05:22.378 having just come from visits to 05:22.378 --> 05:24.960 Afghanistan and Pakistan that none of 05:24.960 --> 05:26.793 what I've seen posted online are 05:26.793 --> 05:28.910 reported in the press affects our 05:28.910 --> 05:31.440 overarching strategy . But frankly , 05:31.440 --> 05:33.760 that's not why this is so destructive . 05:34.740 --> 05:36.518 The sheer size and scope of the 05:36.518 --> 05:38.740 collection now demands a careful review 05:38.740 --> 05:41.310 to determine the degree to which future 05:41.310 --> 05:44.410 tactical operations may be impacted and 05:44.410 --> 05:46.466 the degree to which the lives of our 05:46.466 --> 05:48.890 troops and Afghan partners may be at 05:48.890 --> 05:51.710 risk . And I think we always need to be 05:51.710 --> 05:54.640 mindful of the unknown potential for 05:54.640 --> 05:57.770 damage in any particular document that 05:57.770 --> 06:01.370 we handle , Mr assange can say whatever 06:01.370 --> 06:03.314 he likes about the greater good he 06:03.314 --> 06:05.960 thinks he and his source are doing . 06:06.640 --> 06:08.751 But the truth is , they might already 06:08.751 --> 06:10.880 have on their hands the blood of some 06:10.880 --> 06:13.560 young soldier or that of an Afghan 06:13.560 --> 06:16.700 family disagree with the war . All you 06:16.700 --> 06:19.510 want take issue with the policy 06:20.040 --> 06:22.350 challenge me or our ground commanders 06:22.350 --> 06:24.980 on the decisions we make to accomplish 06:24.980 --> 06:28.340 the mission we've been given . But 06:28.340 --> 06:30.451 don't put those who willingly go into 06:30.451 --> 06:33.860 harm's way even further in harm's way 06:34.240 --> 06:36.940 just to satisfy your need to make a 06:36.940 --> 06:40.000 point . And while I'm at it , let me 06:40.000 --> 06:43.750 make one a big part of my trip . Indeed , 06:44.340 --> 06:46.530 a big part of my time as chairman has 06:46.530 --> 06:48.890 revolved around building and sustaining 06:48.890 --> 06:51.710 relationships everywhere I went over 06:51.710 --> 06:53.910 the last 10 days . Those relationships 06:53.910 --> 06:56.460 were front and center , not just for me , 06:56.460 --> 06:58.700 but for our commanders and for our 06:58.700 --> 07:02.150 diplomats . I saw it in Kabul , where 07:02.150 --> 07:04.039 Ambassador Eikenberry and General 07:04.039 --> 07:06.270 Petraeus have forged a strong team and 07:06.270 --> 07:08.214 an even stronger dialogue with the 07:08.214 --> 07:10.310 Karzai administration . I saw in 07:10.310 --> 07:12.340 Kandahar city where I met with a 07:12.340 --> 07:15.450 company of us mps living and working 07:15.450 --> 07:18.350 side by side with Afghan police at a 07:18.350 --> 07:21.080 security station near the outskirts of 07:21.080 --> 07:23.940 town . I saw it in Islamabad . And yet 07:23.940 --> 07:26.280 another of my engagements with General 07:26.280 --> 07:29.180 Kiani . He spent an entire afternoon 07:29.180 --> 07:32.000 flying me to Northern Pakistan . So I 07:32.000 --> 07:34.222 could see for myself some of the rugged 07:34.222 --> 07:36.222 terrain . He and his troops have to 07:36.222 --> 07:39.450 patrol . If we've learned nothing else 07:39.450 --> 07:41.420 in fighting these wars , it's that 07:41.420 --> 07:44.160 relationships matter . They are vital . 07:44.940 --> 07:46.940 We are not going to kill our way to 07:46.940 --> 07:48.940 success and we sure aren't going to 07:48.940 --> 07:51.160 achieve success alone . So , in 07:51.160 --> 07:53.271 addition to making sure we understand 07:53.271 --> 07:55.690 the tactical risks from these leaks , I 07:55.690 --> 07:58.160 think it's incumbent upon us not to let 07:58.160 --> 08:00.510 the good relations relationships we've 08:00.510 --> 08:03.330 established and the trust we've worked 08:03.330 --> 08:05.497 so hard to build throughout the region 08:05.497 --> 08:08.080 also become a casualty . Thank 08:08.080 --> 08:11.960 you . Ah , Trade you that the 08:11.960 --> 08:14.070 investigation should go beyond the 08:14.070 --> 08:17.660 source or sources military to include 08:17.670 --> 08:19.850 those who received or use the 08:19.850 --> 08:22.440 information wikileaks , the news media . 