WEBVTT 00:02.140 --> 00:04.480 well good afternoon , I hope I can live 00:04.480 --> 00:06.750 up to that . Uh particularly jimmy 00:06.750 --> 00:10.070 durante piece of it and I want to 00:10.070 --> 00:12.640 thank Secretary Shultz , Secretary 00:12.640 --> 00:16.150 Perry Secretary Kissinger , 00:16.640 --> 00:20.080 Senator Nunn , Minister Brown and 00:20.090 --> 00:22.580 everyone else who has taken time to 00:22.580 --> 00:25.380 really focus on this because I I really 00:25.380 --> 00:27.440 do believe this is a critical , 00:27.450 --> 00:29.860 critical subject and there has not been 00:30.840 --> 00:33.118 a lot of focus on this in recent years . 00:33.390 --> 00:36.360 From my perspective was a gap 00:37.040 --> 00:40.180 in the sort of enthusiasm , 00:40.190 --> 00:43.550 the glee , the joy that 00:43.940 --> 00:46.390 occurred from the Western perspective 00:46.390 --> 00:49.970 when the wall came down and uh and we 00:49.970 --> 00:52.180 have at least I believe we find 00:52.180 --> 00:54.180 ourselves in a position where we're 00:54.180 --> 00:56.330 struggling with what deterrence 00:57.740 --> 01:00.760 Is and can be in the 21st century . 01:01.540 --> 01:03.590 So I really do appreciate the 01:03.590 --> 01:05.900 opportunity to be here . I'm also 01:05.900 --> 01:08.530 mindful of the depth and the breadth of 01:08.530 --> 01:11.700 the experience here in this room as 01:11.700 --> 01:14.140 current and former high government 01:14.140 --> 01:15.973 officials , Secretaries of State 01:15.973 --> 01:19.010 Defense senators , you've been rightly 01:19.010 --> 01:21.450 recognized as the very architects of 01:21.450 --> 01:24.440 our national security . So I'm I'm 01:24.440 --> 01:27.260 humbled encouraged and thankful for 01:27.260 --> 01:30.070 your continued service and your 01:30.070 --> 01:32.292 continued leadership because we need it 01:32.292 --> 01:35.250 and we are all in your debt for the 01:35.250 --> 01:37.630 decades of leadership that you have 01:37.630 --> 01:41.440 provided . Mr Secretary , one of your 01:41.440 --> 01:43.440 staffers noted that between you and 01:43.440 --> 01:45.590 Secretary Kissinger . Secretary Perry 01:45.590 --> 01:47.812 Senator Nunn , there are over 200 years 01:48.410 --> 01:50.632 that have been spent thinking about the 01:50.632 --> 01:52.854 use deterrent effect and elimination of 01:52.854 --> 01:55.630 nuclear weapons Today . I bring a 01:55.630 --> 01:57.770 little more than 40 of those years to 01:57.770 --> 02:01.690 bear on of my own thinking on the topic 02:01.700 --> 02:04.330 off and on though To be honest , some 02:04.330 --> 02:06.386 of those years were spent on liberty 02:06.386 --> 02:08.552 and some of the greatest courts in the 02:08.552 --> 02:11.720 world . So I make no pretense of 02:11.720 --> 02:13.860 expertise . But I do have the 02:13.860 --> 02:16.260 microphone here for a few minutes . And 02:17.040 --> 02:19.970 what was it that Mark Twain used to say ? 02:19.980 --> 02:22.430 The less a man knows the bigger noise 02:22.430 --> 02:24.950 he makes and the higher salary he 02:24.950 --> 02:27.640 commands . By that measure you're in 02:27.640 --> 02:30.650 for a real treat this afternoon . Truth 02:30.650 --> 02:32.539 is , I've been given the topic of 02:32.539 --> 02:34.594 deterrence a great deal of attention 02:34.594 --> 02:36.761 since assuming this office and it's my 02:36.761 --> 02:38.594 view that we haven't paid enough 02:38.594 --> 02:40.261 attention to it . Nor have we 02:40.261 --> 02:43.160 adequately resourced it deterrence 02:43.160 --> 02:45.382 today . I don't have to tell you . This 02:45.382 --> 02:47.640 is tougher and more complex . More than 02:47.640 --> 02:49.870 one nation can now reach out and touch 02:49.870 --> 02:52.000 us with nuclear missiles . Americans 02:52.000 --> 02:53.960 are potential targets of terrorism 02:54.340 --> 02:56.700 wherever they travel . And regional 02:56.700 --> 02:58.756 instability in several places around 02:58.756 --> 03:01.490 the globe could easily erupt into large 03:01.490 --> 03:04.150 scale conflict . Yet we've done 03:04.150 --> 03:06.317 precious little spadework to advance a 03:06.317 --> 03:09.250 theory of deterrence . Many , if not 03:09.250 --> 03:11.083 most of the individuals who work 03:11.083 --> 03:13.083 deterrence in the 70s and 80s , the 03:13.083 --> 03:15.360 real experts at this discipline . 03:15.840 --> 03:18.630 They're not doing it anymore . And 03:18.630 --> 03:20.686 we've not worked very hard to try to 03:20.686 --> 03:23.270 find their replacements tell a brief 03:23.270 --> 03:26.580 story . From my own experience . I went 03:26.580 --> 03:29.410 to a brief college war college course 03:29.410 --> 03:31.354 in 1989 and there was an Air Force 03:31.354 --> 03:33.521 Lieutenant Colonel had been in the Air 03:33.521 --> 03:35.688 force about 20 years and we had two or 03:35.688 --> 03:37.910 three sessions with him on deterrence . 