WEBVTT

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it has been many months since I've been

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before you . Uh , and also , uh , we

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did just get back last night from a

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trip into theater . So if I look a

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little ragged , that's , that's it .

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I'm not getting old . Uh , we're just

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getting tired . Um , I would like to

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offer a quick statement and just prime

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the pump . And then uh , we look

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forward to your questions . Uh , and

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and his day referenced Romania .

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Afghanistan . Pakistan and we came back

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out through Germany . Romania is a good

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partner and ally . We attended a Navy

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day there at the port city of Constanta .

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Uh , and we're reminded uh , many times

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that Romania stood with us in Iraq and

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and has now increased their presence in

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Afghanistan to some 1800 troops .

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They've sustained 15 killed in action

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to date in Afghanistan . But they're

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dedicated to the task . And it can be

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rightly said that as a nation , we

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believe they're punching above their

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weight . The Pakistani leadership is

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consumed with responding to the

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aftermath of the flood disaster . Since

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August 12 , we have had 2200 brains

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from the 15th meu responding to the

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crisis as of uh , this morning , the

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eight ch 40 sixes and four ch 53 . So

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that we have deployed Have evacuated uh ,

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3,075 people and delivered more than

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£650,000 of cargo .

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26 mute from the east coast is sailing

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early in order to contribute to the

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disaster relief and should be off the

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coast of Pakistan by mid to late

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september john Kiani cautioned me that

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the involvement of his army in the

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flood relief will for a time to track

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from their efforts to secure the

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Pakistani frontier . We came out of

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theater through Landstuhl Germany where

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we witnessed dedicated people at the

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hospital perform a myriad of task

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associated with a major way station in

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casualty flow gratefully . The number

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of marines and american servicemen in

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general was down from previous days .

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Our primary purpose for the trip was of

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course to visit marines and the great

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sailors who support us in Afghanistan .

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I have several observations for you

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from their first marines in Helmand are

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exercising our definition of

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expeditionary that is fast , austere

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and lethal to keep the enemy off

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balance partnered with Afghan infantry .

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It is not uncommon to find units that

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are away from their forward operating

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bases for 30 days at a time using

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superior firepower and battlefield

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mobility . I believe that they hold the

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initiative even in the height of the

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taliban , so called fighting season ,

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they are making the enemy react to them .

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Second , morale is high though it is a

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tough fight . Marines consents

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conditions are turning their direction .

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Recently a contact team from our

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manpower department went into

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Afghanistan and re enlisted several 100

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marines . Uh , they do value the

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support of their fellow americans and

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the only concern perhaps best expressed

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violence , corporal that I spoke to was

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when he said , sir , don't let our

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country go wobbly honest now . Third

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the capacity of the Afghan army is

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hitting a critical stage . Lieutenant

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General caldwell is ahead of schedule

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with his infantry companies and canned

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axe and by the way the quality varies

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widely . But now he faces the toughest

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part I believe and that is to recruit

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and train the aviators and what's

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called the enablers , what marines call

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combat support and combat service

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support units . Those troops will

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require higher level of education and

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skills training . Then his grunt units

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have required to date that said , the

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organization and approach that he and

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his joint combined team have taken

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appears to be to the interested

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observer just right for the task at

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hand . Next . The key to success in the

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Helmand province is to get the people

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off the fence and squarely on the side

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of their security forces . The

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government and my marines ever so

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slowly and even incrementally in some

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places that is beginning to happen

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better and less corrupt police projects ,

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district and subdistrict governors who

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oversee the rule of law are making a

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difference when I say that is able to

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construct a self contained cell phone

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system . I'm convinced that tips and

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intelligence will pick up , making it

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virtually impossible for the taliban to

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operate while hiding behind the

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citizens . Finally though , I certainly

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believe some American units somewhere

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in Afghanistan will turn over

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responsibilities to Afghan security

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forces in 2011 . I do not think there

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will be marines Helmand and Kandahar

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adjacent are the birthplace of the

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taliban . I honestly think it will be a

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few years before , conditions on the

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ground are such . That turnover will be

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possible for us . I since our country

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is increasingly growing tired of the

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war , But it would remind that the last

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of the 30,000 troops only arrived this

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month . I would also quote the analysis

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of one of my regimental commanders .

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When asked about the pace of the war ,

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he said we can either lose fast or wind

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slow . And I think the first question

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is yours , the Marine Corps in the next

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few years is going to be facing some

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big changes on two fronts . One would

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be the discussion about the role that

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the marines play and future warfare .

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Um , and then also the changes to

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personnel policy under if don't ask ,

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don't tell is lifted . So what advice

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would you like to leave your successors

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considering that these changes will

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probably take place long after you're

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gone . What would you like to say on

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those two fronts ? Uh First of all ,

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and in terms of uh , in terms of the

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size of the core , um , You know , we ,

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we grew 27,000 additional marines . We

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saw the requirement come down uh in

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Afghanistan vis a vis Iraq . So we're

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getting real close to that , that

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objective out there of 1-2 deployment

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to dwell . Although we have resolved as

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a core that we need to take a look at

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what our post afghan figures will be as

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a solid planning figure for purposes of

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reset and for purposes of our

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deployment , our deployments to unit

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deployment plans in the pacific

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we've got a fairly significant BQ build

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out taking place right now . We need to

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know where to cease all of that . Um ,

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I wouldn't start any of that until

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after this . This uh activity in

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Afghanistan is complete and we can do

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it without in any way burning the

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troops . So I think that would be the

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first thing and in terms of don't ask

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don't tell um , you know , we will obey

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the law . We're anxious to see what the

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survey indicates when it's made public

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towards the end of the year . But I

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caution our marines and our marine

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leadership . If the law changes , uh we

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pride our core in leading the services

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in many many things and we're gonna

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have to lead in this too . There will

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be 100 issues out there that we have to

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solve if the law changes in terms of

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how we do business that we cannot be

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seen as dragging our feet or some way

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delaying implementation . We've got a

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war to fight . We need to , if the law

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changes implement and get on with it .

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Okay , general , I want to pick up on

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doughnuts . Don't tell us , you know ,

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the Senate's gonna pick it up next

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month as part of the authorization bill

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and you've told the hill that you think

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the current policy works and that you

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would never ask marines to room with

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homosexual if we can avoid it . You've

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been followed by other marine generals .

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Jack Sheahan , Peter pace carl monday

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in opposing a change in the policy .

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And also , if you look at the polls

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done by military times , the marines

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seem to oppose any change in policy by

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a fairly significant margin . And I

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want you to focus on what is it about

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the marines that they , they oppose

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this change in policy repealing . Don't

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ask , don't tell you've been in the

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core for over 40 years . You get out

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there and talk to marines . What is it

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that , that the marines oppose about

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this more so than the other services .

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Uh , that's , that's a tough question

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to answer . Tom because I'm not as

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familiar with the other services as I

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am my own court . So any , any

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comparison or contrast is difficult .

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Uh , but we recruit a certain type of

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young american , uh , pretty macho guy

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or gal that is willing to go fight and

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perhaps to die for their country . Uh ,

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that's about the only difference that I

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see between the other services . I mean

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they recruit from a great strain of

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young americans as well . They all come

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from the same areas and that type of

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thing . Uh , so I can only think that

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as we look at our mission , how we are

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forced to live in close proximity

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aboard ship , uh , in the field for

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long periods of time and that type of

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thing . Uh , that the , the average

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rain out there . And by the way , my

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own surveys indicate that it's not age

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dependent . It's not ranked dependent .

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It's not where you're from . Uh , it's

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uh , it's as you highlight pretty

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uniformly . Uh , not not endorsed as ,

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as the ideal way ahead . Um , but I

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just think all those things have have

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impact on on the range and we just do

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not see a change . But again , we will

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follow the law . Whatever the law of

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prescriptions were living in tight

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quarters . Is that the issue you hear

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mostly when you talk to marines on the

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field , uh , see we unlike the other

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services we have consciously for

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decades now bill it'd by twos . So if

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the law changes , we start out with a

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problem in terms of how to address that .

08:56.894 --> 08:58.839
And I've I've spoken publicly some

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about that in the past . You know ,

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we'll deal with it . I do not believe

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there's money out there to build

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another uh , requirement for B . E . Q .

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S to allow every marine to have a room

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by his or herself . Uh , so how we deal

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with the billeting problem is going to

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be one of that myriad of issues that

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will have to face . I don't know . I

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don't know . We sometimes ask marines .

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You know , what , what is , what is

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their preference ? Uh , And I can tell

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you that an overwhelming majority . I

09:30.241 --> 09:32.450
would like not to be roomed with a

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person who was openly homosexual . Uh ,

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some , uh , do not object . And perhaps ,

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uh , you know , perhaps a voluntary

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basis might be the best way to start

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without violating anybody's sense of

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moral concern or our perception on the

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part of their mates . I don't know ,

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we're not there yet . Uh , it's one of

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those hypotheticals at this point that

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we have to consider , but we won't have

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to deal with until the law changes if

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it does two . Yes , ma'am . Um , you

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said that the country is growing tired

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of the war . Okay . Um ,

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you're perhaps the first member of the

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Joint Chiefs to openly say that the

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country is growing tired of this war

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and say it so bluntly . How do you

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having said that as commandant ? How do

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you maintain morale ? What are your

10:18.190 --> 10:21.310
concerns for your troops if the country

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is really tired of this war ? Because

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you also say you think you're going to

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be there a few years with a country

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that's tired of this war ? How many

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years ? How do you Barbara ? First of

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all , what I'm saying to you is what

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what I'm reading from , from you folks ,

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really . And , and those are the

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results of the public opinion polls I

10:41.714 --> 10:43.770
read this morning where 70% of Brits

10:43.770 --> 10:46.103
opposes 60% of Americans oppose it . So ,

10:46.103 --> 10:48.103
but I think that's an important and

10:48.103 --> 10:49.826
important factor in this whole

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discussion . I think that that we , the

10:52.410 --> 10:54.632
military leadership have to do a better

10:54.632 --> 10:56.940
job of talking about the last chapter

10:56.940 --> 10:59.162
of this book . If we simply try to walk

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away , I don't think that we have done

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a strong enough uh job in convincing

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the american people there . There are

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good and just reasons why we have to

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destroy the al Qaeda and the associated

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Taliban uh , in Afghanistan . Similar

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to what we did in Iraq certainly to the

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point where there is no future

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opportunity for safe haven , certainly

11:21.857 --> 11:23.690
to the degree that we can create

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conditions for that afghan government

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to rule the country and and avoid safe

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haven . What I just finished About 11

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days of telling our troops is that you

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need to understand that public opinion

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in , in the United States will be

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whatever it is . Okay . But that our

11:38.941 --> 11:41.108
country has matured to such a degree .