08:22.530 --> 08:25.950 And does the presence of the FBI in the 08:25.950 --> 08:28.172 investigation indicates such a widening 08:28.172 --> 08:32.030 of its scope . Obviously in the middle 08:32.030 --> 08:34.086 of an investigation and particularly 08:34.086 --> 08:36.800 one um , that is in the military 08:36.800 --> 08:39.290 justice system . There's very little 08:39.290 --> 08:42.850 that I can say because of the potential 08:42.850 --> 08:45.860 for command influence . Um , my , my 08:45.860 --> 08:48.010 basic position though is the 08:48.010 --> 08:50.110 investigation should go wherever it 08:50.110 --> 08:52.570 needs to go . And one of the reasons 08:52.570 --> 08:56.020 that I asked the Director of the FBI to 08:56.020 --> 08:58.770 partner with us in this is to ensure 08:58.770 --> 09:01.250 that it can go wherever it needs to go , 09:02.340 --> 09:04.340 potentially . I'll just , I'll just 09:04.340 --> 09:07.650 leave it at that Julian . Uh , sir , um 09:08.940 --> 09:11.520 uh , PFC Bradley Manning was charged 09:11.530 --> 09:14.350 earlier with another leak to wikileaks . 09:14.380 --> 09:16.600 Do you feel that there was not ? Was 09:16.600 --> 09:18.670 there an aggressive enough effort to 09:18.680 --> 09:22.310 examine what he was access that he was 09:22.310 --> 09:24.460 not supposed to access ? Have you 09:24.460 --> 09:28.020 thoroughly looked at what documents he 09:28.020 --> 09:31.010 has already accused might have looked 09:31.010 --> 09:33.232 at in addition to what has already been 09:33.232 --> 09:36.260 charged with ? Well , obviously , um 09:36.640 --> 09:39.300 what I just said in response to the anS 09:39.300 --> 09:41.411 question goes here too . I'm just not 09:41.411 --> 09:44.350 going to talk about any specific 09:44.350 --> 09:48.290 individual or or the status of 09:48.290 --> 09:51.840 the investigation . Try again then on a 09:51.850 --> 09:54.530 slightly different matter is there , 09:54.540 --> 09:56.484 are you , you mentioned that there 09:56.484 --> 09:58.596 would be some changes at the tactical 09:58.596 --> 10:01.310 level in Iraq . Are you concerned that 10:01.320 --> 10:04.000 uh is it a problem that the rules , 10:04.010 --> 10:06.177 there were insufficient rules in place 10:06.177 --> 10:08.343 or that rules were not followed to the 10:08.343 --> 10:12.230 letter that allowed breaches on the 10:12.240 --> 10:15.060 front line ? Well , again , the 10:16.740 --> 10:19.590 based on what I've been briefed on and 10:19.590 --> 10:22.680 what I knew before as I said in my 10:22.680 --> 10:26.170 statement if if the kind of 10:26.170 --> 10:29.150 breach involved in the downloading of 10:29.150 --> 10:30.983 these thousands of documents had 10:30.983 --> 10:33.450 occurred at a rear headquarters or here 10:33.450 --> 10:37.320 in the US ah very high 10:37.320 --> 10:39.580 likelihood we would have detected it . 10:40.340 --> 10:42.451 But the interesting thing is , and it 10:42.451 --> 10:44.562 really was one of the lessons learned 10:44.562 --> 10:48.310 from the first Gulf War in 1991 was how 10:48.310 --> 10:51.760 little useful intelligence information 10:51.760 --> 10:54.840 was being received by battalion and 10:54.840 --> 10:57.980 company commanders in the field . And 10:57.980 --> 11:00.036 so there has been an effort over the 11:00.036 --> 11:03.550 last 15 or so years in the military and 11:03.550 --> 11:06.860 I would say really accelerated during 11:06.860 --> 11:09.710 the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to 11:09.710 --> 11:13.320 push as much information to as far 11:13.320 --> 11:15.250 forward as possible , which means 11:15.250 --> 11:17.980 putting it in a secret channel that 11:17.990 --> 11:20.560 almost everybody has access to in 11:20.560 --> 11:24.460 uniform . And obviously many civilians 11:24.460 --> 11:28.010 as well . We want those soldiers in a 11:28.010 --> 11:31.200 forward operating base to have all the 11:31.200 --> 11:33.530 information they possibly can have that 11:33.530 --> 11:37.010 impacts on their own security , but 11:37.010 --> 11:39.010 also being able to accomplish their 11:39.010 --> 11:41.660 mission . And so one of the things that , 11:41.670 --> 11:44.010 that we are going to have to look at 11:44.020 --> 11:47.540 with General Petraeus , uh , and soon , 11:47.540 --> 11:49.960 General Austin is 11:50.940 --> 11:54.820 what kind of should we change the 11:54.820 --> 11:58.560 way we approach that or or do we , 11:59.640 --> 12:02.190 do we continue to take the risk And 12:02.190 --> 12:04.950 there are some technological solutions , 12:05.340 --> 12:08.480 um , most of them are not immediately 12:08.480 --> 12:11.390 available to us . But figuring out if 12:11.390 --> 12:14.120 we need to change the balance , I think 12:14.120 --> 12:16.540 is one of the issues the independent of 12:16.540 --> 12:20.420 the investigations that all of us are 12:20.420 --> 12:24.390 going to have to work on . I just add 12:24.400 --> 12:27.450 one small comment to that is in that 12:27.940 --> 12:30.800 change what it has done is it has 12:30.810 --> 12:34.810 put us in a position too much 12:34.810 --> 12:37.110 better match the enemy in terms of 12:37.120 --> 12:39.320 speed of war . It's integrated 12:39.320 --> 12:41.550 intelligence more rapidly into 12:41.550 --> 12:43.620 operations which then generates more 12:43.620 --> 12:46.590 intelligence which allows us to operate 12:46.600 --> 12:48.820 much more effectively . And I think 12:48.820 --> 12:50.931 obviously as a secretary said , we're 12:50.931 --> 12:53.098 gonna have to take a look at what this 12:53.098 --> 12:55.250 investigation tells us and and make 12:55.250 --> 12:57.361 sure that we have the balance exactly 12:57.361 --> 13:00.550 right Abdel Mullins , you had mentioned 13:00.560 --> 13:02.727 that the founder of Wikileaks may have 13:02.727 --> 13:04.949 blood on his hands . Do you know , have 13:04.949 --> 13:06.560 people been killed over this 13:06.560 --> 13:08.960 information ? Um there's still uh what 13:08.960 --> 13:11.940 I'm concerned about with this is I 13:11.940 --> 13:14.920 think uh individuals who are not 13:14.930 --> 13:18.440 involved in this kind of warfare um 13:18.450 --> 13:22.160 and exposed this kind of information . 13:22.540 --> 13:25.930 Uh can't , from my 13:25.930 --> 13:29.370 perspective , can't appreciate how this 13:29.370 --> 13:31.270 kind of information is routinely 13:31.270 --> 13:34.820 network together uh inside the 13:34.830 --> 13:37.560 classified channels we use specifically . 13:37.940 --> 13:40.220 Uh and it's very difficult if you don't 13:40.220 --> 13:42.570 do this and understand this to 13:42.570 --> 13:45.090 understand the impact and very 13:45.090 --> 13:47.540 specifically the potential that is 13:47.540 --> 13:50.440 there . That is there to risk lives 13:50.560 --> 13:54.120 of our soldiers and sailors , Airmen 13:54.120 --> 13:57.420 and marines coalition uh 13:57.430 --> 13:59.920 warfighters as well as well as afghan 13:59.920 --> 14:02.031 citizens . And there's no doubt in my 14:02.031 --> 14:04.198 mind about that . I would I would just 14:04.198 --> 14:06.410 add one other thing . The thing to 14:06.410 --> 14:09.390 remember here is that that this is a 14:09.390 --> 14:12.350 huge amount of raw data . As I said at 14:12.350 --> 14:16.300 the outset of my remarks , there is no 14:16.300 --> 14:20.280 accountability , There is no sense of 14:20.280 --> 14:24.140 responsibility . Uh It is sort of 14:24.140 --> 14:27.640 thrown out there for take as you will 14:27.650 --> 14:31.450 and the consequences 14:32.440 --> 14:34.496 if I could just come back a minute . 14:34.496 --> 14:36.710 The fact is the department the U . S . 14:36.710 --> 14:39.730 Military new weeks ago . It is part of 14:39.730 --> 14:41.580 the public record that tens of 14:41.580 --> 14:43.413 thousands of documents have been 14:43.413 --> 14:45.358 downloaded without referencing any 14:45.358 --> 14:47.540 particular legal matter . It has been 14:47.550 --> 14:50.270 in the public record released by this 14:50.270 --> 14:52.270 department . Charge sheets had been 14:52.270 --> 14:54.960 filed . The department the military new . 14:55.440 --> 14:57.640 So why the surprise , why didn't the 14:57.640 --> 15:01.300 military move faster to assess 15:01.300 --> 15:04.190 this ? To establish a team to assess it . 15:04.200 --> 15:06.740 To bring the FBI in . Charges were 15:06.740 --> 15:09.150 filed about tens of thousands of 15:09.160 --> 15:12.120 missing documents weeks ago . And has 15:12.120 --> 15:14.120 anyone else been relieved of duty ? 