03:37.970 --> 03:41.440 I couldn't imagine someone new 03:41.460 --> 03:44.000 any more about the subject than this 03:44.010 --> 03:46.290 individual who had spent his whole 03:46.290 --> 03:48.950 career on deterrent to nuclear weapons . 03:48.950 --> 03:51.006 I mean it was one of the things just 03:51.006 --> 03:53.180 made your head hurt sitting in class . 03:53.250 --> 03:56.140 We don't have anybody in our military 03:56.150 --> 03:59.800 that does that anymore . Um And not 03:59.800 --> 04:02.430 unlike the nation and in fact even the 04:02.430 --> 04:05.510 globe , we've let those skills atrophy 04:05.560 --> 04:07.460 and I think to our detriment 04:09.440 --> 04:12.290 Back then in the 89 time frame , it was 04:12.300 --> 04:14.522 as if we all breathed a collective sigh 04:14.522 --> 04:16.300 of relief when the Soviet Union 04:16.300 --> 04:18.578 collapsed and said to ourselves , well , 04:18.578 --> 04:20.633 I guess we don't need to worry about 04:20.633 --> 04:23.620 that anymore . We were dead wrong . The 04:23.620 --> 04:26.080 demands of deterrence evolve . And as 04:26.080 --> 04:29.400 dr Oppenheimer once opined the atomic 04:29.410 --> 04:31.850 bomb made the prospect of future war 04:32.300 --> 04:34.770 unendurable . It has led us up those 04:34.770 --> 04:38.430 last few steps to the mountain pass and 04:38.430 --> 04:40.760 beyond . There is a different country 04:41.540 --> 04:43.429 frankly the country beyond Open , 04:43.429 --> 04:46.410 higher Myers mountain passes 04:46.410 --> 04:48.600 significantly different than what most 04:48.600 --> 04:50.767 of us imagined prior to the end of the 04:50.767 --> 04:53.370 Cold War . I won't bore you with the 04:53.370 --> 04:55.426 history , particularly since many of 04:55.426 --> 04:57.537 you wrote that history but suffice it 04:57.537 --> 04:59.390 to say that even as often and as 04:59.390 --> 05:02.030 quickly as things change , most nuclear 05:02.030 --> 05:04.560 arms agreements between the U . S . And 05:04.560 --> 05:06.338 the former soviet Union had two 05:06.338 --> 05:09.350 elements in common . The realization 05:09.350 --> 05:11.406 that a lack of understanding invites 05:11.406 --> 05:13.990 instability through uninformed and 05:14.000 --> 05:17.160 unconstrained re posturing of nuclear 05:17.160 --> 05:20.960 forces and a common desire to improve 05:21.340 --> 05:24.530 bilateral relations . For example , 05:24.540 --> 05:26.770 perceived missile and bomber gaps led 05:26.780 --> 05:29.290 to the salt talks which produced the 05:29.290 --> 05:32.220 ABM treaty and an eventual albeit 05:32.220 --> 05:34.331 temporary freeze on arms production . 05:34.331 --> 05:38.230 All within the backdrop of detente the 05:38.230 --> 05:40.286 ebb and flow of politics and history 05:40.286 --> 05:42.452 have made such agreements the products 05:42.452 --> 05:45.130 of exquisite timing requiring a so 05:45.130 --> 05:48.420 called alignment of the stars to 05:48.420 --> 05:51.510 succeed as some of my valley friends 05:51.510 --> 05:54.620 from down south might say while other 05:54.630 --> 05:58.120 efforts were doomed to fail a flood of 05:58.120 --> 06:00.342 soviet troops into Afghanistan dissolve 06:00.342 --> 06:02.231 support for Salt to in the United 06:02.231 --> 06:04.453 States . Whereas the fall of the Berlin 06:04.453 --> 06:06.820 wall and later the soviet union may 06:06.820 --> 06:08.890 well have hastened the signing and 06:08.890 --> 06:11.980 ratification of start today . We lack a 06:11.980 --> 06:14.760 similar treaty with Russia . In fact we 06:14.760 --> 06:16.982 haven't had one for almost a year now . 06:17.640 --> 06:19.807 But the arms build up in the aftermath 06:19.807 --> 06:22.010 aftermath of Salt Two's disintegration 06:22.010 --> 06:25.460 highlights the necessity for some sort 06:25.470 --> 06:27.680 of understanding some sort of 06:27.680 --> 06:30.460 verifiable reduction and monitoring 06:30.460 --> 06:34.350 regime and I don't want to sound sound 06:34.350 --> 06:36.370 like too much of a caricature of my 06:36.370 --> 06:38.537 southern California upbringing . But I 06:38.537 --> 06:40.537 think the Stars I mentioned earlier 06:40.537 --> 06:43.660 have aligned once again consider this 06:44.340 --> 06:46.173 President Obama committed to the 06:46.173 --> 06:48.590 pursuit of a nuclear weapon free world 06:48.590 --> 06:51.170 and an agenda to reset the U . S . And 06:51.170 --> 06:54.270 Russian relationship . Russia has a 06:54.270 --> 06:56.940 vested interest in combating the export 06:56.940 --> 06:58.551 of terrorism and heroin from 06:58.551 --> 07:01.210 Afghanistan where we all are , where we 07:01.210 --> 07:04.700 are also engaged in costly but critical 07:04.710 --> 07:07.980 combat operations . The world economic 07:07.980 --> 07:09.869 situation and outlook have forced 07:09.869 --> 07:11.820 governments worldwide to reexamine 07:11.830 --> 07:14.052 expenditures with a particular emphasis 07:14.540 --> 