11:41.108 --> 11:43.219
I think in some ways from our lessons

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learned after Vietnam Has matured to

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the degree that our fellow countrymen

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can be against the war but still

11:49.713 --> 11:51.824
support the troops . I honestly think

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that 95% of Americans support what the

11:53.991 --> 11:56.102
troops are doing and do not associate

11:56.102 --> 11:57.769
them with the policies of any

11:57.769 --> 11:59.991
administration . If I could just follow

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up on a couple of points when you said

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that will the marines or the military ,

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please clarify , will be there a few

12:06.436 --> 12:08.658
years . What is your instinct on that ?

12:08.658 --> 12:10.824
What do you think ? Well , I can't say

12:10.824 --> 12:13.158
it will be there for a few years or not .

12:13.158 --> 12:15.380
What I can tell you is that what I said

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is that I think I think it will be a

12:17.436 --> 12:19.380
few years before conditions on the

12:19.380 --> 12:21.602
ground are such that we would expect to

12:21.602 --> 12:23.824
be able to turn over to Afghan forces .

12:23.824 --> 12:26.120
Uh , and I think there's a mindset that

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needs to accompany that on the part of

12:28.287 --> 12:31.450
our marines that it may be a while . So

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you're talking about five years more

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barbie . I I can't say that for sure .

12:35.682 --> 12:37.793
Things twist and turn again . Witness

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our experiences in Iraq . We had

12:39.630 --> 12:42.110
intelligence officers in 2006 saying

12:42.110 --> 12:45.010
that all is lost by the end of 2006 we

12:45.010 --> 12:47.300
had the awakening and and conditions

12:47.300 --> 12:51.220
changed completely in in Iraq . I don't

12:51.220 --> 12:53.270
see the culture in Afghanistan

12:53.270 --> 12:55.437
permitting something like that . But I

12:55.437 --> 12:57.659
do think that reconciliation could be a

12:57.659 --> 12:59.492
game changer when that will come

12:59.492 --> 13:01.770
remains to be seen very , very quickly .

13:01.770 --> 13:03.770
But let me ask you more questions .

13:03.770 --> 13:05.992
I'll come back to you . Okay , go ahead

13:05.992 --> 13:07.992
please . On on the issue of Okinawa

13:07.992 --> 13:10.214
General there has been uh , the U . S .

13:10.214 --> 13:12.640
Position has been to decide which shape

13:12.640 --> 13:15.060
the runways going to camp Schwab Japan

13:15.060 --> 13:17.116
has wanted to give them authority to

13:17.116 --> 13:19.171
Okinawa is the weather should be a V

13:19.171 --> 13:21.171
shape and I shape . Do you have any

13:21.171 --> 13:23.504
opinions on that ? Well , you know from ,

13:23.504 --> 13:26.230
from the original concept the V shape

13:26.240 --> 13:29.100
runway was agreed upon uh And in terms

13:29.100 --> 13:31.267
of absolute aircraft safety , we still

13:31.267 --> 13:33.510
believe that that that is the best way

13:33.510 --> 13:36.370
to do things . Um So , you know , it is

13:36.370 --> 13:39.450
entirely at this point uh scenario to

13:39.450 --> 13:41.450
be resolved between the very senior

13:41.450 --> 13:43.561
levels of the Japanese government and

13:43.561 --> 13:45.783
the U . S . Government . Uh but given a

13:45.783 --> 13:47.839
set of options , we would prefer , I

13:47.839 --> 13:49.894
think a runway that is entirely safe

13:49.894 --> 13:52.006
for our pilots and air crews that are

13:52.006 --> 13:54.228
that are taking off and landing there .

13:54.228 --> 13:56.006
Yes , ma'am , can I ask you two

13:56.006 --> 13:58.061
questions ? One , how is marja going

13:58.061 --> 14:00.280
right now ? I assume you were there .

14:00.280 --> 14:02.280
And secondly , just to follow up on

14:02.280 --> 14:04.890
Barbara questions , can you say that a

14:04.890 --> 14:07.890
year from now ? Uh there will be no

14:07.890 --> 14:10.001
withdrawals of marines from Helmand ,

14:10.001 --> 14:12.057
maybe that's your area . Well , um ,

14:12.057 --> 14:14.920
okay , first of all , Marja I believe

14:14.930 --> 14:17.870
is a pivotal battle that is ongoing .

14:17.880 --> 14:20.650
Okay , we are dealing with a very uh

14:20.660 --> 14:23.010
intelligent enemy here who realizes

14:23.010 --> 14:25.232
that Marja probably more than any other

14:25.232 --> 14:29.220
battle in Afghanistan has the uh

14:29.230 --> 14:31.240
the capture of an international

14:31.240 --> 14:33.680
audience and so they're not giving it

14:33.680 --> 14:36.013
up it easily . Okay , we drove them out .

14:36.013 --> 14:38.236
Uh we outmaneuvered them . Uh there was

14:38.236 --> 14:40.291
there was not as much fighting as we

14:40.291 --> 14:42.458
thought would be the case because they

14:42.458 --> 14:44.347
sensed are overwhelming firepower

14:44.347 --> 14:46.402
ability to disrupt their command and

14:46.402 --> 14:48.458
control . There was a lot of shaping

14:48.458 --> 14:50.458
that had gone into it . So mars the

14:50.458 --> 14:52.124
clearing of marshall was very

14:52.124 --> 14:54.347
successful and fairly rapid evolution .

14:54.347 --> 14:56.458
What has happened is that the taliban

14:56.458 --> 14:58.680
realize that if that is the end of it .

14:58.680 --> 15:00.847
Okay , that will be a major defeat for

15:00.847 --> 15:03.069
them . So they're trying to string this

15:03.069 --> 15:05.236
out as long as they possibly can now .

15:05.236 --> 15:07.347
They're not , they're sniping at us ,

15:07.347 --> 15:09.513
they're throwing a few odd rounds here

15:09.513 --> 15:09.280
and there , they're shooting at our

15:09.280 --> 15:11.220
helicopters , but mainly they're

15:11.220 --> 15:13.560
intimidating the people . Okay , so as

15:13.560 --> 15:15.671
to maintain a presence there and keep

15:15.671 --> 15:18.290
Marcia from being again this strategic

15:18.290 --> 15:20.290
victory on the part of rains in the

15:20.290 --> 15:22.430
south of helmet . Well , let me , let

15:22.430 --> 15:24.597
me make it clear if I haven't , okay ,

15:25.340 --> 15:27.229
I can't say if marines will be in

15:27.229 --> 15:29.396
Helmand or start withdrawing next year

15:29.396 --> 15:31.062
or not , that's going to be a

15:31.062 --> 15:33.284
presidential level decision . Okay , As

15:33.284 --> 15:35.118
as uh , you know , as I think uh

15:35.118 --> 15:36.951
educated or informed by the best

15:36.951 --> 15:38.951
military advice of General Petraeus

15:38.951 --> 15:40.784
General Mills , the Secretary of

15:40.784 --> 15:42.840
defense etcetera . What I can say is

15:42.840 --> 15:45.062
that I do not believe conditions in the

15:45.062 --> 15:47.284
birthplace of the Taliban in Helmand or

15:47.284 --> 15:49.451
Kandahar for that matter . Whether our

15:49.451 --> 15:51.618
brothers army brothers to the east are

15:51.618 --> 15:53.729
going to be such that we think we can

15:53.729 --> 15:53.620
simply turn over to afghan forces and

15:53.620 --> 15:55.787
leave . Okay , that's that's that's my

15:55.787 --> 15:57.787
point and that's what I'm trying to

15:57.787 --> 16:00.060
prepare our marines for . Okay , I just

16:00.390 --> 16:03.960
see you anticipate U . S . Troops in

16:04.540 --> 16:06.760
Helmand and Kandahar for

16:08.120 --> 16:10.330
birthplace of the taliban . Yeah . And

16:10.330 --> 16:12.441
and the conditions there are not such

16:12.441 --> 16:14.700
as they are in other regions of the of

16:14.700 --> 16:16.922
the of the country . If you look at the

16:16.922 --> 16:18.700
numbers of attacks , numbers of

16:18.700 --> 16:20.811
casualties . If you look at the focus

16:20.811 --> 16:23.033
of main effort , that is uh the view of

16:23.033 --> 16:25.200
the commanders there , uh the fighters

16:25.200 --> 16:27.210
in the south in Marcia , how many

16:27.210 --> 16:29.830
insurgents are ? Was there an estimate

16:29.830 --> 16:32.052
of how many insurgents are left there ?

