WEBVTT

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the marines and sailors of regimental

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combat team six and subordinate

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battalions have been conducting

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operation jaws in the Helmand province

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for three months . I would describe

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operation jaws as regimental combat

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team Sixes bid for success in a a

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Tripoli . Um , the area of

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responsibility that we have in , in

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northern Helmand province , in

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Afghanistan out in the sheer um , we

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don't really have enough people to the

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garrison that full time . So it's a

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major safe haven for the Taliban . Uh

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So we directed an operation , wrote up

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an operational plan to go after the

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insurgent network that was hiding out

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in uh in the Guest down valley of

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washer . Major Jonathan O'Gorman was

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tasked with executing the most recent

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phase of the operation where marines

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with charlie Company first Battalion ,

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eighth Marine Regiment cleared several

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villages of insurgents in the Guest on

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Valley in northern Helmand . The

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Taliban are still talking about , you

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know , the things we did up there and

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demanding that some of their uh

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commanders who now they see is

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incompetent , get fired because they

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either fled the battle or didn't give

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them a good enough advice . And the

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amount of insurgents that were killed

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was a huge morale below to the

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insurgents that were left behind . So I

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would say it was a pretty big success .

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The execution of an operation is no

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easy feat . Major O Gorman had to

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manage more than 1000 people in

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multiple units and different sections

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to ensure the success of the mission we

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did from each section of the regiment

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between , you know , um , admin intel

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operations , logistics and

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communications . We pulled lieutenant

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out of there with me and overall charge

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of it and had to get up there a couple

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days early and kind of train to figure

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out how to be a battalion like

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configuration . Although most of

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Marines were pulled from within our CT

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six due to the size of the unit . They

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really interacted with each other .

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They don't communicate with one another

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on a daily basis and whatever

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interactions they do have doesn't

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involve fighting companies in the

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attacks are once the marines started

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working together in the combat

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operations center , they immediately

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went to work practicing efficient unit

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to unit communication in order to

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better control the mission . We got

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them up there and we had basic kind of

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drill guys through the whole concept of

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taking an intelligence report

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announcing the coc what that would mean

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operationally or fires wise and you

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know , what action is that particular ,

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be it ? Lieutenant or uh no .

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Communications guy was responsible for

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doing to be able to have information

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flow inside the kosi and then um

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you know , continue the media attack

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with all the planning that goes into

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operations . The marines and sailors

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under the command of RCT six can

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operate with the knowledge that they

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are in good hands . Corporal ed , gallo

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Forward operating base Delaram to

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Afghanistan . Yeah