WEBVTT

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Good afternoon , This past february , I

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established a high level working group

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to review the issues associated with

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implementing a repeal of the Don't ask

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Don't tell law regarding homosexual men

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and women serving in the military and

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based on those findings , to develop

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recommendations for implementation .

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Should the law change . The working

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group has completed their work and

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today the department is releasing their

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report to the Congress and to the

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american public . Admiral mullen and I

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will briefly comment on the review's

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findings and our recommendations for

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the way ahead . We will take some

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questions . And then the working

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group's co chairs , General Counsel jeh

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johnson and army General carter ham

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will provide more detail on the report

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and answer any questions you might have

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on methodology , data and

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recommendations . When I first

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appointed Mr johnson and general ham to

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assume this duty , I did so with the

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confidence that they would undertake

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this task . With the thoroughness ,

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seriousness , professionalism , and

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objectivity befitting a task of this

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magnitude and consequence . I believe

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that a close and serious reading of

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this report will demonstrate they have

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done just that . We are grateful for

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the service they have rendered in

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taking on such a complex and

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controversial subject . The findings of

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their report reflect nearly 10 months

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of research and analysis along several

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lines of study and represent the most

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thorough and objective review ever of

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this difficult policy issue and its

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impact on the American military . First ,

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the group reached out to the force to

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better understand their views and

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attitudes about a potential repeal of

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Don't ask Don't Tell law , as was made

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clear at the time and is worth

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repeating today . This outreach was not

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a matter of taking a poll of the

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military to determine whether the law

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should be changed . The very idea of

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asking the force to in effect , vote on

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such a matter is antithetical to our

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system of government and would have

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been without precedent in the long

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history of our civilian led military .

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The President of the United States ,

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the commander in chief of the Armed

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forces made his position on this matter

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clear a position I support our job as

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the civilian and military leadership of

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the Department of Defense was to

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determine how best to prepare for such

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a change . Should the Congress changed

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the law . Nonetheless , I thought it

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critically important to engage our

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troops and their families on this issue ,

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as ultimately it will be they who will

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determine whether or not such a

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transition is successful . I believe

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that we had to learn the attitudes

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obstacles and concerns that would need

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to be addressed . Should the law be

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changed , we could do this only by

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reaching out and listening to our men

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and women in uniform and their families .

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The working group undertook this

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through a variety of means from a mass

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survey answered by tens of thousands of

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troops and their spouses . Two meetings

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with small groups and individuals

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including hearing from those discharged

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under the current law . Mr johnson and

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General Hamm will provide more detail

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on the results of the survey of troops

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and their families , But in summary , a

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strong majority of those who answered

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the survey , more than 2/3 do not

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object to gays and serpent serving

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openly in uniform . The findings

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suggest that for large segments of the

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military repeal of don't ask don't tell

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though potentially disruptive in the

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short term would not be the wrenching

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dramatic traumatic change that many

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have feared and predicted . The data

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also shows that within the combat arms

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specialties and units there is a higher

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level of discontent of discomfort and

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resistance to changing the current

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policy . Those findings and the

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potential implications for America's

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fighting forces remain a source of

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concern to the service chiefs and to me ,

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I'll discuss this later . Second , the

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working group also examined thoroughly

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all the potential changes to the

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department's regulations and policies

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dealing with matters such as benefits ,

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housing relationships within the ranks ,

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separations and discharges as the co

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chairs will explain in a few minutes .

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The majority of concerns often raised

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in association with the repeal dealing

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with sexual conduct , fraternization ,

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billeting arrangements , marital or

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survivor benefits could be governed by

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existing laws and regulations .

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Existing policies can and should be

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applied equally to homosexuals as well

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as heterosexuals . While a repeal would

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require some changes to regulations .

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The key to success as with most things

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military is training , education and

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above all . Strong and principled

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leadership up and down the chain of

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command . Third , the working group

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examined the potential impact of a

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change in the law on military readiness ,

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including the impact on unit cohesion ,

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recruiting and retention and other

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issues critical to the performance of

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the force . In my view , getting this

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category right is the most important

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thing we must do . The U . S . Armed

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forces are in the middle of two major

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military overseas campaigns , a

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complex and difficult draw down in Iraq ,

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a war in Afghanistan , both of which

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are putting extraordinary stress on

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those serving on the ground and their

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families . It is the well being of

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these brave young americans , those

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doing the fighting and the dying since

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9 11 that has guided every decision I

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have made in the pentagon since taking

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this post nearly four years ago . It

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will be no different on this issue . I

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am determined to see that if the law is

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repealed , the changes are implemented

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in such a way as to minimize any

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negative impact on the morale ,

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cohesion and effectiveness of combat

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units that are deployed about to deploy

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to the front lines with regards to

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readiness . The working group report

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concluded that overall and with

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thorough preparation and I emphasised

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thorough preparation , there is a low

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risk from repealing . Don't ask , don't

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tell . However , as I mentioned earlier ,

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the survey data showed that a higher

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proportion between 40 and 60% of those

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troops serving in predominantly all

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male combat specialties , mostly army

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and marines , but including the special

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operations formations of the Navy and

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the Air force , predicted a negative

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effect on unit cohesion from repealing

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the current law . For this reason , the

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uniform service chiefs are less

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sanguine about the working than the

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working group about the level of risk

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of repeal with regard to combat

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readiness . The views of the chiefs

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were sought out and taken seriously by

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me and by the authors of this report .