16:32.052 --> 16:34.160
I don't know . I would put it in a

16:34.170 --> 16:36.392
couple of 100 something like that . You

16:36.392 --> 16:38.337
know , it's compared to our combat

16:38.337 --> 16:41.320
power , it is not significant but based

16:41.320 --> 16:43.376
upon the way they fight . You know ,

16:43.376 --> 16:45.880
trying to induce us to create civilian

16:45.880 --> 16:48.047
casualties firing from compounds where

16:48.047 --> 16:50.047
they have women and Children driven

16:50.047 --> 16:52.158
into the rooms and that type of thing

16:52.158 --> 16:54.213
having to have positive I . D . On a

16:54.213 --> 16:56.269
guy carrying a weapon before you can

16:56.269 --> 16:58.602
take him down . Uh Not wearing uniforms ,

16:58.602 --> 16:58.590
of course has been the case down for

16:58.590 --> 17:00.830
nine years . Uh It just makes it tough

17:00.830 --> 17:02.997
to root them out and take them down in

17:02.997 --> 17:05.150
the back . Yes , sir . Give me thank

17:05.150 --> 17:07.290
you . General . You mentioned that

17:07.330 --> 17:11.080
conditions uh is the key to

17:11.090 --> 17:13.970
deciding whether or not um troops can

17:13.970 --> 17:16.090
start pulling out in large measure in

17:16.090 --> 17:18.630
large numbers . What exact conditions

17:18.630 --> 17:20.741
would you be looking for before ? You

17:20.741 --> 17:23.140
could advise general , are the

17:23.150 --> 17:26.420
president and the rest of your superior .

17:26.430 --> 17:29.760
Okay , uh you know , a military force

17:29.770 --> 17:32.640
shapes the environment . We can't fix

17:32.640 --> 17:34.362
the economy , We can't fix the

17:34.362 --> 17:36.490
government , what we can do is affect

17:36.490 --> 17:38.657
the security now , we can aid in these

17:38.657 --> 17:40.712
other things , but for all intensive

17:40.712 --> 17:42.712
purposes , we shape the environment

17:42.712 --> 17:44.560
that allows these other lines of

17:44.560 --> 17:46.671
operation . If you will to take place

17:47.040 --> 17:50.210
initially in both Iraq now and

17:50.210 --> 17:53.340
Afghanistan , we've had to do that at

17:53.340 --> 17:54.951
the start by ourselves . But

17:54.951 --> 17:57.450
increasingly , our doctrine calls for

17:58.040 --> 17:59.929
turning that over to host nations

17:59.929 --> 18:01.929
security forces . That's that's why

18:01.929 --> 18:04.151
what General caldwell and as people are

18:04.151 --> 18:06.096
doing is so important . That's why

18:06.096 --> 18:08.262
we're partnering right now , almost on

18:08.262 --> 18:10.151
every patrol with Afghan security

18:10.151 --> 18:12.262
forces , uh , when we go out , that's

18:12.262 --> 18:14.318
why we want to posture the police so

18:14.318 --> 18:16.373
they can be successful . So the time

18:16.373 --> 18:18.596
that were there , the shaping operation

18:18.596 --> 18:20.762
is in a transition for the entire time

18:20.762 --> 18:22.984
transitioning host nation forces to the

18:22.984 --> 18:25.151
point where they can do those things .

18:25.151 --> 18:27.151
That's what we hope to accomplish .

18:27.151 --> 18:29.373
When we think that we have sufficiently

18:29.373 --> 18:31.730
beaten down uh , the the insurgency in

18:31.730 --> 18:33.841
the area . We have sufficiently built

18:33.841 --> 18:35.952
up the afghan capability to deal with

18:35.952 --> 18:38.063
what's there , then , I think we have

18:38.063 --> 18:40.286
done , uh , the essence of what we were

18:40.286 --> 18:43.640
sent there to do . General caldwell

18:43.640 --> 18:45.696
briefed us just yesterday and one of

18:45.696 --> 18:48.420
the things he mentioned was that um The

18:48.420 --> 18:51.010
Afghan security forces , one in 10

18:51.240 --> 18:53.640
shows signs of drug abuse , 4-5 or

18:53.640 --> 18:56.040
illiterate , um desertion is a real

18:56.040 --> 19:00.040
problem . Um , is is

19:00.040 --> 19:02.740
there any indication to you that these

19:02.750 --> 19:04.860
Afghan security forces are going to

19:04.860 --> 19:07.720
improve such that if we get the number

19:07.720 --> 19:09.887
we want that they'll be of the quality

19:09.887 --> 19:12.260
we we need to turn them over . You know ,

19:12.270 --> 19:15.310
the biggest the problem I think we face

19:15.310 --> 19:17.477
in all of that is the literacy issue .

19:17.477 --> 19:19.588
And as I said in my opening statement

19:19.588 --> 19:21.810
as we continue to build out the force ,

19:21.810 --> 19:23.810
it's going to become even even more

19:23.810 --> 19:25.921
important . These people are fighters

19:25.921 --> 19:28.088
at heart . Okay . Uh they're every bit

19:28.088 --> 19:30.143
as good as the Iraqis in some ways ,

19:30.143 --> 19:32.421
even more so with regard to , you know ,

19:32.421 --> 19:34.643
their willingness to really mix it up .

19:34.643 --> 19:36.866
Uh we're finding when they partner with

19:36.866 --> 19:38.866
us uh they're quite effective . Our

19:38.866 --> 19:41.088
attrition rate is down about 12% in the

19:41.088 --> 19:43.310
Afghan army forces that operate with us

19:43.310 --> 19:45.199
in Helmand we've had to fire some

19:45.199 --> 19:47.199
police because of corruptness . But

19:47.199 --> 19:49.430
those that we train and and and and

19:49.430 --> 19:51.541
most of them that we get from General

19:51.541 --> 19:54.730
caldwell's uh and cop program are

19:54.730 --> 19:57.420
pretty good but they need to understand

19:57.420 --> 19:59.531
that they will be supported by Afghan

19:59.531 --> 20:01.864
army and by U . S . Marines in our case .

20:01.864 --> 20:03.976
Uh if things get too tense for them .

20:03.976 --> 20:06.031
So we think there's a good construct

20:06.031 --> 20:08.198
air that's working uh and uh and again

20:08.198 --> 20:11.120
it's never gonna be , you know , uh

20:11.130 --> 20:12.908
british royal marines that were

20:12.908 --> 20:15.074
training there , but they only need to

20:15.074 --> 20:17.130
be better than the insurgency and we

20:17.130 --> 20:18.852
think we can achieve that in a

20:18.852 --> 20:21.074
reasonable period of time . Yes , sir .

20:21.074 --> 20:22.574
Questions two of your most

20:22.574 --> 20:24.686
controversial programs . One of the V

20:24.686 --> 20:26.850
22 How well was it performing in

20:26.850 --> 20:29.200
Afghanistan in terms of readiness rates ?

20:29.210 --> 20:32.090
They had an issue in Iraq And what are

20:32.090 --> 20:34.146
some of the types of missions that's

20:34.146 --> 20:36.312
performing And then I had to follow up

20:36.312 --> 20:38.368
on another system . Well , readiness

20:38.368 --> 20:40.590
rates are are about what we expect them

20:40.590 --> 20:42.701
to be for the aircraft based upon the

20:42.701 --> 20:44.646
fact we tossed it immediately into

20:44.646 --> 20:46.701
combat . Uh You know , we thought we

20:46.701 --> 20:48.923
had learned all we needed to know about

20:48.923 --> 20:51.090
harsh environments in Iraq , but quite

20:51.090 --> 20:50.750
frankly , the environment in

20:50.750 --> 20:52.917
Afghanistan is a little different . So

20:52.917 --> 20:54.861
we've got other parts now that are

20:54.861 --> 20:56.917
causing us issues with regard to the

20:56.917 --> 20:58.861
readiness availability . But those

20:58.861 --> 21:01.083
parts having identified now having been

21:01.083 --> 21:03.194
identified and having put in put into

21:03.194 --> 21:05.410
the system , we're seeing a slow but

21:05.410 --> 21:08.270
steady increase in availability as we

21:08.280 --> 21:10.590
apply . Those parts are mechanics are

21:10.590 --> 21:12.646
getting simply better and faster and

21:12.646 --> 21:14.757
they can they can find shortcuts that

21:14.757 --> 21:16.812
are still , you know , uh I think uh

21:16.812 --> 21:19.034
applying proper safety procedures , the

21:19.034 --> 21:21.034
aircraft's doing everything that we

21:21.034 --> 21:23.146
wanted to do and more . It is our new

21:23.146 --> 21:24.979
medium lift helicopter . So it's

21:24.979 --> 21:26.757
involved in uh in some of these

21:26.757 --> 21:28.868
insertions behind the enemy . Uh it's

21:28.868 --> 21:30.646
involved in in re supply , it's

21:30.646 --> 21:32.868
involved in uh in transfer of equipment

21:32.868 --> 21:34.923
and personnel all over the theater .

21:34.923 --> 21:37.146
It's been shot at and hit a few times .