07:17.820 on defense budgets . I think these 07:17.820 --> 07:19.487 converging interests laid the 07:19.487 --> 07:21.620 groundwork for Presidents Obama and 07:21.620 --> 07:24.040 Medvedev to sign the New Start treaty 07:24.370 --> 07:27.330 this spring . And as I have said , and 07:27.330 --> 07:29.052 I know to a certain extent I'm 07:29.052 --> 07:30.663 preaching to the choir , its 07:30.663 --> 07:32.663 ratification , its ratification and 07:32.663 --> 07:34.886 implementation is the right thing to do 07:34.886 --> 07:37.660 because we actually took the time to do 07:37.660 --> 07:40.970 it right . And I want to recognize 07:40.970 --> 07:43.081 extraordinary work of so many in that 07:43.081 --> 07:45.450 regard , particularly Assistant 07:45.450 --> 07:47.617 Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller , 07:47.617 --> 07:49.790 who is here with us today and I was 07:49.790 --> 07:52.300 with Rose a lot of these negotiations 07:52.300 --> 07:54.630 and she did . She and her team did 07:54.630 --> 07:57.820 extraordinary work . The New Start 07:57.820 --> 08:00.042 treaty allows us to retain a strong and 08:00.042 --> 08:02.153 flexible american nuclear deterrent . 08:02.740 --> 08:04.296 It strengthens openness and 08:04.296 --> 08:06.407 transparency in our relationship with 08:06.407 --> 08:08.630 Russia . It also demonstrates our 08:08.630 --> 08:10.670 national commitment to reducing the 08:10.670 --> 08:12.960 worldwide risk of nuclear incidents 08:13.030 --> 08:14.770 resulting from the continuing 08:14.770 --> 08:17.590 proliferation of these most dangerous 08:17.590 --> 08:21.160 weapons . I am convinced that new start 08:21.840 --> 08:23.360 permitting us as it does 08:25.040 --> 08:27.860 1550 aggregate warheads and the freedom 08:27.860 --> 08:30.290 to create our own force posture within 08:30.290 --> 08:32.590 that limit leaves us with more than 08:32.590 --> 08:35.520 enough nuclear deterrent capability for 08:35.520 --> 08:38.240 the world that we live in . I am 08:38.240 --> 08:40.018 convinced that it preserves the 08:40.018 --> 08:42.460 strength resident in our nuclear triad 08:42.940 --> 08:45.107 and that it retains our flexibility to 08:45.107 --> 08:47.460 continue deploying conventional global 08:47.460 --> 08:50.090 strike capabilities . I'm also 08:50.090 --> 08:52.810 convinced that the verification regime 08:53.070 --> 08:56.960 is as stringent as it is transparent 08:57.340 --> 08:59.470 And born of more than 15 years of 08:59.470 --> 09:01.630 lessons learned under the original 09:01.630 --> 09:04.600 start treaty , There will be 18 09:04.600 --> 09:06.600 inspections annually , a mixture of 09:06.600 --> 09:08.322 both deployed and non deployed 09:08.322 --> 09:10.460 strategic systems and will be working 09:10.460 --> 09:12.516 much harder to share data concerning 09:12.516 --> 09:15.440 the numbers , locations and technical 09:15.440 --> 09:18.040 characteristics of systems subject to 09:18.040 --> 09:20.270 the treaty . In other words , we'll 09:20.270 --> 09:22.381 know a lot more about Russian systems 09:22.381 --> 09:24.492 and intentions than we do right now . 09:25.040 --> 09:27.360 And as I have said many times in many 09:27.360 --> 09:30.570 different context , in this fast paced 09:30.850 --> 09:33.890 flatter world of ours , information and 09:33.890 --> 09:36.250 the trust it engenders is every bit as 09:36.250 --> 09:38.880 much a deterrent as any weapon we 09:38.880 --> 09:42.850 deploy . It's what I don't know 09:43.440 --> 09:45.900 and what I can't see that makes me 09:45.900 --> 09:48.920 nervous . So I believe in the rest of 09:48.920 --> 09:51.253 the military leadership in this country , 09:51.253 --> 09:53.420 believes that this treaty is essential 09:53.420 --> 09:56.100 to our future security . I believe it 09:56.100 --> 09:58.870 enhances and ensures that security and 09:58.870 --> 10:00.703 I hope the Senate will ratify it 10:00.703 --> 10:03.210 quickly . There is as you know , a 10:03.210 --> 10:05.154 separate but equally distinguished 10:05.154 --> 10:07.730 cohort that opposes ratification of the 10:07.730 --> 10:10.480 new Start treaty . Typically they talk 10:10.480 --> 10:12.740 about missile defense , pointing to the 10:12.740 --> 10:14.950 preamble language that accepts an 10:14.950 --> 10:17.980 unspecified in a relationship between 10:17.980 --> 10:20.450 nuclear weapons and defensive systems . 