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The chiefs will also have the

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opportunity to explain their to provide

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their expert military advice to the

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Congress as they have to me and to the

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president . Their perspective deserves

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serious attention and consideration as

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it reflects the judgment of decades of

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experience and the sentiment of many

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senior officers in my view , the

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concerns of combat troops as expressed

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in the survey , do not present an

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insurmountable barrier to successful

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repeal of don't ask don't tell . This

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can be done and should be done without

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posing a serious risk to military

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readiness . However , these findings do

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lead me to conclude that an abundance

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of care and preparation is required if

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we are to avoid a disruptive and

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potentially dangerous impact on the

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performance of those serving at the tip

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of the spear in America's wars . This

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brings me to my recommendations on the

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way ahead . Earlier this year , the

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House of Representatives passed

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legislation that would repeal Don't ask

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Don't tell after a number of steps take

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place . The last being certification by

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the President Secretary of Defense and

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the chairman that the new policies and

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regulations were consistent with the U .

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S . Military standards of readiness

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effectiveness , unit cohesion and

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recruiting and retention . Now that we

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have completed this review , I strongly

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urge the Senate to pass this

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legislation and send it to the

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President for signature before the end

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of this year . I believe this is a

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matter of some urgency because as we

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have seen in the past year , the

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federal courts are increasingly

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becoming involved in this issue . Just

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a few weeks ago , one lower court

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ruling forced the department into an

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abrupt series of changes . There were

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no doubt confusing and distracting to

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men and women in the ranks . It is only

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a matter of time before the federal

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courts are drawn once more into the

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fray with the very real possibility

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that this change would be imposed

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immediately by judicial fiat by far the

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most disruptive and damaging scenario I

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can imagine and one of the most

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hazardous to military morale readiness

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and battlefield performance . Therefore ,

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it is important that this change come

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via legislative means that is

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legislation informed by the review .

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Just completed . What is needed is a

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process that allows for a well prepared

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and well considered implementation

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above all , a process that carries the

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imprimatur of the elected

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representatives of the people of the

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United States . Given the present

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circumstances , those that choose not

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to act legislatively are rolling the

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dice that this policy will not be

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abruptly overturned by the courts . The

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legislation presently before the

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Congress would authorize a repeal of

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the Don't ask Don't tell pending the

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certification by the president's

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Secretary of defense and the chairman .

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It would not harm military readiness .

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Nonetheless , I believe that it would

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be unwise to push ahead with full

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implementation of repeal before more

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can be done to prepare the force in

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particular those ground combat

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specialties and units for what could be

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a disruptive and disorienting change .

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The working group's plan with a strong

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emphasis on education , training and

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leader development provides a solid

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road map for a successful full

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implementation of repeal , assuming

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that the military has given sufficient

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time and preparation to get the job

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done right . The department has already

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made a number of changes to regulations

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that within existing law applied more

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exacting standards to procedures

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investigating or separating troops for

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suspected homosexual conduct , changes

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that have added a measure of common

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sense and decency to illegally and

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morally fraught process . I would close

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on a personal note and a personal

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appeal . This is the second time that I

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have dealt with this issue as a leader

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in public life . The prior case being

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in CIA 1992 , when I directed that

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openly gay applicants be treated like

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all other applicants . That is whether

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as individuals , they met our

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competitive standards . That was , and

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is a situation significantly different

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in circumstance and consequence than

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confronting than that confronting the

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United States Armed forces today views

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toward gay and americans have changed

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considerably during this period and

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have grown more accepting since . Don't

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ask Don't tell was first enacted , but

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feelings on this matter can still run

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deep and divide often starkly along

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demographic , cultural and generational

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lines , not only in society as a whole ,

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but in the uniform ranks as well . For

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this reason , I would ask as Congress

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takes on this debate for all involved

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to resist the urge to lure our troops

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and their families into the politics of

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this issue . What is called for is a

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careful and considered approach , an

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approach that to the extent possible

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welcomes all who are qualified and

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capable of serving their country in

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uniform , but one that does not

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undermine out of haste or dogmatism ,

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those attributes that make the U . S .

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Military the finest fighting force in

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the world . The stakes are too high for

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a nation under threat for a military at

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war to do any less . Admiral , thank

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you Secretary . I too wish to thank jeh

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johnson and carter ham as well as

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everyone involved in the working group

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for their extraordinary efforts . Over

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much of the past year , I fully endorse

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their report , its findings and the

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implementation plan recommended by the

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working group , the working group was

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given a tall order . Indeed , nothing

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less than producing the first truly

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comprehensive assessment of not only

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the impact repeal of the law governing .

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Don't ask . Don't tell but also about

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how best to implement a new policy

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across the joint force as the secretary

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indicated . The working group surveyed

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our troops and their spouses ,

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consulted proponents and opponents of

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repeal and examined military experience

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around the world . They also spoke with

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serving gays and as well as former

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members of the military who are gay and .