21:37.146 --> 21:39.312
Um and and so all of those things that

21:39.312 --> 21:41.479
we would expect it is doing , uh , and

21:41.479 --> 21:44.420
it's doing them in ways that still have

21:44.420 --> 21:47.870
us in terms of how best to employ such

21:47.870 --> 21:50.280
a state of the art capability might go

21:50.280 --> 21:52.447
to Pakistan to help with the relief to

21:52.447 --> 21:55.230
six m . Got ospreys on board flooring

21:55.230 --> 21:57.700
the emissions to six m . The one that's

21:57.700 --> 22:00.160
going to arrive in september okay . We

22:00.170 --> 22:02.226
offered , uh , an amazing capability

22:02.226 --> 22:04.400
here . We offered to have the aircraft

22:04.410 --> 22:06.410
self deploy all the way to Pakistan

22:06.410 --> 22:08.632
from the eastern coast . Uh , the issue

22:08.632 --> 22:10.688
has to do with availability of ranch

22:10.688 --> 22:12.910
face in terms of the , of the Pakistani

22:12.910 --> 22:16.290
air fields and the fact that the new

22:16.290 --> 22:18.123
centcom commander sees this as a

22:18.123 --> 22:20.346
marathon , not a sprint . He wants some

22:20.346 --> 22:22.179
long term capacity there to help

22:22.179 --> 22:24.012
extension expeditionary fighting

22:24.012 --> 22:23.950
vehicle . That's the biggest

22:23.960 --> 22:26.127
acquisition program you've got going .

22:26.127 --> 22:28.349
It's always in the target crosshairs as

22:28.349 --> 22:30.571
you leave at this point , it's entering

22:30.571 --> 22:32.627
these crucial reliability tests . Do

22:32.627 --> 22:34.516
you sense support for the program

22:35.040 --> 22:37.460
starting to wane within the Navy and

22:37.460 --> 22:39.349
within the office of Secretary of

22:39.349 --> 22:42.450
Defense . Oh , you know , the program

22:42.450 --> 22:44.617
is , is under continuous scrutiny . It

22:44.617 --> 22:46.561
has been a beleaguered program . I

22:46.561 --> 22:48.672
think it's probably fair to say , but

22:48.672 --> 22:50.728
at this point , I think everybody is

22:50.728 --> 22:52.783
anxious to see how it performs these

22:52.783 --> 22:55.006
new , more reliable vehicles . We think

22:55.006 --> 22:57.117
are going to perform much better . We

22:57.117 --> 22:59.340
are looking at affordability of the

22:59.340 --> 23:01.229
program in the out years , if you

23:01.229 --> 23:03.396
believe there will be a customer , the

23:03.396 --> 23:05.173
defense budget , we have to ask

23:05.173 --> 23:07.090
ourselves , you know , where 573

23:07.090 --> 23:09.290
affordable . Uh , but we're excited

23:09.290 --> 23:11.550
about the capability and , and there's

23:11.560 --> 23:13.449
certainly a need for that kind of

23:13.449 --> 23:15.671
capability in the out years . As we get

23:15.671 --> 23:17.727
back to the sea and chips , you sets

23:18.040 --> 23:20.096
when you leave the knives are really

23:20.096 --> 23:22.318
going to come out and try to cut it . I

23:22.318 --> 23:24.318
can only say , I hope not . I don't

23:24.318 --> 23:26.484
sense it , but I hope not okay because

23:26.484 --> 23:28.818
it is incredibly important to us . Okay ,

23:28.818 --> 23:31.050
General , again , looking ahead to the

23:31.050 --> 23:34.490
future future . Uh , Secretary has done

23:34.500 --> 23:36.556
two things . One , you have to offer

23:36.556 --> 23:38.333
the review of the core and he's

23:38.333 --> 23:41.560
endorsed expeditionary mission , which

23:42.040 --> 23:44.151
true to your heart at the same time ,

23:44.151 --> 23:46.690
he's questioned the amphibious how much

23:46.690 --> 23:49.470
amphibious capabilities we need and ,

23:49.480 --> 23:51.591
and that becomes a navy ship building

23:51.591 --> 23:53.480
problem and sustainment . Are you

23:53.480 --> 23:55.536
concerned that , you know , the next

23:55.536 --> 23:57.758
petition every you know , in the future

23:57.758 --> 23:59.980
will not necessarily include in fifth ?

23:59.980 --> 24:01.924
No , I'm really not . Uh , any any

24:01.924 --> 24:04.091
person that takes a look at that . The

24:04.091 --> 24:06.036
United States as a maritime nation

24:06.036 --> 24:08.202
accepts our dominant defense theory of

24:08.202 --> 24:10.313
forward deployment . Forward , basing

24:10.313 --> 24:12.540
engaging , you know , way away from the

24:12.540 --> 24:14.690
United States has to have a strong

24:14.690 --> 24:18.380
appreciation for a naval uh , Navy

24:18.380 --> 24:20.460
Marine Corps Coast Guard team . It's

24:20.460 --> 24:22.627
able to do whatever has to be done out

24:22.627 --> 24:24.580
there . Um , there are a lot of ,

24:24.580 --> 24:26.636
there's a lot of blue on that map of

24:26.636 --> 24:28.940
the arc of instability . And although

24:28.940 --> 24:30.996
we have been fortunate , I guess the

24:30.996 --> 24:32.829
last couple times our nation has

24:32.829 --> 24:35.051
engaged that a host country would allow

24:35.051 --> 24:37.273
us to come in , build the Iron Mountain

24:37.273 --> 24:39.329
Master forces across the border into

24:39.329 --> 24:39.180
the attack . There's not a lot of

24:39.180 --> 24:41.540
places like that in the world where

24:41.540 --> 24:43.207
some of the people that might

24:43.207 --> 24:45.730
challenges exist . So I think that it

24:45.730 --> 24:47.730
is an asymmetric advantage that our

24:47.730 --> 24:49.970
country holds . Uh And I think that

24:49.980 --> 24:52.036
although the Secretary's question is

24:52.036 --> 24:54.202
right , how much is enough right now ?

24:54.202 --> 24:56.091
That is pretty much laid out by a

24:56.091 --> 24:58.313
previous QDR that says we will have two

24:58.313 --> 25:00.580
brigades not prepared to conduct joint

25:00.580 --> 25:02.540
operational access and it would be

25:02.540 --> 25:04.540
augmented by all the other services

25:04.540 --> 25:06.707
because they too believe it's not just

25:06.707 --> 25:08.484
a Marine Navy thing , the other

25:08.484 --> 25:10.596
services uh would be deeply engaged .

25:10.596 --> 25:12.429
And I honestly think they deeply

25:12.429 --> 25:14.429
believe that it's a capacity of the

25:14.429 --> 25:16.651
nation needs to sustain . Okay , sure ,

25:16.651 --> 25:18.596
Good . General , I want to ask you

25:18.596 --> 25:20.707
about two challenges that the marines

25:20.707 --> 25:22.950
face in Afghanistan . One is the issue

25:22.950 --> 25:24.783
of the rules of engagement . The

25:24.783 --> 25:26.450
emphasis on avoiding civilian

25:26.450 --> 25:28.450
casualties . How big a challenge is

25:28.450 --> 25:30.506
that for the marines getting the job

25:30.506 --> 25:32.394
done . And and the other one is a

25:32.394 --> 25:34.630
perception issue . The president's July

25:34.630 --> 25:37.430
2011 uh date for the beginning of this

25:37.440 --> 25:39.662
withdrawal and the impact that that has

25:39.662 --> 25:41.996
on local afghans and their expectations .

25:41.996 --> 25:44.220
Does that make your job more difficult

25:44.220 --> 25:46.109
in terms of getting things done ,

25:46.109 --> 25:48.053
Especially uh , winning hearts and

25:48.053 --> 25:50.350
minds . Uh , first of all , you're ,

25:50.350 --> 25:52.350
our only question sir is when I ask

25:52.350 --> 25:54.406
every time I go into the theater and

25:54.406 --> 25:56.461
now through two commanders and , and

25:56.461 --> 25:58.183
multiple ground combat element

25:58.183 --> 26:00.294
commanders , the answer is always the

26:00.294 --> 26:02.628
same . It doesn't bother us much . Okay .

26:02.628 --> 26:04.794
One , we believe in it . We understand

26:04.794 --> 26:06.850
the nature of the afghan culture and

26:06.850 --> 26:09.072
society , uh , and we accept that , you

26:09.072 --> 26:11.350
know , if you want to conserve enemies ,

26:11.350 --> 26:11.020
you need to avoid civilian casualties .

26:11.020 --> 26:14.720
Okay , so conceptually were there , uh ,

26:14.730 --> 26:16.897
in execution . We're very good at that

26:16.897 --> 26:19.119
type thing . That's , that's who we are

26:19.119 --> 26:21.230
in terms of a combined arms team arms

26:21.230 --> 26:23.508
team . Our communication is good . Our ,

26:23.508 --> 26:25.619
our , our fires are precise . We have

26:25.619 --> 26:27.674
tactical patients sufficient to make

26:27.674 --> 26:29.730
all of this work . And so every , at

26:29.730 --> 26:29.710
every level . When I asked my

26:29.710 --> 26:31.821
commanders that question , we're okay

26:31.821 --> 26:35.680
with it . Uh , in terms of the July 11

26:35.690 --> 26:38.820
issue . You know , I think , uh , if

26:38.820 --> 26:40.931
you , if you follow it closely and of

26:40.931 --> 26:42.653
course we all do . We know the

26:42.653 --> 26:44.487
president was talking to several

26:44.487 --> 26:46.487
audiences at the same time when you

26:46.487 --> 26:48.598
made his comments , on on July 2011 .

26:48.598 --> 26:50.690
uh , in some ways we think right now

26:50.700 --> 26:52.740
it's probably giving our enemy

26:52.750 --> 26:55.480
sustenance . We think that he may maybe

26:55.480 --> 26:57.480
saying to himself , in fact , we've

26:57.480 --> 26:59.536
intercepted communications and say ,

26:59.536 --> 27:01.647
hey , you know , we only have to hold

27:01.647 --> 27:03.869
out for so long . But let me give you a

27:03.869 --> 27:05.758
different thought . Okay , if you

27:05.758 --> 27:07.980
accept what I offered earlier is true ,

27:07.980 --> 27:10.202
That marines will be there after 2011 ,

27:10.202 --> 27:12.091
Okay , after the middle of 2011 ,

27:12.340 --> 27:14.396
what's the enemy going to say then ?