10:21.040 --> 10:23.151 They say this gives the Russians what 10:23.151 --> 10:25.207 they want , no serious effort by the 10:25.207 --> 10:27.890 United States to develop and field such 10:27.890 --> 10:30.890 systems . There's nothing in the treaty 10:30.890 --> 10:33.001 that prohibits us from developing any 10:33.001 --> 10:36.190 kind of missile defense . And the 10:36.190 --> 10:38.190 president has made it clear that we 10:38.190 --> 10:40.134 have every intention of furthering 10:40.134 --> 10:42.246 those goals . We couldn't possibly be 10:42.246 --> 10:45.060 more open about it or about why we are 10:45.060 --> 10:47.530 doing it to it . We've already shared a 10:47.530 --> 10:49.760 great deal of our missile defense plans 10:50.240 --> 10:53.120 policy and programs with Russia and I 10:53.120 --> 10:55.231 promise to continue to do so in order 10:55.231 --> 10:58.690 to assuage their fears in so much as 10:58.690 --> 11:01.960 the success of deterrence is defined by 11:01.960 --> 11:03.849 the absence of attack . I believe 11:03.849 --> 11:05.682 Russian adherence to date to the 11:05.682 --> 11:07.850 tenants of new start indicates 11:07.850 --> 11:10.550 acceptance of our current and future 11:10.560 --> 11:13.250 missile defense plans . Despite public 11:13.250 --> 11:15.690 conjecture to the contrary in both the 11:15.690 --> 11:18.660 eastern and western hemispheres . 11:19.640 --> 11:21.862 So awaiting the conclusion of this last 11:21.862 --> 11:23.973 chapter in the U . S . Russia nuclear 11:23.973 --> 11:26.480 arms saga , we have the opportunity to 11:26.480 --> 11:29.920 peer further into Oppenheimer's 11:30.170 --> 11:33.300 country beyond the mountain pass and we 11:33.300 --> 11:35.411 would be well counseled to review our 11:35.411 --> 11:37.578 climb to this point when we consider a 11:37.578 --> 11:41.110 rising nuclear power like china , the 11:41.110 --> 11:43.166 greatest lesson I think we can apply 11:43.166 --> 11:45.166 from our experiences with Russia to 11:45.166 --> 11:47.340 china is that in the realm of nuclear 11:47.340 --> 11:50.420 arms transparency of strategy and 11:50.420 --> 11:53.340 clarity of intent issues which have 11:53.340 --> 11:55.650 concerned me about china specifically 11:56.040 --> 11:58.440 go a long way towards promoting 11:58.440 --> 12:01.380 stability to paraphrase Secretary 12:01.380 --> 12:03.600 Kissinger in deterrence . The 12:03.600 --> 12:06.930 assessment of risk becomes less precise 12:06.940 --> 12:09.460 in the face of unprecedented 12:09.470 --> 12:12.080 destructiveness in a world with an 12:12.080 --> 12:14.024 unfortunately increasing number of 12:14.024 --> 12:15.900 nuclear armed actors . There is 12:15.900 --> 12:18.580 precariously little room for air in 12:18.580 --> 12:21.030 that assessment . And in light of the U . 12:21.030 --> 12:22.919 S . And Russian nuclear stockpile 12:22.919 --> 12:24.863 reductions , lack of understanding 12:24.863 --> 12:27.260 about china's strategy and intent 12:27.270 --> 12:29.214 forces new consideration about our 12:29.214 --> 12:32.090 security commitments to our allies . 12:32.740 --> 12:34.851 And I would say the same about Iran , 12:35.040 --> 12:36.984 although in that case there's very 12:36.984 --> 12:39.151 little doubt indeed of their intent to 12:39.151 --> 12:41.850 further destabilize an entire region 12:42.140 --> 12:46.090 and thus the entire globe . I'm hopeful 12:46.090 --> 12:48.090 that our military relationship with 12:48.090 --> 12:50.090 china will grow following Secretary 12:50.090 --> 12:52.310 Gates's visit to Beijing next year and 12:52.310 --> 12:54.540 in doing so , both parties can gain the 12:54.540 --> 12:57.610 insight . They need to minimize any air 12:57.620 --> 13:00.870 in their risk assessments . And I and I 13:00.870 --> 13:02.703 remain somewhat hopeful that the 13:02.703 --> 13:04.759 diplomatic and economic levers being 13:04.759 --> 13:07.220 applied to the Iranian regime will 13:07.220 --> 13:09.350 render from it a more responsible and 13:09.350 --> 13:12.010 productive approach to their role in 13:12.010 --> 13:14.550 the Middle East . The sanctions are 13:14.550 --> 13:16.772 beginning to bite , but thus far , I've 13:16.772 --> 13:18.630 seen no retrenchment from their 13:18.630 --> 13:21.560 declared path of nuclear weaponization . 13:22.840 --> 13:24.920 This bodes ill for their neighbors . 13:25.100 --> 13:27.100 And ultimately it bodes ill for the 13:27.100 --> 13:29.590 Iranian people who must labor and live 13:29.600 --> 13:31.600 under the jack boot of a government 13:31.600 --> 13:33.322 that has chosen isolation over 13:33.322 --> 13:36.630 engagement , conflict over cooperation 13:37.040 --> 13:40.410 and extremism over moderation . Indeed , 13:40.410 --> 13:42.521 as much as our experience prepares us 13:42.521 --> 13:44.577 to engage other rational state based 13:44.577 --> 13:46.920 competitors . It leaves us desperately 13:46.920 --> 13:49.031 wanting a philosophical framework for 13:49.031 --> 13:52.250 dealing with terrorists armed with WMD , 13:53.140 --> 13:55.307 the world faces a complex and adaptive 13:55.307 --> 13:57.029 network of radical and violent 13:57.029 --> 13:59.200 ideologies that binds disparate 13:59.200 --> 14:02.590 individuals movements , organizations 14:02.600 --> 14:05.440 and even states . And while not all 14:05.440 --> 14:07.551 extremist groups share the same goals 14:07.551 --> 14:09.773 or ideology . They do retain sufficient 14:09.773 --> 14:12.020 autonomy to make their own strategic 14:12.020 --> 14:14.800 choices , which in my mind makes them 14:14.800 --> 14:18.060 vulnerable to some form of coercion 14:18.640 --> 14:22.130 and perhaps even deterrence . In 14:22.130 --> 14:24.040 contrast to most states , violent 14:24.040 --> 14:25.984 extremist groups are more prone to 14:25.984 --> 14:29.540 expand , regress , splinter or 14:29.540 --> 14:32.270 die earlier in their life cycles . They 14:32.270 --> 14:34.159 struggle to survive by recruiting 14:34.159 --> 14:36.760 members and acquiring resources . 