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The result is one of the most expansive

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studies ever done on military personnel

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issues and I applaud the time that was

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taken to arrive at solid defensible

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conclusions . More critically . I was

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gratified to see that the working group

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focused their findings and

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recommendations rightly on those who

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would be most affected by a change in

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the law , our people , all of our

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people and so for the first time , the

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Chiefs and I have more than just

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anecdotal evidence and hearsay to

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inform the advice we give our civilian

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leaders . We've discussed this issue

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extensively amongst ourselves and with

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the secretary and the Chiefs and I met

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with the president as recently as

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yesterday . I only want to add three

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points to what the secretary has

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already laid out first . I think it's

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noteworthy that the working group found

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strong leadership to be the single most

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important factor in implementing any

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repeal . That may sound fairly obvious ,

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but it is a key critical point . We all

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have our opinions and those opinions

14:49.376 --> 14:51.590
matter . This is without question , a

14:51.590 --> 14:55.070
complex social and cultural issue , but

14:55.070 --> 14:57.126
at the end of the day , whatever the

14:57.126 --> 14:59.348
decision of our elected leaders , maybe

14:59.348 --> 15:01.348
we in uniform have an obligation to

15:01.348 --> 15:04.000
follow orders when those orders involve

15:04.000 --> 15:07.080
significant change such as this ? Would

15:07.090 --> 15:09.340
we need to find ways to lead the way

15:09.340 --> 15:12.100
forward ? Our troops and their families

15:12.110 --> 15:14.540
expect that from us . And I think the

15:14.540 --> 15:17.380
american people do as well .

15:17.390 --> 15:19.790
Second we've heard loud and clear that

15:19.790 --> 15:21.960
our troops also expect us to maintain

15:21.970 --> 15:24.640
high standards of conduct and

15:24.640 --> 15:26.970
professionalism both as we move forward

15:26.970 --> 15:30.150
in this debate and should repeal occur ,

15:30.740 --> 15:32.620
we treat people with dignity and

15:32.620 --> 15:36.020
respect in the armed forces or we don't

15:36.020 --> 15:39.120
last long , no special cases , no

15:39.120 --> 15:41.650
special treatment . We're going to

15:41.650 --> 15:43.594
continue to comport ourselves with

15:43.594 --> 15:45.650
honor and hold ourselves accountable

15:45.650 --> 15:48.270
across the board to impeccably high

15:48.270 --> 15:51.060
standards , repeal or no repeal .

15:52.640 --> 15:54.862
Finally , the report shows that however

15:54.862 --> 15:57.050
low the overall risk of repeal maybe

15:57.050 --> 15:59.390
with respect to readiness , cohesion

15:59.390 --> 16:01.600
and retention . It is not without its

16:01.600 --> 16:03.980
challenges . We can best address those

16:03.980 --> 16:05.924
challenges by having it within our

16:05.924 --> 16:08.147
power and our prerogative to manage the

16:08.147 --> 16:10.810
implementation process ourselves .

16:10.820 --> 16:13.700
Should repeal occur . I share the

16:13.700 --> 16:15.811
Secretary's desire that it come about

16:15.811 --> 16:18.340
through legislation through the same

16:18.340 --> 16:20.510
process with which the law was enacted

16:20.920 --> 16:23.050
rather than precipitously through the

16:23.050 --> 16:25.750
courts . I further hope that such

16:25.750 --> 16:27.972
debate in the Congress will be as fully

16:27.972 --> 16:30.139
informed by the good work done in this

16:30.139 --> 16:32.590
report as my advice to the secretary

16:32.600 --> 16:35.350
and to the president is Thank you .