27:14.396 --> 27:16.507
You know , what , what is he going to

27:16.507 --> 27:18.729
say to his foot troops where you've got

27:18.729 --> 27:20.673
the leadership outside the country

27:20.673 --> 27:22.618
trying to direct operations within

27:22.618 --> 27:22.410
because it's too dangerous for them to

27:22.410 --> 27:24.900
be there . And the foot troops have

27:24.900 --> 27:26.956
been believing what he's saying that

27:26.956 --> 27:28.844
they're all gonna leave in in the

27:28.844 --> 27:30.956
summer of next year and come the fall

27:30.956 --> 27:33.178
we're still there . Hammering them like

27:33.178 --> 27:35.400
we have been . I think it could be very

27:35.400 --> 27:37.567
good for us in that context . In terms

27:37.567 --> 27:39.789
of the enemy psyche and , and uh , what

27:39.789 --> 27:41.956
he has been , you know , posturing now

27:41.956 --> 27:44.067
for for really the better part of the

27:44.067 --> 27:46.178
year , it could take until after july

27:46.178 --> 27:48.344
of next year for any sort of awakening

27:48.344 --> 27:50.567
or reconciliation process to really get

27:50.567 --> 27:52.789
going . I'll tell you , we visited with

27:52.789 --> 27:55.430
uh Admiral Harward bob Harvard who runs

27:55.430 --> 27:58.110
detention in Afghanistan for for ice

27:58.110 --> 28:00.310
after . And it was really interesting

28:00.310 --> 28:02.532
to talk with him about the forensics of

28:02.532 --> 28:04.754
what he is discovering as he goes about

28:04.754 --> 28:06.643
his interrogation and questioning

28:06.643 --> 28:09.440
prisoners and so forth . Our enemy is

28:09.440 --> 28:11.690
getting tired . two , they're getting

28:11.690 --> 28:14.320
hammered to a much greater degree than

28:14.320 --> 28:16.420
we are . Uh , and they're asking

28:16.420 --> 28:18.750
themselves , hey is , it's all worth it

28:18.750 --> 28:21.550
and are asking themselves that now . So ,

28:21.560 --> 28:23.782
you know , I think the combined effects

28:23.782 --> 28:25.949
of that over the next year or so until

28:25.949 --> 28:29.440
next summer When they realized that uh ,

28:29.450 --> 28:32.370
we may begin to process in July of 2011 .

28:32.370 --> 28:34.630
But it's certainly not going to all be

28:34.630 --> 28:36.797
done in a month or two months or three

28:36.797 --> 28:38.970
months . Uh , that , uh , I think it's

28:38.970 --> 28:41.400
only going to compound his , his

28:41.410 --> 28:43.521
thought process that maybe this isn't

28:43.521 --> 28:47.320
gonna end well . Yes sir . three

28:47.320 --> 28:51.040
questions into 1 1 . How does this wiki

28:51.120 --> 28:53.250
leaks impact on your mission in

28:53.250 --> 28:56.150
Afghanistan And to as far as floods in

28:56.150 --> 28:58.800
Pakistan is concerned . It is impacting

28:58.800 --> 29:00.633
the mission in Afghanistan . And

29:00.633 --> 29:03.120
finally , as far as withdrawal and

29:03.130 --> 29:07.030
mission changing in Iraq , how

29:07.080 --> 29:11.010
your soldiers or your marines or

29:11.010 --> 29:13.780
your , I mean people in Afghanistan are

29:13.790 --> 29:15.623
taking that . You can learn some

29:15.623 --> 29:17.860
message . Some can you learn some

29:18.340 --> 29:21.530
lessons from Iraq into your mission in

29:21.530 --> 29:23.752
Afghanistan . Sure , I missed the first

29:23.752 --> 29:26.030
question . Would you restate it ? Okay .

29:27.240 --> 29:30.960
Okay . Um , Wikileaks was , was

29:31.740 --> 29:34.050
not helpful to the degree that I think

29:34.050 --> 29:36.180
are partners are concerned that we

29:36.180 --> 29:38.630
could have such a serious breach at the

29:38.630 --> 29:41.240
same time . I haven't , I haven't

29:41.240 --> 29:43.407
examined all the documents . I haven't

29:43.407 --> 29:45.462
asked anybody to do that at the same

29:45.462 --> 29:47.629
time , except perhaps for compromising

29:47.629 --> 29:49.573
some of our sources , uh , I don't

29:49.573 --> 29:51.684
think that it's being felt tactically

29:51.684 --> 29:53.907
on on the battlefield . My troops chose

29:53.907 --> 29:56.073
not to raise it with me in in a single

29:56.073 --> 29:58.018
question and answer session . So I

29:58.018 --> 29:57.950
don't think that the that the impact is

29:57.960 --> 30:00.260
uh is severe except as it relates to

30:00.260 --> 30:02.740
our capacity to maintain secrets . Uh

30:02.740 --> 30:06.460
huh . The the muse that are

30:06.460 --> 30:09.370
supporting Pakistan are the theater

30:09.370 --> 30:12.150
reserve for the theater commander that

30:12.150 --> 30:15.070
he has chosen elected to commit both

30:15.070 --> 30:17.292
the mu that's there now in the future .

30:17.292 --> 30:19.459
Um you at least for a time to Pakistan

30:19.459 --> 30:23.300
uh crisis requirements . I think strips

30:23.300 --> 30:25.189
him of some of that capability to

30:25.189 --> 30:27.420
respond elsewhere in theater . But for

30:27.420 --> 30:29.830
purpose of marines in Helmand there is

30:29.830 --> 30:32.420
no impact . We aren't relying upon any

30:32.420 --> 30:34.531
of them . You capacity and in Helmand

30:34.531 --> 30:37.710
province to be able to continue our

30:37.720 --> 30:40.940
functions there . Um in terms of Iraq ,

30:40.940 --> 30:42.996
you know , we're out of Iraq for all

30:42.996 --> 30:45.051
intensive purposes have been now for

30:45.051 --> 30:47.273
the better part of a year , started the

30:47.273 --> 30:49.607
process really about a year before that .

30:49.607 --> 30:49.600
But we ask ourselves to the essence of

30:49.600 --> 30:51.490
your question , What lessons are

30:51.490 --> 30:53.820
transferrable ? That we learned over

30:53.830 --> 30:56.540
four or five years in Iraq to

30:56.540 --> 30:58.762
Afghanistan as we built up our presence

30:58.762 --> 31:01.270
there . And we found there was about 70

31:01.340 --> 31:03.650
application probably . But you've got a

31:03.650 --> 31:05.317
different culture , different

31:05.317 --> 31:07.261
environment , different language ,

31:07.261 --> 31:09.539
different tribal construct , different ,

31:09.539 --> 31:09.520
different leadership of course that

31:09.520 --> 31:11.631
we've got to deal with . Uh and so we

31:11.631 --> 31:13.687
focused on the delta . We focused on

31:13.687 --> 31:15.909
that 30% and try to , you know , inject

31:15.909 --> 31:17.853
that into our training to make our

31:17.853 --> 31:19.742
leadership more prepared and that

31:19.742 --> 31:21.742
manner of thing . Uh and and that's

31:21.742 --> 31:23.798
working for us ? None of it gets far

31:23.798 --> 31:25.909
from our old small wars manual . Uh ,

31:25.909 --> 31:28.020
you know marines back in the twenties

31:28.020 --> 31:30.187
in central and South , America learned

31:30.187 --> 31:32.464
many of these lessons in terms of this ,

31:32.464 --> 31:32.150
this transition process that we talked

31:32.150 --> 31:34.710
about earlier . So Emanuel , that's

31:34.720 --> 31:36.831
soon to be 100 years old , has really

31:36.831 --> 31:38.998
been our beacon for the way ahead . In

31:38.998 --> 31:41.580
terms of how we approach the troops are

31:41.580 --> 31:43.970
watching all the news ups and downs so

31:43.970 --> 31:46.081
incredibly informed they really are .

31:46.440 --> 31:49.460
How do you keep their morale because

31:49.480 --> 31:51.570
things change in their minds . Also

31:51.580 --> 31:53.913
whatever they want , whatever they hear ,

31:53.913 --> 31:55.858
whatever they see . Well again , I

31:55.858 --> 31:58.320
emphasize to them The number one

31:58.330 --> 32:00.608
concern on the part of American troops ,

32:00.608 --> 32:02.552
anywhere they go is is the country

32:02.552 --> 32:04.774
behind us . That was the case in 2003 .

32:04.774 --> 32:07.540
That's the case today in 2010 . And ,

32:07.550 --> 32:10.140
and I'll tell you , I am so proud of

32:10.140 --> 32:12.362
our American public that regardless how

32:12.362 --> 32:14.251
they see what happened in Iraq or

32:14.251 --> 32:16.418
what's happening in Afghanistan . They

32:16.418 --> 32:18.307
support the troops and that's the

32:18.307 --> 32:20.473
message that they get from me . That's

32:20.473 --> 32:20.290
the message that they see when they

32:20.290 --> 32:22.350
come home on on dwell and in that

32:22.350 --> 32:24.461
regard , I'm just incredibly proud of

32:24.461 --> 32:26.517
our country . We're here . Yes sir .