14:37.240 --> 14:39.450 Choices are made by elites who tightly 14:39.450 --> 14:41.870 control the use of violence primarily 14:41.880 --> 14:44.860 for a symbolic or opportunistic reasons 14:45.440 --> 14:47.440 during growth . Where most of these 14:47.440 --> 14:50.310 groups currently linger formal 14:50.310 --> 14:52.199 structures form as leaders try to 14:52.199 --> 14:54.254 overcome the difference between what 14:54.254 --> 14:58.160 they want and individuals actually do 14:58.940 --> 15:00.829 decision making pressures grow as 15:00.829 --> 15:02.829 leaders seek to accommodate a wider 15:02.829 --> 15:05.650 array of stakeholders . We see some of 15:05.650 --> 15:07.706 this with the Taliban in Afghanistan 15:07.940 --> 15:10.090 who still desire to govern and who 15:10.090 --> 15:12.201 continue to reach out to Al Qaeda and 15:12.201 --> 15:14.360 other like minded groups for aid and 15:14.360 --> 15:16.870 assistance . This fact , coupled with 15:16.870 --> 15:19.360 the increasing pressure being applied 15:19.360 --> 15:22.240 by NATO and Afghan forces , helps helps 15:22.240 --> 15:24.520 explain why some of them , though not 15:24.520 --> 15:26.880 the very senior leadership are seeking 15:26.880 --> 15:29.210 preliminary talks with with the Karzai 15:29.210 --> 15:31.480 administration . They want power and 15:31.480 --> 15:35.240 influence . They want legitimacy as 15:35.240 --> 15:37.360 groups like this or like Hezbollah in 15:37.360 --> 15:40.360 Lebanon and Hamas and Gaza integrate 15:40.360 --> 15:42.770 with and become part of government . 15:42.780 --> 15:45.560 They will start losing non state status . 15:46.340 --> 15:48.930 The closer line the group is to the 15:48.930 --> 15:50.880 state or the more governing 15:50.880 --> 15:53.540 responsibilities it assumes , the more 15:53.540 --> 15:56.590 susceptible it is to influence . That's 15:56.590 --> 15:58.479 why I've always believed that the 15:58.479 --> 16:00.479 ultimate solution in Afghanistan is 16:00.479 --> 16:02.930 political , not military . Individual 16:02.930 --> 16:05.370 terrorists however , are often another 16:05.370 --> 16:08.730 matter because by the , by the time 16:08.730 --> 16:10.952 someone makes the decision to commit an 16:10.952 --> 16:13.210 act of terrorism , our deterrent has 16:13.210 --> 16:16.020 already failed . The weapon of choice 16:16.020 --> 16:18.920 being a suicide vest , an airplane or a 16:18.920 --> 16:20.976 weapon of mass destruction is just a 16:20.976 --> 16:24.350 matter of availability to really deter 16:24.350 --> 16:26.017 terrorism at that level . The 16:26.017 --> 16:28.500 conditions that lead a person to that 16:28.500 --> 16:30.860 decision point must be addressed , 16:31.440 --> 16:33.910 attacking the humiliation , the 16:33.910 --> 16:37.100 hopelessness , the illiteracy and 16:37.100 --> 16:39.720 abject poverty which lie at the core of 16:39.720 --> 16:43.140 the attraction to extremist thought 16:43.150 --> 16:45.261 will do more to turn the tide against 16:45.261 --> 16:48.130 terrorism than anything else . We can 16:48.130 --> 16:50.352 continue to hunt and kill their leaders 16:50.352 --> 16:52.710 and we will , but when a person learns 16:52.710 --> 16:56.010 to read and he enters a gateway toward 16:56.010 --> 16:58.450 independent education and thought he 16:58.450 --> 17:01.720 becomes more capable , more employable 17:01.730 --> 17:04.410 and enjoys a sense of purpose in his 17:04.410 --> 17:07.210 life , he will understand the Koran for 17:07.210 --> 17:09.960 what it is and not merely what his 17:09.960 --> 17:13.680 mullah says it is who's equally 17:13.810 --> 17:16.870 uneducated . He can raise his Children 17:16.870 --> 17:19.290 to a higher standard of living than the 17:19.290 --> 17:22.160 one he knew , an aspiration shared by 17:22.160 --> 17:25.910 parents around the world and his wife 17:25.910 --> 17:28.077 will help him prevent the despair that 17:28.077 --> 17:30.480 might lead a child of theirs into the 17:30.480 --> 17:33.860 arms of Al Qaeda or the Taliban . These 17:33.860 --> 17:36.050 accomplishments . Delegitimize the 17:36.050 --> 17:38.990 terrorist ideology replacing the fear 17:38.990 --> 17:41.230 they hope to engender with the hope 17:41.240 --> 17:45.160 they fear to encounter . Now . That is 17:45.160 --> 17:48.350 a deterrence of truly strategic nature . 