16:37.410 --> 16:39.521
He said it would be unwise to proceed

16:39.521 --> 16:41.243
with repeal until there's more

16:41.243 --> 16:44.330
groundwork . How long do you envision

16:44.330 --> 16:46.920
that process lasting ? And is this a

16:46.920 --> 16:48.976
concern and a recommendation that is

16:48.976 --> 16:52.360
shared by the White House ? Uh As far

16:52.360 --> 16:55.360
as once Congress acts , they're still

16:55.360 --> 16:58.300
being a period in which the policy is

16:58.300 --> 17:00.300
in place abnormal . And do you also

17:00.300 --> 17:02.420
share that recommendation ? Well ,

17:02.420 --> 17:04.587
first of all , just to be clear , what

17:04.587 --> 17:06.753
we're talking about is that should the

17:06.753 --> 17:10.530
Congress vote to repeal the law , what

17:10.530 --> 17:12.560
we are asking for is the time

17:12.570 --> 17:15.460
subsequent to that to prepare

17:15.840 --> 17:19.450
adequately before the changes

17:19.450 --> 17:21.950
implemented in the force ? How long

17:21.950 --> 17:24.560
that would take frankly , I don't know

17:25.920 --> 17:29.050
there is the report as you will see in

17:29.050 --> 17:32.420
the in the implementation plan

17:32.840 --> 17:35.960
lays out an ambitious agenda of things

17:35.960 --> 17:38.182
that need to be done including not only

17:38.182 --> 17:40.940
leadership training but training Of a

17:40.950 --> 17:42.894
military force of over two million

17:42.894 --> 17:46.540
people . I would say this . I think

17:46.550 --> 17:48.772
we all would expect that if this law is

17:48.772 --> 17:51.090
implemented , the President would be

17:51.090 --> 17:54.830
watch is if repeal his past . The

17:54.830 --> 17:56.663
President would be watching very

17:56.663 --> 17:58.830
closely to ensure that we don't dawdle

17:58.830 --> 18:02.180
or try to slow roll this . So I think

18:02.180 --> 18:04.980
his expectation would be that we would

18:04.980 --> 18:08.000
prepare as quickly as we properly and

18:08.000 --> 18:11.500
comprehensively could and then we would

18:11.500 --> 18:13.500
be in a position to move toward the

18:13.500 --> 18:15.722
certification , but how long that would

18:15.722 --> 18:19.410
take . I think , I don't know there

18:19.410 --> 18:21.632
will be , there is a level of risk here

18:21.632 --> 18:23.930
is laid out in the report and I I would

18:23.930 --> 18:26.280
hope you spend as much time on the

18:26.280 --> 18:29.020
implementation plan as a report because

18:29.020 --> 18:32.270
implementation plan , certainly from

18:32.270 --> 18:35.130
all the military leadership is strongly

18:35.130 --> 18:37.670
endorsed should this law change . And

18:37.670 --> 18:40.130
it is in that implementation plan that

18:40.140 --> 18:43.520
the risk levels are mitigated and

18:43.520 --> 18:45.970
principally mitigated through

18:45.970 --> 18:48.081
leadership , certainly the training ,

18:48.081 --> 18:50.137
the guidance , but the engagement of

18:50.137 --> 18:52.248
the leadership and having enough time

18:52.248 --> 18:55.810
to do that is critically important . As

18:55.810 --> 18:57.840
we would look at implementation .

18:57.850 --> 19:00.940
That's what really mitigates any risk

19:00.950 --> 19:04.900
that's out there . Mhm . Um you said

19:04.900 --> 19:07.130
that she's are less sanguine . They've

19:07.130 --> 19:11.120
been working uh what specifically have

19:11.120 --> 19:14.000
they told you about their concerns and

19:14.000 --> 19:16.670
why in time of war except anyone

19:17.040 --> 19:20.650
increase in the level . Well ,

19:20.660 --> 19:22.882
the chiefs will speak for themselves on

19:22.882 --> 19:25.660
friday and the chairman has spent much

19:25.660 --> 19:29.520
more time with them that I have on

19:29.520 --> 19:31.631
this . I think , I think it's fair to

19:31.631 --> 19:35.090
say that there are concerns revolve

19:35.090 --> 19:38.960
around Stress on the force after

19:38.960 --> 19:40.560
nearly 10 years of war .

19:41.980 --> 19:45.080
And and I think they are concerned

19:45.090 --> 19:47.860
about the higher levels of

19:48.340 --> 19:51.850
negative response from the ground

19:51.850 --> 19:55.080
combat units and a special special

19:55.080 --> 19:57.302
operations units that I've talked about

19:57.302 --> 20:01.150
in my in my remarks , I

20:01.160 --> 20:03.920
think that I would just like to go back

20:03.920 --> 20:06.590
and underscore the chairman's point and

20:06.590 --> 20:10.140
that is the level of risk is

20:10.150 --> 20:13.550
tied intimately to the quality of

20:13.790 --> 20:16.770
preparation and

20:16.780 --> 20:20.700
uh to do this . So I guess I would put

20:20.700 --> 20:22.922
it this way if a court ordered us to do

20:22.922 --> 20:25.770
this tomorrow . I believe the force ,

20:25.780 --> 20:29.630
the risk to the force would be high if

20:29.630 --> 20:32.760
we had no time to prepare . If we have

20:32.760 --> 20:35.200
plenty of time to prepare the force to

20:35.200 --> 20:37.790
prepare the leadership . I think the

20:37.790 --> 20:40.330
more effectively we do that preparation ,

20:40.430 --> 20:43.690
the lower the risk that I've engaged

20:43.700 --> 20:45.940
actually many , many times with the

20:45.940 --> 20:48.107
chiefs or the class over the last many

20:48.107 --> 20:50.218
months . And so we've had very , very

20:50.218 --> 20:52.273
extensive discussions about this and

20:52.340 --> 20:56.050
from the standpoint of a

20:56.060 --> 20:58.680
change in the law , my perspective is

20:58.690 --> 21:02.470
as what I would call my certainly

21:02.470 --> 21:04.359
was my personal opinion is now my

21:04.359 --> 21:07.820
professional view that this is a policy

21:07.820 --> 21:09.931
change that we can make and we can do

21:09.931 --> 21:13.920
it in a in a relatively low risk

21:13.920 --> 21:16.100
fashion given the time and given the

21:16.100 --> 21:18.156
ability to mitigate whatever risk is

21:18.156 --> 21:20.267
out there through strong leadership .

21:20.280 --> 21:24.000
In fact , part of this is the fact

21:24.000 --> 21:27.110
that we have been at war for so long .

21:27.120 --> 21:29.720
We have one of the discussions about

21:29.720 --> 21:31.887
this is affecting combat effectiveness

21:31.887 --> 21:34.950
or combat readiness . I've never

21:35.740 --> 21:37.907
been associated with a better military

21:37.907 --> 21:39.940
than we are right now and better

21:39.950 --> 21:42.320
military leaders and I have tremendous

21:42.320 --> 21:44.470
confidence that should should this

21:44.470 --> 21:46.192
change that they'll be able to

21:46.192 --> 21:48.200
implement it very specifically .

21:48.880 --> 21:52.340
Again , the Chiefs will speak for

21:52.340 --> 21:55.130
themselves on friday Secretary , you

21:55.130 --> 21:57.352
raised the issue of combat arms and the

21:57.352 --> 22:00.760
report shows that of those polled 50%

22:00.760 --> 22:03.830
an army combat arms are opposed 60% and

22:03.830 --> 22:06.660
marine combat arms . Uh , there's also

22:06.660 --> 22:08.716
the issue of chaplains to the report

22:08.716 --> 22:10.827
says that this very strong opposition

22:10.827 --> 22:12.827
among the Chaplain's here as well .