32:26.517 --> 32:28.680
You mentioned Safe heavens . And you

32:28.680 --> 32:30.791
also mentioned that the leadership is

32:30.791 --> 32:32.569
outside the country . Only foot

32:32.569 --> 32:36.280
soldiers are there . So why are we

32:36.280 --> 32:39.520
still there ? Why don't we focus where

32:39.520 --> 32:42.350
the leadership of Taliban and Al Qaeda

32:42.350 --> 32:46.140
is ? Well , first of all it's not

32:46.150 --> 32:48.317
a black and white situation . Okay . I

32:48.317 --> 32:50.428
would say significant elements of the

32:50.428 --> 32:52.650
leadership are out of the country , not

32:52.650 --> 32:55.710
susceptible to the day to day contact ,

32:55.720 --> 32:57.831
not susceptible to our special forces

32:57.831 --> 33:00.310
that focus on such things . Uh and that

33:00.310 --> 33:02.820
they are avoiding that that type of

33:02.820 --> 33:04.670
jeopardy is noted by their foot

33:04.670 --> 33:06.760
soldiers . And and so we think that

33:06.760 --> 33:08.871
there's a seam there that we probably

33:08.871 --> 33:10.816
can exploit . Okay , that's that's

33:10.816 --> 33:13.060
that's the essence of it . General

33:13.640 --> 33:15.700
submarines . Equate the future of

33:15.700 --> 33:18.640
Marine Corps with the platform . I'm

33:18.640 --> 33:20.750
wondering if you think that if you

33:20.750 --> 33:23.260
agree with that in any way , but does

33:23.260 --> 33:25.093
the Marine Court run the risk of

33:25.093 --> 33:28.000
clinging to the platform too much much

33:28.000 --> 33:30.111
in the same way the Air Force seem to

33:30.111 --> 33:32.970
cling to the F 22 . You know , let me

33:32.970 --> 33:35.570
say it is not the platform . It's the

33:35.570 --> 33:38.290
capability . Okay . The problem is it's

33:38.290 --> 33:40.457
the only thing out there that gives us

33:40.457 --> 33:42.623
that capability uh you know , when the

33:42.623 --> 33:44.623
secretary made the determination to

33:44.623 --> 33:46.512
trim away the the F 22 there were

33:46.512 --> 33:48.512
another number of U . S . Air Force

33:48.512 --> 33:50.346
aircraft that could perform that

33:50.346 --> 33:52.568
function maybe not as well , arguably ,

33:52.568 --> 33:54.734
but could still do it . Uh This is the

33:54.734 --> 33:57.480
only capability that exists out there

33:57.490 --> 33:59.712
to get us from over the horizon . And I

33:59.712 --> 34:01.990
think back to the secretary's comments ,

34:01.990 --> 34:04.101
we all appreciate we're going to have

34:04.101 --> 34:06.212
to come from over the horizon . Now ,

34:06.212 --> 34:06.190
if you're over the horizon , you're at

34:06.190 --> 34:08.900
least 12-14 miles out . And you simply

34:08.900 --> 34:10.956
can't do that in a vehicle that that

34:10.956 --> 34:12.733
moves at six miles an hour very

34:12.733 --> 34:14.789
effectively . I would be hesitant to

34:14.789 --> 34:16.900
put some of those vehicles at sea are

34:16.900 --> 34:19.122
in the water at that distance . So it's

34:19.122 --> 34:21.233
not necessarily the E . F . B made by

34:21.233 --> 34:23.344
general Dynamics that goes 25 knots .

34:23.344 --> 34:25.590
It's the capability that we need to be

34:25.590 --> 34:28.650
wed to . And it's my belief that if if

34:28.650 --> 34:30.817
that program were cancelled outright ,

34:30.817 --> 34:33.030
we would still be looking then to come

34:33.040 --> 34:35.200
up with that capability in some other

34:35.200 --> 34:37.367
context because it is essential to the

34:37.367 --> 34:39.910
way we do business general , going back

34:39.910 --> 34:42.132
to the future of the Marine Corps . You

34:42.132 --> 34:43.910
mentioned small wars . A lot of

34:43.910 --> 34:46.021
prognosticators say that , you know ,

34:46.021 --> 34:48.021
looking forward after Afghanistan ,

34:48.021 --> 34:50.243
that's what the real threat is going to

34:50.243 --> 34:50.240
be . Small engagements , you know ,

34:50.250 --> 34:52.250
North africa , Middle East , around

34:53.440 --> 34:55.640
what what do you what do you think ?

34:55.640 --> 34:57.720
What what about the state of the

34:57.720 --> 34:59.887
readiness of the force going forward ?

34:59.887 --> 35:01.942
How should it be shaped to meet that

35:01.942 --> 35:04.053
threat ? Or do you agree that that is

35:04.053 --> 35:06.109
the threat to worry about the most ,

35:06.109 --> 35:08.331
You know , both the quadrennial Defense

35:08.331 --> 35:10.331
review of this this last year and a

35:10.331 --> 35:12.220
steady group that we put together

35:12.220 --> 35:14.387
shortly after I became commandant said

35:14.387 --> 35:16.553
almost the same thing . If you look at

35:16.553 --> 35:18.553
that sweet spot out there 2022 2025

35:18.553 --> 35:20.664
they said the most likely conflict is

35:20.664 --> 35:22.442
what they call hybrid warfare ,

35:22.442 --> 35:24.664
regional conflict , that that matter of

35:24.664 --> 35:26.887
thing . And so we have to have a marine

35:26.887 --> 35:29.109
corps that's built towards that because

35:29.109 --> 35:30.942
we have an expression that we do

35:30.942 --> 35:30.940
windows , We do whatever the nation

35:30.940 --> 35:33.560
asks us to do at the same time .

35:34.030 --> 35:36.890
Secretary Gates has said I support that .

35:36.890 --> 35:39.420
That is certainly my belief , but that

35:39.430 --> 35:43.190
the there is also in our history , a

35:43.200 --> 35:45.750
routine element of surprise where we

35:45.750 --> 35:47.639
fight the battle that we were not

35:47.639 --> 35:49.694
prepared to fight or didn't think we

35:49.694 --> 35:51.806
were going to have to engage in . And

35:51.806 --> 35:53.861
so our guidance to the core has been

35:53.861 --> 35:56.083
what it always has been as we shape our

35:56.083 --> 35:58.083
future . We need to be a two fisted

35:58.083 --> 36:00.306
fighter . We need to be able to do what

36:00.306 --> 36:02.472
we're doing right now in Afghanistan ,

36:02.472 --> 36:04.639
but we also need to be able to do what

36:04.639 --> 36:06.810
we did in 2003 when we crossed uh the

36:06.810 --> 36:09.350
Iraqi border alongside an army division

36:09.360 --> 36:11.527
and that his role 500 miles to Baghdad

36:11.527 --> 36:13.500
with a heavy combined arms kind of

36:13.500 --> 36:15.611
capability that only the mic town can

36:15.611 --> 36:17.944
provide . So we're trying to build both .

36:17.944 --> 36:20.111
Uh and we're trying to train to both .

36:20.111 --> 36:22.222
Now that we have more time home , not

36:22.222 --> 36:24.444
just counterinsurgency skills that kind

36:24.444 --> 36:24.280
of take you away from some of those

36:24.430 --> 36:26.680
core competencies of a combined arms

36:26.690 --> 36:28.912
capability . That also by the way , can

36:28.912 --> 36:31.023
come from the sea . You're saying you

36:31.023 --> 36:33.190
feel marines are going to be in helmet

36:33.190 --> 36:35.023
another place in Afghanistan for

36:35.023 --> 36:37.023
several years . Do you think that's

36:37.023 --> 36:36.940
going to have a negative effect to be

36:36.940 --> 36:38.890
prepared for that kind of smaller

36:38.890 --> 36:41.112
hybrid or that was kind of the argument

36:41.112 --> 36:43.390
getting out of Iraq and that's the key .

36:43.390 --> 36:45.612
That's the key to the 1 to 2 deployment

36:45.612 --> 36:47.834
to 12 . When we're home for 14 months ,

36:47.834 --> 36:49.612
we can do a lot of that type of

36:49.612 --> 36:51.834
training Uh and still give marines time

36:51.834 --> 36:53.779
with their families . Still do the

36:53.779 --> 36:55.890
preparation to go back to Afghanistan

36:55.890 --> 36:55.020
with the forces that are in that

36:55.020 --> 36:57.131
rotation . So we think that 14 months

36:57.131 --> 36:59.353
is going to be invaluable to us in that

36:59.353 --> 37:01.520
context . So we can build back some of

37:01.520 --> 37:01.460
those things that have gotten rusty .