17:48.740 --> 17:50.573 This isn't dreamy pie in the sky 17:50.573 --> 17:52.890 thinking my friend Greg morgan 17:52.900 --> 17:54.678 Mortensen has lived it in rural 17:54.678 --> 17:56.400 Pakistan and Afghanistan as he 17:56.400 --> 17:59.580 documented in two books , his story 17:59.580 --> 18:01.691 about the elders who keep the Taliban 18:01.691 --> 18:03.802 from burning down a village merely by 18:03.802 --> 18:06.090 standing in front of it . That's only a 18:06.090 --> 18:09.110 few pages . But it speaks volumes to be 18:09.110 --> 18:11.277 sure . In places where terrorists have 18:11.277 --> 18:14.500 had free reign as they did in Iraq and 18:14.510 --> 18:17.210 continue to do so in parts of 18:17.210 --> 18:19.860 Afghanistan today , security is 18:19.860 --> 18:22.027 necessary , but it is not sufficient . 18:22.840 --> 18:24.740 Ultimate solutions cut across the 18:24.740 --> 18:27.480 realms of diplomacy , intelligence , 18:27.490 --> 18:31.360 economics , and social progress . No 18:31.360 --> 18:33.471 clear cut line divides these pursuits 18:33.471 --> 18:37.080 anymore and none should . They demand a 18:37.080 --> 18:38.969 working relationship between host 18:38.969 --> 18:41.460 nations , alliances , international 18:41.460 --> 18:44.080 organizations and volunteer groups 18:44.090 --> 18:46.840 alike . Indeed , relationships at every 18:46.840 --> 18:48.990 level from personal to institutional 18:49.000 --> 18:51.570 are critical to success , but 18:51.570 --> 18:54.440 particularly in a crisis , even during 18:54.440 --> 18:56.730 the darkest days of the Cold War , the 18:56.730 --> 18:59.480 U . S . And soviet Union maintained a 18:59.480 --> 19:01.740 diplomatic relationship and that 19:01.740 --> 19:03.740 relationship brought the world back 19:03.740 --> 19:06.010 from the brink during the Cuban missile 19:06.010 --> 19:09.480 crisis . Conversely today , we have 19:09.480 --> 19:11.730 almost no relationship with the world's 19:11.730 --> 19:14.090 most threatening aspiring nuclear 19:14.090 --> 19:17.600 states . Iran and North Korea . That 19:17.600 --> 19:20.820 alone is cause for concern and that's 19:20.820 --> 19:23.910 why I spend so much time With General 19:23.910 --> 19:25.970 Kiani in Pakistan , a country we 19:25.970 --> 19:29.060 abandoned back in 1990 . It is why I 19:29.060 --> 19:31.060 conferred so regularly with General 19:31.060 --> 19:32.671 Makarov during the new start 19:32.671 --> 19:35.470 negotiations and why I sat cross legged 19:35.470 --> 19:37.414 insurers with afghan elders in the 19:37.414 --> 19:40.640 Panjshir Valley relationships are vital 19:40.650 --> 19:42.872 and while it is good to have friends on 19:42.872 --> 19:45.460 Facebook and I'm up to 13,000 now 19:46.740 --> 19:49.450 there's no substitute for actually 19:49.450 --> 19:52.470 being there . The value that underpins 19:52.470 --> 19:55.210 any relationship working adversarial or 19:55.210 --> 19:58.440 otherwise is trust our allies and 19:58.440 --> 20:00.551 partners can trust . We will stand by 20:00.551 --> 20:03.210 them in bad times and good . We will 20:03.210 --> 20:05.377 pursue treaties that allow us to trust 20:05.377 --> 20:09.200 but verify among nuclear armed nations 20:09.300 --> 20:11.480 and our enemies should trust that they 20:11.480 --> 20:13.702 will be held accountable for any attack 20:13.702 --> 20:16.590 against our nation , our allies or our 20:16.590 --> 20:19.560 interests trust requires credibility 20:19.560 --> 20:22.950 and credibility is built on reliability . 20:23.440 --> 20:25.710 This applies to our national will as 20:25.710 --> 20:28.740 much as our conventional or nuclear 20:28.740 --> 20:31.120 forces . The best way to ensure 20:31.120 --> 20:33.064 reliability is through the regular 20:33.064 --> 20:36.070 exercise of sustainable procurement and 20:36.070 --> 20:39.610 lifecycle practices for both hardware 20:39.620 --> 20:42.680 and personnel . Admittedly this is an 20:42.680 --> 20:44.680 area where we've been improving and 20:44.680 --> 20:46.736 frankly there was plenty of room for 20:46.736 --> 20:49.390 improvement . We cancel programs that 20:49.390 --> 20:51.690 were simply unaffordable such as the F- 20:51.690 --> 20:54.370 22 . We deem urged all of our minuteman 20:54.370 --> 20:56.830 three missiles simultaneously , making 20:56.830 --> 20:58.886 our arsenal more difficult to attack 20:59.140 --> 21:00.830 while decreasing the cost and 21:00.830 --> 21:03.560 difficulty of maintenance . And we 21:03.560 --> 21:06.350 ensured the long range health of our 21:06.350 --> 21:08.450 nuclear stockpiles by incentivizing 21:08.450 --> 21:10.940 careers at the Department of Energy for 21:10.940 --> 21:14.160 young engineers . And I might add here 21:14.160 --> 21:16.271 that despite claims to the contrary , 21:16.290 --> 21:18.401 we have remained and will continue to 21:18.401 --> 21:20.630 remain committed . Two nuclear 21:20.630 --> 21:23.540 infrastructure modernization . We must 21:23.550 --> 21:26.320 do that . We have incredible enough up 21:26.320 --> 21:28.487 to this point in history , but that is 21:28.487 --> 21:30.770 no reason to rest on our laurels . And 21:30.770 --> 21:33.820 as I said , we need a new model . So as 21:33.820 --> 21:36.070 I look to the future , I have to do the 21:36.070 --> 21:39.340 math deterrence is said to be based on 21:39.350 --> 21:42.110 a rational calculus of costs and 21:42.110 --> 21:45.210 benefits . But I graduated near the 21:45.210 --> 21:47.543 bottom of my class at the Naval Academy . 