15:14.120 --> 15:16.310 Where's the command responsibility in 15:16.310 --> 15:18.421 the unit where this occurred ? Well , 15:18.421 --> 15:21.490 first of all , uh those are the kinds 15:21.490 --> 15:22.990 of issues that I think the 15:22.990 --> 15:25.160 investigation will address . I would 15:25.160 --> 15:26.882 tell you that at least from my 15:26.882 --> 15:30.770 perspective , it has only been very 15:30.770 --> 15:33.800 recently that I was aware of the 15:33.800 --> 15:37.530 magnitude of of the 15:37.540 --> 15:41.080 number of documents that that had 15:41.080 --> 15:44.950 been had been leaked . Ah 15:45.640 --> 15:49.570 The reality is at this point , we 15:49.570 --> 15:52.280 don't know how many more there are out 15:52.280 --> 15:55.230 there . It could be a 15:55.230 --> 15:58.100 substantial additional number of 15:58.100 --> 16:00.044 documents and we have no idea what 16:00.044 --> 16:01.989 their content is . Either . Do you 16:01.989 --> 16:04.044 believe there's other documents that 16:04.044 --> 16:06.480 are either missing or download ? Well , 16:06.480 --> 16:08.740 first of all , my impression is that 16:08.750 --> 16:11.830 the head of Wikileaks has acknowledged 16:11.830 --> 16:13.850 that he has thousands of additional 16:13.850 --> 16:16.017 documents that he has not yet posted . 16:16.017 --> 16:18.072 So we have his own statement to that 16:18.072 --> 16:20.890 effect . Talking to the founder of 16:20.890 --> 16:23.112 Wikileaks to determine what he may have 16:23.112 --> 16:25.334 and present released yet . Is there any 16:25.334 --> 16:27.557 kind of dialogue ? Why not not that I'm 16:27.557 --> 16:29.612 aware of ? I'm not sure why we would 16:29.612 --> 16:31.779 you think he's gonna tell us the truth 16:31.940 --> 16:33.700 Julian assange face criminal 16:33.700 --> 16:35.870 prosecution . Will he face criminal 16:35.870 --> 16:38.160 prosecution ? Sir ? I have no idea . As 16:38.160 --> 16:40.430 I , as I said in answering the first 16:40.430 --> 16:42.760 question , the investigation should go 16:42.760 --> 16:44.860 wherever , wherever it needs to go . 16:45.340 --> 16:47.300 You said you were taking steps to 16:47.310 --> 16:50.250 mitigate the damage . What specifically 16:50.250 --> 16:53.010 are you taking afghans who are named in 16:53.010 --> 16:55.121 those documents out of the country or 16:55.121 --> 16:57.177 doing other things that specifically 16:57.440 --> 16:59.990 reduce the danger of without 16:59.990 --> 17:02.046 compounding the problem by revealing 17:02.046 --> 17:04.120 what we're doing . Uh , I would just 17:04.120 --> 17:06.420 say that I , as I said in my statement , 17:06.420 --> 17:09.020 I think we have a moral obligation not 17:09.020 --> 17:11.260 only to our troops but to those who 17:11.260 --> 17:14.790 have worked with us . And and as we go 17:14.790 --> 17:17.940 through these documents , uh , and 17:17.950 --> 17:21.200 identify people who have helped us . It 17:21.200 --> 17:24.540 seems to me , we have an obligation to 17:24.880 --> 17:26.824 take some responsibility for their 17:26.824 --> 17:29.880 security Elizabeth can , without going 17:29.880 --> 17:31.936 into specifics and talking about the 17:31.936 --> 17:33.824 investigation . Can you talk in a 17:33.824 --> 17:35.936 general way about what the FBI can do 17:35.936 --> 17:38.160 that . The army criminal investigation 17:38.170 --> 17:41.320 can't well , I don't know to tell you 17:41.320 --> 17:44.550 the truth . I do know that . Uh , I 17:44.560 --> 17:47.020 mean , we all know the range of skills 17:47.020 --> 17:50.730 of , of the FBI And and frankly because 17:50.730 --> 17:53.920 I don't know whether this investigation 17:53.920 --> 17:57.200 should stop at the edge of the 17:57.200 --> 17:59.311 responsibilities of the Department of 17:59.311 --> 18:01.610 Defense and the military . Uh It seemed 18:01.610 --> 18:04.150 to me to ensure that the investigation 18:04.160 --> 18:06.970 goes wherever it needs to go . That 18:06.970 --> 18:09.200 having the FBI involved as a partner 18:09.200 --> 18:12.060 was very important in terms of 18:12.740 --> 18:14.620 leaving open the full scope of a 18:14.620 --> 18:17.440 possible investigation . Ask