37:02.230 --> 37:04.450
Yes , Sir , General the , your marines

37:04.450 --> 37:06.339
took over from the raw marines in

37:06.339 --> 37:08.870
Sangin in july and since then

37:08.880 --> 37:12.630
they destroyed quite a number of the

37:12.630 --> 37:14.741
forward operating bases which the raw

37:14.741 --> 37:16.797
marines had set up . Can you explain

37:16.797 --> 37:18.797
the thinking behind that ? And does

37:18.797 --> 37:21.019
that imply that the royal marines would

37:21.019 --> 37:23.186
perhaps tactically doing the job ? Not

37:23.186 --> 37:26.040
in the right way ? Uh well , first of

37:26.040 --> 37:27.818
all , the Royal Marines are not

37:27.818 --> 37:30.040
completely out of the sand in yet , but

37:30.040 --> 37:32.207
when when 40 commando comes out , they

37:32.207 --> 37:33.762
will not be replaced as our

37:33.762 --> 37:36.610
understanding . Um we we have a little

37:36.610 --> 37:38.832
bit of a different approach from , from

37:38.832 --> 37:41.970
the Royal Marines . Uh we believe that

37:41.970 --> 37:45.120
we need to to challenge the enemy uh

37:45.130 --> 37:48.370
where he thinks he has strength . Uh

37:48.370 --> 37:50.760
and we are less prone I think to to

37:50.760 --> 37:52.927
move into a forward operating base and

37:52.927 --> 37:54.649
simply use that as a basis for

37:54.649 --> 37:57.100
operation uh may go back to our Vietnam

37:57.100 --> 37:59.267
days , I don't know for sure , but but

37:59.267 --> 38:01.322
I can tell you that our mentality is

38:01.322 --> 38:03.544
that there's no place in the zone where

38:03.544 --> 38:05.600
we're not gonna go . Uh and and then

38:05.600 --> 38:07.322
hopefully be able to stay with

38:07.322 --> 38:09.544
sufficient force to to again build bill

38:09.544 --> 38:12.470
behind us uh with afghans transition to

38:12.470 --> 38:14.692
police in and that type of thing . So I

38:14.692 --> 38:16.526
think just a minor difference in

38:16.526 --> 38:18.414
operating philosophy . Uh , Royal

38:18.414 --> 38:20.414
Marines . Uh , we we consider did a

38:20.414 --> 38:22.359
very good job . They took a lot of

38:22.359 --> 38:24.581
casualties . Uh It's just that there is

38:24.581 --> 38:26.803
some some minor differences I think and

38:26.803 --> 38:28.748
how we approach the matter . Yes ,

38:28.748 --> 38:30.859
ma'am , Just 1 1 . Are you suggesting

38:30.859 --> 38:33.030
with that that it is wrong to have

38:33.040 --> 38:35.096
fixed positions and better to remain

38:35.096 --> 38:37.096
totally suggesting that all we have

38:37.096 --> 38:39.318
fixed positions to , you have to have a

38:39.318 --> 38:41.460
place as a base of operations . Um ,

38:41.470 --> 38:43.692
you know , you you have to have a place

38:43.692 --> 38:45.748
where you can go back to to at least

38:45.748 --> 38:47.930
rest and refit resupply . Uh , those

38:47.930 --> 38:50.097
types of things . Most of those places

38:50.097 --> 38:52.208
are going to have a secure helicopter

38:52.208 --> 38:53.986
pad . We don't want to have our

38:53.986 --> 38:53.910
helicopters flying into places that ,

38:53.920 --> 38:55.976
you know , we aren't secure in for ,

38:55.976 --> 38:58.360
you know , hundreds of meters . So no

38:58.370 --> 39:00.537
fixed bases are absolutely necessary .

39:00.537 --> 39:02.537
We do believe in a paucity of fixed

39:02.537 --> 39:04.648
basis because then you have to have a

39:04.648 --> 39:06.703
security force at that base , you've

39:06.703 --> 39:08.703
got to protect it and at each other

39:08.703 --> 39:10.926
manpower pretty quickly . So we want to

39:10.926 --> 39:13.148
have a minimum of those uh , contingent

39:13.148 --> 39:15.314
with the thought that you then get out

39:15.314 --> 39:17.314
and uh and and roam the countryside

39:17.314 --> 39:19.340
trying again to to suppress the

39:19.350 --> 39:23.080
insurgents . Yes , ma'am , the army

39:23.080 --> 39:26.410
is beginning a complete overhaul of its

39:26.410 --> 39:29.450
m for uh , carving and uh , I was

39:29.450 --> 39:31.640
wondering if the Marine Corps has any

39:31.640 --> 39:34.460
plans to look at their own uh , weapons

39:34.460 --> 39:36.460
or small arms systems and any plant

39:36.460 --> 39:38.516
over all that and if not , why not ?

39:38.720 --> 39:40.887
Well , we've been , we've been looking

39:40.887 --> 39:43.109
at our small arms for a long time , you

39:43.109 --> 39:45.109
know , assessing the effects on the

39:45.109 --> 39:45.090
battlefield , knockdown power , killing

39:45.090 --> 39:47.360
power of those types of things . Um ,

39:47.370 --> 39:49.592
we are , we are never going to be a car

39:49.592 --> 39:51.814
being Marine Corps . Okay . We're never

39:51.814 --> 39:54.037
gonna completely to the M4 . Uh , we're

39:54.037 --> 39:56.203
a rifle . Marine Corps . We believe in

39:56.203 --> 39:58.370
uh , in long range shooting skills and

39:58.370 --> 40:00.481
uh , and those skills are just not as

40:00.481 --> 40:02.703
as resident and a carbon as they are in

40:02.703 --> 40:04.870
a service rifle . That's not to say we

40:04.870 --> 40:04.830
we don't use them for a lot of our

40:04.830 --> 40:06.997
people carry the M4 , but it's more an

40:06.997 --> 40:09.110
extension of the pistol than it is uh

40:09.120 --> 40:11.440
an adjustment to the rifle . We're

40:11.440 --> 40:13.218
experimenting right now with an

40:13.218 --> 40:16.000
automatic rifle as opposed to a light

40:16.000 --> 40:18.056
machine gun in the saw . And we have

40:18.056 --> 40:20.278
three battalions . I think it is , it's

40:20.278 --> 40:22.389
going to go forward with both weapons

40:22.389 --> 40:24.556
systems and those battalion commanders

40:24.556 --> 40:24.120
are gonna come back and give us an

40:24.120 --> 40:26.350
appraisal of the two systems , how the

40:26.350 --> 40:28.572
marines like them , their effectiveness

40:28.572 --> 40:30.683
in combat and those types of things .

40:30.683 --> 40:33.490
Finally , We have looked at a 762

40:33.490 --> 40:36.990
system . Uh we looked at a 6.68 system

40:37.000 --> 40:39.056
that had interchangeable barrels and

40:39.056 --> 40:42.690
receiver . Uh but before we would go to

40:42.690 --> 40:44.468
something like that and go to a

40:44.468 --> 40:46.579
completely new rifle , which would be

40:46.579 --> 40:49.690
fairly expensive for us . We want to

40:49.690 --> 40:51.857
make sure we're getting all we can out

40:51.857 --> 40:53.968
of the car chooses we fire out of the

40:53.968 --> 40:55.750
556 16 8 to

40:55.760 --> 40:59.690
uh pretty soon I

40:59.690 --> 41:01.634
think in annexed rotation probably

41:01.634 --> 41:03.857
towards the end of the year , Maybe the

41:03.857 --> 41:05.857
first part of next year . Okay . We

41:05.857 --> 41:07.857
have time . Okay , in the back over

41:07.857 --> 41:10.130
here please . Ah , After the 4th

41:10.130 --> 41:12.750
Structure Review is done . Do you have

41:12.750 --> 41:14.917
any doubt that in some ways the Marine

41:14.917 --> 41:17.630
Corps will be less capable in certain

41:17.630 --> 41:19.700
niche ways . It's certainly not the

41:19.700 --> 41:21.700
intent or the guidance given to the

41:21.700 --> 41:23.867
fourth structure review is to make the

41:23.867 --> 41:25.978
Marine Corps less capable for for the

41:25.978 --> 41:28.030
long term . Uh But no , I I don't I

41:28.030 --> 41:30.308
don't I don't have that concern at all .

41:30.308 --> 41:32.850
I think , I think uh in time after

41:32.850 --> 41:36.110
Afghanistan , uh 202,000 marines in a

41:36.110 --> 41:38.277
peacetime Marine Corps is probably too

41:38.277 --> 41:40.550
many people are expensive . I don't

41:40.550 --> 41:42.439
know that . We could keep 202,000

41:42.439 --> 41:44.494
marines constructively occupied . Uh

41:44.494 --> 41:46.920
And that that's what in the end , we

41:46.920 --> 41:49.142
will probably take the options given to

41:49.142 --> 41:51.820
us by this force structure review group .

41:52.310 --> 41:54.930
Uh make some assumptions as to the

41:54.930 --> 41:57.180
climate and the world status at that

41:57.180 --> 41:59.360
point and try to come away with a

41:59.360 --> 42:01.527
strong assumption that again allows us

42:01.527 --> 42:03.749
to look towards that figure in terms of

42:03.749 --> 42:05.790
reset in terms of BQ number

42:05.790 --> 42:07.790
requirements in terms of UDP and so

42:07.790 --> 42:09.957
forth . So we need something out there

42:09.957 --> 42:12.620
in the out years . Um but in no way

42:12.620 --> 42:14.620
would we accept that we're going to

42:14.620 --> 42:16.842
build a less capable of a wrinkle . You

42:16.842 --> 42:18.898
want the force to be optimized . But

42:18.898 --> 42:20.898
don't you have to don't you have to

42:20.898 --> 42:23.064
sacrifice certain capabilities to make

42:23.064 --> 42:27.040
the overall force what you want . We

42:27.040 --> 42:30.350
we we know . No , I I don't see that

42:30.350 --> 42:33.510
we're going to uh eliminate in a

42:33.510 --> 42:35.500
vertical slice uh any of our

42:35.500 --> 42:37.900
capabilities . Maybe you say , you know ,

42:37.900 --> 42:40.067
there will be less marines eligible to

42:40.067 --> 42:42.910
deploy when we have a smaller Marine

42:42.910 --> 42:45.243
corps in peacetime than there are today .