21:47.543 --> 21:50.450 So I prefer it to see as I see it as a 21:50.450 --> 21:52.810 multiplication problem as opposed to 21:52.810 --> 21:55.770 calculus in that equation 21:55.900 --> 21:59.740 deterrence is our total national 21:59.750 --> 22:02.780 capability , not just our nukes 22:03.740 --> 22:07.240 Times are national will to engage times 22:07.240 --> 22:10.650 a potential adversaries , perception of 22:10.650 --> 22:14.160 that capability and will . And if my 22:14.160 --> 22:16.130 math is right and I think it is , 22:16.360 --> 22:18.527 there's every reason to believe the US 22:18.527 --> 22:20.527 remains a good friend to our allies 22:22.640 --> 22:25.270 and a formidable foe to our enemies . 22:25.640 --> 22:27.807 And I wouldn't have it any other way . 22:29.640 --> 22:31.807 Ladies and gentlemen , I want to thank 22:31.807 --> 22:33.640 you for everything . You've done 22:33.640 --> 22:35.751 everything that you continue to do in 22:35.751 --> 22:37.751 the service of our nation . And I'm 22:37.751 --> 22:37.430 honored to have had the privilege to 22:37.430 --> 22:39.319 speak with you today . And I look 22:39.319 --> 22:41.541 forward to your questions . Thank you . 22:49.240 --> 22:53.210 Maybe two questions . Got 22:53.210 --> 22:54.988 the nerve to ask the question . 22:59.740 --> 23:00.490 Bill Perry 23:05.540 --> 23:09.260 Rose john 23:09.260 --> 23:10.670 miller are starting 23:13.040 --> 23:15.500 uh one of the uh , express my 23:15.500 --> 23:17.960 appreciation to you . People don't know 23:17.960 --> 23:20.660 the details . He mentioned how much he 23:20.670 --> 23:23.380 did engage with his counterpart , 23:23.380 --> 23:25.158 General Makarov . And it was an 23:25.158 --> 23:26.990 extraordinarily uh effective 23:27.000 --> 23:28.889 intervention , the two of them at 23:28.889 --> 23:31.056 various times in our negotiations . So 23:31.056 --> 23:33.330 word of appreciation . And as you look 23:33.340 --> 23:35.062 further down the road , you've 23:35.062 --> 23:36.896 furthered your relationship with 23:36.896 --> 23:39.550 General Makarov recently with with a 23:39.550 --> 23:42.120 number of visits you've met with him , 23:42.120 --> 23:44.490 but also among your uh your 23:44.490 --> 23:46.490 subordinates . They've been meeting 23:46.490 --> 23:48.546 with their Russian counterparts . So 23:48.546 --> 23:50.323 how do you see that military to 23:50.323 --> 23:52.434 military relationship developing from 23:52.434 --> 23:55.650 here on out the relationship that I see 23:55.660 --> 23:59.050 is quite frankly direct byproduct of 23:59.540 --> 24:01.373 the relationship between our two 24:01.373 --> 24:03.596 presidents and both of them have worked 24:03.596 --> 24:07.240 it hard . I'm at a point now 24:07.250 --> 24:10.960 where I can routinely call him if I 24:10.960 --> 24:13.250 have questions and he me and in fact , 24:13.260 --> 24:15.427 we've actually recently started a very 24:15.427 --> 24:18.400 robust set of staff talks where , so it 24:18.400 --> 24:20.456 isn't , it isn't any longer just the 24:20.456 --> 24:24.160 principles it is now some of my most 24:24.160 --> 24:26.460 senior officers who are who have 24:26.460 --> 24:28.730 established a relationship across a 24:28.730 --> 24:31.560 whole host of issues . Um and I would 24:31.570 --> 24:34.060 I'd go to to Senator Nunn's comment . I 24:34.060 --> 24:37.860 think that that the criticality 24:37.860 --> 24:41.100 of including Russia in the Euro 24:41.110 --> 24:44.340 atlantic security architecture 24:45.220 --> 24:47.276 and certainly in other ways . But my 24:47.276 --> 24:49.880 lane is security is absolutely critical . 24:49.880 --> 24:52.660 And I've been inside NATO on a lot of 24:52.660 --> 24:54.870 this as well as NATO tries to figure 24:54.870 --> 24:57.270 out what its relationship with Russia 24:57.270 --> 24:59.910 is going to be . Uh , and I think it is 24:59.910 --> 25:02.021 something leaders have to continue to 25:02.021 --> 25:04.290 focus on for many , many reasons in 25:04.290 --> 25:07.470 terms of the overall assurance of 25:07.470 --> 25:10.770 security in ways globally . 25:11.140 --> 25:14.710 And certainly in the areas that we have 25:14.710 --> 25:16.932 both focused on for many , many years . 