22:12.827 --> 22:15.049
What would you say to both groups ? How

22:15.049 --> 22:16.993
would you deal with this with both

22:16.993 --> 22:19.160
groups ? Well , the interesting one of

22:19.160 --> 22:22.830
the other considerations in this , that

22:22.840 --> 22:26.200
the report revealed is even in combat

22:26.200 --> 22:28.360
arms units ,

22:30.010 --> 22:33.690
those who among those who believed they

22:33.690 --> 22:37.060
had served with a gay person before .

22:38.740 --> 22:42.020
The level of comfort with going forward

22:42.030 --> 22:46.020
was something like 90% . So part of

22:46.020 --> 22:49.360
this is a question of ,

22:49.840 --> 22:53.450
of unfamiliarity , Part of it is

22:53.460 --> 22:56.270
stereotypes . Um ,

22:57.010 --> 23:00.060
and part of it is , is just sort of

23:00.500 --> 23:04.270
inherent resistance to change when ,

23:04.640 --> 23:06.862
when you don't know what's on the other

23:06.862 --> 23:10.170
side . And so I think I think that

23:10.180 --> 23:14.140
the contrast between the significant

23:14.140 --> 23:17.400
levels of concern for those who had ,

23:17.410 --> 23:19.410
who said they had never served with

23:19.410 --> 23:21.632
someone who was gay as opposed to those

23:21.632 --> 23:24.570
who had is is an important

23:24.570 --> 23:27.330
consideration . But what I would say to

23:27.330 --> 23:31.000
them is frankly , if the

23:31.000 --> 23:33.056
Congress of the United States repeal

23:33.056 --> 23:35.540
this law , this is the will of the

23:35.540 --> 23:38.150
american people and you are the

23:38.150 --> 23:41.440
american military and we will do this

23:41.520 --> 23:45.430
and we will do it right and we will

23:45.430 --> 23:48.700
do everything in our power to mitigate

23:48.710 --> 23:51.290
the concerns that you have . Yeah ,

23:52.840 --> 23:55.180
the same time . A very large number

23:55.190 --> 23:57.270
view homosexuality as a sin or

23:57.270 --> 23:59.490
abomination . And the report and the

23:59.490 --> 24:01.601
report identifies that the chaplain's

24:01.601 --> 24:04.800
already serve in a force many of whose

24:04.800 --> 24:07.440
members do not share their values who

24:07.440 --> 24:10.790
do not share their beliefs . And there

24:10.790 --> 24:14.320
is an obligation to care for all . But

24:14.320 --> 24:16.542
it also is clear that the chaplains are

24:16.542 --> 24:18.660
not going to be asked to teach

24:18.660 --> 24:21.410
something . They don't believe it . And

24:21.420 --> 24:24.510
so I think that I think the report is

24:24.510 --> 24:28.100
pretty clear on them . Thank you . Uh ,

24:28.110 --> 24:31.010
don't ask questions . Wikileaks post

24:31.010 --> 24:33.430
wikileaks reaction , What's your sense ?

24:33.430 --> 24:35.541
And whether the information sharing ,

24:35.541 --> 24:37.763
climate and environment created after 9

24:37.763 --> 24:40.120
11 to encourage greater cooperation and

24:40.130 --> 24:42.130
transparency among the intelligence

24:42.130 --> 24:44.130
communities and the military led to

24:44.130 --> 24:46.019
these three massive don't buy dad

24:46.019 --> 24:48.074
adults . And how concerned are , you

24:48.074 --> 24:50.241
know , there may be an overreaction to

24:50.241 --> 24:52.241
clamp down on information dispersal

24:52.540 --> 24:55.360
because of the disclosures .

24:56.440 --> 24:59.330
One of the common themes that I heard

24:59.330 --> 25:02.710
from the time I was A senior agency

25:02.710 --> 25:05.360
official in the early 1980s in every

25:05.360 --> 25:08.860
military engagement we were in

25:09.440 --> 25:11.273
was the complaint of the lack of

25:11.273 --> 25:14.610
adequate intelligence support . Uh ,

25:14.620 --> 25:17.760
that began to change With the Gulf War

25:17.760 --> 25:20.950
in 1991 . But it really has changed

25:20.950 --> 25:24.240
dramatically after 911 . And clearly

25:24.240 --> 25:28.140
the finding that the lack of sharing

25:28.140 --> 25:30.180
of information had prevented people

25:30.180 --> 25:32.360
from quote unquote connecting the dots

25:32.830 --> 25:34.920
lead to much wider sharing of

25:34.920 --> 25:37.300
information . And I would say

25:37.300 --> 25:40.580
especially wider sharing of information

25:40.590 --> 25:43.440
at the front so that no one at the

25:43.440 --> 25:45.540
front was denied and one of the

25:45.540 --> 25:47.960
theaters Afghanistan or Iraq was denied

25:48.340 --> 25:51.710
any information that might

25:51.720 --> 25:54.710
possibly be helpful too . Now obviously

25:54.890 --> 25:57.330
that aperture went too wide . There's

25:57.330 --> 26:01.290
no reason for a young officer at a

26:01.300 --> 26:04.600
forward operating post in Afghanistan

26:04.610 --> 26:06.710
to get cables having to do with the

26:06.710 --> 26:09.880
start negotiations and so we've taken a

26:09.880 --> 26:12.070
number of mitigating steps in the

26:12.070 --> 26:14.180
department . I directed a number of

26:14.180 --> 26:17.660
these things to be undertaken in august

26:18.140 --> 26:21.670
uh first the automatic

26:21.680 --> 26:23.510
automated capability to monitor

26:23.510 --> 26:26.560
workstations for security purposes .