your 18:17.440 --> 18:20.520 99 Wikileaks question . This is a 18:20.520 --> 18:23.020 veterans Veterans affairs issue . Both 18:23.020 --> 18:25.076 you and abnormal in have worked very 18:25.076 --> 18:27.298 hard to ensure that the transition from 18:27.298 --> 18:30.250 warrior two retired or disabled under 18:30.250 --> 18:32.028 the auspices of the to has gone 18:32.028 --> 18:34.083 humanely and efficiently . Yesterday 18:34.083 --> 18:36.139 the to open an investigation into an 18:36.139 --> 18:38.040 insurance company practice where 18:38.040 --> 18:40.000 survivors benefits are held by the 18:40.000 --> 18:42.111 companies in a large interest bearing 18:42.111 --> 18:44.400 account . The survivors get a small 18:44.400 --> 18:46.567 amount of it and they're not told that 18:46.567 --> 18:48.810 their their benefits aren't really 18:48.820 --> 18:52.270 ensured by F . D . I . C . The Andrew 18:52.270 --> 18:54.326 cuomo that you new york . Attorney , 18:54.326 --> 18:56.326 journalist , subpoena the company's 18:56.326 --> 18:58.492 today it's becoming a larger issue . I 18:58.492 --> 19:00.659 wanted to get your take on the subject 19:00.659 --> 19:02.714 since you sit on an advisory council 19:02.714 --> 19:04.881 for service members and veterans group 19:04.881 --> 19:08.050 insurance . I do . Mhm . 19:08.440 --> 19:12.280 Okay . Uh let me just 19:12.280 --> 19:15.670 say that today is the first time . 19:16.840 --> 19:20.740 Well let me say until today I actually 19:20.740 --> 19:23.750 believed that the families of our 19:23.750 --> 19:26.740 fallen heroes got a check for the full 19:26.740 --> 19:30.550 amount of their benefit . So this came 19:30.550 --> 19:33.890 as news to me . And so I will just say 19:33.900 --> 19:35.733 I will be very interested in the 19:35.733 --> 19:37.900 outcome of the V . A . Investigation . 19:37.900 --> 19:40.930 I would just have that and I saw the 19:40.930 --> 19:44.820 story as well and would have the 19:44.830 --> 19:46.941 same observation . Certainly there is 19:46.941 --> 19:50.540 great care taken in counseling of those 19:50.550 --> 19:52.730 once this tragedy has occurred in a 19:52.730 --> 19:55.210 family . It's a very difficult time . 19:55.220 --> 19:59.170 Uh and that I certainly am anxious 19:59.170 --> 20:02.260 to see where this investigation goes . 20:02.260 --> 20:04.860 Specifically . These are people we have 20:04.860 --> 20:06.860 to take care of . And as you said , 20:06.860 --> 20:08.960 we've both been very focused on it . 20:09.340 --> 20:12.200 Sometimes the devil's in the details 20:12.200 --> 20:14.311 and certainly this is one , I was not 20:14.311 --> 20:16.256 aware of anything from the Defense 20:16.256 --> 20:18.144 Department standpoint possibly to 20:18.144 --> 20:20.160 ensure that at least survivors . No 20:20.160 --> 20:21.993 upfront how their money is being 20:21.993 --> 20:24.104 handled and the disclosure up front . 20:24.104 --> 20:25.882 Even though you can't you can't 20:25.882 --> 20:28.160 regulate insurance companies obviously , 20:28.160 --> 20:31.240 well , you know , all we can do is is 20:31.740 --> 20:35.690 is assure the WVA that we will 20:35.690 --> 20:37.746 do everything we can to help them in 20:37.746 --> 20:40.060 their investigation . But also in terms 20:40.060 --> 20:42.920 of as the chairman just said whatever 20:42.920 --> 20:45.220 we can do to ensure that the families 20:45.220 --> 20:47.510 of the phone I can care of if I can 20:47.510 --> 20:49.880 Tony I would second , I would say that 20:49.880 --> 20:53.100 we have put great emphasis on expanding 20:53.100 --> 20:55.100 the level of knowledge of those who 20:55.100 --> 20:57.450 counsel those who have to make these 20:57.450 --> 21:00.050 decisions . Uh The army in particular 21:00.050 --> 21:02.640 has put in over the course of the last 21:02.640 --> 21:05.350 year or two significant focus here . 21:05.740 --> 21:08.300 Obviously we've got , uh , you know , 21:08.310 --> 21:10.366 again , wait to see what the results 21:10.366 --> 21:12.254 are . But certainly we want to do 21:12.254 --> 21:14.421 everything we possibly can to get them 21:14.421 --> 21:16.477 their benefits . Do you believe that 21:16.477 --> 21:18.477 wikileaks is a media organization ? 