42:45.243 --> 42:47.770
Um but that's the only place that I

42:47.770 --> 42:50.040
would say that we would be less capable

42:50.040 --> 42:51.984
of responding to the call from the

42:51.984 --> 42:54.040
Secretary . Okay . In the back yes ,

42:54.040 --> 42:55.930
sir . Been a big drop in marine

42:55.930 --> 42:58.360
casualties in Helmand this current

42:58.360 --> 43:00.640
month . What commanders on the ground

43:00.640 --> 43:02.751
tell you ? They attribute that to and

43:02.751 --> 43:04.700
has a corner been turned on the

43:04.700 --> 43:07.120
security front and yeah . Um ,

43:07.600 --> 43:11.370
okay , first of all , we we took some

43:11.370 --> 43:13.481
losses early on to some very accurate

43:13.481 --> 43:16.080
snipers uh , in in marjah and some

43:16.080 --> 43:19.040
other places . The best counter sniper

43:19.040 --> 43:21.096
system on the battlefield is another

43:21.096 --> 43:23.207
sniper or snipers are very good . And

43:23.207 --> 43:25.096
so we have taken down that threat

43:25.096 --> 43:27.230
significantly I think over over the

43:27.230 --> 43:30.390
last several months . Secondly , we are

43:30.400 --> 43:34.210
impacting supply lines . Uh , r r

43:34.210 --> 43:36.920
read again as we intercept and question

43:36.920 --> 43:39.087
and interrogate and so forth . Is that

43:39.087 --> 43:41.031
the enemy is having a tougher time

43:41.031 --> 43:43.253
getting the elements of the I E Ds into

43:43.253 --> 43:45.420
place and uh , and and being able to ,

43:45.420 --> 43:47.476
you know , attack us through through

43:47.476 --> 43:51.180
the I E . D systems . Um , no . To your

43:51.180 --> 43:53.940
last question , security has not turned

43:53.940 --> 43:56.107
today sufficient for instance , for us

43:56.107 --> 43:58.384
to say , okay , Afghan security forces ,

43:58.384 --> 44:00.910
uh , police . You got it All right . Uh ,

44:00.920 --> 44:03.280
we have the momentum , we have the

44:03.280 --> 44:05.710
initiative but that's different from

44:05.710 --> 44:08.330
declaring that security conditions are

44:08.340 --> 44:10.900
changed dramatically in Helmand Barbara .

44:10.900 --> 44:12.900
I promise to come back to you . All

44:12.900 --> 44:14.844
right . I want to take you back to

44:14.844 --> 44:16.622
don't ask , don't tell you said

44:16.622 --> 44:18.844
something that I'd like to ask you what

44:18.844 --> 44:20.956
you meant with precision . You talked

44:20.956 --> 44:23.067
about when you said that , you know ,

44:23.067 --> 44:25.233
submarines are skeptical of all this .

44:25.233 --> 44:27.233
You talked about the and your words

44:27.233 --> 44:29.400
were the moral perception that marines

44:29.400 --> 44:31.456
have of people serving in the Marine

44:31.456 --> 44:33.900
corps who are openly gay . What do you

44:33.900 --> 44:36.770
mean by moral perception ? Barbara ? We

44:36.770 --> 44:38.770
have some people that are , they're

44:38.770 --> 44:40.992
very religious . Uh , and I think in in

44:40.992 --> 44:43.214
some instances I couldn't begin to give

44:43.214 --> 44:45.381
you a percentage . But I think in some

44:45.381 --> 44:47.437
instances we will have people , uh ,

44:47.437 --> 44:49.437
that that say that homosexuality is

44:49.437 --> 44:51.659
wrong and , and they simply do not want

44:51.659 --> 44:53.326
to room with a person of that

44:53.326 --> 44:55.492
persuasion because it would go against

44:55.492 --> 44:57.770
their religious beliefs . So that's uh ,

44:57.770 --> 45:00.010
that's that's my belief about some

45:00.010 --> 45:02.232
percentage of marines in our core . And

45:02.232 --> 45:05.380
what do you if that is the case and the

45:05.380 --> 45:08.080
law changes . It's a senior commander ,

45:08.170 --> 45:11.230
then it's a volunteer force . Should

45:11.230 --> 45:12.674
those people leave should

45:12.674 --> 45:14.960
accommodations be made ? What do you

45:14.970 --> 45:17.137
what do you do about that ? Well , I ,

45:17.137 --> 45:19.414
I think as a commander , you try to uh ,

45:19.414 --> 45:21.470
satisfy the requirements of all your

45:21.470 --> 45:23.692
marines . And if the law changes and we

45:23.692 --> 45:25.637
have homosexual marines will be as

45:25.637 --> 45:27.692
concerned about their rights , their

45:27.692 --> 45:29.748
privileges , their morale as we will

45:29.748 --> 45:32.010
marines who who feel differently about

45:32.020 --> 45:34.076
that , that that whole paradigm . So

45:34.076 --> 45:36.300
commanders , local commanders will be

45:36.300 --> 45:38.470
required to to assist us and making

45:38.470 --> 45:41.410
sure that every marine is provided for

45:41.420 --> 45:43.531
and is focused on the fight at hand .

45:43.531 --> 45:47.470
Okay , uh , got 11

45:47.470 --> 45:49.470
more . We got time like , okay ,

45:49.480 --> 45:52.610
please

45:53.190 --> 45:56.220
remove that word . Still . All right ,

45:56.590 --> 45:58.810
thank you . General , uh , General ,

45:58.810 --> 46:00.600
you said several times that the

46:00.610 --> 46:02.832
Kandahar and Helmand are the birthplace

46:02.832 --> 46:05.100
of the taliban . Helmand was also the

46:05.100 --> 46:07.110
center of drug production in

46:07.110 --> 46:09.110
Afghanistan . So I'm wondering what

46:09.110 --> 46:10.999
your sense from your trip and and

46:10.999 --> 46:13.700
earlier , what your sense of is of the

46:13.710 --> 46:16.260
production processing trafficking of

46:16.260 --> 46:18.690
opium from in and from helmet and its

46:18.690 --> 46:20.690
relationship to the insurgency with

46:20.690 --> 46:22.523
this . I think that is now it is

46:22.523 --> 46:25.170
dramatically reduced uh , and will be

46:25.180 --> 46:27.790
further reduced in the future . Uh , we ,

46:27.800 --> 46:29.967
uh , when we , when we started flowing

46:29.967 --> 46:32.133
into Helmand , we had reports that the

46:32.133 --> 46:34.356
drug trafficking brought to the taliban

46:34.356 --> 46:36.244
and associated al Qaeda somewhere

46:36.244 --> 46:38.320
between $70 million a year , all the

46:38.320 --> 46:40.487
way up to $400 million a year in terms

46:40.487 --> 46:43.020
of resources which allows them to , to

46:43.020 --> 46:45.131
buy the tools of war and and use them

46:45.131 --> 46:47.990
against us . So we knew we had to , in

46:47.990 --> 46:50.157
conjunction with the Afghan government

46:50.157 --> 46:53.070
attempt to beat that back . Frankly ,

46:53.080 --> 46:56.380
it was our perception that the farmers

46:56.390 --> 46:59.410
in and around Marjo gambled and lost .

46:59.420 --> 47:01.830
Okay , because they put poppy in the

47:01.830 --> 47:04.052
ground at a time when the governor told

47:04.052 --> 47:06.274
him not to do that . And so by the time

47:06.274 --> 47:08.710
of the harvest season , we own Marsha

47:09.080 --> 47:11.136
and and two things one , the harvest

47:11.136 --> 47:13.191
was blinded this year , it was not a

47:13.191 --> 47:15.191
good crop . And secondly , uh , you

47:15.191 --> 47:17.302
know , we , we said , hey , we're not

47:17.302 --> 47:19.413
going to allow people to come in here

47:19.413 --> 47:19.250
to work your fields , transport off

47:19.250 --> 47:21.472
your , your , your poppy and so forth .

47:21.680 --> 47:23.847
So in many instances we gave them just

47:23.847 --> 47:26.700
a subsistence if you will payment to

47:26.700 --> 47:29.140
burn their own fields . And so the

47:29.150 --> 47:31.094
production this year was very much

47:31.094 --> 47:33.310
disrupted . In the meantime , we know

47:33.310 --> 47:35.310
that you create enemies if you take

47:35.310 --> 47:37.421
away the ability of a man to feed his

47:37.421 --> 47:39.532
family . So we've , through education

47:39.532 --> 47:41.960
through c distribution , through

47:41.970 --> 47:44.200
instruction on how to , you know ,

47:44.200 --> 47:46.270
create a different crop , through

47:46.270 --> 47:47.881
trying to make sure that the

47:47.881 --> 47:50.103
infrastructure is there at harvest time

47:50.103 --> 47:52.159
to get that crop to a market because

47:52.159 --> 47:52.020
you're not going to have , you know ,

47:52.020 --> 47:54.353
bad guys come by and pick it up for you .

47:54.353 --> 47:56.890
We think that we're giving them again

47:56.890 --> 47:59.112
through the afghan government . I can't

47:59.112 --> 48:01.610
overemphasize that another way to once

48:01.610 --> 48:04.420
again be a productive and , and uh ,

48:04.430 --> 48:06.430
you know , successful farmer , uh ,

48:06.430 --> 48:08.480
Russian wheat is going to be less

48:08.480 --> 48:10.690
available on the market . Uh , there's

48:10.690 --> 48:13.450
the Pakistani wheat fields are gonna be

48:13.450 --> 48:15.561
problematic for probably some time to

48:15.561 --> 48:17.617
come . So we think that the price of

48:17.617 --> 48:19.839
wheat is gonna fare pretty well uh , in

48:19.839 --> 48:22.020
the next year or 18 months . So , uh ,

48:22.030 --> 48:24.030
in that regard , uh , you know , we

48:24.030 --> 48:25.752
could be fortunate that we can

48:25.752 --> 48:27.974
transition , uh , the afghan farmers is

48:27.974 --> 48:29.974
something other than poppy . Okay ,

48:30.680 --> 48:33.080
your retirement plan , sir , Fishing ,

48:33.080 --> 48:36.380
Huh ? When

48:36.390 --> 48:38.870
you do not presume the Senate in my job ?

48:38.870 --> 48:40.981
Okay . I gotta go , folks . Thank you

48:40.981 --> 48:42.900
very much . Okay . Take care .