26:26.940 --> 26:29.730
We've got about 60% of this done mostly

26:29.730 --> 26:33.500
in mostly stateside and I've directed

26:33.500 --> 26:35.833
that we accelerate the completion of it .

26:36.040 --> 26:38.600
Second , as I think , you know , we've

26:38.600 --> 26:41.040
taken steps in centcom in september and

26:41.040 --> 26:44.460
now everywhere to direct that

26:44.470 --> 26:47.140
all cD and

26:47.140 --> 26:50.950
DVD right capability off the

26:50.950 --> 26:54.860
network be disabled . Um

26:54.870 --> 26:57.230
we have we have done some other things

26:57.230 --> 27:00.270
in terms of two man policies wherever

27:00.270 --> 27:02.240
you can move information from a

27:02.250 --> 27:04.306
classified system to an unclassified

27:04.306 --> 27:07.620
system To have a two person a policy

27:07.620 --> 27:10.420
there and then we have some longer term

27:10.430 --> 27:12.860
efforts under way in which we can take

27:12.870 --> 27:14.648
in first of all in which we can

27:14.648 --> 27:18.640
identify anomalies from sort of

27:18.640 --> 27:20.696
like credit card companies do in the

27:20.696 --> 27:22.529
use of computer and then finally

27:22.529 --> 27:25.640
efforts to actually taylor as

27:25.650 --> 27:28.830
access depending on roles but let me

27:28.830 --> 27:32.010
say let me address the latter part of

27:32.010 --> 27:34.800
your question . This is obviously a

27:34.810 --> 27:37.260
massive dump of information . First of

27:37.260 --> 27:39.371
all I would say , unlike the pentagon

27:39.371 --> 27:41.680
papers , one of the things that is

27:41.680 --> 27:43.680
important . I think in all of these

27:43.680 --> 27:45.680
releases , whether it's Afghanistan

27:45.680 --> 27:48.270
Iraq or the releases this week

27:49.140 --> 27:51.560
is the lack of any significant

27:51.560 --> 27:53.282
difference between what the US

27:53.282 --> 27:55.504
government says publicly and what these

27:55.504 --> 27:57.671
things show privately . Whereas in the

27:57.671 --> 28:00.120
pentagon papers showed that many in the

28:00.120 --> 28:02.231
government were not only lying to the

28:02.231 --> 28:04.120
american people , they were lying

28:04.120 --> 28:06.330
themselves . Um but let me , let me

28:06.330 --> 28:08.552
just offer some perspective of somebody

28:08.552 --> 28:10.950
who's been at this a long time . Um

28:11.340 --> 28:13.340
every other government in the world

28:13.340 --> 28:15.284
knows the United States government

28:15.284 --> 28:18.150
leaks like a sieve and it has for a

28:18.150 --> 28:21.480
long time . And I dragged this up the

28:21.480 --> 28:25.080
other day when I was looking at some of

28:25.080 --> 28:27.290
these prospective releases , there's a

28:27.290 --> 28:30.200
quote from john Adams , how can a

28:30.200 --> 28:32.560
government go on publishing all their

28:32.560 --> 28:34.860
negotiations with foreign nations ? I

28:34.860 --> 28:37.620
know not to me , it appears as

28:37.620 --> 28:40.270
dangerous and pernicious as it is novel .

28:41.440 --> 28:44.230
When we went to real congressional

28:44.230 --> 28:46.063
oversight of intelligence in the

28:46.063 --> 28:49.170
mid-70s , there was a broad view that

28:49.170 --> 28:51.281
no other Foreign Intelligence service

28:51.281 --> 28:53.337
would ever share information with us

28:53.337 --> 28:55.503
again , if we were going to share it ,

28:55.503 --> 28:57.614
all of the Congress . The spheres all

28:57.614 --> 29:00.060
proved unfounded . Now , I've heard the

29:00.070 --> 29:03.290
impact of these releases on our foreign

29:03.290 --> 29:07.230
policy described as as a meltdown as

29:07.240 --> 29:10.430
a , as a game changer and so on . I

29:10.430 --> 29:12.770
think I think those descriptions are

29:13.240 --> 29:16.860
fairly significantly overwrought . Um

29:17.440 --> 29:19.551
the fact is governments deal with the

29:19.551 --> 29:21.551
United States because it's in their

29:21.551 --> 29:23.662
interest , not because they like us ,

29:23.662 --> 29:25.551
not because they trust us and not

29:25.551 --> 29:27.384
because they believe we can keep

29:27.384 --> 29:30.410
secrets . Many government , some

29:30.410 --> 29:32.521
governments deal with us because they

29:32.521 --> 29:35.220
fear us some because they respect us

29:35.740 --> 29:38.400
most because they need us . We are

29:38.400 --> 29:41.210
still essentially , as has been said

29:41.210 --> 29:44.060
before , the indispensable nation . So

29:44.060 --> 29:46.060
other nations will continue to deal

29:46.060 --> 29:48.116
with us . They will continue to work

29:48.116 --> 29:50.116
with us . We will continue to share

29:50.116 --> 29:52.393
sensitive information with one another .

29:52.940 --> 29:55.310
Is this , is this embarrassing ? Yes .