21:18.477 --> 21:20.421 They should be protected under the 21:20.421 --> 21:22.699 First Amendment or that's one question . 21:22.699 --> 21:24.866 The second is , are you concerned that 21:24.866 --> 21:26.921 there are other we're not getting to 21:26.921 --> 21:29.088 the investigation that there are other 21:29.088 --> 21:31.254 people that might be leaking documents 21:31.254 --> 21:33.032 still ? Or do you think this is 21:33.032 --> 21:35.254 something that's been sort of contained 21:35.254 --> 21:37.421 and there might be documents out there 21:37.421 --> 21:36.980 that were downloaded previously , but 21:36.980 --> 21:39.930 not more being downloaded for release ? 21:40.150 --> 21:42.317 The answer to your second part of your 21:42.317 --> 21:44.340 question is , I don't know whether 21:44.340 --> 21:47.480 there's anybody else out there that uh , 21:47.490 --> 21:49.860 is a party to this ? That's that's a 21:50.840 --> 21:53.480 one element of clearly what the 21:53.480 --> 21:56.590 investigation will pursue with respect 21:56.590 --> 21:58.757 to the first question ? I think that's 21:58.757 --> 22:00.812 that's a question for people who are 22:00.812 --> 22:03.360 more expert in the law than I am . Uh , 22:03.840 --> 22:06.062 sir , actually for both of you , do you 22:06.062 --> 22:07.840 believe there's a going to be a 22:07.840 --> 22:10.370 chilling effect ? Um , I guess and the 22:10.370 --> 22:12.426 commanders to in Afghanistan believe 22:12.426 --> 22:14.537 there's going to be a chilling effect 22:14.537 --> 22:17.800 on future contacts with afghans who may 22:17.810 --> 22:20.330 come forward because of the village of 22:20.340 --> 22:23.790 names out there . And if you do , is 22:23.790 --> 22:26.012 there something you all are planning on 22:26.012 --> 22:28.012 doing or doing to mitigate Uh huh . 22:28.940 --> 22:32.290 That future concern one of my , 22:36.240 --> 22:37.962 I spent most of my life in the 22:37.962 --> 22:41.150 intelligence business where the 22:41.150 --> 22:43.670 sacrosanct principle is protecting your 22:43.670 --> 22:47.620 sources and and that 22:47.620 --> 22:50.760 involves your sources trusting you 22:51.750 --> 22:53.910 to protect them and to protect their 22:53.910 --> 22:57.470 identities . That is one of 22:57.470 --> 23:00.280 the worst aspects of this . As far as 23:00.280 --> 23:03.730 I'm concerned , will people trust us , 23:04.140 --> 23:06.473 Will people whose lives are on the line , 23:08.340 --> 23:10.660 trust us to keep their identities 23:10.660 --> 23:14.330 secret . Will other governments trust 23:14.330 --> 23:17.370 us to keep their documents and their 23:17.370 --> 23:20.690 intelligence secret ? You know , it's 23:20.700 --> 23:22.811 it's a funny thing and especially for 23:22.811 --> 23:25.190 so called realist . But it's amazing 23:25.190 --> 23:28.410 how much trust matters in 23:28.410 --> 23:31.010 relationships , whether it's with 23:31.010 --> 23:33.210 governments or with individuals around 23:33.210 --> 23:36.970 the world . And and it seems to 23:36.970 --> 23:40.580 me that as a result of this massive 23:40.590 --> 23:43.860 breach of security , we have 23:43.860 --> 23:47.570 considerable repair work to do in terms 23:47.570 --> 23:50.950 of reassuring people 23:51.340 --> 23:54.170 and rebuilding trust . Um 23:54.840 --> 23:57.970 because they clearly people are going 23:57.970 --> 24:01.060 to feel at risk . And so I think this 24:01.060 --> 24:03.540 is one of the this is one of the 24:03.540 --> 24:06.900 consequences of this kind of a 24:06.900 --> 24:10.810 breach . Um both for those 24:10.810 --> 24:14.270 who leak the information and those who 24:14.270 --> 24:18.160 posted online that that 24:18.160 --> 24:20.820 they don't perhaps think about . But it 24:20.820 --> 24:23.270 is it is front and center for me 24:24.690 --> 24:26.690 contacted by other governments that 24:26.690 --> 24:28.912 concerned about this besides the afghan 24:28.912 --> 24:32.860 government , which is there has been I 24:32.870 --> 24:35.260 don't know precisely but my sense is 24:35.260 --> 24:37.482 that there have been some conversations 24:37.482 --> 24:40.530 with with other governments beyond just 24:40.530 --> 24:43.590 Afghanistan and Pakistan . But