25:19.040 --> 25:21.096 What do you think of the prospects , 25:21.440 --> 25:23.496 the ratification of the start treaty 25:23.496 --> 25:25.840 and what do you think sitting do that 25:25.840 --> 25:29.600 maybe ? What do I see of the , what do 25:29.600 --> 25:33.390 I think ? Well as 25:33.400 --> 25:35.400 always , I mean , you can certainly 25:35.400 --> 25:37.678 represent yourself to your congressman , 25:37.678 --> 25:39.511 your senators and reference your 25:39.511 --> 25:41.940 senators very specifically . It 25:41.940 --> 25:44.070 difficult to predict Secretary Perry 25:44.080 --> 25:46.247 how this is going to come out . I know 25:46.247 --> 25:49.450 it's a priority for for the president . 25:49.460 --> 25:53.210 It's something that I've said time and 25:53.210 --> 25:55.560 time again , I'm very comfortable with 25:55.940 --> 25:58.510 every aspect of it to include the 25:58.510 --> 26:00.732 reductions . We have plenty of military 26:00.732 --> 26:02.566 capability , preserves the triad 26:02.566 --> 26:05.690 invests In the nuclear infrastructure 26:05.690 --> 26:07.746 which we needed to do . There's some 26:07.746 --> 26:10.700 $80 billion dollars or so over the next 26:10.710 --> 26:13.140 decade that are invested there . And it 26:13.140 --> 26:15.270 isn't all just about investing in 26:15.340 --> 26:17.340 upgrading our facilities because we 26:17.340 --> 26:19.820 need to invest in our young people . We 26:19.820 --> 26:21.764 need to invest in our intellectual 26:22.040 --> 26:25.470 capacity and capability in this area as 26:25.470 --> 26:27.470 well . And I think there's a lot of 26:27.470 --> 26:30.200 opportunity there . So uh , and I spoke 26:30.200 --> 26:32.367 specifically the missile , the missile 26:32.367 --> 26:34.422 defence issue , the global to strike 26:34.422 --> 26:36.478 issue . You know , I'm from a from a 26:36.478 --> 26:38.256 military perspective , I'm very 26:38.256 --> 26:40.367 comfortable with the treaty and quite 26:40.367 --> 26:42.644 frankly , so are my counterparts and I , 26:42.644 --> 26:44.644 so I really , I think it's critical 26:44.644 --> 26:46.867 that we move forward . We are coming up 26:46.867 --> 26:48.756 in december , It will be one year 26:48.756 --> 26:50.422 Without anywhere to verify no 26:50.422 --> 26:53.390 connection to the Russians . Uh and 26:53.390 --> 26:55.840 these as was pointed out earlier , the 26:55.850 --> 26:57.906 two of us have 90% of the weapons in 26:57.906 --> 27:00.320 the world . Uh there's a responsibility 27:00.320 --> 27:03.950 from my perspective tied to to that 27:03.960 --> 27:06.127 that we all have . So I'm actually , I 27:06.127 --> 27:07.960 mean I'm hopeful that it will be 27:07.960 --> 27:11.670 ratified as soon as possible . Uh 27:11.680 --> 27:13.847 Probably the most significant argument 27:13.847 --> 27:16.013 I've seen against it that is out there 27:16.013 --> 27:18.069 has been the missile defense piece . 27:18.069 --> 27:20.690 And I mean as I participated in this , 27:20.700 --> 27:24.020 there there is nothing that that I see 27:24.030 --> 27:26.110 in any way , shape or form which 27:26.120 --> 27:29.450 jeopardizes our ability uh to 27:29.840 --> 27:32.007 develop missile defense capabilities . 27:32.007 --> 27:33.951 And we're doing that . I mean , we 27:33.951 --> 27:37.130 haven't slowed one bit since we uh 27:37.140 --> 27:39.860 we're engaged in this treaty . The 27:39.860 --> 27:41.971 issue of global strike . The issue of 27:41.971 --> 27:43.693 verification work very hard on 27:43.693 --> 27:45.304 verification , but number of 27:45.304 --> 27:47.570 inspections , the exchange of data And 27:47.570 --> 27:51.330 it is very robust and it's robust in 27:51.330 --> 27:53.274 particular in the world that we're 27:53.274 --> 27:56.290 living in . This is not 1991 This is 27:56.290 --> 27:59.660 2010 and that we would adjust the 27:59.660 --> 28:02.270 verification regime given where we are 28:02.270 --> 28:06.030 with the numbers uh made all the sense 28:06.030 --> 28:08.086 in the world to me , But it gives us 28:08.200 --> 28:10.256 and we're exchanging data that we've 28:10.256 --> 28:12.311 never exchanged before . So I'm very 28:12.311 --> 28:14.533 comfortable . I'm very comfortable with 28:14.533 --> 28:18.240 that . Those I think are the are the 28:18.240 --> 28:21.760 three areas that are a big concern . 28:22.840 --> 28:25.007 Several melon . We thank you very much 28:25.007 --> 28:28.060 for coming . Yeah . Finding the quest . 28:29.240 --> 28:31.240 I want you to know that here at 28:31.240 --> 28:33.510 stanford and Hoover , when somebody 28:33.510 --> 28:35.621 comes and gives a wonderful address , 28:35.621 --> 28:39.540 We believe in rich rewards . So here 28:39.540 --> 28:42.850 is a hoover ty . Hey , thanks . But 28:42.850 --> 28:46.850 even more , even more we know that your 28:46.850 --> 28:49.450 wife is here and you always have to pay 28:49.450 --> 28:51.506 attention to her . Right , Thank you 28:51.506 --> 28:53.617 George . This is a scarf that you can 28:53.617 --> 28:54.550 give her . Thank you . Thank you .