29:55.320 --> 29:58.970
Is it awkward ? Yes , consequences for

29:58.970 --> 30:01.220
us . Foreign policy . I think fairly

30:01.220 --> 30:03.610
modest . Thank God . Just on that same

30:03.610 --> 30:05.721
subject , did either of you reach out

30:05.721 --> 30:07.666
to any of your counterparts and in

30:07.666 --> 30:09.777
advance of this week and warn them or

30:09.777 --> 30:11.721
even apologize in advance for what

30:11.721 --> 30:15.520
might come out ? I didn't , I did to

30:15.530 --> 30:19.110
General Kiani in Pakistan . Yeah . You

30:19.110 --> 30:21.700
said that . I'm gonna tell you said

30:21.700 --> 30:24.570
that now is the time to do this largely

30:24.570 --> 30:26.792
because of the threat of legal action .

30:26.792 --> 30:29.014
I'm just wondering if that legal action

30:29.014 --> 30:32.520
wasn't looming ? How much you think

30:32.520 --> 30:34.687
that this , this is the right thing to

30:34.687 --> 30:36.687
do now ? And I'm wondering just how

30:36.687 --> 30:40.130
hard you intend to lobby those hill to

30:40.130 --> 30:42.186
get them to sway to the other side ?

30:42.186 --> 30:46.120
Well , yeah , I don't

30:46.120 --> 30:48.064
spend much time thinking about the

30:48.064 --> 30:51.650
world as I wish it were . The reality

30:51.650 --> 30:54.750
is the court issue is out there and in

30:54.750 --> 30:58.470
my view does lend urgency to this .

30:58.940 --> 31:02.680
Um you know , the question has been

31:02.680 --> 31:04.847
raised , well , maybe the courts would

31:04.847 --> 31:06.791
give us time to which my answer is

31:06.791 --> 31:10.060
maybe , maybe not . We just don't know .

31:10.540 --> 31:12.800
But the one path we know gives us the

31:12.800 --> 31:15.070
time and the flexibility to do this is

31:15.070 --> 31:17.292
the legislative path . And I don't know

31:17.292 --> 31:19.403
how fast the courts are going to move

31:19.403 --> 31:21.570
on this . But what we've seen is seems

31:21.570 --> 31:23.459
to be more and more action in the

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courts in the last year or two . And

31:26.690 --> 31:28.912
that's what gives me a sense of urgency

31:28.912 --> 31:32.700
about my greatest fear is what almost

31:32.700 --> 31:35.090
happened to us in october and that is

31:35.090 --> 31:37.090
being told to implement a change of

31:37.090 --> 31:40.680
policy overnight . Secretary

31:40.690 --> 31:43.420
uh Senator McCain is now arguing that

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this report is the wrong report and

31:45.420 --> 31:47.587
that it won't get to the bottom of how

31:47.587 --> 31:49.587
this could repeal could affect unit

31:49.587 --> 31:51.753
cohesion and morale . I'm wondering if

31:51.753 --> 31:53.587
you were Admiral mullen have any

31:53.587 --> 31:57.060
reaction to that response to the report ?