but 24:43.590 --> 24:45.660 frankly , I'm not familiar with the 24:45.660 --> 24:47.570 details of them . Secretary 24:47.570 --> 24:49.280 recommending or considering 24:49.280 --> 24:50.947 recommending that the federal 24:50.947 --> 24:53.580 government issue an injunction against 24:53.590 --> 24:56.000 wikileaks . If it is indeed considered 24:56.000 --> 24:58.150 to be a news organization in order to 24:58.270 --> 25:00.326 forestall the publication of further 25:00.326 --> 25:02.640 documents . I haven't considered that 25:02.640 --> 25:06.550 at this point . Yeah , I I 25:06.550 --> 25:09.260 would need to uh I would have to defer 25:09.260 --> 25:11.427 to the Justice Department on that kind 25:11.427 --> 25:13.970 of an issue . Um british Prime Minister 25:13.970 --> 25:16.192 David Cameron said today that you can't 25:16.192 --> 25:18.137 tolerate the idea that Pakistan is 25:18.137 --> 25:20.248 allowed to look both ways and is able 25:20.248 --> 25:22.303 to promote the export of terrorism . 25:22.303 --> 25:24.414 What he said , does the US think that 25:24.414 --> 25:26.637 the Pakistani government is looking the 25:26.637 --> 25:29.190 other way uh from the allegations made 25:29.190 --> 25:31.230 in the wikileaks documents . Well , 25:31.230 --> 25:33.540 what I what I will tell you , and the 25:33.540 --> 25:35.762 chairman's just returned from there and 25:35.762 --> 25:37.707 certainly want him to address this 25:37.707 --> 25:41.440 issue . What I have seen over the past 25:41.440 --> 25:44.890 18 months to two years is a 25:44.890 --> 25:48.280 Pakistani government that has become 25:48.280 --> 25:51.140 increasingly aggressive in taking on 25:51.140 --> 25:53.362 terrorists in the western part of their 25:53.362 --> 25:55.473 country , in the northwestern part of 25:55.473 --> 25:57.690 their country . Uh they have 100 and 25:57.690 --> 26:01.530 40,000 troops in that area . If you had 26:01.530 --> 26:03.780 asked me , would they be aggressively 26:03.780 --> 26:06.390 pursuing the taliban in 26:06.400 --> 26:10.210 uh in South WAziristan uh a 26:10.210 --> 26:12.460 year or two ago ? I would have thought 26:12.460 --> 26:15.620 that impossible . So , I think what we 26:15.620 --> 26:17.787 have seen . And one of the reasons why 26:17.787 --> 26:20.210 these documents are dated is that in 26:20.210 --> 26:22.360 the last 18 months or so . There has 26:22.360 --> 26:25.860 been a dramatic change in my view in 26:26.240 --> 26:29.690 um in Pakistan's willingness to take 26:29.690 --> 26:33.260 on uh insurgents and terrorists , 26:33.740 --> 26:35.684 their willingness to put their own 26:35.684 --> 26:37.940 military at risk and take casualties 26:37.940 --> 26:40.040 and going after this . And our 26:40.040 --> 26:42.670 cooperation has been steadily expanding . 26:43.540 --> 26:47.330 I've talked over the last 3.5 26:47.330 --> 26:49.386 years , I have talked about the fact 26:49.740 --> 26:53.100 that one of the challenges the U . S . 26:53.100 --> 26:55.290 Has faced in both Afghanistan and 26:55.290 --> 26:58.760 Pakistan Is that they vividly remember 26:58.760 --> 27:01.450 us walking out in 1989 27:02.340 --> 27:06.010 and being left a to 27:06.010 --> 27:08.350 deal with their own security situation 27:08.360 --> 27:11.630 on their own . The notion that under 27:11.630 --> 27:14.050 those circumstances and not knowing 27:14.050 --> 27:16.106 whether they could count on us to be 27:16.106 --> 27:18.670 there . The notion that they would 27:18.670 --> 27:22.010 hedge in one way or another is not a 27:22.010 --> 27:24.010 surprise and it is something that I 27:24.010 --> 27:26.177 have talked about ever since I've ever 27:26.177 --> 27:28.850 since I got this job . But again , the 27:28.850 --> 27:31.090 point that I would make is I think we 27:31.100 --> 27:33.480 are rebuilding that relationship of 27:33.480 --> 27:36.850 trust with Pakistan . And it is evident 27:36.860 --> 27:39.500 in the expansion of cooperation that we 27:39.500 --> 27:41.270 have had with them both in 27:41.270 --> 27:43.770 counterterrorism and counterinsurgency . 