31:58.240 --> 32:00.640
Well , I think I think that in this

32:00.640 --> 32:03.790
respect and I obviously have a lot of

32:03.790 --> 32:06.790
admiration and respect for Senator

32:06.790 --> 32:09.530
McCain , but in this respect , I think

32:09.530 --> 32:11.419
that he's mistaken . I think this

32:11.419 --> 32:15.050
report does provide a sound basis

32:15.440 --> 32:18.260
for making decisions on this law . Now ,

32:18.260 --> 32:20.440
people can draw different conclusions

32:20.440 --> 32:23.670
out of this report . The comments for

32:23.670 --> 32:26.020
example and the evaluation and the

32:26.020 --> 32:29.130
report of the higher levels of concern

32:29.130 --> 32:32.710
for among the combat arms units and the

32:32.710 --> 32:34.970
Marine Corps and so on . So people can

32:34.970 --> 32:37.030
read this and potentially come to

32:37.030 --> 32:39.252
different conclusions . But in terms of

32:39.252 --> 32:41.410
the data And in terms of the views of

32:41.410 --> 32:44.640
the force , it's hard for me to imagine

32:44.650 --> 32:47.640
that you could come up with a more

32:47.640 --> 32:51.180
comprehensive approach . We had , we

32:51.180 --> 32:53.150
had something on the order of

32:53.150 --> 32:55.850
145,000

32:57.140 --> 33:00.760
People in uniform answer the

33:00.770 --> 33:04.140
questionnaire , the survey , we had

33:04.150 --> 33:07.160
something on the order of 40 to 45,000

33:07.160 --> 33:10.980
spouses respond to the syrup to that

33:10.980 --> 33:14.400
survey , tens of thousands of people

33:14.410 --> 33:16.510
reached in other ways . So I think

33:16.510 --> 33:20.400
there is no comparable source of

33:20.400 --> 33:23.130
information or data on attitudes in the

33:23.130 --> 33:27.000
force than this report . And it's hard

33:27.000 --> 33:30.360
for me to imagine another effort

33:30.840 --> 33:33.600
taking a much different approach than

33:33.610 --> 33:36.390
this report did and and its main thrust

33:36.390 --> 33:39.660
was on combat effectiveness , mission

33:39.660 --> 33:42.480
effectiveness readiness , cohesion

33:42.480 --> 33:46.070
etcetera . And the data again argue the

33:46.070 --> 33:48.480
secretary , you can certainly pick

33:48.480 --> 33:51.300
parts of it that that read , you might

33:51.300 --> 33:53.411
want to read differently but the data

33:53.411 --> 33:55.840
is very compelling in particular with

33:55.840 --> 33:57.951
respect to those issues . I mean that

33:57.951 --> 34:01.290
was the main reason for the report . I

34:01.300 --> 34:03.411
wonder if you could talk a little bit

34:03.411 --> 34:05.300
more about how you would see this

34:05.300 --> 34:07.970
implemented and what you mean by giving

34:07.970 --> 34:11.210
time . For example , would you say

34:11.220 --> 34:15.070
not have openly if this law

34:15.070 --> 34:17.770
has changed , would you not put openly

34:17.770 --> 34:19.992
gay service members into units that are

34:19.992 --> 34:22.690
about to deploy to Afghanistan in 2011

34:22.690 --> 34:25.180
or so , Would you , would you take ,

34:25.250 --> 34:27.640
would you integrate the non combat arms

34:27.640 --> 34:29.751
units first ? I mean , what could you

34:29.751 --> 34:31.807
describe a little bit more what your

34:31.807 --> 34:33.918
implementation plan would be ? Well ,

34:33.918 --> 34:37.520
first of all , um mm the

34:37.530 --> 34:41.530
repeal of the law would not ,

34:41.540 --> 34:43.484
as I understand it now , I'm not a

34:43.484 --> 34:45.850
lawyer but as I understand it and maybe

34:45.850 --> 34:47.961
jay johnson can address this question

34:47.961 --> 34:50.017
for you more authoritatively when he

34:50.017 --> 34:52.294
comes up here . But as I understand it ,

34:52.294 --> 34:55.960
until we certify , tell the president ,

34:56.340 --> 34:58.451
Secretary of defense and the Chairman

34:58.451 --> 35:00.451
of the Joint Chiefs certify that we

35:00.451 --> 35:02.562
that the U . S . Military is ready to

35:02.562 --> 35:06.280
implement the law , the repeal , the

35:06.280 --> 35:09.330
existing currently existing rules would

35:09.330 --> 35:12.670
continue to apply . And so you would

35:12.670 --> 35:15.020
have a period of preparation if you

35:15.020 --> 35:19.000
will . Uh that as I indicated earlier ,

35:19.000 --> 35:21.167
I don't know necessarily how long that

35:21.167 --> 35:24.440
would take Julian Julian . From my

35:24.440 --> 35:27.550
perspective , we are one military . We

35:27.550 --> 35:30.670
are one military . Two more questions ,

35:31.450 --> 35:33.561
you've spoken quite clearly about how

35:33.561 --> 35:35.783
you support the president's position on

35:35.783 --> 35:37.894
this and how you're urging the Senate

35:37.894 --> 35:40.117
to act and how this needs to be done in

35:40.117 --> 35:42.228
an orderly and measured way . But you

35:42.228 --> 35:44.228
haven't seen so much overtime about

35:44.228 --> 35:46.172
your personal beliefs on don't ask

35:46.172 --> 35:48.339
don't tell do you feel personally that

35:48.339 --> 35:50.506
it's been unjust or wrong for gays and

35:50.506 --> 35:52.450
not be able to serve their country

35:52.450 --> 35:54.617
openly or are you comfortable with the

35:54.617 --> 35:56.950
idea of openly integrating the military ?

35:57.540 --> 36:00.950
I think that in my

36:02.930 --> 36:06.320
yeah , one of the things that is most

36:06.320 --> 36:09.360
important to me , his personal

36:09.360 --> 36:12.550
integrity and

36:13.830 --> 36:16.550
and a hey

36:17.030 --> 36:20.240
policy or a law that

36:21.520 --> 36:24.740
in effect requires people to lie . Mhm

36:25.130 --> 36:28.850
gives me , gives me a problem . Um

36:29.530 --> 36:33.110
and so I think it's , I mean we spend a

36:33.110 --> 36:35.910
lot of time in the military talking

36:35.910 --> 36:38.960
about integrity and honor uh

36:39.730 --> 36:43.470
and values , I am telling the

36:43.470 --> 36:46.220
truth is a pretty important value in

36:46.220 --> 36:48.430
that scale . It's a very important

36:48.430 --> 36:50.250
value . And so for me ,

36:51.880 --> 36:54.330
and I thought the Admiral was that

36:54.330 --> 36:56.330
Admiral mullen was eloquent on this

36:56.330 --> 36:58.980
last february . A policy that requires

36:58.980 --> 37:02.790
people to lie about themselves somehow ,

37:02.790 --> 37:04.901
it seems to me fundamentally flawed .

37:05.330 --> 37:08.160
Last question . Earlier in the process ,

37:08.170 --> 37:10.340
General Conway , when raising concerns

37:10.340 --> 37:12.640
about this , close the idea of separate

37:12.650 --> 37:14.650
barracks and said that , you know ,

37:14.650 --> 37:16.483
marines might not be comfortable

37:16.483 --> 37:18.817
sharing barracks with openly gay troops .

37:18.817 --> 37:20.872
Is that even on the table or is that

37:20.872 --> 37:22.928
with the idea of separate barracks ,

37:22.928 --> 37:25.039
separate housing , separate showers ,

37:25.039 --> 37:27.206
just so we can get into the details of

37:27.206 --> 37:29.372
that ? Or you can with jay and general

37:29.372 --> 37:31.594
ham . But the bottom line of the report

37:31.594 --> 37:34.830
is no separate facilities . Thank

37:34.830 --> 37:37.950
you . Mhm