27:44.430 --> 27:46.652 I think the heart of your question goes 27:46.652 --> 27:48.860 to the sea and 27:49.340 --> 27:53.000 specifically , and I've said before , 27:53.000 --> 27:54.910 and would repeat that it's an 27:54.910 --> 27:57.610 organization that actually we have in 27:57.610 --> 27:59.610 ways a very positive relationship , 27:59.610 --> 28:01.721 very healthy relationship between our 28:01.721 --> 28:04.080 intelligence organizations and there 28:04.080 --> 28:06.490 have been that said , there have been 28:06.490 --> 28:09.000 elements of the icy that have got 28:09.000 --> 28:11.450 relationships relationship with 28:11.450 --> 28:15.130 extremist organizations uh and that 28:15.130 --> 28:17.370 we , you know , I we consider that 28:17.370 --> 28:19.670 unacceptable uh in the long run , I 28:19.670 --> 28:23.090 think that uh the uh the I s 28:23.090 --> 28:26.360 I has to strategically shift , it's 28:26.360 --> 28:28.082 tied in great part to what the 28:28.082 --> 28:30.320 Secretary is laid out , focused on its 28:30.320 --> 28:32.209 nash its view of its own national 28:32.209 --> 28:34.260 security interests . Uh these are 28:34.260 --> 28:37.360 issues that uh and I have seen some of 28:37.360 --> 28:39.440 this , I was just with General Kiani 28:39.440 --> 28:42.300 again and uh this is a subject that we 28:42.310 --> 28:46.310 frequently discuss . Uh and uh 28:46.320 --> 28:48.850 and and they have , as a secretary said 28:49.300 --> 28:52.840 in that country , captured lots of 28:52.840 --> 28:55.007 terrorists , killed lots of terrorists 28:55.007 --> 28:56.970 focused on terrorism and they are 28:56.970 --> 28:59.960 strategically shifting . That doesn't 28:59.960 --> 29:03.350 mean that they are through that shift 29:03.350 --> 29:07.340 at all . And they do still they 29:07.350 --> 29:09.460 are still focused on rebuilding this 29:09.460 --> 29:11.650 trust as well . And it is not yet 29:11.660 --> 29:14.910 rebuild . Yeah , last question Mr 29:14.910 --> 29:17.200 Secretary , what are your goals for 29:17.200 --> 29:19.320 your meeting today with industry and 29:19.320 --> 29:21.376 also what's your reaction to the QDR 29:21.640 --> 29:25.510 review panels crisis ? Well , 29:25.510 --> 29:28.310 first of all , the meeting today with 29:28.310 --> 29:30.366 the Aerospace Industries Association 29:30.366 --> 29:33.380 executives is a periodic meeting that I 29:33.380 --> 29:36.960 have with them . Um they are our uh 29:36.970 --> 29:40.780 industrial partners uh and many 29:40.780 --> 29:44.390 and many important projects and and so 29:44.390 --> 29:46.279 I try and stay in touch with them 29:46.279 --> 29:48.550 periodically , both under Secretary 29:48.550 --> 29:51.520 carter and Deputy Secretary Lynn meet 29:51.520 --> 29:53.631 with them more frequently than I do . 29:53.940 --> 29:56.550 So I would characterize it as a as a 29:56.560 --> 29:59.000 routine meeting for me . What was the 29:59.000 --> 30:01.530 other party ? Well , first of all , I 30:01.530 --> 30:05.260 haven't read the report and I have been 30:05.260 --> 30:07.371 briefed on the results . I think they 30:07.371 --> 30:10.550 have some uh some important uh 30:11.240 --> 30:14.050 contributions that they've made in 30:14.050 --> 30:16.510 analysis . Uh they've made some 30:16.510 --> 30:18.510 suggestions that I think we need to 30:18.510 --> 30:21.260 follow up on . But again , before I get 30:21.260 --> 30:23.427 into any specifics , I think I need to 30:23.427 --> 30:25.649 read the report . The one the one issue 30:25.649 --> 30:28.250 that I've heard reported on in in the 30:28.250 --> 30:31.970 news media a little bit just today has 30:31.970 --> 30:35.360 been what has been characteristic as as 30:35.370 --> 30:37.750 the commission's support for the 30:37.750 --> 30:40.890 alternate engine . And and I would just 30:40.890 --> 30:43.230 tell you that I've been informed that 30:43.240 --> 30:45.450 have been told that Secretary Perry 30:45.450 --> 30:47.880 went out this morning and made clear 30:47.880 --> 30:51.000 that what the commission is talking 30:51.000 --> 30:54.210 about is the importance of competition 30:54.220 --> 30:56.620 and real competition . That is where 30:56.620 --> 30:59.100 there are now . It's my phrase where 30:59.100 --> 31:01.044 there are winners and losers , not 31:01.044 --> 31:03.860 where everybody wins . Thank you . Yeah . 31:04.740 --> 31:04.980 Mhm .